VIETNAM EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400510024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 25, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

A846
FOIAb3b
FEB ? 5 1965
Sanitized - AppfW6&?IgR1lRfsra~Gh
Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, February 25, 1965
Mr. LIPSCOMB, Mr. ' Speaker, the
widely respected military editor of the
New York Times, Mr. Hanson W. Bald-
win, has written an excellent, commen-
tary on the situation in Vietnam.
The article appeared in the Feb-
ruary 21, 1965, New York Times mag-
azine entitled, "We Must Choose-(1)
'Bug Out,' (2) Negotiate, (3) Fight;' in
which he analyzes with clarity and deep
understanding the purposes and effect of
our actions in Vietnam.
that we must use what it takes to win,
he says that, "Our policy should not be
'unconditional surrender' or unlimited
victory. Our goal of victory should be
the defeat of Communist attempts to con-
quer South Vietnam and extend their
control deep into southeast Asia."
Vietnam problem will be of interest to the
Congress and under leave to extend my
remarks submit it for. inclusion in the
RECORD: .
WE MUST CHOOSE-(1) "Svc OUT."
(2) NEGOTIATE, (3) FIGHT
(By Hanson W. Baldwin)
What should we do-"bug out" or fight?
Should we be "hawks" or "doves"? Or Is
there a third choice-negotiations now?
Recent events in Vietnam indicate that
"the war that is not a war" has reached a
-crossroads. Washington's policy of the past
4 years, based on the polite fiction that we
were not fighting a war but merely helping
the Vietnamese to defeat the Vietcong in-
surgents within their own territory, has
reached a point of no return.
Compromise and consensus-perhaps ap.
plicable to some of the Nation's great domes-
tic problems-cannot be guideposts to for-
eign policy. There must be a clear cut and
courageous decision. And though in Viet-
nam we face the hard problem of risking
much to gain little, the risk must be taken:
we must fight a war to prevent an irreparable
defeat. We must use what it takes to win.
Our policy should not be "unconditional
surrender" or unlimited victory. Our goal
of victory should be the defeat of Commu-
mist attempts to conquer South Vietnam and
extend their control deep into southeast Asia.
The reasons we must fight for Vietnam
have little to do with making Saigon safe
for "democracy" or "freedom." There has
been far too much cant on this point, far
too much effort devoted to trying to establish,
a politically legitimate South Vietnamese-
Government after our own image. Nor does
it do much good to argue the past, debating
facts are that Communist expansionism in.
.;,Asia has been consistent, related and, pro-
,,
?gressive, that the end of the Korean war,
-without a simultaneous settlement in Viet-
nam, gave Peiping and North Vietnam's Ho
Chi Minh' the opportunity in southeast Asia
they have so well exploited.
Belatedly, but nevertheless clearly, the
United States became aware of the threat.
Our commitments to Saigon began in the
1 Eisenhower administration and were enor-
mously amplified after the Kennedy admin-
istration took power 4 years ago. Today, we
are committed-fully committed-by the
words of Presidents and Cabinet members,
by the actions of the Government, by the
deep involvement of U.S. military forces.
U.S. global prestige and power is In-
timately bound up with the outcome of
the Vietnamese struggle. In Vietnam, we
are attempting to formulate an answer to
the Communist strategy of creeping aggres-
sion, of subversion and Insurgency, of what
Khrushchev called "wars of national libera-
tion." If the might and. will of the United
States cannot evolve a victorious answer to
such tactics, we are undone; the map of the
world will gradually become red. And if we
will not fight in Vietnam, where-after the
series of Communist conquests In the past
20 years-will we fight? Where will we draw
the line?
The psychological and political conse-
quences of a U.S. defeat in Vietnam, a U.S.
withdrawal, or a negotiated peace likely to
lead to a Communist takeover, would be dis-
astrous in much of Asia. It would under-
mine Thailand (already openly threatened
by Peiping), Laos (even now half conquered
by communism), Malaya, the Philippines
(with its growing anti-Americanism), Burma,
India, Japan, and even Taiwan, Okinawa, and
Australia.
For a long time after the politically stale-
mated end of the Korean war, Peiping was
successfully depicting the United States to
the peoples of Asia as a "paper tiger." The
defeat of the French-backed heavily by
American aid-in Indochina enhanced this
image of a windy, weak-willed, feeble Uncle
Sam. That image has since been dispelled
by U.S. actions in and around the Taiwan
Straits, during the Cuban missile crisis and,
recently, by President Johnson's retaliatory
air attacks upon North Vietnamese objec-
tives. But the portrait of flabby indecision
could be easily revived If the United States
loses in Vietnam.
Strategically, South Vietnam is too impor-
tant to be allowed to go by default. North
Vietnam badly needs the rice of the South.
More important, the area is the traditional
rice bowl of the continent, Geographically,
Vietnam is a long appendix pointing toward
the rich archipelago of Indonesia and abut-
ting strategic sea passages. Whoever domi-
nates it will eventually control most of the
Indonesian archipelago.
The strategic importance of the area is
similar to the so-called rimlands, or mari-
time nations, of Western Europe which repre-
sent a powerful bastion against the heart-,
land of Soviet Russia. In Asia, the none.
Communist strategic position via-a-vis Red'
China is based upon mainland positions-
Pakistan, India, southeast Asia, and the is-
land bastions of the Philippines, Taiwan,
Okinawa, and Japan. If the rimlands of
Asia fall to communism, the island positions
will be doomed sooner or later. Ultimately
the Communists will challenge us upon what
is now our unchallenged domain-the
oceans.
In a word, we must remain in southeast
Asia for our own security needs. South
Vietnam is in itself not vital in the sense
that the United States cannot live without it.
But if lost we would be forced to commence
the next chapter of the world conflict In re-
treat, and at a disadvantage.
Despite the admitted importance of South
Vietnam to the U.S. global position, the.cur-
rent '. breed of neolsolationists and the
"Doves" who believe we must out our losses
and get out advance many arguments against
deeper involvement 4nd in favor of with-
drawal.
uary
Most of.the arguments reprn;ent the voeces
of c1'tefeat and despair, caution and fear.
WHY NOT NEGOTIATE NOW?
Any negotiations opened now 'would lead
iro.ni weakness, not strength. If we want to
negotiate-and not to, surrender-we shall
have to raise our ante considerably. And
meaningful negotiations are meaningful
to the Communists only if they are faced
with superior power and a position of
strength.
We must arm to parley. Personally, I
seriously doubt whether talks can guarantee
peace in Vietnam and southeast Aaia, as some
quarters have suggested, by neniralizing the
area, politically and militarily; in short, by
eliminating the struggle for influence be-
tween Communists and non-Communists.
Nevertheless, we need not fear negotiations if
we speak from strength, by really putting up
a fight for Vietnam.
Continuing U.S. air and sea attacks on
North Vietnam would serve notict on Hanoi,
Peiping, and Moscow that the Unst>d States
will no longer tolerate Sanctuary warfare.
They might-hopefully-force Hanoi to the
conference table. Indeed, such a policy
would appear to be the minimum necessary
to open any kind of negotiations. Yet even
such a program will not win the war in the
South,
If the French couldn't win, how can the
United States achieve victory?
The Implication of this argument Is two-
fold: (1) We have donned the colonial mantle
of the French, and (2) our power Is no great-
er than that of Paris. Both suggestions are
absurd.
As some of our diplomats have found to
their discomfort, South Vietnam is distinctly
an independent country-not, as In France's
day, part of a colonial empire. In fact, the
fear of Chinese Communist colonialism is
probably greater in all of Vietnam, and in
North Vietnam in particular, than the fear
of. U.S. imperialism. As for a comparison be-
tween the political, economic, and military
power of the United States and France, there
Is none. Particularly in the air and at sea
we can mobilize power completely unavail-
able to France, backed up by the ultimate
forcQ which France did not possess---a nu-
clear arsenal.
You can't win a war against guerrillas.
Not true. We have dressed up the fight-
ing in Vietnam with a fancy name--coun-
terinsurgency-but some of its bmslo mill-
tary elements resemble the kind of war
Americans have fought successfully many
times in the past in Nicaragua, Haiti, and
behind the main fighting fronts during the
Korean war. Other anti-Communist guerril-
la wars were won in Greece, the Philippines,
and Malaya. The Portuguese seem to have
done a pretty good job of stamping out the
rebellion In Angola. Guerrillas can be de-
feated, but it takes careful organization, spe-
cial training, and security forces that should
be from 10 to 30 times larger than the guer-
rillas. It takes infinite determination and
patience.
"Continued fighting or expanded V.S. In-
volvement will mean higher U.S. casualties
and greater risks of broadening the war."
Of course. You cannot win a war without
spilling blood. We must pay the price of
power. Risks are unavoidable in any foreign
policy worthy of its name. The question is
not whether there will be risks, but the
degree of risk. For against the perils of
action must be weighed the perils of in-
action. Political and military history clear-
ly reveal that compromise, hesitancy, or ap-
peasement merely lead to ultimate disaster.
In Vietnam, the longer we wait, the greater
the price we shall have to pay for even par-
tial victory (as we are now discovering), and
the more restricted'our choice of options.
"We have no moral right to be in Vietnam,
or to attack North Vietnam."
Continued
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CONGRESSIONAL RtiCORD -?? APPENDIX A$4'
Neither do the Vietcong. Nor does North
Vietnam have the right to support the civil
war in the South, Our involvement was
a response to Communist aggression, Since
the beginning, Hanoi has organized, sup-
plied, and directed the Vietcong insurgency.
We were invited by the South Vietnamese
Government to come to its aid. A high
moral purpose Is an essential element of our
foreign policy but we can be left with no
purpose--moral or otherwise-it we are con-
quered by the doctrine that the.ends justify
the means. If we are Inhibited from action
by Hamlet-like indecision over legalistic
concepts of international law, we shall lose
the world.
What's the use of further military In-
volvement, when the political instability of
South Vietnam pulls the, rug from under
our feet?
Here is one of the more cogent objections
to greater involvement. But in the long
history of Vietnam there have always been
French left behind them a people still un-
equipped for self-government. Yet somehow
or other the war has gone on, and some-
what better. in some respects recently.
Greater U.S.' involvement-above all, a
tangible determination to win-may well do
more for Saigon's political stability than
any amount of diplomatic pressures.
Isn't the ' real danger that escalation
might involve us in a larger war? Wouldn't
the Chinese come in?
This is the $64 million question. It is
quite clear that if the United States becomes
more involved we must be prepared for
greater effort by the enemy. Escalation in
some form would be not only possible, but
likely. But we have advantages. We are
fighting, as we did in Korea, on a peninsula
where our superior sea and air power can
be most effective. North Vietnam's few
powerplants and industries are vulnerable
to destruction. The Gulf of Tonkin is
easily blockaded. And China itself, with an
obsolete air force and minimal naval power,
could not defend itself effectively against a
determined air and sea attack.
Nevertheless, an expanded effort by the
United States in Vietnam may well be an-
swered by an increased flow of supplies and
men from North Vietnam, perhaps by an all-
out attack by he North Vietnamese Army,
and perhaps ultimately by aid from China
into South Vietnam. Though the flow could
be hampered and reduced by air attacks it
could not be completely halted. It is quite
We must also remember the riaka of delay.
If there is a danger of nuclear retaliation to-
day by Peiping, how much greater will it be
tomorrow when China will have accumulated
astockpile of weapons? Time Is restricting
our options.
Clearly, then, the stakes in Vietnam are
large enough to warrant the risks of greater
U.S. involvement. Whether or not we raise
our ante, the enemy will. The Communists
are implacably determined to triumph, and
the only factor that can prevent their victory
Is superior power in all its forms, More of
the same on our part will no longer serve any
purpose save slow defeat.
What should we do? First and foremost,
we must recognize as a Government and as a
people that, we are fighting a war in Vietnam,
not merely'advising how to fight one. Such a
recognition would awaken a greater sense of
national and military determination, Inspire
a Presidential and congressional enunciation
of purpose, and create a more streamlined
military operation in Vietnam.
Second, the United States itself must pro-
vide maximum possible security in Vietnam
to major U.S. installations, such as airfields,
supply depots, and headquarters. Secretary
McNamara's statement that it was impossible
to guard against such attacks as those re-
cently made by the Vietcong against U.S. air-
fields and barracks is no answer. Of course,
100 percent security is impossible in any
war; defense against terrorism and sabotage
is especially difficult. But there is no doubt
whatsoever that we can provide better secu-
rity to key installations than the South Viet-
namese, who have been responsible for the
job -in the past.
We need U.S. ground tactical units In
South Vietnam to defend our installations.
We need infantry battalions, military police
companies, Army engineers, and Navy Seabees
to build aircraft revetments, dugouts, and
protected barracks. Yet all this is purely
defensive; it should reduce U.S. casualties
but it will not "win" the war.
Another essential measure is simplifica-
tion and streamlining of both the high mils-
tary command and the "country team" units,
composed of representatives from various
Government agencies, that support our aid
effort in Vietnam. We must get more Amer-
icans and more Vietnamese out of the bistros
of Saigon and Into the bush. The coordina-
tion between the military, the Central In-
telligence Agency, the State Depaiitment, the
U.S. Information Agency, and the Agency for
International Development is far better than
involved in a new kind of Korean war. But` in Saigon or in Washington. The war has
this would not be hopeless by any means, shown, for Instance, that South Vietnamese- .
In fact, some well-informed authorities be- United States teams have been able in many
lieve the United States could win a Korean instances to carry out the military portion
type of war in South Vietnam-Laos against of the "clear-and-hold" prescription for vie-
the best that the Chinese Communists could tory. But AID-not the military-is re-
throw against us. sponsible for police and internal security
"What about the specter of nuclear weap- forces in Vietnam, and these cadres rarely
ons? Wouldn't Russia join in,.even if China have been able to hold an area once it has
didn't have enough A-bombs to do us.any been cleared of the Vietcong. Perhaps mill- 1
There is no certain answer to these ques-
tions, but a full-scale nuclear war Is highly
unlikely. The United States has scared it-
self to death by its own nuclear propaganda.
The fear of a nuclear exchange-never
'probable, or even likely-has been the great-
est single restraint unon a positive and firm
U.S. diplomacy since World War II.
Presidents and public alike have been in-
hibited by the nightmare of the mushroom
cloud. Yet the lessons of the Cuban missile
risis ;should be remembered. Is it in any way
probable that the Kremlin would risk' for
Vietnam what it would not risk for Cuba?
Moscow knows our nuclear power. Would
Russia. Invite its own destruction as a nation
by invoking the use of nuclear weapons in
any cause except the defense of its own soil?
operations. Certainly Internal policing needs
a major overhaul.
A basic change in the prescription for vic-
tory demands a United States-South Viet-
namese unified command such as now exists
in South Korea.
The history of air power dictates the need
for unrelentinlr, massive attacks. Bombing
targets in North Vietnam probably would
have to be broadened to include power-
plants, bridges, industries, road junctions,
docks and oil storage facilities. A naval
blockade and naval gunflte may well sup..
plement the air bombardment. To carry
out effectively any such program as this.
U.S. air and naval forces In the western
Pacific would require material strengthen-
ing.
Meanwhile, it would take years of effort
inside South Vietnam Itself to reduce the
Vietcong to manageable proportions. Much
larger, and better led, South Vietnamese
forces would be necessary, They would have
to be supplemented by U.S. ground troops---
perhaps in small numbers at first, but more
later, particularly. it North Vietnamese reg-
ular forces and Chinese soldiers joined the
Vietcong.
How many U.B. soldiers would be needed
is uncertain-probably a minimum of 3 to
6 divisions (utilized chiefly in battalion or
brigade-size units), possibly as many as 1.0
or 12 divisions. Including Air Force, Navy
and supporting units perhaps 240,000 to 1,
million Americans would be fighting In Viet-
nam.
Obviously, this would mean a Korea-type
,conflict, a major war, no matter what euphe-
misms would be used. Nor could we wage
it in the present "business-as-usual" econ-
omy. We would require partial mobiliza-
tion, vastly beefed-up military production..
Many weaknesses in our military structure
would need strengthening. Even so, we
coud not anticipate quick success. The war
would be long, nasty, and wearing.
No one could relish such a prospect as
this; the stark statistics of war explain the
President's reluctance to embark upon it
path that has no turning.
Vietnam is a nasty place to fight. But
there are no,neat and tidy battlefields In the
struggle for freedom; there Is no "good"
place to die. And It is far better to fight
in Vietnam--on China's doorstep-than fight
some years hence;, in Hawaii, on our own
frpntiers.:, ,i.~
against staging areas, supply routes, train-
ing fields, camps, and recuperation centers
of the Vietcong in North and South Vietnam
and Laos will be necessary for any appre-
ciable diminution in the flow of men and
supplies to the Communists. The one-shot
retaliatory raids have only temporary and
minimum military' importance; viewed as)
political and psychological warnings, they are '!
likely to provoke the Vietcong and- North t
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