INTRODUCTION OF RESOLUTION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400500023-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 15, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

More than 2,400 pact-time teachers tIfin V1 In ?-~ fact has ct it 4t `h ` `.accoo .,.,.acuntedf fav or r of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr.
Lion
were trained for literacy education, and nearly 44 percent of construction costa FsASxnl*
they in turn taught more than 1.000 During the' years Minna the pilot project (Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given
AU G 1 5 1953
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HC)
only about 25 percent of them are liter- education project, more than 1,500 new
ate. Less than a fourth of the children primary classrooms had trained teach-
of school age are in school, and less than ers, 200 new schools were receiving fi-
3 percent ever complete secondary nancial aid, and 20 new primary texts
education. Pupil-teacher ratios of 100 had been published. Nearly 200 second-
to 1 are common, compared to about 25 try teachers had received bachelor of
to 1 In the developed countries. education degrees and 45 high school
To help meet this challenge. the teachers had undergone a 1-year course
United States, through the Agency for for the improvement of English instruc-
international Development has estab- Lion. in addition. Nepal's entire second-
lished cooperative educational programs ail school curriculum had been re-
in b8 nations. In ekch the goal Is the ramped to include vocational instruction
same: To train people who in turn can urgently required in agriculture, home
train teachers, prepare suitable texts economics, commercial education, and
arts.
and teaching aids, and themselves devel- Industrial
op a strong educational program in their A program similar to the?one in Nepal
respective countrie& Assistance is pro- is now being carried out lit India with
vided for all levels of eduction-primary, the assistance of U.8.-AID! education
secondary. and higher education; for all teams from Ohio State University and
age groups and tykes of schools-voca- the Teachers College of Columbia Uni-
tional and technical as well as general veralty. i
education; and far construction and in Cambodia a teacher-training pro-
equipment as well so for technical assist- gram has been under wad for 5 years.
once. e. Prior to 1958 Cambodian students with
In 1989, AID obi g ted $93 million In it sixth-grade education were given a
U.S. funds plus an additional $98 million summer of training an4' then, pressed
in U.S.-owned local currencies to assist into service as elementary school teach-
the developing nations in meeting acute erg. Under the AID contract Cambodia's
educational problens. first teacher preparation center was
In Bolivia, AID projects are being car- established and has already become the
nod out to improl`e commercial educa- largest educational institution in the.
tion. Libya, a program in vocational country. Each year the center trains
training for farniers. tradesmen, and 200 elementary school; teachers. An-
bandicraft artlaanit is in progress. In other similar institution is now being
Iran, U.B. aid helped to establish an en- established with AID assistance to train
tire vocational education system for the secondary school teaches.
Iranian armed fortes. Television represents, a potentially
In Pakistan, ark AID team taught valuable educational mdllurn for the de-
Pakistani rallwaymen--few of whom veloping nations. In tilgoris, for ex-
spoke the some Language or dialect-- ample, AID has provide l an experienced
how to operate diesel locomotives. American educational television execu
With independence approaching in tire as an adviser to the Nigerian staff
Kenya, an AID-sad fated special project of a new educational television station.
has begun to traln'>47 local government From 1960 to 1902 the ~tation has tele-
ofricials for positions of high responsi- oast more than 700 different programs
bility in the government when independ- for a total of 350 hours of instruction to
once is granted. 100 village schools equipped with tele-
A fascinating exapnple of an AID prof- vision sets supplied the Nigerian
cot covering several levels of education Ministry of Education-
is the program in Nepal. Not only teachers, bet also classrooms
Nepal's first teacher-training center are in short supply inmost underdevel- men,:eA;round the world, than educational
was established in 1054 under the dfneo- aped nations. AID his encouraged the a44tance.
l
assrooms
Lion of the University ci Oregon. In building of new schools and c
1950 mobile teaching teams were orga- in.m -any countries by providing -technii-
.~
r ems w Warn' wan+srar w.++..-4 w
+o dents provide the con !;ruction labor
remote provinces.
haftiff 1. .10
A 0011090 of CUUIV11 was UWA&UMNAVU
000 The Guatemala!1 Government
and a start trained to educate - to 2 000
Bx
facing many developing nations is that
of adult literacy. In Turkey a unique
approach to the problem has been insti-
tuted with U.S. aid. Literacy training
has been given to more than 150.000
Turkish soldiers and an additional
120,000 are expected to complete train-
ing each year.
In addition, more than 3.000 primary
school teachers have gained literacy
teaching experience at the military can-
tors. This group will form the teaching
nucleus of a planned civilian literacy
program. The goal is to reduce illiter-
acy in Turkey from 70 to 30 percent by
1975.
in the Turkish project, as in most lit-
eracy Projects. U.B. experts help local
educators prepare training material",
texts. and followup reading materials for
use by the newly literate.
As of 1902. the Agency for Intern.
tional Development had undertaken
projects to increase the supply and im-
ondar the ssch~ ~teachers miin 33 Latin
American. African, and Asian nations.
In Afghanletafi, U.B. aid is the only bi-
lateral assistance permitted by the Gov-
ernment in the sensitive area of educa-
tion.
Because English has become the near.
eat thing to art international language in
many underdeveloped nations. AID has
been providing technical assistance for
the teaching Of English In 14 Asian and
African countries.
. FinaRy, 75 American universities and
colleges are working under AID contracts
in the establishment and improvement
of facilities fog; higher education in more
than 26 Asian. African, and South Amer-
ican oountrles.4
Of the man + needs of the developing'
countries none is more critical than the
need for education. in the broadest sense
of the word. And of the many parts of
our foreign aid program none is more in
keeping with American ideals, and _ the
INTRODUCTION OF RE OLUTION
FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOR-
E'.LGN INFORMATION AND INTEL-
teachers a year. Aureau of textbook launched a self-help aohool construction LICENCE
publication was established and several program in partnership with AID In 1960. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pay -
of staff vaembers were sent AID and the Guatemalan Government order to the United States for special training. agreed to share aqua iy any meta not the ).gentle r an previous from New the ? use.
absorb
The bureau printed 55 different titles the bebegi gnni bng the of the local project, n Comit was ex- At Lensed is recognized for 60 minutes.
the
sew 10 minutes of which have already been
and 225.000 pieces of educational liter's- .._?,,,,, th,,. ....,....?e..- ,..s..... ....,,.tw ..
the Nepalese people could read and write derway in Chile, Liberia, as Salvador, sources. I propose also that it e
At the and of. the IIrst ? years at the Batty. and Honduras. continuing studies in the whole area of
y
u
r
s
o
ng
200 was in school. and only 2 percent of like the one in Ciuateasatla are now un- that it have its own funds and staff re-
Before the AID program began, Nepal Ises the impact of such AID assisted prof- i propose tinar, woo comuuzsee K vuu-
had no national university, no teacher- eats on the lives of the people. stltuted roughly along the lines of the
I child in Self-help school construction programs Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and
ns Onl
in! in
tit
ti
t
and sciences, agriculture and forestry, pleted. The enthusiastic turnout of oil- establishment of a Joint Committee on
adults to read and write in their first began. self-help schools have been built permission to revise and extend his year in the field, and are now operating in every province marks.)
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"MN-GRESSION.AL RECORD -
our foreign information and Intelligence
Programs.
In my remarks this afternoon, how-
ever, Mr. 13peaher, I do not intend to
dwell at great length on the precise terms
of this particular resolution. I think it
is a good resolution but I am perfectly
ready to be persuaded that a better one
might be devised. The question of the
exact structure and composition of this
committee seems to me significantly less
important than the more general ques-
tions of principle involved. I rise today,
not to make propaganda on behalf of a
particular proposal of mine. but rather
to raise a matter which I think is In need
of the widest possible and most intelli-
grnt public discussion.
As most Members are aware, the pro-
por,al of a Joint Committee on Foreign
Intelligence is not a new one. In one
form or another It has been introduced
into this House In each of the last 10
thority In these areas? Of course it does
not. Congress has always asserted Its
right to concern Itself with even the most
sensitive areas of Government. And,
where matters of the highest secrecy
have been involved. Members of both
Houses have shown themselves perfectly
capable of exercising the utmost re-
straint. This was never more clearly
demonstrated than by the experience of
the Manhattan project during World
War 11, when members of the two appro-
priatione committees were kept fully ap-
prised of the progress of the project
without on any occasion breaking secu-
rity. And I am sure all Members of the
House will agree that the record of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in
this connection has been impeccable.
As In the case of the Atomic Energy
Committee, I take it for granted of
course that much of the work of the new
committee-perhaps almost all of It--
mittee on National Security Staffing and
Operations.
It we are going to retrain from looking
into the affairs of executive agencies,
even agencies which report directly to
the President, than I fear we are going to
have to disband a large number of our
committees, or at least to curtail severely
their activities. Of course we in the
legislature cannot and should not inter-
vene in areas beyond our competence.
But in my view we have not only a right
but a duty to maintain a general surveil-
lance over agencies like the Central In-
telligence Agency, which are established
by statute and sustained by funds voted
by the Members of these two Houses, .
These artumenta-concerning secrecy
and the exclusively executive nature of
the intelligence community-are at least
consistent. But strangely enough those
who oppose resolutions similar to this
have often attempted to maintain, not
that for these reasons Congress should
abstain entirely from overseeing the in-
telligence community, but that on the
sessions; in 1955 it was the subject of a would be conducted in private and that
2-day hearing by the Rules Committee. the results would be made public only
In the Senate the Committee on Rules after a close screening by the appropriate
and Administration reported on it favor-
ably in 1956, and for 2 days It Was de-
bated on the floor of that body. Nor Is
it partisan in nature. Back In 1959 res-
oluttons similar to mine were sponsored
in the House by eight Democrats . and
four Republicans. Earlier this year the
matter was brought to our attention by
a member of the other party, the die-
tinguished gentleman from Florida iMr.
Roosas). Moreover, when Mr. MANa-
rrxto's resolution came to a vote in the
Senate In 1956, the minority In favor
included many Members on both sides
of the aisle. On that occasion one of
those who voted in favor was the then
junior Senator from Massachusetts, now
the President of the United States.
If the Proposal for a Joint Committee
on Foreign Intelligence hab come up so
often and been supported by so many
Members, why has It never been
adopted? Frankly I do not And that
question easy to answer, particularly
since some of the arguments against It
sec. m to me so feeble. Take, to begin
with, the argument about secrecy. It Is
an argument that has been advanced
Government agencies. Nevertheless, I contrary congressional oversight is al.
admit that particular concern might still ready more than adequate. Senator
be felt about CIA, since breaches of RUSSSLL made this claim In the debate
security involving CIA might endanger ready "quotc4 end It was reiterated by
the lives of American operatives In other . Allen Dulles,,.the former-Director of
countries, and also. the lives of agents of antral Intelligence, in his recent artielt
other nations working in cooperation Harperts..magaxine.-. What. is In fact
with us, I think this is a legitimate con- the extent, a f.coneresslorm'i"sgrVelllanca
tern, but I hope to show later .in my the moment?
speech that there are many important fn both ? the House and" Senate the
aspects of intelligence work which could bodies responsible for overseeing-the in-
usefully. be studied without any need to telligence community are small subcom- -
inquire In detail into the activities of mittees of the Appropriations and Armed
particular persona and units In the field. Services Committees. Neither-the House
So much for the moment for secrecy. Foreign Affairs Committee nor the Ben-
find myself in even less sympathy with atcr?F"ol`efeA-Relations Committee ?has
other argument that has also been ad- jurisdiction- In -this- area, despite. their
anted frequently In discussions of this obvious interest in intelligence matters;
uestion---namely, that the intelligence Ibis might not matter were It not for the
ommunity exists solely to serve the fact that the surveillance exercised by
esident and the National Security the four existing subcommittees Is almost
ncil. and that therefore we in the certainly both cursory and sporadic. For
Congress have no. right to seek a juris- example, last year during a debate In the
dictional position. This doctrine was Senate the distinguished senior Senator
stated in an extreme form In 1954 by from Massachusetts, my friend, Mr.
Mr. Harass in the Senate. He said at SuTOpm.AU? was asked how much time
that time: the Armed Services Subcommittee de-
The Central Intelligence Agency is an arms voted to the CIA affairs. Mr. fusel-
cussed. During the Senate debate In feel we have no right to attempt to regulate I say
A f ad -161 to on the coos of the Senate that W40
es
h h l
I
Pr
n
a
that Congress late have nptenecuve au- Very area I am diaoueaiua, the 8uboom- .genes w---
em. ev
u
work; without it they could not function, the Foreign Affalrs Committee which in- devote t
and the security of our country would quires constantly Into the policies and mittees do have more time for intelli-
be jeopardized. No one denies that. But actions of the President and his agents, Bence, nevertheless the disadvantages
what is true of the intelligence comma- and the Government Operations Com- of having responsibility for the intelli-
nity Is also true in many other areas of. mittee which closely scrutinizes the en- Bence community divided up among four
government: In the fields of atomic en- tire organization of the executive different subcommittees would. I think.
ergs. weapons development, and foreign branch. The Senate has a subcommittee be obvious to everyone. I maintain that
Policy. for example. But does this mean whose area of operations borders on the congressional surveillance of the intelli-
- is not now adequate.
usiit
a
c
1
ti
A 1954 the chairman of the Senate as agency w
amend several l hours and go into many details
AArmed Services Committee. Mr. Rca- vide the President, who, under the Conti- at opera of r, end go of ominlstratton,
1 sxr.L. went so far as to say that, rather tution, Is responsible for our foreign rein- of ate
ithan have a committee set up and in- bone, with information to enable him to i and so . -
ormation made available to Members of make deeaa-ooa. I ask Members to note the phrase
iCongrees. "it would be better to abolish I, for one.. cannot accept that doctrine. "several hours"-riot weeks or even days,
the Central Intelligence Agency and, by As every Member knows, these two but hours. The members of one of the
doing so, to save the money appropriated branches of our Government, the execu- most important committees in the other
and the lives of American citizens." A tive and the legislative, are not water- House devote only hours to the affairs
former Vice President, Mr. Barkley. took tight compartments separated by steel of one of the most important agencies of
the same view in the same debate. bulkheads: the material between them Is our Government. The reasons for this
Now no one denies that CIA and other . flexible and porous. There are any sum- are .surely clear. The members of the
'intelligence agencies must conduct a very bar of congressional committees which four subcommittees lack any staff ape-
high proportion of their operations in keep a watch over the executive agencies. cialized in these matters: they them-
secret. Secrecy is of the essence of their In this House we have, to name only two, selves can have little time or thought to
t en if these subco n-
B
h
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE 14267
and cannot be adequate as long as It
Continues to be organized as it is at
present.
A moment ago I referred to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency as one of the
most important agencies of our Govern-
tnent. What is true of CIA is, of course,
even truer of the intelligence commu-
nity as a whole. Yet from time to time
those who maintain that intelligence op-
crations fall exclusively within the exocu-
ttve sphere-those. In other words, who
are opposed to the establishment of a
joint congreswional committee--try to
pk r uade us, despite all we have heard
and seen during the past few years, that
nevertheless CIA is a purely advisory
body, that that It Is not directly con-
cerned with the making of national pol-
icy. Mr. Allen-Dullea.hlmself..remarked
several years ago:
CIA is not a policymaking Agency: we
furnish Intelligence to assist in the formula-
tion of policy.
Senator. BnsaQ.L .during a debate In
the other body. was even more blunt:
Some Senators who addressed themselves
to the resolution on Monday last, seemed to
bold the opinion that the CIA Was a polloy-
niaking agency. That theme ran all through
the remar'ke which were made In advocacy
of the adoption of the resolution.
art. President, the Central intelligence
Agency is far from being a policymaking
agency. jtsoakss-ao policy.
The distinguished Senator went on to
say that CIA was merely a coordinating
and information-gathering body whose
function was simply to present Its find-
ings to the actual policymaking body, the
National Security Council.
Senator RUMSLL said all this in 1956.
In my view It was scarcely plausible even
then. Now In 1963, after our experi-
ences in Cuba, Laos and elsewhere, to
say that CIA is In no sense a policymak-
ing body Is to say something that is pal-
pably untrue. The National Security
Act, under which CIA operates, does not,
of course, formally assign it policymak-
tag functions. But CIA Is a pollcymak-
lrtg body, and we all know It. The rea-
sons have been well put by Prof. Harry
Rowe Ransom, our leading lay student
of intelligence affairs. In his study
"Central Intelligence and National Se-
curity," published as early as 1958, he
has this to say:
C-ertainly the CIA has no policymaking
reeponsiblllty. Yet policy making Is not a
simple static action. Rather it is a dynamlo
process. A key element In this process is the
information available to pollcymakers. The
man. or group, controlling the Information
available to pollcymakers does in tact play
a major it Indirect role in policymaking.
A few pages
adds:
later Professor Ransom
It would be unrealistic to suggest that the
bright young man of CIA, by training, talent,
and personality, do not hold strong views on
controversial Issues of national security
policy. If it is granted that knowledge is
indeed power. It will be recognised that In
reality the CIA, through an Increasing ef-
flelency-and consequently rising credit with
responsible decision makers--has some to
play a major rote in creating national secu-
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Surely those statements can no longer Agency has scored a number of quite
be regarded as anything but the simple spectacular successes--the U-2 over-
truth. In fact even Senator RusssLL flights, for example. and the overthrow
appears to have come round. Last year, of the Mossadegh regime in Iran. On
during the hearings on the confirmation balance it Is almost certainly true to say
of Mr. John McCone to be Director of that the intelligence community has
Central Intelligence, Senator RusagLL served the Nation well. But the fact
remarked: does remain that on occasion the com-
In this period through which we are pass- munity has blundered seriously, and that
ing, this once is perhaps second only to the for its blunder the citizens of the United
Presidency In its importance. States have paid a heavy price.
A few moments later he repeated the
point. I am inclined to agree with Sen-
ator RussatL. And I submit to you that
one does not describe a man as holding
an ounce "second only to the Presidency
in Its importance" if the agency of which
he is the head Is not itself a policymak-
ing agency of the very first order of
importance.
Up to this point, Mr. Speaker, I have
been mainly concerned to clear the
ground, as it were-to state as clearly
as I could my objections to the argu-
ments most commonly used by opponents
of the proposal I am supporting. Only
by implication have I suggested positive
reasons why I think a Joint Committee
on Foreign Information and Intelligence
should be established. I want now to ad-
dress myself to the central questions:
why do I think such a Joint committee
is necessary? and, equally Important,
what work do I think it might usefully
undertake?
But first I have to make one further
point. The Central Intelligence Agency,
and indeed the entire intelligence com-
munity. is highly-and necessarily-
se-cretive in its mode of operations. For
this reason outsiders like myself have no
alternative but to rely for their informa-
tion on newspaper reports. on the oc-
casional published hearings on House
and Senate colrunittecs, on the work of
scholars like Professor Ransom, and on
a miscellaneous variety of other sources.
In the very nature of things our coin-
ments and criticisms cannot be authorl-
tative. We are working in the dark, or
at least in the semitwilight. Neverthe-
less, I think we do know enough to have
reasonable grounds for supposing that
an is not well within the intelligence
community. Even more important, I
think we know enough to be certain that
we need to know more--and by "we,"
of course, I mean not necessarily the
general public nor even every Member
of Congress, but those Members who
would serve on the kind of committee I
have in mind.
Why, then, do I think such a com-
mittee should be established?
I have two general reasons. The first
concerns the extraordinary number of
specific criticisms that have been leveled
over the years against the Central In-
telligence Agency and, by implication,
against the intelligence community as
a whole. Admittedly. as Mr. Allen
Dulles recently pointed out,
along weil,Thos. that go badly generally community is doing and of the way In
speak for themselves. which it is going about doing it. The
And I would not want for a moment American people have at stake not
to decay that the Central Intelligence merely their liberties but their lives.
Let me refer to Just a few Instances.
Back in 1960, as Mr. Dulles himself has
tacitly admitted, the Intelligence com-
munity failed to anticipate the Chinese
Communist Intervention In Korea, We
are still living with the consequences of
that particular failure. A few years
later an incident Involving the CIA
caused us serious embarrassment in the
Middle East and may have contributed
Indirectly to the Suez affair. In July
1956 President Nasser of Egypt claimed
In a speech at Alexandria that he had
been strongly advised by a U.S. Govern-
ment official to ignore an important mes-
sage that he was about to receive from
the State Department. It was subse-
quently confirmed that the official in
question had been the regional repre-
sentative of CIA.
More recently, of course, we had the
fiasco of the Bay of Pigs. Chief respon-
sibility for that lamentable affair must
rest with the President of the United
States. However, there can be no ques-
tion but that the Central Intelligence
Agency was deeply Involved in the whole
affair, and that its actions and advice
had a decisive effect on the eventual
outcome. Surely most Members of the
House will agree that It would be in the
national Interest to know whether such
incidents were merely particular aber-
rations or whether. in fact, they form a
pattern that is likely to be repeated in
the future.
My second general reason for pressing
for the establishment of this committee
I can state quite briefly. It is this. I
abhor government by secrecy. I regard
It as inimical to the effective function-
Ing of our Institutions. I regard it as
alien to our American way of life. Above
all, I regard It as a threat to our funda-
mental liberties. I fully realize, of
course, it should be clear from what I
have said already that a high degree of
secrecy Is essential to the workings of
the Intelligence community.
But I fear that with respect to the
intelligence community we are often the
victims of secrecy for secrecy's sake.
Things are done to us and In our name
which we know nothing of. I do not
wish to see the legitimate secrets of the
intelligence community reported in the
press and on the air. Of course I do not.
But it does seem to me of enormous im-
portance that a few selected representa-
tives of the people, chosen by the two
Houses of Congress, should be continu-
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ONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE August 15
I1)"rplte all I have ' said so far, there
would, of course, be little point in estab-
ii..~tiing; this Joint committee unless we
had some fairly clear idea of what we
thought it should do, of what subjects
pie thought It should study. I propose,
therefore, to continue by discussing four
gue;tioms, all of high importance, which
I think might usefully be investigated:
first, the relations between the Central
Int4,1ligence Agency and the State De-
partment, especially overseas: second,
the relations between intelligence-gath-
erirg on the one hand and so-called
special operations on the other; third,
the selection and training of Intelligence
personnel: and fourth, the whole ques-
tion of intelligence evaluation. I pro-
pose to deal briefly with the first three of
the0o questions and to say rather more
about the fourth.
First, the relations between CIA and
the State Department.
The problem here has been posed suc-
cinctly by Henry Howe Ransom in the
book I have already cited. On page 916
he writes:
The operation by the U.S. Government of
a farftung secret apparatus for Intelligence
gathering and political action could have
widespread diplomatic ramifications. There
may be a basic Incompatibility between the
maintenance of accredited diplomatic mis-
slons in some 78 foreign posts (as of 1968)-
The number would be considerably
greater now-
end the existence of American secret agents
in most of these same foreign areas. Great-
eat care must be exercised in keeping VA.
diplomacy separated from spying and back-
stare political maneuvering, at least on the
surface, yet the diplomats probably should
not be completely In the dark as to the
activities of American secret agents.
The possibly disruptive effect of hav-
ing, on the premises of American em-
bassies abroad or in the field, agents
who owe allegiance to someone other
than the ambassador and to an organi-
sation other than the State Department
and who may be engaging in activities
running counter to expressed State De-
partinent policy, scarcely needs spelling
out in detail.
Nor are these dangers merely specu-
lative. It seems, for example, that to-
ward the end of the Chinese civil war
remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Na-
tionalist Army moved into parts of
northern Burma. These troops claimed
to be eager to harass the Communists
across the border, and CIA accordingly
supplied them with large quantities of
money and arms. But according to
available reports the Chinese had long
since tired of fighting. Instead of at-
tacking the Communists, they proceeded
to settle down, to occupy much of the
best agricultural land in northern
Burma, and to cultivate opium-all with
the assistance of U.S. funds.
This would have been a melancholy
epi:>ode in any case. But what made it
worse was the fact that our Ambassador
in Rangoon apparently had not the
faintest idea of what CIA was doing.
When the Burmese Government formally
complained to the United States, the
Ambassador issued a categorical denial;
he said the United States had nothing
Sanitized
to do with the activities of the Nation-
alist Chinese. Our Ambassador of course
believed he was telling the truth. But
what he was saying was in fact not true,
and naturally the Burmese were shocked
by this apparent evidence of American
duplicity. What was the upshot of this
episode? The American Ambassador re-
signed, the U.B. Goveriunent was deeply
embarrassed, and the Government of
Burma threatened for a time to break off
diplomatic relations,
Admittedly, this Incident was particu-
larly ludicrous. But It is not without
parallel. Our policy In the early stages
of the Laotian crisis appears to have
been constantly bedeviled by a lack of
effective coordination between the CIA
and the State Department. Similarly
with Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs In-
vasion. Mr. Tad Szulc and Mr. Karl
Meyer, In their able account of than
affair, describe how, on its own initiative,
CIA established close working relations
with exiled supporters of the former dic-
tator Batista. They add:
This decision marked the inauguration of
what, in effect, became its independent for-
eign policy toward Cuba, In cavalier disre-
gard of the thinking In the White House
and the State Department.
Note that all this occurred despite the
efforts of an earlier Secretary of State,
Mr. Christian Herter, to regularize rela-
tions between the State Department and
CIA. Since then the Herter-Allen Dulles
agreement on the relations between Am-
bassadors and CIA personnel in the field
has been reaffirmed by Mr. Rusk and Mr.
McCone. And by now we have reason
to hope that the responsible foreign
policymakers-the President and the
National Security Council-have reas-
serted their authority over the Central
Intelligence Agency. I agree that to a
considerable extent this is a problem of
particular persons and particular situa-
tions. But it Is also the case that, as
long as both State Department and CIA
personnel are working in the field, as
long as both agencies are responsible for
the collection of information, and-per-
haps most Important-as long as CIA
continues to be responsible for special
operations, the problem of integrating
the Central Intelligence Agency into our
general foreign policy apparatus will re-
main difficult and will remain worthy of
close and continuous examination. The
exercise of surveillance In this field I
conceive to be one possible function of
a Joint Congressional Committee on For-
eign Information and Intelligence.
A moment ago I alluded to the con-
duct by the CIA of so-called special op-
erations; that is, the fomenting of oppo-
sition against hostile governments, the
arming of insurgents, the provocation of
enemy action, and so on. The question
of housing these special operations-or
additional services or other functions or
whatever you want to call them-under
the same roof as the CIA's purely Intel=
Ilgence-gathering operations has, of
course, long been a matter of controversy,
and it Is this question that I suggest
might usefully be the second of the new
Joint committee's areas of study.
I do not suppose we need to be re-
minded of the importance of this cues.
Lion. The Bay of Pigs invasion was only
the most spectacular and best publicized
of CIA's special operations. There was
the Iranian affair In 1953, and the fol-
lowing year the overthrow of the Arbenz
regime in Guatemala. CIA also appears
to have had a hand in the main risings
in Eastern Europe, in East Berlin and
Hungary. Operations of this sort, unless
carefully supervised and controlled by
responsible political officers, could un-
wittingly involve the United States in a
major international crisis, possibly in
war. If this was not clear before the
Bay of Pigs, It ought to be clear now.
The Institutional danger here is read-
ily apparent and has often been stated:
As Professor Ransom puts it:
To mix the two functions-
That Is, of Information gathering and
special operations?
Involves the danger that foreign agents col-
lecting facts and trying at the same time
to bolster or cause the overthrow of a foreign
government In America'. apparent interest
may develop a less than objective sense for
distinguishing between fact and aspiration,
Messrs. Szulc and Meyer make the
same point apropos of Cuba:
The CIA men were not only shaping. In
effect, foreign policy, but were exempt from
any meaningful outside checks on their se-
tivities. Indeed. they were In the enviable
position of both organiring a clandestine op.;
oration and preparing the intelligence data
through which the validity of the venture
could be judged.
The obvious solution to this problem
would, of course, be to deprive CIA en-
tirely of Its special operations function.
Unfortunately the people in the most fa-
vorable position to collect clandestine
Information are often also the people
best placed to engage in subversive polit-
ical activities. In addition, a total di-
vorce between the two functions might
lead, in Ransom's words, to "competi-
tion, duplication, and even outright con.-
filet."
For a time the Maxwell Taylor Com-
mittee, appointed by the President to in-
quire into the Bay of Pigs affair, ap-
pears to have toyed, at least, with an
alternative idea-the Idea of transfer-
ring the bulk of CIA's special operations
to the Defense Department. But this
solution would have had the equally ob-,
vious disadvantage of ensuring that the
uniformed military-and hence the
credit and prestige of the U.B. Govern=
menu-would become involved as soon as
any paramilitary operation became a
matter of public knowledge.
In the event, it seems that routine
covert operations have been left in the
hands of CIA, with control to be trans-
ferred to the Pentagon only If a particu-
lar project becomes so big as to warrant
open military participation. Mr. Hanson
Baldwin In the New York Times summed
up the matter thus:
The general rule of thumb for the future
Is that the CIA will not handle any psi-
martly military operations, or ones of such
size that they cannot be kept secret. How-
ever, each case will apparently be judged
on its merits; there Is no hard-and-fast
formula that Will put one operation under
the CIA and another under the Pentagon"'
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All of us, I think, will agree that this
is an area In which hard-and-fast for-
mulas are not appropriate and In which.
In the nature of things, organisational
gimmicks cannot solve the major dUll-
cuitles. As in the case of relations be-
tween CIA and the State Department,
much depends on particular people and
particular situations. But largely be-
easusc the problem is of this sort, because
it is a problem which can never finally
be solved. I feel very strongly that con-
ti ruing congressional surveillance is
urgently required. If a joint committee
had been in existence in the early stages
of the first Cuban crisis, and if It had
had cognizance of this matter, would the
iaay of Pigs fiasco have occurred? I
think It in at least possible that It would
not.
Discussion of the Bay of Pigs leads me
naturally to the third of the questions I
think a joint committee might investi-
gate: the whole question of recruitment
and personnel within the intelligence
community. For It seems to me perfect-
ly.ciear that one of the things that went
wrong with the abortive Cuban Inva-
sion-not the only thing, but one of the
things--was that much of the CIA per-
sonnel responsible for the operation con-
sisted of the sort of people who could not
distinguish between the reactionary and
the democratic elements In the anti-
Castro camp, between the opponents of
Castro who were acceptable to the Cuban
people and those who, as former sup-
porters of Batista, were anathema to
them.
Let me quote again from Szulc and
Meyer. In their book, "The Cuban In-
vasion," they write:
Thus the CIA established contacts in If1-
ami with pro-Datista organizations and with
exile groups whose entire political philosophy
was dedicated to the return to the pre-Castro
status quo In Cuba. ? ? * Thee factions
were placing themselves not only against Of*-
tro but against history; whether or hot the
f:rA operatives were aware that total regrea-
elon is Impassible, the contacts with the
rightist factions ran counter to official ML
policy, aimed at encouraging social reform
In Latin America."
A few pages later they remark that
the activities of the. CIA agents reflected
a desire to promote anti-Castro groups
which they could manipulate. They con-
tinue:
It also reflected as attitude of hostility to
left-of-onnter exile groups by second-rate
feld operatives. This in turn affected the
top level of the agency and resulted in a lack
of understanding at the top. It is not clear
to what extent the CIA attitude was idoolog-
Ically motivated or was simply a response
b:w.?ed on the agent's view of what was prao-
ticnl or realistic.
This tendency on the part of the CIA
to seek out and support the most anti-
Communist groups in the field, regard-
less of whether or not such groups are
politically viable, has of course been
manifested on a number of other occa-
eiona-In Laos as well as In Cuba, and
apparently in Algeria and the Congo as
well, It is a persistent tendency, and
one that on occasion has had a damag-
ing effect on our policy. I suspect it has
something to do with the kinds of people
the Central Intelligence Agency gets to
Sanitized
is it Rise, for example, to rely to the with the top-level U.S. Intelligence
extent CIA seems to do on the services Board and Its auxiliary bodies.
of retired service oiiicers? One would Probably a few words are in order on
suppose that retired service oiilcers, how these agencies are organized. I
ity, would have an instinctive tendency
to take a rather narrow, strictly "opera-
tional" view of the problems confronting
them. Similarly, is it wise to rely too
heavily on the services of political exiles
and refugees? It seems reasonable, for
example, to suppose that an exile from
Ruritania, especially someone who has
passionate convictions about what course
events In his homeland ought to take,
may not be the best person to assess
what course events In his homeland actu-
ally are taking, especially if what is actu-
ally happening is not to his taste.
Please do not misunderstand me. I
do not mean to impugn the enormous
amount of valuable work being done by
retired service officers and by exiles and
refugees in the CIA. Without their help,
the organization simply could not func-
tion. Altogether the Central Intelli-
gence Agency undoubtedly commands
some of the ablest minds in the US. Gov-
ernment. And of course I do not mean
for a moment to suggest that CIA should
be staffed with "soft-liners" or people
who have had no personal experience of
the countries in question. That would be
absurd.
But what I do think is that we have
to be sure that what we are getting are
actually the facts, and not what we
would like to be the facts. This is not a
matter of personal preference one way
or the other. It is a matter of Andil]g
out what is actually taking place.-and
personal preferences enter only as they
may color one's judgment. I suspect
that the judgment of the CIA is some-
times colored by the preference of its
employees. I suspect that CIA ought to
take special care to recruit and employ
men and women of widely differing back-
grounds, temperaments, and opinions. I
suspect that in these kinds of situations
one gets at the truth only when a wide
variety of Inclinations is brought to bear.
But remember that these are my feelings
only. I have little data at my command.
All I am saying Is that I have a hunch
that CIA recruitment policy has had an
effect on CIA's performance. I may be
wrong, but I submit that the only way
we in Congress can find out is by our-
selves conducting an inquiry Into the
subject.
The whole question of personnel and
recruitment is, then, the third of the
areas I would like to see a joint com-
mittee study. I would only add that of
course no investigation need Inquire into
the names and histories of particular
individuals Involved; there need be no
breaches of security or secrecy. The
matter we are concerned with is one of
general policy.
Finally, I want to turn to what is
perhaps the most difficult of the four
questions I referred to earlier: the ques-
tion of how best to organize the evalu-
ation of the enormous amount of ma-
terial, collected every day by the various
agencies of the Intelligence community.
Obviously evaluation of some sort, takes
place at every echelon within the com-
munity, but I am particularly concerned
accurate, though the Central Intelligence
Agency refused to provide me with au-
thoritative Information so I have had to
rely on data from published sources.
By the phrase "Intelligence com-
munity" I mean the numerous agencies
within the executive branch concerned
with intelligence collection and evalua-
tion: the CIA, the new Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the State Department,
RAND, and so on. The community as a
whole Is responsible for producing the
national estimates--described by Profca-
sor Ransom as "these vital building
blocks of national security policy." With
the exception of the ultrnsecret net esti-
mates which are produced by special ma-
chinery within the National Security
Council, most estimates are prepared un-
der the aegis of the so-called Board of
National Estimates.
This Board consists of a small number
of intelligence experts--soldiers, diplo-
mats, and scholars-who, to quote Ran-
som again, "preside as a kind of planning
general staff for the intelligence com-
munity." The Board can Initiate the
preparation of an estimate. though It
usually does so only on request from the
President, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, or some other member of the Na-
tional Security Council. In all cum, the
Board of National Estimates sets the
terms of reference, breaks the problem
up into feasible components, and assigns
appropriate tasks to the various agencies.
The resulting staff studies are collated by
the small Office of National Estimates.
The Board then drafts either a straight
estimate-that Is, one which attempts to
assess a foreign nation's Intentions or fu-
ture policies with implicit a; sumptions as
to future U.S. policy-or a general esti-
mate-that Is, one involving stated as-
sumptions concerning passible changes In
U.S. policy. After the draft estimate has
been returned to the participating agen-
cies for their comments and criticisms, it
Is submitted, possibly with dissents, to a
committee which used to be known as the
Intelligence Advisory Committee but Is
now named the U.S. Intelligence Board.
If the Board of Estimates Is the plan-
ning board for the intelligence com-
mutiity, the Intelligence Board is Its
board of directors. As hansom puts it, it
Is the "final forum for the professional
Intelligence community.". It resolves
jurisdictional disputes within the com-
munity and is finally responsible for for-
warding the national estimates to the
National Security Council. Invariably
the attempt Is made to produce agreed
estimates, and usually the attempt is suc-
cessful; but on occasion dissenting opin-
ions will be submitted. The Intelligence
Board meets usually once a week. It
consists of the leading intelligence om-
cials of the community and is chaired by
the Director of Central Intelligence.
Two aspects of this process in particu-
lar are worth noting. The first is the
central role of the Central Intelligence
Agency. A high proportion of the Intel-
ligenoe community's- fact gathering is
done _ by CIA. The Board of National
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 14270
Sanitized - AF fSq,3?ALe*Wb 4-Rpg1 O149R0004005599 -i,
F,~tlannte5 functions as a part of CIA.
'1'lle chairman of the U.8. Intelligence
Board is Director of CIA. And, of course,
the intelligence community's spokesman
on the National Security Council itself
is also the CIA Director. The second
thing worth noting, however, Is the
duality of CIA's role. Under the Na-
tional Security Act the agency Is not
only one of the participants in the In-
telligence community, it is also the chief
metre? cy responsible for coordinating It.
In other words, at many points In the
process of evaluation, CIA Is both player
and umpire, both witness and judge.
This ambiguity is implicit in the title
of the Director who Is formally not the
"Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency" but simply "Director of Central
Intelligence."
Now the danger here is clear. It is
that the Central Intelligence Agency will
become-perhaps it has already be-
come-not merely the chief intelligence
agency but the dominant intelligence
agency, and that It will develop persistent
institutional tendencies, biases, and even
policies. This type of problem is, of
course, not peculiar to the American In-
telligence community but Is character-
istic of any complex administrative ap-
paratus. That Is the reason it has con-
stantly to be guarded against.
Sherman Kent, a Yale professor and
a World War II Intelligence officer, put
the point this way:
Almost any man or group of men con-
fronted with the duty of getting something
planned or getting something done will,
sooner or later hit upon what they consider
a single most desirable course of action.
Usually It is sooner; sometimes, under du.
recs. it is a snap judgment of the top of the
heed. I cannot escape the belief that Under
the circumstances outlined, intelligence will
Cad Itself right in the middle of policy, and
that upon occasions It will be the unabashed
apologist for a given policy rather than lti
impartial and objective analyst.
Srulc and Meyer, writing of the Bay
of Pigs, conclude:
Yet CIA was not behaving Idiotically; it
was in many senses responding to the insu-
lated rationalism that infects a sheltered
bureaucracy. Indeed, if there is an institu-
tionrd villain, it Is bureaucracy itself-that
hulking, stubborn giant that seemingly can
only took where it has been and not whither
It to tending.
Professor Ransom calls it simply the
problem of "feedback."
Naturally In the early months of 1961
the administration addressed itself to
this problem, After the Bay of Pigs it
could scarcely do otherwise. In particu-
lar It reactivated a watchdog group set
up by President Eisenhower In 1986,
originally called the President's Board of
Commultants on Foreign Intelligence Ac-
tivities and now named the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
This Board, under the chairmanship of
Dr. James R. Killian, Jr? of the Massa-
cuhetts Institute of Technology, studied
the question of evaluation and appar-
ently forwarded one or more reports to
the President in the course of the year:
These reports have not been made pub-
lic, but I think It is possible to piece to-
gether from newspaper reports roughly
what happened, It seems that the Eli-
Ilan committee, or at least some of its
members, were unhappy about the dual
role being played by CIA. They proposed
that In future the Director of CIA should
be more of a technician, and that a new
post should be created, probably at-
tached to the White Houses, with some
such title as "Coordinator of Intel-
ligence," the new coordinator would be
in a position to analyse and assess the
results achieved by the intelligence com-
munity without having any bias in favor
of CIA. Reports to this effect appeared
frequently in the press In June and July
1961. In August Mr. Cabell Phillips of
the New York Times stated that the new
post had actually been offered to Mr.
Powler Hamilton.
Either these reports were inaccurate.
of the administration changed its mind,
or they could not find anyone to occupy
the new post, because in September 1961
the President announced that Mr. John
A. McCone had been -named Director of
Central Intelligence without any major
change being made In the structure of
the intelligence community. Subse-
quently, however, in January 1962 one
such change was announced. Hence-
forth the Director of Central Intelligence
was not to function both as Chairman of
the U.B. Intelligence Board and also as
CIA member of the Board. Instead, al-
though the Director was to remain Chair-
man of the Board, his deputy was to act
as representative of the CIA. In a letter
to Mr. McCone, the President noted this
change with approval. He added:
As head of the Central Intelligence Agency,
while you will continue to have overall re-
sponsibility for the Agency. I shall expect
you to delegate to your principal deputy,
as you may deem necessary, so much of the
direction of the detailed operation of the
Agency as you may be required to permit you
to carry out your primary task as Director
of Central Intelligence.
Clearly there was a. dilemma here, On
the one hand, it was evident that CIA's
intelligence gathering and operational
functions could conflict with Its coordi-
nating function-and, of course, what
was true of the Agency was also true of
Its Director. On the other hand,, the
President and his advisers were almost
certainly aware that an Independent co-
ordinator, who was not himself the head
of a major agency, might find himself
weak, even powerless, in the face of the
vast intelligence bureaucracies. Inde-
pendence In theory might mean im-
potence in practice. So a compromise
was struck, and the duties of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence merely
redefined.
How successful this compromise has
been it Is probably too early to say. But
from all that I have said, it ought to be
obvious that the problem of evaluation,
like the other problems I have already
mentioned, is a continuing one, and not
one that can be spirited out of existence
by merely institutional gimmickry. It
is also obvious that the problem of eValu-
ation Is an enormously important prob-
lem, probably the most important con-
fronting the intelligence community.
For these reasons, I think that it, too,
should be a continuing subject of scru-
tiny by a well-qualified and well-staffed
committee of Congress,
Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to detain
the House further. I have spoken at
considerable length, yet I am only too
well aware that I have only skimmed the
surface of this extraordinarily compli-
cated and difficult subject. There are
any number of further questions that I
might have posed-for example, concern-
ing the apparently increasing concentra-
tion of authority within the intelligence
community, or about the role of the
U,S. Information Agency. And, of
course, I must repeat that this has
been essentially an outsider's analysis.,
I have been trying merely to suggest
what kinds of Inquiry a joint committee
might undertake, not to anticipate what
the results of those inquiries would be.
Nor as r remarked at the outset, do
I wish to insist that the resolution I am
introducing today provides the only pos-
siblo way of proceeding. Perhaps the
joint committee should be given rather
different terms of reference. Or perhaps
a body should be established comprising
private citizens as well as Members of
Congress. I do not want to be dogmatic
about this. My purpose In' speaking to-
day has been to reopen public discussion
of an issue that has too long been dor-
mant, and moreover to reopen It at a
time of relative tranquillity, when the
Intelligence community is not in the
public spotlight, at a time therefore when
these matters Can be considered soberly
and dispassionately.
But we in Congress should not be too
timid about putting ourselves forward.
I wonder how many Members of this
house are aware of the enormous body
of opinion In favor of the creation of a
congressional joint committee. Both
the Hoover Commission and its special
Intelligence task force favored congres-
sional intervention. The New York
Times has consistently supported the
idea in its editorial columns. Two years
ago the distinguished military analyst.
Mr. Hanson Baldwin, stated that one of
the lessons to be drawn from the Bay of
Pigs was "the necessity of keeping all
secret intelligence activities and opera-
tions under constant top-echelon sur-
veillance and review." He noted that
the machinery for achieving this would
be greatly strengthened by the creation
of a joint congressional watchdog com-
mittee.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, I should like to
quote just once more from the writings
of Professor Harry Howe Ransom who,
as I have already said, is our country's
leading lay student of Intelligence affairs.
I think his comment deserves all the
greater consideration because it comes
from a member of the political science
profession-a profession which, as we all
know, has always had a strong bias In
favor of the executive branch of gov-
ernment. On page 206 of "Central In-
telligence and National Security" Pro-
fessor Ransom remarks:
It Is common experience for security
pollcymakers, military and civilian, to find
their fear of congressional interference
changed into gratitude for congressional
support, frequently more effective support
than has been accorded on the executive side
of Government. No executive agency today
reveals everything to congressional com-
mittees with jurisdiction over its operations.
O05cia1s of central intelligence may be ex-
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 _ Sanitized - Ae8~gRisf,&'.,-4?17)*V149R000400500023-14271
p rted to reveel even Ion. But more ad-
,mitagos are to ba gnincd than feet from
es,tabli'hing a more institutionalised eye-
Loin for congressional surveillance.
I agree with that, Mr. Speaker, and I
hope that what I have said today will be
given earnest and thoughtful attention
I'; my colleagues on both sides of the
astie.
Mr. NOFtBLAD. Mr. Speaker, will the
wrntlernan yield?
Mr. LINDSAY. I yield to the gentle-
man from Oregon.
Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Speaker. I want
to associate myself with the gentleman's
remarks. I think we should have had
a joint committee to monitor the CIA
vk i:en it was first established. I have had
a little experience In the matter as a
member of the Committee on Armed
Y'ervices. As you may know, we have a
subcommittee on the CIA. I was a mem-
ber of that committee for either 2 or 4
years. We met annually-one time a
year, for a period of 2 hours In which
we accomplished virtually nothing. I
think a proposal such as you have made
is the answer to It because a part-time
subcommittee of the Armed Services
C;ommitte, as I say. which meets for just
2 hours, 1 day a year, accomplishes
nothing whatsoever. I want to compli-
ment the gentleman on his proposal.
Mr. LINDSAY. I thank the gentleman
from Oregon and appreciate the con-
tribution he has made. He knows where-
in be talks. He Is an expert on the
subject and is a member of the Commit-
tee on Armed Services and was a member
of the subcommittee supervising the
CIA-in theory-and what he says dove-
tails entirely and agrees with the experi-
ence, and the statements made in the
other body as well.
(Mr. LINDSAY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
(Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr.
LfxnsAY) was given permission to extend
his remarks at this point in the RsceRD.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to
commend my distinguished colleague,
the gentleman from New York [Mr.
LINDSAY], on the step he has taken In
introducing his resolution. The gentle-
man from New York [Mr. Ln sssyl has
taken the initiative in remedying a seri-
ous inadequacy in our foreign policy
making process. His efforts merit our
'thoughtful attention and solid support.
I have joined the gentleman from New
'York (Mr. LINDSAY) in filing a com-
panion resolution which, by establishing
a Joint Committee on Foreign Informa-
tion and Intelligence, would All what is
now a gaping hole in the congressional
mechanism for the formulation of for-
eign policy. At present, intelligence
matters are handled simultaneously by
several committees on both sides of Cap-
itol Hill, Not only confusion but omis-
sion as well result from this decentral-
ization of supervision. Our proposals,
which would apply to any intelligence or
information agency, not only the CIA,
would remedy this situation.
Ielrst, the proposed joint committee
would give Congress the machinery it
must have to exercise its responsibility
for the oversight of the Nation's intelli-
gence activities. The present lack of
congressional supervision in this area is
itself a serious omission In view of the
work required of the foreign policy com-
mittees of both Houses. A variety of
congressional committees now handles
the Nation's everwidening range of In-
telligence activities. Effective coordina-
tion of congressional supervision is im-
possible.
The proposed committee would have a
comprehensive view of the intelligence
and Information aspects of foreign af-
fairs. A single committee of this nature
would provide the existing foreign policy
committees with more direct and effi-
cient service. The agencies under Its
supervision would benefit as well. A
prime target of the joint committee's
efforts would be the improvement of
their operations and policies. Studies
of the agencies' problems and programs
would, of course, be considerably more
extensive and complete when conducted
by a committee with single responsibility
of intelligence oversight.
Ultimately, I believe, both Houses of
Congress would benefit from the estab-
lishment of the proposed joint commit-
tee. The Senate and House would be
afforded a broader opportunity for care-
ful consideration of foreign information
and intelligence matters. The agencies
involved would similarly benefit from
the committee's studies and recom-
mendations.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hope the
House may net promptly on our proposal.
It would fill a vital gap in our foreign
policymaking process. It would stream-
line existing efforts in the areas of for-
eign Information and Intelligence. This
is an area In which congressional re-
longer Ignore this problem. The United
States and the entire world failed to pro-
perly plan ahead in the development of
our present subsonic jet transports and,
as a result. millions of people throughout
the world have had their lives drastically
changed by the unbearable noise which
today's jet transports produce at air-
fields near large urban areas.
My own district lies just east of O'Hare
Field. the world's busiest airport. It
would be literally impossible for me to
fully describe the deafening noise which
thousands of my constituents suffer
everyday from conventional subsonic jets
either arriving or departing O'Hare
Field. It cannot be said that there peo-
ple shouldn't have built near the airport;
these people were there before the air-
port was built.
I believe it is tragic that airplane
manufacturers of the world did not take
these consequences into consideration
when they developed the subsonic jet
transport during the past decade.
I was not a Member of Congress In
those days, but I feel it is not only my
duty but the duty of every Member of
this Congress both In the House and in
the Senate to recognize the fact that we
cannot repeat this error on the threshold
of the supersonic air transport era,
jr"
We must do everything possible to In-
sure that this new type of supersonic
aircraft-which is being developed from
scratch--does not repeat the tragic mis-
take of its subsonic jet predece sor, FAA.
The legislation which I have intro-
duced today would prohibit the opera-
tion.i any civil supersonic aircraft in
ESTABLISHING MINIMUM f;I'AND- exceeding 1.5 pounds per square foot on
the groused directly beneath the bight
ARDS FOR OPERATION OF C1VIL
path.
SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT This legislation would further make it
Zile' SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. unlawful to operate any civil supersonic
RoYSAL). Under previous order of the aircraft into or out of U.S. airports un-
House, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. less it can be demonstrated that ground
PucxNexsl is recognized for 30 minutes. noise level generated by such civil super-
Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have sonic aircraft is substantially lower than
today introduced legislation designed to that generated by long range aubsonio
deal with a most serious problem which jet aircraft.
will confront our Nation In the very near I am not at all persuaded by the argu-
future. Specifically, Mr. Speaker, my meet that you cannot stop progress.
legislation would establish certain limits Certainly we all are for progress. But
of tolerance associated with the advent we cannot blindly state that we are for
of the supersonic civil transport plane progress when we know that such prog-
now being developed by aircraft manu- ress can seriously impair the health and
facturers in Prance and England and emotional stability of great numbers of
being purchased by several American Americans. Nor can we say blindly we
airlines. Similar efforts to develop a are for progress when we are faced with
supersonic transport are now underway the prospect of seeing huge belts of
In the United States. destruction cress-crossing the United
This is a problem which we no longer States from sonic booms generated by
can ignore. I have introduced this leg- supersonic aircraft.
islation at this particular time, in order It is my belief, that unless Congress
to give airplane manufacturers both in deals with this subject matter at this
our own country and abroad ample op- time, we may conceivably see such havoc
portunity to make sufficient changes in wrought upon this country from sonic
the design of their powerplanta to avoid booms that millions of dollars in dam-
future distress to millions of Americans. age to property and a serious threat to
The supersonic jet powerplant of the the health of.many of our people may
future must be developed and designed ensue.
with appropriate consideration for noise My bill limits sonic boom overpres-
abatement. , cures not to exceed 1.6 pounds per square
This is far-reaching legislation, But toot on the ground directly beneath the
I submit, Mr. Speaker. that we can no !tight path.
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