THE DARKNESS OF THE CLOAK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400500006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 27, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

=OIAb3b
2 7 1964
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECOfTO==DOUSE 3787
Emile Benoit and Kenneth Boulding (edi- The immediate dangers past, commenta- most any man or group of men confronted
tors), "Disarmament and the Economy," tors have sought to unravel the confusing with the duty of getting something planned
Harper & Row, New York, 1983. web of influences in both situations. The or getting something done will sooner or later
Emile Benoit, "Adjustments to Arms Con- full truth is not yet known, and may never hit upon what they consider a single most
trol," Journal of Arms Control, 1:105-11 be. Nonetheless, it seems Indisputable that desirable course of action. Usually it is
(:1963). In both cases the three principal instruments sooner; sometimes, under duress, it is a snap
Emile Benoit and Kenneth Boulding, "The of U.S. foreign policy-the State Department, judgment off the top of the head. I cannot
-Economic Consequences of Disarmament," the military, and the Central Intelligence escape the belief that under the circum-
Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, Agency-were at crucial times pulling in stances outlined, intelligence will find itself
1961. separate directions. right in the middle of policy, and that upon
v "The. Economic Impact of Disarmament in The criticism most frequently heard is that occasions it will be the unabashed apologist
the United States," in Seymour Melman's the CIA was meddling in policy, undertaking for a given policy rather than its impartial
(editor) "Disarmament: Its Politics and functions that were not its proper respon- and objective analyst."
Economics," American Academy of Arts and sibility. The charge has been made that the The failures of CIA covert operations are
Sciences, 1962. CIA was combining Intelligence gathering well known. Less well known, and of equally
Kenneth Boulding, "Economic Implica- with active ',operations," a course which sobering magnitude, are the successes. The
.tions of Arms Control," in Donald Brennan's carries the risk that Intelligence may be used CIA, for example, played a key part in the
(editor) "Arms Control, Disarmament, and to support prior operational decisions. It ousting of the Mossadegh regime in Iran in
National Security," 1961. has been alleged over and over that in.Viet- 1953, paving the way for eventual reform of
Horst Brand, "Disarmament and the Pros- nam, as in the Bay of Pigs, the CIA, with or the pro-Western government of the Shah.
pects of American Capitalism," dissent (sum- without direction from higher authority, be- Both British and American vital interests
mer 1962). came enmeshed in its own intrigues. In the had been threatened by the capricious Mos-
Otto Feinstein, "Michigan Economic Bay of Pigs, the CIA was found supporting sadegh policies, the major threat being to
Myths: Defense Contracts, Jobs, and Af- a collection of Batista refugees, apparently Britain's necessary supply of oil. The suc-
fluence," (monograph No. 1, Wayne State without clear direction from the State De- cessful coup which unseated Mossadegh was
University: "Impact of Foreign Policy on partment. In Vietnam, it became clear that of great benefit to the United States and the
the Community"), 1963. Copies by request the CIA was closely alined with and subsi- West.
to Monteith College, Wayne State Univer- dizing the Special Forces run by the late Ngo The following year the virulently anti-
sity, Detroit 2, Mich., attention Otto Fein- Dinh Nhu, an elite military force that raided American Arbenz regime in Guatemala was
stein, the Buddhist pagodas. Responsible repre- overthrown. The CIA was widely believed
Wassily W. Leontieff and Marvin Hoffen- sentatives of the press have reported strong to have engineered the coup. But for the
berg, Economic Effects of Disarmament," disagreements between the State Department success of that coup, Soviet-directed com-
Sc , " munism in Latin America would presumably
S e American (April " and the CIA with regard policy In Viet- be far more deeply entrenched than it is
-
-Seymo ymour Melman (editor) ) "Disarmament: nam, and these reports must stand even today.
Its Politics and Economics," American Acad- beside the exaggerations of less-responsible for
emy of Arts and Sciences, 1962, Cambridge, press accounts. The evidence was over- dgoaayh h of ill, the these explosive nature demonstrates, CIA's
Mass. whelming that U.S. policy was confused and ea or ill, A's
operati involvement ve t
. Seymour Melman, "The Economics of Arm- that the divisions within agencies were being operational
. It is not all improbable international
CIament and Disarmament," Our Genera- hung on the public wash line. When later will ics si milady involved in prroo future. that it
The
tion Against Nuclear W (spring 1962) and our Government's support swung to the in- cold war will l with u for a very tore time;
also TTnivrr~ll Thnueht (spring surgents who ousted Diem, this very possibly co will the will b. Accordingly, our democratic time;
- 1962) . meant an about-face on the part of the CIA. 1 1 e government, unused to secrecy, has within
em nt even then
f
THE THE DARKNESS OF THE CLOAK
(Mr. MORSE (at the request of Mr.
ASHBROOK) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, the recent
disturbing trends in our foreign rela-
tions throughout the world point up once
again the need for adequate intelligence
and the responsibility of the Congress to
make the intelligence establishment re-
sponsive to our best national interests.
Our distinguished colleague from New
York [Mr. LINDSAY] discusses this prob-
lem in the current 'March issue of Es-
quire magazine. His is a thoughtful,
moderate approach to an issue which has
too long been beclouded by emotional
tirades and irresponsible finger pointing.
I have joined with Congressman LIND-
SAY III sponsoring legislation to create
a Joint Committee on Foreign Informa-
tion and Intelligence and-I believe that
the Esquire article outlines the reasons
for its enactment effectively.
Under permission granted, I Include
the Article following my remarks in the
body of the RECORD.
' AN LNQT.TXRY INTO THE DAaKNESS OF TH31
CLOAK, THE SHARPNESS, OF THE DAGGER
(By Mr. Lindsay)
Two major reversals in our foreign policy
within the last 3 years have shaken the poise
of the Intelligence branch of the U.S. Gov-
ernment to its underpinnings: the abortive
adventure at #he Bay of Figs, and the blind-
ing miasma of S. policy that arose in South
Vietnam during the Diem era.
our nvo v
The extent o
it an Immensely
ex-
unknown, but that we were involved must powerful and extremely possible. pensive secret organization, for the past few
seem quite few
years housed
Almost every qualified outsider who has building in a very large permanent on the banks of the Potomac. That
hat
examined the history of the Bay of Pigs building represents the institutionalization
blunder has concluded that it was founded of the CIA in the Government establishment.
on a haphazard jumble of foreign policy, More exactly, it marks its positive elevation
Intelligence gathering, and military opera- in status, always important in government.
tions. The CIA appears to have organized And yet there is no effective check on its
and ponducted the attempt and also to activities now, And there was none in 1961.
have gathered the Intelligence data en which Few can deny the actual and potential
the prospects for the attempt were judged. power of the CIA, however carefully it may
Not only was CIA shaping policy-perhaps be held in check by the skillful men who run
understandable because of the absence of it. Ours is supposed to be a government of
direction from policymaking organs of the laws, not of men. At stake are questions of
Government-but that policy was patently war and peace, as the two Cuban crises so
at odds with State Department thinking. clearly demonstrated. All of us at that time
Without fully rehearsing the baleful events took a look into the atomic pit. Decisions
that preceded the Bay of Pigs, it is perfectly can be made at such times and actions taken
clear, to understate the matter, that the about which the public is totally in the dark.
President was badly served by the agencies So be it. As much as we may abhor govern-
involved. ment by secrecy, as much as It threatens
These premises, like all of my remarks in fundamental liberties, we must understand
this article, arise only from material and Its limited and necessary application in par-
information available to the public. In re- ticular circumstances of hot or cold war.
spect to such material and information I Nevertheless, crucial decisions are made for
am in the same position as other representa- us and in our name of which we know noth-
tives of the people in Congress, with very ing. And all too often secrecy which is nec-
few exceptions. All the more reason for such essary breeds secrecy which is unnecessary,
a representative to speak out. at which point the danger becomes nothing
To state the danger posed by the inter- less than a threat to democratic institutions,
mingling of intelligence gathering and op- a marginal one at the outset, but poten-
erations is not to say it is unrecognized by tially a most serious one.
responsible officials. Able men throughout The Bay of Pigs fiasco occurred despite
the intelligence community are well aware efforts by Secretary of State Christian Herter
of and deeply concerned by dangers arising and CIA Director Allen Dulles to sort out
from the absence of clear distinction between the relations between their two agencies so
intelligence gathering and operations. The that the making of foreign policy would be
trouble may often start, as Allen Dulles, the removed from the CIA, and the command of
distinguished former head of the CIA re- policy kept firmly in the hands of ambassa-
cently said, from lack of clear-cut operation- dors in the field at all times. The Herter-
al policy in Washington. When a policy Dulles agreement was reaffirmed by Secretary
vacuum occurs, men in the field are almost Rusk. More recently, following events in
involuntarily propelled into operational ac- Vietnam during the Diem regime, the Pres-
tivities which are not their proper respon- ident found it necessary to reassert publicly
sibility. Sherman Kent, the head of the his authority and that of the Secretary of
Board of National Estimates-one of the State and the National Security Council over
most influential elements of the intelligence the intelligence community. Collaterally the
community-makes the point this way: "Al- Secretary of State sought to assure the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 27
primacy of ambassadors in the policy area may not be the best person to assess these
overseas. events. Again, I hope that I will not be
Particular persons and particular situa- misunderstood. I do not, mean to impugn
tions may seem to define problems of this in the slightest the enormous amount of
sort. But It is also the case that, as long as valuable work done by exiles and refugees
both the State Department and the CIA are in the CIA. Without their help, as in the
responsible for the collection of information, case of the ex-military men, the organization
and-perhaps most important-as long as simply could not function as it should.
CIA continues to be responsible for special Neither do I mean to suggest that CIA should
operations-the support of anti-Communist be staffed with "soft-liners" or people who
elements and the fomenting of opposition have had no personal experience with the
to hostile governments-the problem of in- countries in question. That would be ab-
tegrating the Central Intelligence Agency surd. But I do think that by every recom-
into our general foreign policy apparatus mendation of commonsense we must be cer-
will continue to grow in scope and potential tain df the objectivity and breadth of our
danger. intelligence.
For a time the Maxwell Taylor Committee, This raises the question of the structure
appointed by the President to inquire par-- of the intelligence community and of Intel-
ticularly Into the Cuban question, appears ligence evaluation-the question of how best
to have considered the possibility of trans- to organize the interpreting of the enormous
ferring the bulk of CIA's special operations amount of material collected daily by all
to the Defense Department. But this solu- agencies of the intelligence community.
tion would have had the obvious disadvan- The phrase "intelligence community" em-
tage of insuring that the uniformed mill- braces the numerous agencies within the
tary-and hence the authority and prestige executive branch which are concerned with
of the U.S. Government-would be identified intelligence collection and evaluation: The
with any paramilitary operation as soon as CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
it became a matter of public knowledge. State Department's Bureau of. Intelligence
In any event, it seems that the Taylor and Research, the intelligence branches of
Committee has left routine covert operations the armed services, the National Security
in the hands of the CIA, with control to 'be Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and
transferred to the Pentagon only if a par- others. The daily chore of coordinating and
ticular project becomes so big as to warrant cross-checking daily intelligence data is
open military participation. Mr. Hanson largely in the hands of the Defense Intelli-
Baldwin in the New York Times summed up gence Agency. The long-range estimates
the matter thus: "The general rule of thumb are prepared under the direction *of the
for the future is that CIA will not handle any Board of National Estimates, which presides
primarily military operations, or ones of such as a kind of general planning staff for the
size that they cannot be kept secret. How- intelligence community. Estimates prepared
ever, each case will apparently be judged on by this group are submitted to a committee
Its merits; there is no hard-and-fast formula known as the U.B. Intelligence Board. If the
that will put one operation under the CIA Board of Estimates is the planning board for
and another under the Pentagon." the community, the Intelligence Board Is its
Now surely this is an area in which neither board of directors. It is the final forum for
hard-and-fast formulas nor organizational the professional intelligence community; its
gimmicks can solve the major difficulties, judgments go to the National Security
Much depends on the particular situations. Council.
The people who are in the most favorable Two aspects of this system in particular are
position to gather information are some- worth noting. The first is the preeminence
times the best equipped to engage in clan- of the Central Intelligence Agency. A high
destine political activities. But largely be- proportion of the intelligence community's
cause the problem eludes organizational for- fact gathering Is done -by CIA. The Board
mulas, because it is a problem to which there of National Estimates functions as a part of
is no simple solution, it must be recognized CIA. The chairman of the U.S. Intelligence
as such and held ip check as much as pos- Board is the Director of the CIA. And the
Bible. Problems unwatched and unattended intelligence community's spokesman on the
tend to multiply. National Security Council itself is that same
CIA is served by only one politically re- CIA Director.
sponsible officer: the Director himself. All The second aspect worth noting is the
others are career officials. In comparison, the duality of CIA's role. Under the National
President keeps ultimate control in the Pen- Security Act, this agency is not only one
tagon by his political power to appoint all participant In the intelligence community;
the top civilian officers there. These officials it is also the chief agency responsible for co-
are entrusted with clear political responsi- ordinating it. In other words, at many points
bility, for which there is no parallel in the in the process of evaluation, CIA is both
CIA. player and umpire, both witness and judge.
There are in fact questions repeatedly This ambiguity is implicit in the title of the
raised about the CIA. Is it wise, for ex- Director, who is formally not the "Director
ample, to rely to the extent the CIA seems of the Central Intelligency Agency," but
to on the services of retired military officers? simply "Director of Central Intelligence."
.One would suppose that retired service of- The problem this raises is clear. It is
titers, though almost always men of great that the Central Intelligence Agency, being
ability, would have an instinctive tendency not merely central but dominant in the in-
to take a rather narrow, strictly operational telligence community, is in an extraordinary
and efficient view of the problems con- position, so long as it is left unchecked to
fronting them. I hope I will not be mis- carry its special institutional tendencies into
understood. CIA officials are among the the shaping of American foreign policy.
most distinguished in the entire Federal I believe that these difficulties of un-
establishment. The leadership of the agency checked power in the intelligence community
comprises men of great gifts and dedica- can be alleviated only by the Congress, which
tion-and I Include the former military men has the constitutional responsibility to over-
in the agency. But recruitment of high- see the functions of the executive branch
caliber men in large numbers is a problem in on behalf of the American people. There-
the Federal Government, especially in agen- fore, I propose the establishment in the
ties whose work is international. Congress of a Joint Committee on Foreign
It is also fair to ask whether the CIA Information and Intelligence. I propose
should rely heavily on the services of polit- that such a committee be constituted along
cal refugees. It seems reasonable to sup- the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic
pose, for example, that an exile from his Energy and that it have its own funds and
homeland, especially one who has passionate staff. It should continuously inquire into
convictions about the courseof events there. our foreign information and intelligence
programs, including: (1) the relations be-
tween the Central Intelligence Agency and
the State Department, especially overseas;
(2) the relations between intelligence gather-
ing on the one hand and so-called special
operations on the other; (3) the selection
and training of intelligence personnel; and
(4) the who''-e question of intelligence eval-
uation.
The proposal of a Joint Committee on
Foreign Intelligence is not new. In one form
or another it has been introduced into the
House in each of the last 10 sessions, though
it has not been debateed on the floor. In
the Senate, a bill to establish a joint com-
mittee, sponsored by Senator MANSFIELD in
1956, was debated for 2 days on the floor of
the Senate and defeated.
Nor is the proposal partisan. At time of
writing, there are 14 Democratic and 5 Re-
publican sponsors in the House. In 1959
resolutions were sponsored in the House by
12 Democrats and 5 Republicans. In the
Senate in 1956, Members on both sides of the
aisle voted for Senator MANSFIELD's resolu-
tion-including the then junior Senator from
Massachusetts, the late President Kennedy.
It is most often argued against the estab-
lishment of a "watchdog" committee that
the secrecy of our intelligence system would
be endangered. The argument does not
stand up. No one denies that the CIA and
the other intelligence agencies must conduct
a very high proportion of their work in
secret; secrecy is of the essence in their work.
But what is true of the intelligence com-
munity is also true in many other areas of
Government-in the fields of atomic energy,
weapons development, and, in some respects,
foreign policy. But does this mean that
Congress is to have no effective authority
in those areas? Of course it does not, for
Congress has such authority. It has always
asserted its right, indeed its constitutional
duty, to oversee even the most sensitive areas
of Government. And where matters of the
highest secrecy have been involved, Members
of both Houses have shown themselves
capable of exercising the utmost restraint.
This was never more clearly demonstrated
than during the Manhattan project in World
War II, when Members of the two appropria-
tions committees were kept apprised of work
on the atomic bomb without breaking se-
curity. The record of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy in this connection has
been impeccable.
Moreover, the CIA is even now monitored,
in theory, by four small subcommittees of the
Committees on Armed Services and Appropri-
ations of the Senate and House. Not even
the most experienced and security-conscious
officials in the intelligence community would
deny these subcommittees--had they time
to apply for it-access to the pertinent in-
formation that might enable them conscien-
tiously to provide the vast sums of money
that are requested year after year. But ap-
parently the notion exists that if the whole
matter is kept on the lowest possible level
of congressional concern, secrecy will receive
a higher degree of respect. There is no logic
in the notion. I should think just the oppo-
site would be true.
I find myself in even less sympathy with
another argument advanced frequently in
discussions of this question; namely, that the
intelligence community exists solely to serve
the President and the National Security
Council, and that therefore we in the Con-
gress have no right to exercise jurisdiction in
the matter. But clearly the executive and
legislative branches of our Government are
not watertight compartments separated by
steel bulkheads; the material between them
is flexible and porous. There are any num-
ber of congressional committees which keep
a watch over the executive agencies. And,
as I have already said, it. Is not only their
right to do so; it is their duty under the Con-
stitution.
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 1,964
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CONGRESSIO AL-4RECO1t1 --`~ TGUSE 3789
- These arguments concerning secrecy and
the exclusively executive nature of the in-
telligence function are, though unpersua-'
sive, at least consistent. But strangely
enough, those who oppose the idea of a joint
committee insist as well that congressional
surveillance is already"more than adequate.
This contention was made by Allen Dulles in
his recent book and by President Kennedy,
in answer to a question at his October 9
press conference.
What, in fact, is the present extent of con-
gressional surveillance over-Intelligence ac-
tivities? As mentioned, in both the House
and Senate the bodies responsible for over-
seeing the intelligence community are sub-
committees of the Appropriations and Armed
Services Committees. Neither the House
Foreign Affairs Committee nor the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee has jurisdiction
in this area despite their obvious interest in
intelligence matters. This might not matter
were it not that the surveillance exercised
by the four existing subcommittees is both
cursory and sporadic.
At the time I introduced the resolution
-proposing the joint committee and spoke on
the floor of the House in favor of it, Con-
gressman WALTER NORBLAD, of Oregon, the
second-ranking minority member of the
House Committee on Armed Services, had
this to say:
"Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself
with the gentleman's remarks. I think we
should have had a joint committee to mon-
itor the CIA when it was first established.
I have had a little experience in the matter
as a member of the Committee on Armed
Services. As you may know, we have a sub-
committee on the CIA. I was a member of
that committee for 4 years. We met an-
nually-one time a year, for a period of 2
hours in' which we accomplished virtually
nothing. I think a proposal such as Mr.
LINDSAY has made is the answer to it be-
cause a part-time subcommittee of the
Armed Services Committee, as I say, which
-meets for just 2 hours, 1 day a year, accom-
plishes nothing whatsoever. I want to com-
pliment the gentleman on his proposal."
.The reasons for the lack of adequate check
and examination are almost self-evident: The
-members of the four subcommittees them-
selves, by definition, have relatively low
status. But even had those subcommittees
both status and time, the difficulties in-
volved in dividing jurisdiction among the
four would, I think, be insuperable.
It should be clear from what I have said
that the bipartisan proponents of a Joint
Committee on Foreign Information and In-
telligence are fully aware that a high degree.
-of secrecy is essential to the workings of the
intelligence community. Neither I nor any
legislator wishes to see the legitimate secrets
of the intelligence community reported in
.the press and on the air. Indeed, this seems
far more likely to occur under present con-
ditions because the press, sometimes called
.,the fourth branch of the Government," may
turn out to be the only effective check on
intelligence activities-and that check could
be dangerous as well as disruptive. But
danger and disruption are certain if public
cpilSdence in the intelligence establishment
erodgs._ It is less likely if a body of the ped-
ple's representatives, properly constituted
and carefully chosen by the leadership of the
two Houses of Congress, 'remains coritinu-
ously aware of the activities of the Intelli-
gence community. The performance of this
,function is nothing less than their duty to
the American people, whose lives and lib-
erties are profoundly involved in the
intelligence activities of our Government.
Finally, I would observe that such a joint
congressional committee would perform a
useful, perhaps an indispensable, service for
the Intelligence community itself. There
bs been a tendency to assign the burden of
lilae to the CIA when some foreign under-
takings have gone bad or failed altogether.
Whether the blame has been justified-as
in some cases it may have been-or whether
unjustified, the liability to blame is appar-
ent, and the CIA, unlike other less inhibited
agencies, can do little to defend itself. A
joint committee could do much to maintain
the record fairly.
As the central Government grows in size
and power, and as the Congress, like parlia-
ments everywhere, tends to diminish in im-
portance, the need for countervailing checks
and balances becomes all the more impor-
tant. The shaping and implementation by
secret processes of some part of foreign pol-
icy is an extremely serious matter in a free
society. It cannot be shrugged off or
stamped as an inescapable necessity because
of the dangers of the time and the threat
from present enemies of democracy. To do
so is to deny our history and to gamble dan-
gerously with our future. There are internal
as well as external dangers. Free poltical
systems and individual liberties can be,
swiftly undermined. Confidence in the sys-
tems and liberties themselves can be lost
even more swiftly. And when that happens
to a free society, no foreign policy, however
well conceived, will protect Its highest in-
terest, the continuation of the free system
of government and the society on which it
rests.
SOVIET ANTI-SEMITIS
(Mr. HALPERN (at the request of Mr.
ASHBROOK) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I should
like once again to draw the attention.
of the Congress to the subtle, yet
monstrous, discrimination against the
Jewish people in the Soviet Union.
We have renewed indications that
despite repeated refutation of the
charges, the Soviet Government is con-
tinuing to treat its citizens of the Jewish
faith cruelly and with definite bias.
These acts are to be deplored and pro-
tested, not only by all freedom-loving
Americans, but officially by our Governr
ment through its diplomatic channels
and through the United Nations.
Mr. Speaker, earlier this month a
group of well-known Western scholars
wrote to Mr. Khrushchev- inquiring into
the situation. They referred specifically
to the current trial of 23 persons for so-
called economic crimes. Eleven of these
Last October, before the recent court
case, the Government newspaper Izvestia
demanded a public show trial of the de-
fendants accused of bizarre economic
crimes. The names of the Jewish ac-
cused were prominently displayed.
The show trial never developed be-
cause the Kremlin rulers did not want to
reveal the names of Government officials
who supposedly took bribes. All West-
ern newsmen were barred from the trial.
Now Theodore Shabad reports in the
New York Times of this morning, Feb-
ruary 27, that nine death sentences have
been pronounced by the court. It is evi-
dent from reports that the majority were
JewS.
Despite all its disavowals, we cannot
believe that Russia is making any sin-
cere effort to halt the anti-Jewish preju-
dice. To the contrary, through cunning
book attacking the Jews. It is an
ulting and cynical onslaught against
the Jewish population. The Institute
of Human Relations in New York ob-
tained.a copy.
I wish to applaud the remarks of the
new president of this dedicated com-
mittee, Mr. Morris Abram, which he
made as a U.S. delegate to the United
Nations Subcommission on the Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities. Mr. Abram denounced the
book as a "hodgepodge of misinforma-
tion, distortion, malicious gossip and in-
sulting references to Jews and Judaism."
The book, written by a Soviet profes-
sor of philosophy, is a product of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. We
know that almost all literature in the
Soviet Union, certainly work of this na-
ture, is censored and published only with
the approval of the regime.
We cannot believe that such a dis-
criminatory piece could be printed with-
out the consent of the authorities. The
Soviet Government is cloaking its anti-
Jewish policy by allowing academic
groups to apply the pressure in its stead.
persons were known to be Jewish, includ- The Kremlin does not want the West
ing the alleged ringleader. Premier to believe that it is anti-Jewish. So the
Khrushchev replied as follows: rulers subtly permit so-called private or-
There has never been, and there is not ganizations and groups to promote dis-
now, a policy of anti-Semitism in the Soviet crimination so they will not be labeled
Union * * " Our Constitution proclaims with the ugly fact.
equality of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. Ir- Throughout Russia's long history,
respective of nationality or race. treatment of the Jewish minority has
This response is absurd and ridiculous. varied between outright oppression and
To the contrary, circumstances do not behind-the-scenes discrimination. The
bear him out. The facts clearly point majority of rulers, including Stalin, be-
otherwise. lieved that the Jewish nationality repre-
It is perfectly obvious that the Soviet sented a separate and cohesive entity, a
Government has consistently exerted separateness which inherently consti-
pressure in bearing down upon the tuted a threat to central government.
maintenance and development of Jewish The situation is not radically different
-cultural and religious life. There have today. Dictatorship will always fear re-
been efforts to seriously curtail publish- ligious or racial identities within its area
ing in Hebrew. The authorities, in the of rule. It will always seek to weaken
general antireligious campaign, have ties of allegiance to anything excepting
concentrated upon the closing of syna- its own being.
gogues wherever feasible. Jews in Mos- Our Government must seek to secure
cow were prohibited from arranging equality of treatment for the Jewish peo-
burials in Jewish cemeteries. These are ple of Russia. We must seek to end the
but a few flagrant instances of a deliber- discrimination against them. We can-
ate policy. not succeed by remaining oblivious to
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE February 27
the manifold evidence of ill-treatment
which is accumulating. We should uti-
lize all the diplomatic instrumentalities
at our command, and work actively
through the United Nations, to obtain a
reversal of the ominous trends-of Soviet
anti-Semitism.
(Mr. CUNNINGHAM (at the request
of Mr. AsHBROOK) was granted permis-
sion to extend his remarks at this point
in the RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
[Mr. CUNNINGHAM'S remarks will
appear hereafter in the Appendix.]
WITHDRAWAL OF JURISDICTION
FROM FEDERAL COURTS IN LEG-
ISLATIVE REDISTRICTING MAT-
TERS
(Mr. MEADER (at the request of Mr.
ASHBROOK) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. MEADER. Mr. Speaker, I have
today introduced a bill to provide that
district courts of the United States shall
not have jurisdiction to enjoin or modify
the operation of State laws respecting
legislative districts where comparable re-
lief is available in State courts, and for
other purposes.
Mr. Speaker, my interest in this mat-
ter was first aroused by the decision in
Baker v. Carr, March 26, 1962, 362, U.S.
355. I commented on this decision in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Of July 16, 1962,
pages 13,745 to 13,754.
I agree with Justice Frankfurter's de-
cision in the Baker against Carr case
that the Court has made a grave error in
entering the field of legislative redistrict-
ing and my bill is designed to withdraw
Federal court jurisdiction and the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in matters of this kind.
The chairman of the Judiciary Com-
mittee has announced that Subcommit-
tee No. 5 of the Judiciary Committee will
commence hearings March 18, 1964, on
his bill to establish criteria or guidelines
governing congressional districts. I be-
lieve it would be appropriate in those
same hearings to consider the propriety
of Federal courts entertaining suits com-
menced by citizens, the effect of which is
to place the courts in a position of
supremacy over a coequal branch of the
Government, and to have judicial deter-
mination of a matter most vital to the
independence of the legislative branch,
namely its composition.
I hope this legislation will receive seri-
ous consideration by the House Judiciary
Committee.
The text of the bill is as follows:
H.R.10181
A bill to provide that district courts of the
United States shall not have jurisdiction
to enjoin or modify the operation of State
laws respecting legislative districts where
comparable relief is available I. State
courts, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (a)
chapter 85 of title 28 of the United States
Code is amended by adding at the end there-
of the following new section:
"? 1361. Legislative districts
"A district court shall not have jurisdic-
tion of any civil action-
"(1) to enjoin, suspend, or modify the
operation of any State law respecting the
boundaries of, or the number of persons to
be elected from, any district to be repre-
sented in the legislature of such State or in
the Congress of the United States; or
"(2) for damages arising out of the opera-
tion of any such State law;
if an action for comparable relief would be
within the jurisdiction of, and justiciable in,
a court of such State."
(b) The table of sections at the beginning
of chapter 85 of title 28 of the United States
Code is amended by adding at the end there-
of the following:
"1361. Legislative districts."
SEC. 2. (a) Chapter 81 of title 28 of the
United States Code is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new section:
1259. Exception to appellate jurisdiction
in cases involving legislative dis-
tricts
"The Supreme Court of the United States
shall not have appellate jurisdiction Of any
civil. action of any type described in para-
graph (1) or paragraph (2) of section 1361
of this title regardless of whether such action
was originally brought in a State or Federal
court."
(b) The table of sections at the beginning
of chapter 81 of title 28 of the United States
Code is amended by adding at the end there-
of the following:
"1259. Exception to appellate jurisdiction in
cases involving legislative dis-
tricts."
(Mr. LIPSCOMB (at the request of Mr.
ASnBROOK) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this, point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
[Mr. LIPSCOMB'S remarks will ap-
pear hereafter in the Appendix.]
WHY FEED THOSE WHO SHUT OFF
WATER AT GUANTANAMO?
(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr.
ASHBROOK) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. FINI)LEY. Mr. Speaker, I have
urgently requested that President John-
son embargo Cuba-bound lard shipments
to Canada. It has come to my attention
that U.S. traders in Montreal are now
completing a deal to ship 20 million
pounds of U.S. lard worth about $2 mil-
lion to Castro via Canada. Lard ship-
ments to Castro are permitted under
present administrative rules, but the
President could change the rules in-
stantly with the stroke of a pen.
This transaction should be halted un-
til all facts are known, and until its
potentially adverse effect on our foreign
policy can be fully explored. The United
States is attempting to restore free world
economic sanctions against Castro, an
effort which was badly shattered by our
feverish effort to deliver wheat to Rus-
sia.
A food sale of this magnitude to Castro
might completely destroy our position of
free world leadership.
These questions should be answered:
Can we logically oppose British bus sales
to Cuba, but permit U.S. lard sales? Is
lard less strategic than a bus? Why is
lard being shipped to Castro by way of
Canada? Is it because U.S. longshore-
men have already effectively shown their
opposition to Russia-bound wheat and
might block Cuba-bound lard?
I hope the President will act quickly,
revise export regulations, and block this
aid to Castro before it is too late.
To me, it is foolish and fantastic to
help feed the same Communists who
turned off the water at Guantanamo.
A FURTHER COMMENTARY ON OUR
ECONOMIC STATISTICS
(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr.
ASHBROOK) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat..
ter.)
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, on Octo-
ber 15, 1963, I inserted in the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD a copy of an article on our
economic statistics by Dr. Oskar Morgen-
stern of Princeton University. The arti-
cle was critical of the methods of collec-
tion of our statistics and particularly
urged that more attention be given to
determining the margin of error in our
economic statistics. Subsequently, I re-
ceived a large number of comments from
economists supporting the general ob-
servations in Dr. Morgenstern's article.
These were inserted' in the CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD of November 27.
I have now received a thorough and
scholarly commentary on Dr. Morgen-
stern's article prepared by Raymond T.
Bowman, Assistant Director of the Bu-
reau of the Budget. I highly recommend
Dr. Bowman's letter to those who are
interested in our statistical programs
and what is being done and can be done
to improve them. Under unanimous
consent, I include his letter in the RECORD
at this point.
I am certain that this will move the
dialog on this important matter for-
ward. I trust more comments will be
forthcoming from other scholars and
particularly from Dr. Morganstern.
Hopefully the subcommittee on Econo-
mic Statistic of the Joint Economic
Committee will hold hearings on the
general subject matter in the near fu-
ture:
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
1', 'F. \r' OF THE BUDGET,
Washington, D.C., February 5, 1964.
Hon. THOMAS B. CURTIS,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CURTIS: I greatly appreciate your
note to me requesting my comments on the
article by Prof. Oskar Morgenstern which ap-
peared in the October 1963 issue of Fortune
magazine. I have delayed replying until I
could give this important matter my personal
attention.
As you know, I have for many years been
particularly interested and concerned, both
personally and in official capacities, with
promoting and developing economic and
social statistics better designed to aid
analysis. I had been familiar with the first
edition of Professor Morgenstern's book "On
the Accuracy of Economic Observations,"
published in 1950, which presented much the
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