PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S NEWS CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400340024-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2001
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 31, 1963
• Content Type: MISC

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141.8 Oct. 31 - -4! Papers of
who were so unwilling to accept our test
ban treaty, where there \vas a very adequate
area of verification of whatever the Soviet
Union was doing, were perfectly ready to
accept Mr. Khrushchey's very guarded, care-
ful, cautious remark that he was taking him-
self out of the space race and use that as an
excuse for us to abandon our efforts.
The fact of the matter is that the Soviets
have made an intensive effort in space, and
there is every indication that they arc con-
tinuing and that they have tile potential to
continue. I would read Mr. Khruslichey's
remarks very carefully. I think that he said
before anyone went to the moon, there
should be adequate preparation. We agree
with that.
In my opinion the space program we have
is essential to the security or the United
States, because as I have said many times be-
fore, it is not a question of going to the
1110011. It is a question of havIng the ciiii
penile,' to to.,,h tlus \-,,,,,ownt And
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itt tht tii s it littttut t,ttig lii n1Lc 0
race Jul the, 1110011 or whether it is going to
attempt an even greater program.
I think we ought to stay with our pro-
gram. I think that is the best answer to Mr.
Khrushchey.
Q. Mr. President, it still continues to be
the fact that we have had no responses to
your proposal for a joint moon exploration?
PRESIDENT. That is correct. In addi-
tion, the two astronauts of the Soviet Union
earlier that week had made a statement say-
ing the Soviet Union was prepared to go on
lunar expeditions, so I think that we should
not disregard our whole carefully worked out
program which is being carried on very im-
pressively in Huntsville, Ala., and in other
places, merely because Mr. Khrushchev
gave a rather Delphic interview to some
correspondents.
[19.] Q. Mr. President, Fidel Castro
claims to have captured some Americans
832
l'rcsidents
whom he says are CIA agents, and he says
lie is going to execute them. Is there any-
thing at all that you can tell us about this?
Tim pREsinFNT. No, no.
[20. Q. Mr. President, what is the
siatus of the bilateral air transport
mem between the United States and Russia?
TI II PRESIDENT. It was initialed soinC
1110111.11S ago, more than a year ago, in tact
a year and a half ago, and there are still
some technical matters which have to be
discussed before it can be formally signed.
Q. Are you optimistic of it being signed,
and if so, when?
THE PRESIDENT. I think there is a good
chance it will be signed; yes.
[21.1 Q. Mr. President, as you know, the
plan to build a National Faivironmental
i lealth Research Center has been hung up in
Congress. Apparently they can't decide
where to build it. Now time is a tepott
thal you would likc it Imih iiN,0111 -,,,,,
11,11
, t ,
ik11.1 1,0, ? It.i1t I.t. it.tt
4111i itO liii It iii Iai it IS Ii 1 II ole,lEAV
IlladC, the first recommendation was Mary-
land. The site in North Carolina is a good
one, as there is a triangle there of colleges
and hospitals and medical facilities. And
I have indicated that that would be satis-
factory, if that was the judgment of the
Congress. I think our first choice was
Maryland. -
r22.1 Q. Mr. President, in spite of
something you said here in May 1962, there
is talk that Lyndon Johnson will be dumped
next year. Senator Thruston Morton used
the word "purged." Now, sir, assuming
that you run next year, would you want Lyn-
don Johnson on the ticket, and do you ex-
pect that he will be on the ticket?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, to both of those ques-
tions. That is correct.
[23.1 Q. Mr. President, Navy Secretary
Korth had some correspondence which in-
dicated he worked very hard for the Con-
I.,? ?I I I
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[405] Oct. 9 /-:// -;" Public Papers of the Presidents
to the extent that their limited supplies of
gold, dollars, and foreign exchange must he
used for food, they cannot he used to pur-
chase military or other equipment.
Our allies have long been engaged in ex-
tensive sales of wheat and other farm prod-
ucts to the Communist bloc, and, in fact,
it would be foolish to halt the sales of our
wheat when other countries can buy wheat
from us today and then sell this flour to the
Communists. In recent weeks Australia
and NATO allies have agreed to sell To
million to Ts million tons of wheat and
\diem- Cour to the Communist bloc.
1.01.0 Iii .111VCIIP.I''; 11, Ilie 55,11
:o; ith i eke (mild the success of Iwo.
American agriculture. it demonstrates our
willingness to relieve food shortages, to re-
duce tensions, and to improve relations with
all countries. And it shows that peaceful
agreements with the -United States which
serves the interests of both sides are a far
more worthwhile course than a course of
isolation and hostility.
For this Government to tell our grain
traders that they cannot accept these offers,
on the odter hand, would accomplish little
or nothing. The Soviets would continue to
buy wheat and flour elsewhere, including
wheat flour, Irons those nations which buy
our wheat. Moreover, haying for many
years sold them farm products which are
not in surplus, it would make no sense to
refuse to sell those products on which we
must otherwise pay the cost of storage. In
short, this particular ticciNiou whit respect.
to sales to the Soviet Union, which is not
inconsistent with many smaller transactions
over a long period of time, does not represent
a new Soviet-American trade policy. That
must await the settlement of many matters.
But it does Teptesent one more hopelid shut
that .1 mow 1.1 i'itii \yolkl is both possible
and benclicial to us all.
Q. Mr. President, do you have any mis-
givings about possible political repercussions
from your decision?
rnr: PRESIDENT. Well, I suppose there will
be some who will disagree with this decision.
768
That is true about most decisions. Put I
have considered it very carefully niul T hihk
it is very much in the interest of tile
States. As I said before, we have got
lion bushels of this in surplus, and American
taxpayers are [ilying to keep it, and I thihk
we can use the $2oo million or $2.-;0
of gold which will help our balmce of pay-
ments. I think it is in our interest, particu-
larly in view of the fact that the sales arc
being made by other countries.
12.1 Q. Mr. President, could you discuss
some of the recent pohlic accootu': (if (
;iclivi', in;(.11111 Vii t\Litn, jiti lily
thu
.11 1,. iii 1-111111% III 1w
undertaken certain independent operations,
or independent of other elements 01 the
American Government, that are in South
Viet-Nam ?
THE PRESIDENT. I must say I thinl( the re-
ports are wholly untrue. The fuel of the
matter is that Mr. McCone sits in the Na-
tional Security Council. I imagine I see hint
at least three or four times a week, ordinarily.
We have worked very closely together in the
National Security Council in the last 2
months attempting to meet the problems we
faced in South Viet-Narn. I can find noth-
ing, and I have looked through the record
very carefully over the last 9 months, and
I could go back further, to indicate that the
CIA has done anything but support policy.
It does not create policy; it attempts to exe-
cute it in those areas where it has com-
petence and responsibility. I know that the
transfer of Mr. joint Richardson, who is a
very dedicated puhlic servant, has led to
surmises. But I can just assure you flatly
that the CIA has not carried out independent
activities but has operated under close con-
trol of the DirciThr cif CnItral
(tct.ilinr situ 11? cv,ycl:ition iii tlic
tiotril Security Council and under lily in-
structions.
So I think that while the CIA may have
made mistakes, as we all do, on ditTcreiai
occasions, and has had many successes winch
may go unheralded, in my opinion in this
case it is unfair to charge them as they have
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10 Pitrsou:Nr. \Veil, this continues to be
an exchange of views on those flatters which
are at issue between the Soviet Union and
A the United States. In my speech before the
:ly General Assembly, I indicated those areas
,as where the Soviet Union and the United
Is, States had disagreement. It is my hope that
he those disagreements will not lead to war.
h am hopeful that what has happened in the
last months will lessen that prospect. Really,
what has happened since a year ago when
saw Mr. Gromvko will lessen the prospect
of a military clash. liut the ditierences go
iii on. The systems are very different.
:y. Mr. IChrushchev has said that there is no
coexistence in the field of ideology. There
are hound to he very severe matters which
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y. of State has been having them for several
weeks, and I will see Mi', Gronwko this a Iter-
noon to just ip Over the i,round which has
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some exchange of intormation on weather
and other rather technical areas.
Wc have had no indication, in short, that
the Soviet IJnion is disposed to enter into
the kind of relationship which would make
a joint exploration of space or to the moon
possihle. But I think it is important that the
United States continue to emphasize its
peaceful interest and its preparation to go
quite far in attempting to end the harrier
which has existed between the Communist
world and the \Vest. and to attempt to hting,
as much as we can, the Communist world
into the free world of diversity which we
seek. So the matter may come up. lint I
must say we have had no rvsponse which
ss'uilsl ills I hits' that they ale going to 1.11,e
us lip ou it.
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the United States to ban nuclear weapons
from outer space, has the issue of verification
come up in any way, and if so, sir, in what
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[4o51 Oct. 9 /f13 Public Papers of the Presidents
investigator, I wonder whether you feel they
are serving any useful purpose?
THE PRESIDENT. NO, I wouldn't want?I
'haven't commented on the Senate proce-
dures and I wouldn't now on this hearing
or other hearings. That is a judgment for
Senator McClellan and the committee. I do
think that we shouldn't get a distorted idea
from the hearings. I think?particularly as
Columbus Day comes up I think there may
be some feeling of some people that the name
Valachi perhaps causes embarrassment to
other American citizens. I don't think it
should. These difficulties occur in a good
many different racial groups, and I think
that they ought to feel a good deal of pride
in what they have done and not be concerned
because a Valachi or an Irish name or sonic
other name may occasionally get in trouble.
[ z x.] Q. Mr. President, Congressman
Pucinski of Illinois has said to me, and I
think he has proposed to Secretary Wirtz,
that we should have three categories instead
of two in our labor statistics, general statis-
tics. He is proposing that we have em-
ployed, unemployed, and unemployables, be-
cause of their lack of skills. Would you
agree with the Congressman that this would
be helpful in highlighting the problem we
have in employment and education?
vi IE PRESIDENT. I wouldn't want to put it
in that kind of a category. 1 think I can
See there might be some merit in trying to
mark ma t hose who are unemployed because
of structural unemployment, those who are
unemployed because of the seasonal nature
of their work, those who are unemployed be-
cause of illiteracy or lack of motivation.
think all that information?we have a good
deal of it?a good deal of technical informa-
tion, but I don't think I would label anybody
in the United States unemployable.
[121 Q. NEI.. President, how do you feel
about Senator Gruening's proposal to set up
a congressional committee as a watchdog
over the CIA?
Tins plutsmr.N.r. I think the present com-
mittees?there's one in both the House and
Senate which maintains very close liaison
772
with the CIA?are best, considering the sen-
sitive nature of the Central Intelligence
Agency's work.
As you know, there is a congressional com-
mittee in the House, one in the Senate, com-
posed of members of the Appropriations
Committee and the Armed Services Com-
mittee. They meet frequently with Mr.
McCone. He also testifies before the For-
eign Relations Committees of House and
Senate and the general Armed Services Com-
mittee. And I think the Congress has
through that organization the means of keep-
ing a liaison with him.
In addition, I have an Advisory Council
which was headed by Dr. Killian formerly,
now Mr. Clark Clifford, which includes
Jimmie Doolittle and others, and Robert
Murphy, who also served as an advisory com-
mittee to me on the work of the intelligence
community. I am well satisfied with the
present arrangement.
[13.] Q. Sir, there seems to be some con-
nection between the attempt of the State
Department to discharge Mr. Otto Otepka,
the Security Officer, there seems to be some
connection between the fact that he gave
much information to the Senate internal
Security Subcommittee about various em-
ployees of the State Department?William
Arthur Wieland and Walt W. Rostow and
many others. Also Secretary Rush has now
put forth an order that employees of the State
Ikpartment cannot talk or give infortnation
to this congressional committee. Isn't that
a direct violation of law?
TIM PRESIDENT. No, it isn't.
Q. That Government employees are al-
lowed to give information to Members of
Congress and to committees?
'rim PRESIDENT. By what means? You
mean secret dispatches?
Q. Well, any information. The law
doesn't say what it will be. It says that any
Government employee can give information
to Members of Congress or to the committees.
TIM PRESIDENT. Well, let Inc just say that
the Secretary of State has been prepared to
testify since August before the Internal
ons
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ind
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udes
ibert
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illiamu
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c State
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he law
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say that
pared to
Internal
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101111 I:. Kennedy, 196.;
Sk\-111'11V CO111111lItOC ;Ind diNVIISS the CAA' 'VOX
0, \\.,-n,
12111: TRI,sll'IN ClISO 1110. .11lCI?s was a
hearing scheduled for early September, but
because of the Labor Day weekend that hear-
ing did um take place. The Socuctarv ol
State stands t-C,IdV: iSmime iesnstbk'
\TV. NOW tho best thing- to do ut to 1;iVi
the Secretary of State a chance to explain the
entire ease, because in all frankness your
analysis of it is not complete.
Q. Would you like to complete it, sir?
=PRESIDENT. Well, I will be glad to have
the Secretary of State talk to the Internal
Security Committee about what it is that has
caused action to be taken, administrative
action within the Department of State, to be
taken against the gentleman that you have
named, the kind of actions he carried out,
what the law said, how he met the law, how
he didn't meet the law. This is all a matter
which is going to be heard by the State De-
partment board. Then it will be heard by
the Civil Service Commission for review.
Then it can be discussed in the courts.
In the meanwhile the Senate subcommit-
tee can have all the information that it re-
quires as to why Secretary Rusk has taken
the action that he has. I think that is the
best procedure. And I can assure you that
I will examine the matter myself, when it
comes time, as the Secretary of State will,
who bears the responsibility, when it comes
time to take any disciplinary action, if such
a time does come.
[4.] Q. Mr. President, last spring there
were selective price increases in steel, re-
cently there have been price increases in steel.
Are you concerned about these increases, sir,
and do you feel you are going to take any
action about them?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, we are watching
very carefully the rises which have taken
place in certain industries. This country
has avoided an inflationary spiral. We see
no reason why there should be one now.
The Wholesale Price Index has remained
relatively constant for 5 years. We are con-
Oct. 9 1.1o.1
COrli0,1 titit ice incroAsos iii one or
;11o.ls OLIN NIO1O11,110 OIllt'r Ill it O Ut
tUU,s" tins It it ill I ,?IA.
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our balance of payments, t he cline at tCCI
11,111011:11 interest.
In addition, prolit.: ate at a tectild hie,h
now the\ Itti s 11,N si Isseti Ilil;1101 ill ltts't V.
lIi wholc ot 1,10 looks voiv sslsl ;wit,
IllelefOlt`, we .l1SO ivhtli
reducing prices as well as increasing them.
For the time being we are watching the mat-
ter with concern and will continue in the
clays ahead to do so.
[15] Q. Mr. President, has there been
an official ruling that giving commercial
credits to Russia would not violate the John-
son act?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes, that is correct, be-
cause it is not a government-to-government
transaction.
Q. It is not a government-to-government?
THE PRESIDENT. It is not a government-to-
government. These are private traders that
will be involved and the credit will be
granted by banks. In the case of Canada,
as you know, the terms were 25 percent
down, 25 percent then for every 6 months
for a period of 18 months. But because the
interest rate was of a certain figure, I think
4%3 percent, the Soviets decided to pay
cash and, therefore, paid something like
8o percent cash. We will be dealing on
the same matter with them on interest rates.
Our interest rates would be slightly higher
than the Canadian rate, possibly, under the
private commercial system, and it may be
that they will decide, therefore, to pay a very
large percentage in cash.
But I have gotten a ruling from the De- ?
partment of Justice that this does not contra-
vene existing laws, particularly the Johnson
act.
Q. Will the grain dealers take the risk,
then?
THE PRESIDENT. The grain dealers will take
the risk with the private banks.
[x6.] Q. Mr. President, former head of
the CIA Allen Dulles said in an interview
773
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[405] Oct. 9 Public Papers of 2.he Preside')ls
in the Journal American today that reports
of disputes between the CIA and the State
Department and various branches of the
government in South Vict-Nam have arisen
because "of a lack of a cicarcut operational
policy in Washington." And he goes on to
say that he thinks what is needed is less
backbiting between U.S. agency officials.
In view of the defense you just gave CIA,
would you care to agree with the Dulles
charge or contest it?
THE PRESIDENT. I would agree with the
last part of it, that the agencies?as we all
know, they are faced with a very difficult
problem in South Viet-Nam, which we are
all familiar with, both on the military and
political side. Men have different views
about what actions we should take, and they
talk to members of the press, to all of you,
in Saigon and here in Washington. But I
must say that as of today, and I think this is
particularly true since General Taylor and
Secretary McNamara came back, I know of
no disagreement between the State Depart-
ment at the top, CIA at the top, DcfenSe at
the top, the White I--louse and Ambassador
Lodge, on what our basic policies will be
and what steps we will take to implement it.
Now if down below there is disagreement,
I think in part it will be because they are not
wholly informed of what actions we are
taking. Some of them arc necessarily con-
fidential. But I think our policy, though
we can't say what effect it is going to have,
I think we are in agreement about what we
ought to do. I would think that Saigon,
and personnel in the various agencies, should
support that policy, because that is the policy
we are going to carry out for a while.
[17.] Q. Mr. President, if I understood
you correctly on the wheat statement, you
said the Russian people will know they are
receiving American wheat.
THE pRESIDENT. That is correct.
Q. Is that by some agreement with the
Soviet Union or how would that come
about?
THE .pRESIDENT. NO, but WC have Our OW11
means of informing the Soviet Union. As
774
you know, for many months the Voice of
America has not been blocked, for example,
and therefore we believe that we have ade-
quate means to inform the Russian people
of the arrangcmcnt.
In addition, I am not sure that there is
any reason for the Russians themselves to
keep it quiet as it is a commercial transaction.
But in any case, we have the means to pro-
vide that knowledge.
[18.] Q. Mr. President, as the election
year approaches, there is an unusual amount
of political activity already, as the questions
reflect. I wonder if you would give us your
thinking as an experienced politician as to
the prime assets of your administration next
year, and the prime liabilities of your admin.
istration ?
THE PRESIDENT. I think that you would not
want to?as we only have a relatively short
time, I think we ought to make a judgment
on that in 1964. And I say that without
any?a lot of these matters we will have to
decide whether the United States is better
off economically than it was before, and
whether our position in the world has im-
proved, and whether our prospects for peace
are greater, and whether our defenses are
stronger, and whether we are making prog-
ress at home and abroad. That is a matter
which it seems to me will be argued very
strongly in '64. For example, we can't make
a judgment about the state of the economy
in '64. I think if they pass our tax bill, we
are going to be able to demonstrate a very
successful, ebullient economy for a period of
4 years. If they do not, we will have a differ-
ent situation.
I cannot tell. what our relations will
be in Southeast Asia a year from now.
I know what results our policy is attempt-
ing to bring. But I think that result
ought to be judged in the summer of '64 and
the fall of '64, and I have hopes that the
judgment will be that the economy is moving
ahead, that the rate of growth has been al-
most $1oo billion, will have been from about
$.500 billion to $600 billion, that we are sub-
stantially stronger militarily, that the chances
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CJj ?
John F. Kennedy, 1963 Sept. 9 [349]
9Z
Malaya, but would also give the impression
that the wave of the future in southeast
Asia was China and the Communists. So I
believe it.
Mr. Brinkley: In the last 48 hours there
have been a great many conflicting reports
from there about what thc CIA was up to.
Can you give us any enlightenment on it?
TIIE PRESIDENT. No.
Mr. Huntley: Does the CIA tend to make
its own policy? That seems to be the debate
here.
THE PRESIDENT. No, that is the frequent
charge, but that isn't so. Mr. McCone, head
of the CIA. sits in the National Security
Council. We have had a number of meet-
ings in the past few days about events in
South Viet-Nam. Mr. McCone participated
in every one, and the CIA coordinates its
efforts with the State Department and the
Defense Department.
Mr. Brinkley: With so much of our pres-
tige, money, so on, committed in South
Viet-Nam, why can't we exercise a little
more influence there, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT. We have some influence.
We have some influence, and we are at-
tempting to carry it out. I think we don't?
we can't expect these countries to do every
thing the way we want to do them. They
have their own interest, their own person-
alities, their own tradition. We can't make
everyone in our image, and there are a good
many people who don't want to go in our
image. In addition, we have ancient
struggles between countries. In the case of
India and Pakistan, we would like to have
them settle Kashmir. That is our view of
the best way to defend the subcontinent
against communism. But that struggle be-
tween India and Pakistan is more important
to a good many people in that area than the
struggle against the Communists. We
would like to have Cambodia, Thailand,
and South Viet-Nam all in harmony, but
there are ancient differences there. We
can't make the world over, but we can in-
fluence the world. The fact of the matter is
.;:tics in South Viet-Nam, could it
our Government tends occasionally
--! locked into a policy or an attitude
finds it difficult to alter or shift that
RI smENT. Yes, that is true. I think
,cc of South Viet-Nam we have been
, with a government which is in con-
, ;wen in control for so years. In
v.'e have felt for the last 2 years
struggle against the Communists
better. Since June, however, the
1'trs with the Buddhists, we have been
about a deterioration, particularly
- n area, which hasn't been felt
!he outlying areas but mar spread.
:.a:ed with the problem of wanting
the area against the Communists.
- other hand, we have to deal with
crnment there. That produces a
of ambivalence in our efforts which
.ri us to some criticism. We are using
?::,thience to persuade the government
? - to take those steps which will win
..i.port. That takes some time and we
Imtient, we must persist.
i bailey: Are we likely to reduce our
Viet-Nam now?
piti:sinEmr. I don't think we think
: be helpful at this time. If you
r your aid, it is possible you could have
cifcct upon the government structure
On the other hand, you might have
?.:tion which could bring about a col-
Strongly in our mind is what
in the case of China at the end of
War IT, where China was lost, a weak
?:oment became increasingly unable to
cvents. We don't want that.
1:rinkley: Mr. President, have you had
to doubt this so-called "domino
that if South Viet-Nam falls, the
:outheast Asia will go behind it?
1?RisiDENT. No, I believe it. I believe
? t chink that the struggle is close enough.
O ic co large, looms so high just beyond
??,raiers, that if .South Viet-Nam went,
? 01,1 not only give them an improved
?, position for a guerrilla assault on
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a very close vote. So we would have to take
a look at the details of the bill. But as of
now?I looked at the statement of Congress-
man Albert, the Majority Leader. He indi-
cated that he did not think any bill would
pass this year.
[13.] Q. Sir, in El Paso there are goo
jobs in the smelter dependent on some execu-
tive action by you. And according to the
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and man-
agement there, and even the Chamber of
Commerce, there are plants in Denver, Colo.,
and California and other States that are also
dependent on executive action that you might
take in reallocating lead quotas from South
Africa. I wonder how you think this af-
fects domestic mining and what you plan
to do about it?
THE PRESIDENT. I am not familiar with the
matter. I will be glad to look into it, but I
am not familiar with what the executive
powers might be in regard to the importa-
tion of lead from South Africa, nor am I
familiar with the exact quantity of lead we
are receiving from South Africa. But I
will be glad to look into it.
[4.] Q. Mr. President, there is still
quite a lot of discussion in the Congress,
Senator Lausche among others, on the in-
creasing buildup militarily of Cuba. Is
there anything you can say that would be
in any way encouraging about the removal
of the Russian troops there, or of the military
situation in Cuba?
rue PRESIDENT. We do not have any evi-
dence of increasing military buildup of the
Soviet Union. I think in previous press con-
ferences I have given an answer in response
to the question of how many Russians were
there and the comment in regard to the with-
drawal of Soviet troops. We have no evi-
dence that there is an increasing military
buildup. There has not been a satisfactory
withdrawal as yet. That is quite true, but
we have no evidence that there is a number
coming in larger than going out.
Q. Pardon me, sir. I was thinking more
in terms of military equipment going into
Cuba.
422
TIIE PRESIDENT. Yes, I understand that.
We have no evidence that there is an increas-
ing military buildup in Cuba. The intelli-
gence communit has not found that.
15. Q. Mr. President, do you think
Mr. Freeman's effectiveness as Secretary of
Agriculture has been seriously impaired by
the results of the wheat referendum?
THE PRESIDENT. No, no; I think he is
doing very well. If you compare farm in-
come this year?the last 2 years, 1961,
1962?it is higher than it has been any time
since 1953 at the end of the Korean war.
The farmers are better off today than they
have been for so years. In addition, if we
had not had the feed grain proposal, there
would have been a much higher surplus
and there would have been a much lower
farm income.
So I think that while this is a very com-
plicated problem, because automation has
hit the farmers much harder than it has hit
any other element in our community and
their production is growing faster than our
consumption, and therefore this has a tre-
mendous effect on support prices and it has
a tremendous effect, of course, upon the
market price. Mr. Freeman is attempting
to deal with them. My judgment is that he
has met with some successes, because he has
prevented us from spending a lot more
money than we would have spent.
We are getting rid of our grain surplus.
We are hopeful in 2 years it will be gone.
I think we could have made important
progress with our wheat surplus if we had
been successful. It may be that with the
experience we are going to have now, the
farmers may agree with that next year. But
the fact of the matter is in 1963 the farmers
are better off than they have been for so
years, and I think Mr. Freeman deserves
some of the credit for it.
[16.] Q. Mr. President, there has been
considerable discussion in the Far East that
Chiang Kai-shek might be preparing to in-
vade the mainland of China. How would
our Government view an attempt of that
sort?
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!ems svch we face and the exiles face with
200,000-250,000 people coming into our
country. But a government in exile, I think
that is a different question, and in my view
it would be imprudent today and I don't
think it would help the struggle.
iz.] Q. Mr. President, Senator Keating
,ays that according to his information there
has been no reduction in the number of
Russian troops in Cuba. 1-le said several
thousand have left, several thousand have
arrived there, with no change in the overall
number since November. Would you care
to comment?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes. I have already said
that the best information we have from the
intelligence community?and I rely upon
the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency as chairman of the intergovernmen-
tal intelligence community for the informa-
tion which I have given publicly. We
attempt to ask any Congressman or Senator
who has information to the contrary for his
sources so they can be evaluated. I have
stated that our information was, I think the
last time we met, that 4,000, we thought,
left in March, and that no substantial num-
ber had come in this winter. There is some
evidence that some have left in April, but
not a large number. Of course, the equip-
ment itself seems to still be there, however,
so that I would think there has been some
reduction this winter in the number of Rus-
sian personnel on the island. There has not
been a substantial reduction in the equip-
ment. There has been no evidence, how-
ever, of any substantial introduction.
It is not, in my opinion, a grave question
as to whether there's 17,000, 15,000, 13,000.
There are still important elements on
the island, and there's still Soviet equipment
on the island. So I don't think Senator
Keating and I are debating a serious ques-
tion, unless there is a challenge on one side
or the other of good faith, and I am sure
there isn't. It is our best information that
k000 or 5,000 have left since January and
that there has not been an equal number
come in. In fact, much, much less-300 or
Apr. 24 {144}
400 at the most. That's our best evidence
and I repeat it as it has been gathered by our
intelligence sources.
[13.] Q. Mr. President, you have re-
jected the Civil Rights Commission's pro-
posal for the withholding of funds from the
State of Mississippi in particular; yet
Negroes and other persons in some Southern
States are encountering violence and the
withholding of some of their rights. Could
you discuss with us what alternative steps
the Federal Government might be able to
take to bring some of these States into line
with the law of the land?
TIIE PRESIDENT. Well, in every case that the
Civil Rights Commission described, the
United States Government has instituted
legal action in order to provide a remedy.
The Civil Rights Commission gave a num-
ber of cases, the dogs, of a denial of equal
rights at the airline terminal, and all of the
rest. We are attempting through the estab-
lished procedures set out by the United
States Constitution to give protection,
through lawsuits, through decisions by the
courts, and a good deal of action has been
taken in all of these cases.
Now, it is very difficult. We had out-
rageous crime, from all accounts, in the State
of Alabama, in the shooting of the postman
who was attempting in a very traditional
way to dramatize the plight of some of our
citizens, being assassinated on the road. We
have offered to the State of Alabama the
services of the FBI in the solution of the
crime. We do not have direct jurisdiction,
but we are working with every legislative,
legal tool at our command to insure pro-
tection for the rights of our citizens, and we
shall continue to do so.
We shall also continue not to spend Fed-
eral funds in such a way as to encourage dis-
crimination. What they were suggesting
was something different, which was a
blanket withdrawal of Federal expenditures
from a State. I said that I didn't have the
power to do so, and I do not think the
President should be given that power, be-
cause it could be used in other ways
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a $13 V2 billion tax cut without any reforms
at all?
ME PRESIDENT. No, that isn't what I said.
The program which we have sent up is the
fairest and most equitable program, and the
most fiscally responsible program. It pro-
vides for a combination of tax reduction and
tax reform, and I think that a good many
of the reforms make more equitable the tax
reductions, make more equitable the burdens
which the great mass of our taxpayers carry.
So that I think that the best program is
the one we sent up which provides for $131/2
billion in tax reduction and $31/4 billion
revenue in tax reform. I think that's the best
combination. What we will do will depend
of course on what kind of a bill the Congress
enacts, but my judgment is that they will
enact a tax reduction bill which will include
important elements of the reforms that we
sent up.
[31 Q. Mr. President, can you say
whether the four Americans who died in the
Bay of Pigs invasion were employees of the
Government or the CIA?
THE PRESIDENT. 707 I would say that
there are a good many Americans in the last
15 years who've served their country in a
good many different ways, a good many
abroad. Some of them have lost their lives.
The United States Government has not felt
that it was helpful to our interest and par-
ticularly in the struggle against this armed
doctrine with which we are in struggle all
around the world to go into great detail.
Let me say just this about these four men:
They were serving their country. The flight
that cost them their lives was a volunteer
flight and that while because of the nature
of their work it has not been a matter of
public record, as it might be in the case of
soldiers or sailors, I can say that they were
serving their country.
And, as I say, their work was volunteer.
[4.] Q. Mr. President, on Monday
Adrian Fisher of the Disarmament Agency
said that even if the Russians were able to
test underground indefinitely this would not
alter the strategic military balance between
23-711-04----19
the United States and the Soviet Union. He
said this was the executive assessment.
Given that assessment, can you tell us what
considerations then would prevent accepting
a test ban on the terms set by Russia?
THE PRESIDENT. I don't think, if I may say
so?in my opinion that is not what is the ad-
ministration's position. We have suggested
that we would not accept a test ban which
would permit indefinite underground testing
by the Soviet Union. We would not accept
a test ban which did not give us every assur-
ance that we could detect a series of tests
underground. That's the administration's
position. We wouldn't submit a treaty
which did not provide that assurance to the
United States Senate. Nor would the Senate
approve it.
Q. You believe that the present insistence
on seven will have to be maintained?is that
correct?
THE PRESIDENT. I believe that we will insist
upon a test ban treaty which gives us assur-
ance that if any country conducted a series
of clandestine underground tests that that
series would be detected,
Now we have not only the problem of the
number of inspections, but the kinds of in-
spections, the circumstances under which the
inspections would be carried out, so that we
have a good deal of distance to go in secur-
ing an agreement with the Soviet Union.
We've not been able to make any real prog-
ress on the question of the numbers, but I
want to emphasize that this is only one phase
of it. We have to also discuss what the area
would be, in each test, what would be the
conditions under which the inspectors would
move in and out.
I want to say that we have made substan-
tial progress, as a result of a good deal of
work by the United States Government in
recent years, in improving our detection
capabilities. We have been able to determine
that there are a substantially less number of
earthquakes in the Soviet Union than we
had formerly imagined. We have also been
able to make far more discriminating our
judgments from a long distance of what
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because the military threat to Europe is less
than it has been in the past. In other words,
whatever successes we may have had in re-
ducing that military threat to Europe have
brought with it in its wake other problems.
And that is quite natural and inevitable. I
prcfcr these problems to the other problems.
I think that in the summer of 1961?
and of course this all may come again?we
were calling up reserves in preparation for
what might be a collision of major propor-
tions between the Soviet Union and the
United States in Berlin. I would say our
present difficulties in Europe, while annoying
in a sense, or burdensome, arc not nearly as
dangerous as they were then. As far as
Cuba, it continues to be a problem. On the
other hand there are advances in the solidar-
ity of the hemisphere. I think we've made it
clear that we will not permit Cuba to be
an offensive military threat. I think that
we are making some progress in other areas
so that if you ask me whether this was the
"winter of our discontent" I would say no.
If you would ask me whether we were doing
quite as well this winter as perhaps we were
doing in the fall, I might say no, too.
[8.] Q. Mr. President, yesterday Gover-
nor Rockefeller charged that you had been
appointing "segregationist judges" to the
Federal bench in the South. Privately, some
NAACP officials have said before that that
they, too, had been critical of some of the
judgeship appointments that you had made
in the South, and that that had blunted a
certain amount the aggressive stand that the
executive branch had taken against segrega-
tion and race problems in the South. Will
you comment on that?
THE PRESIDENT. No. I think that SOTTle of
the judges may not have ruled as I would
have ruled in their cases. In those cases
there is always a possibility for an appeal.
On the whole, I believe?and this is not true
just of this administration, but the previous
administration?I think that the men that
have been appointed to judgeships in the
South, sharing perhaps as they do the general
outlook of the South, have done a remark-
able job in fulfilling their oath of office.
So I would not generalize. There may be
cases where this is not true, and that is un-
fortunate. But I would say that on the
whole it has been an extraordinary and very
creditable record and I would say that of
Federal judges generally that I have seen in
the last?certainly in the last xo years.
[9.] Q. Mr. President, of late some of
your congressional critics have started to
charge that your administration has been
deliberately withholding important infor-
mation on the Cuban situation. Among the
claims that have been made is that your
Central Intelligence chief, John McCone,
actually knew before October x4th tMrih?e*
Soviets had planted offensive missiles in
Cuba. Is there anything that you can say
on this?
THE PRESIDENT. No. I've Seen charges of
all kinds. One day a distinguished Republi-
can charges that it is all the CIA's fault, and
the next day it is the Defense Department's
fault, and the next day the CIA is being
made a scapegoat by another distinguished
leader. So that we could not possibly answer
these charges, which come so fast and so
furiously. Mr. Arends I said the other day
that the testimony by the Air Force before
the committee indicated that we knew all
about this October loth, even though Gen-
eral LeMay 2 made it very clear in the same
testimony that the Air Force didn't have
such information. So we are not in a posi-
tion to answer these.
I think in hindsight, I suppose we could
have always, perhaps, picked up these mis-
sile bases a few days earlier, but not very
many days earlier, because the missiles didn't
come in, at least in hindsight it now appears,
until some time around the middle of Sep-
tember. The installations began at a later
date. They were very fast, and I think the
photography on the same areas, if we had
'Representative Leslie C. Arencls of Illinois, rank-
ing Republican member of the Armed Services
Committee.
'Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
Force.
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[89] Mar. 6
Public Papers of the Presidents
known that missiles were going in, io days
before might not have picked up anything.
The week before might have picked up
something. Even the pictures taken October
r4th were only obvious to the most sophis-
ticated expert. And it was not until the
pictures taken really the 16th and 17th that
you had pictures that would be generally
acceptable. So this was a very clandestine
and fast operation. So I feel that the intelli-
gence services did a very good job. And
when you think that the job was done, the
missiles were discovered, the missiles were
removed, the bombers were discovered, the
bombers were removed, I don't think that
anybody should feel that anything but a
good job was done. I think we can always
improve, and particularly with the advan-
tage of hindsight. But I am satisfied with
Mr. McCone, with the intelligence com-
munity and the Defense Department, and
the job they did in those days particularly
taken in totality.
[ro.] Q. Mr. President, as you prepare
for your visit to Costa Rica this month, there
seems to be a position there among the Cen-
tral American countries in Panama that the
United States should take a more active
leadership in attacking the problem of Cuba.
I wonder if you could give us some of your
thoughts about how you think this project
should move along that you might find it
possible to discuss with your colleagues there
in San Jose?
TIIE PRESIDENT. Well one of the matters, of
course, that is of interest to us is the question
of the movement of people in and out who
might be trained by the Communists in Cuba
for guerrilla work or subversion in other
parts of the hemisphere. This is an action
which must be taken by each of the countries
in Latin America. We are making proposals
to them bilaterally. There has been an OAS
Committee which has reported on the need
for control. Now it's up to the Latin Amer-
ican countries, I would hope in common
consultation as well as individually, to take
those steps which will control the movement
of people in and out. So we'll know who
240
they are, why they're going, what happens
to them when they get there, and when
they're coming out, and what happens to
them when they come out. This is the kind
of thing which each country finally has to do
itself because it is part of the element of
sovereignty that the control of movement is
within the country of citizenship, but we are
bringing this to the attention of the Latin
American countries as perhaps one of the
most important things we can do this winter.
In addition there have been other things
which have been done on trade, diplomatic
recognition, and all the rest. But I think
we've indicated very clearly that what we
feel is the wisest policy is the isolation of
communism in this hemisphere. We would
hope that the countries of Latin America
with us will participate actively in that
program.
[ii.] Q. Mr. President, recognizing the
interdependence of Canada and the United
States and of course conscious that the cur-
rent anti-American flareup is about defense,
are there any attempts being made to ease
the irritations that are chronic, such as wheat
surplus policy or the trade balance between
the two countries?
TIM PRESIDENT. Well, On the wheat we're
in constant communication with the Canadi-
ans and other wheat producers, that our
disposal under P.L. 480 would not disturb
their normal markets. In the question of
trade balances, we were able to be of some
assistance to Canada during its difficulties
some months ago, on the Canadian dollar,
with other countries, and I would hope that
the United States and Canada would be able
to?having been joined together by nature?
would be able to cooperate.
[12.] Q. Mr. President, for 20 years the
Justice Department has assured Congress
that it had evidence showing that Interhandel
was a cover for the German firm of I. G.
Farben, and therefore the seizure of General
Aniline and Film in this country during
World War II was justified.
Now in the past few days there has been
an agreement between Justice and Inter-
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John F. Kenned , 1963
joined with the power of the North
-:ican Continent, would provide a source
..:ngth in this decade which would
thc balance of power to be main-
with us, and which would inevitably
for an attraction to the underdevel-
.- world.
fhink it would be a disaster if we should
, !-, The forces in the world hostile to
rc powerful. We went through a very
ti;t and dangerous experience this fall
coba. I have seen no real evidence that
policy of the Communist world towards
t: basically changed. They still do not
us well. We are not, as I said at the
;.! puns conference, in the harbor. We are
to very stormy seas and I really think it
he a mistake for us to be divided at
time when unity is essential.
the United States is prepared to
, every effort to provide Western Europe
.11 the strong voice, to join with Western
to cooperate with it to work out
hanisms that permit Europe to speak
.:h the power and the authority that Europe
',titled to.
What we would regard as a most serious
would be, however, a division between
ktlantic, the division between the United
and Europe, the inability of Europe
: the United States to coordinate their
;es, to deal with this great challenge.
is the danger to Europe and the danger
s. And that must not take place. If it
it will have the most serious repercus-
.., tot the security of us and for Western
.rt,pc.
Q. Mr. President, at a time when
Secretary of State and his department
been coming in for some criticism,
tt?tr Jackson's subcommittee on national
.my policy has said the Secretary should
a larger role in national security af-
: a What do you think the Secretary
,..ttc's role should be? And do you think
-; slew and his are the same on this
t.sw PRESIDENT. Yes, my view and his are
711-64-14
Feb. 7 [54]
the same. The Secretary of State is the prin-
cipal adviser to the President in the field
of foreign policy. He is also the chief ad-
ministrative officer of the Department of
State which includes many responsibilities
but whose central responsibility, of course, is
to carry out the day-to-day business, as well
as to set down the larger?and advise the
President on the development of larger poli-
cies affecting our security.
Mr. Rusk and I are in very close com-
munion on this matter. We are in agree-
ment and I have the highest confidence in
him, and I'm sure that?but I do think that
Senator Jackson's suggestions deserve very
careful study. One of our great problems
is we deal with the whole world, and the
Department of State is involved, the Treas-
ury may be involved, Agriculture may be
involved, Defense may be involved, and the
intelligence community involved. The co-
ordination of that in an effective way which
finally comes to the White House is one of
the complicated tasks of administering our
Government in these days.
{51 Q. Mr. President, what, if anything,
do you propose to do about the continued
presence in Cuba of the Soviet military per-
sonnel? Are you just going to let them stay
there?
'am PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, we've
been carrying out a good many policies in
the last 4 months, since October. We were
able to effect the withdrawal of the missiles.
We were able to effect the withdrawal of the
planes. There has been a reduction of 4,500
in the number of personnel. That was done
by the United States being willing to move
through a very dangerous period and the loss
of an American soldier.
The continued presence of Soviet military
personnel is of concern to us. I think the
actions the United States has taken over the
last 4 months indicate that we do not view
the threat lightly.
Q. Mr. President, Defense Secretary Mc-
Namara apparently failed to convince some
Republicans that all offensive weapons are
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[54] Feb. 7 Public Papers of the Presidents
withdrawn from Cuba. What more, if any-
thing, do you believe the administration can
do to convince some of the critics?
Tum ritEstDENT. Well, I don't know what
more we eatt do. Mr. McNamara went to
great length. As he pointed out, he exposed
a good deal of information, and also he went
further than under ordinary conditions we
would have liked to have gone in telling our
story.
Now, he has asked, and I endorse, and
Mr. Mc_Cane has asked, that if anybody has
illfor1111114111 ill IT}1,41111 If)ilirhrc!4r11(11
id I M4101144" Wei )4y441e1111
hITSCIll'e of ally military force or weapons on
the island of Cuba; I think they should make
it available to General Carroll, who's in
charge of intelligence for the Defense De-
partment-if they would turn the informa-
tion over.
Now, we get: hundreds of reports every
111011111, 411111 WI try to check them out. A
good mom, III them me 11111101)1 Er,
pow., and even some of the Metnhers of
ndio've 101 wok! (sillier irhisc
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III 4 4044 I, koll 444, 1,44 1 41 no ,11 04410 111
%, 10111 I 11111 114 1,114t, 111n I 111111 .f141114 1111,4
114,41 14,1111, 441 14,1 fkk.kilk? 0111 ,111{4?44 444 4,04114? nk
ko ,44 ilin 444(4
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Ik? odd, ?\ kiN Imlyo 44144
101% 11{111 h$ 1,1%0?), 4414,44 ??.,,'1,1
ion ,k \\-4, ,,4011441 141444. 1114, 144444' a
44, ,4 41401444 04 10,0'11, 441114 11
41444 111141,111t1A1,,I, 441 44 111, 11 4111110 1111'111110V
14 I stIll4)1C4'k 1,11004 NVIWW th' 110,4141
It
'11104, kkookk, {kook doim(1,,lv 441141
And Nvhen von tall, about the pies,
it 41".
there, I think the Soviet Union is aware and
Cuba is aware that we would be back where
we were in October but in a far more con-
centrated way.
Now, if you're talking about that, and
talking about the kinds of actions which
would come from that, it seems to me we
ought to know what we are talking about.
Now it may be that there are hidden away
some missiles. Nobody can prove, in the
finite sense, that they're not there, or they
might be brought in. But they're going to
have to he erected, nod we contione complete
mit veillance. They have to lir moved. They
have to he put onto pads. 'lliey have to be
prepared to fire. And quite obviously, if the
Soviet Union did that, it would indicate that
they were prepared to take the chance of
another great encounter between us, with
all the clangers.
Now, they had these missiles on the pads
and they withdrew them, so the I limited
States is not powrtless in the area of Cuba,
b
I do ;I
we should keep our hendsitnd ut
attempt to use the hest information we have,
We've got, I Ihinit, IS ,1.,1111441 v Ic Namara
clemotisti met' we't c? talcinn the eatest
plitectO 444' ,1? ",,, 10?,,
111 411 14 1111 141k 14 41 \I 14 1.11i114' 111I 111, t11141 11411
111011 IV 1 11111111 4 411141 )411t' 111,1111,W
Non', 114 1 101', 1111.O. 111111n4 111114 4111 1 4111141
441i44111 !11111 44,? 411,45' 10141 14111,,?1 V4,1t i01,1141 \OR
1 114; 1,14\ t1.1 14444411 1,44, 1,4 100, 14111 WO 4141041 14k
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1,1111n 1110 I1161441 i1,114,4, 411111 41?1, 0111 4111101
It, 44(14 444, to 1tto 144(14k ,4)1,1(41.
h,14 14 ch,,
1?04141on now ithonyho ,tto impe,
thwiv, that Ion 44444' itoillitte, %Iron (11 1 1410
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1111' 1411411'1N i \'1'4, 41014 1(11111 C11151
11111 1101 111111 0 114 1111 4140 444(5454(44441 11111014
tit, 4,4 44,44, 1144110, (10.44 1144, I 1444t551 :!;1,114`,4,
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411141 1144` SO 11401 Ilkow. 11,14 !kook kko
ilwroviion ,ind 14111111 lo ?41,1 inky,
And I don't 44x1,041 111441 Co11,1 will agive to
111e kind of On site inspection that would give
Approved F-Of Release-2011110.8/28_:_CWREIR75-01/ttaR000400340024-8
us more
present ti
Q. Mr.
much on
be our p
should ff,
test to tip,
call our d
THE PR
deal with
This is a
of on-site
anI Mai(
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of the ()
cannot, gi
deception
be expect(
gard to a
have to f
we'll face
16.1
IIMVS1/411)Cl
fall at the
Icy law, a
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ApHoved For Release 2001/08/28 : CIA-RDP75-00149R00040.03401324-8?
6?
John F. Kennedy, 1963 Feb. 7 [54]
s more assurances than we have at the
present time through photography.
Q. Mr. President, because we depend so
much on p1-titreconnaissance, what would
he our position if the President of Cuba
should forbid that and perhaps take a pro-
test to the United Nations about what you
call our daily scrutiny over their territory?
THE PRESIDENT. I would think we would
deal with that situation when it comes up.
This is a substitute, in a sense, for the kind
01 on-site inspection which we hope to get
and which was proposed by the Secretary
General of the United Nations at the time
of the October crisis. The United States
cannot, given the history of last fall, where
deception was used against us, we could not
he expected to merely trust to words in re-
gard to a potential buildup. So we may
have to face that situation, but if we do,
we'll face it.
[6.1 Q. Mr. President, the New York
newspaper?and Cleveland?strikes do not
fall at the present time under the Taft-Hart-
ley law, and the impact of the New York
strike can be seen by the fact that New York's
economy is off 8 percent in department store
sales. Do you feel that there should be some
sort of legislation to bring strikes of this
nature which affect the economy within the
Taft-I lartley law, or do you see a larger role
for the Government in these types of strikes?
nu: PRESIDENT. Well, WS hard to have a
strike under the Taft-Hartley law or under
iiity language. You mean, really, that the
Government would be involving itself in
hundreds of strikes, because a good many
strikes which do not affect the national health
and safety can affect local prosperity, so that
you would find the Government heavily
involved in dozens of strikes.
I must say that I think that I believe
strongly in free, collective bargaining, but
that free, collective bargaining must be re-
sponsible, and it must have some concern,
it seems to me, for the welfare of all who may
Ise directly and indirectly involved. I an
not sure that that sense of responsibility has
been particularly vigorously displayed in the
New York case, this trial by force. It may
end up with two or three papers closing
down, and the strike going on through the
winter.
It would seem to me that reasonable
men?there should be some understanding
of the issues involved, and I don't think in
my opinion that the bargaining there has
been particularly responsible.
[7.] Q. Mr. President, Mr. Khrushchcv
apparently gave you some reason to believe
last October that the Soviet military per-
sonnel were going to be withdrawn from
Cuba. That hasn't happened. And my
question is: Is there any official dialogue
going on now to find out why the Russians
are still there?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, as I say, there has
been this reduction which we already de-
scribed. In addition, as Mr. McNamara
described yesterday, a picture of some evi-
dence of some equipment being moved out.
This is a continuing matter which is being
discussed, obviously, with the Soviet Govern-
ment, and we would expect that we would
have clearer information as to the prospects
as these days go on. But it has not been
completed, and quite obviously in that sense
is unfinished business.
Q. Mr. President, what chances do you
think or do you believe there are of elimi-
nating communism in Cuba within your
term?
TIIE PRESIDENT. I couldn't make any pre-
diction about the elimination. I am quite
obviously hopeful that it can be eliminated,
but we have to wait and see what happens.
There are a lot of unpleasant situations in
the world today. China is one. It's unfor-
tunate that communism was permitted to
come into Cuba. It has been a problem in
the last 5 years. We don't know what's
going to happen internally. There's no ob-
viously easy solution as to how the Com-
munist movement will be removed. One
way, of course, would be by the Cubans
themselves, though that's very difficult, given
the police setup. The other way would be
by external action. But that's war and we
151
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