SOVIET COSMONAUT DEATHS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 14, 1998
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 9, 1967
Content Type:
OPEN
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CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100001-9.pdf | 112.24 KB |
Body:
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Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100001-9
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
. of ,.
PON. CRAIG HOSDMER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, October 9, 1967
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, Julius
Epstein is a research associate at. the
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution,
and Peace. He was educated at the Uni-
versities of Jena and Leipzig and has
been a foreign correspondent. In the,
following article, which appeared in the
Los Angeles Times of October 4 he asks
that the United States give an honest
accounting of what it knows about So-
viet space losses, so that tragedies in the
U.S. program can be assessed with
proper perspective. I second Epstein's
request.
TOPICAL COMMENT: SOVIET SPACE LOSSES-
U.S. PUBLIC NOT PROPERLY INFORMED
(By Julius Epstein)
News on failures of Soviet manned space
flights is, at least in part, "managed" by
Washington. No American without access to
the relevant classified information can know
for sure whether the Soviets suffered fatali-
ties in space. But the evidence is clear that
Washington would not tell even if it knew
all about Soviet space accidents.
Rumors that Soviet cosmonauts were lost
have been circulating for years-long before
Vladimir M. Xomarov was killed last April,
in the only fatal accident admitted by Mos-
cow. For example, on Oct. 4, 1965, Electronic
News reported "the Russians have lost 10
cosmonauts, including one woman, in faulty
space shots." This information was attrib-
uted to "a top NASA official."
In the same year, the celebrated "Penkov-
sky Papers" were published. Col. Oleg Pen-
kovsky was a high official in Soviet intelli-
gence. President Kennedy considered him
to be our best informer inside the U.S.S.R.
During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Mr.
Kennedy relied on Col. Penkovsky's informa-
tion about Soviet missile preparedness. Pen-
kovsky was caught and executed.
The Penkovsky book contains two refer-
ences to Soviet space fatalities. "Several
sputniks were launched ... and. never
FOIAb3b
heard from again. They took the lives of sev-
eral trained astronauts." The colonel also
asserted: "There were several unsuccessful
launchings of sputniks, with men killed prior
to Gagarin's flight. Either the missile would.
explode on the launching pad or it would go
up and never return." Since Penkovsky's in-
formation on Soviet casualties proved to be
accurate, there seems to be no reason to dis-
pute his other disclosures. The Central In-
telligence Agency allowed the publication of
the Penkovsky materials.
In hearings before the foreign operations
and government information subcommittee
on May 23 and June 6, 1963, witnesses from
the National Aeronautics and Space Admi'n,
istration (NASA), hinted broadly that the
Soviets had suffered various mishaps in
space. But, on'the ground that the informa-
tion is classified, they shied away from full
disclosure.
Some Soviet mishaps even became known
to the free world through Communist
sources. A few years ago, a high official of a
Czech-Soviet space research center in Prague
leaked to an Italian news agency the story
that several Soviet cosmonauts had died in
space.
.Even more authenic was the front-page
story in the London Daily Worker on April
12, 1961. The headlines read: "Soviet Cos-
monaut Circles Earth Three Times" ...
"First Man in Space Back Alive-BUt' Suffer-
ing from Effects of His Flight."
The story, according to which the Soviet'
cosmonaut was launched on April 7, 1961,
was wired to the Daily Worker by its Moscow
correspondent, Dennis Ogden.
He and other Communist correspondents
had received sealed envelopes which con-
tained the sensational story. The envelopes
wre not supposed to be opened without the
permission of the Soviet government. All the
Communist newsmen except Ogden followed
the order.
Since the launching actually was a failure,
the Kremlin never released the story-and
only Ogden sent a dispatch anyway.
According to reliable information, the CIA
submitted a confidential document to the
-??..White House early this year reporting the
deaths of at least 11 cosmonauts in addition
to that of Komarov.
The Washington decision not to disclose
information on Soviet manned space flight
failures was made during the last days of the
Eisenhower Administration, presumably to
protect intelligence sources. This decision is
laid down in an agreement between the De-
partment of Defense and the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration, dated
January 13, 1961.
At present, Washington's silence appears
to be motivated by the strong desire to hear
no evil, see no evil and speak no evil about-
the U.S.S.R.
According to the 1961 agreement, NASA
publishes information on Soviet space ac-
tivities which has "been authorized for
public release through the office of the assist-
ant secretary of defense for public affairs,"
provided "the data on foreign space activi-
ties" have been "officially reported to the
United Nations Registry." In addition, only
those data can be released which were con-
firmed by the U.S. space surveillance sys-
tem run by the North American Air De-
fense Command.
However, only those confirmed "data on
foreign space activities (including failures) ".
can be released by NASA "which have been
publicly announced by the foreign govern.
ment concerned."
With the one exception of the Komarov
catastrophe, which could not be concealed,
the Soviets have never yet announced any of
their manned space flight failures. Hence, the
agreement of Jan. 13, 1961, has probably re-'
suited in the withholding of such informa-
tion from the American public.