SOVIET COSMONAUT DEATHS

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100001-9
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 14, 1998
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 9, 1967
Content Type: 
OPEN
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100001-9.pdf112.24 KB
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FOIAb3b Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400100001-9 EXTENSION OF REMARKS . of ,. PON. CRAIG HOSDMER OF CALIFORNIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Monday, October 9, 1967 Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, Julius Epstein is a research associate at. the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. He was educated at the Uni- versities of Jena and Leipzig and has been a foreign correspondent. In the, following article, which appeared in the Los Angeles Times of October 4 he asks that the United States give an honest accounting of what it knows about So- viet space losses, so that tragedies in the U.S. program can be assessed with proper perspective. I second Epstein's request. TOPICAL COMMENT: SOVIET SPACE LOSSES- U.S. PUBLIC NOT PROPERLY INFORMED (By Julius Epstein) News on failures of Soviet manned space flights is, at least in part, "managed" by Washington. No American without access to the relevant classified information can know for sure whether the Soviets suffered fatali- ties in space. But the evidence is clear that Washington would not tell even if it knew all about Soviet space accidents. Rumors that Soviet cosmonauts were lost have been circulating for years-long before Vladimir M. Xomarov was killed last April, in the only fatal accident admitted by Mos- cow. For example, on Oct. 4, 1965, Electronic News reported "the Russians have lost 10 cosmonauts, including one woman, in faulty space shots." This information was attrib- uted to "a top NASA official." In the same year, the celebrated "Penkov- sky Papers" were published. Col. Oleg Pen- kovsky was a high official in Soviet intelli- gence. President Kennedy considered him to be our best informer inside the U.S.S.R. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, Mr. Kennedy relied on Col. Penkovsky's informa- tion about Soviet missile preparedness. Pen- kovsky was caught and executed. The Penkovsky book contains two refer- ences to Soviet space fatalities. "Several sputniks were launched ... and. never FOIAb3b heard from again. They took the lives of sev- eral trained astronauts." The colonel also asserted: "There were several unsuccessful launchings of sputniks, with men killed prior to Gagarin's flight. Either the missile would. explode on the launching pad or it would go up and never return." Since Penkovsky's in- formation on Soviet casualties proved to be accurate, there seems to be no reason to dis- pute his other disclosures. The Central In- telligence Agency allowed the publication of the Penkovsky materials. In hearings before the foreign operations and government information subcommittee on May 23 and June 6, 1963, witnesses from the National Aeronautics and Space Admi'n, istration (NASA), hinted broadly that the Soviets had suffered various mishaps in space. But, on'the ground that the informa- tion is classified, they shied away from full disclosure. Some Soviet mishaps even became known to the free world through Communist sources. A few years ago, a high official of a Czech-Soviet space research center in Prague leaked to an Italian news agency the story that several Soviet cosmonauts had died in space. .Even more authenic was the front-page story in the London Daily Worker on April 12, 1961. The headlines read: "Soviet Cos- monaut Circles Earth Three Times" ... "First Man in Space Back Alive-BUt' Suffer- ing from Effects of His Flight." The story, according to which the Soviet' cosmonaut was launched on April 7, 1961, was wired to the Daily Worker by its Moscow correspondent, Dennis Ogden. He and other Communist correspondents had received sealed envelopes which con- tained the sensational story. The envelopes wre not supposed to be opened without the permission of the Soviet government. All the Communist newsmen except Ogden followed the order. Since the launching actually was a failure, the Kremlin never released the story-and only Ogden sent a dispatch anyway. According to reliable information, the CIA submitted a confidential document to the -??..White House early this year reporting the deaths of at least 11 cosmonauts in addition to that of Komarov. The Washington decision not to disclose information on Soviet manned space flight failures was made during the last days of the Eisenhower Administration, presumably to protect intelligence sources. This decision is laid down in an agreement between the De- partment of Defense and the National Aero- nautics and Space Administration, dated January 13, 1961. At present, Washington's silence appears to be motivated by the strong desire to hear no evil, see no evil and speak no evil about- the U.S.S.R. According to the 1961 agreement, NASA publishes information on Soviet space ac- tivities which has "been authorized for public release through the office of the assist- ant secretary of defense for public affairs," provided "the data on foreign space activi- ties" have been "officially reported to the United Nations Registry." In addition, only those data can be released which were con- firmed by the U.S. space surveillance sys- tem run by the North American Air De- fense Command. However, only those confirmed "data on foreign space activities (including failures) ". can be released by NASA "which have been publicly announced by the foreign govern. ment concerned." With the one exception of the Komarov catastrophe, which could not be concealed, the Soviets have never yet announced any of their manned space flight failures. Hence, the agreement of Jan. 13, 1961, has probably re-' suited in the withholding of such informa- tion from the American public.