IDEOLOGY OF ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA EXPLORED

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000300330001-5
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• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1968
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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IDEOLOGY OF ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA EXPLORED
[Article by Peter Schenkel, Bad Godes'b erg, Vierteljahresberichte, German,
CFNW 1968, pp 137-153]
GHT
The death of Ernesto Che Guevara, officially confirmed in Bolivia
in October of 1967, finally solved the mystery about the Argentine-Cuban
revolutionary. But his death and the failure of the guerrillas led by
him in Bolivia also provided new fuel for the violent controversies
carried on by continental left-wing forces about the means of the Latin
American revolution.
Although Guevara became famous as a daring guerrilla leader, his
real significance lies in the ideological field. As Marxian theorist
of a particularly militant proletarian internationalism, as strntetist
and tactician of guerrilla warfare in Latin America, and as a reformer
in Cuba, his was without doubt the most prominent and ablest intellect
of Cuban Marxism besides Fidel Castro, and he had great influence on the
thought and actions of the young revolutionary forces. His ideas, which
were proclaimed loudest in Havana, will probably continue to play a part
with the Latin American left. This is already assured by the fact that
the discrepancy between the idea of armed struggle propagated by him and
Cuba and the more moderate course of action advocated by the Soviet Union
and the majority of the Latin American Communist Parties has entered a
stage of open antagonism which c a n n o t b e s e t t I e d over-
night. For this reason alone, it appears useful to examine the ideological
legacy of Che Guevara.
It must be mentioned beforehand that Che Guevara has not left a
comprehensive theoretical work. With the exception of his book on
guerrilla warfare La Guerra de Guerrillas (The Guerrilla War), Havana,
INRA*1960, translated into all world languages), his ideas are found
scattered in a great number of speeches, interviews, official documents
and other publications. In spite of this somewhat splintered character,
his ideological legacy does not lack a certain coherence. Only Guevara's
last manuscript could not be taken into account here: his still-
unpublished diary on the guerrilla episode in Bolivia. However, that
too -- this much is known -- leaves his fundamental theses unchanged.
*Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria; National Agrarian Reform Institute
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I. Che Guevara's Radical Global Concept
The general line of action followed by N. Khrushchev, but also
by the present leaders of the Soviet Union, is that of coexistence, of
peaceful competition between states with different social systems,
of avoidance of policies which might lead to a direct confrontation with
the US and to atomic war, and of the realization of the socialist revolu-
tion in developed and underdeveloped countries in a peaceful way with
participation of the non-Communist sectors of the population. This line
of action ran into growing resistance not only in China but also in the
militant movements of many of the developing countries.
1. Enemy of Peaceful Coexistence
Che Guevara was bitterly opposed to the politics of "peaceful
coexistence," where his reasons were of a political and doctrinal nature.
On the one hand, due to the strained relations between the US and Cuba
and their consequences, he held that peaceful coexistence was illusory
and impossible. ". . , The aggressive nature of the US's monopolistic
capitalism makes any agreement impossible; the relationships will of
necessity remain strained or become worse until the final destruction of
imperialism."1 Like Fidel Castro, Che Guevara refused to sign the
Nuclear Agreement of August 1963 and spoke against the suggestion advanced
by Brazil, Chile and Mexico in the UN to create a nuclear-free zone in
Latin America.2
On the other hand, Guevara saw in the general concept which had
been worked out by the international conference of the Communist Party of
1960 and by the last conferences of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union in which great significance was seen in the possibility of realiz-
ing the socialist revolution in a peaceful manner and of developing the
"state of national democracy" in the "Third World" a renunciation of the
armed fight for independence in colonial and economically dependent areas
and a watering-down of the struggle against i~.~~rialism in general. He
was convinced of the inevitability of armed struggle. in the underdeveloped
world and above all in Latin America, and saw in Vietnam the shining
example for the even greater conflict "which awaited imperialism on
the Latin American continent." He prophesied that "the final victory
in this struggle will also signify the end of US imperialism."3 The
process of disintegration of the "imperialist world system" he thought
to be so far advanced at the present that there exists a real possibility
of changing the existing balance in the world and of sealing the "fate of
imperialism" through the armed struggle for independence. Hence, in the
final analysis, the idea of coexistence of the Communist states meant for
Guevara a strengthening of imperialism and neo-colonialism.
1Footnotes may be found following the text.
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Che Guevara's concept of proletarian internationalism far
exceeds the limits set by the Eastern European countries.4 He judged
that "there are no limits in this struggle of life or death." "The
victory of any nation over imperialism is our victory, and its defeat
is defeat for all of us. The practice of proletarian internationalism
is not only a duty , . . , but an urgent necessity. It is our interna-
tional duty . . . with our efforts to help bring about the liberation
of the nations as quickly and as radically as possible."5 What he meant
by this is obvious from the following reproach addressed to ~'oscow and
Peking: "The solidarity.of the progressive world with the peoil c of
Vietnam today resembles the bitter irony of the plebeians wh o encouraged
the gladiators in the Roman arena. The point is not to wish the victim
of aggression success, but to share his fate." It would have been their
duty "to make Vietnam an inviolable part of the socialist world and to
force the US into a decision -- even at the, risk of world war."7
This is the way, similar to Fidel Castro, in which Che Guevara
conceived of the "basic line of action of militant anti-imperialism
and internationalism" of Cuba. The development of socialism in Cuba
was for him only one of the fundamental tasks of the new regime -- and
not even the most important. The more meaningful task was to acrrively
and with all possible means advance the "anti-imperialist struggle for
liberation wherever it had started or where conditions were rine for it.
Long after Guevara had left Cuba, Fidel Castro said, ". . . . Ct.r Country
is fighting for its wealth and its future, but it will never want to
achieve this future at the dishonorable price of the betrayal of its
international duties."8 For Che Guevara, this postulate was not only o'
political but also of eminent moral significance. He feared that a revolu-
tion which concentrated only on the solution of its own economic problems
and forgot militant proletarian internationalism would soon cease
being a guiding force for humanity.9 Glancing at Eastern Europe, he
felt that it would certainly degenerate to sluggish indolence in which
the real revolutionary spirit would be lost.
No problem has been more vigorously disputed during the past years
within world Communism than the question of war and peace. In this connec-
tion it has frequently been asked whether Guevara's militant anti-imperial-
ism does not represent a particularly extreme pro-war doctrine. This
question cannot be answered in the affirmative without reservations. For
him, nuclear conflict was not an unavoidable means of carrying out the
world revolution, But neither did he draw back from a world v-ar which
might be the consequence of a local fight for liberation. With regard
to Cuba, he explained: "For the right to build up socialism according
to the will of our people, we must pay any price."10 And, at another
point, "If it has fulfilled its role as example for Latin America, our
nation will be completely happy, even if because of it nuclear war should
come about.1111 That this was not mere rhetoric became apparent during
the rocket crisis of 1962.
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Che Guevara considered the :;.ti-imperialist struggle for libera-
tion in Africa, Asia and Latin America to be historically justified and
necessary. "If anybody opposes it," it was his opinion that "it is
permissible . . . to employ arms in the fight for peace."12 He demanded
of the Communist countries to make this fight for liberation their fight,
and he blamed them for having betrayed Vietnam out of fear of a global
conflict with the US. He wrote, "Since the imperialists extort humanity
with the threat of war, it is a wise reaction not to fear war! . . . It
is our duty to liberate it at any price."13 he said it was the task of
Latin America to create a second or third Vietnam which would then intro-
duce "the final victory over imperialism" in a global conflict.
Che Guevara talked of the suffering and the victims of such a
struggle as nothing by saying, "They would be less than those which we
would have to suffer if we continuously avoided war so that others would
have to do the dirty work for us."14 His statement that " US imperial-
ism is weaker than we think; it is a giant or, clay feet," does not permit
us to interpret this to mean that he may perhaps have had in mind a
peaceful submission by the US.15
Thus, it is obvious that Guevara's ideas on war and peace do not
agree with the Soviet line but are closer to Mao's.
4. The Unity of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle
In the writings from the time Che Guevara spent in Cuba, we find
no hint as to his position with regard to the schism in the Com unisy
world. Nevertheless, it was hardly a secret to anyone that he sympathized
with Peking as far as the tactics and strategy of the so-called anti-
imperialist struggle was concerned. only after he had left Cuba, he
wrote, "In view of the malice and inflexibility with which the respective
points of view are advocated, we, the dispossessed, can take our stand
neither on the one side nor on the other side of the discrepancies . ,
even though we sometimes agree more with the assertions C)17 the eec side
than with those of the other."16 ','his statement, which may be interpreted
as being pro-Chinese is however not based on a relationship of ideological
dependence by Guevara on Peking. Early in 1960, Che Guevara admitted to
the author that he knew neither Mao Tse-tung's writings nor anything else
about China, and in 1963 he explained to a US student delegation that any
agreement of his position with that of Peking was "purely accidental."
He blamed both Moscow and Peking for the continued existence of the
schism.17
Guevara had no illusions about the prevailing contradictions.
They were said to have reached such intensity and bitterness that there
was little or no hope for a dialogue or perhaps even a reconciliation.
Nevertheless, he passionately called for unity. He wrote, "The time
has come to bury our discrepancies and to employ all of our forces in
the service of our struggle." And his reason for this was that "The
enemy is at hand; he attacks us daily and threatens us with new attacks,
and these attacks shall unite us today, tomorrow, or the day after.
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Anyone who is the first to see this and who prepares for the necessary
unity will receive the gratitude of the nations."18
Guevara considered the unity of the Communist world movement to
be more than merely a theoretical, academic question. For him it was
the prerequisite for "the creation of a common front of all underdeveloped
countries with the Communist countries against imperialism." The manner
in which "imperialism" proceeds against both groups of countries "justi-
fies with elementary logic the necessity of as alliance -- and if there is
no other reason for a close alliance, the common enemy provides it."19
But Guevara was skeptical of the Eastern European countries. Independently
of them, the pleads everywhere -- at the World Conference for Trade and
Development (Geneva, 1964), in the United Nations (December, 1964), and
during his stay of several months in Africa and Asia (early in 1965) --
"to establish the unity of the c wip of the underdeveloped countries."20
He was, without doubt, the spiritual originator of the Tricontin.atal
Conference held in Havana in January 1966 and the founder of the Latin
American Solidarity Organization (OLAS), which was given the task to
become the mouthpiece for the liberation movements in Asia, Africa and
Latin America, and to advance and coordinate their armed strug1e.21
II. Che Guevara on the Strategy and Tactics of the Revolution in Latin
America
Guevara's ideological complex which is most significant and most
nearly complete in itself concerns the revolution in Latin Ammerica. This
was his most important business. Guevara:'s contribution consists in his
having clarified the theoretical theses w1ich were designed to serve as
fundamental guidelines for the strategy and tactics of an armed struggle
for liberation and for guerrilla warfare. Even today, these theses are
still an integral part of Castro-.'h:arxism, especially of the OLAS mentioned
above which has its seat in Havana.
Che Guevara's theses on the Latin American revolution are primarily
characterized by the extrapolation of the Cuban example to the conditions
on the whole continent. Its motto is: `What was possible in Cuau can be
repeated in Latin America." With reference to this, we have to call atten-
tion to the following authoritative theses:
Objective and subjective conditions. According to Guevara, the Cuban
example proved that wherever lati'r:undium and capital are allied with US
capitalism and where, as a consequence, political dependence and under-
development prevail -- and this is said to hold for most countries of
Latin America -- the objective conditions for a revolution according to
the Cuban example are given. He specified that "these objective condi-
tions are based on hunger -- the common denominator of the masses of
Latin America -- the reaction of the masses to this hunger, the govern-
ment terror and the hatred which is a product of this terror."22 Of
course, in some countries (such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, ~,exico),
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he did not consider the objective conditions for a revolutionary develop-
ment as being immediately present. But in most of the countries of Latin
America he judged the objective conditions to be incomparably more ready
than those which had existed in Cuba.23
As far as the subjective conditions arc concerned, the Cuban
revolution was said to have shown that these can be created during the
struggle itself. Guevara stressed that the revolutionary consciousness
is created through the struggle, through armed struBgie," because only
this struggle would bring "clearly into consciousness the necessity of a
radical revulsion and the defeat of the army by the people's forces."
Fidel Castro also explains- that "Man hiasclf, the revolutionary process,
creates the revolutionary consciousness."24 Like him, Che Guevara was
of the opinion that there was no need for politically-prepared masses to
get a revolution under way, but that one needed only a small guerrilla
nucleus with the capacity to draw the masses into the struggle, as in Cuba.
The Hopelessness of the Peaceful bay. Next, Che Guevara feels that
the Cuban experience has proven until everybody became weary of it that
it is impossible in Latin America to effect thorough reforms for the masses
in a peaceful manner. He thus thought the struggle which aims only at
creating civil legality without putting itself the task of assuming power
to be completely senseless.25 In guerrilla warfare, the masses must be
convinced of the impossibility of carrying on the struggle for social
gains within the framework of civil conflict.26
Justification of the Armed Str.z; e. Third, ho thought the Cuban,
revolution to have shown the correctness of the idea of an armed fight
and of the fighting methods of guerrilla warfare. Che Guevara did in
fact warn not to underestimate the role played by the constitutional
methods of fighting, but he left no doubt that he considered armed fighting
-- according to Cuban example -- the principal way "of getting to power."77
After all, without destruction of the existing ar?iy, even the victory in a
popular election would provide no Guarantee, The conf=lict with the reac-
tionary classes would soon spring up again, and the of a military
coup d'etat would always be there. hence, Guevara had little regard for
the more moderate theses of many of the Communist parties. His fighting
motto was that of the Second Declaration of I-Iavana: "It is the duty of
each revolutionary to make revolution." Referring to the hesitating Com-
munist parties, he wrote, ". . . Nobody has the right to believe that
liberty can be obtained without struggle."28 Besides, he thought the Cuban
experience to have shown that, in Latin America, guerrilla warfare is the
only correct form of fighting for power to be used by the :.iasscs.29
Rural Areas as Center of Gravity in the Fighting. Fourth, he
thought the Cuban revolution to have clearly shown that "the basic armed
struggle in the underdeveloped part of America must be carried out in
the rural areas."30 Guevara opposed those who wanted to concentrate
the fighting in the cities and ignored the large part of the rural popula-
tion. He said that because of the inhuman conditions under which they
live, theirs would be the decisive part in the national struggle for
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liberation. In the end, the country would conquer the cities with the
help of an army of peasants.31 To the forces in the city should be given
the role of merely supporting the guerrilla bands operating in the rural
areas. The decisive factor in this was that Guevara saw the principal con-
tradiction in Latin America in the gap between the backward rural areas
and the far more highly developed cities. To this was added his tactical
consideration that the nucleus of guerrillas in the country would continue
to guarantee the continued existence of the revolutionary leadership, even
if the movement in the city were to be destroyed by the enemy.
Support by the Rural Population. As a basic prerequisite of success-
ful guerrilla fighting, Che Guevara postulated, according to the Cuban
example, the support of the guerrillas by the local rural population. He
found this support to be a condition "sine qua non" for the struggle against
a powerful ;.rmy with modern equipmcnt.~2 Guevara considered it a foregone
conclusion that the masses of the workers and peasants of Latin America
would take the side of the guerrillas, join them, and supply them. After
all, on the basis of the Cuban experience, they would know that it is
possible to win with the guerrillas; secondly, they would have thus become
conscious of the fact "that the future belongs to the people, since it is
for social justice."33 He figured that without comprehensive support by
the rural population, guerrilla warfare could not be recommended in Latin
America, either.
The similarity of Guevara's postulates with the theses of Mao Tse-
tung on peasant war and the encirclement of the city by the country is
obvious, The OLAS conference in Havana (1967) accepted all of these
theses. Contrary to this, they are not accepted today by the majority
of the Latin American and European Communist parties which point out the
difference in the conditions in Cuba and in Latin America.
2. Exception from the Cuban Example
From within the ranks of many orthodox Communist parties, repeated
statements have been made since the triumph of i,idel Castro which consider
it questionable whether the Cuban revolution could be repeated and which
point toward the "exceptional character" of the case of Cuba. Che Guevara
himself was aware of some of these exceptions in the Cuban model.
Polarization of the Forces. Guevara admitted that the success of
the Cuban revolution was made possible by the support which Fidel Castro
was also given by many sections of the propertied classes and by the
passive behavior of the US. "Thus, non-revolutionary forces actually
helped in the establishment of the revolutionary regime US
imperialism was disoriented, and it did not succeed in understanding the
true significance of the Cuban revolution.1134
However, Che Guevara felt that this formula today could no longer
be successfully be applied in Latin America because of the later change-
over to the socialist revolution in Cuba. He thought that the propertied
classes of Latin America had learned their lesson from this and that
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"even imperialism on the continent could no longer be taken by
surprise."35 He maintained that "The Cuban revolution has given the
signal . . . . It has drawn the line in the sand and introduced a process
of polarization of the forces: the exploiters on one side of the line,
the exploited on the other."36 He further assumed that this polarization
process would become more strongly accentuated with the continuing radical-
ization of the Cuban revolution. Neutrality would, of necessity, become
the exception, and the contrary positions of the bourgeoisie and the work-
ing class would become more clearly defined. Finally, the polarization of
the antagonistic forces would explode in a global conflict.
Revolution Without, Bourgeoisie. Che Guevara was convinced of the
fact that, because of the polarization which had occurred, one must no
longer expect the participation of wide strata of the middle class and
the lower middle class in the revolution. Even though he thought that
there existed contradictions "between the national bourgeoisie and imper-
ialism, these bourgeoisieshave shown that they fear the people's revolu-
tion more than the suffering of imperialist suppression . . .1137 For
this reason, the majority of them have allied themselves with "imperial-
ism" and openly resist the revolutionary efforts of the masses. Hence,
the possibility of the participation of the Latin American middle classes
in the revolutionary struggle, as it was postulated by the declaration
of the 81 Communist parties (Moscow, 1960), was decidedly denied by Che
Guevara. Also, he thought that the tactics successfully employed by
Castro to disguise his movement by giving it an exclusively anti-dicta-
torial and even slightly anti-Communist appearance before the seizure of
power, could not be repeated. Today, such a disguise would be illusory
and damaging. Hence, the struggle for liberation would have to be carried
on in the name of Marxism-Leninism in Latin America and would have to
openly pursue the goal of the "realization of the socialist revolution."38
He thought it absolutely necessary that it identify itself with the Cuban
revolution. Guevara reasoned that with the "victory over imperialism"
and over local reactionary forces in Latin America, too, the first stage
of the socialist revolution would be attained ". . . Then the people
could begin with building up social ism."s9
The Continental Character of the Struggle. Due to its tactics
during the period of the uprising, the Cuban revolution did not Leconte an
object of global conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, prior to
its triumph but attained its victory, in a way, "isolated" from other
world affairs. Guevara considered a repetition of this happy state of
affairs impossible in Latin America. ,c was certain that now the US
would leave nothing undone in order to give not only political but also
military support to the ruling oligarchies. hence, military intervention
by the US and by the reactionary neighboring states would make the success
of the revolution in each country much more difficult to attain. He
thought that from this arises the necessity to reply "to the unification
of the forces of suppression with the unification of the forces of the
people."40 Consequently, Che Guevara conceived of "The organization of 41
a continental fighting front against imperialism and its local allies.
This idea was realized in the OLAS and probably also in a kind of strategic
supreme command of the guerrilla movements.
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Thus, on a number of significant questions, Che Guevara admitted
the exceptional position of the Cuban revolution. However, he did not
conclude from this that a repetition of this revolution would therefore
be impossible on the continent,but that it would just be much more diffi-
cult and could take much longer. For example, in Bolivia, Guevara is
said to have expected the fight to take about ten to twenty years.42 His
basic conception of the correctness of an armed struggle in Latin America
was not diminished by this but rather strengthened.
3. The Guerrilla as the Military Arm in the Struggle for Liberation
For Che Guevara,guerrilla war was the primary military instrument
of the revolutionary movement. Hence, he attributed decisive significance
to the tactics of guerrilla warfare. P4nat were his relevant fundamental
ideas?
Phases of Development of the Guerrilla. Guevara wrote that after
the selection of the area of operations, a guerrilla war would generally
run through three stages.43 In the first stage, that of strategic defense,
he thought it was the principal task of the guerrillas to get to know the
terrain, to carry out limited attacks, and above all to prevent their own
destruction.44 In this stage, during which also contact with the popu-
lation and future strongholds would have to be built up, there would be
"three conditions for the survival of the guerrillas: constant i:obility,
constant vigilance and constant distrust."4a As soon as the guerrillas
had overcome their relative tactical inferiority, had grown in numbers
and had established a solid stronghold in an area in which the army would
no longer dare to attack, the guerrilla war would eater its second phase.
During this, the guerrillas would resort to over more powerful strikes,
would force the opposition forces into the defensive and would enlarge
the liberated zone. The third and last phase would be introduced with
bringing out the guerrillas, now organized in strong units, and would
lead to the occupation of the large cities and to the total destruction
of the enemy.46
Fighting Tactics of the Guerrillas. Like Mao 'i'se-tun;, Che Guevara
saw the basic problem of a weak guerrilla group as opposed to a powerful
regular army in the followin tactic: "I;, view of the general superiority
of the enemy, we must find the tactical way of attaining relative superiority
at a selected point."47 By the concentration of superior forces or the
use of the terrain, the correlation of the forces would have to be shifted
and superiority of one's own forces would have to be created. Under no
circumstances should a struggle be entered into "which does not bring
victory as long as one is able to determine 'how' and 'when' ."4S Guevara
ascribed decisive significance above all to the element of surprise and to
the speed with which the guerrillas hit the enemy, where he assigns an
important role to night attacks, fast retreats and evasion movements. On
the other hand, he scorned the idea of guerrilla war as "passive self-
defense" of a certain area, without regard to the rest of the country.49
Such a tactic would necessarily lead to the localization, surrounding and
destruction of the guerrilla. Even in the beginning stage, the guerrillas
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should "constantly develop their capacity to attack the enemy." n y y
consistently using the Vietnamese principle of "armed propaganda," i.e.
of the demonstration of their military strength and invincibility, Che
Guevara believed, can they win the population to their side and thus
serve as catalist of the popular forces.50
Disturbance of the Existing Balance. The tendency toward institu-
tionalism in the countries of Latin America was evaluated by Che Guevara
as being unfavorable to the development of a guerrilla war. But even more
he was afraid that the ruling classes, "who assume the appearance of
democratically-elected representatives of the people," could succeed in
blunting the class struggle by economic and social concessions and in
averting the social explosion. hence, he demanded that it must be the
task K the guerrilla to prevent this backward development. he wrote,
"It is necessary to disturb by force the balance between the oligarchic
dictatorship and the pressure of the masses." "The dictatorship tries
to maintain itself without use of force"; hence, it would be necessary
"to force them to show themselves without disguise, in their true form
as a violent dictatorship of the reactionary classes; this would . . .
intensify the struggle to such an extent that it is no longer possible
to withdraw."51 The guerrilla actions would force the democratic regimes
to rid themselves of their pseudo-legality and to use terror against the
guerrillas and their allies in the cities and in the country. I-;ence, he
thought the main concern was to press on with the progressive radicaliza-
tion of the revolutionary process.
Vietnam as Example. By using the guerrilla war, he not only
wanted to force the downfall of the prevailing orders in Latin America,
but also wanted to level a ruinous attack against the "imperialism of
the US." For this reason, Guevara demanded the simuit4neous develop-
ment of guerrilla movements in several Latin American countries. Each
was supposed to try to transform itself as fast as possible into an
invincible people's army and thus force the US to secure the stability
of the government, whose armed forces would collapse under the guerrilla
attacks, by sending its own regular troops.52 Guevara reasoned that with
this the tactical aim, "to lure the enemy from his nctural environment
and to force him to fight in regions whore his living habits will collide
with the existing realities," was attained. The cost in privations,
victims and repeated defeats in the end would wear down the US soldiers
and would bring about the class struggle in the US itself. Thus, for Che
Guevara, the road for Latin America to take was that or Vietnam.
4. The Guerrillas as Political Center in the Struggle for Liberation
In addition to their decisive military function, the guerrillas,
according to Che Guevara, also have significant political tasks which are
designed to increase their revolutionary resonance and striking power.
The Guerrilla as Propagandist and Social Reformer. "The guerrillas
are the fighting vanguard of the people." According to Guevara, this
axiomatic necessity requires of the guerrillas that they create political
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conditions which are necessary for establishing revolutionary power.53
Thus, it is the important task of the guerrillas to convince the local
rural population of the justice and necessity of the armed struggle. In
this, however, neither proclamations to the people nor personal dialogue
are sufficient. The important point is to demonstrate the humanitarian
goals of the guerrillas, to help the peasants "technically, economically,
morally and culturally,"54 in other words, to demonstrate with actions to
the population the moral superiority of the guerrillas over the regular
soldiers.55 As an example, Guevara mentions the execution of agrarian
reform in the liberated areas as it was carried out by Castro in the
Sierra Maestra of Cuba. As a consequence of such measures, the land-
hungry peasant population would take the side of the guerrillas and thus
create the prerequisite for developing the guerrillas into a popular army
and for extending and radicalizing the revolution.
The Guerrilla as Political Leader of the Revolution. however, Che
Guevara took one more decisive step. He demanded that the guerrillas are
to be considered not only as the military but also as the political center
of the national liberation movement. Thus he remained true to the example
of the Cuban revolution with respect to teis point, too, in wn ch the
military and political leadership had been with Fidel Castro's head-
quarters. Guevara argues that, on the one hand, "the back one of the
political power of the movement remained unbroken, even when the revolu-
tionary forces in the city suffered a defeat."56 On the other hand, the
guerrilla activity could not be directed from the city without robbing
it of its striking power and efficiency, os:)ecially if one would try to
subordinate the actions of the guerrillas to the goals of political
maneuvers in the urban areas. For this reason, Guevara demands that both
the political campaigns of the movement and the actions in the cities must
be subordinated to the guerrilla war as the fundamental fighting method.
Even in countries in which there is a large urban preponderance, "the
political center of the struggle must therefore be developed in the
country." In addition to this, he also demanded that "the military and
political leaders . . ., as far as possible, should not be identical.i57
With this, Che Guevara definitely opposed the thesis which had been used
by the Communist party of Venezuela and also by the Communist party of
Bolivia and which consisted of the argument that the guerrillas should
only represent the armed branch of the revolutionary movement, while
the political center of gravity should remain in the city in the hands
of the party leadership.
Challenge to the Leadership Role of the Orthodox Communist Parties.
Guevara's conviction that the orthodox Communist parties of the continent
had lost their "leadership role in the revolutionary and anti-imperialist
struggle" was in back of his thesis of the central political role of the
guerrillas.58 Guevara was strengthened in this conviction by the partly
passive, partly negative attitude of the majority of the Latin American
Communist parties toward the Cuban call for armed fighting in the Second
Declaration of Havana (1962) and by the almost unanimous condemnation of
the course of guerrilla warfare recommended by Cuba and by the OLAS by
all of these parties in recent times.59 As early as 1963 he wrote,
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"Nobody can claim the title of vanguard li::e a diploma handed out by a
university. To be the party of the vanguard means to lead the working
class in its struggle for power, to guide it in its conquest of this
power, and to show it the shortcuts available for this road."60 Guevara
accused the traditional Communist parties of occupying themselves only
with the forms of legal fighting. In his opinion, they were striving only
for alliance with other forces and, in this way, were indefinitely post-
poning the seizure of power. Ile thought that under present conditions
the guerrillas were the only force which would consistently identify
itself with the justified demands of the ,;asses for radical solutions.
With this, Che Guevara denied the Communist parties of Latin
America the moral right to lead the masses and he postulated instead
that the future party, as in the case of Cuba, would have to grow out
of the guerrilla nucleus. "The guerrilla is the germ of the party and
not vice versa."61 In the same sense, Fidol Castro had attacked the
"right-wing course" of the Communist parties of Latin America and had
claimed for the guerrilla movements the loading political role in the
continental fight for liberation.62 Thus, from the very beginning, there
was hidden in Guevara's theses on the Latin American revolution the
ambitious idea to Cafi into life, through the guerrillas, a new radical
left front for the %Q%olet continent which would be independent of the
existing Communist parties and which would take its direction from Havana.
III. Che Guevara on the "Building of Socialise,;"
Che Guevara's ideas on the reconstruction of society in many ways
put his personal stamp on the Cuban model of the "building of socialism.'
Of course, he formulated nothing concrete on the question of institution-
alizing the revolution. Also, in the purely economic area he has left no
original ideas; his theses on the priority of industrialization and on a
strict centralism are today considered outdated even in Cuba. Neverthe-
less, Guevara has made a lasting contribution to the "development of the
socialist order of society in Cuba, namely in the area of education and
morals.
1. The Building of Socialism, the Individual, and Ethos
The Aim of Communist Society. Lice 'Marx, Guevara considered the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the building of socialism a pre-
liminary stage in which the socialization of the means of production,
the maximal development of tcchnology, and a just property distribution
had to be secured so that later the classless society of Communism with
its optimal satisfaction of demands could be realized. 3ut, for him,
satisfying the material requirements was not the only and not even the
most important concern. Socialism and Communism meant more to him than
the destruction of the capitalist order and the creation of socialist
conditions of production and distribution; they meant above all overcoming
old ideas and replacing them by new ones.
In addition to the development of technology, Che Guevara therefore
considered it to be the principal task of the socialist state "to create
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the new man" who is poisoned "neither by the ideas
of
the
19th century
nor by those of our decadent . . . 20th century."
"It
is
the ;:an of the
21st century whom we have to create."63 Hence, it
is
not
the function of
the dictatorship of the proletariat to keep down
t h
e
classes which
have been deprived of power, but to call forth spiritual and moral change
in the victorious masses and above all in the young.
The Significance of the Revolutionary Consciousness. selecting
the correct instruments for the mc-lization of she masses, Che Guevara
always came back to the model of the guerrillas who had aroused a readi-
ness to make sacrifices and a figi. i; g enthusiasm in the people and,
after the triumph, a growing devotion to the revolutionary cause. l,e
believes that only in this way was it possible to skip over certain stages
and to realize the "transition to socialism in Cuba" within barely two
years.64 Hence he demanded that it be a postulate that "to find a ormula
which will perpetuate this heroic attitude in the daily work, be one of
our most important tasks from the ideological point of view."~,5 however,
in his opinion, this formula could in no way consist of ways c.:ld cleans
which were a legacy of capitalism and in using the,.; one would get into
a "blind alley without escape" and "open the door to revisionism." Only
by moral means would the state be able to prevent that the adult genera-
tions, who, for a large part, are affected with the reprehensible remainders
of yesterday, "become morally corrupt and infect the growing generation."66
Hence, Che Guevara demanded that the instrument of mot lization of the masses
must basically be of a moral character.
Moral and Material Inducements. Guevara called the material
inducement a damaging anachronism and, therefore, rejected it in pri_:;c.pie
as a lever for an accelerated develop,-,e-it. He held teat '. . . _.: is a_
remainder or the past; in the new society to be created teere will be no
room for it . . . ; it will be replaced by a ,::oral inducement, co;,-
sciousness of duty and the new revolutionary attitude.1167 He left r.o
doubt that he considered the moral inducement to been the su nort and
t;ae,
principal point of orientation of the Cuban revolu-ton. At the same
he was convinced that with the moral inducements he COUic., in the en ,
achieve a faster development of the productive forces than with material
ones.68 Che Guevara's idea of the budget ina::ce system which he intro-
duced and defended passionately also was based on this consideration. Che
Guevara thought it superior to fire system of scld-financing and as convinced
of the fact that it was closer to the stage o"l because it Was not
based on the capitalist concepts of profitability, sel- nterest, ann
material inducements. IIe saw the budge Finance s;, ste, as an ii,; nortant
instrument for the development of the revolutionary consciousness and
believed strongly that, in the final analysis, it would prove to be
superior to the bonus system and the principle of economic accounting
even with regard to the increase of productivity.69 Finally, voluntary
work played an important role in C:e Guevara's conception of the develop-
ment of man under socialism and communism.
Example and Messianic Calling. In connection with the task of
creating a new "kind of man" during the "period of the building of
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socialism," Che Guevara demanded of the revolutionary elite to act as
examples of their own ideas. By being a living example, something which
Guevara took very seriously, he also wanted to gain distance from those
Communist parties into which had crept the abuse of power and a return to
the life of the bourgeoisie. lie considered this duty to be an example of
historical calling and thus gave it the characteristics of a mystical self-
sacrifice and a devotion to the revo.utio::1,%nich far exceeded the normal
measure of devotion of the ;Marxist rationale. Even of the guerrilla
fighter he had demanded that he be a "perfect ascetic ."70 Later he
demanded of the revolutionary leaders that "in their daily dosag-e o
human emotion" they must "not descend to the level which the ordinary
human being shows them."71 Though he considered the elite to be the
interpreters of the desires of the ;::asses, as executors of the ,,.?.;s of
history, he still thought them, however, to be far above the -)co 0.7-2
His unshakable belief in the inevitability of the predestined path caused
him to admit that "all tasks of the revolutionary vanguard are at once
magnificent and cause for anxiety.73 In a completely charis:rat c spirit,
he announced that, "In order to be able to say that we are the ideal, that
as a nation we are leading all of America, w e, the leaders, must pay a
daily price . . . with our self-sacrifice."74 All of this reflects a
Messianic mysticism which constitutes a part of the legacy of Che Cuevara
which must not be underestimated.
2. Criticism of the bast : uronean Attitude
Che Guevara's passionate appeal to the moral obligation o.~ the
socialist state was directed above all to its relationship to ogler
states, in particular to those of the underdeveloped w ;ord.
Hein for the Third ;t'orid by the "Social ist Cou:;tries com-
plete dependence of Cuba on the assistance of the deve oped Communist
countries prompted Guevara to examine this problem first. In doing
this, he developed the idea that this aid -- contrary to that which the
West grants -- must not be based on purely commercial interests but on
the moral obligation unselfishly to help make it possible for the
developing countries to join the highly industrialized nations sec.-,.
He blamed the East European, countries for getting themselves be guided
by world market prices in their economic 'c1ations with the areas of
the Third World, prices which are determined by the capitalist natio..s
and by the price gap between law materials and ;;;anu actured Toocds caused
by these -nations. He accused them. of profiting by this situation, "since
they generally exhort manufactured) goods and -r,-port raw materials from
the Third World."~5 From this, Guevara concluded that under those cond:g-
tions there can be no question of "mutual profit," that such an
exchan e
could rather be said to be "immoral in nature," and that by it the Co;.i-
munist nations would, in a way, even become "accomplices i n
imperialist exploitation."76 He claimed that the "socialist countries"
have "the moral obligation to discontinue their silent conspiracy wits.
the Western exploiting countries . . . . The development of the countries
which are now on the road to liberation (should) cost the 'socialist
states' something."77
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Simultaneous Development o' and Communis.,. Guevara
rejected, on principle, the thesis or tl .e development of socialism and
Communism in two stages strictly separate:! in time. On the national level,
in Cuba, he saw possibilities of a certain parallel development of socialism
and Communism, e.g. through socialist educational measures and Communist
advancement of consciousness. But, on an international love!, Cho Guevara
definitely rejected the Soviet thesis that the realization o:i Communism
would first occur in a single country. To strive for absoliu-te satisfaction
of all demands in a single country, e.g. the Soviet Union, at a time at
which two-thirds of humanity still remain in the abyss of underdevelopment
was for him -- as he once explained it to a group of his closest co-workers
-- an "abject amorality,"78 because, first, this country pursues its goal
by way of discriminatory economic relations with the Third World and,
secondly, because in this way the point at which the underdeveloped
countries would be able to join the industrialized nations is being moved
into an even more distant future. Because of this point of view, which
sounds like Maoism, Guevara rejected the concept of economic competition
with the West as a long-range overall strategy. in its place, he demanded
massive help for the underdeveloped world as prerequisite for an accelerated
"defeat of imperialism" and, when the time comes, a common and ;-.ore or less
simultaneous development of the "socialist" and the underdeveloped countries
toward Communism.
IV. Concluding Considerations
One basic attitude which unequivocally characterizes his position
within world Communism runs like a red thread throul~'-h all of C;e Guevara's
ideology: the fact that he opposed, on principle, the hoscow-
lining c o n c e p t s. In all areas, whether it be the general strategy
for the anti-imperialist struggle, that of the fight for liberation ir.
the underdeveloped world, or that for building the socialist society, his
ideas depart from these concepts on significant points. In -.;:ace of
peaceful coexistence, of the popular- front tactics, and the o;:._ sis on
the satisfaction of material demands, he puts the militant anti-
ism of the Third World, with the Communist countvies or without them,
direct armed fighting for liberation and emphasis on the ;::oral development
under socialism and Communism. This inadvertently calls to mind Mao
Tse-tung's theses on cultural revolutio.., on _ ermanent popular struggle,
and on the encirclement of the city by the country in a universal sense.
In spite of this apparent relationship of the basic conceptions, it would
be wrong to speak of an ideological dependence on Pehing by Cho Guevara.
If Guevara sympathized much more with China than with the Soviet Union,
then this is explained by the fact that he -- lino "two Tse-tung -- for,m.u-
lated his Marxist theory exclusively fro;., the -poi-,t o view of the prob-
lems and the requirements of the Third and in that respect Latin
America has more in common with China than with Eastern Europe. hence, it
is correct to say that Castro-Marxism, of which Ghe Guevara was the most
prominent ideologist, is basically a product of their own experience and
of the Latin American realities.
Thus, the significance of Che Guevara's ideas must be seen in the
fact that they contributed theses for a new, essentially independent Latin
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American Marxism which renounced many of the formulas of the conventional
Communist parties of the continent and took on the role of a rival in the
revolutionary process. Both, Che Guevara as well as Fidel Castro, have
repeatedly and in recent years with increasing emphasis pointed out this
original, independent character.79 It is not clear whether Che Guevara
supported Fidel Castro's break with China early in 1966; but it is obvious
that this pointed dispute was the logical consequence of Guevara's theses
on the independence and the originality of the ideology of Cuban :,iarxism.
The will toward independence of this new Marxism is not only expressed
with regard to the Communist parties of Latin America and the so-called
modern revisionism in general, but also with regard to Peking with the
goal of establishing a third Communist center of force with Havana as the
new Mecca. Thus, in the final analysis, the significance of Che Guevara's
ideas must also be seen in the fact that it exceeds by fax the concept
of freedom of action and tactical independence of the individual Communist
parties as given at the conference in Karlovy Vary, as well as Togliatti's
polycentralism or the theory of the "unity of multiplicity."
Especially with reference to the international solidarity of the
liberation movement, Guevara's position was even further to the left than
that of Fidel Castro himself. I'inile the latter acted with reservation
during the crisis in the Dominican Republic in the spring of 1965 and
thus, de facto, recognized the priority of the consolidation of socialism
in Cuba, Che Guevara was, even with reference to Vietnam, definitely a
champion of consistent use of the principle of proletarian international-
ism, no matter what the consequences might be.
Mysticism, Messianism, and belief in an elite gave Che Guevara's
theories markedly romantic and idealistic characteristics and an emotional
force which could not help but rouse, particularly, an impatient youth
within and outside of Latin America.
in this connection we can speak of an objective significance of
the ideological legacy of Che Guevara. And we can do this regardless of
the fact that Che Guevara's theses as well as the prograAL-,iatic OLAS
declarations80 which have largely incorporated these theses are almost
uniformly rejected as voluntaristic and romantic left radicalism by the
pro-Soviet Communist parties of Latin America and Europe.Sl
After what has been said, the interesting question arises whether
developments will pass over Che Guevara's legacy or whether his ideas
will live on after his death, as he had prophesied, and will continue to
be effective in Cuba and in the revolutionary liberation movement of the
Third World.
As far as Cuba is concerned, his main theses will certainly continue
to be of significance. His theses on the Latin American revolution have
been incorporated into the declaration o the OLAS conference organized
by Havana.82 The fundamental role of moral inducements has repeatedly
been stressed by Fidel Castro. However, especially the latest deteriora-
tion of relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union must be evaluated
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as a triumph of Che Guevara's ideas. The condemnation of the Soviet Union
by Castro because of the re-establishment of diplomatic and economic rela-
tions with the different countries of Latin America, his remarks about
capitalist tendencies in the Russian economic system, the proceedings
recently held in Havana against a so-called "micro-fraction" of pro-Soviet
Communists, and the decision by Cuba not to take part in the Budapest
conference are all an indication that today Che Guevara's fundamental
conceptions with regard to Eastern Europe are reflected to a greater
extent in Cuban domestic and foreign policies than they were even during
his lifetime.83 Nor will this probably change in the foreseeable future.
Compared to this, the survival of Chc Guevara's ideas on the Latin
American continent must be considered doubtful. Negative experiences with
guerrilla warfare, up to now, in many places have brought about the point
of view that many of his theses do not withstand an objective analysis of
the present Latin American conditions. The reproach that he stayed too
closely with the Cuban model and that he did not sufficiently take into
consideration the Latin American conditions is probably justified. Both
Guevara's theses on the willingness of the peasant population to join the
guerrillas and on their capability to develop a broad revolutionary popular
movement, as well as his conviction of the invincibility of the guerrillas
can be subjected to this objection. Beyond this, there arises the basic
question whether, today, in Latin even in the most backward
countries, there even exist the objective conditions for an armed struggle
for liberation and a guerrilla war.
On the other hand, as is apparent from the latest reports, the
economic and social progress in Latin America advances at an alar.iingly
slow rate.84 In several important areas such as in agriculture there is
stagnation or even a regressive tendency, while in the area of foreign
economic aid the situation appears to be considerably less favorable than
ten years ago. Furthermore, the more favorable rates of growth are, in
the long run, completely insufficient to stop the continual increase of
the gap between Latin America and the highly industrialized nations,let
alone of decreasing it. The difficulties which face even the most pro-
gressive governments in Latin America in the enactment of even modest
economic reforms and social programs are well known.
From these circunstances, iroportant conclusions may be drawn.
After all, Guevara's basic conception rests on the assumption that a
solution of the fundamental problems of Latin America is impossible by
peaceful means, by way of the capitalist economic order and of repre-
sentative democracy, or with the help of the US. As long as this thesis
is not convincingly disproved by facts, above all by a general and lasting
economic improvement, Che Guevara's ideas will probably continue to
find disciples in intellectual and student circles and among the discontented
masses of Latin America.
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Because of the important role Chd Guevara played in the Cuban revolution and as the org siz-
ing brain of armed revolt in Latin America, the author considers that his recent death in B livia
marks an opportune moment for an analysis of his ideological heritage. The urgent nee for
such a study is felt to be underscored by the present challenge posed by the Havanna come lied
OLAS to Latin American peaceful development and because of the growing rift between Ca tro's
Cuba and the pro-soviet CP on the continent.
As regards Che Guevara's global concepts concerning the anti-imperialist struggle, the at thor
shows t lie rejected the concept of peaceful coexistepice, considering it a betrayal o the
liberation struggle fought in many parts of the word. Chu: Guevara interpreted the princi? c of
international proletarian solidarity as an obligation to give more than just lip-service sit port
to this struggle. In his "Message to the Tricontinental" in 1967 he even rebuked the by big
communist powers for failing to make Vietnam their battle-ground at the proper time. rom
this the author concludes that Chd Guevara did not rule out the possibility of a nuclear con-
flagration. The threat of war, he taught, should not deter the masses in the underdcvci pod
countries from fighting for their liberation at any cost. To doom the stronghold of worn im-
perialism, the United States, the country he called "a giant with clay feet", Chd Guevara )lea-
(led for unity in the communist world advocated a close and militant alliance betwee the
'communist nations and the progressive ceu:htries and liberation movements in Africa, Asi and
Latin America. The author deals thereupon with the core of Chd Guevares heritage - his t Isis
regarding the basic strategy and tactics of armed revolt and guerrilla warfare in Lati:1 Am ricer.
He points out that one the ',hand Chd Guevara professed the Cuban revolution to be the exa, iple,
because it had demonstrated a) that in many Latin American countries conditions were ripe
for revolution, b) that armed struggle and the guerrilla liar method focussed on the cob try-
side and based on peasant support rather than on the eLy movement, were the only c reel
solutions for seizing power. The author notes, however, that Cad Guevara admitted except oral
6rcumstanccs ha r u m?nh t t,-,e Cuban revolution L,\.)f-c
' '
repeat themselves on the continent. He held, above al,, that the rap: transition to socialism
of the Cuban revolution had produced a polarization o forces in Latin America, aligning all
reactionary forces and U. S. imperialism on one side and the pop uiar :masses oil the other.
Neither the middle classes nor the United States could therefore be deceived and surprised
again (as they had been in Cuba:); repressive measures would be severe from the outset and
the struggle long and hard. Consequently, Chu Guevara ruled, revolutionary war in Latin
America would have to be waged without the support of the bourgeoisie and on an openly
anti-imperialist, Marxist and pro-Cuban label.
Ch6 Guevara called for armed struggle on a continental scale to counteract the close military
collaboration between the so-called Latin American and U. S. imperialism.
Small guerrilla units, operating in a number of countries according to a coor ?mated strafe y
and hit and run tactics were to sharpen existing contradiciiuns making the struggle more and
more radical. Gradually they were to grow into large peasant armies, turning finally Latin
America, as Chd Guevara put it, into the torch of a second or third Vietnam. Attention is also
called to the fact that Chd Guevara did not consider the guerrilla only as the main military
instrument, but as the political center of the whole revohut' nary movement as well. lie main-
tained that the revolutionary party should grow out of the guerrilla and not 'ice versa. Most
of these views, the author points out, are rejected by the orthodox CP of Latin America and
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Europe.
The article goes on to discuss Chu Guevara's ideoluiieai contribution to the period of con-
structing socialism in Cuba, noting that Chu Guevara the economist was less influential than
Che Guevara the moralist. The author stresses his convicion that socialism as well as commu-
p ?r',or man and explains thus,
nism only made sense in terms of the creation of a morally ::- }
why the development of a revolutionary consciousr....s '.vns nhnre important to Chit Cucvara
than the problem of satisfying the material needs.: or c:hass-:hho:p.,:ration he therefore relied
on moral incentives, looking upon material in eativ.:; rnuu. n:nnants of the capitalist
past.
Particular attention is also called to .:,e :act that Cui? C:'evar_ c nsc,crcc. exi'tir ; trade
relations between the communist nations of ::astern Europa and the underdcseI.d ed coun-
tries to be immoral and crier "accomplice, of inhperialissnh", because of their ba,ir,,; trade
on world-market prices. .,,o objected o,; moral grounds to the Soviet thesis of constructing
communism in one country first and ad,anced the idea that simultaneous development of
socialism and communism was possible to a curia;.:, clci,:ec.
As to the conclusions, the author points out that while Chu Gucva ras views differed
pro-soviet conceptions on all major points, their r.;-parant coincidence with those of :l:..o
Tse-tung was not due to ideological dependence on : clod g.
The importance of Guevara's ideological hcri;age :s above all seen in the fac it .aid tllhe
groundwork for an independent Latin American naar