FOREIGN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000300320008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 20, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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Contents '! il'''; ', n(!) 1'') ) ~tP,r)11izf)rr~it) off Inir:t'c,) zi
Coping with Cast ro's;Guerrilla.!)?,, i I I :r)' i "i ?-( OTC a(O.VI~' ' , 11i',/ u7.)''r':)
Nigeria: Shell and the Oil Imbroglio"
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Red Guard Trouble, in Tibet. i
Vietnam: NWho Succeed r General Tha ?
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The Vice-President of the' United States, Mr Hubert Humphrey, has recently
claimed! that President Johnson persuaded Mr Kosygin at Glassboro to speak
`firmly' to Fidel Castro about the dangers in Cuba's policy of training guerrillas to
subvert other Latin American, governments. Mt! Humphrey may believe this: most
observers are sceptical.
At the moment Castrf, is said to be spending oyer,$1,000,000 a month in support of
underground movements; and Russian experts are said to superintend the guerrillas'
training. (When the Mexicans arrested a leading Guatemalan communist who was
shipping arms from Mexico to Guatemala, they discovered his paymaster was a Cuban
embassy third. secretary, Julian Lopez Diaz, whose wife was both the ex-wife of 'the
Cuban minister of the interior, Ramiro Valdez, dead of the Cuban general-directorate
of intelligence, and the daugher of Victor Trapote, a Russian agent. The ' Cuban
intelligence directorate has Russian advisers.)
Mr Khrushchev has claimed in a television :programme that he won the Cuba
missile crisis in 1962, persuading President Kennedy to promise that Castro could
remain in power in return for Russia's withdrawal of its missiles. Khrusi,tchcv's claim'
drew an, immediate indirect retort from Mr Rusk, the Secretary of State, who in reply
to a?journalist's question 'said that the United States regards the Castro regime as 'a
temporary one'. Castro is"now expected to give his retort to that in a speech at Santiago
de Cuba on 26 July, the' ann h'+rsary of the launching of his Movement. ' ?' j'' "1' ,
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Asian, African and Latin American `people's solidarity' conference in Havana in
January of last year; at the end of this month there will be a similar performance in
Havana, when Latin American communist chiefs stage a conference which, according
to Mr Rusk, is aimed at `stirring up a series of Vietnams' throughout Latin America.
How are the Johnson Administration and the more pro-American governments in
Latin America reacting to this challenge? The foreign ministers of the Organisation
of American States may meet in Washington in August to discuss the situation. No hard
decisions are likely. The United States, Brazil and Argentina would favour an OAS
police force, but this is opposed by Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and others.
Most Latin Americans took a dim view of Brazilian troops being sent to the Dominican
Republic in 1965.
At the same time, the countries which have guerrilla organisations operating on their
soil are worried about Castro. The Bolivian president, Mr Barrentios, says the
guerrillas in his country include Brazilians, Argentinians and Peruvians as well as
native Bolivians, and claims that they are led by Che Guevara; he missing Cuban t
revolutionary leader. (The Central Intelligence. Agency does not accept this.) But there
is certainly no disposition in Washington to treat the guerrilla movements lightly, nor
to believe that Castro will easily fall. Castro, it is recognised, runs a tight police state --
and, besides, nobody in Cuba is hungry.
Mr Rusk has said there is `no grass-roots support' for Castro's guerrillas and that
Latin America is taking large strides toward `eventual economic integration of the
entire area,' helped by American economic aid, which may be increased this year by
30 per cent. But two checks on this optimism exist:
(i) Latin America may get a quarter of the total American economic aid funds, as
Mr Rusk has predicted - but those funds are more likely to shrink than to grow. Congress
is out to slash foreign aid this year'more sharply than ever before.
(ii) One reason Mr Rusk gave for lack of grass-roots support for the guerrillas was
`the contacts made by our Peace. Corps volunteers in many parts of Latin America'. But
many of the volunteers themselves tell a different tale. They complain bitterly about the
lack of social conscience among wealthy Latin Americans, and some have asked whether
the road to change in Latin America lies not through a `tame' Alliance for Progress but
through violent revolution. (These doubts were laid very frankly before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in March by Mr Seth Tillman, the committee's con-
sultant, after he had visited the Peace Corps in Latin America.)
How then is it proposed to counter the guerrilla movements? Alongside scepticism
that Mr Kosygin was really persuaded by Mr Johnson to deal sternly with Castro goes
the firm belief that the Russians nevertheless do hold the key to the situation - and may,
t., k)crsuaded to turn it.
It is argued that if Castro does not seem to face much internal dissatisfaction, this
is largely due to his getting western credits - which are based on western faith in Russia's
credit-worthiness, not in Castro's. This is just another way of stating the familiar truth
that it is Russia that keeps Castro going, and pays heavily to do so.
However, Russia is anxious to increase its trade with other Latin American countries.
When the Economic Commission for Latin America met in Caracas in June, the largest
g ~p present consisted of non-members; Russian `observers' who were eagerly;
seeking trade and who offered Latin American countries technical assistance..
2
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000300320008-9
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The president of Colombia, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, -adroitly made it clear that
Russia could expect to' do little business with him ' unless the guerrillas' that plague
Colombia 'ceased their activities. The United States hopes ? to persuade. other OAS
countries to follow this promising lead (this point will be pursued if the foreign ministers
assemble in Washington next month):
Perhaps Mr Kosygin, having' mended' his fences as best'he can after' the Middle East
debacle, may in'fact be persuaded to tell Castro firmly'to cut`it'out~- and to'cut'out?the
Russian advice and funds known to be' channelled to the guei`rilla movements through
Castro's intelligence organisationsLli (.l
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rT Nigeria: Shell and the Oil Imbroglio
What are the chances of a solution to the' Nigerian oil dispute?
Shell-BP has been ordered by the federal government to pay'immediately, and in full,
the royalties on oil produced in the former eastern region. This money is also claimed
by Biafra, as the eastern region now calls itself, and has in fact been promised to it.' The
company's request for more time has been refused; the federal government argues that
Shell's obligations arise from its contract with the federal authorities, and that the
#250,000 token payment which has been promised to Biafra - with the rest to follow by
the end ofJuly - would provide the rebel regime with arms to sustain its rebellion.
'The'excuse pleaded was that the insurgents were in a position to threaten the oil
installations in the area. Shell-BP thus tried to ignore the federal government's effective
control of the territorial waters and the oil ports' : so the federal government's line runs.
The last point at least is in question. Shell-BP, which' considers that Nigeria has no
right in international law to penalise a company for paying under duress to an insurgent
regime, is.doubtful about the federal government's ability to enforce the blockade. At
least one frigate (and possibly more) of the' Nigerian navy is in Biafran hands, and such
of a navy as the federal authorities still have is obviously insufficient. Biafra has assured
the oil companies of safe conduct within territorial limits for all tankers calling at the
port of Bonny - th- assumption being that international law would protect shipping
on the high seas.
The two freighters which were arrested in recent weeks by federal ships were inter-
cepted 20 miles out to sea. Neither of the boats carried cargo; or intended to call at
Biafran ports. (According to a current story in Biafra,. the Panamanian boats were
hired by the Nigerian government for the purpose, 'since the navy could not make an
example of the shipping which enters Port Harcourt to load produce.)
But Shell-BP has decided to observe the embargo, and the federal government has
suggested that immediate payment of the royalties as demanded would help in getting
the blockade lifted. But if the company were to comply at the expense of the under-
taking given to Biafra, Colonel Ojukwu the Biafran leader, would be certain to stop
the flow of oil from his side.,Moreover, since Biafra depends for foreign exchange on
these oil revenues, non-.payment would probably force Ojukwu to take over the com-
pany's assets and offer them to any concern which can' make'them pay. The prospects
are sufficiently attractive to induce those who,are less t;oncetned about the' Nigerian
blockade to take the risk& i,. .... s ;