SAVE THE 'SAVANNAH'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000300230003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 6, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX April 6, 1967
PATTERN ESTABLISHED
The Savannah, in her two years of opera-
tion, established an internationally accepted
pattern of marine operations for atomic com-
mercial ships that might follow the report
noted.
It observed that Government support for
the vessel's operations was determined by op-
erating costs in excess of estimated revenues.
The Savannah, the report stressed, was not
designed to compete on an economic basis
with other ships her size in the carriage of
cargo. The Savannah has a cargo capacity of
9,830 tons.
Nuclear power, the report observed, is most
likely to be practical on large ships (with
twice the cubic capacity, of Savannah) and
on very high-speed ships (30 knots and
above), designed to carry containerized cargo
on long trade routes. The Savannah operates
at 2012 knots.
The estimated first year cost to the Gov-
ernment for operation of the ship by First
Atomic Ship Tra r sport, Inc, an American Ex-
port Isbrandtnen Lines subsidiary, was $1,-
811,556.
The actual fii% cost, the report said,
was $1,417,848, }ichlinb F.A.S.T. a $200,000
"profit."
The $200,000 l.ri ht wos based on it reduc-
tion of operatin: cost and improved revenue
beyond that oi. ,, .::mated in the agree-
ment for the fl v(,.;;.- of operation.
Under this arr,.narmont any reduction of
losses was equall, shored between F.A.S.T. as
a profit and th,,: iinent as a reduction
in operating co 'r' rn a limit of $400,000.
The actual cos. .':, :ion was $426,117.
fidence gap between the public and Gov-
ernment. In this case, the CIA must be
rather naive itself.
Apparently the CIA judged the con-
sequences of such a disclosure to be only
bothersome side effects.
I recommend Norman Cousins' clear
and convincing article for not only adult
reading, but for high school and college
textbooks on American government:
SUBVERSION BY GOVERNMENT
The CIA was conceived twenty years ago as
a specific response to the global subversive
activities of communism. It was decided, on
the highest levels of government, that what
the U.S. needed was a super-secret agency
with worldwide capabilityies--an agency far
more secret than even the FBI.
The CIA was specifically exempted at the
start from most of the checks and balances
that are indigenous to American Constitu-
tional government. The funds at its disposal
might run into billions of dollars, but there
was no requirement for open public or legis-
lative debate or review. The agency would
be responsible to the President and would
operate through a watchdog committee in
Congress but even this procedure was at
variance with the Constitutional require-
ments.
The work of the CIA was divided into two
broad areas. One area involved the operation
of a top-level information-gathering service
that would make its reports available to the
security centers of government, such as the
White House, Department of Defense, De-
partment of State. The second area was an
operational branch that would carry out
top-secret activities designed to advance the
national interests of the United States.
It is now essential, on the basis of available
but limited information, to attempt an
assessment.
The analyses and reports compiled by the
information or intelligence arm of the CIA,
according to many competent observers In-
side and outside government, have been of
the highest order.
It is over the action area, however, that
the difficulties and tl;Le debates have arisen.
The most recent disclosures about the CIA
concern secret government funds being
channeled into universites, labor unions, and
organizations of students, newsmen, and
businessmen: CIA officials privately would
probably point to such activities as being
among their finest achievements. For these
were no cloak-and-dagger operations involv-
ing thefts of secret documents or under-
gruond acts of daring and violence. These
activities have been part of an effort to
mount an intellectual and cultural counter-
offensive against the threat of communist
ideology. The CIA was shrewd enough to
know that the most effective forces it could
recruit and send into the field would come
not form the far right but from the center
and the non-communist left. In the case of
the international meetings of students, news-
men, and labor leaders, the main purpose of'
the CIA was not to use Americans as agents
but tq, give the United States top-level rep-
resentation at world intellectual or economic
meetings involving opportunities for leader-
ship.
Defenders of these CIA activities say that
the nation has been well served by 'what
they describe as a highly sophisticated and
knowledgeable counter-offensive against the
enemies of cultural and political freedom
It also said that the CIA, both in Washing-
ton and in the field, has maintained the
highest standards in the recruiting of its
personnel.
But all this is beside the main point.
For what is intended as a defense of the CIA
actually constitutes its severest indictment.
It has now been demonstrated that even the
most well-intentioned purposes and proi-
N ects, when conceived and carried out within
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. LESTER L. WOLFF
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 6, 1967
Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, I wish to
insert in the RECORD at this time an
article from the New York Times, dated
April 6, 1967, which relates to the con-
current resolution which I introduced in
the House earlier today. Mr. Werner
Bamberger points out, as I did in my
remarks to the House, that the Savan-
nah, the world's only nuclear-powered
vessel, is being retired despite its demon-
stration of great potential, and without
its being able to exploit that potential
fully.
UNITED STATES HAILS A-VESSEL AS
LAY Up NEARS
(By Werner Bamberger)
The Federal Government, which is ex-
pected to lay up the Savannah in about five
months, issued yesterday an "AX" report
card for the merchant ship, the world's only
atom-powered commercial vessel,
In a full-scale review entitled Technical,
Operational and Economic Report on the
N.S. Savannah 'First Year of Commercial
Operation 1965-1966, the Maritime Admin-
istration declared:
"Initially designed as a vehicle to demon-
strate one of the peaceful uses of the atom,
and as a test bed for the application of nu-
clear power for merchant ship propulsion,
she has met many challenges and passed all
tests."
However, a Maritime Administration
spokesman indicated that the report might
have no effect on the future of the Sa-
vannah's commercial operation, saying:
"We are in the process of developing plans
for the lay-up of the ship."
At the same time, he recalled recent testi-
mony before Congress by officials of the De-
partment of Commerce,of which maritime is
a part, that the department was giving con-
sideration to ways in which the ship might
be used.
The 1967-68 Federal Budget proposes ex-
penditures on the Savannah that are in-
sufficient to keep her in operation.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS CITED
In reviewing the vessel's accomplishments
the Federal ship agency said the Savannah
experience had:
Demonstrate) that a nuclear merchant
ship can operate safely and reliably in a reg-
ularly scheduled service.
Developed the framework for acceptance
and entry and opened new ports to any fu-
ture nuclear ships.
Demonstrated a favorable reaction on the
part of shippers toward using nuclear trans-
portation.
Produced information that could lead to
reduce cost of operation of any future nu-
clear snips.
Produced and maintained a reservoir of
marine engineers trained and licensed to op-
erate seagoing nuclear power plants.
Added to.the prestige of the United States
through demonstrations of an advanced ship
type.
Demonstrated to the world the sincerity
of United States efforts in using nuclear
power for peaceful purposes.
Kept maritime regulatory problems before
the regulatory bodies and industry, thus
stimulating efforts to establish optimum re-
quirements that will be applicable to any
future nuclear merchant ship.
SPEECH
of
HON. EDITH GREEN
OF OREGON
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, April 5, 1967
Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Speaker,
the oratory stenciling from disclosure of
CIA's involvement with private organiza-
tions has been interesting to follow. Im-
passioned partisans of the Central
Intelligence Agency have rushed in-
dignantly to its defense, and those who
question CIA policy are accused of
naivete and a lack of concern for this
country's security.
But, as Norman Cousins points out in
the following article, the great danger to
this Nation's security occurs when a
group of men, even if of avowedly "good"
intensions, are able to function outside
the constitutional limits of law. This,
the CIA apparently does.
A New Yolk Times editorial expressed
the matter thusly:
Faith in American institutions has been
besmirched in a way that would have eluded
the reach of any foreign enemy.
Faith, like charity, begins at home.
This involvement has shaken the faith
of the public in the integrity and inde-
pendence of private groups working for
assumedly private goals.
But the harm that has been done to
public trust in private institutions is
overshadowed by the harm done to pub-
lic trust in Government.
Perhaps the CIA did not think that
their infiltration would, if revealed, have
a devastating effect on the widening con-
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000300230003-4
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000300230003-4
April 6, 1967 . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
the context of undercover operations, carry
penalties that far outweigh any good that
might be achieved. The abuses of the CIA
are not chargeable to poor judgment of its
officials. The abuses are inherent in the
terrible misconception behind the existence
of the CIA.
The secret underwriting by the CIA of ac-
tivities by the National Student Association
is a case in point. Some student leaders who
cooperated with the CIA were exempted
from the draft. All were required to lie and
to sign oaths saying they would not reveal
the true state of affairs.
Half the nation's population is under the
age of twenty-five. It is always risky to
characterize the dominant mood of any gen-
eration, but there are many indications that
many of the young people of this country
today are losing confidence in the ability of
their elders to operate a civilization respon-
sibly or to demonstrate the kind of integrity
that can provide a moral tone for the society.
The discovery that the government itself
has played a corrupting role is not likely to
have a cleansing effect on the attitudes of
the young people toward adult-approved
Institutions.
The misconception behind the existence
of the CIA is a simple one. That misconcep-
tion is that it is possible and proper to turn
over to a group of men the kind of authority
and power that the U.S. Constitution was
specifically designed to prevent. In fact, the
very existence of the CIA is a monument to
the failure of the recent and present genera-
tion of policymakers In government to take
the basic philosophy of this nation seriously.
The main point or principle that emerged
from the work of the Philadelphia Constitu-
tional Convention was that the biggest dan-
ger to human freedom was represented not
just by bad men at t'.e heads of bad govern-
ments but by good men who were put in posi-
tions where they were able to operate outside
the law. The Founding Fathers didn't have
to be told that extraordinary situations
would arise in which extraordinary authority
might be required. What concerned them,
however, was that the existence of such sit-
uations might stampede and mislead men
into creating a mechanism that in itself
would be subversive of Constitutional gov-
ernment.
While the full story of the CIA in practice,
as apart from theory, is known only to a few,
enough is now known to underscore the fore-
sight of the American Founders. Consider
Cuba. When President John F. Kennedy
came to office, he was confronted by a fully
developed plan to equip and finance an
emigre Invasion of Cuba. The effort failed,
despite extravagant advance assurances to
the contrary. The President was urged to
bail out the enterprise by authorizing the
use of American troops for invasion purposes.
This the President refused to do-not be-
cause the might of the United States was in-
adequate for such an objective, but because
the President had a sense of history, respect
for the moral position of the United States
In the world, and was opposed to the killing
of thousands of Cubans.
The Cuban episode revealed one aspect of
the grave danger represented by the CIA.
This was that it could set forces in motion
which could impel an American President,
governed by considerations of national pride
to,depart from his own basic policies. Presi-
dent Kennedy had the wisdom and the cour-
age to avoid compounding a national error.
It would be a serious mistake, however, to
suppose that such qualities are automatically
built into the Presidency.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to
ease world tensions by exploring with the
Soviet Union the possibility of bringing the
spiraling world arms race under control. He
wanted to take full advantage of any genuine
change in Soviet leadership following the
death of Josef Stalin. The President's moves
In this direction were blocked by the action
of the CIA in penetrating the airspace of the
Soviet Union with a spying plane at precisely
the time a Paris summit meeting was about
to begin. The President was persuaded by
the head of the CIA to identify himself with
the incident. le.;t it appear before the world
that the Preslrirnt had been cut off from the
nation's own an ority policies.
General Eisenhower ordered the discon-
tinuation of then spying planes over Russian
territory, but the episode undermined his
long-held hope that he could make a funda-
mental contribution to the enlargement of
world peace. No one knows whether the
summit meeting, if it had been held, would
have altered history, but it is not incon-
ceivable that a dent might have been made
in the arms race, possibly including the
signing of a nuclear test ban and a nonpro-
liferation treaty. In any event, it was dem-
onstrated once again that the CIA had veto
power over U.S. policy.
The role of the CIA in Vietnam is a mat-
ter of speculation. One of the sticking
points in the Geneva negotiations of 1954
.that ended the French occupation of Indo-
China had to do with the provision in the
Geneva Treaty calling for all outside forces
to leave the area. Premier Mendes-France
of France has said he was pressed at the ne-
gotiations to provide assurance that the de-
parture of the French would not be the signal
for the arrival of the Americans. Mendes-
France replied he had no reason to believe
that the United States would not respect
.the terms of the Geneva Treaty. Shortly
after the French left, the United States
moved into Laos and Vietnam. The Bao Dal
government in South Vietnam was replaced
by that of U.S.-hacked Ngo Dinh Diem. The
countrywide free elections specified in the
Geneva agreement were called off by South
Vietnam. Shortly thereafter, the Vietcong
started its campaign of assassination, terror,
and subversion against the South. The Viet-
cong was backed by North Vietnam but a
large part of its total military supplies-at
one point it reached an estimated 80 per
cent-came from the United States, having
been captured or turned over by Vietcong
sympathizers.
Eventually, the Diem government was
violently overthrown from within and its
President killed in a coup in which the
United States was a tacit partner, according
to former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Fred-
erick G. Nolting, Jr. The Ambassador said
he believed it was not the CIA but the State
Department that gave its approval to the
enterprise. Be that as it may, the critical
point here is that the government of the
United States was involved in the subversion
of another government. The overthrow and
murder of Diem made a shambles of Amer-
ica's declaration that it came into South
Vietnam at the express invitation of that
government in order to keep it from being
subverted.
As for Laos, this observer has no informa-
tion about the role of the CIA in the ghastly
mistake that led the United States in 1960
to help Phoumi Nosavan stage his military
coup against the elected government - of
Souvanna Phouma. What is known, how-
ever, is that the coup touched off a civil
war, with the United States in the incredible
position of supplying arms to both sides and
paying the salaries of both armies.
Eventually, the United States helped to re-
store the government of Souvanna Phouma,
but the incredible misadventure had mean-
while taken the lives of thousands of civil-
ians and soldiers.
While in Vientiane, Laos, in 1960, I met a
pilot from the Tom Dooley Hospital who told
me he had just turned down an offer of
$3,000 a month from the CIA to fly arms se-
cretly to a corner of Burma where remnants
of the Chinese Nationalist Army had settled
after the revolution. Several weeks after my
encounter with the pilot, I read newspaper
reports about demonstrations outside the
U.S. Embassy in Rangoon when it became
known that the United States had violated
Burmese. sovereignty and had jeopardized
Burma's security vis-A-vis Its powerful neigh-
bor to the north. If one aspect of the work
of the CIA is to make friends for the United
States, this particular aim was not furthered
in Burma.
The Secretary of State has justified these
activities by describing them as an inevitable
concomitant of international life in the
world today. The United States, he has said,
should not be the only country to stand aloof
from such undertakings.
This remarkable statement misses the
main points at issue. One point is that one
of the characteristics that distinguishes the
United States from totalitarian countries is
the trust that It can inspire both in its own
people and In other peoples throughout the
world. How do we weaken the communist
conspiracy or any other conspiracy when we
make other nations uncertain and suspicious
about the depth and range of our secret
activities inside their countries? Is It estab-
lished that the only effective way of dealing
with totalitarians Is to Imitate them?
A second point has to do with the concept
of a free society held by those who are now
acting in its name. When did the American
people give their representatives in govern-
ment the right to engage in the subversion
of other governments or to decide arbitrarily
and outside Constitutional processes how
their money is to be spent, or to involve its
own citizens in secret oaths, or to give some
citizens special privileges for playing the
game?
The third point is that there is no more
pathetic fallacy than the notion that such
enterprises can be carried out without cor-
rupting those who are part of them. Those
who believe that it is possible to mount a
CIA in a free society and keep its operations
sanitary are poor students of history. More-
over, the notion that it is possible to keep
these operations totally secret is a species of
naivete.
Nothing would be easier than to attempt
to pin the blame on a few government ofii-
clats. The blame must reach Into the society
as a whole. Nothing as large as this could
have come this far without the Involvement
of large elements of the American commu-
nity.
A government now exists within a govern-
ment. The interior government has not been
elected. It cannot easily be replaced or re-
called. But neither Is it beyond the reach
of the American people. It will be said that
the nation's security requires that further
debate over the CIA be closed. But it is pre-
cisely in the name of national security that
the debate must be pursued-that is, If the
national security bears any relationship to
what the nation is all about.' -N.C. ,
Colorado Welfare Director Foresees End
of States Participation in Food Stamp
Program if House Agriculture Commit-
tee Amendments Prevail
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. LEONOR K. SULLIVAN
OF MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, April 6, 1967
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Speaker, in
numerous statements here on the House
floor and in the Appendix of the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD in the past month I
tried to warn the Members of the danger
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000300230003-4