THE FATAL ARROGANCE OF POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200900050-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: May 15, 1966
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

NEW YORK TI) MAGAZINE
Sanitized - Approved For I@,a0ej$A-RDP75-0
Thy. ratal Arrogagace of
try's leaders in the short run but
strengthen their hand in the long run;
CPYRGHT
O or
By I. W. rU1.BRIGHT
A great nation is peculiarly
susceptible to the idea that its
.I STATINTL-
power is a sign of God's favor,
conferring upon it a special
responsibility to remake other
nations in its own shining image."
O criticize one's country is to do
it a service and pay it a com-
' pliment. It is a service because
It. may spur the country to do better
than it is doing; it is a compliment
because it evidences a belief that the
country can do better than it is doing.
Criticism may embarrass the coun-
-of diverse peoples and cultures,
come -together in harmony, but not
identity, in an open, receptive, gener-
ous and creative society.
We are an extraordinary nation,'
endowed with a rich and productive
land and a talented and energetic
population. Surely a nation so favored
is capable of extraordinary achieve-
ment, not only in the area of produc-
ii: may destroy a consensus on policy,..', Ingand enjoying great wealth-where
while expressing a consensus of our achievements have Indeed been
values. Woodrow Wilson once said
that there was "such a thing as being
too proud to fight" There is also, or
ought.to be, such a thing as being too
confident to conform, too strong to be
silent in the face of apparent error.
Criticism, In short, is more than a
right: it Is an act of patriotism-a
higher form of patriotism, I believe,
than the familiar rituals of national
adulation.
Thus, It Is not pejorative but a
tribute to say that America Is worthy
-of criticism. If nonetheless one is
charged with a lack of patriotism, I
would reply with Albert Camus: "No,
I didn't love my country, if pointing
R," unjust in what we love
amounts to not loving, if insisting
that what we love should measure up
to the finest image we have of her
amounts .to not loving."
What is the finest image of Amer-
'lea? To me it is the image of a
:composite-or, better still, a synthesis
F, J. W. FULBRIGHT, chairman of the
t Senate 'Foreign Relations Committee,
delivered three speeches - the annual
Christian A.- Herter Lectures- st the
Johns Hopkins University School of Ad.
vanced International Studies in Wash.
ington recently. This article Is adapted
from one of them. The series will be pub-
lished in book form.
extraordinary-but also In the area
of human and international relations
-in which area, it seems to me, our'
achievements have fallen short of our
capacity and promise. The question
that I find Intriguing is whether a
nation so extraordinarily endowed as
the United States can overcome that
arrogance of power which has afflict-
ed, weakened and, In some cases,
destroyed great nations In the past.
THE causes of the malady are a
mystery but its recurrence is one of
the uniformities of history: Power
tends to confuse itself with virtue and
a great nation is peculiarly suscep-
tible to the idea that its power is a
sign of God's favor, conferring upon
it a special responsibility for other
nations- to make them richer and
happier and wiser, to remake them,
that Is, in its own shining Image.
Power also tends to take itself for
omnipotence. Once imbued with the
idea of a mission, a great nation
easily assumes that it has the means
as well as the duty to do God's work.
kind of infatuation-an exaggerated
sense of power and an Imaginary
sense of mission-that the Athenians
attacked Syracuse and Napoleon and
then Hitler invaded Russia. In plain
words, they overextended their com-
mitments and they came to grief.
My question is whether America
can overcome the fatal arrogance of
power. My hope and my belief are
that It can, that it has the human
resources to accomplish what few,' if
any, great nations have ever accom-
plished before: to be confident but
also tolerant, and rich but also gen-
erous; to be willing to teach but
also willing to learn; to be powerful
but also wise. I believe that America
is capable of all of these things; I
also believe It Is falling short of
them. Gradually but unmistakably we
are succumbing to the arrogance of
power. In so doing we are not living
up to our capacity and promise; the
measure of our falling short is the,.
measure of the patriot's duty of dis-
sent.
The discharge of that most impor-
tant duty is handicapped in America
by an unworthy tendency to fear seri-
pus criticism of our Government. In
the abstract we celebrate freedom of
opinion as a vital part of our patri-
otic liturgy. It is only when some
Americans exercise the right that
other Americans are shocked. No one,
of course, ever criticizes the right of
dissent; It Is always this particular
instance of it or its exercise under
these particular circumstances or at
The Lord, after all, surely would not this particular time that throws peo-
choose you as His agent and then ple Into a blue funk. I am reminded
deny you the sword with which to of Samuel Butler's observation:
work His will. German soldiers in "People In general are equally horrl-
the First World War wore belt buckles . fled at hearing the Christian religion
Imprinted with the words "Gott u* doubted, and at seeing It practiced."
CRI'T'IC-SenMtor Fulbright talks with members of his audience at
lectures thereSean1Xz&fdcyAppLQw0c6@teRilkep-,-O diviWA-RDP75-00149R000200900050-9
to charge that he was knding "aid and comfort to our enemies."
 'CPYRGHT
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s land by helicopter in search of the Vietcong. There are, says the author,
TNAM -11
troo
S
p
,
.
P 1
"moral distinctions between one war and another-between resisting Hitler and intervening in Vietnam:'
value and (values of French democracy but we regard this alliance or that as
th
e
but hel
us
,
--- -- - - - -
importance of national conse s
consensus can be understood in two 'ened policies of the Fifth Republic 'land, of course, we will stand stalwart
ways. If it is -interpreted, to mean -which have made France the most!in Berlin from now until Judgment
unquestioning support of ? existing respected Western nation in the Day. Certain words must never be
0 policies, its effects can only be perni-underdeveloped world. uttered except In derision-the word
dons and undemocratic, serving to A second great advantage of free"appeasement," for example, comes as
g
suppress differences rather than to tdlscussion to democratic policymakers' ear as any to summarizing
reconcile them. If, on the other hand, 'is its_ bringing to light of new ideas everything that is makers regarded
as by Amer-
consensus is understood to mean a and the supplanting of old myths ican disastrous.
general agreement on goals and with new realities. We Americans and
values, but not necessarily on the are much in need of this benefit I do not suggest that we should
best means of realizing them, then because we are severely, if not heap praise on the Chinese Com-
it becomes a lasting basis of national `uniquely, afflicted with a habit of munists, dismantle NATO, abandon
strength. policy making by analogy: North Berlin, and seize every opportunity
It Is consensus in this sense which 'Vietnam's Involvement in South Viet- that comes' along to appease our
has made America strong in the past. _nam, for example, Is equated with enemies. I do suggest the desirability
Indeed, much of our national' success Hitler's invasion of Poland and a, of an atmosphere in which unorthodox
in combining change with continuity parley with the Vietcong would repre. Ideas would arouse interest rather
can be attributed to the vigorous ' Sent another Munich. than horror, reflection rather than
competition of men and ideas within The treatment of slight and super.' emotion. As likely as not, new pro-
semblances as if they were posals, carefully examined, would be,
context of shared values and gen- fi
l
l
re
e
a
a
erally accepted institutions. It is only full-blooded analogies -as instances, found wanting and old policies judged,
through this kind of vigorous comps- ' as it were, of history "repeating sound; what is wanted is not change
tition of Ideas that a consensus of itself" - is a substitute for thinking Itself but the capacity for change.
values can sometimes be translated and a misuse of history. The value Consider the idea of "appeasement."
into a true consensus of policy. of history is not what it seems tol In a free and healthy political atmos-
prohibit or prescribe; but its general phere it would elicit neither horror.
indications as to the kinds of policies:nor enthusiasm but only interest in,
TH]E correction of errors in a na- that are likely to succeed and the 'what what precisely Its proponent had in.
tion's foreign policy is greatly assisted kinds that are likely to fail, or, as.mind. As Winston Churchill once '
by the timely raising of voices of crit- one historian has suggested, its hintslsaid: "Appeasement In itself may
icism within the nation. When the as to what is likely not to happen. be good or bad according to cir-
British launched their disastrous There Is a kind of voodoo about cumatances... Appeasement from
attack on Egypt, the Labor party American foreign policy. Certain strength is magnanimous and noble
raised a collective voice of Indigna- and might be the surest and perhaps
tion while the military operation was drums have to be beaten regularly to the only path to world peace." . {
ward off evil spirits - for example,
0 still under way; refusing l to be it de- .the maledictions which are regularly In addition to its usefulness for
terrisi by calls for national unity in uttered against North Vietnamese redeeming error and introducing new
a crisis, Labor began the long, painful ? ? Ideas, free and open criticism has a
process of recovering Great Britain's ;aggression, the wild men in Peking, third, more abstract but no less im.-
good name at the.very moment when communism in general and President rtant function in n a democracy. lea It
de Gaulle. Certain pledges must be , th
those
a
f
d
th
d
'
e
an
c
b
or
one.
still being
the damage was
erapy ' who are troubled or dismayed s
Similarly, the French Intellectuals who repeated every day lest the whole
ck and ruin-for
t
o ra
~~-rs~q,Tree world
protested Francewi;l~`b)As+ 611' W&IFF Rve u m &WO r 4)50-9
Tneine.hina and a `b)ds+ ---"__
i
.--?
how
nsw
held the Continuos
MAY1 r, 1gF,
 ";vipn a?^
re are U Ui rititpaeld 41A
T7,e
rivate life when one must protes
p
01 solely or even primarily because
ne's protest will be politic or mate-
ally productivebut because one's
nse of decency is offended, because
e is fed up with political craft and
/
public Images, or simply because
something goes against the grain. The
catharsis thus provided may indeed
be the most valuable of freedom's
uses.
WHILE not unprecedented, pro-
tests against a war in the middle of
the war are a rare experience for
Americans. I see It as a mark of
strength and maturity that an articu-
late minority have raised their voices
against the Vietnamese war and that
the majority of Americans are endur-
ing this dissent not without anxiety,
to be sure, but with better grace and
understanding than would have been
the case in any other war of the
20.th century.
PYR? V s by no means cgrtain that
iielatively healthy atmosphere in
which the debate is now taking place
,will not give way to a new era of
McCarthyism. The longer the Viet-
namese war goes on without prospect
of victory or negotiated peace, the
,higher the war fever will rise. Past
experience provides little basis for
confidence that reason can prevail in
such an atmosphere. In a contest
.between a hawk and a dove the hawk
has a great advantage, not because
it is a better bird but because it Is
a bigger bird with lethal talons and a
highly developed will to use them.
Without illusions as to the prospect
of success, we must try nonetheless POLICY CHAMPION, POLICY CHALLENGER-
to to bring reason and restraint into the Senator Fulbright is greeted by President Johnson at a
emotionally charged atmosphere inWhite House reception for Congressional leaders.
which the Vietnamese war Is now be given In mere party wantonness, war have been held up to scorn on
being discussed. Instead of trading and that the one given is justly cen- the ground that they wish to "select
epithets about the legitimacy of de- surable if it had no other, or better, their wars," by which it Is apparently
ocritical to object
who
hy
t it i
t th
th
p
s
a
ose
mean
bate,' we would do well to focus on foundation. I am one of
the issue itself, recognizing that all l joined in that vote, and I did so under to this particular war while not object-
!of of us make mistakes and that MIS- my best impression of the truth of ing to war in general. I fail to under-.
takes can be corrected only if they.the case." stand what is reprehensible about
are acknowledged and discussed, and That is exactly what the students trying to make moral distinctions be-
,
who tween one war and another-between
t
liti
i
i
s no
c
ans
sors and po
recognizing further that war
and profes
its own ' justification, that it can oppose the Vietnamese war have been for example, resistance to Hitler and
I and must be discussed unless we are doing: they have been acting on their intervention in Vietnam. From the
prepared to sacrifice our traditional '.y '.,best impression of the truth of the time of Grotius to the drafting of the
rocesses to a false image case 1' Some of our superpatriots United Nations Charter, international
l d
moc1Otic
e
p
of national
In fact, the protesters against the States fights is a just war, if not tween "just wars" and "unjust wars."
Vietnamese war are in good historical Indeed a holy crusade, but history It is a difficult problem of law and lem company. Jan. 12, United 1848, braham does not historian wtheir view. No ould deny that the morality, but it isf difficult
valid
Lincoln nee se in the UnitMates table
House of Representatives and made a' United States has fought some wars problem.
speech about the Mexican War worthy which were unjust, unnecessary or Under the American Constitution-
! of a Senator Morse. Lincoln's speech both - I would suggest the War of the Congress-especially the Senate--
'w" an explanation of a vote he had 1812, the Civil War and the Spanish- has a particular responsibility. In
recently cast In support of a resolu- American War as examples. In a : coping with such problems, yet in
ton declaring that the war had beeen historical frame of reference it seems recent years the Congress has not
unnecessaril3P' and unconstitutionally, to me logical and proper to question fully discharged Its obligations in the
begun by President lt'olk. ,.I L,.! the wisdom of our present mItat'7I field of foreign relations. The reduced
he said, "tI)M such a vote should trot? ~dinvolvement in Asia. role of the Congress and the enhanced
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 in become- it
10reign policy are not ere
p !dent Johnson's Ideas force." against aggression In South- used to be, an institution in which
;~niY of tiZeebe # 6VE1'"~'+br Relg1se ? a~IQ~~g tI r i s 9
It consen 1 a
qon of & trend In the conatitu onal The joint reso v on energy and candor.
relationship .between President and check signed by the Congress in an
,Congress that began in 1940-that is atmosphere of urgency that seemed In recent months, the Senate Com-
to say, at the beginning of this age at the time to preclude debate. Since mittee on Foreign Relations has
of crisis. its adoption, the Administration has engaged in an experiment in public
The cause of the change is crisis converted the Vietnamese conflict education. The committee has made
itself, The President has the authority from a civil war in which some itself available as a forum for the
and resources to make decisions and American advisers were Involved to a meeting of politicians and professors
take actions in an emergency; the, major international war in which the and, more broadly, as a forum through
Congress does not. Nor, in my opinion, principal fighting unit is an American which recognized experts and scholars.
should It; the proper responsibilities army of 250,000 men. Each time that could help increase Congressional and
of the Congress are to reflect and Senators have raised questions about public understanding of the problems
'review, to advise and criticize, to successive escalations of the war, we associated with our involvement in
consent and to. withhold consent have had the blank check of Aug. 7, Vietnam and our relations with Com-
In the past 25 years, American 1964, waved in our faces as supposed munist China. It is my hope that this
foreign policy has encountered a shat- evidence of the overwhelming support experiment will not only contribute
tering series of crises and inevitably of the congress for a policy In South- 'to public education but will help to.
-or almost inevitably-the effort to east Asia which, in fact, has been restore the Senate to its proper role adviser cope with these has been executive radically changed since the summer. great issues of foeeiPn policy. on the
effort, while the Congress, inspired by of 1964.
patriotism, importuned by Presidents All this is very frustrating to some I -believe that the public hearings
and deterred by lack of information, of us in the Senate, but we have only on Vietnam, by bringing before the
has tended to fall in line. The result ourselves to blame. Had we met our American people a variety of opinions
has been an unhinging of traditional responsibility of careful examination and disagreements pertaining to the
constitutional relationships; the Sen- of a Presidential request, had the war, and perhaps by helping to
's constitutional powers of advice Senate Foreign Relations Committee restore a degree of balance between
?it have atrophied into what held hearings on the resolution before the executive and the Congress, have
is widely regarded-though never as- recommending its adoption, had the done far more to strengthen the coun-
serted-to be a duty to give prompt Senate debated the, resolution and try than to weaken it. The hearings
!consent with a minimum of advice. considered its implications before have been criticized on the ground
Two examples will illustrate the giving its overwhelming approval, we that they conveyed an "image" of the
extent to which this trend has gone. might have put limits and qualifica United States as divided over the war.
On the afternoon of April 28,1965, the tions on our endorsement of future, Since the country obviously is divided.
leaders of Congress were called to an uses of force in Southeast Asia - if
emergency meeting at the White not in the resolution itself, then in the what was conveyed was a fact rather
House. We were told that the revo~ legislative history preceding its adop? than eared, Image.
see no merit ivethe alread
lution that had broken out four dayd tion. As it was, only Senators Morse
before in the Dominican Republic and Gruening debated the resolution. that we should maintain an image of
had got completely out of hand, that I myself, as chairman of the For- unity even though it is a false image,
Americans and other foreigners on eign Relations Committee, served as maintained at the cost of suppressing
the scene were in great danger, and floor manager of the Southeast Asia the normal procedures of democracy. that American marines would be resolution and did all I could to bring. In coming months, and perhaps
landed in Santo Domingo that night; about its prompt and overwhelming years, the Foreign Relations Commit-
for the sole purpose of protecting the adoption. I did so because I was tee contemplates additional proceed-
Ives of Americans and other foreign confident that President Johnson Ings pertaining to major questions of
`era. None of the Congressional lead. would use our endorsement with American foreign policy. It Is our
era expressed disapproval, wisdom and restraint. I was also expectation that these proceedings
Four months later, after an Influenced by partisanship: an elec- may generate controversy. If they db,
exhaustive review of ? the Dominican tion campaign was in progress and It will not be because we value con-
crisis by the Senate Foreign Rela- I had no wish to make any difficulties troversy for its own sake, but rather
bons Committee, it was clear beyond had the President in his race against because we accept it as a condition
reasonable doubt that, while saving a Republican candidate whose election of intelligent decision-making, as, in-
American lives may have been a fac- I thought would be a disaster for the deed, the crucible in which a national
tor in the decision to intervene onecountry. My role In the adoption of consensus as to objectives may be
:the resolution of Aug. 7, 1964, is a translated Into a consensus of policy
April 28, the major reason had been
a determination on the part of the, source of neither pleasure nor pride as well.
'United States Government to defeat; to me today-although I do not regret; An individual Senator, attempting
the rebel, or constitutionalist,. forces, the outcome of the election. ? to make a useful contribution to the
whose victory at that time was immi- country 's foreign relations, faces some
neat Had I known in April what I (special problems. A Senator who
knew in August, I most certainly; THE problem, then, is to find to influence foreign policy
would have objected to the American, ways by which the Senate and indl-'wishes must consider the eobable results of.
intervention in the Dominican Repub- vidual Senators can discharge their m~~i~ g privately with the
lie, constitutional duties of advice and tom,, alternatively, of speak-
Almost nine months before the Do- consent in an age in which the direr- Executive out publicly. Y do not see aspv,
minican intervention, on Aug. 5, 1964, tion and philosophy of foreign policy ing ~..e. - ,,. ~, ?.,....:I
the Congress received an urgent re- are largely shaped by urgent deci-. . Continued
quest from President Johnson for the sions made at momenta of crisis.
Immediate adoption of a joint reso- The Senate as a whole, I think, :
lotion regarding Southeast Asia. On should undertake to revive and
Aug. 7, after perfunctory committee, strengthen its deliberative function.
hearings apd a brief debate, the Con-I Acting on the premise that dissent is
gress, with only two Senators dissent-, not disloyalty, that a true consensus'
ing, adopted the resolution, authori>- is shaped by airing our differences
lag 1Q et4Wft~"kAAP aFa em Red,e"A W5-00149.R000200900050-9
Y15196,6
 great principle Involved here; It is largely to the determination of oth-
. a matter of how one can better ers. The Senate consists of 100 indl-
achieve what one hopes to achieve. viduals with 50 separate constituen-
For my own part, I have used both Iles and widely varying fields of in-
methods, with results varying accord- dividual knowledge and interest. There,
.ing to circumstance. Other things is little that a Senator can accom-,
being equal-which they seldom are- plish by his own efforts; If he is to;
;I find it more agreeable to communi- have an effect on public policy, he
Cate privately with Democratic Presi- must influence his colleagues.
dents and publicly with Republican
Presidents.
Since 1961, when the Democrats SOMETMES, but not often, a col-
came back to power, I have made league's support can be won by'
recommendations to the President on charm; It can certainly be lost by
a number of occasions through confi- rudeness. Occasionally 'it can be won
dential memorandums. In April, 1965, by persuasive rhetoric; more often it
I sent President Johnson a note con- is got by trading your support on one
taining certain recommendations on Issue for his on another, or simply
the war in Vietnam, recommenda- by a general practice of limiting your
,tions which I reiterated thereafter in owtt Initiative to matters of unusual
private conversations with high Ad- interest or importance while other-
ministration officials. When it became wise accepting the recommendations
,very clear that the Administration Of the committees. And, In some in-
did not find my ideas persuasive, stances, a Senator may influence his
began to make my views known pub- colleagues by 'influencing their con-
licly In the hope, If not of bringing stituencies.
about a change in, Administration Some may regard this process of
policy, then at least of opening up a mutual accommodation as unethical.
debate on that policy. I do';not regard it so, because I do
Sanitized - Approved For ReleaseQFOIR AP75-00149R000200900050-9
PYFIHTdifficult to measure the ef- not place my own wishes and judg-
fectlveness of a public statement.ments on. a. plane above those of my
by a Senator-a speech, say-because colleagues. There are no areas of pub-
Its effect may be something not done lie, policy in which I am absolutely
rather than some specific action or'sure of the correctness of my opin-
change of policy by the executive. Ions, but there are some in which I
Generally' speaking, It seems to me am reasonably confident of my judg-
that a Senator's criticism is less like-meat. It is in these areas that I try
'ly to affect the case In point than it to make a. contribution. There are
is to affect some similar case in the other areas in which my knowledge is
future. I am Inclined to believe,. for limited, and In these I prefer to let
example, that my Senate speech of others take the lead. There are still
Sept. 15, 1965, may have been a fac- other areas in which I am proscribed
for in the Administration's subsequent from leadership or Initiative by the
support of the Garcia-Godoy Govern- among Preferences of my constituency.
ment in Its resistance to pressures bye A politician has no right to ask
'the Dominican military. Its more sig-i that he be absolved from public judg-
nificant results will be shown in the ment; he may hope, however, that he
reaction of the United States Govern- will be judged principally on the basis
ment if It Is, again confronted with of his performance In the areas of
a violent revolution in Latin America. big principal effort. He may hope
As to my criticisms--and those of myl that he will be judged not as a saint
colleagues-regarding the Vietnamese or a paragon, but as ,a human being
war, their effect remains to be seem entrusted IV his constituents with ex-
Before considering how he will try'traoidinary responsiblities, while en-!
to influence events, a politician must' dowed by . the Lord with the same,
hrfldence :end Which t: he will leave that afflict the _ ot .the
race. . , ,kSr...r .. ~.., .:. , ?,'..?:
decide which events he proposes to Problems at ,judgment and temptation. ;
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