MR. DOVE AND MR AND MR. HAWK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200900007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 18, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

' POST
Sanitized - Approve,,~~1111d"FAr lI' e : CIA-RMS
Affairs of State, by Stewart Alsop
Dove and Mr. Hawk
fir.
IL of
CPYRGHT
WASHINGTON:
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his leading
critic, Senator William Fulbright, have a good
many characteristics in common. They were
both Rhodes scholars and thus certified intel-
lectuals, and they both have southern accents.
and smoke too much. Moreover, they were
both candidates for the job of Secretary of
State in 1960, when John Kennedy seriously .
considered Fulbright for the post. In the end,.
Kennedy decided against Fulbright because of
his civil-rights record and chose Rusk instead.
Suppose Fulbright, not Rusk, were Secretary
of State today. What would he do-or what
does he think he would do-that Rusk is not
doing? And why is Rusk not doing these things
that Fulbright thinks ought to be done?
Recently, to try to answer these questions,
this reporter interviewed both Fulbright, the
Senate's leading dove, and Rusk, the Admini-
stration's leading hawk, on the same day. it was
Second, he would propose to Communist
China a treaty calling for the "neutralization
The purpose of this Fulbright program, which
is in essence the program of the more rational
members of the senatorial "peace bloc," is to
achieve "accommodation by negotiation." The
accommodation would include internationally
supervised free elections leading to a govern-
ment in which the Viet Cong, if successful at
the polls, would take part. On this score, there
is no difference between Fulbright and Rusk,
for Rusk has the same announced purpose.
Fulbright is convinced, he says, that "de-
escalation" of-the war would "increase rather
than decrease the chances of negotiation lead-
ing to accommodation." Rusk and the Adminis-
tration, Fulbright says, believe the opposite,
and this is the "key difference" between them.
Dean Rusk refuses to be drawn into a debate
at second hand with Fulbright, but there are
certain obvious points to be made about Ful-
bright's program. The senator says that he
would defend Formosa. against Chinese Com-
munist attack, and the Chinese Communists
have made it abundantly clear that they will
not join the United Nations, or seek any ac-
commodation with the United States, unless
this country abandons Formosa. They have.
made it equally clear that they are not in-
terested in an agreement with the United
States to "neutralize" Southeast Asia, because
they do not want a neutral Southeast Asia.
They want a Communist Southeast Asia,
which is hardly the same thing, as Fulbright
and President Johnson did not want to take. acknowledges.
Here they are: As for Fulbright's key proposal-a cessation
First,, Fulbright would "cease to oppose" the of the bombing and a withdrawal of American
seating of Communist China in the U. N. ? forces to defensive positions-Fulbright agrees
an interesting experience, for both i ulbright
and Rusk are interesting men.
Bill Pulbright is a likable fellow-as most
politicians are, for an unlikable politician has a
hard time getting people to vote for him. But
Fulbright does not mind being disliked. in fact,
he enjoys being in an unpopular minority-in
the Carly 1950's he was briefly, to his credit, a
lonely minority of one against Senator Joe
McCarthy. Over a pleasant two-hour lunch,
Fulbright named three specific actions which
he wanted to take, and which Secretary Rusk
:. Chinese Communists that we are prepared to
of the entire region as between China and the
United States." He would "indicate to the
Third, he would cease bombing North Viet-
nam. cease further reinforcement of American
remove American military power from all of
Southeast Asia in return for a similar prohi-
bition on her part."
proposed, he would adopt instead a defensive
holding posture in Vietnam, in "enclaves,"
-?? sive operations there. As Gen. James Gavin
that it is "possible" that this would lead to a ,
quick victory of the Communist forces over the
South Vietnamese forces outside the "en-
claves." All military observers on the spot are
absolutely certain that it would lead to such a
result. It is hard to see how a Communist vic-
tory would induce in the Communists an ac-
commodating mood. It would seem far more
likely to lead to a neutralist or pro-Communist
government in Saigon, which would order the
American forces to leave South Vietnam.
Queried on this point, Fulbright was amiably
fuzzy. "I'm not an ideologue," he says. "These
countries want mainly to be independent. Tito
proved a Communist' can be independent, and '
LL _ : which he compares to Gibraltar or Guantanamo.
Con,inued
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