WHEREIN DID HE DO WRONG?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200540034-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: May 27, 1960
• Content Type: NSPR

sr PEVEPORT TIMES (LA. )
President Eisenhower's report to the na-
J tion Wednesday night was a forthright and
STATINTL
0 cc tnplete accounting of American espionage
and the reasons for it-by spy planes over
Russia, which starte,R ;our years ago, and
of Khrushchev's wrecking of the Summit
Conference.
Bluntly, the President stated that if
there had been adequate espionage by the
Uhited States there would have been no
!'earl Harbor. He could have added also
hat there would have been no second
;Corcan War through sneak invasion by the
Red Chinese after the North Korean Com-
munists had been wiped out. MacArthur
was not even permitted to make ordinary
military aerial surveillance over Red China
at that time.
In its entirety, the effect of Mr. Eisen-
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part-was to, place 'the chatterings of the
A(llai Stevensons, the Democratic ,Advisory
C"~SIT} Paul Butlcrs,' the Kennedys,
the Symingtons and their type in the cate
g;;ory of asininity. The quicker the Rayburns,
{
the Barleys, the Johnsons and others of the
Democratic leadership can put an end to
such chattering the greater will be the
security of the nation itself and the respect
in which the Democratic Party is held by
the people.
I3riofly, President Eisenhower's revela-
tions concerning the U2 and destruction of
the Paris Summit Conference by Khru-
shchev presented these high spots:
Four years ago the President authorized
aerial espionage over Russia under direc-
tion of the
C~]aI&~ Ir~~--s':h4ncy.
(Creation of Ci rns one of the fine
achievements of the Democratic Truman
administration after World War II had re-
vealed the terrible tragedies that could
cone to this nation through lack of a com-
petent peacetime intelligence system-not
only Pearl Harbor, but the Battle of the
Bulge and many other instances of tre=
mendous military setbacks, including huge
loss of life,)
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The success' of the four years of spy
flying has been magnificent-almost beyond
belief.
(It has been published in both Germany
and the United States, including articles on
this page, that the U2 flights mapped vir-
tually all of Russia except barren areas. The
President showed a photograph of an Amer-
ican naval base from 13 miles up, in which
parking area lines six inches wide were
visible clearly even on the TV screen, as
an example of the amazing detail now avail-
ile in American air photography from tre-
tnc,:dous distances. It was an American
base. But clearly the President was saying
" Ti: is is what we have of Russia as a result
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down (the President said), the United
States followed the only course that can be
followed under such circumstances to try
to protect its spy system and perhaps the:
life of the spy himself. Not knowing the:
exact details, it put out a "cover statement"'
with the explanation of "a weather flight."
(When a British military intelligence
spy was caught skin diving under a Russian
warship in Portsmouth harbor while Khru-
shch.ev and Bulganin were official guests of
the British government in April, 1958, Prime'
MFOster Eden as well as Bulganin and;
Khrushchev brushed the incident aside. Thc,
British attitude was that it was an odd place
to "practice" skin diving. The British spy,
Commander Crabb, has not been heard from.,
since.)
When it became known that Powers Was
a prisoner of Russia, and the plane or parts
of it presumably also captured, the Presi-
dent (he explained) at once ordered the full
facts of the flight revealed. There was. no
lack of co-ordination between government
agencies and nothing of one hand not
knowing what the other was doing. Very
quick decision& had to be made. They
were made. In retrospect they were deci-
sions that. hardly could have been made'
otherwise under the conditions existing.
As for Khrushchev in Paris (Mr. Eisen- i
hower went on), It was clear as the Sum
mit Conference approached that the Rus-
sians were determined:
(1) That . President Eisenhower's
planned visit to Russia, including
speeches in live cities and unrestricted
use of radio. must be cancelled In view
of the fact that he had become a world.
wide symbol of peace through his
travels to foreign ? nations and that
there was rioting in the Soviet and
political revolt in its government.
(2) That the Summit Conference
must not accomplish anything and
should be prevented if possible be-
cause the Allies would not yield on
Berlin and Berlin was the one issue
on which the Soviet had to have
"gains" to satisfy the Communist bloc
of nations.
So, the President stated unequivocably,
the Soviet delegation made its plans in ad. j'
vance to go to Paris to scuttle the Summit,
Conference and the U2 was merely ani
excuse. Khrushchev, Mr. Eisenhower point-
ed out, said he had known of the U2 flights
for several yearsi lie knew of them all the
time he was in the United States and made,
no protest. He protested-only when protest!
~
suited the Soviet plans to blow up the possi-
bilities of steps toward world peace.
Those are the basic facts as presented I