(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200330118-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 1999
• Sequence Number: 118
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 20aR1Y4}CIA
It Tl ?_ECOND ANNIVERSARY Ol?" the un iyenS hatred of the great t~vs of
A THE PROCLAMATION OF AN IN- pae0Pict I em also ooaivinoed that this
DEPENDENT UKRAINE hatred Is particularly intense in areas
like the Ukraine where hatred of foreign
Mr. DODD. Mr. President. last Fri- {ipt oo ooniMnes with the general.
day, January- 22, was the 42d anniver- hatred of cgntmunism.
sary of the proclamation of an rode- N wi ere irk the vast territory of the
,pendent Ukraine. Soviet Union has the Kremlin enoom-
Almost three ; centuries of czarist tared greater or more stubborn r?eststae+oe
domination and "atterr-pted Russianiza- - than in the Ukraine. And nowhere has
tion had yVt been able to extinguish the the Kremlin been mare,ntthieae, pc-
will. to fie. Odom in the hearts of the corder tox study madb by the 7Agfds*
Ukrainian people. When the czarist five Reterettaoe Service .L. the LOWN r at
regime 'collapsed in World War I, the from 8 mllltoh to 1f edifie r
cOngrew ainiaa people asserted this will by perished in the reglma-made
9nd
roclaiming their independence and famine of 1943. In addltioa, almost 24
establishing a democratic parliamentary million were deported from the Ukraine
government. to Siberia and other remote areaa.
In all. of their early 'statements, the The Policy of Ukrainianizatlon, which'
Bolsheviks had promised the right of the .Bolsheviks tolerated for, .amswal
national self-determination to all the years after their takeover. on gave wag
subject peoples of czarist Russia. But to a policy of compulsory RusalAcMion.
these,promises were as false as all their Why is this so? Hugh Seton-Wateom a
other promises. In 1920 the Red Army British student of Soviet affairs. has mug-,
invaded the Ukraine, dispersed its legal go~,~ that the Soviet Oovernmertt seeks'
government, end inaugurated a reiinl the destruction of the hoe-Ruestanlwa"
of terror, which persists .to this day. tionalities, not in the interest of. the
l: am pro:oundly oonVinced that, Russian nation per se. but rather because
wr,erever it has taken power, the tyr. the totality of its power demands the
anny of communism has Won for Itself destruction of national differences end
the creation of a monolithic. unified,
Russianiaed, Soviet people. Whatever
the explanation may be, there can be no
disputing. the mass of evidence that the
Soviet regime has been seeking to destrog
the national spirit of the Ukrainian peo-
ple by destroying their culture and pro-
gressively Russifyfng their language.
According to all reports, the Kremlin
has not been successful in achieving this
objective. After 40 years of persecution,
mass murder, and cultural oppr Waien.
the Ukrainian people, more than 40
million strong, are perhaps more united
than ever before in their desire for free-
dom qnd in their yearning for national
independence.
May I suggest, Mr. President. that In
observing the anniversary of Ukrainian
independence this year, we gq a bit be-
yond the simple expression of sympathy
which has characterized our. resolutions
of 'previous, years. I *feel that this Is a
time when we ought to ask ourselves
whether we are doing everything that Is
Within otrr power to foster the ?wi,H to
liberation among the captive nations of
they achieved power. We should 'In our
broadcasts place emphasis on events and
holidays that have special mttlonal s1g-
nificanoe. Certainly we must avoid any-
thing which might give the Impression
that we accept the subjugation of the
si-tellite states of Europe or the national
structure of the Soviet Union Itself as
things that are final and Irrevocable.
Everything that has happened since
the Khrtnshchev visit makes see fear that
we are, in effect, turning our back on the'
.qbtlre ply of liberation. jlf we do. we
do so at our own risk... The dlssatlsfao-r
Lion of the peoples at the captive na-
tions, of the Ukr inimns and the other
subjugated minorities within the Soviet
Union. bat played a -for more Important
role than is commonly, realised In re-
strairlllis the Kralnualis espa~ssioniam, j
Every lapse on our part whltf~ can be
utilfscd by the Kremlin to disootnnga The spirit of resistance, leaves IC that much
freer' to engage in pressures. ultimatums.
limited aggressions. 1-n4 military chal-
lengps. Beery measure that-mm take to
encourage'. the .Hope of liberation Is an
additional deterrent to Soviet aggression,
an additional assurance oL, peace.
We must. therefore, In the critical pe-
riod wl}loh now confronts up.? rededicate
ourselves, in terms of oo erete actions.
to the goal of freedom for' all men
central and eastern :Europe and Among.
the captive .peoples of the Soviet Union'
Itself.
Because of certain inhibitions that
seem to be an orga4le part of democracy.
it would-be politically unrealistic to .ex-
pect any American administration---or,
for that matter. any democratic govern-
ment.-to engage in open subversion of,
the Soviet regime or openly to espouse
the cause of Ukrainian independence.
Needless to say, the Kremlin sutlers from
no reciprocal Inhibition. But there are a
number of things we can and should do
to encourage opposition to the regime in
general as %ell as the natural desire for
Indeperldence of some of the non-Rua-,
sian peoples.
We should remind the Bolsheviks at
every opportunity how they promised the
right of national self-determination
when they were seeking power and hew
they trod this promise underfoot once
Approved' For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00149R000200330118-7