THE BEN BARKA SCANDAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000100350060-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 1999
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: February 14, 1966
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

THE NEW, DEADER
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POLICING DEGAULLE'S FRANCE
FOIAb3b
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OME FRENCHMEN are calling
the scenario "Thundergaulle,"
others have labeled it "To Rabat
with Love." But despite their respect
for the inventive powers of the late
Ian Fleming, they feel the creator
of James Bond never came up with
a 'tale as explosive as that of the
kidnapping of Moroccan labor
leader Mehid Ben Barka in front of
a drug store on Boulevard St. Ger-
main at 12:30 P.M. last October 29.
Ben Barka, to be sure, was not
the first political exile ever abducted
on a Paris street. The agents of
Stalin and Mussolini similarly dis-
patched several others, and the
French secret services themselves
have not always been above such
methods. The kidnapping of Al-
gerian rebel chief Ahmed Ben Bella
in a commercial airplane in 1956
is still well remembered, and so
is the abduction of French Secret
Army Organization (OAS) leader
Antoine Argoud from a Munich
hotel in 1962.
The Ben Barka scandal is special,
however, because it has revealed
that behind the virtuous facade of
the Gaullist regime there could oc-
GEORGE W. HERALD, a previous
contributor here, is a veteran for.
elgn correspondent based In Paris.
By George Herald
en
the police, the secret service, vari-
ous so-called "parallel" police or-
ganizations, and a mafia of thugs
. and . ex-convicts. Perhaps most
shocked and embarrassed was Gen-
eral de Gaulle himself, for the
evident negligence and malfeasance
of his subordinates tarnishes his
image as an all-seeing father figure
with everything under control. He
is said to feel let down and be-
trayed by his own chosen sub-
Many Frenchmen see in the Ben
Barka drama a kind of new Drey-
fus affair that is bound to be kept
alive for many months, if not years.
It will almost certainly become a
significant campaign issue in the
French general elections in spring
1967, and the opposition has al-
ready started exploiting it for all
that it is worth. At the same time,
its international implications arc
grave. The affair has strained the
relations between France and
Morocco to the breaking point and
may yet lead to the downfall of
King Hassan 11. It is also likely to
affect the already strained friend-
ship between France and the United
States because many people around
de Gaulle, Including Nobel-prize
winner Francois Maurlac, are In-
einuating, so tar without any proo4
in Ben Barka's disappearance.
Trying to sift indisputable facts
from second-hand accounts based
on unproven testimonies is not an
easy matter in this case. Here, how-
ever, are the essential and estab-
lished facts:
On October 29, Ben Barka had
a date at the restaurant Lipp with
movie director Georges Franjus?
journalist Philippe Bernier and "re-
pented" ex-convict George Figon
to discuss a common film project.
The meeting, a trap arranged-- by
Figon, never took place. When Ben
Barka stepped out of a taxi in front
of the St. Germain corner drug
store next to Lipp, he was ap-
proached by police inspectors Louis
Souchon and Raymond Voitot. They
showed him their tricolor creden-
tials and asked him to follow them.
He did so without suspicion, par-
ticularly since they took him to
an official police car. Except for
the fact that Ben Barka was ac-
companied by a Moroccan student,
Mohamed Azemouri, who wit-
ncssed the scene and immediately
alerted Ben Barka's brother Ab-
delkader, the world probably would"
never have learned how the victim
disappeared.
The police car already had three
nocupantst wlrnn Ran Rarlra aN
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preached it: the two "retired" gang-
?steis, Julian Le Ny and Jean Palissc,
and Air France flight manager An-
toine Lopez, wearing dark glasses
and a false beard. Because of his
key position at Orly airport, Lopez
had often been used as an informer
by the French counter-espionage
and the narcotics squad. Together
with Souchon and Voitot, they took
Ben Barka to a villa at Fontenay-le-
Vicomte, near Orly, which be-
longed to ex-gangster Georges
Boucheseiche, now the owner of a
number of shady "hotels" in Paris
and Casablanca.
Ben Barka was left at the villa
together with-Le Ny and Palisse.
Lopez and the two policemen re-
turned to Paris, and did not again
see or hear from their victim. To
date, no one knows for sure what
happened to him after he entered
the villa.
SECOND SEQUENCE of proven
Q events began the day after
the kidnapping. On Saturday, Oc-
tober 30, at 5 P.m., General
Mohammad Oufkir, the' Moroccan
Minister of Interior, arrived at Orly
airport where he was met by major
Ahmed Dlimi, head of the Moroc-
can security police, Hamid Chtouki,
chief of the secret service, and
police inspector El Mahi. All three
were in Paris to prepare for the
state visit of King Hassan II, sched-
uled for. November 11 (and later
cancelled).
El Mahi had booked a room for
General Oufkir at the Royal-Alma
hotel, but it has beeh established
that he did not stay there. Oufkir
took a plane for Geneva from Orly
the next morning at 5 A.M. to visit
his family in the Swiss resort town
of Gstaad. He claims that he did
not meet anyone involved in the
Ben Barka kidnapping while he was
in Paris. But he has so far failed
to explain his activities here during
the 12 hours from 5 P.M. Saturday
to 5 A.M. Sunday.
These are the objective facts of
the case. Everything else is ~ based
February 14, 1966
on largely concording testimony of
participants interrogated separately.
According to these depositions, the
Ben Barka kidnapping was insti-
gated by General Oufkir. He con-
sidered Ben Barka, who had twice
been sentenced to death for con-
tumacy, to be his worst political
enemy. He knew that King Hassan,
seeking a broader political base at
home, had sent emissaries to the
labor leader, promising him a royal
pardon if he came back from exile
and entered the government. Oufkir
was allegedly afraid of being forced
out of office, and felt he had to
act before Ben Barka returned.
Through his connections with
various French "parallel" police,
Oufkir is believed to have secured
the cooperation of Figon, Bouche-
sciche and other underworld char-
acters, offering them a total award
of $200,000. He also is believed
to have obtained the help of Lopez,
who had long been eying a well-
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< < r a Post With Koyal Air
When Oufkir landed'at Orly on
October 30, Lopez, by his own ad-
mission, took him directly from the
airport to Boucheseiche's villa,
where Ben Barka was held. Figon,
who has since committed a con-
troversial "suicide," made an
equally controversial confession a
few days before his death, in which
he affirmed having been present
while Oufkir tortured Ben Barka
with the edge of a sword until he
fainted. By Figon's account, Ben
Barka was then transported to
Lopez' villa at Ormoy and tied to
the boiler in the basement. It is
presumed that, during the night
from Saturday to Sunday, he was
either killed and buried on the spot
or taken to Orly, dead or alive, and
whisked away to Morocco aboard
a private plane; but for this there
is no material evidence.
All the various testimonies raised
more questions than they answered.
While Oufkir might have been
motivated by hatred and his ac-
complices by greed, it was more
difficult to explain the participa-
policemen like Souchon and Voitot
in the plot. They claimed that Lopez
had told them the operation was
"covered" by top French officials in
the know, including Jacques Foc-
cart,, the grey eminence of the
Elysee Palace. Figon, for his part,
asserted that he too was "covered" '
by Gaullist Deputy Pierre Lemar-
cnand, a close friend of Minister
of Interior Roger Frey. Lemarchand
used to run one of those "parallel"
police that distinguished themselves
in the struggle against the OAS in
the early '60s.
Whatever the truth may be,
Lopez really did act as if he con-
sidered himself covered. On Sun-
day morning, immediately after Ouf-
the strange happenings of the previ-
ous 36 hours to Commander Marcel
Leroy, his superior in the Counter-
intelligence Service. Leroy .Id
FES1'419
on the in ormation to General
Jacquier, the head of the service,
and to police commissary Leon
Caille, the second in command at
the Paris Prefecture. Caille. through
Lemarchand, called in Figon, who
came clean on November 2. Sou-
chon and Voitot admitted their par-
ticipation in the kidnapping on No-
vember 3. No one was taken into
custody at that time.
Meanwhile Ben Barka's brother
had alerted the French Ministry of
Justice, and Judge Louis Zollingcr
had started looking for the kid-
nappers. But the police told him
nothing, letting the judge fend for
himself for 13 days. Only after
Figon leaked his version of the story
to the opposition weekly Express
were Lopez, Souchon, Voitot, Ber-
nier and El Mahi arrested. Figon
and the other truants could not be
found.
Anti-Gaullists indignantly charge
that the story was deliberately sup-
pressed to avoid embarrassing Pres-
ident de Gaulle in his reelection
campaign, which ran from Novem-
ber 4 to December 19. They claim
that even after Souchon's arrest,
the details of the story were. kept
hidden from the public and that
certain high officials, as well as
Deputy Lemarchand, made demon-
striiihIg fnfm statom.nh,
O ONE ACCUSES General de
Gaulle himself of complicity
in the attempt to suppress the Ben
Barka scandal. There is a consensus
that he is sincerely trying to find
an answer to the crucial question
of the case: whether high-placed
Frenchmen actually knew before-
hand of Oufkir's kidnapping project,
as Lopez affirms, and not only did
nothing to thwart it but actually
endorsed it. The General seems to
suspect this, for he has already
fired General Jacquier, the chief of
Counterintelligence, and. his aide
Leroy. If it were proven that Pierre
Lemarchand also had fore-knowl-
edge 'of the plot, de Gaulle might
come to more far-reaching con-
clusions, with drastic consequences
for many associates.
For the time being, France has
withdrawn its ambassador from
Rabat, and Judge Zollingcr has is-
sued a warrant of arrest against
Oufkir. These measures are con-
sidered a first warning to King Has-
san that one does not tangle with
the President of France. Dc Gaulle
also feels that those involved in
the Ben Barka scandal should be
taught not to tangle with his policy
of cooperation with underdeveloped
countries which is based on a re-
fusal to draw distinctions between
domestic political regimes.
The General has always been
careful not to identify himself too
closely with the Gaullist UNR party.
As election time approaches, he
may use the Ben Barka affair as
a lever to dissociate himself even
more strongly from certain Gaullist
followers who fail to follow him
scrupulously enough. He is expected
to insist more than ever that he is
the President of "all the people"
and that he plans to stay in office
even if the majority in the National
Assembly should change in 1967.
Up to now, Paris political observers
have wondered whether Gaullism
is going to survive de Gaulle. Since
the Ben Barka kidnapping, it rather
looks as if de Gaulle will be trying
is sumve .
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