WILL - NOT WEAPONS IS BEST FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300490023-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: September 2, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000
NORWICH, N.Y..
SUN
e. ,908
Front Edit Other
'Pall. Pag. S 1
Dale:
. --~ir 1i--
protecting oneself . . . g
"Even extremely large numbers of high. "Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets..{
cost weapons would provic'e no assurance of vie. that the diplomatic and military stance of..the
tory or even survival. Thus, if there is any United States was that of a power seeking to
valid and rational'' concept today upon which avoid confrontation and fearful of its conse. .~
to develop or measure a strategic militaryforce, gin'hc+'X;, and therefore a power which could be
it is that of deterrence. subjected to a series of setbacks without high
sible to build a nuclear force capable ofdestroy. United States was a voc g
ing an enemy's capabilities and simultaneously _ tional capability and a counterinsurgency pro.
ram
a
Which convince Soviet leaders we lack deterrn . the poi c
nation in a crisis. of pigs expedition. The United States had ac.
CIA t d th> erection of the Berlin Wall with
h
the years ahead may come from U.S. actions The Un e a
risks necessary to save the Bay
i iti
United States probably appeared to them to be
n e
A Central
to conclude the seatest risk of nuclear war in uncertain and cautious.
it d St tes had chosen not to run l
1964
T77;
a s Is Lest 1 orce _411
ons
t,It nce Agency study seems
I
e cep e
I The study, by Willard Matthias of t
''Board of National Estimates, says: little more than verbal pyrotechnics. And the
"While it is most unlikely that Soviet United States had accepted the neutralist solu.
leaders will choose to carry out actions they tion in Laos.
know to carry a high risk of general war . "Formal U.S. -statements regarding Cuba it
such knowledge is not easy to come by ... conveyed an air of studied uncertainty.
"In this age of mobile striking forces and "In military planning, despite substantially'
hardened missile sites, it does not appear pos. . increased programs of missile deployment, the
d ", a greater conven.
'But one cannot find any rule for deter-
mining that a stated level of force will deter
and that another will not." Deterrence depends,
says Matthias, in very considerable measure on.
how the enemy sizes up the determination and
will of his opponent.
xam lehow
n e p
i
missile,. crisis; of 1J62.
Says this` CIA paper: This study has the "general approval" of
"In the international atmosphere of early the CIA Board of National Estimates, "though
1962, when the Cuban move was planned, the : no attempt has been made to reach con;pleie
Soviet leaders were still riding 'high and the agreement on every point."
ves a
The Matthias study g
the United States, by seeming to be afraid of other places in which Soviet leaders coula
confrontation, set the stage for the Cuban aga;n real a lags. of will power in U.S. actions.
This cotih: lead to trouble.
+ ~u+` The U. S. show of determination in the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962 convinced Soviet leaders
,we did mean business, Ziatthtas says. He uunkcs
that will stand the United States in good stead
for a little while.
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300490023-7