AN INSURANCE POLICY FOR PEACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300490020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 3, 1954
• Content Type: NSPR

STA
Approved For Release 2004/11/29 :
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An In PqIicy for Peace
. WHAT POSES the greatest 'risk
of nuclear war in the years ahead?
The answer offered in a study by
the Central Intelligence Agency is, we
think, correct = i'lMly,-a miscalcula-
tion by Soviet leaders of the U.S. will
to resist in a crisis.
The point closely parallels one
made by David Lawrence. today in his
editorial page column analyzing the
save -the Bay of Pigs expedition. The
United States had accepted the erec-
tion of the Berlin Wall with little more
than verbal pyrotechnics. And the
United States had accepted the neutra-
list solution in Laos.
"Formal U.S. statements regard-?
ing Cuba conveyed an air of studied
uncertainty.
"In military planning, despite sub
causes of World War II. Appeasement, stantially increased programs of mi
and vacillation by the United States sile deployment,- the United States was
and Hitler's European neighbors em-
boldened the Nazi leader to take the
reckless steps that produced a world
bloodbath.
The CIA study, prepared by Wil-
lard Matthias of the CIA Board of Na-
tional Estimates, notes that deterrence
is the key. It is our best insurance
against war. This means that, in addi-
tion to prodigious nuclear might, a na-
.Lion must manifest unmistakably a
determination to use its power if push-
ed too far.
The Matthias study gives a good
example in reverse -- how the United
States, by seeming to be afraid of a
confrontation, set the stage for the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Says the
CIA paper:
"In the international atmosphere
of early 1962, when the Cuban move
was planned, the Soviet leaders were
still riding high and the United States
advocating a greater conventional ca-
pability and a counter-insurgency pro- 'i
gram.
"Thus, it probably appeared to the.
Soviets that the diplomatic and military
stance of the United States was that of '?
a power seeking to avoid confrontation
and fearful of its consequences, and {
therefore a power which could be sub-.
jected to a series of setbacks without
high risks of forceful resistance."
* a ?
THE SOVIETS, of course, badly
misjudged our determination in 1962.
We meant business and we proved it.
However, this has not stopped
further probing by the Soviets or
other Communist adversaries, as the
complex situation in Southeast Asia
illustrates. Our show of toughness in
Cuba in 1962 stands us in good stead
-- but only temporarily. There are now
other places and other circumstances
certain and cautious. will power.
"The United States had chosen not And that, as the saying, goes, to run fkpepo 1~ F risk ecess~
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