TOUGH ATTITUDE INSURES PEACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300490018-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 4, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

ST
Approved For Release 2004/11/29 ~
PALESTINE, TEX.v
HF.F~AT.T)--PRESS
e. 7,577
S, 7,,941
Front Edi Other
Pap? P? a Page
P 4 996
TOUGH A,TTITUDI~ 11VSUiZES~ IyEAC;~'~ ~?
I protecting oneself ~. .
',E
ven extremely large numbers of high-cost weapons would
In contrast to the soft line taken on Communism by'L`lte j provide no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, if them.
'U.$. State Department, some other authorities within the is a.ny valid and rational concept today upon which to develop
er measure a strategic military force, it is that of deterrence.
government long have warned, and continuF to warn, ghat ,.13~at one cannot find any rule for determining that.a stated
..appearance of softness by this country encourages Com- level of force will deter and that another will not." Deterrence
d spends, says Matthias, in ~ very considerable measure on how
munism to risk adventures that might lead to war. ~~ the enemy sizes up the determination and will of his opponent,
It should be encouraging to most Americans that there ~. The Matthias study gives an'example-how the U"nlted States,
are still officials in the government who see the strength' 1~.Y seeming to be afraid of a confrontation, set the stage for the
of the United States, in materiel and in attitude, as the I+' E:Ubar? missile crisis of 1A62,
i flays this CIA paper:
'only way to protect our nation and keep the peace of the i "In the international atmosphere of early 1962, when the
Cuban move was planned, the Soviet leaders were still .riding
world. Thus this country's safety will depend on which set ` hiCh and the United States probably appeared to them to be
'off experts the president, whoever he may be, chooses to I uilr.crtam and cautious.
~ "~ hr United States had chosen not to run the political risks
ltistm to. , necessary to save the Bay oP Pigs expedition. The United
Even as the hippy-toed policies of the State Department{` Safes had accepted the erection of the Berlin Wall with llttie~
tiiore than verbal pyrotechnics. And the United States had ac-
continue to be pressed upon the White Douse, others, in-,; r.Fptrrd the neutralist solution in Laos.
eluding the military and intelligence agencies, submit tc~ ! 'Formal U.S. statements regarding Cuba conveyed an air of
tst-e presidea~t much more hard-boiled and clear~mindeda'~ m~radied uncertainty. ,
7n military planning, drsplte substantially .increased pro-
x~commendat;ions. An example the other day ~ as a Central ~ crams of missile deployment, the United States was advocat-
~-ntelligence Agency report on the risk of nuclear war. As ' j''g a. ^?reater conventional capability and acounter-insurgency'
~ program
reported by Ray Cromley, I~Tewspaper Enterprise Associa-' ,Thus, it probably appeared to the Soviets that the diplomatic.
trian columnist, here is the gist of the report: ti and military stance of the United States was that of a
LFeking to avoid confrontation and fearful of its consequen esr
WASHINGTON (NEAT - A Central Intelligence Agency ~ a.n~l therefore a power which could be subjected to a series of
study seems to conclude the greatest risk of nuclear war in , xefhacks without high risks of forceful resistance."
..' the years ahead may come from U.S. actions which convince The U.S, show of determination in the Cuban missile crisis of
? Soviet leaders we lack determination in a crisis. '~ 1462 convinced Soviet leaders we did mean business, Matthias
The study, by Willard Matthias of the CIA Board of National ~~ sayys. lie thinks that will stand the United States in good stead'
'~? Estimates, says: =^?'"~ ,~ Per a. little while.
?a.rryhiout~ actionsstheyknow tot Sao ~y to eadg~ ris {llocfhoeneral ' But he says there will be other time$ And places in which
war, such knowledge is not easy to come by .. , g ~, Soviet leaders could again read a lack of will power in U.S. ac-
"In this a e of mobile strikin forces and hardened missile ~ t7Ons. This could leadr to trouble.
sites, it does not a pear ossible. to build a nuclear force ca- This study has the general approval" of the CIA Board of
aple o! destroyin ~n enemy's capabilities=and. simultaneous T Ne ti'o11~1 Estimates, "though no attempt has been made to'
p g ~.Yw C` r.ac>1 complete agreement. on everp point."
Approved For Release 2004/11/29 :CIA-RDP75-000018000300490018-3