BEST PEACE INSURANCE-TOUGH ATTITUDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300490004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 23, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/08/26: CIA-RDP75-
WAUSAU, WISC.
RECORD-HERALD
e. 18,965
Front EdL Other
Page P. a Page
Date: DEC 23 1964
est Peace In8u.rance -'ouc h t~ttitu . .
It is unfortunate to have to make the ob-
se.Fvation just two days before celebrating the
bath of the Prince of Peace, but there is con-
siderable evidence supporting the thesis that
O e greatest risk of nuclear, war in the years
4head may come from U.S. actions which con-
'ince Soviet leaders we lack determination in
crisis, in other words, in view of present
pvorld realities, a tough attitude may be our
best peace insurance:
The observation is made now because o.f'
.growing suggestions: that we abandon. South
Viet Nam.
upon which to develop or measure a strategic
,military force, it is that of deterrence."
The study says that in very considerable
measure, deterrence depends on how the enemy
sizes up the determination and will of his op-
ponent.
As an example, Matthias cites how the
U.S., by seeming to be afraid of a confrontation,
set the stage for the Cuban missile crisis of
1962. This confrontation came immediately
after we chose not to run the political risks
necessary to save the Bay of Pigs, after we
accepted erection of the Berlin Wall with little
more than verbal. explosions and after we ac.
Isn't it contradictory to recommend the 'cepted the neutralist, solution ,in Laos.
,,use of toughness to assure peace? Again, con,,: In other'words, if we demonstrate weak-
sidering human nature and the goals of Com- ness in South Viet Nam, we can alinost certain-
munism and its leaders, we think riot,., ly expect the Soviets to test our determination
This thinking is supported in a study by . -or to probe for lack of it-elsewhere. This
Willard Matthias of the Central Intelligence pattern has-occurred over-and over again.
Agency's Board of National Estimates. In brief,. The Matthias study has the "general ap-
its conclusion is this: "Even extremely large .. proval" of the CIA Board of National Esti-
numbers of high-cost weapons would provide mates, "though attempt has been made to
no assurance of victory or even survival. Thus, reach complete -agreement on every point:
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300490004-8