INTERNAL WAR THE NEW COMMUNIST TACTIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300280044-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: September 15, 1961
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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ROGER HILSMAN
to live in peace. Absence of freedom is the most horrid form
of restlessness.
The Federal Government and with it all Germans in the
Federal Republic of Germany feel in these days particularly
close to the Germans in the Soviet-occupied zone. We are
all aware of the obligation that we have explicitly taken upon
us when adopting our Basic Law. We stated at the time that
we acted also on behalf of those Germans to whom participa-
tion was denied. To the entire German people on both sides
of the zonal border we addressed our appeal to complete in
free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany.
Our fellow-citizens in the Soviet-occupied zone should even
in these critical days not doubt for a moment that we shall
never slacken in striving passionately for the attainment of
this great objective. We are sure of the support of all free
nations in the world, and we have no doubt that the legitimate
national concern of the whole German people will find its
fulfillment. The tenacious determination of all Germans in
all parts of our country is a prerequisite to such success; no
one in the world should ever doubt the determination and
steadfastness of the Germans in this vital pro em o our
people.
THE FREE WORLD WILL SUCCEED
Let me finally say a few words to the inhabitants of the
Eastern sector of Berlin and the Soviet zone of Germany.
Your sorrow and suffering are our sorrow and suffering. In
your particularly difficult situation you were able at least to
derive some comfort from the thought that, if your lot should
become quite unbearable, you could mend it by fleeing. Now
it looks as if you had been deprived of this comfort, too. I
request you with all my heart: do not abandon all hope of a
better future for yourselves and your children. We are con-
vinced that the Free World, and particularly we here, shall
some day be successful in our efforts to obtain freedom for
you. The right to self-determination will continue its victorious
march throughout the world and will not halt at the boundar
of the Soviet zone. Believe me, the day will come when you
will be united with us in freedom. We do not stand alone i
the world; justice is on our side, and so are all the nation
who love freedom.
Internal War
THE NEW COMMUNIST TACTIC
By ROGER HILSMAN, The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, Washington, D. C.
CPYRGHT a :Tore at nstitute of World Affairs, San Diego, California, August 10, 1961
T HE COLD WAR with Communist Russia has been with
tis for 16 years. And each year the Communist tactics
are more subtle and complex. In the 1940's, it was sim-
ple: The Soviet policy of expansion and the American policy
of containment. The threat of direct Communist aggression
remains, but new, more sophisticated tactics are added every
year.
To most Americans, the basic danger over the past decade
has been the threat of all-out thermonuclear war. The threat
remains. It does and should demand our careful, constant atten-
tion.
Next there has been the threat of "limited war"-old-
fashioned, foot-slogging fighting on the ground-with artillery,
machine guns, and grenades. This is the dirty, bitter business
of direct, personal killing, as we knew it in Korea.
Limited wars and total war are closely linked. A limited war
can be the escalator carrying the world right up to the mush-
room clouds.
But even as we have pondered this connection-and have
tried to prepare for both eventualities-the Communists have
found what they regard as a new chink in our armor. The new
tactic is internal war-using military force not across national
boundaries, but inside them.
This newest concept is guerrilla war-or, to use a more
accurate term, internal war.
It was this that President Kennedy had in mind in his
speech to the nation two weeks ago when he said:
"... We face a challenge in Berlin, but there is also
a challenge in Southeast Asia, where the borders are less
guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the dangers of
Communism less apparent to those who have so little.
We face a challenge in our own hemisphere."
Thus even while reheating the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev
has stressed this third approach of internal war over and over
again this past year. He sees the possibilities for internal wars
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the best way of using
force to expand the Communist empire with the least risk.
He argues that nuclear war is too disastrous even o .
Apparently he has begun to have his doubts about even limited
war on the Korean model.
We can take some credit for Khrushchev's change of heart.
Our strategic force to deter nuclear war has paid its way. Our
efforts to build ground forces, our alliances, and our sacrifices
in Korea-the fact that we stood and fought-have all paid
off.
In retrospect we can be proud of all this, though our pride
should not lead to over-confidence. Moreover, we must beware
of thinking that these different tactics were separate or un-
related.
Even in the early stages of the cold war, the Soviets manipu-
lated internal wars in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, India, Guatemala, and in vulnerable states in the Middle
East. The Soviet leaders, bred as they were in an atmosphere
of urban-based intrigue and revolutionary plotting, were
pushed further in their thinking by the success of Mao Tse-
tung's peasant-based Chinese Communist revolution.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS
The result is that recently internal warfare has gained a new
prominence in Soviet dogma. What Khrushchev calls "wars
of liberation" or "just wars" are now considered the most
promising paths to further expansion. The theory enables
Moscow and Peiping to manipulate for their own purposes the
political, economic, and social revolutionary fervor which is
now sweeping much of the underdeveloped world. Since many
governments are weak; since some are corrupt; since there is
much injustice in the world; and since the Communist con-
spirators are well trained and supplied, it is usually fairly easy
to start or take advantage of an internal war and to claim that
years of blood and terror are in the people's interest. Even
when a government tries to undertake reform and keep the
peace-as in Venezuela or Colombia-the Communists chant
that the government is "repressive" and redouble their efforts.
A second development is the flexibility and sophistication
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ue to sponsor Communist rebellions overtly wherever pos-
sible. They also do their best to infiltrate nationalist movements
against colonialism. They try especially hard to capture the
extreme nationalists like Lumumba. They sponsor radical na-
tionalism wherever they can find it, for the more violence
there is in a country, the greater the Communists' opportunity.
If a democratic nationalist government is in power, Com-
munists will advise that it separate itself from the West and
permit the Communists to have "equal democratic rights"-
that is, positions of power in the government, freedom to
propagandize, and the right to officer regular forces or their
own militia.
If a colonial or reactionary government is in power, the
Communists direct efforts along the entire spectrum of sub-
version. They foster discontent in the cities, leading to demon-
strations and strikes, perhaps to riots and mob action. Here
their targets are student groups, labor unions, and left wing in-
tellectuals. In the countryside, they establish guerrilla forces
in inaccessible regions, move to peasant areas, and, through a
judicious mixture-on the Chinese Communist and Castro
Cuban patterns-of social reform, administration, and sheer
terror, establish a base of political rule. Whenever possible,
in both urban and rural sectors, they endeavor to create "peo-
ple's militias" as a device for organizing mass support to sup-
plement their fulltime combatants. Thus they operate con-
tinuously to undermine an unfriendly government, and differ
in their handling of popular nationalist regimes only in the
degree of their effort to influence the government directly and
infiltrate its power centers.
Let me repeat that this new Soviet emphasis on internal
war does not mean that we can forget about the other, greater
levels of war. Moscow's willingness to raise the Berlin issue
indicates that their so-called "peaceful coexistence" does not
rule out manufactured crises that run the risk of conventional
or even nuclear war. In fact, they could not get away with
internal war, except for the inhibitions imposed by these other
two possibilities.
The great advantage of internal war is that it is less risky
and less conspicuous than the more violent wars. It also in-
volves techniques that the Communists feel they have mas-
tered and we have not. We must also remember that Khru-
shchev is using his recently increased capacity to wage the more
violent kinds of war to expand his freedom of maneuver in
guerrilla war and to threaten escalation if we try to stop him.
In short, the so-called nuclear stalemate has not served to
inhibit violence. If anything, it has enabled the Communists
to resort to a wider variety of force. Their new strength in
nuclear weapons makes them all the more tempted to ad-
venture with internal war.
How can we help stop the Communists from destroying in-
dependent states from within? At President Kennedy's direc-
tion-as outlined in his second "State of the Union" message-
steps have been taken in several parts of the government to
meet this threat. The people in the Pentagon and we in the
State Department have devoted special attention to it.
Let me take up the question of how we stop the Commu-
nists from destroying independent states from within under
three headings: Military Security; Modernization and Re-
form; and Political Factors, especially those unique political
factors undercutting a regime's stability.
Here we must be very hard-headed-for there are several
all-too-popular misconceptions.
MILITARY SECURITY
In my judgment, it is nonsense to think that regular forces
trained for conventional war can handle jungle guerrilas ade-
quately. Yet in spite of some very hard lessons-Magsay-
say in the Philippines, the British in Malaya, and the French in Indo-China and Algeria-we have been slow to learn.
Regular forces are vital to resist external aggression. But
we must not be deluded by the desire of local generals' for
"prestige hardware" or by the traditionalists belief that well-
trained regulars can do anything.
Regular forces are essential for regular military tasks. But
guerrilla warfare is something special. Conventional forces
with heavy equipment in field formation tend to cluster
together, centralizing their power on terrain that allows rapid
movement. They rely on roads, consider strong points and
cities as vital targets to defend, and so, when they do disperse,
it is only to get tied down in static operations. In combat,
rigid adherence to the principle of concentration keeps units
at unwieldy battalion or even regimental levels, usually with
erroneous stress on holding land rather than destroying enemy
forces.
It is ironic that we Americans have to learn this military
lesson again in the 20th century. Have we forgotten that we
were the ones who had to teach the British regulars "Indian
fighting" back when we were still a colony? Have we forgot-
ten that we taught the British regulars another kind of lesson
in "Indian fighting" during our own revolution?
We Americans have also forgotten that it was we who
fought one of the most successful counter-guerrilla campaigns
in history-in the Philippines back at the turn of the Century.
We learned some fundamental military lessons then, and it is
time we remembered them.
After Aguinaldo's Army was defeated and Aguinaldo him-
self captured, some of the extremists took to the hills to be-
come guerrillas. And they were not alone. For 300 years the
Spanish had been fighting a guerrilla war with bands of
religious fanatics in the southern islands. And further south,
in Mindinao, the Moro remained unconquered. All these
roamed the jungles and mountains-raiding, ambushing, kill-
ing, and pillaging.
The Army tried to fight the guerrillas, but with little suc-
cess. The enemy faded into the jungle, and the unwieldy
regular units were too burdened with equipment, too slow to
follow. Regulars needed supply lines. They could not live off
the country or do without ammunition trains or hospital corps.
The regulars tended to establish a fixed base from which they
sallied out. Thus the guerrilla always knew where they were
and when their guard was lax. The stage was set for surprise
attacks and massacre.
In fact, one of these massacres was famous in the old Army
-second only to Custer's last stand. It occurred at Balangiga
on the Island of Samar, and involved Company C of the Ninth
Infantry, one of the finest regiments in the Army. At 6:40 a.m.,
the men were lined up before the cook shack, the opposite side
of the parade ground from where their rifles were stacked.
Suddenly the jungle came alive as 450 guerrillas charged. The
regulars of Company C never had a chance. They fought bare-
handed. One soldier killed several men with a baseball bat be-
fore he was overwhelmed. The cook accounted for several more
with a meat cleaver. But soon it was all over. Twenty-four men
escaped. The rest were killed and mutilated.
But, finally, the United States found the solution to the
guerrilla problem in the Philippines. We recruited native
Filipinos-men wise to jungle ways, men who knew the trails
and mountains as their own back yard. These were divided into
small groups of 10, 15, 20, or 50 men, and over each group
we put a trained American officer-a bold and determined
leader.
This was the famed Philippine Constabulary and the his-
tory of their fabulous exploits is well worth reading. The
story is told-and very well-in Vic Hurley's book, jungle
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1 trol
, published about 30 years ago.
c reful attention to intelligence work. The jungle, nighttime,
a d surprise attack are the guerrilla's weapons. The solution
i to adopt the same weapons to fight him.
During World War II our O.S.S. guerrilla oper-
a ed behind the enemy lines in "Burma Nothing pleased us
e in those days than to have a regular Japanese force take
t after us. They operated in large unwieldy units that were
sy to ambush. Their movements were simple to follow
t rough the mountains and jungle. We felt that our own
istence was well justified when the Japanese had to take
r gular forces from front line fighting to chase a guerrilla
it. At one stage my outfit-consisting of four Americans
d about 200 Burmese-kept a whole Japanese regiment of
000 men marching and counter-marching over the moun-
ins far away from the front lines. What we would have
ared far more were smaller groups patrolling steadily-
specially cavalry.
In many parts of the world today counter guerrilla opera-
ions conducted by regular troops rely on the tactic of sweeps
hrough the countryside like those of the Japanese regiments
hat chased our guerrilla battalion in Burma. The sweeps are
oo well publicized and too cumbersome to bring results. This
attic leads to antagonism between the regular troops and the
opulation. Villagers fear reprisals and refuse their help.
oldiers sense they are in guerrilla territory and act accord-
ngly toward the people. Military inadequacy leads to failure
nd so to defeat.
I also fear that in the past our military aid programs for
ountries fighting against guerrillas have often followed the
mistaken assumption that all war is similar to the large-scale
ank and artillery engagements so familiar in western Europe.
The tactics of guerrilla warfare and the customs and culture
of the peoples, it seems to me, should determine the proper
weapons for counter guerrilla forces. For instance, the moun-
tain tribes of Burma prior to World War II conducted their
wars with long knives-a kind of sword called a "doh"-
1 k B moun-
rma s
fl
we hit and we ran. This particular unit, d
we ambushed
,
ating behind the enemy line for six months, killed over 3
of the enemy, blew up many bridges and ammunition and sup=
and yet suffered less than a dozen casualties.
ply dumps
,
For effective counterguerrilla operations we need radical
changes in organization, combat doctrine, and equipment. Our
key units might be decentralized groups of fifty men, self-
reliant and able to operate autonomously, fanned out into
the countryside. The premium is on leadership, for only men
of courage and great skill can make this system work; with
such men, plus decent pay and training, counterguerrilla force
should not be difficult to maintain.
The operational concept is as follows: A guerrilla-infested
part of the country is marked off and divided into sections.
Each section is patrolled by one of these units, but all are
in contact with a central headquarters, which in turn has
reserve force at its disposal. Upon contacting guerrilas,
patrol alerts headquarters and adjacent patrols. As the latter
converge, headquarters dispatches paratroops or helicopter
transports behind the enemy, who is surrounded and destroyed
Once an area is pacified, the government consolidates its con
trol and moves its forces on to the next section of land to b
cleared. The main ingredients then are constant patrols, goo
communication facilities, rapid mobility, and a capacity fo
rapid concentration.
One further point. The operations must cause minimu
harm to the people, lest they become antagonistic to th
government. The troops must be highly disciplined to respec
civilian rights and property. They should offer help (ranging
from field repairs to Magsaysay's offer of legal services in the
Philippines). Cargo planes should carry in supplies, so th
the forces do not have to live off the countryside. The on
for anti-civilian behavior should be diverted squarely to
guerrillas themselves. They are the ones who are compelledtht
take to repressive measures, seizing rice or conscripting me
in their desperation. As they lose popular support, they wi I
have nothing to fall back on as they suffer military defeats.
MODERNIZATION AND REFORM
int oc s. u
and with one-shot muzzle-loading
tainous regions are sparsely settled and the semi-nomadic in- I hope that this last point indicates my awareness of ho
habitants constantly move from one mountain valley to an- important it is to have popular support in conducting
other when the soil begins to wear out. Consequently, they internal war. Many observers argue that stability and physical
see no point in holding ground or in taking ground, and security are basically political issues, depending on the pop -
their whole history in war is one of lightning raids, sneak larity of governments. To this ddthat heconomic nd!-
attacks, and ambushes. velopment key popular support, and
Those of us in O.S.S. who tried to make our guerrilla troops which regimes will be judged.
attackVa defended position or to stand by their own positions In the long run, popular support is essential for sta e
reaped only disaster. We had to adapt our weapons and our governments and a stable world. And there is no questi n
tactics to the terrain and to the customs of the people. I found that economic development, modernization, and reform, a e
that my own troops, accustomed to fighting with knives, key factors in creating popular support and stable gover -
would wait until the enemy was within arm's reach before ments. But in my judgment it would be mistaken to thi k
firing their guns. I also found that they saw no point in that guerrillas cannot thrive where governments are popular
sticking around after exhausting the first clip-load of ammu- and where modernization, economic development, and reform
nition. They were brave in sneaking up on an enemy; they are going forward. And the usual corollary to this thought-t e
were brave in holding their fire in an ambush until an enemy notion that the existence of guerrillas is proof positive t at
was upon them; but their fundamental maxim was that the the government is unpopular and therefore not worth s p-
wise soldier lives to fight another day. The Americans who porting-is even more mistaken. It is, in fact, defeatist. e
thought their purpose was to stand and hold found them- need modernization, economic development and reform to
selves all alone in standing and holding. defeat guerrillas. But other things are also needed.
The lesson was obvious, it seems to me. I equipped my Let me draw on my personal experience once more. W en
men with submachine guns of .45 calibre. The men wanted we fought in Burma, about 10 percent of the people w ,-re
to wait until the enemy was close before opening fire, and the pro-West, another 10 percent were pro-enemy, and the st
jungle itself rarely permitted a shot ranging more than a few were indifferent or turned inward towards their own fa ily
yards. I needed weapons with a large volume of fire power but and village. Yet our guerrilla group performed with great
neither range nor accuracy. I equipped my 8-man squads with success. We recruited men not only from the 10 percent ho
7 submachine guns and one light machine gun. One squad had were pro-West, but also from the 80 percent who were in-
60 millimeter mortars to lay down an umbrella of fire to cover different. We gave no quarter to the enemy and his suppor rs,
our withdrawal. Our tactics were traditional for guerrillas- but we did everything we could to avoid creating hardship for
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ECHES OF THE DA'
to move around their growing crops. And when we had to ask
them for food we paid or arranged an airdrop of double the
amount of rice we took. Before the war was over it was the
enemy and his supporters in the puppet government who ap-
peared oppressive to the people-and not we guerrillas.
The idea that guerrillas thrive only where the government
is unpopular may apply to the more developed parts of the
world. But in many parts of the world, states are underde-
veloped in the political-administrative sense as well as eco-
nomically. The number of people are few who have the train-
ing to perform the standard civil service jobs that we take for
granted. Lacking that "steel frame" in which India takes such
just pride, a government appears as a weak and distant
entity to most villagers, except when it serves as a burden-
some tax collector. In most lands, at least half the people are
indifferent to a government. Even the active elements, ranged
for or against the regime, are not too set in their political
commitments.
In these circumstances, maintaining the bare minimum
of national services is enough to determine a nation's fate in
the short run. In the Congo, the collapse of two supports-
the military Force Publique and Belgian technical service-re-
vealed how far the state has to go before becoming an admin-
istrative entity.
By contrast, the Somali Republic, which gained its inde-
pendence at the same time last year also faced a potentially
difficult situation-of keeping newly joined regions and pow-
erful tribal groups satisfied. As matters developed, no pseudo-
popular manifestation of discontent emerged, thanks in part
to a small but efficient western-trained civilian police force.
As for modernization, although essential for the long haul,
it cannot help much in a counterguerrilla program. Modern-
ization inevitably uproots established social systems, produces
political and economic dislocation and tension, and cannot de-
liver results quickly enough to relieve these short-term pres-
sures.
However, there is mounting unrest in rural areas all over
the world. What peasants increasingly crave is social justice
and reform-at a minimum, the old way of life with the
cruelties removed.
This includes reform of land tenure arrangements, reasonable
rent, credit, and market facilities, and simple modern tools.
They may see ahead to the value of urban centers that buy their
produce-instead of importing from abroad and forcing them
to raise crops for export-and in turn manufacture for their
simple needs. Finally, they crave peace and physical security.
Yet there is a growing link between urban and rural unrest.
As modernization begins, the poorer farmers drift to the city,
there to form the hard core of the unemployed slum-dwellers
who overtax the rudimentary metropolitan facilities. These
unfortunates form the recruits for the city mobs that Com-
munists and demagogues have been turning out in the Middle
East and Latin America for the past 15 years. The political
link between the two becomes clear when we see how the very
poor are used as recruits for guerrilla forces in the rural
areas and for "people's militia" in the urban regions. Commu-
nists have long made use of the former in sustaining a re-
bellion; Castro and "Che" Guevara have become adept at using
both groups to support the present Cuban regime. In Latin
America alone, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru come
immediately to mind as countries where the combined urban-
rural problem exists.
What is required first is a program of social reform. Very
often the conservative element in a community will struggle
irrationally against all reform. As a consequence, we have en-
countered in several parts of the world the amazing and suicidal
spectacle of conservatives giving secret aid to the Communists
Equally important is the need to indicate some effort and
progress on the long path to modernization. Small results, if
they prove the intent of a regime, can aspire faith that will
outlast the distress of early change. Finally, where these efforts
are combined with democratic government and mass party
organization, the government can broaden its base of physical
power.
In Venezuela, for example, the ruling party has been fos-
tering reform and change. It has also created a national organ-
ization, with loyal popular militia elements to support it.
Though not professionals, militiamen can keep the peace in
the face of provocative demonstrations and can perform useful
services in supplementing the work of regular forces. A gov-
ernment that cannot get its image across to the peasantry or
mobilize peasant support will find its functions in both these
endeavors usurped by the Communists.
To summarize my feeling on popularity, reform, and mod-
ernization: (1) they are important ingredients but are not
the determinants of events, (2) their role must be measured
more in terms of their contribution to physical security than
we generally realize.
OTHER POLITICAL FACTORS
Let me hurriedly refer to several other variations on the
theme of internal security-the political factors that threaten
the stability of new states. So far we have noted primarily the
nature of the Communist threat and the issues of good gov-
ernment and economic development. Unfortunately, on top of
these universal problems, most states have to grapple with
specific difficulties that create further divisions, induce ten-
sions, and propel even the best intentioned regimes to violence.
Among these difficulties are the following:
(1) Antagonisms between underdeveloped states. The fa-
miliar pattern of rivalry between neighbors, as old as history
itself, exists with even greater intensity today because so many
new states have suddenly sprung into being. Territorial claims
and other sources of friction are still fresh, as in the Persian
Gulf or India's northern border regions. Such difficulties gen-
erate tensions, arms races, and nationalistic fervor that Com-
munists try to exploit.
(2) Disagreements between regions of a state or between
a region and the center. The issues of regionalism in India;
separatist movements in Indonesia, and tribalism in the frag-
mented Congo are examples of serious challenges to govern-
mental authority and stability.
(3) Social Class Antagonism. It is characteristic of estab-
lished economic elites that they feel themselves threatened
from below and refuse to countenance the very reform that
would ease the real dangers that they face. The great failures
of old regimes in France before 1789 and Russia at the start
of this century are but the outstanding instances of this his-
toric problem that presents itself on almost every continent
today.
(4) Intense Disagreement Over Foreign Policy. Iraq's ad-
herence to the Baghdad Pact despite internal opposition and
disapproval by all other Arab states is a case in point. Radical-
nationalist African states accuse their neighbors of following
a colonial, subservient line. In trying to get them on a com-
parable course, radical states engage in clandestine operations
to subvert neighboring regimes or support opposition factions
whose ideology resembles their own.
(5) Traditional Political Rivalries Within a Social Class.
Colombia offers the leading example of two parties that, with-
out basic social or ideological differences, became embroiled
in a long civil war, so bitter as to cause over 250,000 casual-
ties. This war literally superimposed itself on all the other
problems of security that normally confront a developing state.
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he ruling party in Burma split into hostile factions in 1958
nd the army had to act to keep that situation from frag-
enting the country.
(6) Lack of Popular Belief in the State as a Sovereign
Entity. In large areas of Africa and the Middle East, normal
oyalties follow either tribal and provincial lines or grand
reams of regional African or Arab unity. The state does at-
ract some loyalty because it is a going concern, one that can
e used as a lever of power at both these other levels. With
this overlapping of loyalties, it is only too easy for a govern-
ment to meddle in the affairs of its neighbors and further
weaken their internal cohesion-always, of course, in the be-
lief that its cause is just.
(7) Ethnic or Racial Issues. Rebellious tribesmen are con-
stant drains on national military power in various states
throughout Asia and Africa. The Communists found in Ma-
laya's Chinese community ready hands for their bloody insur-
rection, partly because of inter-racial political rivalries. Indians
in some Latin American countries are living at very low
standards, are beginning to stir, and are potential bait for a
Communist ethnic-economic appeal. Central-African pagans
have strained relations with Moslem Arab northerners in a
crossroad land that is beset by outside pressures.
(8) Banditry is a cultural inheritance in many parts of
the world. Bandits (or armed rural gangs) that flout the au-
thorities and exploit local neighbors have long existed in many
parts of the world-colored perhaps with varying degrees of
political or ideological overtones, but essentially dedicated to
violence. One thinks of recent illustrations in the Philippines,
of traditional sporadic outbreaks in Java, of troubles experi-
enced by the new state of Burma. These actions impoverish
the peasant, ruin the government's authority, paralyze public
morale and open the path to similar Communist tactics or,
conversely, to establishment of Communist authority in that
region.
(9) Constitutional Crises. Unconstitutional extension of
presidential power, so often exemplified in the history of
Latin America, is one example of a constitutional crisis that
may lead to political turmoil when such excesses are tradition-
ally resented and countered by violence. The seizure of power
by a military junta is another.
There are other obvious factors, such as the outburst of
nationalism that may follow independence, proximity to Sino-
CPYRGHT
Soviet territory, the existence and strength of a Communist
party and its orientation toward Moscow or Peiping, and of
course revolts against colonial rule and white-minority rule in
certain areas. The addition of just a few of these special
hazards to the basic difficulties I described earlier places a tre-
mendous strain upon a government's staying power. You can
clearly see why I am saying that internal security is a problem
in its own right and not simply a function of good government
or economic growth.
Conclusion. There are many things we can do to help re-
sponsible and friendly governments attack this problem all
along the line. I have already illustrated how the training of
armed forces can be better geared to the specific war against
guerrillas. Equally important is the training of police and
other forces to cope with the lesser manifestations of violence,
not only in detection and surveillance but also in handling
actual outbursts. We may find ourselves encouraging re-
formers to organize mass parties, and in certain tense circum-
stances we may need to help create citizens' militia forces. We
are seriously interested in broadening the will and capacity of
friendly governments, to augment social and political reform
programs as a basis for modernization.
We must also look for ways to ease the access of beleaguered
states to outside assistance. The Communists use the concept
of state sovereignty as a device to seal off a land from "inter-
vention" once they have made sufficient inroads. They use
international law, appeals to neutralist neighbors, the un-
pleasant reactions to what is called "Western imperialism,"
and the threat of force in this effort. We must foster the
growth and use of international organizations as sources o
help-help on all the problems I have mentioned, and help
that can be on the scene and in action before the crisis
reaches its peak. In this way we may ward off a showdown o
at the very least have elements there to indicate outside sup
port in being and on the way.
In any event the United States must be prepared to be-
come deeply involved. This effort may be costly, but carefu
and early involvement is far less expensive or dangerous that
a crash program. The Communists are already committe
everywhere, and unless we approach the problem in a sys
tematic way, with considerable thought, we will simply b
paving the way for Mr. Khrushchev in his new and poten
tactic-internal war.
The Fate Of Our Country
FORCES AT WORK TODAY
By ARLEIGH BURKE, Admiral USN, (Ret.)
Delivered before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., August 3, 1961
I T IS A particularly great honor to be invited to talk
before the National Press Club, for the members of the
press through the years have proved themselves singularly
ffective in safeguarding the fundamental values and institu-
tions of the American way of life. I have had the privilege
and the responsibility of speaking in this room on two previ-
ous occasions, and on each occasion I have been impressed,
perhaps even more than you, with the importance of this
forum.
From the earliest days on record, the members of the press
have been in the van of the efforts to mold our nation and
to preserve its security. Indeed, even before our nation became
a reality, Peter Zenger-with courage and determination-
scored an important victory for freedom in the English
Colonies. With the political freedom that was soon to tolloV4
the press exerted a vast and continuous impact on the trend
of our national affairs. The Federalist Papers, for example, ha
a tremendous influence on the final form of our Constitutio
and on its ultimate ratification. And surely, as our nation gre ,
no group of men played a more important role in directin
our attentions and energies than men like Greeley, Dana, Rei ,
and Pulitzer.
Thus I feel greatly honored to have this opportunity
speak to the members of the press. You have inherited t
proud traditions of your profession, and you bear the gra
responsibilities which those traditions impose.
My own career in the naval service has now come to a
close. After 42 years of duty-many years of peace, and so e
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 7 YRGHT
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war- am starting my retirement with considerable an-
t cipation. And I know my long-suffering wife shares that
ticipation with me. There is no question that retirement
rings with it a certain sense of relief. I've sailed with the
avy all my adult life, in fair weather and foul. And as I
1 ft her Tuesday, she still remained the finest fighting force
e world has ever seen. I am confident she will move out
artly in the future, under the very able leadership of our
ew Chief of Naval Operations.
I have left my naval duties in the hands of Admiral Ander-
n. But there are other responsibilities that I can never
linquish: the responsibilities that every citizen in our democ-
cy faces. For no matter what our professions may be, no
atter whether we are active or retired, each of us bears the
sponsibilities of his citizenship. Each of us carries his own
are of the responsibilities that are fundamental to our
ncept of government-responsibilities that are dictated by
conscience and directed by principles. These responsibilities
re not unique to our era. My father and your fathers-all
f our forebears-were required to meet the same type of
sponsibilities. And fortunately for this Republic, history
lows that our forebears met them well, met them with
isdom and with the God-given strength that walks hand-
-hand with courage.
Each age faces its own conflicts and its own challenges.
But the fundamental fact of our age, a fact blurred neither
y symbolism nor by rhetoric, is that the future of the Free
I orld, the conditions of human life for years to come are
eing determined now. The fate of our country-the future
xistence of our way of life-depends on what we as a nation,
hat we as individual citizens are willing to do today. That
why I would like to discuss briefly some of the forces at
ork in this troubled world, and how those forces may well
ffect the lives of our own generation and of generations to
ollow. Now, I'm not really going to say anything new about
ose forces this afternoon. Nor will I advocate anything you
on't already believe. But I do want to give added emphasis
o the seriousness of the present world situation and to the
remendous importance of our taking the steps that President
ennedy called for last week.
Clearly astride our path toward a world of justice and order
tands the relentless force of communism, a godless ideology
hat finds its seat of power and its center of control in the
oviet Union. Now one thing is most apparent about the
eaders of the Soviet communist state today. They have
ecome confident-very confident. And with their con-
dence they have developed arrogance. That is why they are
alking tough; that is why Khrushchev has dared to challenge
is over Berlin. The reason for this confidence is that some
undamental changes have occurred in Soviet Russia, particu-
arly in the last 5 or 6 years.
Just a little over forty years ago, communism was virtually
onfined to a rented room in Zurich. When the Bolsheviks
eized power they had nothing-certainly nothing to be proud
f. In every area of the world there were countries with better
ndustries, better schools, better farms, and better housing.
he communist leaders felt inferior-and they were inferior.
ut men like Lenin and Stalin were, above all, realists. They
ecognized this inferiority, and they developed programs to
hange matters. The fantastic cost of these programs-not
ust in rubles, but in degradation, deceit, and despair-was
f no consequence. The communist hierarchy readily accepted
he law that "the end justifies the means" Purges, pogroms,
nd persecution were integral parts of their five-year plans.
Yet these men were as diligent as they were ruthless. They
worked hard, with concentration and great singleness of
purpose; and now, in t e as eca e, eir ans ave egun
to pay off.
The Soviet emphasis on scientific training gave birth to
Sputnik, to Lunik, and to their man in space. And this
scientific skill, combined with espionage and dogged de-
termination, produced the Soviet missile capability: the
"rockets" which Khrushchev so often rattles at the Free
World. For the first time in Soviet history, they accomplished
something before anyone else; and real accomplishment, in any
society, is the father of confidence. The communists now feel
they are better than the rest of the world.
That is one reason why they are confident. But there is
another reason which is just as important. The communists
have watched their "enemies" in the West very closely. They
have looked for signs of weakness: for weakness in our al-
liances, for weakness in our decisiveness, for weakness in our
will. The communists have probed the soul of the Free World
to see if we really practice what we preach, if we are really
willing to stand up for principles-rather than merely spout
pious platitudes. They have watched our deeds and ignored
our diction. And all too often they found us wanting, our
words trailing off to inaction and our opulence expressing
itself in complacency.
Many of the communist leaders do not believe that we in
the United States will stand up for our principles. They do
not believe that we will risk a fight for what we know is
right. Menshikov has expressed this attitude very clearly. He
stated that ". . . when the chips are down the American people
won't fight for Berlin." He would like to promote such a
notion.
And so with a growing arrogance born of their own con-
fidence and of our suspected weakness, Khrushchev has thrown
the issue of Berlin in our faces.
But in considering Berlin it is extremely important that
we recognize one fact. The future of the half-city of Berlin,
this "bone in Khrushchev's throat," is not an issue distinct
and separate from the many other pressing international
issues that confront our nation. Berlin is isolated geographical-
ly, but politically, it is intimately related with everything else
that is unfolding in the world: with the communist aggres-
sions in Laos and South Vietnam; with communist exploitation
of the situation in Cuba; and with the growing pressures
throughout Latin America. The question of the freedom or
slavery of West Berlin is a very real part of all our relations
with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
It is obvious that these relations are at present based on
challenge and response-whether that challenge and that
response be in South East Asia, in our own hemisphere, or
in Central Europe; and our willingness and ability to respond
in one area is directly related to our willingness and ability
to meet challenges in other areas.
Even if Khrushchev had not chosen to confront us with
this issue at this time and at this place; or if the issue o
Berlin becomes not a crisis but an unresolved question, w
can be sure that the communists will still continue to present
us with other issues, at other times and other places, in their
drive toward world empire. Sometimes these issues will b
primarily of a military nature. At other times they will b
economic, or psychological, or political. But one thing i
certain: The patterned policy of communist pressure and con-
flict will continue at an accelerated rate as long as they ca
hope that such a policy will be rewarding.
Naturally, of course, our attentions are now focused o
Berlin. Our efforts and our energies are directed toward Berli
because the issue is related to far more than the hopes an
aspirations of 2 million Berliners, far more than to th
ultimate reunification of a free Germany. Berlin is a symbol
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