CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- HOUSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300280036-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: July 30, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

lJUL 3 0 19b;j a
Approved For Release 2003/12/02: CIA-RDP7,8,
the conclusions reached in an authoritative
article by Sam Peltzman in the New Individ-
ualist Review:
"If what we mean by public interest here
is the satisfaction of market demands, in
all their variety, at lowest social cost and,
as part of this, the quick adaptability to
changing market conditions, then our his-
tory indicates that this interest is best served
by competition free of arbitrary interference
by State power.
"We have not given free competition a
chance in this industry. We might do worse
than to try it."
PEONS, COOLIES, AND BRACEROS
(Mr. GONZALEZ (at the request of
Mr. ALBERT) was granted permission to
extend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, the im-
portation of foreign workers is no new
thing; the braceroprogram is just an-
other variation on a very old theme.
History shows that this country in its Hit Assistant Secretary ofd
formative years was short of labor. To orrEastern Affairs, personally ex-
fill the gap, indentured servants were perienced in this special kind of war-
used. Indentured servants were bound
to a master for a specific length of time-
not unlike the modern bracero. In addi-
tion to indentured servants, we had
slaves to perform what is now called
stoop labor. As time passed and man
progressed, both indentured servants and
slaves passed from the scene.
In the era of railroad building, we find
that the railroads utilized another form
of cheap, captive labor. Thousands of
Chinese were used in railroad construc-
tion gangs. These coolies were often
brought in under a contract which ex-
changed their labor for passage to the
United States. The importation of Chi-
nese labor eventually reached such pro-
portions that legislative remedies were
demanded-the Oriental Exclusion Act
resulted.
But there were yet other markets for
cheap labor. Many entrepreneur: turned
to Europe. Workers, skilled and un-
skilled alike, would be contracted to per-
form work for a company or persons
over a period of'2 or 3 years in exchange
for passage to this country. By the
1880's this contract labor reached scan-
dalous proportions, and again legislative
remedies were demanded.
In 1885, a law was passed which pro-
hibited the contracting of foreign labor-
ers. Thus it would seem that the system
of captive labor had at last come to an
end. But here today, in the 20th cen-
tury-78 years later-we find that the
contracting of foreign labor is carried on
with the blessing of our Government.
There is essentially no difference be-
tween the indentured servant and the
bracero; nor is there much difference be-
tween the coolies of the 19th century and
today's bracero. Neither is there much
difference between the contracted labor-
er of the 1880's and today's bracero. Yet
all these captive laborers passed from
the scene by 1885. I would respectfully
urge my colleagues not to perpetuate
Public Law 78-let us end one more form
of captive labor.
ANSWER TO EXPORTED
AGGRESSION
ALBERT) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous
matter.)
Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, an effec-
tiV'e'defense program must be able to
respond to all levels of aggression. To-
day we find increasingly that the chal-
lenge to free and democratic govern-
ment is in the form of? erri warfare
in the underdeveloped areas of the
wor ""ignorance, not ideology, causes
such areas as -southeast Asia, Africa,
and Latin America to be the seedbeds
of Communist activity; discontent in
these strategic areas makes them liable
to Communist propaganda.
Militarily;' guerrilla warfare demands
radically different organization, strategy
and equipment from those of conven-
tional combat. The Honorable Roger
fare, discusses this problem in his arti-
cle, "The Answer to Exported Aggres-
sion," which appears in the tissue
of the General Ele Forum. I
As I " Theaay aone W1Ln other
excellent pieces from this magazine, I
am calling to the attention of all my
colleagues, along with all those who read
the RECORD, this provocative analysis of
our crucial task in an ever more import-
ant field:
An expert on count tactics
suggests that "Vie tIf l a twilight r for the
villages may yet rank as one of the decisive
battles of world history." Secretary Hilsman,
a former World War II guerrilla fighter him-
self, stresses that this form of hidden aggres-
sion poses a threat to the entire free world-
that the- Communists see guerrilla wars in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America as the best
way to expand their empires with the least
risk. To meet this exported aggression ef-
fectively, Secretary Hilsman says:
"We must adopt the methods of the guer-
rilla himself-the very tactics our ancestors
learned from the Indians.
"Our long-range goal must be 'nation-
building'-aid which includes the many
things an American pioneer village needed.
"The really important appeal of the West
is the respect for the individual which is
built into Western culture."
Question. Secretary Hilsman, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have defined counterinsur-
gency as the military, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions taken by
existing governments to defeat subversive in-
surgency. Would you subscribe to this
definition?
That is a very reasonable definition, par-
ticularly as applied to the Far East-namely,
the Philippines, Malaya, and currently Viet-
nam. But I would broaden it slightly by
stating that the real problem is one of ex-
tending government control to areas where
governments have never had control
throughout history. In a broader sense this
means providing government services to the
villages, knitting the people into the fabric
of the whole community and national life.
In southeast Asia today, there is no per-
vasive national spirit as we know it. The
villagers in the back country still feel no
deep loyalty to their government, which
seems much further from them than ours
does from us. Since most of the villagers
make nearly all the material goods they use,
they have relatively little commercial, polit-
ical, or psychological contact with other vil-
lages or the provinces around them.
In such circumstances, there does not have
to be a basic discontent with the government
for a guerrilla unit to thrive. It is just a
question of the villagers' isolation.
Recently, in northeast Thailand, a govern-
ment team visited 40 villages-not particu-
laarly isolated ones, either. In 10 of them
the people had never seen a government offi-
cial-no policemen, no firemen, no health
inspectors, no one.
In villages like these, it is relatively easy
for an outside subversive power to recruit
young men for guerrilla bands by simply
promising sheer adventure, just to get away
from the borning, monotonous tasks of an
agricultural life.
For example, in my Personal experience
with the OSS in Burma during World War
it eve?l.'ound only about 10 percent of the
people to be pro-West. Another 10 percent
were proenemy, but the rest were either
indifferent or else just so isolated that they
had no ideological convictions one way or
the other. Yet we. were able to recruit over
30,000 guerrillas for fRtlone in
Bi71'fri "a'" Aur.. white faces.
To raw a parallel with a situation closer
to home, one may ask whether the citizens
of Chicago "supported" the hoodlum gangs
which flourished during the 1920's. Cer-
tainly the shopkeeper hit by the protection
racket did not support the gangs, but he
often had no choice except to go along with
them. The same thing is true in many of
the isolated villages in some of the under-
developed areas of the world.
Question. In the past, you have defined
this guerrilla activity in southeast Asia as
internal war, or hidden aggression. What
do these terms imply?
The terrorist activity in Vietnam is really
aggression in the truest sense of the word.
Over the centuries international law has
categorized aggression as an overt attack.
But here we have, as President Kennedy
has said, "a subterranean war," which doesn't
fit easily under the doctrines of international
law.
I call it hidden aggression, or twilight
warfare, because it is an attack directed
across an international boundary. It is
clearly an attempt by one state to bring
down another by exported terror. From
North Vietnam, the Communists are sending
in trained cadre, propaganda, money, equip-
ment, and directions to the Viet Cong ter-
rorists in South . Vietnam. All the while
they try to maintain the fiction that it is
an internal uprising.
The pattern of the Vietnam war so far has
followed closely Mao Tse-tung's three stages
of guerrilla warfare. In the first stage, sym-
pathizers are recruited and indoctrinated,
and abase is built from which weapons, rice,
and other supplies can be distributed. The
second stage is one of terror, hit-and-run
tactics, ambushes, night attacks, and assas-
Einations. This is the stage in which we are
engaged now. Finally, in the third stage
Mao says there must be a change to a true
civil war where the terrorist bands are turned
into conventional armies to fight the regulars
by conventional means. As a practical mat-
ter, the Communists hope to create enough
political chaos and instability so that the
government will fall by a coup d'etat, let-
ting them move in and skip the third stage.
WE MUST ADOPT GUERRILLA TACTICS
To fight this exported aggression effec-
tively, we must adopt the methods of the
guerrilla himself-the very tactics our an-
cestors learned from the Indians. We must
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 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300280036-6
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
realize that the guerrilla does not care about
north or south, or east or west. He doesn't
care about this town or that piece of real
estate. He lives to fight, to .ambush, to kill.
His only goal is to kill-not to seize and hold
territory.
It is nonsense to assume that regular forces
trained for conventional war can handle
jungle guerrillas adequately. Regular forces
are essential for regular military tasks, but
twilight warfare is something special. It is
a war of shadows in the night which calls
for radical changes in organization, combat
doctrine, and equipment. The main in-
gredients for success are constant patrols,
good communications, mobility, and a ca-
pacity for rapid concentration. Our key
units might be decentralized groups of 50
men, self-reliant and able to operate autono-
mously, fanned out Into the surrounding
countryside.
Let me again draw on my experience in
Burma. At one stage my outfit-consisting
of 4 Americans and 200 Burmese-kept
an entire 3,000-man Japanese regiment
marching and countermarching through the
mountains far away from the front where
they would have done more good. What we
would have feared most would have been
smaller groups patrolling steadily. The
Japanese were much better soldiers than
our guerrillas. They were better trained,
tougher, and more mobile. But they fought
us as if we were regular troops. We never
tried, to take or hold ground. We laid am-
bushes, fired our weapons, and ran just as
fast as we could. After a month of chasing
us, this 3,000-man regiment had over a hun-
dred casualties; we had only 1.
ONE OF HISTORY'S DECISIVE BATTLES
Vietnam's twilight war for the villages
may yet rank as one of the decisive battles
of world history. In one sense, it is no
more or less decisive than an effective de-
terrent against a Korea-type war, nor is it
more or less decisive than an effective stra-
tegic nuclear deterrent. However, even as
we have prepared for both conventional and
nuclear wars, the Communists have been
giving increased emphasis to internal war-
fare. Of course, we can take some credit
for their change in strategy. Our nuclear
force buildup has paid off and so have our
efforts to build ground fortes, our alliances,
and our sacrifices in Korea.
Now the Communists are beginning to see
possibilities for guerrilla wars in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America as the best way to ex-
pand their empires with the least risk. So
the Vietnam war is quite decisive, in the
first place, because unless we develop an
effective counter there, we may well find our-
selves in the same difficulty in some of these
other areas. Secondly, this war is decisive
in that the steps needed to fight it are the
very steps needed for building the new na-
tions of the world into independent, self-
sustaining states. Our job in Vietnam is as
much political and economic as it is mili-
tary-the long-range task is nation building.
WHAT ARE THE STEPS INVOLVED IN NATION
BUILDING?
To become a stable nation, Vietnam needfs
much more than dams, power station, steel
mills, and other giant foreign-aid projects
which will have to come sooner or later.
This sort of foreign aid is important, of
course, but on a longer-term basis. In the
short term, these people need more simple
aid such as communication routes, so that
goods and services can flow freely from vil-
lage to village throughout the country.
There must be a way for information about
the needs of the people to flow upward, and
a way for government services to flow down-
ward to answer these needs. They need
health programs, police security, educational
systems, economic help, sewer systems-the
very things many an American pioneer vil-
lage needed over 100 years ago.
TRA II; HAMLET PROGRAM
An im rtant part off this nation-building
program is to provide the villagers with the
physical security so necessary to peaceful
progress. This is what the strategic hamlet
programs does. We are helping the villagers
ring their villages with barbed wire, much as
our frontier towns were protected with stock-
ades. Then 20 or 30 in a village of 200 are
trained to use weapons such as hand gre-
nades, shotguns, and carbines. And they are
given a radio with which they can contact
province headquarters for help if_ they are
attacked by a large band of terrorists.
But the strategic hamlet program involves
far more than just physical security. It
is also a vehicle for getting government
services to the people to help enlist popular
support for the government. And as the gov-
ernment becomes more popular, and as more
villages are secured, the Viet Cong will be
isolated more and more from their key
sources of supply-the villages of the back
country. No longer will marauding bands
of five or six guerrillas be able to walk into
villages and either seize or buy rice.
If they can't get into the villages, and if
they are occasionally ambushed themselves,
will the Viet Cong then start to wither?
That's right. By cutting off this important
supply line to the villages and by keeping
them on the move, we will begin to make the
guerrillas suffer from lack of food, from
hunger, and from discomfort. They will be-
gin to dry up.
Of course, we are not at that stage yet in
Vietnam. However, we have come a long
way and have made much progress recently.
During the last half of 1962, outlying villages
containing roughly half a million people
were made secure by the government, bring-
ing the share of rural population in secured
villages to about 51 percent. The Viet Cong
controls about 8 percent.
This still leaves around 40 percent of the
rural population unsecured. It is to this
group that the Government must extend its
services and control in the next phase.
In the mountain regions during the last
year we have helped the Vietnamese train
over 37,000 Montagnard tribesmen in the use
of simple weapons, how to set up village de-
fenses, and how to patrol areas between vil-
lages. But one Special Forces team I know
of is most proud of a completely nonmilitary
kind of project-a village market. They
went to the province capital and persuaded
a tailor, a tobacco merchant, and a general
store operator to move to the Montagnard
village where they were stationed. Then they
persuaded the villagers in the area to start
producing a surplus of what they grow, and
to bring the excess to the market where they
could sell it and buy thimbles, needles,
thread, pots, pans-the instruments for a
better life that they could never have'before.
This isn't warfare in the usual sense and
it isn't killing Viet Cong. But it is the real
way to fight the Communist terror. It is a
vital step in nation-building, and that is our
long-range goal.
Question. Secretary Hilsman, it has been
said that the Communists are offering a
"spiritual" challenge to the people in Asia,
telling them, "We need you desperately,
whoever you are, whatever you can do. Ours
is the revolution of the future. You can be
the liberators of mankind." -
In contrast, it has been said that the
American appeal offers no such "cause" but
merely a slight material gain through our
aid and assistance programs. We have been
told that there really isn't an "American
side." Is this theory true, or half-true, or
is it completely inaccurate or obsolete?
There is no question in my mind that this
theory is completely obsolete. In terms of
appeals, the Communists are not doing at
all well. The normal Communist ideology
does not cut much ice anymore. Where they
do make headway, they capitalize on an
appeal to nationalism, or they use threats
of terror and retaliation.
The theory about American appeals is also
obsolete. We have a spiritual appeal that is
a truly revolutionary one-a government
interested in the wants and needs of the
people. In the past, government has usu-
ally meant-if anything-an official who col-
lects grain or yams and gives nothing in re-
turn. So we have a revolutionary appeal to
excite and inspire these people-the simple
but very effective concept that government
exists to serve and protect them.
In a sense, the whole nation-building pro-
gram has a revolutionary, spiritual appeal,
not only in Vietnam but in all the world's
underdeveloped areas. This is really the
guts of the Alliance for Progress program,
except that in Vietnam nation building must
proceed under the guns of Communist ter-
rorism. The barbed wire and guns of a stra-
tegic hamlet program would not be needed
in a country not under attack as Vietnam
has been, but the civic action certainly
would.
But the really important appeal of the
West is the respect for the individual which
is built into Western Culture. In contrast,
the whole Communist bloc leans toward a
monotonus grayness-the Tibetans should
act like the Chinese, the Chinese like the
Russians, and the Russians like the Poles.
There is not the diversity which is found in
the free world. .
What can industry here in the Unite
States do to help these countries build-thelif,
civilizations? For example, Dr. Wernher von
Braun has said that much of the success
of the space program has resulted from the
individual contributions and innovations of
private industry. He told us that he spends
a substantial part of his time "trying not to
drown in all the many ideas which come to
us." Do private companies face this same
kind of challenge in "nation building pro-
grams" as they have already faced in aero-
space and defense?
They most certainly do. There are many
areas of science and technology where new
ideas can help Vietnam and similar coun-
tries to discover new approaches to their
problems. Right now scientists in this coun-
try are on the brink of some discoveries in
genetics which are just as dramatic and
exciting as the discovery of the nuclear re-
action. Some of them may help to solve
many of the tremendous problems in disease,
overpopulation, and food shortages.
To help break the Illiteracy problem we
may be able to use a communications
satellite, providing a country with a com-
plete television network which could be
picked up on television sets powered by wood-
burning generators. We could Increase a
teacher's exposure a hundred times.
Chemistry, biology, electronics, physics-
every science you can name-may have some
answers if we can get researchers to focus
on the problems.
How optimistic are you that our nation-
building program will succeed in Vietnam?
Do you have a time-goal in months or years?
Right now about Vietnam I am optimistic
-but cautiously so. It is not a question of
winning a battle or defeating an army. It
Is a question of building a nation, and that
takes time. So far things are going rather
well, but we have to think in terms of years
instead of months. It will be some time
before you can go anywhere in Vietnam with
a feeling of complete safety and security.
Of course all the new nations like Vietnam
need time. No magic of science can trans-
form their way of life overnight. It took
7 years to eliminate guerrillas in Malaya.
It may take more than this in Vietnam, or
it may take less. But I think time is on
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