INDONESIANS GO TO THE POLLS: THE PARTIES AND THEIR STAND ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300210059-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: May 1, 1958
• Content Type: OPEN

Apps'iQey ,Ft4J~,FWJ@ ul4 qpm s;i vR.Qt zOjQ ijJ9A0030021005gg-8
FOIAb3b
HAROLD F. GOSNELL
American University
Indonesians Go to the Polls: The Parties and
Their Stand on Constitutional Issues *
BEFORE THE GENERAL elections of 1955 the hopes of the Indo-
nesians were high regarding the effectiveness of democratic devices
in solving political and economic problems. It was thought that
the election of a Constitutional Assembly would solve the prob-
lems of the future of constitutional government in that country
which so recently acquired its independence from the Dutch. The
problem was of enormous size. During its brief history,' Indo-
nesia had lived under co-opted governments chosen in accordance
with the provisions of a tentative constitution.2 With these make-
shift arrangements it had to contend with inflation, repair of war
damage, replacement of trained Dutch personnel, elimination of
graft and corruption, armed insurrection in a number of spots,
a military establishment uncertain of itself and of its place in the
body politic, regional uprisings and the fragmentation of central
authority, foreign exchange crises, and a general lack of experience
with government, public administration and democratic institutions.
The Constitutional Assembly convened November 10, 1956, at
Bandung, about one year after the voters went to the polls to
select the delegates.' It met at an ominous time. President Sukarno
scolded it for having so many factions and hinted at an appointed
* The author was in Indonesia during the 1955 elections. This article is
primarily based on interviews with prominent Indonesians, official records, Indo-
nesian newspapers and press services. The Ministry of Information was very
helpful.
' President Sukarno likes to use 1945 as the year independence was won, although
this independence was not recognized by the Dutch until 1949.
2 Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia, The Provisional Constitution of the
Republic of Indonesia, Act No. 7, 1950, Gazette 1950, No. 56.
9 The elections to the General Assembly were held during the period beginning
September 29, 1955, and lasted several weeks due to delays in making the arrange-
ments in certain localities; the elections to the Constituent Assembly were held on
December 15, 1955. The results were not announced until half a year later.
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
CPYRGHT
super council which might take over the affairs of government in
the troubled land.4 A military and civilian revolt broke out soon
after in Sumatra, the wealthiest of all the islands. Dissatisfied with
their share of the total expenditures of the national government in
view of their large contribution to national taxes, the Sumatrans
demanded the resignation of the Ali Government and the return of
Hatta as an emergency premier at the head of a government dedi-
cated to more local autonomy and greater efficiency and honesty.
Early in 1957 the islanders of East Indonesia followed the Suma-
trans by declaring partial independence.
The Constitutional Assembly, a large and unwieldy body of 520
members (just twice the size of Parliament) listened to the Presi-
dent's words solemnly and pondered slowly and deliberately the
gigantic tasks facing it. It had to decide whether to adopt a demo-
cratic or a dictatorial form of government, what the role of the
President would be, what the place of its elder companion, Parlia-
ment, would be, what the powers of the states would be, whether
the present centralization should be continued, if democratic forms
were followed, whether the parliamentary or presidential system
of government should be adopted, what would be the role of Islam,
what would be the place of the minor religious bodies, what would
be the relationship between civil and military authorities, and what
kind of parliament should be established and how it would be
elected.5
Constitutional issues were not prominently debated during or
since the election campaign. It is doubtful whether the average
Indonesian voter knows very much about the complicated legal
and political power questions involved. At the polls he had merely
punched a hole through the symbol of his favorite party using the
' Ministry of Information of the Republic of Indonesia, "Draw Up a Consti-
tution Which is Really Based on Res Republica," speech delivered by the President
of the Republic of Indonesia at the Opening Ceremony of the Constituent Assem-
bly on 10 November 1956.
6 Materials in English on Indonesian constitutional history are scanty. A. Arthur
Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia 1945-1949 (New York: Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1955) covers one phase very thoroughly. His notes and bibli-
ography cite the Dutch sources. George M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution
in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952) gives a vivid account of
constitutional changes during the Revolution.
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
nail provided in the polling booth for that purpose.' He probably
does not know exactly what position his party takes on the consti-
tutional issues that are being raised by the convention and by
recent events.
Of the many parties that President Sukarno criticized, four
divided roughly four-fifths of the seats. The remaining fifth went
to some thirty odd parties. As to the total number of parties
President Sukarno was right. The system of proportional repre-
sentation did produce too many parties.? The behavior of these
parties and the possible grounds for a stable coalition were some-
thing else. Could the parties get together in time and establish
stable constitutional government? As President Sukarno indicated,
time was running out.
The chart indicates how different the results were in Java, the
most populous island, and in the outlying islands which are now
in a state of semi-revolt. The nationalist, secular, and left wing
parties polled their strongest vote in Java (Election Districts 1-4,
inclusive) and the parties with religious orientation and backing
were generally ahead in the outlying islands.
Of the nationalist parties, the Indonesian Nationalist Party
(Partai Nasional Indonesia-PNI), is by far the strongest. It origi-
For the symbols of the four leading parties, see Chart. The Chart also shows
the election districts, the apportionment of seats for the National Assembly and
Constituent Assembly, and the results by districts of the Constituent Assembly
Elections of December 1955. The large numbers give the location of the election
districts, the names of which are given in the table. Due to a faulty working of
the system, some elections districts did not get the number of seats apportioned
to them. Thus Election District 10, E. Kalimantan (Borneo), was apportioned
6 Constituent Assembly seats but only obtained 2. The vote was light in this
district and apparently only 2 seats were assigned in the first distribution. When
remainders were pooled nationally, the E. Kalimantan lists did not fare well.
'In the Election Law of 1953, Indonesians copied the Dutch system of propor-
tional representation which tended to fragment political opinions. The some 150
parties presented a confusing picture to the voters. On the relationship of the
system of representation to the number of parties, see Maurice Duverger, Political
Parties (New York: Wiley, 1954). On the results in Indonesia, see Justus M.
van der Kroef, " Indonesia: Search for Stability," Current History, XXXI (July
1956), 25-31; Irene Tinker and M. Walker, "First General Elections in India and
Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXV (July 1956), 97-110; Soedjatmoko, "The
Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., Nationalism and
Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956).
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
CPYRGHT
nated in 1927 when a young engineer, one year out of Bandung
Technical School, helped to form a movement of that name.,, The
Dutch were very suspicious of the movement and of the man,
whose name was Sukarno. Except for two years, 1932 and 1933,
Sukarno spent the years from 1929 to 1942 in prison or in exile.
Freed by the Japanese in 1942, he became their main collaborator,
but this did not lessen his zeal for Indonesian nationalism nor his
reputation as one of the founders of the Indonesian Republic.
Actually, PNI began its organization work after 1945. After the
withdrawal of the Japanese Sukarno remained as the head of the
revolutionary movement which sought to shake off Dutch rule and
to establish an independent Indonesian republic. PNI was in a key
position to build up an organization. After he became president of
the republic in 1945, Sukarno was nominally aloof from politics
but in practice he did many things to aid PNI. A major share of
the key civil service positions went to PNI, including those in the
important Ministry of Information, which had field representatives
everywhere down to the smallest village. Some Ministry of Infor-
mation officials were PNI candidates in the elections and are now
serving in the National Assembly.
As PNI developed its program, it became clear that it was above
all nationalist. As one commentator put it, the party is still fighting
the Dutch for independence.9 Another tenet of the party is " pro-
letarian nationalism " (marhaenism), an Indonesian brand of social-
ism which may be linked to Indonesian village customs of doing
things together and to the lack of Indonesian capitalists. On con-
stitutional issues, PNI favors the secular state with religious free-
dom for all and a highly centralized government with power con-
centrated in Djakarta. This last policy is a reaction against the
Dutch attempt to use federalism as a device for dividing and ruling.
PNI came out on top in the popular vote because of the glamorous
reputation of President Sukarno, the general enthusiasm for nation-
alism, the efficient political work of the PNI patronage machine,
and the ineffectiveness of the opposition in capitalizing on the mis-
'New Century Cyclopedia of Names (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts,
1954).
'Quoted by R. C. Bone, "The Future of Indonesian Political Parties," Far
Eastern Survey, XXIII, No. 2, February 1954.
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
takes made by PNI. Its vote was particularly heavy in Central and
East Java. This party is trying to persuade the Sumatrans to end
their revolt against central authority. It is not united on President
Sukarno's anti-parliamentary proposals for a guided democracy,
but it generally supports his views. Partly because of this split the
party lost votes in the regional and municipal elections of 1957.
The minor nationalist parties did not fare so well in the Con-
stituent Assembly elections. PRN, a small group that split off from
PNI over the question of the recognition of the Viet Minh, which
it opposed, and federalism, which it favored, won 3 seats in the
Constituent Assembly. The other nationalist parties made hardly
any showing.10
In a state whose inhabitants are estimated to be 90 per cent
Muslim, it can be expected that religion will play an important
part in political affairs. While the provisional constitution of 1950
provided for a secular state, Indonesian governments have had a
Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Muslim political parties are the
Masjumi, NU, Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), and Persatuan
Tarbijah Islam (Perti). The two Christian parties are Partai Ka-
tholik Republic Indonesia, and Partai Keristen Indonesia (Par-
kindo), of which the former is Catholic and the latter is Protestant.
The Masjumi is a federation of Muslim theological, charitable,
women's, youth, peasants', and other organizations that were formed
by the Japanese to unite into a single body in order to provide a
convenient means of controlling the Islamic religious community.h1
It ties together the Muslim religious community, the major Muslim
social organizations, and their village leaders in a political party.
Its 1946 program included the following: " Realization of the
Islamic ideology in matters concerning the state in order to be able
to establish a state based upon popular sovereignty and justice in
harmony with teachings of Islam." 12 Emphasis has been placed
upon the position of the village in the national economy with co-
operatives as means of avoiding high interest rates. As compared
with other parties, the Masjumi is less rabidly nationalistic and
10 Two separate factions of Persatuan Indonesian Raja won 1 seat each in the
National Assembly.
11 Kahin, op. cit., pp. 305-13.
"Emergency Program, 1946.
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
 Approved For Release 2000/05/24: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300210059-8
INDONESIAN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS OF DECEMBER 1955
^O
~ F P m_ A A N N~ m- N- N~.. f
h
r
w
W F~ n R h m n n -_ n m N~? N
Q. N N = .~ m N f - - - $
V=* H m N N- N- m f N
ID < N
N p~ f OI m ~ N N Fl .~ '1 N N N f
N A f- m --- N N -- N A
- m
h W
< 2 2 W
h f F 33 ; <
Z < a O
0 C <