MY WORLD AT LARGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000300160020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 1, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

WIDE WORLD
F ROM my side, as it were, of
this issue of our magazine,
three things particularly im-
press me. Firstly, the story
of the loss of the M.V. Dora, " Four
Hours To Die I " paints a picture
of a tragedy that was in many ways
more shocking than the loss of the
Titanic, For although more people
died with that ship, the high pro-
portion of women and children on
the Dara lends its drama extra
poignancy, and nothing is quite so
terrifying as fire at sea.
Secondly, as someone who
comes into contact with a great
many travellers and explorers, I am
lost in admiration for that great
fiction writer Erle Stanley Gardner.
For in this story " The Case Of
The Burnt Palms," incidentally his
first non-fiction work to be published
in Britain, he reveals that he em-
barked on an arduous and even
dangerous expedition, into a hostile
country, when he was well over
70 years of age.
Thirdly, the question of whether
or not we should have published
BY THE EDITOR
Blueprint For A Spy." Many in-
telligence experts asserted that the
book from which it comes reveals
too much of the behind-the-scenes
organization of Western intelligence
networks. I feel, however, that tax-
payers who foot the bill for these
activities should know something of
how their money is spent, and should
have a better understanding of why
" businessmen " and " students,"
seemingly innocent people, so often
feature in spy trials. Finally, you
may be surprised at the implied
ineptitude of the Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.) of America, one of
the leading protagonists in the
world power game. On the other
hand, is so much spying really
necessary ?
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The Dara tragedy is so full
o/ human drama, heroism,
cowardice and sheer terror,
that cover artist Neville
Dear was faced with great
difficulty in choosing one
aspect of the disaster to
represent the whole. He
decided that the element of
despair common to many
of the passengers was most
forcibly embodied in the
large number of women and
children on board. The
Indian woman and child
symbolize those who perished
in the flames. It is a
poignant and moving illus-
tration.
ADVENTURE
BLUEPRINT FOR A SPY
Startling revelations about spies and their methods.
THE CASE OF THE BURNT PALMS
Erle Stanley Gardner's first non-fiction work in Britain.
FANTASY IN FREE FALL
They dice with death at great heights-for your entertainment.
WHEN A "KISS" CAN BREAK A LEG
e story of a roan-and his dangerous way of life.
MED IINE
SUR RY BELOW SEA LEVEL
A moder miracle of medical science.
CRIME
WHO KILD THE LORD OF LIFE?
A judge invests tes the mysterious murder of a king.
FOUR HOURS TO DI
My World At Large 220
Wide World Brotherhood 286
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WIDE WORLD
contents ...
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? Explorer of 70
? Baby Smuggler
? The Ghostly Dane
? Bees in the Belfry
capable of sawing and sorting
500,000 board feet pr day.
Canadian experis will super-
JLn dense
intend its erection t
forests of southern Sib ia, where the
Russian timber indus y is com-
parable to forestry i Canada's
After being hopelessly to
ship of Stevenson the Yukon river
Alaska-saved by a ghost.
Their leader, Greg Meyer, said
that he and his men had floundered
around in swirling snow without any
sense of direction, until a huge dog,
similar to a Great Dane, had
suddenly appeared before them, then
bounded away at an easy lope.
With their two dog teams, the
Americans had followed, the myster-
ious dog keeping just ahead of them,
until they arrived at a collection of
huts used by a weather team, One of
the meteorologists stood in the door-
way of one of the huts, holding a
lighted lamp aloft, for he had heard
their dogs approaching, barking
furiously at the large animal ahead
of them.
But the weather man had not
in the newly-fallen snow. This
the sixth reported instance of
Rima Choti was a poor fare r near
beggar squatted on hiE land, he
allowed the man to re in, feeding
him regularly in ret rn for light
work. The old man,`had but three
possessions, a pair of battered
sandals, a loincloth wind an umbrella.
One day the old man died and
he gave him a decent funeral, getting
permission to bury him on the farm.
Choti thought it would be a nice
gesture to erect the old man's
umbrella over his grave as a sort of
memorial, but while planting it in the
ground, the fastening became loose,
and banknotes spilled in the dust.
?..
Peripe was sacked from
caretaker of the little
For the fifth consecutive ear,
Roger Carriere has been crow ed
Manitoba, and is fast becoming a
legendary figure. Aged 33, and just
under six feet tall, he weighs
15 stone and is powerfully built.
Here are some of the feats that
made him champion. He ran 100
yards in 23 seconds with a 125-lb.
canoe on his shoulders, won a flour.
carrying contest by jogging around
with 650 pounds on his back, and
then, wrestled and defeated some
of Canada's top exponents of Indian
wrestling. But that was only the
beginning. He went on to swim
a mile in 19 minutes, excelled in log
lifting, jousting, fish eating, ice
fishing, paddling, rat skinning and
trap setting. There must be easier
King Trapper,
heavyweight loads-
and up the pole.
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By CHRISTOPHER FELIX
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LUEPRINT FOR A SPY
(continued)
prone to the temptation to oversta.to his
accomplishments, if not deliberately falsify
them.
More importantly, he must always be
assumed to be available to the highest bidder,
and it must always be assumed that the
highest bidder will be the opposition. But
generally it competent secret service avoids,
as much as possible, the agent working for
money.
Thero has seldom been a Western trial of
a Soviet agent which revealed anything more
than relatively trifling sums involved (the
Vassal case is an exception).
It is not that the Russians are mean in
theso matters; they simply observe thin classic,
principle that a hired agent is the least
desirable.
Compulsion of an individual to act as a
secret agent takes many forms, and is not
infrequent. Blackmail is one form of such
compulsion, and it is a favourite Soviet
technique.
It is by no means limited to sexual
matters. But it is a regrettable fact --
accurately understood and used by the
Russians-that Americans, and to a lesser
extent the British, are particularly subject to
blackmail in this sphere.
however, one of my American colleagues
once gave the right answer when confronted
by. the problem. Shown a series of highly
compromising photographs of himself with a
lady not his wife, he was threatened that they
would be sent to his wife, his father and his
mother. His answer was brief. " Superb
photography, I'll take a dozen copies."
lie at least understood that if you're
going to go out it may as well be laughing ;
the tears arc for later. In his case, interest-
ingly enough, they weren't--noither he nor his
family over hoard of the matter again.
Another favourite Russian device is the,
holding of hostages, usually family, to compel
service as an agent.
It is also a fact that compulsion is not
limited to the Russians.
In many Western European countries it
is made clear to resident foreigners, particularly
refugees in difficulties, that the necessary work
and residence permits are dependent upon
agent, rose to a high rank in his
country's security network. He master-
minded the American intelligence
operation in Hungary during and after
the revolution. Recently he resigned
from security work, but for obvious
reasons he writes under a pseudo~~t,..
rehn idcntit r of the American C.I.A.
their reporting regularly and fully to the
intelligence authorities.
Even so, it stands to reason that the
recruitment of an agent by compulsion is it
very limited technique. An agents moved only
by fear of punishment is certainly lacking in
initiative and is in no state of mind to exploit
his own skills or possibilities to the fullest.
The most important limitation on such an
agent is his lack of reliability. Hidden betrayal
is it constant possibility, even when the hold
over the agent still exists, and is pretty much
of a certainty when the hold is relinquished.
It is also fairly certain that if the agent
is uncovered by the opposition he will co-
operate fully with them.
Tho agent who is moved by prospects of
personal gain is a more subtle and sophisticated
variant of the agent who seeks only money.
His scope is wider, since he knows and acts on
the principle that secret information is power.
his intention is to turn that power to personal
profit.
He usually counts on participation in a
secret operation to give him access to informa-
tion otherwise unobtainable, or to put him
in a position lie can turn to good account in
terms of money, influence, position or oppor-
tunities. His intention is seldom to profit
from the operation itself; on the contrary, he
usually renders reasonably good sertico up to
it point. His personal profit comes as a sort
of fringe benefit to the operation.
The limitations of such an agent in terms
of control and dependability are obvious. Since
the fringe benefit--never acknowledged by
him to be paramount -is to him the important
part of the arrangement, his participation in
the operation has an element of falsity which
can lead to serious errors.
At first glance, ambition seems a strange
motive to associate with secret operations. It
is not readily clear what ambition can be
satisfied by work in a field hidden from the
public gaze and without rewards. Ambition,
nevertheless, does play it valid role, largely
because of developments in the last twenty
years.
Before the Second World War, the secret
war was limited in scope and intensity. Its
professionals were men who performed valu-
able services for their governments, but their
influence was limited.
Today, all over the world, on both sides
of the Iron Curtain, that has changed. The
real power that is now wielded by the upper
echelons of secret operations is no loss con-
siderable for not being advertised to the public.
The Central Intelligence Agency, America's
princtlliiiflifinin "the secret war, has overt per-
sonnel and functions, even though virtually all
it's activities are secret. The Director of Central
Intelligence Agency and his two principal
(l Tutigs, are. overt officials, although responsible
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One of America's top
agents reveals. the facts
about how intelligence
operations are run in
the ceaseless. secret
war between the nations
MELODRAMA is avoided by the
professionals who fight the secret war
of espionage. This is not because
of a lack of patriotism or determina-
tion to win, but a simple recognition
of the facts of international life and
an unwillingness to underestimate their
tasks.
The professionals also use different
terms than those employed by the
public prosecuting attorneys and mystery
writers.
The words spy and enemy are
not used.
They become agent and the
opposition.
There is in this a tacit, even if
precarious, mutual respect which is
the universal mark of competing pro-
fessionals. This mutual respect should
not, of course, be confused with any
code of chivalry. The basic theory of
this kind of conflict begins with the
premise that no holds are barred.
The motives of most secret agents
fall into identifiable categories. In
ascending order of desirability, these
categories are money, compulsion,
personal gain, ambition, political
support and duty.
The agent who operates only for
money exists : cities like Vienna,
Beirut, Hong Kong, Zurich, trading-
places of information and centres of
manoeuvre for both sides in the secret
war, are full of men attempting to
glean a living from selling their
services as agents, without regard for
nationality.
Obviously, however, the provider
of secret services for money is all too
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UEPRINT FOR A SPY lacked the necessary vast personal resources
His functioning as an agent was, therefore, to
proportion to that which is secret than t he
visible part of an iceberg to its underwater
mass.
In Coniniunist countries, the rncn who
control the secret operations apparatus are
high party functionaries and participate in
major decisions. it is noteworthy that as time
goes on, more and more of these men achieve
their high party rank through advancement
in the secret service.
Secret operations have tended to berniae
a career, an accepted path of governmental
power.
Two British former secret operations
officials with whom I collaborated, are now
increasingly influential Members of Parliament.
One of president Kennedy's ambassadorial
appointments was a. man who made his mark
in the Central Intelligence administration.
Political support is a highly reliable but
varied and complex motive. It, transcends
limitations of nationality and is a prime mover
in the secret war.
As a motive for an agent, a sense of duty
ranks high. It ensures his reliability, and it
eliminates any necessity for bargaining about,
objectives. Since the fulfilment of a sense of
duty brings its own rewards, the agent thus
moved is devoid of any falsity in his position.
Anonymity, lifelong if necessary-, is acceptable.
Nobody enters into secret operations as
a lark. The demands are too rigorous, the
issues too weighty and complex, for a mere
adventurer. Some men in secret operations
have indeed a strong sense of adventure. Some
relish being privy to secrets. Some experience
personal satisfaction at being able to operate
outside the framework of normal order and
society--but these are attributes of the life
and insufficient as reasons for entering it.
Some men and women even become involved
in secret operations unconsciously, so to speak
,a chain of circumstances ensnares there
without a clear or definite realisation or
decision on their part.
It is rare, however, that an agent is moved
by only one of the motives described above.
Such purity of motive does not correspond to
the complexity of most human beings. When
it does occur it is usually for special reasons,
generally of short duration, and often results in
fanaticism-not a desirable quality in a field
where cool-headedness and breadth of view are
prime qualities.
In most cases motives arc mixed, and if
properly understood. by the agent's chief, can
tribute to his usefulness.
n
some extent an example of the agent working
For personal gain.
lie also had a strong sense of duty, so his
reliability was not in question. Similarly, his
interest in the kind of life he led contributed
to his usefulness and success as an agent.
The most important relationship in the
whole field of secret operations is that between
the agent and the man who controls him-
his case officer.
It is the agent who acts and who is
directly in touch with the enemy, the "opposi-
tion ". Thc. agent is exposed and visible---he
operates "outside ". The case officer directs
the agent. lie is invisible and works only
inside ".
The ease officer must ensure that the
agent's actions advance the objectives of the
operation on which they are engaged; this
clearly requires domination of the agent by
the case officer.
Tiro possibilities of this domination are
reinforced at the outset by the fact that the
ease officer represents the authority which
defines the objectives of the operation, and
lie controls the resources which make the
operation possible.
But woo to the case officer who relies only
on these two elements to achieve his mastery
over the agent. In doing so he immediately
forfeits the confidence of the agent as well as
his essential willingness.
It is just hero that an American weak-
ness occurs.
Time and again I have seen American case
officers cut off funds to enforce discipline over
an agent.
ce
d
t
u
o re
One effect of this is ultimately
the agent to the status of a mere pensioner.
In espionage operations this can result in
highly unreliable information. In a political
operation it can be fatal.
Often the matter of funds
becomes an irritant between
case officer and agent simply
because of American suspicion
about money, and fear of being
victimized. Behind every case
officer in the Central Intelligence
Agency is a squadron of
bookkeepers and accountants,
sniffing hungrily for a wrong-
fully-diverted penny.
One highly qualified agent
once worked out with the
Americans a complex political
operation which included con-
siderable postage, for which ho
was given a specified budget.
c.o
~
The value of one highly useful American The Sverdlovsk brought Krushchev to
agent in Latin America, for example, for years Britain on a friendship visit. Never-
depended on his ability to move freely among theless, said the Russians, British
the very wealthy. IIo was a social snob and frogman Commander Crabb, spied
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Z""
GEORGE BLAKE
Undercover at
British Consulate.
COMM. CRABB
Underwater at
Portsmouth.
COL. ABEL
Underground in
U.S.A.
61 The various
combinations of
overt and secret
operations reflect
the different national
circumstances.
WILLIAM VASSAL
Inside the Admiralty.
PETER KROGER
Outside at Portland.
GARY POWERS
Overhead in Russia.
Director's British counterpart, on the other
hand, is secret and withhold from all except
those needing to know.
The identity of the head of the (West)
Gorman, General Gohlen, is known, but only
a handful of authorized persons, including but
a few of the personnel of his own organization,
know him by sight as such. He appears in his
identity of General Gohlen only to this small
group, a practice made easier by the reported
fact that there is only one very old photo-
graph of him in existence.
Interestingly enough the Soviet arrange-
ment, although different in important respects,
than to the Britisli or German solutions, at
least to the extent that the Committee on
Stato Security is an overt organization, and its
chairman's identity is known.
Tho French, on the other hand, tend to
resolve the problem moro in the British fashion.
They admit., as the British do not, the exist-
ence of an overt organization the Service do
I)ocnnnontolion et Contre-Espionage, but they
neither publish nor publicize the identity of
its Director.
It will be seen that in secret oporalions,
chile the various combinations of overt and
secret reflect the different national eircum-
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organization and, early in the operation, before
he had received the promised funds, he had to
absent himself for ten days. He told his
secretary to continue the postings, using the
cover organization's postage-meter.
In his absence a bookkeeper complained
of his unauthorized use of the postage-meter
auul- irrmntediately, without any opportunity for
explanation on the agent's part, the case officer
was required to cancel the operation.
When the agent told no' this story, almost
a Scar later, be was still paying oft the debts
with which this episode had saddled himr. He
was not enthusiastic about working with
Americans.
The American difficulty in t.ho agent-case
officer relationship is often
simply a reflection of the
bureaucratic approach to
problems, and the dis-
proportionate influence of
tlto American fetish for
administration.
1 was once charged with
the planning and direction of
the American part of a joint
Anglo-American operation,
similar to the Cuban operation,
but smaller and more tenta-
tive in scope. (It also failed,
with loss of life, but at least
the failure was not public.)
`? bodies ", and that. I would happily sett lc for
six brains.
By Ray t11' contrast. 1 went to London it
week later and observed the British approach
to the saunc problem. After sitting round at
tarble for an hour or two, one Englislnnan said :
" I say, why don't we get old henry up here Y
He knows about this."
A day or two later old Henry showed up
front down in Sussex and agreed to undertake
the task although, as lie said, "This will wreak
havoc with the garden, you know. Just getting
it into trim." He then added that he would
do it. only on condition that he could have six
persons, whom lac named, and that they be
responsible solely and directly to him.
One of the principal tools
in the ease officer's hands for
establishing and maintaining
his dominance over the agent
is greater knowledge. He has,
alter all, national resources of
information behind taint and
he must use them.
Obviously, the case
officer's authority must be
unassailable. 'I'bis moans
ideally that the agent's con-
tacts with the organization
should be limited to the case
officer only. This is usually
possible in esp1 1 oit age
is I have worked
all this out,
you will need 457
bodies for
this operation.#J
While I was still casting about for the
most qualified personnel-the area was fairly
exotic, and very few Americans were acquainted
with it--I was called to a conference in
Washington. In the room I saw an intricate
organizational chart on the wall and it colleague
pointed to it, saying : "T have worked all this
out, and as you will see you need 457 bodies
for this operation."
He then spoke for Forty minutes, without
ever mentioning the country with which we
were, concerned. I confined myself to remark-
operations, but. in political operations it is
much tuore difficult.
However imperative the need for tht case
officer to dominate the relationship with the
agent, there are major obstacles to his doing
so. For one tiring, the relationship is not that
between employer and employed, nor is it the
military one between superior and subordinate.
In its theoretically ideal form the case officer
would be master and the agent servant. The
case officer would define the objectives and the
agent would obey unquestioningly, his skill
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BLUEPRINT FOR A SPY agent should not knew the true identity, or
even appearance, of the case officer. It riot
fcoi7tNrcrc~ infrequently happens that even the cut-out
completely at the disposal of the case officer.
Obviously, no human relationship is that
simnple.
The military system is an attempt to
approach such a relationship, lnet every new
officer in a military service soon learns that, it
is not sufficient merely to give an order for
leadership to be real and effective. This is
even more true in secret operations, which
exist in a shadow world in which the generally
accepted constraints and values of conven-
tional relationships do riot apply.
It is the agent who acts and to this extent
every agent is a free agent. The case officer
can neither be present at the action, take part
in it, nor supervise it on the spot. A uian Huts
dependent on another is not in a good position
to dominate their relationship.
This basic problem is intensified by the
fact that communications between the case
officer and agent are frequently difficult. There
may be long intervals between meetings, or
communications may consist of no more than
occasional radio signals. Where personal con-
Inet between case officer and agent is non-
existent, contact is maintained by " cut-outs ".
A cut-out is a person, also an agent, who
acts as intermediary between time case officer
and his agent. Cut-outs serve one, or perhaps
two, valuable functions. They permit oral con-
tact between case officer and agent where
physical meetings would be dangerous and
written messages undesirable.
They are also used in situations where the
does not know the true identity of either case
officer or agent.
I teas once saved great embarrassment by
the fact that. an agent hall no knowledge of
illy mien identity or of the cut-out's. Sortie
nurntlrs alter giving him money and a mission,
via the cut.-out, this agent defected to the
Russians. 't'hanks to the cut-out device, all
ho could till the Russians was that a roan he
knew only as "Mike" gave him instructions on
behalf of a man named " Ray " whom he had
clover seen. No great loss.
When conditions permit, the curt-out rnav
be a device such as a. "drop"- a person or
even a place by means of which written mes-
sages may be safely exchanged without per-
sonal contact. Drops are an opportunity for
roil ingenuity and a classic device involves
sending a theatre ticket to an agent. His
neighbour in the darkened theatre, sometimes
the case officer, more usually a, cut-out, then.
exchanges documents with him, often without
a word passing between them.
Where personal contact is dangerous, but
still imperative, resort is made to the "safe
house". This is a place where contact can be
rna.do under circumstances and with pre-
cautions that mirnirnizc risk. Brothels were
once t:raditionally favoured as safe houses, but
nowadays they are regarded as booby traps
because the inmates have usually been cor-
rupted by the police into becoming informers.
A further difficulty in the, case officer-
agent relationship stems from the recruiting
process. As often as not the initiation comes
from the agent, who proposes a course of
action which he is, or claims to be, equipped
to carry out. In effect, he is offering a special
skill. This gives him some bargaining power,
and he can negotiate, even if within small
limits.
}n place of the confidence that should
characterize it, both case officer and agent are
in danger of behaving like a pair of irascible
marriage partners, each trying to impress the
other that he is indispensable to the rotation-
ship--to the detriment of its true, purposes.
There are ways, of course, of overcoming
some of these initial advantages of the agent
and American practice has achieved a certain
sophistication over the years in this respect.
Faced with a specific task, the Central
Intelligence Agency will usually make it con-
siderable effort to determine who is the best
qualified roan. They will then study the man's
chain of friendships, and more often than not
it is possible to reach one of the friends to do
the recruiting.
Another tactic is to overwhelm the pros-
Reinhard Gehlen, head of the German Secret Service,
keeps himself hidden. This wartime
 nnnn n>>u ^UmmI-I zinEl >n>na>nr zz ^r~annr~^ ^c
FINISHED niv j gal business in Calcutta
on the Friday vening, but there was no
'plane to Ba A kok until eight-thirty the
following m Icing. It was a slow 'plane
that halted at angoon for several hours. I
decided to stir the night at the old Grand
After a good dinner, 1 strolled to the
cabaret t.ht adjoined the hotel. The place was
crowded, irily with British and Indians. It
had I:ha eliciting atmosphere, which is a corn-
pound of sex and alcohol, that seems to
_1t_L_1_._ b
t
u
The King had been found
in bed with a
45 colt revolver
by his hand.'
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pective agent with rank. An approach by it
high official is not only flattering, but is an
implicit mark of confidence.
Unfortunately, American practice may be
well-conceived, but often falls down badly in
the execution. What matters is not so much
what you do but how you do it.
A friend told nie he had finally refused to
make any more contacts for_tjW CI.~. because
in too many cases the Agency either never
followed through, or even spoke with the roan
they had begged my friend to make contact
with.
Another friend-I'll. call him Frank-
worked in the CIA for Sumo years and left in
a far from satisfied frame of mind. Even so,
about three years later lie was approached and
asked to act as agent in an operation which
would have meant completely altering some
urgent and, to him, vitally important plans.
He explained his difficulty to the CIA, but
said he would be willing to undertake the
operation because of the importance they
seemed to attach to his taking part. His only
condition was that he must know definitely
about it within two weeks.
He heard nothing further-ever.
But about two years later he was at a
cocktail party in Washington when Allen
Dullos, director of the CIA, walked up. They
were introduced, but Dulles said heartily "Or
course I know Dank. I've been trying to get
hint back into our work for the past five
years."
As Frank, later explaining to me his
stupefaction, said : "I guess the explanation
is simply that it's a very big organization."
He added, moodily : "At least, I hope it's no
worse than that."
"Cover" is something that shields the
secret agent from his opposition. It puts him
into a position to accomplish his mission. And
it is an art.
All good cover reaches into
the opponent, thinks as he
would think, and then creates
it combination of fact and
fancy, or actual arrangements
and contrived impressions
which the opposing mind is
prepared to believe.
In. all human conflict the
stronger man is ho who can
think as the enemy drinks,
and the victor is lie who
seizes the advantage this
gives him.
Cover takes an infinite
variety of forms. The
commonest--and widely used by people
outside secret operations, such as bankers,
ambassadors and lovers is the large cocktail
party of diplomatic reception. At these affairs,
meetings and conversations can take place
seemingly casually.
The budget of the United States Govern-
rn'enu is `itself a cover. Buried in it is the
b
d
f
h
C
l I
lli
u
get o
t
entra
e
nte
gence A ency , ,
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Greville Wynne was just another British businessman
working in Hungary, until the Russians
placed him under arrest and tried him as a spy.
scattered about in a manner that is reportedly
proof against the closest scrutiny. la other
words, the CIA receives its money under the
cover of the Federal Budget.
It is one of the seeming iniquities of the
secret war today that, in general, world opinion
is often indifferent to transparency in Soviet
political cover arrangements.
The Peace Campaign was launched initially
in 1948, as it Soviet cover organization aimed
at reinforcing Soviet policy concerning Western
Defence.
The U.S. Government reacted with state-
ment after statement showing conclusively
that this was a Soviet initiative, in support of
`Brothels are
regarded as booby
traps because the
inmates have usually
been corrupted into
becoming informers.19
Soviet foreign policy. The
technique did not work.
The Campaign succeeded
beyond the Russians' fondest
hopes, oven to the extent that
years later, when they inter-
vened in Hungary, they had
to pay a high price in loss of
prestige with the very people
they had won in the Campaign.
In brief, people were
indifferent to the unmasking
of the Peace Campaign as a
Soviet initiative. I do not
believe it was because they
were dupes. I believe that it is because-
people liked what was offered.
Occasionally the inter-relation of what the
American is, what the foreigner thinks lie is,
and what the American drinks the foreigner
ideally ought to think lie is produces sonic
unexpected results.
I t was, for example, and still is, widely
 Apved For Release 2003/12/02: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000300160020-6
WEPRINT FOR A SPY tire. It endured fora considerable rime by
professional standards and even continued to
(continued) confuse the investigtrtors after the couple's
came, they canoe pieccrncal. First there WAS
arr announcement about ilte mysterious dis-
appearance of a marl who had registered at.
it Yortsmoutlt hotel. It was Soine time before,
it further announcement gave his name. Then
a newspaper reporter uncovered the fact that
the man trod arrived in Portsmouth Zwitlr
(living equipment.
To this there was added cventu;dly an
official announcement that Crahb oceasioualiV
did some research for the Admiralty under
contract.
This was followed later by a denial that
Crahb was on official business when he visited.
Portsmouth, and that was the last official word
on the subject. Throughout :ill these state-
ments there was an air of vagueness, implying
that Crahb either didn't exist, or that he was
such a tremendous enthusiast for diving that
he had probably gone to Portsroout:h for
several days of his favourite sport.
To speak out too fast on it cover story is
to show your hand before you know all you
can about what cards your opponent holds.
To tell all in one bleat el'i'minates your ch;uu?es
to improvize as the situation develops.
The proof or this British pudding lay ill
the filet that the Russian visit went on to its
planned completion, and after their single pro-
test, the Russians dropped the rattier.
it is typical of the drama and irony of
secret operations that at the same time Com-
rnander Crahb was being discovered by the
Russian watch aboard the Scer?dloz'slc, a.
Russian espionage ring was I'urrcttoning
smoothly ashore in the British Underwater
Detection l stablishment at Portland.
The principal agents were a couple who
conducted their operations under the cover of
a, bookshop. 'I'lrey were uncovered and
arrested only in 1961 and even then there was
considerable doubt as to their true identity
and nationality.
Their personal cover of false identities as
Canadians held up until American authorities
carne forward with positive identification of
there as American citizens with past records
of Communist activity.
The couple--the Cohcns alias Kroger-
lived in it house in which was found a radio
transmitter and other clandestine equipment.
They themselves never received documents
from the sub-agents working at Portland Naval
Base. These were transmitted to the Cohcns
by it cut-out who was in due course brought
under British security surveillance.
Even after arrest, however, tile Colleris
produced a cover story. It was that they had
lent their house several times to friends, among
activities had here revealed. Its effectiveness
is uretstn'cd by the extent to which other
agents and activities of Ih eir group were pro-
tected by the story and its accompanying
delays and confusion.
And who knows who and Nrhat, these other
agents and activities were? illoscow does.
London and Washington do not.
Who can propel l}' est innate the I inc extent
of the defeat represented by the co'rest, of the
Coleus?
Only illoscow can. This is good cover' it
work.
Cover is not created by recourse to it
theatrical supply house. Disguise is rarely
feasible. Exceptions always exist, of course,
and the outstanding one in my experience is
it non-nioustaclrioed British general who
periodically operates disguised its a woman. He
once said to rrre : "Not flashily attractive, You
understand, but not motherly either. Just
chic, don't you know."
But the lone agent, operating under a.
persorr;d cover, is fast becoming an anachron-
ism. In it world of organization men, tho hest
cover for an agent is to be an organization
rtut,n.
The adventurous explorer lots been cou-
verted into it travel agency executive, arid
Rlata. Bari works from nine to five as a
research assistant on the stal'l' of a largo
circulation magazine.
This melancholy development is known
as organizational cover, and it is a field in
which the Russians have serious problems.
Since almost all activity in the Soviet Union,
and certainly ill] Russian foreign activity, is
organized and directed by the State, no Soviet
agency can provide plausible organizational
cover. Consequently, the Russians often use
foreign organizations, obviously without
sanction. It is this which explains their
inability to resist the tetaptaliorrs offered by
the United Nations as cover for some of their
agents.
We live in a period of sharp conflict in
,which, for the moment, the driving forces are
two g reat centres of power. Neither of these
two Powers is willing to risk open warfare of
the kind which will call into play the ultimate
weapons.
Accordingly the conflict moves forward
largely covertly in the political and para-
military realms. It is the covert nature of
these operations which avoids the kind of
direct confrontation which could produce
nuclear Warfare.
To that extent we aright all pray for more
and better cover. &,& A~
them the cut-out, and they denied knowledge Ada fed fitotn . " The Spy and his Master's'", by
of the equipment or of those. friends' activities. niStmpher Felix (Seeker & Warburg, 25s.). Copy-
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UEPRINT FOR A SPY
(continued from page 229)
sionals that it c
r
fe
d b
ertain bank
y p
o
s
assume
in a European city is a Soviet cover
organization.
As U.S. operations in Europe grew in per-
plexity, and their financing became a real
problem, it was at one point decided to follow
the Russian load and to take over a certain
old-established but relatively inactive bank in
it large American city and establish a branch
in Europe. The operation failed because the
inan chosen to lay the groundwork in a peculiar
may overdid his cover.
It was necessary to purchase the charter
of an existing bank in the country in Europe.
As it happened, I know of it small bank which,
for a reasonable sum, was willing to sell its
charter, subject, as required, to the Finance
Ministry's approval.
Unfortunately the emissary from America
talked too much.
Instead of saying merely that his principals
in America wanted to enter banking to make
money, he talked incessantly and widely about
bo-,v local interest rates were usurious. It was
his principals' intention, he said in noble ring-
ing tones, to introduce modern banking prac-
tices, to put credit within reach of everyone,
for the ultimate benefit of the local economy.
His hearers, many of them bankers,
hastened to the Ministry to protest strongly
in advance against the approval of any charter
to such disruptive elements. (As it colleague
of mine remarked at the tirno, " a good example
of all cover and no agent ".)
Ono of the American weaknesses wit}r
cover is the psychological limitations on
Americans, a certain slipshod quality at the
professional level, which is not so much it lack
of thoroughness as it is the hope to get by.
In the summer of 1960 two young Americans,
travelling ostensibly as students gathering
material for it treatise, were arrested by
the Russians in the Ukraine on charges of
espionage. (It is worth noting that oaclc
denounced the other, and that they were forth-
with released and expelled from the Soviet
Union.) They were travelling, they said, on
grants from the Northeraft Educational Fun,[
of Baltimore, Maryland. An American reporter,
hoping that the Fund. itself would be able to
refute the Russian charge, uncovered the fact
that no such organization existed in Baltimore
or anywhere else.
In this case, a minor expenditure for a one-
room office and a telephone listing would have
saved the U.S. considerable embarrassment.
Cover may be no more than a story used
to explain the visible evidence of it clandestine
operation, or to provide an explanation when
an operation encounters difficulties.
The U-2 flights, for example, operated
under cover of meteorological research.
When the Russians protested about
viously prepared cover story was given out
that the pilot reported having difficulty with
his oxygen equipment while on a flight, one
leg of which brought him close to the Russian
border. The story went on that it was assumed
that tho pilot lost consciousness and inadver-
tently crossed into Russia.
'hie failure of this cover story illustrates-
among other things-several points about cover
stories in general. They should not be no
precise, nor too detailed, and they should not
be forthcoming too quickly, nor all at once.
When Bulganin and Prushchev paid their
official visit to Britain aboard the Russian
heavy eruisor Sverdlovsk, thorn was great
Western interest in the ship itself. During the
visit the Russians protested that the ship had
been attacked in Portsmouth Harbour by a
frogman.
Whatever was the true mission of Com-
mander Crahb, the Admiralty's underwater
expert, it was clear that the Russians had
caught him.
British ot}icial aunouncerncuts on the
subject were some time in corning. When they
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