REMARKS OF COLONEL LAWRENCE K. WHITE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BEFORE THE 61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA SEPTEMBER 27, 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200510004-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 27, 1954
• Content Type: MISC

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Gt Cola .EL 1A E xC3 Le tt
B-fo
The' 6lt t a e . conference
o the
,tri '3ers .t f.Or& A#noci&tion C X ("hiefs Of Poll ce
New Orleans, lzmisiaaa
September 27, 1954
, an of ,
In fazing td eiiestin ai_sb ea d3 r,ce I reminded
t ~
Nler L . t utR+tl37? t N{ Fort tiiLu. n 're'I rgU 1W W6 Y' L ~ ago Y 1?
r)Y p: '' himepi! explaWmg ss dewmat:raatiat of tank ts:tics e Per..
to a s i zes le cp ad" (Iorwr+e; . Of tee:r N The t ex. i.n v
au-A? that in o r? x,o ota rYe the tie ` tr Ztic,)n it u ee%m fcrr
f E i ce y? group, ssttt ran. h tzti ly erected biee chaeree %
ral
r la
f estea the sun'.." ht. The U u";.0mUt, of course., faced the
sunl i t1t . lie cpe hls preys s t ion '' - & t' ,
"i~ irsY .r d' $ ?e ? such that la otter' for you to see this den=
Sw: x..0;3, it xas:?? a .ecesssry to he ~7!s you 'mtca3 this bright 1dni1 1t
hu?- : ciijn Mzc.eure you that the sv t ca 't possibly blind YOU s much
' YP
I?A lAC' 1^l xw.o )
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problea with the police to date am mist
t?re!ti.c violations for overperk y one of mbich I
4''16s yOG. I s~aoui t't, bas~ve been char t. a .tb,, OW fti asgi ? at
sunz &,a impressive array of law enforeewent officers ex*
pia"ptrshle to tit ?t of the Second Lieutenant at fort Banning. I will
faa':-d that l feel an extra misgiving or two because I an here today
pinch-hitting for nV boost, Mr. Alien W. Dulles, Director of Central
I t .i:tgesce, vho has been prevented from speaking because of Ivq)ortAn-t
cr ato in pia $ tom. AM to what I have said the fact that my
here at all is something of a contradiction in terms, since one
of t b* fundamental 'wets of intelligence work is cultivation of the
;ntle &rt of 1.isten:iar , and you can see apprehension. st addressing
Oveh a largo and impressive audience.
in Mr. Itul..len a staead,, then, I should like to tell. you Something
the baeWotxad function of the National InUMORne* )'f'ont
aar~d to place in the structure of the United at tes Wrernet, while
kirg a f observations on -ssible sl atilsrities between the tech-
x,i goes of lay enforcement and those of i ntelli nee that maY hi gbli.ght
certain bt3sic resemblances between the wars in which each of us
ccaadacts our business.
11. Similarities ?tvneen. Law Enforcement and Intelli'nce ncies
t first place, law enforce, nt and iateili, ce have both
been the recipients of comidlerable gratuitous publicity of one kind,
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x i ic>g ;,hay
ac *i therx &1_1 of i1sieb has bad t t ei7Cerct of
twat o(zcupatl l t'.eia , >som tisaes 930"t to as point of e Xr&&e'
romt . There is zcuthiag tb t radio script writers, nOveb istas, pulp
f,..t:ion vriterv, & journalists enjoy ftDre than tbh cA"tc story
nether it nat'ter sae. dAmVrOUD cruel Or aL state
e cret. ycincalogiaeats 'v suld probably pant, out that these writers
*ire ;r ly catering to a fundamental bumn desire to re * good
s=ave iI to basic terns so that their conflict might more a t1 be
,t; r atoc4 this context, a DIL . r and a bats Uri e
*,;maryoms as refr seatatiors of "toad ,'a" while un-iformod police,
4ate_etiveRas or intelligence its in hot pursuit are mmitestations
of the " 90mays .
Uov -evir, both iav eatorce ent and inteUigence
ftmetion more efficiently by not publicizing their sources or mthOdS.,
thou& el.1 of the errata of a goes! WIstarY a inhex t in
e'arery action ar a tber group. In fact, in our busivOss Publicity al mat aver exatia the chances of success of as oparaati0; nor
Is pxb1.icity stter s succeaeful, operation more beneic1 There a
s=va r* soaarces and methods that mvy be disclosed which jeopardize
other current or future operations, and I awe sure tb. t you to your
must rind. these principles generally sound also. In . 1tion,
the profeas ion of ixat.11i ce is - beset by the mWetie s?t tr&crtion
that the very vord "? Intelligenea" bees for the general public. It
to > tbiaet the avsrege persona im"dUtely %ttaaches a sinister
,rm e aixge with as strong CIDak a r f lawor, to th. vary motion
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of "Intalli ee." There is the general Impression that anyone in
Intelligence, regardless of his position, 1*8 access to all state
.secrete while they axe "hot of the griddle." As I am sure you know
as well as I, 1ben you've told three people a "secret" it is sometimes
anything but a secret. deuce, we try to operate on a "need-to-kaw"
principle which, with perfection, would insure that each officer or
employes received only that classified iforiastion which he needed. in
order to do hies' job. But all you have to, do when your friends ask
you about the situation in the Far Est, fte6t t, or eLeewbere, is
to smile and say, ".1. don't know,'? ? and you are credited vith really
having the inside dope. I've often thou tt that if I knew only a
fraction of what I was given credit for under these circumstances
my service would certainly become invaluable. glamor without publicity
to a little difficult to have. Whenzviewed in this context, there is
Little g'r in our business. Our work, like yours, is not done with
mirrors and the reward for a. sterling performance is usually anonymity
end the self-satisfaction of a job' well done and known only to a few.
Each of .our fields depends in a Large mMMure upon logical deduc-
tions made from available facts, painstakingly researched. Upon these
facts and opinions conclusions are drawn, on the basis of which positive
action to-taken. Nations, as far as their posture toward other nations
is concerned,. are similar to individuals, in that they should be vell.-
iinformed, not only about their own capabilities and weaknesses, but
about those of their friends* Likewise, once they know from what
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quarter possible danger can cnme,' either overtly or the too
great rskience upon soma or all of their allies, they tat be
pry to -take steps, to circumvent disaster. The std that
nations take to protect themselves or to advance their intsrests
in the vorld we based, in large or small.' measure, upon than advice
that they receive from their intellience advisors. Just as vehen
you conasult a. Tied mep before driviang frcm one place to anther Vhere
you any not he-vee been before,, so governments of the world r 3i upon .:
the advice and facilities of their intelligence components in the
formulation of their policies, foreigrx and domestic, wtdch my have
an international impact. {
XII. ~Te~tiones.Inteel.l
From the days when man first devised methods of protecting
elvers frexet their enemies by memo of standing armies, there
has been an intelligence function. The Indian scouts veho rode the
Western ploins of the United States as outriders for the cavalry were,
in effect, intelligence dents whose job it was to report on the loeea-
tio; strength, disposition, and probable hostile intent of enemy
forces. Their value vas negated entirely if they kept whet they knew
to themaselves, were won over to the enema, or distorted it for personal
or political reasons when reporting to their commands. It was equally
disastrous on occasion when their advice vent unheeded.
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National inteliizncs then is the means by which governments
are advised frog the best sources available as to, the vi" M of
adopting certaft broad national policies that are sure to have an
effect on other lauds and in World councils . In today' a complex
v ri4# advice does not confine itself solely to military a*tters,
fOr under certain coaffiitians, econamic sanctions, Internal politics
c Jr cultural upheavals may accOs fish Meat fogroe of arms ceamot do.
'hue, it may be gust as important to know what the social conditions
or industrial productivit;C ofccountary "A" are as it is to knout their
military potential. Into3.3.tgence is then the has siden of foreign
policy....tbst instrument through which nations express their basic
attitudes toward the rest of the World. Such policy cannot be static;
it must change or adjust as the need dictates and the measure of its
f1i xibility is often aL function of the efficiency with Which the
intelligence communiti operates and the clarity of the advice given
the architects of foreiga- policy.
C bvious],v, the best advice is that Which is the most ccm9reheasive,,
objective, and, truthful. There is an opposite side to this matter
,....leaders of nations mat be Willing to be and believe in
their am intelligence producers, even when the advice they give or
the now they bring is not easy to swallow. Of courser, It goes without
saying tbet the intelligence producers must consistently cosec up 'with
reliable estimates- of the situation in.order to merit this confidence.
No country unwilling to give credence 'to its own intelligence prOduct
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can Soong advance itself in world councils during peacetimes, or
preserve itself from disaster during var. For example, there is
abundant evidence that Adolf Hitler, nhen the tide of battle was
running set against the Third Reich, refused to believe his ovA
intelligenceegeOple because what they told him was inctmipatebl,e with
his own delusions regarding the way the war should have gone. No
matter how distasteful it is, policymakers mist do all of their erring
on the side of confidence in the intelligence presented to them and
to be well-merited this confidence must be born of a never-ending
pursuit of all of the facts that can possibly be marshalled and pre-
sented in time to be properly used.
1V. Central Intelligence Agency
I have dealt thusly in generalities about the natter of national
intelligence s0 that I might set the stage for a description of vbat
our national intelligence effort le and how it functions in the United
States. Until the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group
in 1946, whose membership was lerge3y drawn from the wartime Office,
of Strategic Services, and until 1947 when the National Security Act
Of that year gave form and substance to the Central Intelligence
Agency as it is now constituted, there was no such thing es a centralise=d
federal intellligenee concept in the United States Government. Policy-
makers relied upon the various separate intelligence activities, most
of which were located within the structure of the military, and whose
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0:r;t s i s of ten: differed each trce the other in s igai ficant respects.
(ie git *we21 acegnre such a situation to that which teig tt exist
i:, aefaY ito c=.zx)ti.naied to x&v if actu.re cc fxent parts for its
r !" L1r. max vit be ut )r yid. a assembly line t:a t out the
t t 1ajh (A i'~r -zct) . It that desire of . the President, expressed
t r.,ca h ;ougg>r`e:aa x, to create a *sduinisa thro igh which effective
a~? 1iket:i s iantelUgence c M b sstepplnrnted by a form where
r, =t',!' 1.i.ct* e- tViai h'mtwetae t.? t .13-i euce aeetiviti esse coul& he ccxe_
as l-A:e resolved, where poasible,, prior to subu assi x. of their
as i ri . to the architects of foreign policy. To met: thiiR seed. the
Ce t al Irrttil_igence + en r was estaeblshed as a truly indea-p a at
Any, reparting thr=a its ]Director to the Naticeal Security
;;a7t,9x i 1 idaere the Pr