REMARKS OF COLONEL LAWRENCE K. WHITE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BEFORE THE 61ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA SEPTEMBER 27, 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200510002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 27, 1954
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R00020
1;k'H 4 +~ ' . pry p g d"+l"d v ?. i 9 ,Y L~ 'u'~pp~~y
'i IN ' 'Y C'.!,!"J . ' ~, c :'' AL ' i r1 c AMN
Before
' G14it dui Con recce.
the
arnatlo. Association of iefs of PoU.ce
'tat
New Ct-ie , Loul.r is s
geptem r 27, 195b
In facing this &istir , aIs1 Wdl cc I au Vmin ed tai t ht
St.morid Lieuteuaut it Fort n , fie or -, a few years 0690 whey
~~F'cx: --`~.yyyy~~ty~.i himself '' ydj~pp~iyTit:ni awry ~~4 of ~ yyyt'~~a?y4~w1. aIt-,wof tank tacty1 .{~ 6Yey,,an per--~y
$ o dSA ace to a kf ze r7M+? Jt.p oii "+ 4em-l /~ ~VW~? a ices it . The AF. n temm
such ' hmt is`: oT& ? t tretion it. was n,Messr~j for
'~?~~. ':X:Y`ZKl. group, sitting t I3$f+i.e.y i'!'3'4"Gta;4 bleaChe2';lK, 'W
Officer
face into t awn1_14 .~t a `::.r Lieut mi:, ; co>ur?se, faced the Oewr?ais
with h13 hack to t s light . He o erved his presentation by ss,Y ,,
}irs;, I reg t. ve t;- xxe that in or r for yo i 'to see this deiz%-
strst1o it h 'terra, cecer ary to have you face tbi.as brit si t,
but I cam azewre you that ttiu sun ca't possibly blind you ch
as a.11 of tho84 agte ..q 71M i'c'ings; do me!"
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
M one v hose peracmal problems with the police to deter consist
settli t traffic violations for o,rerparking, one of which I
you I shouldn't bare beeu charged with, my mi.agivtngs at
= a:a -I such an impressive array of law enforcement officers aerie
cc 1e to that of the Second Lieutenant at Fort Bening. I will
uthi that I feel an extra misgiving or two because I am here try
pi.nch4hitting for wl boss, Mr. Allen W. Dull**, Director of Central
rreLt nce, who has been prevented from speaking because of i rtan
tcqmAt nts in Wbahingtc.. . to what I have said the fact that wy
being here
scsmetiing of a contradiction in terms, since one
the f ntal tenets of intelligence work is cultivation of the
&*ntle art of listening, and you can see my apprehension at addressing
such a large and impressive audience.
In Mir. Dulles' atea , then, I should like to tell you Something
of the bftckgroutd and funetion of the National Intelligence Mort
axe. Its place to the structure of the United States Wreraw, it, While
v*king a rev observations on possible similarities between the t*ch-
ni ures of law enforcement and those of intelligence that way highlight
certain basic resemblances beetveen the wades in which each of us
ccoducts our business.
U . :SixilaritieslMet Law Enforcement and 'Into ies
In this first place, law enforcement and intelligence have both
been the recipients of considerable gratuitous publicity of one kind:
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 I Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
a x , a of ieb 'hms basal the net af'f'ect of riz; than
ta!,~ oc!C patioasi fie.l+is, s t s a sst to a point of rr+asa-
there is nothaix that ratdlo script writers., mve?li.staa, pull
T
f? -tion riters,l w*A jourxltalists enjoy more than the el"SIc tor
cam' the c ,eo whether it be after a c roua crisiao.l or a state
Y3 icr*t. y'cbK 1*S %tab vou$4 pr?oba bly point out that these writa:rs
:rea Mly catering to a t u#&l. bueae gems re to r a . gg(xA
&,t d evi.. to basic tsar no that their ccaar'l:i.ct mal t more e.sasiiy be
~., Aerstood. In th .s >.ovtext, a btl.linger and a. l :ta Uri be o
s: o a? as repmmerxtati of "bad mss" while ublformiot police,
do tectives or inta1li once agents in hot pursuit ere afestaattons
lamer, berth law ettorcem nt ate. tt U lW nce
> rction acre efficiently by t publicizing their sources or methods,
.van thou a.:11 f,' the ea is of a pod are i hereret in
e: wry action of elt r pipe In fact, in our busine.aas p abli.city
alert river .lea the ebances of. success of an cation; nor
In pa` li.city after -i successful operation ware beneficial. There art
eaty ras m maces wA tbods that be d.isclosed which jesqpu*W.ze
of r eurmut or future operations,, an I as sure that you is your
wk cyst fitnd these principles generally sound also. In e4ditioa,
t1c ;session of Intelligence is beset by the tic atts?actiori
ttc t th very wow "Irrtsli. nce" has for the gmer+a l public. It
aa-e to maa that the aver me person immOKetely attaches a sintsUr
tth ee strong clack and dmWr flavor, to the very mention
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
of " Iutelligenee . " 'there Is the general i -ression that anyone in
nteiligence regardless of hire position,p his access to ail state
secrets while they are "hot off the griddle." As t as sure you know
as well as 1, ahem you've told three people a "secret" it is, sometimes
anythix* but a secret. Rene, we try to aperate on a "'need to-knOW"
principle which, with perfection, would. insure that each offiarr or
erplcye* received only that alassified i forntion which he needed in
order to do hii' job. But all. you have to. do when your friends ask
you about the situation in the Far East, Now. East, or elsewhere, is
to smile wd say, "I don't keor," a you are credited with really
having the inside dope. I've often tht t that if Y knev only a
traction of what I was given credit for under these circumstances
mr.service would certainly become invaluable. Glamor without publicity
toa little . difficult to have. Whew viewed in this context, there is
little glamor in our business. Our work, like yours, is not done with
mirrors and the reward for a sterling pertonae is Usually anonymity
end the self-satisfaction of a job well done and known only to a few.
Each of ear fields depends in aw large msasuMe upon logical deduc-
tions made from available facts, painstakingly researched- Upon these
facts and opinions conclusions are drawn, on the basis of which positive
action is taken, Nations, as tar as their posture toveid other nations
is concerned,. are aimiler-to izividuals, in that they should be well-
inforaed, not only about their awry capabilities and weaknesses, but
about those of their friends.. Likewise, once they know fray what
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
_g.
.iarter possible danger can once, alt her overtly or tb*u& too
amt re] isa ee upon some or all at their allies, they nsest be
to take steps . to ctrctmrvee-t disaster. She steps t st
sti+smr teaks to paraleect #l u3ves or to a Vauce their lnbweats
in the world we besed, in large or Wall msasu re, open the cc
that thew receive froew their late advisoars. JUst as when
you commit a road m bef'eaere drivi from we pisce to another ithere
YO.Q =W not leave beep befaore, so govern nts or the world rely upon
the advice and facilitiesof their Intel i ce caan~aanemts in the
foxeaulat ou of their policies, lareigf and. daeaestic, vbich mey bane
an internatiaeeel tupaot.
IIt. >iati+cn 7. Thtell ant -
Prat the days when moon first devised, eretho6s of protecting
thasselves from their ene .es by means of $tax ding a mien, there
has been an intei tigenci tanation. The Wien eoouts who rode the
Western pI1as of the United States ae , autrldere for the euval:y
in effect, intenionci agents vbose jdb it wee to report on the loca.
tlcej, strength, disposition, aad probable hostile intent of eaetgy
forces ? their value vu negated eutiare4, it they kept what they knew
to themselves, were vm over to the e=Ws or distorted It for perscra1
or political reasons when reporting to their aaasmnda . It vas equsUy
disastrous on occasion when their advice vent unheeded.
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
-. 6 r
National inte11ignce than is the mean by which gOVerwrentB
are advised t'rmn the best sources available as to the wisdom. of
adcgtiug certain broad national. policies that are sure to have en
effect on other lands and in world councils.. In todasy'$ complex
Voc]4, 'this advice does not confine itself so]0]7 to military matters,
far under certain cowlitione, economic s4anetioaos, internal politics
or cultural upheavals may accoaeplish'what fovea of arms cannot do.
it aar be just as iuaportant to know what the saris1 conditions
MM.
or industrial productivit7 ofccountry "A" are as it is to know their
military potential. Intelligence is than the handmaiden otforeiW
which nations express their basic
policy.... hat instrument through
attitudes tovard the rent of the world. Such policy cannot be static;
it moat eUwW or adjust as the need dictates and the measure of its
flaaxibility is often an function of the efficiency with which the
intelligence comnunit:y operates and the clarity of the advice given
the architects of foreign po1icy?
Obvioun],y, the best advice is that Which in the most comprehensive,
objective, and truthful. There is an apposite Bide to this matter
too....leaders of nations must be wilting to be.Ueve and beUeve is
their own intelligence producers, even when the advice they Siva or
the news they bring is not easy to svallOW. Of course, it goes vithout
saying that the inteMpuce producers must consistently come up with
reliable estimates- of the situation in ,order to merit this confidence.
No country unwilling to give credence to its own intelligence product
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
-7-
can long advance itself in world councils during peacbtima, or
preserve itself from disaster during war. For examples,. there is
abundant evidence that Adolf Hitler, when the tide at battle vain
running set against the Third Reich, refused to believe his own
Into le because what they told him Was iaaampeteble With
his own delusions regarding the very the war should have, gone. No
matter how distasteful it is, policy makers must do all of their erring
on the side of confidence in the intelligence presented to them and
to be well-merited this confidence moist be born of a never-ending
pursuit of all of the facts that can possibly be marshe11ed and pre-
sented in time to be properly used.
N. Casual.Inteliimence 6AMM
I have dealt thusly in generalities about the matter of national
intelligence so that I might set the stage for a description of that
our national. intelligence effort is and how it functions in the United
States. Until the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group
in 193, whose membership was largely drawn from the wartime Office
of Strategic Services, and until 1947 when the National Security Act
of that year gave form and substance to the Central Intelligence
Agency as it is now constituted, there was no such thing as a centralised
federal intelligence concept in the United States Government. Policy-
makers relied upon the various separate intelligence activities, most
of which were located within the structure of the military, and whose
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
..0.-
b t`teI difre red e&oh frt the other in sWafic t ras cts.
"it X11 = t ~.a such a situation to tt t. Bch ss1 t exist
t x& it zr c .,atine to rs facture * cr po ent parts for its
t ~'t . , ;}, i theca . ,t_- idt g an ass ly 'e.1 t t:e t the
tia1ahowi t-ri .'i t) . V. was t& sire of the Pmaident,, expressed
tzam,.agh U* Co esas, to '"rfsm * a mete hi nia thri a which effeecti ve
e t of inter I (grace cr,r, ld be aupp1 .at d ;ay a forz.% mere
~Li1 r i to xi i atAt-Ilirice a ctirrit let ccwii.d c -
- tsoiy t, rare pc *ib3ae, prior to sub .ttaion of their
n- rl to tla esmIc' act* of fareeign policy. To met tlil r qe the
Ct.Aa traa1 Irte:Ut uce **acy vas este al.i.et . as a truly # nt
re :xrti. t~irj its Director to that rational SuritN
"'Un- eil a the :li"meaaident is the presi&iDg o#`ficer. CU is not
re-ApmwibI to the Dej nt of fentaee, the D a xat :of State,
84, &. the c t t t't r6a?r. nt, or axe the intel l.i ace
O P Ox its -it thecae aaftacies under the c - t' tDiamect,:v cr
Cts is .1 first er' . aie . Tt Director s..s, h eer, respocess i h1e fo the
ec~iak:tt of the fre t irs ns;tio .1 inte11t nctr Over ta -we
G to rex to thok t iU ncee a o? i of all a nelso an the
rk vary c csely tth oat tath .
Is a crossly et rmdUataerd, c rt effort, the results of which
ur e1 thrc4, the Cexatr 1 Intelligence Agency. tay t ht Satlo),wd Security
cats all. rahte,'ti -ess .- Nation's ?toii advis.rrry hoSA on scatters r.ffeert
e a ti i socuri ty and of which the e i dent is the t. s aaix cai f 3 seer <
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
Mr. Allen W. Dulles, our. Director, briefs the President and tbO
National security Council regularly on sensitive foreign develop-
mss, and, th - upon regUest be, nary rOOMMOOd a course of action
to this body, the making of foreign policy is not his function or
sponsibility. CIA does not make the foreigrI policy of the President
and his poiicymking associates any more then the chief' of police
makes the decision as to the verdict that a judge and jury will
determine in a perticular care.. It is our job to assemble the facts
based upon careful ixrvestigation, to awe the.- and to present
our estimates to the proper authorities for vbatarer action is 400MOd
ante. The ingredients which make up such act estimate are
military, political, economic, sociological, scientific, etc., all
p in proper perspective to as to present a balanced estimate.
There are, of course, infrequent occasions when complete agreaemsnt
cannot be reacher. We wou1 have cause for concern, it seems to eases,
if this were not the case. In such a case a dissent by any partici-
pating intelligence comonmt is given a full presentation alcmeg with
the estimate. We believe that an estimate, to be useful, must be
forthright, clear, and concise, and that watered-down, least common
denamiaators of agreement must be avoided.
When you consider the sheer bulk of the material Carom which
inteUigence opinions and estimates are dream, the result is staggering.
In any one year literally millions of separate pieces of intelligence
in the form of reports, public&ti.ons,x radio broadcasts, documents, and
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
-20 -
photographs find their tray into each of the member agencies of
what we have come to call the "intelligence cammity." Many of
these are at odds with each other and others coats1n only partieles
of useful .informtionl. Tlme process of reconciliation, revision,
checking and reobecking, editing and paring down is tremamudous, but
absolutely necessary to insure acceptable accuracy.
Take foreign radio broadcasts, for examaople. It is sigalfieaut
that a foreign- radio broadcasts a certain comomsn-tary. Of greater
significance is how messy time it was broadcast in a given period, in
what languages, and to what audiences. Was tbsre any semblance of
truth in the commentary? Was it slanted?....And if so, how? Was it
slanted differently for different audiences, etc? I am sure you can
see that a comparable analysis of other categories of information
that may go into an estate makes this a rather delicate process
with plenty of margin for error. Of course, one never has all of the
information he would like available upon which to base intelligence
estimates. I would estimate, however, that perhaps as such as eighty
percent of the information available to us is obtainable through
perfect]y open sources; the press, publications of all sorts, educational
institutions, industry, and individuals. An additional ten percent may
be obtainable through more difficult, dangerous, and costly methods.
The remaining ten percent of an intelligence estt to is final evalua-
tion. TMs, of course, is the most difficult and where the greatest
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
p~ossysibilirealm tyoferror Ues. This Isthe unknown area vb:Lah Sets
into tin of vbat pwWU we a/~ctu&lly thinking. I we ourselves as Communist estimators for a moment end think back imagined
to
the situation shortly before the entry of the United States Into
the Korean war, I think that we mutt v*U be justified, from
they attitude of the United States as mstratad in w ,
tbst the United States would not commit its forces to defend South
Korea. Yet, we did exactly this and did it very expeditiously when
the Communist farces launched their invasion.
The kind of positive foreign intelligence of which I have been
speakiaag in connection with CIA's responsibilities mist not be ccasfused
with the interval intelligence, or counterintelligenee, developed by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with whoa! CIA has sxtaeding]y
satisfactory relations, I am pleased to say.
I should like to empieize to you as police officers that the
Central Intelligence Agency has no police, subpoe e, bear enforcement
powere, or internal security functions. Those security forces that
CIA does have are concerned entirely with matters of Drsical secrurity,
protection of classified information, sad"ifrvestigetion of personnel
who may be employed by us. In the performance of this latter task,
mwY c you bave costs in contact with our representatives. I want to
add here that we are exceedingly grateful for the splendid assistance
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
which they have been given by the state and municipal authorities in
this country, without whose help, spontaneously offered, the nark of
CIA would have -,bean seriously hang Bred:
Despite the simihaaritieo between laze cnforcen nt and o tional
intelligence to which I have alluded, there remains one ms4or point
of difference between the two fields. When a police force produces
an exceptionally brilliant piece of works, either in forestalling a
felou3r or in sppnehending a criminal, its aucces"M are usually given
ample recognition by thepiess, as rightly they should. In the field
of intelligence, me4or successes stein such as long as they are not
recognized.. A favorite tactic of the opposition in the present "cold
vac" is to attribute every internal diaarder, ever failure on their
part to "paid agents of aggressive American iverialism," or other
less charitable phrases. Thrau i this device the opposition hopes
to smoke out an inadvertent admission or denial from acme recognized
intelligence source in the Free World.
Like the police force that fails to locate a criminal at large.,
the intelligence community comes in for its share of public criticism
when evidence sew to point in the direction of an "intelligence
failure" in our country. Even though the actual facts ref be at
variance with this assusgstion, you learn to roll with the punch and
to accept the fact that you have only your personal sense of antis-
faction to show for a particular success in which you my have played
a part. In a vary, it is analogous to being a baseball un i e; you
MV call the PIOWD et you see them for eight innings and everyone on
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
-13-
both teams is satisfied, but comes a close play at the plate and you
are a blind, degenerate robber to at least half of the audience sitting
two hundred yards any in the bleachers.
A great deal has been written and said about the difficulty of
securing reliable information from countries in the hard core of the
Cos^nnist orbit. I maAe no bones about the relative difficulties
that do exist in obtaining information from a country where the entire
population lives in fear or its life, and where every movement is sub-
ject to rigid control and ekhaustive examination. Not only is the
physical problem of getting accurate information extremely difficult,
but it is further complicated by the fact that in the most extreme
cases of authoritarian rule, such as in the Soviet Union, we see an
entire population that has been carefully trained to spy on itself!
Not only are there secret police and paid informers, but through per-
versions of what we in the Free World understand as the code of ethics,
families spy and inform on their relatives, sons on their fathers, and
with a zeal and conviction that is astonishing. And it is even more
astonishing when you consider that the popular conception that "every
Russian is a Coaaaunist" is definitely not true. The Soviet leaders
have established complete control over their population of appr ximstely
220 aillion people with an actual Camwnist Party membership of 7 million,
or one person out of every 30 in the country. At the height of its
strength in the United States the actual members of the Comm mist
Party numbered something less than one in 3000. And these 7 million
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
lie
hard core Communist Party members include all Cammuriists serving in
the armed forces of the USSR,
However, numbers can be misleading. The Communist technique of
infiltration has never depended on mass penetration, but rather upon a
few highly trained and dedicated operatives who "control" the movements
of sympathetic indigenous personnel, training them over a long period
of time, years in fact, making sure that these people find, their way to
important posts in the military and the government so that when the
whistle blows, the inevitable uprising appears to have strong nationeal.is-
aliZe,
tic overtones, at least initially, and the control of11& municatione,
the military,transportation, and food supplies fall first into their
kiands. As a case in point, I might mention the recent disclosures con-
cerning the sizeable Coaruaist espionage ring uncovered in Iran this
mom with the arrest and implication of more than 1400 officers in fate
Iranian Army, mzay of them holding top government advisory and inter-
national liaison posts. The interesting fact is that the groundwork: for
this network was laid certainly 13 and possibly 20 years ago by the
Soviet Union, as a "long-term investment", only in this case using
Vier people's currency! Not only was the ring well-hidden enough to
e-e detection for so long a time, but it was also able to survive
the mass purge of the Tudeh or Communist Warty ranks that took place
alter the overthrow of the Mos degh regime and the reinstatement of the
Shah. At a time chosen by the Soviet leaders, this network could havt
tni;ineered large scale assassinations of everyone from the Shwa on 4own.
Sven today, there is no assurance that there are not other, equally
well-disguised cspionage rings operating in Iran, totally independent
of the one just uncovered. The important thing for you. as chiefs
Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-001 8000200510002-8
 Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200510002-8
-15-
police organisrati;ans, dmestic > foreign, to reasnber in this context
is thse old }ring that "Sternal vigilance is the price of liberty", and
no coutere piona a mission is ever emploktel. fini .
this pen?;tr' e, divide and conquer mechanism of the Soviets is
used with devastating effect within their own bore, as I have said,
largely tbrouA a practical a plia ration of the "cwt and the stick"
phailout y, vhereia informing far the State is not only an asst, it in
a prat 9 r rewarded by the necessities of life, ass d where defections,
either p1:iysi , or philosophical we pur*i.sshed by deprivation of the
right ',o work, the right to travel, and the right to "live in freedom,
in floe glorious workers' paradise." Inset: i., aa; long term lewie in the
Ur iss is often the only reward of the defector. No wonder information
i,e difficult to obtain wear conditions such asss these.
Contrast this, if you win, with conditions existing In OW WU
country. it has often seemed to me, as I have read the often as