DISCUSSION ON THE CARIBBEAN PATROL AND ITS BACKGROUND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200200087-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 87
• Publication Date: November 27, 1960
• Content Type: TRANS

'KTXU- November 2I# b d F*iReI le 2000/05/05: CIA-RDP5&01 R000200200087-9
November 27, 1960
DISCUSSION OF THE CARIBBEAN PATROL AND ITS BACKGROUND
Editor's Forum, at 1:00 P.M. over KTVU-TV (Oakland, Calif.):
Moderator: Leslie A. Nichols, KTVU-TV News Director
Panelists: Professor Ronald Hilton, Director of Hispanic
American Studies at Stanford University and
Editor of the monthly Hispanic American Report.
Dro Austin S. McDonald, professor of political
science at the University of California, special-
ist in Latin American affairs*
Herbert Cerwin, San Francisco public relations
consultant, formerly of the U. S. Embassy in
Rio de Janeiro and one-time staff associate
of Nelson Rockefellero
SHOW OPENED SHOWING MR. NICHOLS ON CAMERA. THE BACKGROUND
WHERE HIS GUILTS WERE SEATED WAS DARKENED THROUGHOUT NICHOLS'
OPENING STATEMENT,
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NICHOLS: "Just 10 days ago the United St
t
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a Navy patrol around the Caribbean coast
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uatemala and Nicaraguan
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estroyers were assigned to this duty
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the landing of armed forces or sup
lies (
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roar abroado In the
six days prior to this action- there we
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uatemala, Two days later small bands of rebel
pprove or a ease
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CPYRGHT
ra ers seized army arsenals in two Nicaraguan towns. Now, both
of these revolts were repulsed. The one in Guatemala 'as'ter heavy
figktings beoaaae It was the better organized.
"What then are the bare details of immediate events leading
to t he dispatch of a U.S. Navy patrol assigned to guard the sea
and air approaches to Guatemala and to Nicaragua? But as in
all such developments, the story is not even one-quarter told,
perhaps not oven one-sixteenth told. We have the abortive revolt
and the request for U.S. assistance (sic) is first the struggle
of American, that is to say, U. S. leaders, to suppress mounting
unrest in the Caribbean that might lead to Castro-type revolu-
tionary governments in Central America and in North and South
America. And second, the age-old fact that the Latin American
regimes find it necessary at all to cope with these attacks
and their overthrow,"
A M&P OF CENTRAL AMERICA WAS SHOWN BRIE 'LY ON T HE S CR.EEN.
"Our discussion, therefore, cannot be wholly confined
to Guatemala and Nicaragua, or even to the other four republics
of Central America. Nor can it be wholly adequate if extended
merely to Cuba and nations such as Venezuela and Colombia.
We must touch upon U.S, policy toward Latin America generally,
toward the position and perhaps the positive action of the new
adninistration that it may adapt toward this region, toward
the Organization of American States. And finally, toward a
consideration of how this dovetails into the struggle with
world-wide Communism.
"As a point of departure, suppose we return to the immediate
developments In Central America. First, let me read several
excerpts from a commentary on the relation between Fidel Castro
and the situation in Guatelmala. I quote: 'Guatemalans of all
shades of opinion believe rightly or wrongly, that Castillo
Ama's military campaign was planned and financed by the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency. There is now a wide-spread belief
that the CIA is 4)onsoring a similar invasion of Cuba from Guatemala.'
"The commentary continues: 'Reliable observers in Guatemala
say that without doubt there is in Retalhulou a large and well-
fortified base where Cuban exiles are being trained to invade
Castro's fortress. It is generally believed among responsible
Guatemalans that there is only one possible source for the funds
necessary for such a majorproject, namely the U.S. Government
operating through the CIA. Reliable sources from Cuba say that
Castro is informed about this base and believes the plan is
to seize the Isle of Pines and set up a U.S. sponsored governments'
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"The commentary concludes: 'Hundreds of entries appear
in the U.S. press daily about Cuba, but there seems to have been
no mention of the Retalhuleu base. Is the explanation ignorance?
If indeed a CIA sponsored base results in international conflict
we could have another U2 incident on our hands.'
"Now, the author of these comments is one of our three guests
today on Editors Forum. He is Professor Ronald Hilton, Director
of Hispanic American studies at Stanford University and Editor
of the monthly Hispanic American Report. Our second guest is
Dr. Austin S. McDonald, Professor of Political Science at the
University of California at Berkeley and a specialist in Latin
American affairs. And our third guest is Herbert Cerwin, San
Francisco public relations consultant, former consular of the
U.S. Embassy In Rio de Janeiro and one-time staff associate of
Nelson Rockefeller.
"Let us consider Professor Hilton's observations regarding
U.S. policy toward Cuban exiles and his report about the alleged
American sponsored counter-revolutionary activities centering
in Guatemala and aimed at Fidel Castro. So, Professor Hilton,
first, do you believe these reports yourself, and assuming you
do, how would you equate such a development with another U2
incident?"
AS THE PANELISTS WERE INTRODUCED, THE LIGHTS CAME ON AND THEY
WERE SHOWN SEATED BEHIND TWO DESKS. HILTON AND McDONALD
WERE A T THE DESK ON T HE LEFT AND CERWI N WAS ALONE AT THE
RIGHT HAND DESK. DURING THE FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, EACH
SPEAKER WAS SHOWN ON THE SCREEN IN CL OSEUP.
HILTON: "Ah, you summarized the commentary, leaving out
some of the things which I introduced. You read the section
that said that hundreds have appeared in the U.S. press about
Cuba, but there seems to be no mention of the Retalhuleu base.
Ah, since this was written, things have changed in the sense
that the observations I brought up from Guatemala spread like
wildfire around the country and I began getting phone calls
from all over the place. And I have had long conversations with
the New York Times. The net result of that was that they did
publish a brief report on what they could find out, which wasn't
very much. Now, you asked very pointedly do I believe these
reports. What I also said was '... responsibility demands that
an impartial journalist or observer be sent to Guatemala to
investigate these reports so that we may know how much truth
there be to the story which is accepted beyond question by
so many responsible Guatemalans.'
"Now, the situation in brief is that these reports which
are circulating in Guatemala, not as barroom chatter, but among
very responsible observers, have come to the attention of the
United States press. But the United States press still has
done a very miserable job of reporting, even in the New York
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Times, a paper for which I have a great respect. My contention
in this whole thing is that the reporting on the whole Cuban
and Latin American situation has been abominable. I came to
this conclusion when I visited Cuba in the winter. What was
going on in Cuba didn't correspond at all tow hat the U.S. press
said, which told only part of the story. We've had people in
Cuba and in Latin America constantly since then and I still have
this complaint.
"So to get back to your question, I do think that there ought
to be better reporting. And what I'm saying is tentative. I
believe myself the report is not without a good deal of substance
In addition to the report from very reliable people in Guatemala,
I've been in contact with an experienced and respected U.S.
journalist who's been a specialist in Cuban affairs who has been
in the Miami area sitting on this whole story. And in our phone
conversation I was able to supplement what he knew, because he
didn't know the Guatemalan end, and he informed me about what
he knew concerning the Florida end. It's a fantastic story.
Ah, we have a lot of details which are hard to deny, including
the names of the bases from which soldiers of fortune have been
flown out from Florida,
"It's really a funny story. You could write a comic short
story about it. They were operating out of one base in Florida.
The neighbors became suspicious at seeing these planes flying
out with U.S. markings badly painted out. They called the FBI.
And the FBI then apparently requested the CIA to move its operati s
elsewhere because of expected public interest, And so they moved
to another airport. I have the name here. And they've been
operating out of there. And the descriptions we've had of the
pickups seem to be from perfectly reliable sources. They have
been gathering soldiers of fortune, some Cubans, some not, in
Florida. And they've told them to be ready at night with nothing
but their clothes and a card whichw as given to them to identify
them to a ahauff eure They are taken in plans c ars into the
airport and shipped down to Guatemala. All this and of the story
comes from an extremely reliable reporter who has been studying
the Florida end of the case."
AS HILTON TALKED, HE SHUFFLED THROUGH AND READ FROM SEVERAL
PAGES OF NOTES LAID OUT BEFORE HIM.
"Now, for what it's worth, and I think it's worth a good
eal, I'd like to point out a piece of evidence, and that is
that the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency,
yman B. Kirkpatrick, spoke to the Commonwealth Club very recently
riday,. November 18, and at the end of the address in which
e talked about Cuba and Fidel Castro and Latin American Communism
someone in audience -- I heard the program on the radio. I
ust happened to turn on the radio. And someone in the audience,
don't know who he is, I've got his name, but I don't know him,
eked this question: 'Professor Hilton of Stanford appears to
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believe a training base in Guatemala is financed by the U.S.
for attack on Castro. He says if the CIA is behind it and gets
caught it will be a black day for the United States. Is this
true?' Then there was a long and painful silence and Mr. Kirkpatrick
replied; 'It will always be a black day for the United States
whenever the CIA getscaught.'
"Now, this evidence is cumulative. I should point out very
clearly that whatever demands I may make for responsible reprting,
and I make this demand very vehemently, for vis-a-vis especially
San Francisco press, which in general does a dreadful job, except
for the Palo Alto Times, which is a good newspaper. Ahhh, and
I make this demand because I think we have a right to ask the
question. It doesn't imply in any way a lack of respect for
the Central Intelligence Agency, which like the FBI is (?) and
in general is doing a very good job. But we do have the precedent
of the U2 incident and I think that we were just a little careless
there, and I'm against carelessness on principle. Such is the
story in brief treatment."
NICHOLS: "Thank you, Professor Hilton. Now, Professor
McDonald, have you any information to support or, let us say,
even contradict Professor Hilton's views?"
McDONALD: "No, I have not. I am most happy to accept
Professor Hilton's statements on the matter, which I am sure
are very accurate. I think, however, at this point or at some
point during this hour we have to consider at some length the
question of whether this is good or bad or, for that matter,
Indifferent -- certainly not indifferent as far as we are concerned,
Now, we should remember always that we have two policies, we
the United States. We have two policies and to some extent
they are contradictory. We have agreed definitely and specifically
by treaty that we will not intervene in the affairs of another
Latin, of a Latin American nation. And certainly we are expected
to honor this agreement. On the other hand, by the Eisenhower
amendment to the Monroe Doctrine, which was just a very short
time ago, we will not accept -- and I think the word is accepts
accept or tolerate, accept I believe -- the establishment in
the Western Hemisphere of a government dominated or controlled
or influenced by international Communism. Now the ..."
HILTON: "Wait a minute. The Monroe Doctrine didn't talk
about international Communism."
McDONALD: "No, no, no, no, this I said was an amendment
to, just as the Roosevelt, Teddy Rooselvelt correlary was a
considerable extension -- this is a considerable extension
of the Monroe Doctrine, you understand."
HILTON:
"... before the Caracas conference voted on."
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MCDONALD: "Yes, exactly. And so, but he got it under the
Monroe Doctrine. Well now, how can we say, ah, what can we do?
We say we will not tolerate, we will not permit, so how are we
going to prevent? Well, there are things we might do, but it
would seem that anything we could do would come under the heading
of intervention in one way or another. And how can we justify
that by referring to the government as being dominated by inter-
nation Communism. In other words, here is the thought that
this is an. international agency, an international organization
that is playing the partner. And, therefore, this is in principle
under the Monroe Doctrine. So, if we follow that policy and yet
at the same time we follow the policy of non-intervention, in
other words, we pledge ourselves to intervene while we are not
intervening, we're going to have a rather difficult time to follow
both policies."
NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald, you very nicely put those
horns of the dilemma side by side with r egard to policy. Now,
Mr. Cerwin, what is your reaction to Professor Hilton's information
and his evaluation of it?"
CERWIN: "I agree with Professor Hilton. I was recently
in Guatemala, as recent as three and a half weeks ago. I think
one of the problems that comes up is we have bases in different
parts of Latin America and we established many years ago in
Guatemala. As a matter of fact, Guatemala during the war was
a second defense for the Panama Canal. Ah, the great mystery
in Guatemala is the fact that nothing was said about this base
at Retalhuleu. You can't get near it within 10 miles, I under-stand
and as a result this mystery continues and people become more
preoccupied with what is taking place. There is also another
fear in Guatemala which Professor Hilton did not mention, and
that is the fear that Guatemala is going to be invaded by Cuba.
Ah, as you well know, Guatemala was at one time the first Communist
stronghold in Latin America, and Guatemalans who were there under
a Communist regime certainly fear any type of a Castro possible
invasion of Guatemala. I do believe that one of the problems
on this state of Retalhuleu is the fact that the Guatemalan
government has not denied that such a base exists, has refused
to comment except to the extent of saying that the United States
is assisting to defend Guatemala from invasion from other sources,
The embassy in Guatemala does not mention a word about it, and
I do think that this is bad. Whenever we keep something shrouded
in,mystery it creates greater rumors and gossip about it and
it s a very serious situation. Guatemala at the moment is going
through certain economic crises, and the regime is somewhat
shakey. I do think that besides the Retalhullu air base there
are other much more serious problems as to what has caused these
problems in Guatemala and Nicaragua and Costa Rica, and how did
it happen that Castro is in power in Cuba. I think perhaps later
we might discuss that whole issue."
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NICHOLS: "By all means, we shall certainly get around to
this background. But right now, for the purposes of tying in
this American patrol action that we have taken, we are going to
go to the map here because we can return also later in greater
detail to the Central American situation. Now to get to the
map itself and to square ourselves around on the geography of
the situation, Professor Hilton has very kindly brought one of
his better maps of the Caribbean, and so, Professor Hilton,
won't you orient us to the two geographic elements with which
we are concerned here?"
HILTON: "Well, I'm going to tie in the geography with
the current development because you simply can't understand the
whole story unless you get the geographical picture straight.
I'd like to say at this point that the reporting on the Guatemalan
episode in the last few days -- there have been revolts there has been, again, dreadful. I say this with some knowledge
of what I'm talking about because just yesterday I received
not only press clippings, but confidential reports about what's
going on in Guatemala. And it doesn't coincide at all with
the story that's being put out and is apparently swallowed by
the United States public."
THEN HILTON WAS SEEN STANDING AT TWO LARGE MAPS, ONE ABOVE
THE OTHER. ONE WAS OF THE CARIBBEAN AREA IN GENERAL AND
THE OTHER OF CENTRAL AMERICA. HE USED A SHORT POINTER TO
SHOWY LOCATIONS ON THE MAPS AS HE MENTIONED T IEM.
"Now, here is Guatemala Cit , there is Retalhueleu, and here
is Puerto Barrios. Here is the Isle of Pines, there is Cuba
and here is Swan Island, which is very much a bone of contention
because the United States claims sovereignty to it and there s
actually a radio station there broadcasting anti-Castro propa-
ganda to Cuba. The Hondurans, particularly the young Hondurans,
are very angry about this abuse of what they regard as their
sovereignty off the Honduran coast, and they recently staged a
kind of mock opera invasion and they demanded that the Honduran
government occupy Swan Island, which, of course, the Honduran
government can't because it depends upon the good will of the
United States.
"Now, there was a great deal of damage done to Puerto Barrios,
which is the port here. And the plan apparently was to take these
people being trained in Quezaltenango -- they are only half of
them Cubans, the Cubans in exile. The others are soldiers of
fortune, led apparently by a fellow called Avida (?), who is a
Philippino who fought against the (?) in the 'Philippines. And
then they were to come through Puerto Barrios and possibly attack
the Isle of Pines so that they have a kind of Formosa of Cuba.
All the reports add up to this. It seems to make some kind -f
sense. And the revolution in Guatemala, which failed,
broke out for all kinds of reasons. Let me point out tha". tree
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report that this was an invasion by Cubans is simply not borne out.
This is what the Guatemalan government and the Nicaraguan govern-
ment would like to have you believe, but it isn't true. The
State Department itself has admitted that there is no evidence
of Cubans, either here or here.
"Moreover, the revolt in Guatemala was a very tangled affair
and it's a gross over-simplification to make it appear that it
was the Guatemalan President, Ydigoras Fuentes, was sending his
country against Cuba. On the contrary, it seems to have been
a revolt led by some moderate pro-U.So junior army officers against
the old man, Ydigoras Fuentes. And the, ah, I have this evidence,
and there is also factual evidence in print, which arrived yester-
day, that the newspaper in Guatemala, thich is looked upon as
being vitually sold out to the United States, Imparcial, 100
percent pro-U.S., would tie in with this. And the assistant editor
of the paper, Ramon Blanco, was in Puerto Barrios and when Ydigoras
Fuentes succeeded in the suppressing the revolt here he went into
hiding. Ydigoras Fuentes then suspended the publication of
Imparcial, which as I say is 100 percent pro-U.S., and the editor
of the Imparcial, David Verra, again very pro-U.S., protested
and finally after its being out of publication for eight days,
it's been allowed to reappear. So the people staging this supposed
Cuban revolt, Castro revolt, in Guatemala were pro-U.S, elements.
The whole thing is terribly painful andthe press reports were
simply abominable. `what I s why we are constantly trying to get
people to take a serious interest in Latin America and that's
why we work on Hispanic American Report every day. But I'm
afraid that the press won't learn a lesson. Now, does that
answer your question?"
NICHOLS: "Certainly does, thank you. Let us then take
from this discussion of the geographic aspects of it, and here
Is the Hispanic American Report, which Professor Hilton edits
(HOLDS UP A COPY)* Let us go on f rom there to this matter of
whether there should be any validity to the fact, I should not
say the fact, to the widely supposed assumption that is currently
general here in the United States -- by whom it is fostered we
can't be sure -- that Fidel Castro himself is arming with Soviet
weapons, tanks, planes, rifles, is arming the largest militia
in the history of Cuba, would have any purpose other than self-
defense In so doing. Now, have you any suggestion on that,
Professor McDonald?"
McDONALD: "If you mean any inside knowledge on the subject,
I do not. May I first say just a word that will perhaps set
Professor Hilton's mind somewhat at rest. I don't know, Professor
Hilton, whether you have seen the current issue of Time magazine
which came out a few days ago. If you did not ..."
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HILTON: "What did it say?"
McDONALD: "It says almost exactly what you said, that there is
no evidence whatever of any Cuban activity in this matter. Nor in-
deed, for that matter, should anyone suppose that it is at all
necessary to discover Cuban activity in revolutions in Latin America
HILTON: "That's a great danger. Whenever anything happens in
Latin America we immediately start thinking about Communism, and
this, of course, is what the governments of Guatemala and Nicaragua
would like to have us do, because then our bile goes to work and a
biological consequence follows. But the story is, and I didn't
really complete the story, that somehow we got ourselves tied up
almost fatally with the shabbiest characters in Latin American
history. We've got ourselves tied up with Batista, of course, with
Perez Jiminez, with Str.oessner of Paraguay and Ydig;oras Fuentes is
generally looked on as kind of a clown.
"And don't forget that this isn't the first time that he's pro-
duced an International scare really to get the people of Guatemala
behind him. First he tried the good old trick of raising the issue
of British Honduras, Belize they call it, and in perfect comic opera
style he staged a one-man invasion. He walked across the border in-
to British Honduras, and a police officer at the border stopped him
and told him to go home. And so he went home. That didn't produce
the results he desired, so then he tried trouble with Mexico. Now,
the Mexicans were sending fishing boats into Guatemalan waters, and
for a time Guatemala broke relations with Mexico and actually made
war preparations to fight Mexico. Then this faded out. And just at
the time when it looked as though he might be overthrown -- because
Guatemala is in an awful economic mess and there is a great deal of
corruption there. The country reminds me, unfortunately, of Cuba
under Batista. Just at this time he pulled another rabbit out of
the hat. I'm afraid he's going to run out of rabbits very soon.
Now, do you want to say anything about that?"
NICHOLb : "Mr. Cerwin?"
CERWIN: "Nell, I think that the problems of Guatemala are very
deep. They've been going on, the revolutions, for some time. Al-
though we must not forget the fact that Guatemala did have a very
strong Communist regime, similar to the one of Castro, and that the
Guatemalans are afraid. of that. And I think that one of the reasons
why the present government continues in power is the fact that they
fear that a. change in government might bring a government that would
be more leftist than the one which is there at present."
NICHOLS: "As a matter of fact, Mr. Cerwin, is not the man who
led that pro-Communist regime in Guatemala, is he not now in Havana
or reputed to be there?"
CERWIN: "Yes, he is supposed to be. That's Colonel Arbenz."
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HILTON: "There is an angle on this that should be brought out.
No doubt about it that Arbenz is in Havana. There's no doubt about
it that he and his gang are just aching to be avenged. But you
couldn't forget that the Guatemalan revolution went through really
two phases, just as the Cuban revolution went through two phases.
The first phase, which was not really pro-Communist; the second
phase, which was pro-Communist. And in Guatemala the (?) phase
was not strictly a Communist phase. It was just a kind of leftist
Betancourt style government, and that, of course, was replaced by
Arbenz. Now, in Guatemala today, as far as I can tell, and Mr.
Cerwin's opinion on this would interest me, there's not much
sympathy for Arbenz. He's just not a charismatic character, to
use the term that social scientists like to use. Whereas Arreljo (?)
does seem to have a tremendous following amony many Guatemalan
people. His name evokes an emotional response, which makes him
very dangerous. But I don't think Guatemalans, except for a very
small minority, seem to have much use for Arbenz, who was definite-
ly pro-Communist."
CERWIN: "I agree again, Professor Hilton, with the fact that
there is a fear of a Communist regime taking over in Guatemala and
the fact that there are certain elements of Communism in these
countries. But I think it's a problem that's a lot deeper, and I'd
like to see what Professor McDonald thinks about this. Ah, what is
the cause, what has brought about the problems in Latin America
that did not exist 25, 30 years ago. Certainly Latin America, in
the days when I lived there as a youngster, there was a very strong
pro-American feeling. This is not true today. Latin America and
most of Latin America looks upon the United States with a great deal
of fear, with a feeling of imperialism. There is a lack of feeling
that this is a country that they can depend on. Only during the
period when Franklin D. Roosevelt was president was there a feeling
that here is a leader looking out for the underdog, for the people
that were not well off financially. I wonder how Professor McDonald
feels about what is the cause of the unrest. Why are people so
restive in these countries?"
NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald, you have the floor."
McDONALD: "It seems to me that the unrest in Latin America is
really, as a matter of fact, nothing new. This is something that's
been there for a long time. It's based, to a very large extent, on
the poverty. There is,however, this that today the Latin Americans
have perhaps more hopes, greater hopes, than they had before. They
have been inspired by a number of things. They have been inspired,
among others, by their discovery of the American standard of living,
by the United States standard of living. And this to them seems
very very important. They have a. feeling that somehow if they can
only wave a magic wand they can attain this. Now, of course, this
as a matter of fact, is not so. There are so many factors that make
it virtually impossible for most of the nations of Latin America --
lack of natural resources primarily
--
to
accomplish anything of
that sort within a reasonable time
difficulty none the less.
at
all,
because you have this
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"Now, Professor Hilton says that we have been involved with
some of the shadiest characters in Latin America, and this is per-
fectly true, I think we have been. And one of the major reasons
or this is that some of the shadiest characters in Latin America
happen to have been the people who were in power in Latin America."
HILTON: "Yes, but the unfortunate thing is that they're the
people who make the greatest show of pro-Americanism, pro-U.Sism.
And this is precisely what's happening now. I told you, and you
know well, the attitude of Latin America in general toward Ydigoras
Fuentes. Somoza, the Somoza brothers are looked upon as the heirs
to a very corrupt dictatorship, and my own impression is that they
are strong because they received vast amounts of money and don't
want to lose it. And money is involved in this on the part of a
small group of Latin Americans who seized power in order to get
money. And we do the silliest things, ah, we simply can't explain
some things in terms of any knowledge of Latin America.
"For example, when we tried to justify the sending of the fleet
to the shores, ah, well to the Caribbean in general, President
Eisenhower said that we'd done it at the written request of the
Guatemalan and Nicaraguan governments. Now, this can make most
Latin Americans just go into gales of laughter and very bitter
laughter, because neither of those nations evokes any respect among
Latin Americans. If it had been done at the request of a respect-
ed president or a group of presidents, it might have been tolerat-
ed. But it's simply going to reinforce the attitude of Latin
Americans that the United States is following the dictatorial policy,
pro-dictatorial policy, and the reaction in Latin America has been
that any more or less informed person could have foreseen even most
of the pro-U.S. papers have f oresaken us. For example, Novidades In
Mexico, ah, even Las Noticas in Mexico, both have strong articles
condemning the U. S. action. And Ti Tiempo Bogata, which is a very
good newspaper, better than any newspaper in San Francisco by far,
has an editorial in which it condemns this unilateral action which
didn't even go through the Organization of American States.
"So, ah, and there have been demonstrations all around Latin
America. So you have to believe that the people in Washington, who
are running out of, just don't know what they're doing. And when I
go back to Washington and talk with the people there, and I just
finished with some business groups in New York, they maybe are very
good as to their particular field, say electric power or coffee or
pushing papers around. But when it comes to a grasp of what makes
Latin America tick they just don't have it."
CERWIN: "I agree with Professor Hilton to a certain extent.
I'm reminded of a comment made many years ago by Diaz when he was
dictator of Mexico. He said, 'Poor Mexico, so far from God, so
close to the United States.' And I think that's one of the problems
in Latin America is the fact that the United States has been a sort
of a big brother to Latin America, and lending it money, helping out
in many other ways. And I think it's done in a way, in an unrealisti
way, and has incited a certain amount of resentment. One thing that
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we haven't touched upon is this, and I think it's very important,
being in the public relations business, ah, the fact that the
United States, when a corporation, a company, is in trouble they
usually discover that the image to the public is wrong. Something
is basically wrong, and they start to correct it. There is no
question that the image of the United States in Latin America is
wrong, and we have made no effort to correct that image. Our in-
formation program of the United States government is very inef-
fectual. Our State Department people in Latin American countries,
as well as in Europe, are ineffectual. I think that if you bear
in mind that our State Department people are the eyes and ears of
the government, and when they do not report to Washington correct-
ly and accurately such conditions occur as Castro. They should
have known exactly what the situation was going to be and should
have taken effective measures.
"Also it might be borne in mind too that the United States,
Castro has attacked it from all angles. Very seldom, except,
strangely enough, of all publications, Saturday Evening Post about
a year ago gave a rather well-rounded picture of Castro, ah, that
there was very little correction and that he was doing an effective
job agrarian reform and other methods of that type. Now, I think
that in the early stages if Washington had acted effectively I
think there would have been a possibility of running Castro over."
HILTON: "I'd like to emphasize that point, and I can do it
from my own experience. I went down to Cuba iatt winter to see
what was going on, just after Castro had come to power. I im-
mediately observed two things. One, that what was happening was
not what the press was reporting. What the U. S. press reported
was only a part of the story, that Castro was being given no credit
at all for the good things he was doing. And I sat at the Cuban
Foreign Office in Havana and spoke to the propaganda chief, who was
putting out a lot of anti-American propaganda of a very violeht
character. And I said, 'How can you justify this propaganda you're
putting out.' And he said, 'Oh, look what they're saying about us.'
And he produced bales of clippings from all over the United States.
He had an excellent clipping service showing what the U. S. press
was saying, and much of it was fair, and most of it was distorted.
Now, his reaction was a perfectly normal reaction.
"Then, I happen to have once worked for a radio station, so I
could lie honestly, and I went to some meetings, one of them a
meeting of the American Radio Association in Havana. I got past
without having credentials. When they asked me who I was I just
said 'radio' and that satisfied them. And I went to these meetings
and I found there a delegation of people who were urbane and suave
and spoke pretty good Spanish, and they were buttering up the Cubans
when (?) was simply out to :get Castro. And in fact we were out to
get Castro.
"This station isn't affiliated with any network, so I can tell
one story that's well known in New York. And that is that a pro-
gram appeared on one network which was balanced and favorable, at
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m y avora e to as ro. And immediately orders went out
from above to do a real job on Castro. Another program came along
which was completely corrupt. So we simply don't know what's going
on. People don't realize that studying Latin America is an exact-
ing job, just as exacting as being a surgeon or being a lawyer
.
They realize they've got to have a trained surgeon to do an operati n
.
You've got to have a trained lawyer for a law suit. But it seems t at
anyone with kind of a general educational background can be an area
specialist. You can't! It's just as exacting.
"Now, I blame not only the U. S. State Department and the U. S
Government and (?), but I blame our American universities. I say
this with a good deal of feeling because we at Stanford have got
what is about the only institute of its kind in the United States
for study of contemporary Latin America. But it's extremely hard
to get anywhere. We've got somewhere largely because of persistanc
and general cussedness. But the whole departmental structure in
American universities makes it almost impossible to produce an
advanced picture of any area of the world, and until we do somethin
about our whole university structure we're not going to train the
right kind of specialists. The result is, for example, that we do
not have in the United States one specialist in Cuban affairs. We
have 10 specialists in (?), we have, I don't know how many special-
ists, 200, in Hebrew, we have specialists in anything you'd like to
name, but you simply can not name in an American university one
specialist in Cuban affairs, except for a young fellow, one per-
son, who writes the Cuban section of the Hispanic American Report.
So our American universities have this built-in interest, a vested
interest within the various departments, have been a major ob-
stacle to our understanding of what's going on in the world. Now,
so this all corroborates what you said about the lack of understand-
ing. I saw it recently in Bogata. I stopped off in Guatemala of#e.r
attending a meeting of political leaders of the Americas in Bogata.
A very important meeting, which was attended by leading politicians
from all over Latin America explaining what they policies were.
And there were only two U. S. delegates invited, myself and
Professor Tannenbaum from Columbia University. There was no evident
of interest on the part of the State Department. No one was present
The State Department showed no interest. The American embassy made
no attempt to get in touch with me. The Canadian embassy did. The
Canadian embassy asked me to dinner because they wanted to know what
was going on. But the American embassy showed not the slightest
interest, nor was the American press represented. So until we can
correct this we're not going to have cordial relations with Latin
America. It's going to be difficult anyhow. But we've simply got
to do something about dreadful job which we are doing, as far as in-
formation is concerned. And while the Latin American press is often
corrupt and very frequently inaccurate, and therefore we live in
glass houses and shouldn't throw stones, yet when they say the
American press is inadequate they have a point."
NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald."
McDONALD: "It seems to me perfec 11y v i~ a need
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to do a much better job than we're doing at the present time of
selling ourselves to Latin America. That does not necessarily mean
however, that we should follow a very different policy- in Latin
America. That's an entirely different question. And, of course,
when you come to that we again are, to some extent, on the horns
of a dilemma because we find that there is a tendency on our part,
a very natural, human tendency, as it is on the part of all peoples,
to favor those who favor us."
HILTON: "That's right."
McDONALD: "It's a very reasonable thing."
HILTON: "Naturally."
i'icDONALD: "After all, here is a fellow who says the United
States is the great enemy and there's another fellow who says the
United States is a good friend. Which one are we going to favor!
There's a natural tendency, at least, for us to -- well now, under
those circumstances it may well be that the fellow who is a dic-
tator at the moment will be a fellow who doesn't like us. It may
be the reverse. Or it may be that the fellow who is a democrat
does like us, or it may be the reverse."
HILTON: "But usually it's the dictators who try to make us
feel that they're pro-U. S. and depend upon U. S. support of one
kind or another to keep in power. And of course when they fall
then we're in for trouble. This is what happened in Cuba, and it
might happen in Guatemala If Ydigoras Fuentes falls. What will
happen with the next government I don't know."
McDONALD: "When any government takes over, if we follow the
policy of supporting the government because it is the government
then when it falls we're sure to be in trouble. I am reminded of
a story that you probably have heard many times, but I think it's
a good story anyway of the time that Governor Stevens was at a
committee hearing in Congress. And he sat there dozing (:), and
finally the hearing was still going on and he leaned over and said,
'What's this all about?' They were refering to a fellow who was to
have a seat in Congress, there were two candidates, two contingents.
And someone said to him, 'It doesn't make a particle of difference,
they're both scoundrels.' 'Oh no doubt, said Stevens, but which one
is the Republican scoundrel? I want to vote for the Republican
scoundrel.'"
HILTON: "Unfortunately, this has a parallel in inter-American
affairs and I will not use bad language on television, but I will
come as close as I think I am permitted to. There is a famous
story about Franklin Roosevelt wb.o was idealized in Latin America.
The story, which is verified by all kinds of people, is that some-
one said, 'Look, you're supporting Somoza. How can you support
Somoza? He is an w. blank blank, you see.' And so Roosevelt re-
plied, 'He may be an S blank blank, but he's our S blank blank.'
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Now, this hasn't done our public relations in Latin America much
good. And, for example, Figueres, president of Costa Rica, and
a good friend of the United States and a good friend of mine,
took me up to his mountain house alone one evening. We had supper
there and he talked about his problems. He has this (?) called
Lucha Pinti. And he was terribly bitter about U. S. support of
Somoza and terribly bitter about the fact that we keep Whelan
there as ambassador. Now, all reports are that Whelan is an in-
credible character, and why does the U. S. State Department keep
him there when tendency is to move their ambassadors at the fall
of a hat. Paul Bonsell, he was until recently ambassador to Cuba,
was in Colombia. He got on the wrong side of the dictator Rojas
Pinea (?) and immediately the State Department sent him off to
Bolivia. But when you get in the same kind of situation in
Nicaragua when Whelan's efficacy is questioned all over Latin
America we do nothing, we just leave him there."
NICHOLS: "May I break in here to get us straight on one
point. What differentiation do you gentlemen make between re-
cognition of a government or a regime and support? This I want
you to nail dawn. Could you do that, Professor McDonald?"
McDONALD: "I think so. Recognition can, as a matter of fact,
be a form of intervention. It all depends on just how much this
country depends on, ah, how much it needs the recognition of the
United States. If it is, let us say, the Dominican Republic, if
it is Guatemala, if it's one of these countries either recognition
or nonrecognition by the United States may spell the difference be-
tween collapse of the regime and maintenance of the regime. If,
on the other hand, it's a country like Argentina the chances are --
it's a long distance away and it doesn't have its ties primarily
with the United States and is a much more powerful country -- the
chances are that our recognition or nonrecognition would have a
very much smaller part in the maintenance of that government.
"But around the Caribbean area and the section we're talking
about this can be very important and, as I say, can be a form of
intervention. As a matter of fact, it's very difficult because
the United States is so big, so rich, so powerful. Because it
plays such a role in the lives of these little countries of the
Caribbean, it's very difficult for the United States to avoid
intervening. I have heard it said, and I have heard it said by
President Figueres, as a matter of fact, ah, I heard it said that
when the United States does nothing at all that is a form of inter-
vention. And I think that's true."
NICHOLS: "Professor Hilton."
HILTON: "Yes, but I think that the question that Mr. Nichols
asked is extremely valid, and if the United States is getting a
reputation for being two-faced in Latin America, or three-faced, we
have ourselves to blame, and I can report you some cases in point.
Take Milton Eisenhower. Now, Milton Eisenhower, the President's
brother, is a good, upright individual and I respect him as a man,
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but as a Latin American specialist he's a menace. Even though he
has considerable (?) in the field, he's essentially a cow man. He's
a veterinarian or some kind of professor of agronomy, bless his
heart. I'm all in favor of agronomy, but he's not a Latin Americanis
And so he goes down to Argentina at a time when Peron was about to
collapse, and just at that time the United States decided to help
Peron. We couldn't have timed it worse. And he said that Peron
was a great American and a great friend. And of course, this remark
got in the gullet of most Latin Americans, who are, believe it or
not, very alert and very informed, even though they have passionate
prejudices.
"It might not be inappropriate in a minute to show some of
these cartoons I brought along to show the difference of attitudes.
Now, I brought the first cartoon along -- it's one by Herblock (?) --
even Herblock who's a leftist, say, an extremely liberal cartoon-
ist, a good one, but who's been grossly unfair to unfortunate Mr.
Nixon. Nevertheless he swallows the idea that Castro is really
responsible for invading Central America and that he is using the
pretext of a possible attack on Cuba, the smoke screen. This is
strange coming from a leftist cartoonist.
SCREEN SHOWED THE CARTOON AS HE TALKED ABOUT IT. IT WAS
TITLED "THERE'S NOTHING LIKE A GOOD SMOKE, MEN.11 IT
SHOWED CASTRO AND HIS MEN IN A LITTLE BOAT WHICH WAS
TRAILING A SMOKE SCREEN. ON THE SMOKE SCREEN WAS WRITTEN,
"THE U.S. IS PLANNING TO INVADE US."
"Now, I prefer to show the other cartoons. I brought one
along from, oh yes that's a nice one, that's from Punch. Because
there you can see, looking at it from Punch's viewpoint, the
European viewpoint, why it is Latin Americans like Castro. (CARTOON
SHOWED A LITTLE BULLFIGHTER STANDING UP TO A HUGE BULL.) You may
not realize it, but in Latin countries when they want to say a man's
politician they say he's a good bullfighter, and the United States
plays the role of a bull. I've heard this comparison frequently.
"And then one last cartoon or two cartoons I'd like to show.
The top one again is from Punch. I th-I.nk it's a marvelous car-
toon. You can see the fellow who's very intent on carrying out
the revolution and someone down in the crowd below is shouting to
him, 'Can't you forget the revolution a while? This is fiesta
time.' (SHOWED A MAN VUITH A GUN STICKING OUT OF THE TOP OF ONE
OF THE BIG FIESTA BALOONS.)
"Now, below that very lovely cartoon with a sensb of detachment,
ah, look at the cartoon below from Revolucion which depicts the
United States as being a corrupt villain. Now, this is the picture
which Latin Americans are getting. (SHOWED A VERY SIMPLE DRAWING
FEATURING THE THEME "OF MICE AND MEN".) In other words, we're de-
picting Castro as a villain; the Latin Americans are frequently of
all shades. I found in Bogata the most vitriolic attacks against
the United States came from some of the Catholic leaders, believe
it or not. Ah, now compare that with the. ah compare the U. S.
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Castro with the Latin American, especially the Cuban attitude and
the attitude of detachment which I think Punch displays.
"Now, let's bring the story down to the present at the San
Jose de Costa Rica meeting. We tried to get the Latin Americans
to condemn Castro. They wouldn't do it. They went through a
half-hearted resolution, so the United States then agreed to with-
draw recognition from the Dominican Republic. And it was thought
that it was at least a gesture to show that the United States
was supporting democracy. Almost immediately we increased the
sugar quota of the Dominican Republic of Trujillo, because Trujillo
really owns the sugar, except for some foreign interests. And the
reaction to tais around Latin America has been violent. Now, they
say what do you mean to talk one thing and practice another? So
there's a very real difference, as Mr. Nichols pointed out, between
simple recognition and all that it involves, and things that 'go
above and beyond the call of recognition. I don't know whether you
agree with that ."
McDONALD: "Yes, I think that's an entirely fair statement of
the matter. None the less, I do think that when a country like the
United States, which has such a tremendous interest, by its very
existence, the fact that it's there, and the little countries in
the Caribbean, now, I think the mere fact of its existence means
that it has a tremendous influence on these countries. So that
what we do, so that what we do, as I said before, is very important
to them. It may, as a matter of fact, as it has frequently, re-
sulted in overthrow of some of these countries, or governments,
or in the maintenance of some of these countries. But perhaps
this or perhaps despite some popular opposition."
HILTON: "May I bring in a point there? Again to show how
double-faced we are, not you or I or Mr. Nichols or Mr. Certain
or the people who run the show. I think we ought to move the capit
to California from back East. But that's another story. (LAUGHTER
Now, to be quite serious. I jim t pointed out the situation vis-a-v
Somoza, Ambassador Whelan and Nicaragua. But that goes on and neve
a peep is heard. Recently in El Salvador a government which is
condemned as corrupt, that of Lemus, was overthrown, and a liberal
junta has come in. Immediately we start saying, well we'll have to
look at it very carefully before we provide recognition. And we
aren't the only two-faced nation. Brazil is doing the same thing.
You have the curious situation that while Brazil is vigorously
supporting the Stroessner administration in Paraguay with every
means at its command, and when it comes to the liberal regime in
El Salvador (?), the foreign minister, says well, we don't want to
recognize it until we've had a good look at it to make sure it's
going to recognize proper democratic processes. Well, Mr. (?9, in
that case, for heaven's sake, withdraw your support from Stroessner,
but don't support one story in Paraguay and another story in El
Salvador. Your Spanish American colleagues are too bright to
swallow that kind of thing."
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nation Ts ing out or its own...
NICHOLS: "I'm sorry, I must break in, gentlemen. We could
have gone on at least two more hours and still have not covered
the whole matter. But I would like to have a view from each of
you before we close in the remaining minutes, and you have only
about 30 seconds each. I'd like to ask Mr. Cerwin to start first.
In developing and reshaping U. S. policy toward Latin America,
what would you emphasize?"
CERWIN: "Well I think one of the most important steps that
should be taken is the appointment of a secretary for information
with a cabinet rank. I think that's the most important step
that you c a n take at the moment . "
NICHOLS: "Professor Hilton, what would you emphasize?"
HILTON: "Well, unfortunately, In this debate we've left out
the whole other side of the story, what to do about Cuba, and
that's a terribly complicated problem. I would agree entirely
that we must defend our interests. That's what a government
exists for. I just ask we be a little better informed and a
little brighter."
NICHOLS: "Professor McDonald."
McDONALD: "It seems to me that what we have said essentially
is that we would do a much better job, from our own standpoint of
things, if we had better information, if we saw to it that people
understood better what we were doing, or at least understood our
side of the story, and I don't think anyone could disagree with
that point of view."
NICHOLS : "Well, thank you so very much, gentlemen. I do
want to make one announcement at the request of Professor Hilton.
There will be a conference on Latin America at Stanford University
in Palo Alto this coming Saturday, and it may interest many of you
who are seeking more information on it. These sessions are going
to be held in the Bowman Alumni House from 10 to 12 in the morning
and 2'to 4 in the afternoon. There is a two dollar luncheon which
will be served there for those of you who wish to partake. That's
this coming Saturday, and you can get more information on it, of
course, from the Hispanic American Studies Group that Professor
Hilton heads at Stanford.
"So, our thanks to our guests today in this discussion on
Editor's Forum."
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