"IS UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ANSWERING THE RED CHALLENGE?"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200200025-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Content Type: BIO

JAN F. W. HAAKApproved For Release 2003/12/02: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200200025-7 205 %
BRITISH AND DUTCH DESCENT IN SOUTH AFRICA,
AND HOW DO YOU ACCOUNT FOR THESE DIFFER-
ENCES?"
HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: The difference between the
British and the Dutch in South Africa ? I assume that this ques-
tion has to do with the political difference. I will state it to you
as shortly as I can. In 1910 a Union was formed. The four
provinces at that time united to form the Union of South
Africa. There was a coalition and new parties. Then in 1912
those parties split. General Hertzog who became Prime Minis-
ter in 1924 said that he believed that if the interest of South
Africa clashed with that of Great Britain, or with the interests
of the empire, then the interest of South Africa must be given
priority. He coined this phrase: "The interest of South Africa
must always be placed first." That was the cause of the political
division which started in 1912. That approach has been the
cause of our differences since then.
In 1924 the party of Hertzog, which broke away in 1912,
took over the government. He decided that it was time that
we had our own South African nationality. It was time that
we should have our own South African flag. The result was that
since then we have had two flags, the Union Jack and also our
own National Flag. We have had two nationalities-Union
nationality and British nationality. There was always a dif-
ference of opinion on that.
In 1932 there was a coalition between the parties of General
Smuts and General Hertzog. They agreed on the main points.
The points of agreement were on our native policy. But they
couldn't agree on one, and that was whether South Africa had
the right to remain neutral in case Great Britain was involved
in a war. They agreed to differ on that point.
In 1939 that issue divided the party of General Hertzog and
General Smuts. General Hertzog had to resign as Prime Minis-
ter and the United Party of General Smuts took over in 1939.
After the war the National Party again took over in 1948. Since
then we have abolished the Flag of Great Britain as our flag.
We have now only one flag, the National Flag. We have only
one nationality, a South African nationality. We had two Na-
tional Anthems, now we have one. There was a right of appeal
from our highest court to the Privy Council-that was abol-
ished, too.
We want to build up those factors which unify and work
for unity. The only outstanding factor was that of a republic.
In October of this year we had the referendum, which was won
by the Republicans. The only issue at stake was whether we
should replace the Queen of Great Britain who is also Queen of
South Africa, with our own President. It is expected that on the
31st of May, 1961, South Africa will become a republic, and
the head of state will be the President instead of the Queen.
The Queen of Great Britain is Queen of South Africa out of her
own right; not because she is the British Queen. We have our
own laws making her the Queen of South Africa.
As to our Commonwealth membership, all parties agree that
we should maintain our membership. We feel that this is a
constitutional issue. Ghana, India, Pakistan and Ceylon have all
become republics and continued membership was not denied to
any of those countries. We see no reason why continued mem-
bership should be denied to South Africa. I don't know whether
anything has happened in the last six weeks. I have had no news
from South Africa as far as that is concerned. Maybe something
appeared in your newspapers which did not come to my notice.
In any case, as far as our relationship with Great Britain and
the Commonwealth is concerned, we feel that now that we are
to become a republic, that issue which has been the dividing
factor in our politics since 1910 is a closed issue. We are all
agreed on our continued membership in the Commonwealth.
We feel that that issue which was an issue for 50 years has
come to an end now.
ALLEN B. CROW : (Reading Question) "TO WHAT EX-
'I'ENT WILL THE THREATENED BOYCOTT UPON THE
PART OF OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS AFFECT SOUTH
AFRICA?"
HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: Mr. Chairman, I have indicated
that last year the British boycott did not have any effect. Instead
of having a detrimental effect, our exports to Great Britain in-
creased. There was a boycott on fruit, organized by some British
Labor Unions. It is interesting to note that our export of fruit
to Great Britain increased by about $15 million, while there
was a boycott. Those who buy, buy the article, the flavor they
prefer, and they compare the prices.
As far as Africa is concerned, some countries have started to
boycott. Pan American Airways operating to South Africa had
some trouble in Ghana when they said that before landing in
Ghana we must declare that we are not in favor of apartheid.
That ban has been lifted already. I think that once the African
states begin to divide their loyalty-and I think that is bound to
happen-then there will be a better relationship among those
countries who stand with the Free World against the Com-
munists. I think that there will not be a unified action to boy-
cott the South African products.
ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "WHAT PER
CENT OF THE WEALTH OF SOUTH AFRICA IS OWNED
BY ITS CITIZENS, AND WHAT PERCENTAGE BY FOR-
EIGN INVESTORS?"
HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: Mr. Chairman, that's very diffi-
cult to say. Our Reserve Bank made a compilation about 1956,
and in it proved that direct foreign investments in the Union
amounted to 1,600 million pounds. That's about $5,000 million.
Investors in Great Britain had about 60 or 70 per cent and in
the United States approximately 20%. But what percentage of
our total economy that represents, is very difficult to say. I
think that the major interest in mining is owned by South
Africans and certainly the major interest in our industry is held
by South Africans. It's very difficult to say what percentage that
will be.
ALLEN B. CROW : (Reading Question) "DOES SOUTH
AFRICA SELL ITS GOLD ON THE FREE MARKET, OR
TO THE BANK OF ENGLAND AT A FIXED PRICE?"
HON. JAN F. W.:HAAK: South African gold is sold to our
Reserve Bank, and our Reserve Bank sells it to the Bank of
England. There is a fixed minimum price, but if there is an
increase of price we receive the benefit. The South African
Reserve Bank only pays a percentage, a commission, to the
Bank of England.
ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "IF THE UNION
GOVERNMENT IS SO SURE AND CONVINCED OF THE
CORRECTNESS OF ITS POLICY, WHY DOES IT DENY
FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO THE OPPOSITION, FOR EX-
AMPLE, THE BISHOP WHO WAS DEPORTED?"
HON. JAN F. W. HAAK: There is full freedom of religion
and freedom of speech as far as the political. parties are con-
cerned. I think if the Bishop was so sure of his own church
activities, he would not have fled the country immediately
when we had those disturbances. You know that he fled South
Africa immediately when the disturbances broke out. I think
that's an indication. Surely no man will leave South Africa be-
cause of religious reasons only, or because of his religious
activities or church activities. The fact that he left of his own
accord is an indication that there was something wrong.
ALLEN B. CROW: The last question is a clipping that ap-
peared on the first page of the New York Times of a few days
ago:
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"WORLD COURT GETS SOUTH AFRICA CASE"
It refers to the mandate that was given by the League of
Nations over South West Africa. This case was filed by the
government:: of Ethiopia and Liberia, first on the basis that in
South West Africa the segreation policy remained, "the civil
rights of the inhabitants of South West Africa have been sup-
pressed, they cannot vote, join trade unions, live where they
wish or travel freely about the country without special passes.
They are denied adequate schooling and can hold no grants or
leases on lard. The complaint also charged that the territory's
inhabitants were liable to criminal prosecution for leaving a jcb
and were subject to curfew orders and forcible deportaticn
without appeal. Membership in political parties is forbidden
and severe criminal penalties, including corporal punishment, is
providd! for violators, the Court was told.
"South Africa is acfteq or vi .t x en: e its a ministra-
tion and legistlation to South West Africa with a view to ab-
sorbing the mandate territory into the Union."
WILL THIS MANDATE BE REVOKED?
HON. JAN F. W. HARK: Mr. Chairman, any indictment
is always only one side of the story. You can only judge when
you've heard the answer to that indictment. As this is being
referred to the World Court, I think it is best to wait until you
hear the other side, too, when you will be able to judge. But
seeing that this is sub judice, I don't think it is encumbeht on
me at this stage to give the answer on behalf of the govern-
ment. There are men more capable of doing so, and I would
therefore prefer not to give the answer. All I can say at this
stage is, that is the indictment, judge after you have heard the
other side.
"Is United States Intelligence
Answering The Red Challenge?"
By LYMAN B. KI
THE JOB OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ashangtn, D. C., Inspector General United ~talre Cq ral, nt lli nc: efacy
er ee a o're the Economic Club -o f e roi t , ?rich any ovembsr 21, 1960
J T IS A GREAT pleasure to be with you in Detroit today.
I can th:.nk of few places where the subject of this talc
could more appropriately be given. You should well know
that the "Red challenge" is not to our Intelligence services
alone but: to our entire way of life. Principal among the targets
has been the business interests of the United States abroad.
Typical of the approach that the Communists have made
to this particular target is that of the Brazilian Communist
Party, which has tried to recruit Brazilian businessmen, who
dislike foreign competition, on the thesis that their objectives
are the same.
The Red challenge to the south, in Latin America, has con-
centrated to an extremely large degree in the field of inter-
national trade and business. The Soviets have granted a $100
million economic aid to Cuba, ostensibly for the purchase of
equipment, but also used to a certain degree for the purchase
of arms.
A similar Goan has been made to Argentina. Mexico turned
down one of the same size. Just within the last few days they
have made a very astutely timed offer of a tin smelter to Chile.
The point here is that the economic offensive of the Soviet
Union is clo ely tied in to a wide-scale, world-wide effort on
the part of the Communists, intensifying their openly avowed
objective of Communization of each and every country, and
that the principal target of this effort is the major obstacle
which stands in their way--the United States of America.
The trade challenge is just one that is facing us. Those o:.'
you in the business field know the extremely favorable credi:
opportunities that the Communists offer and the various othe.:
aspects of their work in this area. But I want to enumerate the
other challenges the Communists are posing today and very
briefly describe how, they go about this.
One of the most insidious of their efforts is the peace move-
ment, stemming out of the activities of the World Peace
Council in Vienna and the Peace Partisan Committees which
have been orda.nized throughout the world. The Communist
are taking advantage of a natural tendency against nuclear
weapons, against armed strength, and using as dupes the many
honest, earnest people who would like to see war abolished
from the world.
Their efforts in this field show precisely how the atheistic,
materialistic Communist movement works? because by spe-
cific directive they endeavor to recruit patriotic priests and
leaders of other religious movements to lend their peace of-
fensive dignity.
A second major effort on the part of the Communists--also
equally dangerous because of its target-is the youth move-
ment. Recognizing that the capture of minds in their forma-
tive stage is one of the most valuable assets they could gain,
the Communists throughout the years have placed tremendous
emphasis in this particular field.
Look at Cuba and the organization of the Latin-American
Youth Congress in Cuba last year. Started originally by groups
in various Latin-American Countries which had no Communist
affiliation, capture in the course of progress by the various
national Communist parties, so that when the Latin-American
Youth Congress was held in Havana in July, 1.960 it was Com-
munist controlled and dominated to the extent that quite a
few of the young people there went on immediately to train-
ing camps in Cuba similar to those used by the Cuban militia
for training in guerrila warfare and other subversive activities.
Indicative of the effort that the Communists are putting in
the youth field, and using Latin America again as an example,
in 1955 at the Warsaw World Youth Festival there were 1,000
from Latin America. The same number went to Moscow in
1957, but in 1959, 1,380 went to Vienna.
How much do they want to spend on this? It cost there
$932,000 to take the delegates to Moscow in 1957; $60,000 of
this came from Latin America.
Now equal to their intensive drive in the youth field has
been their effort to organize labor throughout the world, In
the Western European countries and the United States this has
come to naught, to a large degree, although in France and
Italy they have made some progress. But in the underdeveloped
countries where industrialization is just starting, where trade
unions are a new thing, where trade union leaders themselves
have to be trained, the Communists through the World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions are making; a very intensive effort,
and are taking union leaders back: behind the Iron Curtain
for training and sending them forth to organize all of the
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newer areas in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia.
There are many other front organizations that I could men-
tion, in which the Communist challenge is intensive. And the
danger in this is that many of the front organizations outside
of the United States are not recognized as such by the people
of the areas. Thus this is an insidious and highly dangerous
element to the future stability of many now democratic coun-
tries.
One of the key elements in this effort has been the Com-
munist delegation, diplomatic and otherwise, for through these
missions the Communists have been able to provide the nec-
essary support essential to all of these types of activities. The
Communist missions, for example, act as a channel for all re-
ports and messages going back to Moscow. These include the
biographic sketches of candidates for conversion. They make
the travel arrangements for these candidates and for the loyal
Communists to go behind the Iron Curtain for the various
Communist meetings, for vacations, and for medical assistance.
Furthermore, they act as the funding mechanism for Commu-
nist activities throughout the world and to pay the salaries
of the key members of the subversive cadres of the Communist
Party.
In this effort I should stress to you that the Communists are
extremely adept in working at two levels, the first level being
the official, avowed, recognized Communist Party. In recent
years there has been a growth of the accepted Communist
Party. Again using Latin America as an example, five Commu-
nist parties were legal in Latin America in 1954; nine are
legal today; yet in all but a very few of these republics the
Communists are able to operate with a certain amount of
freedom.
In those areas where they cannot operate with freedom, they
operate through adjoining areas, with the Communists in those
areas dealing with the underground cadres in those countries
where communism is repressed.
That is the open element-the officially recognized party.
Every Communist party in the world has a subversive cadre.
These are well organized, highly compartmented, and staffed
by skilled professionals of which they always seem to have a
reserve. And the technique as directed from Moscow is to use
one to try and achieve parliamentary strength or recognition,
and to use the second where the first fails. This leads to the
next element of the Communist challenge, which is direct
subversion.
Here, of course, we have many modern examples of where
they have been too successful. Perhaps the most obvious and
closest is that of Cuba. Many people in this country and in
the world, for example, and in Latin America, looked to the
advent of Fidel Castro in Cuba as a welcome change from
what had been described as a dictatorship. And yet I believe
that everybody in this room today recognizes the incredible
speed with which the Communists moved in and took over
the complete control of power in Cuba, through the efforts of
such men as Raoul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Antonio
Nunez Jiminez, who today are the key Communist leaders in
the Cuban government.
Here was an effort mounted largely through the subversive
field in which the Communists have succeeded in taking over
complete control of a government in this hemisphere. Gentle-
men, this was not by accident, it was by direction from Mos-
cow. At the Nineteenth Party Congress, of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, orders were given that Cuba would
be the base of Communist activity in the Western Hemisphere.
This has been confirmed by ample evidence in the various
Communist parties throughout the Western Hemisphere.
And then last but not least is the challenge of the Com-
munist intelligence services. Here we have a challenge which
should in no way be underestimated. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation tote United States which has the complete anZT
exclusive jurisdiction for internal security in this country, has
made available to many committees of the Congress excellent
material illustrating the methods by which they operate. The
role of the Intelligence Services of the government is to deal
with the Communist intelligence threat elsewhere in the world.
And of course this varies from country to country. Some of
our friends and neighbors have good internal security services,
and others-particularly the newer ones-have poor to non-
existent services.
Consequently, you will find that the Communist effort, while
not neglecting those areas with good internal services, moves
immediately into the newer areas where they can operate with
relative impunity.
Of course, the leader in this effort is the Soviet Intelligence
Service, a highly competent, skilled, aggressive and ruthless
organization, but one which we should never under-estimate
or feel that in any way their ideology lessens their professional
capacity. Nor should we be misled by what we see as a po-
tential and possible split between the Russians and the Chinese,
because we would be misleading ourselves if we thought this
in any way lessened their effectiveness, or their cooperation on
the working level, or their ability to allocate areas for opera-
tions.
In careful attention to the work of the Soviet and the Com-
munist intelligence services throughout the world, we have
noted with interest how the Russians will allocate to the other
satellites and the lesser services specific jobs and specific areas
to cover. And we have also watched with interest the differ-
ence in technique of the operation of these services. While the
parent service uses what we would call "quality" operations,
some of the satellite services go in for the mass production
basis. Taken as a total, a very formidable challenge.
What are we doing to meet these challenges that threaten
the very existence of our way of life? How good is our Intelli-
gence Service? How effective is it in combatting communism
throughout the world? How well does it keep our government
informed? Do we have those ingredients of information which
taken together, analyzed and assessed make intelligence so
essential for the policy makers in the government.
Not only is intelligence vital in diplomacy, but it is abso-
lutely essential in defense, for you must know the composition
of the enemy forces, the weapons they will use, the direction of
the attack and their intentions, in order to enable our own
defense structure to be properly constructed and properly
alerted.
This is not an easy question to answer, particularly in public.
If we say too much about how much we know, or how we
operate, or what we are doing, we are providing hostile serv-
ices with essential ingredients of information such as we are
constantly looking for from them. Yet, on the other hand, it
is of great importance that the American public have confi-
dence in the work of their intelligence organization, which in
one sense of the word certainly could be regarded as our first
line of defense.
In order to approach an answer to this subject, let me de-
scribe to you very quickly the evolution of our intelligence
organization since World War II. As you may remember, we
went into World War II with various intelligence services
operating out of Washington-the Army, the Navy, the State
Department and others-and with very little in the way of a
central organization, with the result that in many instances not
all of the information was ever compiled or assessed or ana-
lyzed in one place, nor was one view presented to the President
and the policy makers in the government.
President Roosevelt was so seriously concerned about the
quality of his information that in 1940 he called on a New
York lawyer, William J. Donovan, and asked him to make
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YRGHT
-e
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can and a an area,
and one to England. The President particularly wanted to
know whether the British would stand and fight, and he was
also interested in all of the various elements that were active
in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Donovan came back
with basically three important items of major information.
First, the British would stand and fight, and that they would
hold out until aid could come. Secondly, he warned the gov-
ernment that the Germans were undoubtedly going to move
into North Africa.. Third, he urged the President to create ,.n
organization to combine all the information and intelligence
activities of the Federal Government.
President Roosevelt asked him to see Attorney General
Jackson, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy
Knox. These three gentlemen rapidly agreed with Donovan
that an organization should be created to combine intelligence
information and the unorthodox warfare elements of the gov-
ernment, with the result of the creation of what was first
known as the Coordinator of Information Office. This was
short-lived because it combined domestic information, news,
propaganda, as well as intelligence.
In 1942 it was split into two organizations, the Office of
Strategic Services under Donovan, and the Office of War In-
formation.
Now, in the course of the war, the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices, working with Army and Navy Intelligence, and also
importantly with our Allies, particularly the British and the
French, mounted a fairly major clandestine effort against the
enemies. This included dropping agents behind enemy line;,
dropping go rrriila leaders into various countries-France, No.:-
way, Italy, Burma, Thailand-and, equally important, organiz-
ing for the first time an over-all research organization to pre-
pare those encyclopedias of information required to conduct
diplomacy or to conduct military operations in any area of the
world, with such vital facts as not only the gradients of the
beach and the composition for landing craft, the depth of the
waters in the ports and the harbors, and the utilities, but the
political structure and the internal security services and the
police.
It has beer, generally agreed that the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices made a contribution to the war effort, and certainly it left
certain heritages for the peace-time. Perhaps the most im-
portant of these was the fact that General Donovan and Ger..-
eral John. Magruder and others in the organization were look-
ing forward to peace-time and recognized the need, in fact the
necessity, for a peace-time intelligence service, with the result
that as early as 1942 a paper was prepared outlining a pos-
sible structure for a peace-time service, and again in 1944,
Donovan cirn:elated in Washington a proposal for a national
central intelligence organization.
Needless to say, this was not acted upon during war-time,
and when demobilization came, the Office of Strategic Services
was disbanded on the 18th of September, 1945. Fortunately,
certain cadres were retained from this organization, one under-
the Secretary of the Army, and the large research organization
that had beers developed was transferred intact to the Depart.
ment of State where it still resides as a major element in their
research staff.
In the Fall of 1945, Ferdinand Eberstadt, another New York
lawyer, was preparing the so-called "Unification Act," and this
had in it a proposal for a Central Intelligence Agency. But
President Truman wished to act more quickly, and in January,
1946, he created a Central Intelligence Group, to be staffec.
by representatives of the other services, plus a permanen:
civilian cadre. to coordinate the intelligence effort of the gov-
ernment.
And finally in July, 1947, the National Security Act wa<
passed which created in one fell swoop the Department of
e ense, the National Security Ccuncil, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence
Agency. This Act, interestingly enough, embodied many of
the principles which Donovan had put forth in his paper,
which are quite important for a modern-day understanding of
how our intelligence works.
First, he felt very strongly that there should be one voice
of intelligence in the Federal Government; a man to whom
the President and the highest deliberative body in the Execu-
tive branch, the National i Security Council, could look for a
statement on what was going on., or what the threat was to
the country.
Secondly, Donovan recognized that departmental responsi-
bility should be preserved and maintained so that each of the
departmental organizations could collect and process that in-
telligence essential to its Work. For example, the Army could
collect and process intelligence on the ground forces of the
world.
Finally, another important provision was that this new or-
ganization would have no domestic responsibilities, other than
a base from which to operate, and that internal security should
be exclusively the prerogative of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, and that the new intelligence organizations should
look entirely outside of the United States. Finally that: this
organization would coordinate the over-all work of the intel-
ligence agencies of the government, and that the Director
would report to the National Security Council and the Presi-
dent.
Since the passage of this Act some 13 years ago, our intel-
ligence organization has evolved, become much more closely
coordinated, and we think has become more efficient. Under
the Director of Central Intelligence, it operates through what
is called a United States Intelligence Board on which the Di-
rectors of all of the intelligence services either sit or are rep-
resented. This Board is not only the Board. of Directors of the
intelligence services, it is also the final substantive authority,
passing on to the President, those vital documents called "Na-
tional Intelligence Estimates," perhaps the most important
documents created in the itttelligertce mechanisms of our gov-
ernment.
The National Intelligence Estimates illustrate very well the
degree of achievement in an integrated service that we now
have in the United States. A National Estimate is a statement
of what is going to happen' in any country, in any area, in any
given situation, and as much as possible into the future. We
naturally would like to project them as far in the future as we
could, but the information isn't always available upon which
we can make these projections. And often there are certain
current day situations in Which we do not have all of the
intelligence available that we would like to have, if we could
get it. But these estimates are put: together under a Board of
National Estimates, which operates in the C.[.A., but as a serv-
ice of common concern. And each of the responsible depart-
ments prepares the original draft on that section which comes
under its purview.
Thus, the Department of State would draft the section on
the political or economic or sociological development in a
country or an area or a situation, while the Army would deal
with ground forces, the Air ,Force with the air forces, the Navy
with the naval forces, and the Department of Defense under
the direction of the joint Chiefs of Staff with the guided mis-
sile threat, with each of the services making their particular
contribution.
The Board of Estimates would then go over this very care-
fully, sometimes very heatedly, and would arrive at a common
view, or, if possible, any one of the intelligence services has
the right of dissent from the view which will be expressed as
that of the Director of Central Intelligence. Thus, if anyone
 Y 1-N B. KI RKP kpff&ed For ReleaW*W /62 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200200025-7 209'
d or
of them feels strongly enough about what they think the in- curate intelligence, or mis estimates of the future irection
terpretation of the facts should be-for remember that they the army of those powers which have hostile intentions for
are all dealing with the same facts-they can go on record this country, could be such an important and decisive factor
before the senior policy makers of the government as indicat- in our defense structure that we might be well arming for the
ing that they do not believe the interpretation as presented is wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. Conse-
correct, but that a certain variation is correct. quently, it is absolutely essential that we get up-to-date and
This system, which I have watched very closely since the vital information on what the Communist powers are doing,
war, has resulted in a high degree of unanimity among the and are planning to do.
intelligence services, yet with that important right of dissent No intelligence officer, if he is worth his salt, is ever satis-
maintained. For I am sure that all of you having read the fied with the amount of information or the accuracy or the
various statements made by our military leaders in World War validity of the information that he has at any time. He is con-
II on intelligence recognize the importance of one voice. Often stantly striving to get more and more information, and to
many possibilities were offered the military commanders by assemble those vital ingredients which we call "hard facts"-
their intelligence officers of what the enemy might do, such which we are absolutely certain of. I think you can recognize
as stage a massive counter offensive, maintain a stalwart line where some of those come from. While today I could not say
of defense, resort to unorthodox warfare, or sue for surrender. that we have all of the hard facts that we need, I think it can
Faced with this broad spectrum of possibilities, obviously be said today that we have reasonable assurance that we can
the military commander is often placed in the position of de- anticipate any hostile activities directed at this country. Our
ciding himself what the enemy is going to do, whereas this objective is to have absolute assurance.
truly is a responsibility of his intelligence officer. So today in- ALLEN B. CROW:- We l Ye a niucr .,of, questiq_s, Mr.
telligence is speaking with one voice, or close to one, to the Kirkpatrick:`-' -
policy makers. ea ing uestion) "HOW DID IT HAPPEN THAT OUR
Finally, we should recognize that the intelligence effort of GOVERNMENT WAS MISLEAD OR MISTAKEN REGARDING CAS
the United States is a massive effort. The flow of information TRO'S INTENTIONS IN CUBA?"
alone into Washington is of tremendous proportions. We not LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: I think that there was a genera
only have all of the information coming in from the press, the under estimation of the ability or the depth of penetration
radio, travelers abroad, from the official representatives of of the Communists in the 26th of July movement. There i
other governments as transmitted by the Foreign Service of no question that it was an under estimation of the speed an
the United States, from the service attaches, and then from ability of the Communists to take over. And I would suggest
the intelligence organizations. Part of the major responsibility that you look at the original Cabinet that Castro set up i
of our intelligence organization is to sift and filter this ma- Cuba, in which you will find very few leftwingers and no Com
terial, to remove the significant, to add the highly classified munists. Of course, that has evolved or changed or revolve
or sensitive material which we have obtained through a variety over the years until today all of the respectable Cubans, o
of means, and to present to the policy makers in concise and practically all of them, have gotten out of the government.
readable form that which they think the situation to be, and ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "DO THE RUSSIAN
what they think is going to happen. AND CHINESE COMPETE OR COOPERATE IN LATIN AMERICA?'
The security aspects of intelligence in the world today are LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: Cooperate. They will work ver
of a very high order. The Communists are extremely sensitive closely together. The Chinese Communists are starting to mov
about intelligence efforts, and ascribe to our work all types of in now with their China News Agency, which is always th
activities, some of which are very flattering in their propor- forerunner and the center of their intelligence and subversiv
tions. The Communists tell their own people very little; con- activities. They might compete if the Chinese got too strop ,
sequently, make it even more difficult to find out what is going but I don't foresee that in the foreseeable future. I thin
on in this vital effort toward self preservation. the competition there is on much higher levels and ideologica ,
Further, in the last two years we have noted a very distinct and I just urge that this country not over estimate that co
Communist campaign directed particularly at United States in- petition.
telligence efforts, but also at Western intelligence efforts. ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "DO THE OTHE
Through their very adept and facile use of fabrication, planted NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD HAVE SIMILAR ORGANIZATIO
documents, etc., they have tried to discredit our work, our Di- TO THE C.I.A. WITH WHICH YOU COOPERATE?"
rector and the work of various other services, and to split the LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: Yes. All governments are a litt
work of the various allied intelligence organizations. While differently organized for intelligence and national securit.
this is flattering, it is also dangerous. In fact, in Khrushchev's There are no two exactly alike in the world. We cooperate >
visit to the United States, you will recall that he made several a very large degree with some of our colleagues in the NAT
comments about American intelligence efforts, indicating or powers and in other powers in the Far East, and this is a ve
implying that he read some of our messages, that he received important aspect of our work.
some of our documents in fact, some agents were being paid ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "COULD A MISSI
by both sides. A very skillful propaganda warrior, Mr. Khru- ATTACK BE LAUNCHED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WIT -
shchev, but in his efforts to sow discord and distrust of U. S. OUT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAVING PREVIO S
intelligence in this country, he failed. KNOWLEDGE OF IT?"
The importance of our work today I don't believe can in LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: This is a very difficult question
any way be underestimated. If we achieve what is our principal to answer. A missile attack will be noted by many differe it
objective, and that is to keep United States policy makers bet- types of intelligence collection. I think you gentlemen sho d
ter informed at all times than those of any other country in be aware of the fact that with the tremendous technologi I
the world, we have the possibility of peace. For if our diplo- advances in recent years of an almost overwhelming capaci ,
mats are better armed with facts when they sit at the confer- that there, too, have been technological advances in inform f-
ence table, they certainly have the tools for successful negotia- tion collection mechanisms. When you say, Will the Cent 1
Lion. Intelligence Agency necessarily know in advance," I do 't
But on the other side, as I mention at the start, intelligence think any of us would say, "Yes, absolutely, we are going o
is absolutely essential to national defense. Incorrect or inac- spot it." But it might be spotted by radar or other scienti c
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200200025-7
 Z10 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R00 9O
C RGHTQRHEs OF THE
i^ ?t1'vde o `coll. Phli ii i ~4 i d I i, u l sines
i i ~"
"
r
some form will spot any missile attack. Now, the goal of course
ha
rd
i
o
e
n
advance, or know that they are thinkinn of ? n
su t
g
ofd er. Because when you speak of missiles moving into sight,
.,
. . .
11
are at
:59 in
f
o
ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "HOW DEPENDAnr P
ucmnn the iron curtain, they can provide exceedingly valuable
ALLEN B. CROW: (Reading Question) "WHAT ARE THE
STAFF OF THE C.I.A., AND FROM WHENCE ARE THEY 013-
DAY.,
TAINED?
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK: We have a recruiting program
in which we go to colleges and Universities, research organiza-
tions and foundations, and of course through our many ex
tensive contacts with business. 'We are constantly on the
lookout for professionals :of a wide variety of interests and oi!
experience to come to work for us. We have a program in.
which each year we bring in junior officers to be trained to
make a lifetime career with us. Intelligence work is work in
which there is no substitute for experience. It is difficult to
have what you would call on-the-job training in this work. Yet
our junior officers must be taken out under the wing of ex-
perienced officers. It's an exacting and a dedicated profession.
The type of person we are looking for is somebody of high
intelligence with a wide variety of interests, a great amount of
emotional stability, and ability to stand up under stress. We
don't give formal exams, but we'll put them through a very
intensive assessment program even before we start the security
clearance.
We also have a large number of applicants; in fact, since
last May the number of applicants has doubled.
40
Deteriorati
on Of Relaticolms
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND LATIN AMERICA
By MR. ALFONSO MARTIN, Bogota, Colombia
J T IS RATHER extraordinary that I should find myself here
tonight, at the suggestion of a countryman of mine (Carlos
Londono, a. junior majoring in international affairs at La-
fayette from Medellin, Colombia) who is a champion wrestler,
:a good student, an intrepid leader, a conscientious Pan-Amer.i-
canist. I am too old to wrestle; I am too lazy to study; I am not
an intrepid leader, but a docile husband. I am, however, a
conscientious Pan-Americanist, profoundly preoccupied and
chagrined by the threatening and ever-increasing deterioration
of the relations between the U. S. A. and the Latin American
nations. Perhaps this last qualification warrants my having ac-
cepted the honoring challenge for me to talk to you tonight.
The topic that I have chosen concerns the dire problem that
endangers the ultimate liberty, tranquility and right to develop
freely of the wrestler in question, of myself and of scores of
millions of individuals in our free American nations.
As a foreigner who has been granted the privilege of coming
to your country to educate our two children, it is my accepted
obligation net to indulge in political issues. I trust, therefore,
that my heartfelt expressions of thought and feeling will in no
way deter fro.n my non-political status.
I am not a:i expert in social and political behaviorism. I am
a simple obse.-ver, who fears that the good things in his life are
in jeopardy, and that he and his friends and neighbors might
.suddenly find that the sun no longer shines, that the freedom of
a starlit evening or of a dewy dawn is no longer ours, that the
priceless right to fish, or paint, or drive a taxicab, or drill for oil,
or write a book, or sell insurance, or teach arithmetic in gram-
mar school h-, s gone to hell-a hell where the devil with the
longest tail has the uncontested power to bruise our knees and
then to force its to kneel on brine and crawl towards the copper
statue of a de:pot, which exudes sulphur and lies, plus a smell
that kills the staunchest daffodils that ever grew.
The Oxford Dictionary defines a poet as follows: "A writer
in verse (or sometimes in elevated prose) distinguished by
Delivered ai a meeting of the International Relations Club and Theta Xi fraternity, Lafayette Coh'ege, Easton, Pennsylvania,
imaginative power, insight, sensibility, and faculty of expres-
sion." Were I a poet with the imaginative power, insight,
sensibility and faculty of expression i:o adequately paint for YOU
.-as I clearly see it-the diabolical and realistic picture that
lies right around the corner from our complacent: existence!
In my generation, the people of some Latin American coun-
tries were quite friendly to the U. S. A.; some were more indif-
ferent; a few were frankly antagonistic; one sole Latin nation
was sincerely, warmly fond of the U. S. A. The people in said
friendly nation loved chewing gum, hot dogs, baseball, Heming-
way, Miami, Arrow shirts, westerns, jazz, Marilyn Monroe and
the Monroe Doctrine. In the whole world, no country--includ-
ing Canada--ever liked and respected the North American
form of life as much as the people of Cuba did. Something
happened. A dictator was ousted. A struggling zealot', replaced
him, with the blessings of the U. A. and of other countries.
Then, i:n a few months, Cuba became the world's most aggres-
sively anti-American nation on earth. Right before the strained
eyes of the world, communism arrived here and took Over.
Cuba, as we all know, is a beautiful, colorful, tropical island,
only 40 minutes away from the continental U. S. A. It was our
most devoted, pro-American friend two years ago. It is our most
furious and ignominious enemy in November of 1960,
What exactly happened? Few experts really know. However,
something is appallingly and completely obvious. If this.nlirac:u-
lously complete turn-about took but a breathlessly short period
of time, surely the same transformation can be effected more
rapidly and even more easily in two or five or more of the
Latin American nations, where the masses do not have the
sincere, popular affection that the masses of Cuba did have for
the U. S. A. and the American people.
The communists work around the clock, while we, in our
relatively carefree form of life, watch TV; they plot and con-
nive, while we're out on fishing trips; they are flexing and
strengthening their totalitarian muscles, while we're vacation-
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