A BAD BOOK BY ANDREW TULLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200180022-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: BOOK

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The insides of a best-seller dis-
mantled with greater care than
they had been put together.
A BAD BOOK BY ANDREW TULLY
Sherman Kent
with
Wilma Slautterback
During the evening of 7 March 1962 the author of .
The Inside Story l appeared on Mike Wallace's TV program
at Station WNEW New York. After some introductory re-
marks and some chitchat on the Agency and its doings Wal-
lace put the question, "Why did you go ahead and write the
book?" Mr. Tully replied, ". . . we have here an organization
which spends up to a billion dollars a year and it makes mis-
takes ... that in the past have all but led us into war. For
that reason I thought it was time to write a book about the
CIA to let the people know something about this organiza-
tion." On three other occasions Mr. Tully said substantially
the same thing in replies to Barry Gray (WMCA radio, New
York, 8 January 1962), Patty davin (WRC radio, Washington,
15 January 1962), and Steve Allison (WWDC radio, Washing-
ton, 16 April 1962), reiterating that "the tax payers are paying
up to a billion dollars a year on this organization and I think
the public should know something about it."
Much can be said of Mr. Tully's book, and indeed much will
be in the pages that follow, but here at the beginning of
things let me inform the reading taxpayer that if he wants to
know what he is getting for the "billion dollars a year" Mr.
Tully speaks about, the last place in the world to look is in
Mr. Tully's volume. Mr. Allen Dulles-who should be in a
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Book by Andrew Tully
position to know-shares these sentiments; in a letter to the
publishers commenting on the book he wrote:
The Tully book, in my opinion, does not contain "the facts"
about the C.I.A. In part it is a compilation of rumor, hearsay
and republication of previously published speculation about the
C.I.A. Much of the book is fiction. In its description of C.I.A.
activities it contains gross inaccuracies and distortions. Some
statements in the book are repetition of Communist propaganda
which over the years has been directed toward the destruction
of C.I.A. by Moscow and other Communist centers A
Mr. Dulles must have used the greatest fo rebearance in con-
fining himself to these words. He might have gone on to say
that the book contains more factual errors than any other
book he had ever read, that large sections of it were plagia-
rized and often from poor and faulty stuff, that the fantasies
he noted were all but certainly introduced in a disingenuous
attempt to give the book its so-called "inside" character, and
that in cases where there may have been some solid source
material Mr. Tully quoted it either inaccurately or with gra-
tuitous embellishments. He could have g Even chapter and
verse to the point that Mr. Tully repeated Communist canards
on the Agency which have no relation whatever to the truth.
Not that it is easy to do a good book on the operations of a
secret organization past or present. Scholars and reputable
journalists for long have shied away from undertaking such
tasks because of the nature of the source material. If an or-
ganization is truly secret it does not leave behind much of an
open record. See what you can find out about the Italian
Carbonari, the secret German student organizations, or the
French secret societies of the early 19th century. If you want
to find out about any present-day secret intelligence organiza-
tion you have, to be sure, words to read and perhaps people
to interview, but little stuff of substance. CIA is a good case
in point.
For example there is a little solid material like the National
Security Act of 1947 and its relevant amendments which give
the legislative bones of the organization. There are some on-
'Quoted by Jack Raymond in the New York Times book review sec-
tion of 28 January 1962.
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Book by Andrew Tully
he-record congressional heanngs in which witnesses discuss
his Agency among other things. There are some guarded
ress releases from the White House or Department of State
hich bear on CIA doings, and some rare public utterances of
gency officers. There may be some purposeful leaks, not
,ways easy to identify as such. This is about all that there is
n the way of primary material, and as you can observe not
all of it is forthright fact.
There are, however, moments in the life of a secret organi-
ation which produce a lot of writing about it. If it embarks
upon an activity which not only goes awry but does so in such
fashion that its role becomes known-like CIA's in the mat-
ers of Cuba and the U-2-there is of course a spate of litera-
ture. If there are bitter recriminations many people may talk
to the press. However, the Agency's policy and indeed gov-
rnment policy is one of not publicly setting the record
straight even in such events. Thus while there is no dearth
of what could be called information, what gets into print is a
onfused collection of truth, rumor, falsehood, contradiction,
fantasy, and half-truth. A discriminating and careful student
can perhaps reconstruct the thread of verity in this conglom-
eration, and if he also has the journalist's contacts and skill
to exploit them he may come close to the whole story of what
happened.
At about this point there is a cut-off of even this type of
information. What remains is a mishmash of almost every-
thing. Some of it starts when a newspaperman gets on the
trail of a secret agency operative who is misbehaving or has
stubbed his toe, some of it when an ex-employee (frequently
but not always disgruntled) talks out of school, some of it
when someone in the know yields to the temptation to be im-
portant at a cocktail party. Some secrets just seep into the
public domain with the passage of time, and have happen to
them what happens to anything that seeps. Many of the
molecules get stuck on the way, many take on the constitu-
ents of the various media they pass through, a lot of foreign
matter is dislodged and joins the flow. What started as water,
say, will not come through as crude oil, but it may look like
pretty strong coffee. Some alleged CIA secrets are just plain
Communist fabrications, having originated in books and
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Book by Andrew Tully
pamphlets bearing the imprint of Moscow, Prague, and East
Berlin. They are invariably a verbal contribution to the Soviet
campaign to stymie or destroy the Agency.
All the above is the tired old space garbage that circles in
the wake of a secret organization. It passes from journalist
to propagandist to journalist again and loges nothing on the
trip. No careful and critical workman is going to try to write
a serious book from such materials any more than an archi-
tect would undertake to build a hospitaa. out of materials
found on the city dump.
Almost by definition then, a book proclaiming itself "CIA:
The Inside Story" is doomed before it is written. This one
was. It is a bad book, a shoddy piece of goods. From the
purely technical point of view it is by all odds the worst bad
book that this reviewer has ever encountered.
Mr. Tully Gives the Facts
To begin with, it contains more errors of fact than one
would believe possible. Take the rendering of people's names
as a starter. You would think that an author who knows that
the new CIA building is in Langley would know how to spell
the names of: Maurice Couve de Murville (chap. 4, a dozen
times), Bulganin (p. 175), Abdul Karim Kassem (p. 73),
Gamal Abdul Nasser (pp. 100, 104), Prince Boun Oum (p. 217),
Pal Maleter (pp. 171, 172), Prince Souphar.:nouvong (pp. 211,
212, 214), Edouard or Edward Ochab (p. 174), Reinhard Geh-
len (p. 156, twice), Ellis Dresel (p. 37), Hugh Latimer Dryden
(p. 120), J. Henry Schroder (pp, 38, 39, 91) , Clarence Leonard
Johnson (p. 113), Selim Fakri (p. 79), Fuacl. or Fouad Chehab
(p. 86), Adel Osseiran (p. 86), Ghazi Daghistani (p. 80),
Albert Kalonji (p. 220), Sekou Toure (p. 221), Justin Bomboko
(p. 222), and Rajeshwar Dayal (p. 225). The names of Orien-
tale Province, Elisabethville, Poznan, Phony; Saly, Sam Neua,
and the Neo Lao Hak Xat also give this author trouble, and
these are not all that do.
Do not zip past the foregoing paragraph. Think a minute
before you read on, to realize that these names are not those
of just anybody but of the French foreign minister, of the one-
time number one man of the USSR, of the presidents of Iraq,
Guinea, and the United Arab Republic, of the hero of the Hun-
garian revolt, of a past and of the present prime minister of
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Laos, of the chief of the German intelligence service, and of
comparably prominent men and things.
As for errors more substantive than mere misspellings, they
abound. Many of these touch matters that must remain
secret; dangerous as such errors are, it would be more harm-
ful to the national interest to correct them publicly. I shall
not comment, for example, on Mr. Tully's allegation that in
U.S. diplomatic missions abroad CIA's men outnumber the
Foreign Service officers. But you do not have to be on the
inside of CIA or in the know of secrets to recognize the many
other misstatements he makes. As you read the formidable
list that follows, you will perceive that a close look at The
World Almanac would have obviated a good part of them.
Practically all the rest could have been corrected in a morning
at the public library. A few days there would have contrib-
uted to reducing the number of inaccurate generalizations-
a matter which this list scarcely touches.
P. 9. President Truman did not "sit down and dictate the
identical letters." The letter was prepared in the Bureau of the
Budget.
P. 10. In 1947 there was no "Army Air Corps."
Pp. 11-12. The confusion at issue is not helped by misquotation
from the National Security Act of 1947.
P. 15. "Those legislators who pass on CIA appropriations .. ."
are not unaware of how the CIA budget is concealed in the national
budget.
P. 23. CIA bothers with plenty of students who have not been
in the upper 10% of their class.
Pp. 36-7. In the original document the word British is not
spelled with a lower-case B.
P. 37. Mr. Dulles did not make several trips to Germany with
Mr. Dresel nor did he see "a great deal of the German industrial-
ists and generals ..."
Pp. 38-9. The paragraphs relating to the Schroeders is a tissue
of confused error.
a. The British and American companies bore the name
Schroder, not Schroeder.
b. The American house is known as the J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corp.
c. The American house is an affiliate of a London firm origi-
nally known as J. Henry Schroder & Company.
d. The German firm with which Baron Kurt von Schroeder
is identified had no connection with the British Schroder house
other than normal banking relations. In any case it was cer-
tainly not one of the great German banking houses.
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0o by ,~n rew u y
P. 39. William J. Donovan was not picked to head OSS but its
predecessor organization as Coordinator of Information.
P. 40. The Hohenlohe mentioned as an acquaintance of Mr.
Dulles in 1916 was a different member of that large family from
the one associated with his name in Febru-try 1943,
P. 41. Mr. Dulles did not do business with. the "Nazi plotters."
P. 41. The OSS code was not broken.
P. 42. The recommendations of the so-called Dulles Committee
affected far more than the Central Intellige ice Agency.
P. 43. Mr. Dulles did not become Director three years after
joining CIA.
P. 53. There were no "CIA operatives who, ... led the Challe
rebels to believe that the US looked with favor on their adventure."
P. 55. MI-5 is wrong here and on p. 263.
P. 64. Typewriters, needless to say, are not locked up in safes
to preserve the security of the ribbon.
P. 66. There were no B-26's on either side in the Guatemalan
revolution.
P. 70. CIA did not "fail to understand the psychology of the
green and untried Caracas police force."
P. 73. Kassem was not helped to power by he Communists.
P. 74. In 1899 no one knew that there way.; oil in Kuwait. To
link the British Kuwait treaty of that year with oil is ridiculous.
P. 78. If Eugene Burns was a founder of th3 "American Friends
of the Far East" it is a well-kept secret. His interests in the
Middle East are well known.
P. 79. The Kassem regime never claimed, as alleged by Tully,
that Mr. Burns was a CIA agent nor was he a marked man. His
death was the result of an irrational mob action for which the
Kassem government subsequently expressed re rets and ultimately
paid some $50,000 compensation to his survivors.
P. 78. No Iraqi mob led by Communists or anyone else took
violent action against CIA.
P. 79. Kassem did not go to any American war college.
P. 80. There were not "a series of revolts on the part of various
tribes" after Kassem's takeover. It seems likely these allegations
are a garbled version of the Mosul revolt, an urban affair in
which Kurdish tribes were involved but involved on the side of
the Kassem regime.
P. 82. July 1958, not June 1958.
P. 82. The Hashemite genealogy is all mixed up. Sherif Hussein
had four sons, not two, and King Hussein of Jordan was the
grandson of Abdullah, not the son.
P. 87. Chamoun did not fall with the evacuation of US forces.
He had fallen several weeks before this event.
P. 90. Reza Pahlevi was not "an illiterate ofl icer" in the Iranian
army. He did not "take over in 1.921 as Minister of War." He did
not "proclaim himself Shahinshah in 1926."
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P. 92. The hyperbole about a traffic jam in Teheran caused by
the influx of Soviet agents and CIA officers is the "ludicrous" part
of this sentence.
P. 93. Mr. Dulles' trip to Europe in August 1953 had no connec-
tion with the Iranian situation, nor did Mr. Dulles see Princess
Ashraf, nor did she come to the "same Swiss resort."
P. 94. The principal Soviet response to Schwartzkopf's visit to
Iran was one broadcast beamed to Iranians. Does this constitute
"Russian fuming over [his] presence?"
P. 95. Schwartzkopf had left Iran some 13 days before the time
when Mr. Tully alleges he acted "as paymaster for CIA." The
rest of the sentence is equally erroneous.
P. 96. Mossadegh's troops did not fight fiercely, nor for "nine
hours." Mossadegh was not captured in the "palace."
P. 100. The Agency had no role in the fall of Farouk. The
middle paragraph of p. 101 and indeed practically all of what
follows about CIA in Egypt is pure fabrication.
P. 105. A tiny fraction of what Mr. Tully erroneously names
Nasser's Free Officer Corps was the inner group actually responsible
for the coup.
P. 107. At the time of the assassination attempt in Alexandria
Nasser was not hit. Needless to say he was not "wounded in the
shoulder."
P. 111. There was no mysterious letter from Bulganin to the
White House.
P. 112. The U-2 group did not bear the name "10-10 Recon-
naissance Detachment." Its identity was not Top Secret. It issued
orders under its official title and its personnel acknowledged
openly their affiliation with the unit.
P. 112. The U-2 could not take pictures "from 15 miles above
the earth," nor from 17 miles as stipulated two pages later.
P. 113. The U-2 was designed in 1954, not 1953. This and other
information relating to construction and first flight became public
even before NBC's White Paper, "The U-2 Story."
P. 113. The relationship between the U-2 and the XF-104 is
hopelessly garbled.
P. 113. The designer's name is Clarence Leonard Johnson.
Kelly is a nickname.
P. 113. The U-2's wing span was not "more than 80 feet . .
P. 114. The "pogo-a wheel on a stick" was not attached "to
each wing tip," but some 20 feet inboard from the tip. This
information is all in the public domain.
P. 114. The pilot's helmet was not "sealed to his body which
meant that he could neither eat or drink before or during a
flight." The helmet was much like that used by the Mercury
astronauts who, of course, are able to eat and drink.
P. 115. The pilots and their wives did not live "in mystery and
seclusion for nearly four years."
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P. 115. The only published article from the Soviet press which
gives a title to the U-2 calls it "the Prima:ionna of Espionage,"
not the "Black Lady of Espionage." By "a British flight magazine"
I presume Mr. Tully means the British magazine Flight, which had
published several articles on the U-2 prior to the 1959 crash. The
first of these articles appeared in Novembe:, 1956. In these cir-
cumstances Mr. Tully's use of the word "manwhile" is scarcely
appropriate.
P. 116. Powers' plane was not equipped with a mechanism which
could destroy the plane in the event of forced landing.
P. 116. Powers was familiar with Bodo airport, but not because
of "having flown there . . . during one of his reconnaissance
missions."
P. 118. There was no ground-to-air contact with Powers or his
plane. The allegation that Powers "radioed that there had been
a flameout" is ridiculous.
P. 120. The No. 1 and No. 2 men of NASA do not bear the
titles Director and Deputy Director respective :y.
P. 121. The meeting of 1 May began many hours before
nightfall.
P. 134. The Sverdlovsk flight was not referred to by U-2 pilots
as "the milk run."
Pp. 135-147. Lest the reader perceive that I note no errors for
Chapter 10 it is because the first half seems tc be made up entirely
of whole cloth and the second half cribbed in large part from the
testimony which Richard Helms, a high officer of the CIA, gave
before the Internal Security Subcommittee :if the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary.' Helms, a careful workman, made no
errors that I can find and accordingly these pages of the book
are among its most convincing.
P. 148. The house which Mr. Dulles occupiod, "Highlands," was
located on "busy Wisconsin Avenue," but, as any Washington resi-
dent should know, it was at least a mile north of the northern
boundary of "Washington's Georgetown secti.m."
P. 149. The institution in question was not the Intelligence
Advisory Council.
P. 150. The estimates cited are National Intelligence Estimates
produced as a collective intelligence community operation and
concurred in by all of the chiefs of the various Intelligence services.
P. 158. Gehlen did not assume Otto John's job upon the latter's
departure from the scene.
P. 160. General Trudeau was not the commander who spear-
headed MacArthur's drive to take Manila.
Pp. 163-4. There is absolutely no evidence that CIA was involved
in the East German insurrection of June 1953 nor can there be
any basis for deducing such a connection.
'Communist Forgeries ... Testimony of Richard Helms ... June 2,
1961.
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P. 165. Concessions to the East German workers were maae
before the riots took place, not after.
P. 165. Soviet troops were not "moved into Berlin at 6:30 next
morning" i.e., 18 June. They arrived on the 17th.
P. 167. The situation in Hungary was not virtually identical to
that in East Germany.
P. 167. It is by no means "a virtual certainty that CIA managed
to smuggle arms to the [Hungarian] rebels and generally gave
them assistance before the uprising." This is a flat error. This
goes also for the allegation on the next page that CIA supplied
arms and counsel which helped the Hungarian people to prepare
themselves for the big day.
P. 168. Gero was not more moderate than Rakosi. That was
his big trouble. He was born and bred a Stalinist diehard.
P. 169. In these circumstances one may wonder who the CIA
experts were who "felt Gero would do something about the Hun-
garian people's grievances."
P. 170. There is great confusion here in the events of the revo-
lutionary day in Budapest and in the order of their happening.
P. 170. It has never been established that any elements of the
Hungarian army came over to the side of the insurgents as organ-
ized units.
P. 170. "The job of bringing the Hungarian government to its
knees" was not "done in five days ..." It took about ten.
P. 171. The detail of Nagy assuming office is in the wrong time
bracket.
P. 171. One thing may be said of Nagy-he did not lack courage.
P. 171. Kadar was not Minister of the Interior at the time.
P. 172. Suslov has never been head of the Soviet secret police.
Mr. Tully has apparently confused him with Serov, who was head
of the Soviet secret police and who did appear in Hungary at a
later stage.
P. 173. Nagy was not executed until the following summer.
P. 174. Gomulka was not in a situation to do much prodding
of the Polish Communist leadership before mid-1956. He was not
re-admitted to the party until August of that year, a date errone-
ously cited as July 1955. Poznan riots took place in June 1956,
not June 1955, but Gomulka was then in no position to help
arrange the trial of the rioters, In fact he probably had nothing
to do with the trial at all. .
P. 175. The showdown which Mr. Tully mentions in paragraph
2 occurred on 19 October 1956, not 19 September 1956.
P. 175, What CIA is alleged to have reported on the basis of
its espionage came from the Western-particularly the French
and German-press.
P. 175. The meeting of Polish party leaders was called to elect
Gomulka to top party leadership and kick out Rokossovsky, not
"to plan steps for further `liberalization' of the regime ..."
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~ook rby ndrew u ly
F. I'm The "troops which o ossovs y zad started toward
Warsaw" were not Soviet-they were Polish.
P. 177. Perhaps the biggest bouquet CIA will ever receive, and
unfortunately cannot claim, is the credit Mr. Tully gives it here.
In reality the phenomenon in question is deathless, enduring, and
heroic Polish nationalism.
P. 178-195. No errors are noted in this chapter (13) for the
reason that the bulk of the material is lifted bodily from the
Truman Memoirs' and congressional hearin;s.
P. 198. Sebald did not resign for the reas Dn that he was not
ambassador at the time.
P. 201. The elaborate cover operation mentioned at the top
of the page was not set up on the offshore islands.
P. 201. "Whole battalions of Nationalist guerrillas" did not take
part in the sorties.
P. 208. No Chinese Communist troops engag:?d in "direct military
action" in Indochina and there had not been any evidence of an.
infiltration of Chinese Communist troops when Tully went to press.
P.208. Whatever Dienbienphu was in thus context, it should
not be termed a city. History will know it as a large and pre-
dominantly flat rural area of many square miles that takes its
name from the small town which was a French administrative seat.
P. 209. CIA did not estimate "that the attack on Dienbienphu
would be timed with the fixing of the date in Berlin for the
Indochinese peace talks in Geneva."
P. 209. Mr. Tully indicates that "CIA's estimates were disre-
garded." There is a strong implication that the party who dis-
regarded them was the French. Does Mr. Tully believe that the
French government is on the mailing list for "CIA estimates?"
P. 209. The figure of $300,000,000 a year is wrong and wrong
on the high side by a factor of almost 10.
P. 210. The Geneva Conference occurred in 1954, not 1955. The
agreements signed at Geneva ultimately result,sd in "a Communist
North Vietnam ..." To use the word "created" gives a totally
erroneous impression.
P. 210. General Phoumi is not a first cousin of Marshal Sarit.
The kinship is as distant as fifth or sixth cousin. Thai is not
the country's [Laos] "principal language."
P. 211. The Pathet Lao did not receive "from Red China ...
supplies and technical aid." These of course came from North
Vietnam.
P. 214. The group which CIA is alleged to have been backing,
in the last line, was a group composed mostly of civilians.
k Volume One, Year of Decisions, and Volume Two, Years of Trial and
ope. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1955 axed 1956 respectively.
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P. Z15. enera oumi did not organize the CD I. Inciden-
tally, although the "group of militarists" mentioned at the bottom
of page 214 and the CDNI at the top of page 215 are one and the
same organization, Mr. Tully's presentation obscures this fact.
P. 215. No "delegation [of CIA men] was sent to confer with
Kong Le."
P. 220. The time interval of the first full paragraph begins in
the period before Congo independence. Van der Meersch, the
"Belgian resident minister," was not there. He did not arrive
until 12 days after independence. Furthermore, he returned to
Brussels two days later without having seen Kasavubu.
P. 221. Lumumba's request to the UN did not bear on the matter
of technical assistance in "reorganizing the Congolese armed
forces" as the sentence at the top of the page seems to imply.
Pp. 234-5. The story of "Eugene Nicolai Maki's" defection in
Paris is a complete fabrication. It contains not a grain of fact.
P. 235. Allen Dulles did not meet Hayhanen when the latter
"arrived in New York by plane."
Pp. 243-256. Almost every reference to CIA in this chapter is
incorrect.
P. 245. The scale of Manolo Ray's resistance organization in
Cuba is grossly overstated.
P. 247. CIA did not pick the Cuban invasion leader. The char-
acterization of Artime is wrong.
P. 252. Mr. Dulles did not predict uprisings in Cuba.
P. 255. Mr. Dulles was not at the White House meeting of 18
April 1961.
P. 258. CIA has not had resources "up to $1 billion a year ...
The above we can call errors-some are simple inaccuracies,
some downright howlers. The list is not complete, for there
are more which it would be impolitic to notice. Moreover,
the list does not include that class of misstatement which
while partaking of the nature of error is so gross a form that
it must be treated as something apart. I refer of course to
those passages that possess not an atom of truth, that are
nothing but the inventions of Mr. Tully or of the authors he
so often draws upon.
Tall Tales New and Old
Perhaps a little note on the verso of the title page is sup-
sposed to take care of this sort of thing. It reads, "In a few
cases, fictitious names have been used and operational meth-
ods have been disguised-for obvious reasons of security.-
AT." Whatever its purpose, this note, as the reader will per-
ceive, cannot be made to apply to the matters below.
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Boo
Consider the opening paragraphs of the book. There is a
deal more fiction here than the names and the so-called opera-
tional methods. It is all fiction. Or take page 21 on the Soviet
aluminum coat hanger. Through clandestine procurement of
this item and its analysis CIA is alleged to have been able to
find out what a Soviet "bomber wing was made of, and from
there it took only a few more steps to figure out both the range
and the bomb load of that particular plane." This particular
piece of balderdash first appeared in Newsweek,6 but since Mr.
Tully does not refer to the source he has made the story his
own. Is it possible that he could have believed it? Why didn't
he talk with a technical man and then have some fun with
Newsweek?
Or take the scene set in Stettin (pp. 62-3), where Mr. Tully
believes there to have been a CIA agent operating under cover
as a German businessman. In these paragraphs Mr. Tully's
information is presumably of the most detailed: the man was
tall and angular; he was newly arrived; the machine tool fac-
tory he took over was small; the spring days of April were
balmy; the man was in the habit of putting up his lunch in
a paper bag and strolling on a hill top-which was bucolic
and which overlooked the wharves; he was E., nature lover; he
owned a pair of field glasses; he observed the birds in the trees,
and from time to time he took a casual peep at the river-front
piers. One afternoon he dictated a letter which was long and
statistics-filled to his secretary who was a blonde, and so on
and so on. All this detail sounds fine, but the fact is that the
entire story is made of dreams. If Mr. Tully had set the scene
on Mars the story would perhaps have been less convincing
but no closer to the truth. That Mr. Tull r has cribbed the
incident from the Harknesses 6 does not exculpate him. He
apparently wants you to think that the story is the fruit of
his own diligent research, for here again there is no mention
of his debt to another.
Or take the pages in which Mr. Tully rehearses the fall of
King Farouk of Egypt and the emergence of Naguib and ulti-
mately Nasser. Throughout these stirring events CIA, ac-
8 May 1961 (pp. 29-38). See p. A24 below.
Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA,"
Saturday Evening Post (30 Oct., 6 Nov., 13 Nov. 1954 1. See p. A26 below.
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cording to Mr. Tully, is the unseen hand that manipulated
the whole thing. If he got these notions from his reading I
have not yet discovered his source, but wherever it came from
it is just plain fantasy.
Consider the incident alleged to have taken place in Mos-
cow (pp. 135-140). Here we have the most intimate details
of an "operation" to recruit a relatively obscure party handy-
man and use him as a defector in place. Everything worked
wonderfully, including a rendezvous between the agent and
his handler in a "safe house" in Moscow. One wonders how
many Americans, not necessarily those devoted to the thrillers
of international espionage, would believe that any foreign in-
telligence service could maintain a "safe house" in Moscow.
But this technical gaffe is no more ridiculous than all the
rest of the story is untrue. There is nothing about it which
even approximates fact.
How such tales get started is hard to explain on any grounds
other than a writer's willingness to fabricate for attention or
just for kicks. How they get better in the telling is easier.
Consider for example the Tully fantasy relating to the un-
dercover heroine with the wooden leg (p. 155). In real life
this story starts with a real woman who did have a prosthetic
leg and who served in the secret operations part of OSS during
World War II. In the spring of 1944, several weeks before the
landings of 6 June, she was secretly taken across the Channel
on a small surface craft and put ashore. She lived and worked
the life of a clandestine agent. Her courage and her skill be-
came something of a legend in OSS and as security wraps
dropped from wartime stories this one came out into the open
and with a few dramatic changes. The legend began to have
it that she had gone through jump training in the UK and
then had parachuted into France. When Richard and Gladys
Harkness told their version in the Saturday Evening Post
they portrayed her not merely as a parachutist but as a CIA
employee who had jumped into postwar Europe. As they
wrote it: "There are feminine operatives in the undercover
branch of CIA- and good ones too-as well as research work-
ers. One woman, who has a wooden leg, jumped into enemy
territory at least twice." Look at this closely. Your first im-
pression probably was that as a postwar operative she jumped
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twice into enemy (i.e., Soviet Bloc) territory. A second read-
ing will show you that this is not necessarily so, and that as
the Harknesses have written it it could m tan either this or
World War II enemy territory. Now comes Mr. Tully who, as
has been indicated, had something more than a passing fa-
miliarity with the Harkness articles. He writes, "Notable
among these feminine [CIA] operatives is a woman with a
wooden leg who has parachuted into energy territory twice
and once was forced to shoot her way out oaf a trap in West
Berlin [emphasis added]. CIA has no worries about female
courage." The ambiguity is now dispelled. It has to be after
World War II and the enemy territory has tr.. be Bloc territory,
for there was no West Berlin until well afte . V--E day.
Mr. Tully often yields to this kind of temQQtation, as for ex-
ample when he embellishes a sentence from. Richard Helms's
testimony before a Senate Committee.? Mr. Helms had
made reference to a manual which the Soviets had issued
for the guidance of their propagandists; he called it just that,
yet when Mr. Tully borrows the information, the manual has
become "secret." The italics are Mr. Tully's.
The great bulk of literature classified as non-fiction lies
somewhere between the scholarly treatise with its footnotes,
citations, bibliography, etc., and the sober essay which dis-
penses with learned paraphernalia but strives no less ardently
for objective truth. The great bulk of the non-fiction we read
is a considerable contribution to wisdom, for what it may lack
in exactness or detail it makes up for in good generalization
and readability. Many of Mr. Tully's reviewers-even Jack
Raymond-have spoken of the interesting way the author
writes. No one can blame a writer for trying to write a book
that will sell.
Where blame may be attached to this kind of writing, how-
ever, is where it professes to be something that it isn't-
where, for example, the author, by an overindulgence in
name-dropping, endeavors to convey that hi.., has done more
work, been more places, talked to more people, thought more
deeply than is actually the case. If an author is making a
hasty set for the best-seller list he well knows the magic recipe
in that old cookbook of non-fiction. Pick A subject in the
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CPYRGHT
public eye which for reasons of state must have as little pub-
icity as possible; write up the subject in a manner to catch
he public eye; give it a seeming profundity with a wealth of
owever specious detail; give it a texture of authority by seem-
ng to have talked with all of the important actors and to
ave read the important books. Make up a frosting of lurid
necdote, and serve with a fanfare.
some Debts of Gratitude
Consider Mr. Tully's use of attributed sources of informa-
ion if you have any doubt as to which class of book his falls
nto. To begin with, there is the little note up front in which
he author acknowledges "a considerable debt of gratitude
o. . . [Mr.] Salinger . . . [Mr.] Dulles, Colonel Grogan . . .
[Senator] Mansfield ... Assistant Secretary Roger Tubby ...
ssistant Secretary Sylvester, McGeorge Bundy ... and Roger
Hilsman, Jr., director of Intelligence and Research in the
State Department." This is the end of the acknowledgement.
You will note that Mr. Tully does not go on to say what per-
haps a million authors have said before him, namely: I am
grateful to these gentlemen; they have been very helpful, but
I want everyone to know that the sentiments in this book are
my own and I take full responsibility for them. It so happens
that most, if not all, of the gentlemen mentioned have noticed
this omission and with considerable displeasure. A number
of them have taken the matter up with the publishers. They
have objected to the implication that they were of service to
Mr. Tully and that the sentiments he expresses in the book
may be ascribed to them. Printings of the book subsequent
to the first omit the acknowledgement.
Inside the book Mr. Tully lards his text with something like
200 references to the written or spoken utterances of various
authorities. The unsuspecting reader would be led to think
that Mr. Tully had done quite a piece of research, that he
had ransacked the whole spectrum of available literature from
the most solid to the most dubious, and that he had done a
fairly careful job of evaluating his sources. It would be diffi-
cult to establish that this was not in fact Mr. Tully's intent.
It is not at all difficult to say that if Mr. Tully had been com-
pletely honest with his audience, his book would never have
been published.
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o by , n rew u y
o e roughly
two hundred sources which he cites he probably consulted first
hand about twenty. Maybe this figure i; high. The other
hundred and eighty are sources which a few of the twenty
have themselves cited and used; Mr. Tu111y's contact with
them is at second hand. Almost invariably Mr. Tully perpetu-
ates any errors or liberties or misquotation, of the first quoter.
For example the quotation from my Strategic Intelligence 8 on
page 54 almost certainly is not directly from the book; in all
likelihood it was lifted from the Fred J. Cook issue of The
Nation.9 It is worth noting that this passage consists of five
sentences, four from page 197 of the book, the last from page
200. When Cook used them he employed -,he printer's device
(. . .) to indicate ellipses. Even so, he did mild violence to
the intended meaning. Tully dropped the dots and makes it
seem as if the last sentence followed exactly on the heels of the
next to last.
All of the learned quotations from the foreign press in chap-
ters 4 and 10 are from the transcript of the Helms testimony.
All of the rich array of sources in the chapter on the U-2 inci-
dent are the ones the NBC researchers dug up and incorpo-
rated into Chet Huntley's NBC White Paper No. 1.10 The
sources quoted in the Cuba chapter (17) first appeared in the
articles of Fred J. Cook and Tad Szulc.11 And so on and so on.
So much for the materials which Mr. TuL4y almost certainly
did not see first hand. How about those be did? These fall
neatly into two categories: the ones with which he acknowl-
edges an acquaintance and those with which he does not.
Take the first category. Mr. Tully refers to the Helms testi-
mony six times, the Truman Memoirs four times, the long
Cook article three times, H. H. Ransom's bo ak twice.12 These
sources of information are important ones. See now how he
uses them. Take the case of Fred Cook. The three references
appear on pages 60, 61, and 66, and the reader will perceive
"Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.
0 24 June 1961, Special Issue.
10 29 November 1960 (telecast).
"'Anatomy of a Failure," Look, 18 July 1961.
12 Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1939).
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hat Mr. Tully is indebted to Mr. Cook for material encom-
assed in some 10 lines. Little does the reader know that Mr.
'ully has actually drawn upon Cook some 25 times without
ny references whatsoever and has cribbed some four or five
Vu, ndred lines almost verbatim. This amounts to, let's say,
pages or about five percent of his book. If you don't believe
read the succeeding parallel passages as a sample.
MR. COOK
(p. 548.) The natural resources
of [Iran] include an estimated 13
per cent of the world's oil reserves.
This liquid treasure ... long had
been exploited by British inter-
ests.
Baron Reuter, founder of
the British news service that still
bears his name, had received in
1872 a concession that gave him
practically a monopoly over Ira-
nian industry....
MR. TULLY
(p. 91.) Iran's resources include
an estimated 13 per cent of the
world's oil reserves, and as early
as 1870 this mouth-watering fact
had come to the attention of Brit-
ish interests.
In that year, the
Baron Reuter, founder of the new
service which still bears his name
obtained a concession that gay
him a monopoly over Iranian in-
dustry....
It seems worthy
of note that Frank C. Tiarks, one
of Allen Dulles' fellow directors
in the Schroeder banking enter-
prises, served also as a director
of Anglo-Iranian oil and that Sul-
livan and Cromwell, the New York
legal firm in which the Dulles
brothers were such prominent
partners, was the long-time legal
counsel of Anglo-Iranian Oil....
The huge financial interests of
the West virtually boycotted Ira-
nian oil.
Mossadegh tried to make
deals with smaller, independent
American companies to work the
Iranian fields, but the State De-
partment frowned on such free
enterprise. The international oil
cartel held firm-and Iran lost all
its oil revenues....
it also has bee
brought out that Frank C. Tiark
one of Dulles' fellow directors i
the Schroeder banking empire,
was a director of Anglo-Irania
Oil, and that Sullivan and Crom-
well, the New York law firm i
which Dulles and his brothe ,
John Foster, were partners, w
the legal counsel for Anglo-Irania
Oil....
Iranian oil was virtually bo -
cotted.
Mossadegh promptly tri d
to swing some deals with small ,
independent companies to wo k
the Iranian fields, but the Sta e
Department gave these compan s
little encouragement-which is o
say it told them "hands oil"
Meanwhile, Iran was losing its
revenues and going broke.
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Book by Andrew Tully
testified "We had no advance in-
formation of any kind [regarding
the Israeli attack on Egypt]. The
British-French participation also
came as a complete surprise to us."
(p. 548.) CIA swung at once
into a "crash" program designed
to provide the necessary informa-
tion.
The instant Dulles got the
word of Stalin's death, he began
sending out orders to CIA agents
and undercover men scattered
throughout the world.
He de-
manded from them information
on what to expect, morale behind
the iron curtain, arms shipments,
troop movements, purges.
Before
long, detailed reports began to
pour in. . . . Dulles and the ex-
perts in his analysis section in
CIA headquarters sifted reports
and studied their volumirious files
on Malenkov and the men most
closely associated with him.
retary of State Dulles would say,
"We had no advance information
of any kind . . . The British-
French participation also came as
a. complete surprise to us." .. .
(p. 149.) Dulles immediately
. .. set in motion the machinery
needed to obtain a "crash" esti-
mate of the changed world situa-
tion.
Orders went out to CIA
agents and :secret operatives all
over the wor.'d and to other gov-
ernment agencies with listening
posts abroad.
He wanted to know
as soon as possible what diplo-
matic or military moves to ex-
pect, informal;ion on troop move-
ments, purges and arms ship-
ments, the condition of morale
behind the Irr.n Curtain.
Reports
poured into C [A headquarters all
night ... Dulles and his experts,
flanked by experts from other in-
telligence agencies, pored over the
reports and s;udied the bulging
files on Malerikov and the other
men in and out of the Politiburo
who were likely to help him wield
his power.
(p. 554.) Gehlen is a product (p. 156.) Reinhold Gehlen is a
of the German Reichswehr, a life- life-long professional soldier,
long professional soldier ...
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CPYRGHT
Ma. COOK
The
on of a publisher, he is quiet and
cholarly in manner, but he speaks
n the terse, clipped tones of a
an long accustomed to com-
and.
He joined the Reichswehr
in 1920; he fought in the inva-
sions of Poland and France;
and
when the Russian war broke out,
he was transferred to the Eastern
Front where, in April, 1942, he
was selected to head the German
Army's key new intelligence sec-
tion....
ue~
spite his early background as the
son of a German publisher and a
youthful frequenter of literary
salons. From that early back-
ground he acquired a quiet and
scholarly manner; from his service
in the Reichswehr he developed
the terse and precise tones of
the commanding officer.
He had
joined the Army in the decrepit
days of 1920 but stayed with it
to fight in the invasions of Po-
land and France when the mis-
ery of the Twenties seemed worth-
while.
When the Russian war
broke out he was transferred to
the Eastern Front, where in April,
1942, he was named head of the
German Army's Intelligence Sec-
tion ...
With the collapse of the Hitler When the war ended and the
regime, Gehlen saw to it that he Hitler regime collapsed, Gehlen
got captured by the Americans.... conveniently--for both sides-was
captured by the Americans.
Take the case of Richard Helms. Giving Mr. Tully the
break, one may say that his six references to Helms account
for some 40 lines. There are another 60 lines with respect
to which Mr. Tully writes in such a way as to convey the im-
pression that he and Helms spontaneously just happened t
find the same material at the same time. You will find what
I am talking about on pages 46 and 47. There are yet another
full 100 lines (pp. 142-144) taken from Helms and not faintl
attributed to him.
Take the case of Mr. Truman. The first mention of th
Truman Memoirs comes on page 183 of Tully. Yet at the to
of his page 180 appear these two sentences: "CIA warned tha
at any time the North Koreans might decide to change from
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Book by Andrew Tully
isolated raids to full scale attack. But, i.ike CIA reports on
other danger spots throughout the world, there was no infor-
mation on when such an attack would take place." I invite
the reader to compare these with the following from II, 331 of
the Truman Memoirs. "Throughout the spring the Central
Intelligence reports said that the North Koreans might at any
time decide to change from isolated raids to a full-scale at-
tack. The North Koreans were capable of such an attack at
any time, according to the intelligence, but there was no in-
formation to give any clue as to whether an attack was cer-
tain or when it was likely to come."
Then six and a half pages after Mr. Tully's first reference
to the Truman Memoirs appears what follows in the right-hand
column, carrying no hint of its origin, evident on the left.
MR. TRUMAN (II)
(p. 372.) On October 20, the
CIA delivered a memorandum to
me which said that they had re-
ports that the Chinese Commu-
nists would move in far enough
to safeguard the Suiho electric
plant and other installations along
the Yalu River which provided
them with power.
MR. TULLY
(p. 190.) On October 20, CIA
handed President Truman a mem-
orandum which said it had reports
the Chinese Communists would
move in far enough to safeguard
the Suiho electric plant and other
installations :),long the Yalu River
which provided them with power.
The State De-
partment's reaction to this report
was to suggest that General Mac-
Arthur issue a statement to the
United Nations that he did not
intend to interfere with the oper-
ations of the Suiho and other
power plants.
The Joint Chiefs
said that such an announcement
would be undesirable from a mili-
tary point of view.... General
MacArthur felt ... that he did
not wish his hands tied in such a
manner, and the statement was
therefore not issued.
From the State Department came
a suggestion that General Mac-
Arthur issue a statement to the
United Natioas that he did not
intend to interfere with the oper-
ation of the Sidho and other power
plants.
But both the Joint Chiefs
and MacArthur opposed such a
move from the military point of
view and it was dropped.
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00
And seven pages after, this one:
CPYRGHTMR. TRUMAN
(pp. 376-377.) The Central In-
telligence Agency also now sup-
plied me with an estimate of the
situation based on their sources of
information. It reported that
there might be as many as two
hundred thousand Chinese Com-
munist troops in Manchuria and
that their entry into Korea might
stop the United Nations advance
and actually force the United Na-
tions forces to withdraw to de-
fensive positions further south.
The estimate concluded by point-
ing to one inescapable fact: With
their entry into Korea, the Chi-
nese Communists had staked not
only some of their forces but also
their prestige in Asia.
It had to
be be taken into account that they
knew what risks they were tak-
ing; in other words, that they
were ready for general war.
(p. 191.) CIA was ready with
its own estimate, which was a
grave one. General Smith re-
ported that there might be as
many as 200,000 Chinese Commu-
nist troops in Manchuria and that
their entry into Korea might stop
the UN advance and perhaps
force the UN troops to withdraw
to defensive positions.
Smith
called one fact inescapable. It
was that with their entry into the
Korean War, the Chinese Commu-
nists had staked not only their
armed forces but also their pres-
tige in Asia.
Presumably they
knew the risks they were taking,
that is, the danger of a general
war.
Mr. Tully handles H. H. Ransom's book and Newsweek with
similar shabbiness. Here are a few examples of material used
without reference to source.
MR. RANSOM
(p. 45-48.) Even though neg-
lected as an important function
of government by the United
States, the concept of intelligence
and of its importance to the strat-
egy of any operation, civil or mili-
tary, is as old as society itself.
The Bible records that Moses
was instructed to send what in ef-
fect were intelligence agents "to
spy out the land of Canaan."
MR. TULLY
(p. 8.) Respectable or not,
espionage is almost as old as man
himself and over the centuries it
has been a valuable instrument
in the hands of military leaders
and ambitious rulers.
Moses dis-
covered its value when, according
to the Bible, he sent his agents
,,to spy out the land of Canaan."
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CPYRGHT MR. RANSOM
the sixth century, B.C., Sun Tzu,
a Chinese military theorist, wrote
in On the Art of War, ". . . what
enables the wise sovereign and the
good general to strike and con-
quer and achieve things beyond
the reach of ordinary men, is fore-
knowledge."
In the Mongol invasion of Eu-
rope during the thirteenth cen-
tury, Subotai, a disciple of Gen-
ghis Khan, utilized the well-organ-
ized intelligence system of the
Mongols in his spectacular ad-
vances westward. As one au-
thority has noted, "Whereas Eu-
rope knew nothing about the Mon-
gols, the' latter were fully ac-
quainted with European condi-
tions, down to every detail, not
excepting' the family connexions
of the rulers." *.. .
Michael 'rawdln, The Mongol Empire,
London, G., Allen, 1940.
The Elizabethan intelligence
system was the highly personalized
domain of the Queen's principal
State Secretary, Sir Francis Wal-
singham. He developed to a high
degree th art of foreign intelli-
gence, uti'izing his personal for-
tune as Well as official financial
provisions) to maintain several
score agelts in foreign lands.
Walsingham's motto was "Knowl-
edge is never too dear," and he
concerned himself not only with
his spy network but with the codes
and ciphers by which vital in-
formation was secretly communi-
cated.
opher, Sun Tzu, also gave intelli-
gence high credit. He wrote in
the Sixth Century, B.C., that
"what enables the wise sovereign
and the good general to strike and
conquer and achieve things be-
yond the reach of ordinary men is
foreknowledge."
The Mongols who
overran Europe in the Thirteenth
Century depended on a well-knit
intelligence service to gather an
abundance of information which
Michael Prawdin in his The Mon-
gol Empire reported included even
"the family connexions of the
ruler." Meanwhile, "Europe knew
nothing about the Mongols."
As
Europe was emerging from the
darkness of the Middle Ages,
Queen Elizabeth I enjoyed the
services of a really top-notch in-
telligence operator, Sir Francis
Walsingham. State Secretary
Walsingham's motto was "knowl-
edge is never too dear," and he
spent a considerable portion of his
private fortune to finance an
espionage network- which included
an elaborate system of codes and
ciphers.
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CPYRGHT MR. RANSOM
(p. 103.) A good example of the
interdependence of agencies with-
in the intelligence community is
provided by the process in which
these National Intelligence Sur-
veys are produced... .
Its content and format are
determined by the National Intel-
ligence Survey Committee, which
is an important subcommittee
within the Central Intelligence
Agency....
.. . the section .. .
dealing with Russian highways is
compiled by the Army's Trans-
portation Corps, the section on
telephone networks by the Signal
Corps, and so on.
Priorities and
production schedules for various
sections of the NIS come from the
NIS Committee, a CIA-chaired
committee containing representa-
tives from the various intelligence
agencies of government.
(p. 189.) A striking bit of evi-
dence of this [suspicion of the in-
telligence product] is seen in Ad-
miral Arthur W. Radford's off-
hand comment, while serving as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in 1956. "In general in the
intelligence field they tend to err
on the safe side," he told a Senate
committee. . . . "There is good
reason to believe that we normally
overestimate Communist capabili-
ties in almost every respect .. .
there has been an almost hysteri-
cal assumption of great capabili-
ties on the part of the Commu-
nists, some of which, in my opin-
ion, do not exist."
(p. 241.) . . Every ay
are new examples of the inter-
dependence of the nation's in-
telligence agencies.
For instance, there is the Na-
tional Intelligence Survey....
Producing a National Intelligence
Survey starts with the National
Intelligence Survey Committee, a
subcommittee within CIA. This
committee sets down what needs
to be known and how that infor-
mation is to be organized.
If it is
a survey that seeks a general pic-
ture, say, of Poland, the job is a
community chore. The Army's
Transportation Corps compiles the
section dealing with highways, the
Signal Corps does the section on
telephones.
CIA furnishes data
on priorities and production sched-
ules, the FBI chips in with a memo
on suspected Polish Communist
agents in the United States, the
State Department with political
and cultural data.
(p. 260.) Sometimes these esti-
mates seem to play it safe by
printing a darker picture than ex-
ists; sometimes they gravely un-
derestimate the Cold War enemy's
capacities and progress. Admiral
Arthur W. Radford, former Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
always insisted that CIA normally
overestimated Communist capabil-
ities "in almost every respect . . .
there has been an almost hysteri-
cal assumption of great capabil-
ities on the part of the Commu-
nists, some of which, in my opin-
ion, do not exist."
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by iily
And !,,echoing Newsweek:
CPYRGHIVei sweek (May 8, 1961)
e- )nl
t
left the
flight.
) Af
er tite Passenger's
Russian Aeroflot liner at
outside Vienna, a ground
ie aboard to clean up and
lane ready for the return
There was the usual lit-
ter-a tattered magazine, paper
napkins,, the remains of sand-
wiches, ',empty bottles-and all
went into the trash along with
a bent coat hanger and a broken
cup. A few hours later the air-
port garbage concessionaire loaded
the trash in his little truck and
hauled it away.
Enroute to the
dump, he stopped and delivered
the box of Soviet trash, which had
been kept separate, to a man who
was willl'g to pay for it. The
man was, not a crazy junk collec-
tor; he Was an agent for the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sifting through the trash, the
CIA agent} spotted the coat hanger,
and remembered it was on his pri-
ority list. He picked it out, along
with seve al other items, wrapped
them, an l left them in an ap-
pointed spot-in this case a locker
in a busy 'railroad station.
When
the packs' a arrived at the near-
est CIA headquarters, the agent's
superiors were elated. To them,
what seemed like an ordinary coat
hanger was more valuable than
diamonds.
MR. TULLY
kPIJ. - uss an com-
mercial Aeroflot liner had just
landed, and the ground crew went
aboard to clean up the plane for
its return flight.
As the plane
was being spruced up a man in a
dark suit approached the airport
garbage concessionaire and slipped
him a bill. Shortly thereafter the
concessoinalre picked up the trash
from the Soviet plane, loaded it
into his truck and hauled it to
his station.
There the man in the
dark suit turned up to claim the
box in which the Soviet litter
had been dumped. . . . He went
through the trash: two magazines,
paper napkins, an empty bottle, a
crust from a sandwich, a broken
plate-and a bent coat hanger.
The man wrapped the coat
hanger carefully in brown paper,
tied it with a strong cord and
walked over to a railroad station.
There he deposited his package in
a locker... .
In Washington, a few days later,
the coat hanger was sent along
to ... CIA headquarters. The
men who signed a receipt for it
were delighted.
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Book y 2QO 8 An2d ew Tully
CPY~leek (May 8, 1961)
CIA knew from scraps of in-
formation put together that the
Russians were building a powerful
long-range bomber. They knew
about test flights, numbers of
planes in production, and even
had photographs of the plane.
They did not know its range or
bombload but they did know that
shavings from the machining of
the wing were remelted and made
into a particular type of coat
hanger.
At last, the CIA had obtained
one. By chemical tests and spec-
troanalysis, the agency learned
exactly what metals were being
used in the wing of the plane.
The formula for the alloy was the
last piece in the puzzle; with that,
CIA's experts in aircraft engineer-
ing could tell both the range and
bombload of that particular Soviet
bomber.
They had been
working for months to put to-
gether information on a new So-
viet long-range bomber. They had
found out a number of things
about the plane,
but had been
unable to get anything on its
range or bombload. They did
know, however, that shavings from
the machinings of the wing were
remelted and used to make a spe-
cial kind of coat hanger.
This, at last, was the coat
hanger. By spectroanalysis and
chemical tests, experts were able
to learn the kind of metal alloy
used to make the hanger.
With
that formula at hand, CIA knew
what the bomber wing was made
of, and from there it took only a
few more steps to figure out both
the range and the bombload of
that particular plane.
Some Unacknowledged Debts
What about the second category. of sources-the ones he
mentions not at all? You will recall the three articles on CIA
by Richard and Gladys Harkness which I have mentioned
earlier, and the article by Tad Szulc on the Cuban affair in
Look. You surely did not hear of them in Mr. Tully's book.
There is no mention of them, yet from the Harkness article
alone Mr. Tully has plagiarized some 470 lines with relatively
little change in wording or sequence of thought. He has
plagiarized Szulc similarly to the extent of some 30 to 40 lines
He has further cribbed from an article by J. Edgar Hoover i
This Week and an article by Dan de Luce which appeared i
the Outlook section of the Sunday Washington Post of Sep-
tember 19, 1954. He has taken without attribution large sec
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 ApproveBdo F, Ij,F eLeads a 200,1/08/01 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200180022-3
Y r
CPYRGHT
tions of the text of the Chet Huntley NBC
the U4 Let me give you some examples.
old friend.
H!ARKNESS (part I)
A manj with the plump pink
cheeks and blue eyes of a typi-
cal middle-class German sat on
the grassy hilltop overlooking
the Red !port city of Stettin on
the left lank of the Oder River
in communist-held Poland.
As he
had done'~every seasonable day of
last spring, he basked in the warm
April sun (while washing down his
lunch of dry bread and sausage
with a liter of white wine, and
watched he birds in the nearby
trees, through his field glasses.
Then, rising to leave, he swept his
glasses along the piers on the
river front below, where freighters
were being loaded for the thirty-
mile trip northward along the
Oder and into the open Baltic Sea.
Returning to his small machine-
tool works after the noon hour, the
businessm n called in his secre-
tary to tale dictation.
The letter
addressed to a French automobile-
parts concern was formal and con-
cise in the stiff manner of Ger-
man commercial houses. It cited
precise specifications for presses
his firm was offering for sale to
stamp out motorcar fenders.
White Paper on
The first is an
MR. TULLY
(pp. 62-63.) The first person
on stage as this secret drama un-
folded was a tall and angular Ger-
man businessman, newly arrived
in Stettin, a port city on the Oder
River in Communist Poland, to
take over a small machine-tool
factory.
During the balmy spring
days of April the businessman had
made it a habit to pack his lunch
in a paper bag and stroll with it to
a bucolic hill top overlooking the
wharves. Like so many Germans
he was a nature lover, and he had
with him a pair of field glasses
with which he observed the birds
in the nearby trees.
From time
to time he casually let his glasses
sweep along the riverfront piers,
where. freighters were being loaded
for passage into the Baltic Sea
and beyond.
One April afternoon, in his little
office the German businessman
dictated a long and statistic-filled
letter to his blond secretary.
Ad-
dressed to a French automobile
parts concern, it was a stiff mis-
sive creaking with precise specifi-
cations and references to favor-
able discounts. It offered presses
for the stamping out of motorcar
fenders,
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CPYRGFfARKNESS (part I)
The
price was less than the British
could quote. The machines car-
ried the official guarantee of the
Ministry of Machine Industry of
the Polish People's Republic.
It
was a letter that the local Red
commissar could approve and did.
Once the letter from Stettin was
in the hands of America's espio-
nage and counter-espionage serv-
ice, it was rushed to a common-
place-looking shop in the arty
Montmartre section, where a sign
on the window read Salon de
Photographie.
Behind the front
of a simple photographic studio,
a CIA microfilm technician went
to work.
The agent, squinting
through a magnifying glass under
bright lights, scraped at each
"period" on the typewritten page
with a delicate razor-sharp instru-
ment. Finally one black dot came
off.
There, scarcely larger than
the point of a pin, was a tiny
circle of microfilm which had
been pasted on the sheet of paper
at the end of a sentence.
It had
been disguised by the ink of the
secretary's typewriter ribbon back
in Stettin as a period.
machines that had the
official guarantee of the Ministry
of Machine Industry of the Polish
People's Republic and, besides,
were cheaper than the British
could offer.
After signing the
letter, the businessman gave it
back to his secretary so she could
carry it to the commissar for ap-
proval. Casually the commissar
attached his stamp, and the letter
went out that evening....
... But he forgot business for
a while to carry the letter per-
sonally to a shabby building in
the Montmartre hung with the
sign salon de photographie.
In
the back room of the studio, after
the auto-parts man had left, a
CIA microfilm expert took over.
Using a magnifying glass under
powerful lights, the expert scraped
at each period on the typewritten
page with a tiny instrument with
a razor-like edge. Shortly he was
rewarded-one little black dot
slid off the paper.
Underneath that black period
was what the technician had been
looking for-a tiny circle of micro-
film barely larger than the point
of a pin. It had been pasted to
the paper at the end of a sentence
and then disguised by the ink
from the secretary's typewriter as
she pressed the period key.
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CPYRGI*TRKNESS (part I)
The agent,
holding his breath lest he blow
away the minute speck, used
tweezers to carry the film to a
photographic enlarger.
The
agent removed the minute dot of
film with a pair of tweezers and
carried the film to the photo-
graphic enlarger.
When he
emerged from the darkroom, the
blownup message was the size of
a tea saucer. The words could
be read as easily as the words on
this printed page.
(p. 78/2.) At the same time,
CIA ignored President Kennedy's
directives' excluding Batistianos
... from the Liberation Army.
(p. 80/2.) In Guatemala, the
official policy of excluding Batis-
tianos was never put into effect.
Artime 'gave the San Roman
brothers, former Batista officers,
high commands. Other Batis-
tianos were streaming into the
camps.
Now the CIA took the
position that the Batistianos were
experienced military men and
proven anti-Communists, and
therefore should not be barred
from the "Liberation Army." .. .
A short time
later he had the finished product
in his hand-a square of photo-
graphic paper the size of a salad
plate with the letters in the blown-
up message as large as those in
a typewritten letter.
MR. TULLY
(p. 249.) President Kennedy
had issued an order excluding Ba-
tistianos from the Liberation
Army, and in the last days of the
preparation for the landing he
ordered the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service to arrest Mas-
ferrer.
But unknown to the
President, CIA refused to put into
effect Kennedy's Batistiano ban.
Other former Batista officers, in-
cluding the San Roman brothers,
were given important commands
because, as CIA explained it, they
were experienced military men
and, more important, proven anti-
Communists.
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CPYRGHTMR. SZULC
anue ay eman ec a the
atistianos be weeded out of the
nti-Castro army.
(p. 81.) In these final days of
reparation, President Kennedy
rdered the Immigration and Nat-
ralization Service to arrest ex-
enator Masferrer.
MR. HOOVER
(p. 22.) . . . and now we
howed Hayhanen a curious five-
ent piece which had baffled us
or nearly four years. A news-
aperboy had been given the coin
ith other change as he was col-
ecting from his Brooklyn cus-
omers. It felt light in his hand.
le let it fall to the street, and the
wo halves fell apart to reveal a
crap of film.
The boy turned his
nd over to a New York detective.
he detective passed it to the FBI.
he laboratory had never seen a
ickel quite like this one before.
or could our experts decode the
essage written in columns of
ve-digit numbers on the micro-
hotograph.
Manolo ay de
manded that the Batistianos b
weeded out.
MR. TULLY
(p. 233.) ... but the story ha
its beginnings on a sultry summe
evening in 1953. On that evening
a delivery boy for the now defunc
Brooklyn-Eagle knocked on the
door of an apartment ... He wa
collecting for the paper.
. . . The boy left the apart
ment building jingling severa
coins in his hand. He notice
that one of the coins-a nickel
had a peculiar ring. He reste
the coin on a finger; it felt lighte
than an ordinary nickel. The
he dropped the coin on the floo
and it fell apart. Inside was
tiny photograph, apparently
picture of a series of numbers
... The FBI man asked th
detective if he could lay his hand
on the coin, and the next day th
cop called on the newsboy an
traded him a real nickel for th
trick coin. In turn, the co
turned over the nickel to the FB
agent.
(p. 234.) . . . The microphoto
graph inside the nickel appeare
to show nothing but ten column
of typewritten numbers, with fly
digits in each number and twenty
one numbers in most columns. I
Washington the experts went t
work but were unable to deciphe
the message.
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CPYRGHT
MR. HOOVER
(p. 11.) ... His parents were
peasants, but the boy became an
honor student in school, with
Finnish as his second language.
He received a teacher's certificate
in September 1939, but when So-
viet forces invaded Finland that
November, he was conscripted by
the NKVD
(p. 235.) . . . Hayhanen ha
started his career as a high schoo
teacher. He had studied th
Finnish language and had becom
fluent in it, and two months afte
his assignment to a school in th
village of Lipitzi he was con
scripted by the NKVD, the Soviet'
internal secret police.
and sent to the com-
bat zone to translate captured
documents and interrogate pris-
oners.
By that
time, in the fall of 1939, the Finn-
ish-Soviet war was on, and Hay
hanen was assigned as an inter-
preter to an NKVD group and sent
to the combat zone to translate
captured documents and to inter
rogate prisoners.
(p. 11.) In 1948 Hayhanen was (p. 236.) In the summer o
brought back to Moscow. 1948, Hayhanen was called to Mos
cow by the MGB.
Soviet
intelligence had a new job for him,
and his fluency in Finnish was the
key.
The Soviet in
telligence service had a ne
assignment for him-
The work would require him
to sever relations with his family,
learn English, and take special
training in photographing docu-
ments, as well as encoding and de-
coding messages.
It was part of
the plot that he should go to Valga
in southern Estonia for his train-
ing-and for a special reason. A
family named Maki had lived
there and they had a son, Ameri-
can-born in Enaville, Idaho, just
Hayhanen's age. . . .
one whit
would require him to sever rela-
tions with his family, study the
English language, and receive spe-
cial training in photographing
documents and in encoding an
decoding messages.
Reino Hay
hanen was to become Eugene
Nicolai Maki, a native of Enaville
Idaho, who had accompanied his
Finnish-born father and Ameri-
can-born mother to Estonia in the
mid-Twenties, when he was eigh
years old. . . .
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CPYRGHTMR. HOOVER
e no ay anen returned-to
inland in July 1949, this time in
is new identity of Eugene Maki.
or two years he lived in a series
f Finnish communities working
uietly as a mechanic and manual
borer, establishing a character.
e met Hanna Kurikka and mar-
ied her without revealing his So-
iet origin.
... On July 3, 1951, he called
it the United States Legation in
elsinki where he displayed Maki's
firth certificate from the State
f Idaho. In July 1952, a United
tates passport was duly issued.
NBC White Paper
(p. 3.) ... This is a U-2,
lmed by NBC with special per-
ission at the place of its birth,
the Lockheed Aircraft Corpora-
on in Burbank, California.
(p. 4.) Here is the man who
esigned it, Lockheed Vice-Presi-
ent, Kelly Johnson.
Back in 1953 and 1954, we were
udying ways and means of
aking fighter airplanes like the
11104 go higher and further than
t,iey did at that time. As we
ent further and further into
ese studies, it soon became ap-
arent that it would take an en-
rely new kind of aircraft to do
e job that we wanted done.
Then in the summer of 1949 he
entered Finland as Eugene Nicolai
Maki, an American-born laborer.
He lived in Turku for four years
to establish his identity. .. .
But he did take a wife, Hanna
Kurikka, who knew him only as
Eugene Maki, a pretty fair plumber
and a good dancer.
In July 1951, Hayhanen visited
the United States Legation in Hel-
sinki where he displayed a birth
certificate from the State of Idaho
which showed he was born in
Enaville on May 30, 1919. . . .
He got the passport about a year
later . . .
MR. TULLY
(pp. 113-114.) The story of the
10-10 Reconnaissance Detachment
began back in 1953 when the Lock-
heed Aircraft Corporation of Bur-
bank, California, instructed its en-
gineers to design an airplane that
would go higher and farther than
the F104 went at that time. It
shortly became apparent that it
would take an entirely new kind
of aircraft to do the job.
A designer named Kelly Johnson
went to work and came up with
the U-2. It was a plane that was
like a glider with a jet engine.
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We made a wing that ha a very
long span-over eighty feet. The
wing had to carry the whole
weight of the aircraft and still be
very, very light. It had to be de-
signed not only to hold a great
amount of fuel,
but it was de-
signed so the wing tip acted as
part of the landing gear. On the
take off we invented what we
called the pogo landing gears.
These stick into sockets in the
wing, and rest on the ground and
keep the airplane level in take off.
The plane he flies will range
as high as 90,000 feet-17 miles
above the earth-far above the
operating ceiling of any other jet
and during the eight hours it can
stay aloft, the U-2 will half fly,
half glide for nearly four thousand
miles.
The pilot of a U-2 must spend
an hour-and-a-half before take-off
relaxing and breathing pure oxy-
gen in order to prepare himself
for high altitude conditions.
His helmet is airtight and sealed
to his body by a cork ring; he can,
therefore, neither eat nor drink
before-or during a flight. A long
flight may keep the pilot sealed
up for more than eight hours.
After such a voyage, he will
emerge hungry and thirsty from
his cramped cockpit, his skin
chafed and raw from the tight
fitting suit and helmet.
The wing span was more an
eighty feet, and although the wing
was extremely light it was de-
signed to carry the whole weight
of the aircraft including a large
amount of fuel.
In addition, it
was necessary for stability's sake
on takeoffs to make the wing tip
a part of the landing gear. This
was done by attaching what John-
son called a "pogo"-a wheel on a
stick--to each wing tip.
(p. 114.) . . . It ranged as high
as ninety thousand feet-seven-
teen miles above the earth-and
during the eight hours it could
stay aloft it could half fly and
half glide for nearly four thou-
sand miles.
Before takeoff, the
pilot had to spend an hour and a
half relaxing and breathing pure
oxygen in order to prepare himself
for high altitude conditions.
His
helmet was airtight and sealed to
his body by a cork ring, which
meant he could neither eat nor
drink before or during a flight.
Often when a pilot was in the air
for as long as eight hours,
he
landed in a state of physical ex-
haustion, his body chafed and raw
from the tight fitting suit and
helmet and burning with thirst.
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Book y 20018 0And3ew Tully
If you were to tot up the lines of his book which were
taken without direct attribution to sources which Mr. Tully
mentions in some other context and the lines he more grossly
plagiarizes from writers he mentions not at all, you could ac-
count for perhaps as much as a third of the book. Then if
you will start another census on a clean sheet of paper, where
irrespective of source you take account of the childish fabrica-
tions and so-called background material which is full of er-
rors, contradictions, and omissions and which has no direct
bearing whatever on CIA, you might get up towards the fifty
percent mark. One of the tasks left then is to look at the re-
maining half, or at least one very interesting part of it.
Mr. Tully Sits in Judgment
If there is a thesis in the book it would run like this: CIA
violates "its mandate by trespassing on policy making"; (p. 62)
and entirely on its own it has meddled in the internal affairs
of foreign nations (pp. 52, 55). When it meddles it generally
does so with local talent. These local agents are not merely
anti-Communists, they are extreme rightists "that stole
everything [they] could lay hand on" (p. 89) or "elegant foot-
pads" (p. 200), sometimes "indolent" to boot (p. 219) ; one is
an ex-Nazi (Chapter 11). CIA avoids contact with anyone
with a leftist tinge.13 The result has been a long list of un-
savory characters connected with it. CIA also has embarked
upon high risk adventures-the U-2 intrusions and possible
war with the USSR, support of Chiang Kai-shek and possible
war with Communist China. " . . . After Cuba it was obvious
that something had to be done to curb CIA's free wheeling
[emphasis added] operations, especially in the political-
military area." (p. 265)
Time after time the reader is given the impression that the
Agency is in fact an insulated pocket of power and irresponsi-
bility, that it hides behind a screen of secrecy, is housed in a
vast building, spends up to a billion dollars a year, and goes its
own sweet way. As these sentences of repeated derogation
take their place by the side of others conferring equally mis-
informed praise, the light begins to dawn. Apparently Mr.
11 "never supporting anybody to the left of McKinley," Mr. Tully said
in one of his radio appearances (WMCA, New York, 8 January 1962).
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n
Tully is saying that all those activities which are not pure in-
telligence gathering and intelligence processing are beyond the
CIA charter, that even though these activities may have grave
foreign policy implications they are nevertheless embarked
upon without so much as the by-your-leave of legitimate for-
eign policy makers. If this is in fact what Mr. Tully is getting
at one cannot regard him as a very sophisticated student of
the federal government.
Does he really believe that it is CIA that shapes the foreign
policy of the United States? Does he really believe that the
penchant of the U.S. government to go along with or support
men such as the ones he mentions and others like Franco,
Salazar, Sarit, Diem, and Rhee is, or was, something dic-
tated by the Agency? Does he really believe that the U.S.
government's chilliness to left-wingers like Arbenz, Mos-
sadegh, and Souphannouvong derives from what he twice re-
ferred to in broadcasts as CIA's "anti-Communist fetish"? In
his mind is there no notion of how foreign policy gets made?
Does he think that decisions as basic as the ones he discusses
are forced through or slipped past the President, the National
Security Council, and the other powerful instruments of pol-
icy formulation? Does he think they come about by some
youthful CIA officer down the line starting a game of cops
and robbers-"free-wheeling," as he calls it?
By "free-wheeling" I take it that Mr. Tully means what a
man does when he disobeys instructions or exceeds his au-
thority or, lacking instruction, acts imprudently or brashly.
A great many officers of the U.S. government have free-
wheeled in the past and will in the future. Mr. Tully, indeed
a lot of people, could name a number of otherwise admirable
men in our civil, military, and foreign services who have free-
wheeled and are now in safe dull jobs or premature retirement.
If Mr. Tully can name any free-wheeling CIA operatives the
Director of Central Intelligence would certainly like to know
who they are so that he could fire them. If on the other hand
Mr. Tully's generalized accusation includes the Director him-
self and his top lieutenants, then he does not know how the
U.S. government works.
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mcnJATully
Obviously he cannot mean this. For a close reading of
what he has written will indicate that he knows as well as
anyone that CIA is an operating arm of the executive branch
of the government, that like any other it takes its policy orders
from the chief executive and his high-level advisors, that it
coordinates its plans with other instrumentalities of the gov-
ernment, that it gets its funds through Congress on the rep-
resentations of fully-informed subcommittees of the House
and Senate. At one point Mr. Tully himself says that the
Agency "regularly reports to four subcommittees of the Con-
gress, made up of seventeen senior members of the House and
Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees."
(p. 261)
What is he getting at then? I do not think he is getting at
anything. I believe something has got at him and what that
thing is has little or nothing to do with subject at hand. It
was a fever to get into print. This is a malady which often oc-
casions a quick and indiscriminating use of material closest to
hand. From the Harkness articles he got a lot of information
implying that the Agency was a good thing or perhaps even
better than that; from the Cook, Edwards,14 and Szulc articles
he took information showing it all bad and a mile wide. The
hasty mixture of these produced a four and a half dollar book
with two and a quarter's worth of "you're great" and two and
a quarter's worth of "you're terrible." If the resulting in-
consistencies and contradictions lay the ailing author open to
a charge of childish simple-mindedness, no matter; a higher
good has been satisfied: the subject of his book-the Central
Intelligence Agency-has been handled with Jovian imparti-
ality.
Idle Gossip and Red Slander
What I have written above is in defense of the proposition
that Mr. Tully's book qua book is certainly one of the poorest
ever written. I would like to go one step further. I find it
not only bad but shockingly evil. To begin with, Mr. Tully
"Bob Edwards and Kenneth Dunne. A Study of a Master Spy (Allen
Dulles). (London: Housmans Publishers and Booksellers and the
Chemical Workers' Union, 1961.) Edwards is a left-wing Labour Party
Member of Parliament.
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has engaged in a hateful sort of rumor mongering and in-
nuendo.
Take the case of the French generals. On page 53 he says
that there is evidence that there were CIA operatives who led
the Challe rebels to believe that the United States looked with
favor on their adventure. He then evokes CIA's critics (un-
specified) who could point out that the Agency was "overly
eager to get mixed up in policy making." On his own say-so
there was "every reason to believe that some irresponsible
CIA men went too far." Sympathetically he explains that "If
some CIA agent had sold himself on the view that de Gaulle's
Algerian policies would lead to a Communist takeover there,
he might have been tempted to indulge in words and actions
that would give aid and comfort to those opposed to the de
Gaulle policies." A little later, noting that CIA has to know
what is going on, he indicates that there is extraordinary dif-
ficulty in doing this "without getting involved." By this time
Mr. Tully has built up a pretty firm impression that the
Agency was guilty.
This is the stuff of the middle of the chapter. He then
stops talking about the French generals, makes a quick recon-
naissance of the Turkish coup of 1960, and resumes in a last
paragraph on the generals. "In the French revolt," he writes,
"there is good reason to believe that President Kennedy was
almost as upset at CIA's international image as he was with
the French Foreign Office's pusillanimous dabbling in danger-
ous gossip." This is a strange sentence: the first half seems
to indicate that the President gave credence to the allegations
of Agency guilt on the grounds that it had a reputation for
this sort of business. In the last half Mr. Tully seems to be
saying that both he and the President know these allegations
to have been nothing more than "dangerous gossip" from the
Quai d'Orsay. In other words they were not true, but, as he
goes on to repeat, the Agency had such a bad reputation that
people suspected its presence in every international crisis.
What are we to conclude: guilty or not guilty? I personally
feel that Mr. Tully has it both ways; he has blackguarded the
Agency and he has exculpated it. A reader who wants to be-
lieve the: worst has plenty to comfort him while a defender of
the Agency objecting to the hostile innuendo can be silenced
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th the reminder that Mr. Tully himself has dubbed it merely
d ngerous gossip.
Or take this one on page 30. The topic sentence goes
tories both weird and shocking are told about CIA." Then
c mes a story, unattributed but actually written by West-
b ook Pegler in the Washington Times-Herald of 30 July 1953,
setting forth that a retired Marine Corps general allegedly
c aimed that CIA had attempted to enlist him in a plot to
" et" General Douglas MacArthur. Yes, there are weird and
socking stories told of many people and institutions, but be-
fore retelling them to a large audience a responsible reporter
ill usually do some checking about.
Much more harmful is Mr. Tully's whole-souled acceptance
certain myths respecting CIA for which the Communists
e originally responsible. It is important to let the sense
the word "myth" sink in. It is of considerable importance
i the light of a contretemps between Mr. Tully and Mr. Jack
aymond, who had reviewed the Tully book in the New York
imes book review section of 28 January 1962. Raymond had
i icorporated into his article quotes from the letter which Mr.
ulles had written the publishers, saying among other things
.11at some statements in the book were repetitions of Com-
unist propaganda. A few weeks later Mr. Tully responded in
the 4 March number of the same publication. His communi-
ation ends, adverting to Mr. Dulles's remarks on the book's
se of Communist propaganda, with the following pregnant
ententes: "Surely we are past the time when all that is
ecessary to discredit a work is to say that it says what Com-
unists say. The question is not who says what, but whether
hat is said is so." Mr. Raymond contented himself with a
rief reply to the effect that Mr. Dulles's comment on the
ook, as far as he was concerned, "puts a cloud over it"; but
ith a little homework he would have had no difficulty what-
ver in meeting Mr. Tully squarely on the latter's chosen
round. He could demonstrate over and over again that
tories Mr. Tully puts forward are not only straight Commu-
ist stuff but demonstrably untrue in the bargain.
Take the one on pages 38-39 where a false connection is
ade between the British banking house bearing the name
chroder and a German banker and early friend of the Nazis
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n
name Baron Kurt von Schroeder. Mr. Dulles's membership
on the Schroder Board of Directors is parlayed into a wholly
imaginary connection with the Nazi Baron. Mr. Tully, to be
sure, does not press the false point as the Communists do.
They make quite a thing of it, going so far as to make Mr.
Dulles "the advisor and organizer and . . . godfather of the
Nazi regime," 15 the whole story hanging on the willful confu-
sion of the British Schroder with the German Schroeder.
Nevertheless Mr. Tully falls in with the basic error, makes
the connection, effects the smear, and then winds up telling
us that whatever Mr. Dulles's "critics" [unspecified] have said
of "his connection with the Nazi financial angels, there is no
reason to believe that he ever was influenced by their child-
ishly hideous theories." But the second half of that sentence
does not negate the first.
The internal evidence is convincing that Mr. Tully took this
slander from the pamphlet of Bob Edwards and Kenneth
Dunne, and it is just as convincing that Edwards and Dunne
in turn took it from material acknowledgedly published by the
Communists. If Mr. Tully did- not know this, he could have
found it out with a half an hour's research. One would think
that ordinary prudence, if not deference for the character of
an important public servant, would have dictated more cau-
tion.
In Chapter 12 Mr. Tully goes into the East German riots of
1953 and the Hungarian insurrection of 1956. He implicates
CIA in the German affair via the employment of three kinds
of source material: (1) Radio Moscow, which accused the
Americans of using one General Sievert USA for inciting a
group of West Germans to infiltrate East Germany and take
violent direct action. Mr. Tully feels that CIA would not use
"a general in uniform" as its agent provocateur ,and to this
extent derogates Radio Moscow (which suffers from "the So-
viet's congenital inability to tell the whole truth"--emphasis
added) as a source. (2) Other "sources [unspecified] with
considerable access to the story of what went on behind the
scenes indicate that CIA nevertheless had at least a sly finger
"See for example, among many such, Ivan Vavra, "The Master of
Futility," Mlada Fronta, Prague, 15 September 1961.
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in the pie." (3) Circumstantial evidence: the rioters, it ap-
pears, were so well outfitted with the tools of the professional
saboteur's trade that "it seemed indisputable that they were
getting their espionage paychecks from CIA's top German
spy . . . Gehlen." In other words CIA was guilty; if noth-
ing else, the Agency had put Gehlen up to it. The fact is that
CIA had no role in these disturbances. Furthermore, I know
of no allegations of guilt prior to the Tully book which do not
come originally from the Radio Moscow drivel that he cites
plus a number of other Communist pronouncements which ac-
cused the "Americans" or "American intelligence." All of this
about Gehlen and his operatives began with accusations by
the East German government; it was reported as beginning
this way in the New York Times on 17 November 1953; from
there it went to Fred J. Cook, who noted its Communist origin
as reported by the Times; thence to Mr. Tully who blanks out
references to the true origin with the phrase "sources with
considerable access to the story . . ."
In the case of the Hungarian insurrection of 1956, Mr. Tully
says that CIA accurately predicted the outbreak and almost
certainly "managed to smuggle arms to the rebels and gen-
erally gave them assistance before the uprising" (p. 167). On
the next page he reiterates the second count. It is just as
wrong here as it was the first time, but made with somewhat
less firmness. For in the span of some twenty lines Mr. Tully
has changed his estimate of CIA's foreknowledge of the even
from "accurately predicted" to "when [the] day came i
caught CIA . . . unawares. . . ." Some of Mr. Tully's dif-
ficulties are explained in the welter of conflicting Communis
accusation. The Communist outcry went out over the radi
and Tass; it was picked up by Western newsmen in easter
Europe; bits of it found their way to the New York Times an
the wire services, other bits to the New York Worker. Th
Communists had made much of a statement attributed to Mr
Dulles that "we knew in advance of the events in Hungary'
because of its important support to the rest of their attack
If CIA knew in advance, all the more reason for its complicit
in the outbreak. They then laid into the Agency with every
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y n rew u y
thing they had, .."d theft Stur!es were n necessary v con-
Little more need be said of Mr. Tully's debt to the Commu-
nist apparatus which has been doggedly engaged for years in a
broad-gauge and systematic attack on CIA. It has gone about
this by blackguarding Mr. Dulles, by trying to stir up trouble
between the Agency and the State Department and Foreign
Service, and by leveling every kind of accusation, usually
wnoiiy raise, against the Agency through forged documents.
planted stories, and all its manifold propaganda channels.
And Mr. Tully has fallen for most of it.
There are a good many more places in the book where Mr.
Tully comments on CIA's non-intelligence activities; he cites
cases in the Middle East, Far East, Africa, and Cuba. In most
he is harsh on the Agency, reiterating his charges that it has
busied itself in another country's domestic affairs and has
used as its chosen instrument an incompetent local of the ex-
treme right. The Communist literature is of course full of the
same allegations and the same abusive characterization.
I fully agree with Mr. Tully's very wise remark quoted ear-
leer, -surely we are past the time when all that is necessary
to aiscreait a work is to say that it says what the Communists
say. The question is not who says what, but whether what is
said is so." The trouble is that in many cases it is extremely
difficult for any one man to say "what is so," and impossible
to get Hair a dozen to agree with his findings. There are
bound to be many views of what the situation really was, what
were the operative trends within it, what their direction, and
what their probable stopping place if left alone.
In all these matters my own views are quite different from
those of Mr. Tully. The latter could command my attention
it not my respect if I thought that he had sweated them out of
his soul after a careful study of the available record. But
since most of them are taken ready-made from Fred Cook,
Bob Edwards, and others, I am not impressed at all. I reserve
a particular spot of disrespect for Mr. Tully's views on the
Cuban affair, where, while neglecting the findings of a
good number of other and better informed commentators, he
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d des a fair job of reproducing Cook except for adding bits from
T d Szulc.
People on our side who dislike the Communists should be
a Tare of one of the penalties of the gullible use of Commu-
n st handouts, particularly when these are blasts against the
a leged deviltry of Western governments and their instru-
mentalities. As long as Western listeners and readers are
f ally aware of the true source of attacks, some of them at
1 ast-perhaps many or most-listen or read with a built-in
c ution. They may even apply an automatic discount rate to
ords spread via Radio Moscow and Tass. Of this the Com-
unists are well aware and little can please them more than
t have an uncritical Western commentator or journalist bor-
r w one of their tall tales, make it his own, and repeat it with-
cut attribution to source. From this moment the Commu-
ists are relieved of the relatively unremunerative chore of
peating themselves; they can now quote the Western source.
And they do. If they can quote one who acknowledges to
rominent officers of the U.S. Government "a considerable
ebt of gratitude," dropping the names of Dulles, Mansfield,
ubby, Sylvester, Bundy, and Hilsman, they have it made.
When Patrice Lumumba was murdered in the Congo, the
ommunists gave it one of their biggest plays. Belgian em-
assies including the one in Moscow were attacked by mobs,
here were speeches in the UN, and their propaganda lashed
ut by many means and in many directions. The United
Rates and the CIA came in for their full share. Now comes
r. Tully writing (p. 224), "There were reports [nature and
ource unspecified] at the time that CIA had helped track him
[Lumumba] down, but there is nothing on the record to
confirm this. If CIA had any hand in the recapture it
as only to counsel Mobutu [identified in the chapter as
"CIA's man"] to continue to treat Lumumba with at least
legal consideration to avoid international repercussions"
(emphasis added). Although there is no accusation here, I
wonder how Mr. Tully might feel if someone had written this
sort of sentence substituting his name for CIA's. If this had
happened surely Mr. Tully could not have been surprised when
his enemies began quoting the passage as evidence of his guilt.
Would he think he had been smeared or not? Is it entirely
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Book by Andrew Tully
urprising that the communists have use these re erences to
he Agency for their own purposes?
he Playback
For example the Peking New China News Agency broadcast
he following to Asia in English (16 February 1962) :
The Central Intelligence Agency of the United States was the
chief criminal behind the murder of Congolese Premier Patrice
Lumumba. This was revealed by a book newly published in the
United States entitled "CIA-The Inside Story," according to a
New York report.
In a report from its correspondent in the United Nations the
New York Worker said in its 11 February issue that former CIA
Director Allen Dulles' plot to murder Lumumba was dealt with
in a sensational book that U.N. correspondents were reading. The
author of the book is Andrew Tully, a supporter of the CIA. In a
chapter on the Congo he pointed out that Joseph Mobutu, the
military commander in Leopoldville who first arrested Lumumba,
was a CIA agent. The author said that Mobutu was the CIA's
"right man at the right time."
He added that President Joseph Kasavubu of the Congo also
"sat at the CIA men's feet." He said that Kasavubu was following
CIA advice when he issued his proclamation "deposing" Premier
Lumumba. A puppet named Ileo was then put up as "Premier."
But the Indolent Kasavubu and the Inexperienced Ileo were no
match for Lumumba, so Mobutu, the CIA man, took over as
military dictator and Lumumba was later sent to the killers.
The correspondent of the Worker said: "This is a gruesome story
of treachery and murder that makes a mockery of the CIA's
free world propaganda. And it is also a warning of what the
CIA may have in store for Antoine Gizenga."
That the Chinese quoted the New York Worker as their in-
ermediate source may have somewhat lessened the impact of
heir story among the few sophisticated anti-Communist
isteners who knew the nature of this publication. But I fear
he main impact was the one desired; an outsider, a Westerner,
as telling the truth against interest. The Russians a few
reeks later (20 March 1962) fed the following in English, to
heir African audience-and they did not refer to the Worker:
Printed on one of the pages of the newspaper [reference is to
the South African paper New Age] is a photograph of Patrice
Lumumba. A little lower is a photograph of Allen Dulles, former
Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. At first sight
one is entirely at a loss to understand why these photographs
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appear together. Indeed, what can there be in common betwee
a staunch fighter for the independence of the Congo and th
leader of U.S. spies? The headline in bold type at the top o
the page makes everything clear: "The Role of the U.S. Spy Chief
in the Lumumba Murder Plot."
Yes, they were the ones who played a special role in the deat
of the former Congolese Prime Minister. An article publishe
on the same page furnishes the facts. Recently a sensation
book was published in the United States exposing the role of the
CIA in the Congolese plot which ended in the murder of Lumumb .
This book, "CIA, The Inside Story," was written by Andrew Tull
who drew on material from CIA itself.
The Chinese broadcast cited above goes on to other
r. Tully's allegations :
In the book Tully also dealt with the role played by CIA duri
the counterrevolutionary riot in Hungary in 1956. He said, "It s
also a virtual certainty that CIA managed to smuggle arms to te
rebels and generally give them assistance before the uprisin
The CIA also blew up bridges in socialist lands when it could.
The book said that the overthrow of the Mossadeq governme t
of Iran in 1953 "was an American operation from that beginning o
end. The job cost plenty of money. Tully stated
kopf (the CIA agent-NCNA) supervised the careful spending f
more than 10 million CIA dollars."
The book also tells of the fact that the Arbenz government f
Guatemala was overthrown by the CIA with U.S. weapons. e-
ferring to the failure of the U.S. armed invasion of Cuba last year,
it said that one of the reasons for the defeat was former C A
Director Allen Dulles' belief that "popular uprisings" would follow
the landings in Cuba.
The Worker pointed out that the materials of Tully's book w re
from CIA and State Department sources. Tully said that in w it-
ing the book he got aid from Allen Dulles, high CIA official Col.
Stanley Grogan, and Director of Intelligence and Research or
the State Department, Roger Hilsman, Jr.
Fidel Castro's Prensa Latina was on the air with this e
n Spanish to Latin America (10 January 1962) :
"The Central Intelligence Agency is used to assault people, viol to
sovereignties, inflame countries, provoke international conflicts, nd
prepare wars," an editorial of the paper La Prensa declares in re-
nouncing the appearance of a new volume entitled "The Histor of
the CIA."
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e book demonstrates with precise data
that the CIA is more than a police group, it is an omnipotent min-
istry, a universal organization that watches and acts, that spies and
overthrows governments, that is above the North American laws
and beyond the principles of international law."
The book, according to the commentary, lists some of the
"achievements" of the CIA: "it overthrew Mossadeq of Iran to
punish him for his attempt to nationalize petroleum; it organized
the mercenary incursion against the government of Jacopo Arbenz
in Guatemala; it favored the return to power of the Nazis in West
Germany; [an understandable liberty with Mr. Tully's chapter 11
entitled "CIA's ex-Nazi"] and it planned, financed, and directed the
invasion of Cuba in April 1961."
As to Cuba, the Czech publication Zemedelske Noviny 16 ran
three short articles in which the three following paragraphs
occur.
The first step of the CIA was to "unite" the groups of emigres,
which up to then were engaged in a mutual fight for the emigre
souls, but primarily for North American dollars, without which
they would have found themselves long ago on the dung heap of
history as other emigres did before them. The CIA succeeded
in joining under the firm of the so-called "Revolutionary Demo-
cratic Front" the real "cream" of the former Batista officers, plan-
tation owners, landowners, businessmen, and some "revolutionaries"
whose offended vanity could not bear that the developments in
Cuba went the way they did not prophesy.
Several isolated farms in Florida rented or bought by the CIA
were transformed into military training centers in which mer-
cenaries of the "liberation army" were trained. Who paid for
their training? The CIA and some "American associations with
interests in Cuba. Such are the facts as the book "CIA-The
Inside Story" presents them. "The highest command" in this
"enterprise" was held by Richard M. Bissell, deputy to CIA Di-
rector Allen Dulles.
Of course, Andrew Tully can be hardly suspected of communist
propaganda when among his "informants" were the director of
CIA, Allen Dulles himself, Assistant Secretary of State Roger
Tubby, Assistant Secretary for Defense Arthur Sylvester, and spe-
cial adviser to the President on questions of national security,
Bundy. [emphasis added]
11 Jok, "DDT, The Department of Dirty Tricks intervenes against the
freedom of Cuba" (Prague) 15, 17 & 18 April 1989
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Book by Andrew Tully
The East Germans broadcast in Kurdish to Iran on 18
anuary 1962:
Recently an American reporter, Andrew Tully, published a book
on the subject of the American spying organization and its former
Chief, Allen Dulles. This book echoed throughout the world
press. Most of what is written in this book is quotations from
the officials of the spying organization, the State Department,
and the American White House. On the first page of the book
the author mentions these officials' names and acknowledges
gratitude for the documentary materials which they supplied
him. The author of this book has raised the curtain on many
events of the world and has disclosed many secrets of the American
Central Intelligence Agency. One of the events discussed in the
book is the 1953 coup d'etat in Iran.
Andrew Tully writes in his book that the American Central
Intelligence Agency headed by Allen Dulles became the sole cause
of . . . the overthrow of Dr. Mossadeq's government. Following
this coup d'etat an unfortunate and inauspicious regime, which
has only been able to prolong its existence by continuous American
aid, came to power.
Later on the author of the book discusses the Battle of Suez
and the aggression against Cuba, and states that the American
Central Intelligence Agency is guilty in all these events.
The content of the book regarding Iran is nothing new to the
people of Iran. Several years ago Nelson Rockefeller, the American
oil tycoon, in a letter to Eisenhower explained that the Central
Intelligence Agency was the backbone of the Nordad 28 coup d'etat.
Later on many American newspapers and magazines discussed this
matter in detail.
However the importance of this recent book is due to the fact
that all the documentary material is supplied by those who are
at present government employees in America, and each occupies
a sensitive position. For example one of the people upon whom
the book bases its coup d'etat documentation is Roger Tubby, who
is now an Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State Department.
Another one of these people is Bundy who is now an Assistant
to U.S. President Kennedy. . . .
The Nelson Rockefeller letter referred to above is the Com-
munist forgery mentioned by Richard Helms and duly noted
as such by Mr. Tully (pp. 143-4). I suppose he will not be
pleased at the way the East German broadcaster misused his
text; perhaps he will understand the better how some of us
feel about the straighter playback of other parts of his book.
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Book by Andrew Tully
How will we account for the sale of this book; for sixteen
consecutive weeks it had mention in the best-seller listing of
the New York Times Sunday book review section. By and
large, reviewers have probably contributed something to its
success. I have some forty-five notices, not including plugs by
bookstores or other advertisements. Of these perhaps ten
merit being called full-dress serious reviews and twenty-seven
can be called short reviews. The rest are squibs of a few words
or a few lines. There is no question that Mr. Tully got a fair
to good press. Not one single reviewer spotted his unacknowl-
edged borrowing, though half a dozen did say he had not
added much to what was already in the public domain. War-
ren Unna in the Washington Post alone seems to have pin-
pointed some of his factual errors and went on to indicate he
did not think much of the book; Jack Raymond in the New
York Times book review section is critical and said a few
things Mr. Tully did not like, but his review probably piqued
more curiosity than it dulled. Patrick Laughlin in the Phoenix
Republic, Jim Mathis in the Houston Post, and Barret Sanders
in the Pittsburgh Press are aware of the book's general weak-
ness and say as much. There are a half dozen other reviewers
who in short notices indicate that they were unfavorably im-
pressed.
At the other end of the spectrum is Edward :Le Clair in the
Albany Times Union, who gives him this accolade: "Working
with the cooperation of officials both in and out of CIA Tully
has made a major contribution to a general understanding of
this important agency. Much that [he] tells its is either un-
known or little known to the general public . . . carefully re-
searched facts and a penetrating and well-balanced ap-
praisal . . . highly readable . . ." There is also Frederick
Yeiser in the Cincinnati Enquirer who interprets Mr. Tully's
note of acknowledgement to Mr. Dulles et al as evidence that
"the book could not have been written without official con-
sent. . . . Patently Tully was given the bitter with the sweet
and a free hand in the treatment of the material. In addi-
tion the information of public record--and presumably a sub-
stantial amount of reliable gossip-provided what he wanted
for a story, astonishing as it may seem, based solidly on fact."
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Book by Andrew Tully
These are the high water marks, but there are another
twenty-odd short reviews and squibs that are either on the
favorable side or-by confining themselves purely to descrip-
t on of the contents-completely neutral. Thus of the notices
all categories that I have seen the pros and neutrals prevail
t something better than two to one.
It is not likely that these notices in themselves account for
e book's sale, although those which repeated some of Tully's
ntasies unquestionably helped. Nor probably did the ad-
erse ones impede it. There are, as I have said, only a few of
these, and not a single one recognizes the book for what it is.
yen the most critical often speak of the readability of the
rose.
A short version of the book was syndicated in the press, but
rather doubt that this helped its sale. Mr. Tully's radio
roadcasts and TV appearances probably helped, but they of
ourse took place after the book had got a good start. The
dvertising campaign was vigorous and probably one of the
wo most important reasons for the book's commercial success.
The other reason, and the more important, is the American
eople's zealousness to keep its government accountable to it
nd its attraction to "revelations," "inside dope," spies, spying,
nd international intrigue. After the U-2 and the matter of
uba there were few in the United States who did not want to
now what was going on. CIA was out in the open and not
odestly clad. The long Cook article might have satisfied a
great many if it had been published in one of the mass circu-
lation magazines. If the Harkness articles had come in 1961
instead of 1954 they too might have done the trick. But as
things stood around the year's end there was a wide and under-
standable curiosity about that secret part of the government
which, though being roundly criticized and sometimes praised,
was not answering back.
If CIA's secrets are one of the important national resources,
they have come through Mr. Tully's processing relatively un-
damaged. Whatever his aim-and I much doubt the genuine-
ness of the one he has given voice to-he most emphatically
has not showed the taxpayer where his "up to a billion dol-
lars a year" has been going. The mischief of Mr. Tully's
"revelations" will be felt more deeply by the country as a
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BOO by Andrew Tully
whole than by the specific institution of government he pur-
ports to investigate and appraise. CIA will survive his harsh
and ill-informed commentary, but it will be quite a while be-
fore our enemies stop quoting him as the true and proper
source of the calumnies on the United States which they them-
selves have previously floated.
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CIA INTFPN ! I I1SFNi v
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