SOVIETS SET BOOBY TRAPS WITH POWERS RELEASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200030055-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: February 21, 1962
• Content Type: NSPR

WIOVM-
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 CIA-RDP75 QO0
Soviets Set Booby Trams thi ' powers Release
Red Variation on an old Themes
'You Can Do Business with Kremlin`
WORLD ROUNDUP
su n re
Soviet prison was a great event. But the U-2 pilot`s per
sonat happiness carried with it problems and.questions for
the United States.
was as prickly as a porcupipe.
0 In arranging for the
rowers release, the Soviets had
11vTassed the U.S. government
and approached a private citi-
,..en. This was a needle whose,
diplomatic jab was certain to
have diplomatic repercussions.
0 Lawyer James Donovan,
who negotiated the release,
was handed a small timebomb:
Marvin Makinen, an American
1'rilhright scholar arrested by
communist police on trumped-
o1 charges, would also be re-
leased "if better relations" be-
tween the Soviet Union and the
U.S. "should develop as a re-
^.ult of the incident." Ti, the
communists, better relations
means knuckling under to
them.
e Powers, a flier from
whose "crash" over Russia the
Soviets had milked every drop
of propaganda value, was
traded for Colonel Rudolf
Examined from any vantage point, Soviet 64magnanimity-
parMS to budge an inch. Dis
Qernible to the naked diplo
mats eye was a tort
s
;p:tAald the .wily, warty
boas sti0 continued to play
game of double.dcaling mane
ver.,,flard on the heels of.
,Powers, release, he had dus
clef that old ploy: the call f
+'tt,ys always done in the
l past,lpull every propaganda
stop, unabashed and unh
as.'
Nsgtrtiator Danevan tAoves. Refusal by the U.S.
, (W14. w"'w Ph"*)
to gree to the meeting would
disarmament, ' 'Berlin,' ; Laos,, b touted by the Reds as a
atomic .testing,: South Vietnattt,' s of American ingratitude
eat indication that her wall: pre I t' ty in releasing Powers
communist allies than the world I
knew, thkt he needed to come
to an understanding with the I
U.S. and enlist American aid 1
against his own "yellow peril."
Nikita, it was also argued, was
"coming to his senses." "seek-
Tvatfovieh Abel, a high-rank-
ing, highly-trained espionage
expert, ready and able to serve
his masters on other assign-
ments.
Soviet Tranquilizer
During his trial, Abel had
disclosed nothing, conceded
nothing. Powers had sung like
a bird, but the most serious
aspect of the Powers-Abel ex
change, observers are con.
vinced, was the lulling effect
it would have on the American
public. From the moment the
trade was announced, pundits
in and out of government be,
gan looking for deep portents
"A sign of a 'thaw' in the
Soviet attitude," was the first
reaction of the perpetual opti
mists. "You can do business
with the Kremlin."
From that point on, they
were off in a blizzard of horse-
fadish. The deep- and ftktgq'
thinkers at the State Depart-
ment hinted that the episode
was an indication `that Soviet
Dictator Khrushchev was in
greater trouble with his Chinese
stick. In no, critical area-':
ing some kind of modus viven- I
di with the West." I
The facts, as seen by the
more hard-headed on Embassy
Row, hardly fit this rosy view.
Comrade Khrushchev, it was
clear, had simply offered a
very shrivelled carrot while
,; continuing to swing a very big '
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Approved For Release 1999/09/07 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200030055-3