CONFUSION OVER THE CUBAN AFFAIR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160050-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 23, 2000
Sequence Number: 
50
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 1, 1963
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160050-5.pdf105.55 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 200Ab6 : l) - P75-00001 R000100160050-5 ver the Lack of Administration Co-ordination, Not Any Goof in Operation, Is Blamed The administration has handled the domestic politics of its Cuba problem with un- usual clumsiness. As a result confusion has been com- pounded. But that is., pt to say that there was a goof in operations, or a "photo. gap," or a jurisdictional fight be- tween the CIA; arid the Air Force, or even that Senator Keating is a prophet. What has been wrong with the administration approach has been a lack of co-ordina-. tion. For one thing, it has allowed PAsx:rnortem inquiries on Cuba to become the prop- erty of q.. gaggle of different Con; ssional committees- ridi b df' thor with clearly defined terms of reference. There Is Senator Dirksen's one-man investigation. There. is the investigation of the, Senate Preparedness Sub- committee "under Senator Stennis. There are inquiries by subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees. It has been ru- mored that Congressman Hardy's Government Opera- tions Committee is consider- ing the possibility of an in- vestigation of the Cuban policy of the Eisenhower ad- ministration. The admini- stration's attention to the problem has been so lax, that it seems not even to have taken steps to block the appointment of one of its sharpest and most irrespon- sible critics-Senator Thur- mond of South Carolina-to the Stennis 'subcommittee. It is also becoming clear that the administration -has been speaking with jWrA , voices. Ona.:,pf the principal administration witnesses has been the CIA_ a:&rt" ohn McCone Republican Who was one of_ , bcakiest of the hawks during the week- lotig dellbei'ation which pre- ceded the Cuba quarantine last October. Mr. McCone apparently has been,intimat- it hat he felt as early as August and September that the `Russians were putting offensive missiles into Cuba. Another of the principal administration witnesses has been Defense Secretary Mc- Namara. He has been at great pains to show that the first indisputable evidence of offensive missile bases on Cuba came through the photos taken by the U-2 overflight of October 14. To drive home the point, he showed the last previous photos of the exact same area - photos which were taken on a flight of Septem- ber 5, and which showed no offensive missile sites. As a, result there has grown up the theory of the "photo gap" which supposedly existed be- tween September 5 and Octo- ber 14. This theory lends itself to a view"3ea:T- to the critics of the administration, and which seems to fit in with Mr. McCone's testimony. Namely,..that. the-administra- tion failed to press home photo surveillance at the criticaff`momeiit either be- cause of negligence, or be- cause of a jurisdictional bat- tle, or because it wanted to delay the crisis until the eve of elections. IJ4.0-f s ts, ar.e._yery _differ- erlt. Through most of 1961 and 1962 U-2 flights over 'Cuba were going on at the rate of two a month. In Sep- tember, 1962, the rate was increased to four per month. The flight of September 5 covered the western part of the island where offensive aIn Aiia:r missy a la uyfffi b it 'we not yet under constructio . Subsequent flights on Sep tember 17, 26 and 29, and o October 5 and 7 turned u nothing, either because th sites were not yet in, or be cause the wrong areas wer covered, or because of clou cover. Many scheduled flights ha to be cancelled because o bad weather. That is how I happened that the first in disputable evidence came o October 14. It is true, -as the Whit House has announced, tha on October 6, Air Force plane were. substituted for CI planes in the over-flight op oration. But that came abou not, as has been alleged, be cause of a jurisdictional figh which delayed photo opera tions. The fact is that the Ai Force planes were technical ly inferior. The - change wa made mainly because the Ai Force had more plane's avail able. As to Senator Keating, th prevailing con f us 10 n ha made it seem that the ad ministration was either wron or disingenuous while he wa right all along. But has I been all along?' And has h been right? His first mentio of offensive missiles in Cub seems to have occurred, no in August and September a so many suppose, but in Senate speech of October 10 At that time he referred t "at least a half-dozen launch ing sites for Intermediat Range Tactical Missiles." I fact, only three launchin sites were ever discovered. B itself the disparity in ' num bers may seem unimportant But it suggests that the source of the Senator's infor- mation was the under-cur- rent of refugee gossip which looks good in hindsight, but upon which no responsible Government can take action without supporting evidence. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100160050-5