CONFUSION OVER THE CUBAN AFFAIR
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160050-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 23, 2000
Sequence Number:
50
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 1, 1963
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160050-5.pdf | 105.55 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 200Ab6 : l) - P75-00001 R000100160050-5
ver the
Lack of Administration Co-ordination,
Not Any Goof in Operation, Is Blamed
The administration has
handled the domestic politics
of its Cuba problem with un-
usual clumsiness. As a result
confusion has been com-
pounded. But that is., pt to
say that there was a goof in
operations, or a "photo. gap,"
or a jurisdictional fight be-
tween the CIA; arid the Air
Force, or even that Senator
Keating is a prophet.
What has been wrong with
the administration approach
has been a lack of co-ordina-.
tion. For one thing, it has
allowed PAsx:rnortem inquiries
on Cuba to become the prop-
erty of q.. gaggle of different
Con; ssional committees-
ridi b df' thor with clearly
defined terms of reference.
There Is Senator Dirksen's
one-man investigation. There.
is the investigation of the,
Senate Preparedness Sub-
committee "under Senator
Stennis. There are inquiries
by subcommittees of the
House Foreign Affairs and
the Senate Foreign Relations
Committees. It has been ru-
mored that Congressman
Hardy's Government Opera-
tions Committee is consider-
ing the possibility of an in-
vestigation of the Cuban
policy of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration. The admini-
stration's attention to the
problem has been so lax, that
it seems not even to have
taken steps to block the
appointment of one of its
sharpest and most irrespon-
sible critics-Senator Thur-
mond of South Carolina-to
the Stennis 'subcommittee.
It is also becoming clear
that the administration -has
been speaking with jWrA ,
voices. Ona.:,pf the principal
administration witnesses has
been the CIA_ a:&rt" ohn
McCone Republican Who
was one of_ , bcakiest of
the hawks during the week-
lotig dellbei'ation which pre-
ceded the Cuba quarantine
last October. Mr. McCone
apparently has been,intimat-
it hat he felt as early as
August and September that
the `Russians were putting
offensive missiles into Cuba.
Another of the principal
administration witnesses has
been Defense Secretary Mc-
Namara. He has been at
great pains to show that the
first indisputable evidence of
offensive missile bases on
Cuba came through the
photos taken by the U-2
overflight of October 14. To
drive home the point, he
showed the last previous
photos of the exact same
area - photos which were
taken on a flight of Septem-
ber 5, and which showed no
offensive missile sites. As a,
result there has grown up the
theory of the "photo gap"
which supposedly existed be-
tween September 5 and Octo-
ber 14. This theory lends
itself to a view"3ea:T- to the
critics of the administration,
and which seems to fit in
with Mr. McCone's testimony.
Namely,..that. the-administra-
tion failed to press home
photo surveillance at the
criticaff`momeiit either be-
cause of negligence, or be-
cause of a jurisdictional bat-
tle, or because it wanted to
delay the crisis until the eve
of elections.
IJ4.0-f s ts, ar.e._yery _differ-
erlt. Through most of 1961
and 1962 U-2 flights over
'Cuba were going on at the
rate of two a month. In Sep-
tember, 1962, the rate was
increased to four per month.
The flight of September 5
covered the western part of
the island where offensive
aIn Aiia:r
missy a la uyfffi b it 'we
not yet under constructio .
Subsequent flights on Sep
tember 17, 26 and 29, and o
October 5 and 7 turned u
nothing, either because th
sites were not yet in, or be
cause the wrong areas wer
covered, or because of clou
cover.
Many scheduled flights ha
to be cancelled because o
bad weather. That is how I
happened that the first in
disputable evidence came o
October 14.
It is true, -as the Whit
House has announced, tha
on October 6, Air Force plane
were. substituted for CI
planes in the over-flight op
oration. But that came abou
not, as has been alleged, be
cause of a jurisdictional figh
which delayed photo opera
tions. The fact is that the Ai
Force planes were technical
ly inferior. The - change wa
made mainly because the Ai
Force had more plane's avail
able.
As to Senator Keating, th
prevailing con f us 10 n ha
made it seem that the ad
ministration was either wron
or disingenuous while he wa
right all along. But has I
been all along?' And has h
been right? His first mentio
of offensive missiles in Cub
seems to have occurred, no
in August and September a
so many suppose, but in
Senate speech of October 10
At that time he referred t
"at least a half-dozen launch
ing sites for Intermediat
Range Tactical Missiles." I
fact, only three launchin
sites were ever discovered. B
itself the disparity in ' num
bers may seem unimportant
But it suggests that the
source of the Senator's infor-
mation was the under-cur-
rent of refugee gossip which
looks good in hindsight, but
upon which no responsible
Government can take action
without supporting evidence.
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100160050-5