INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK LEFT IN THE COLD

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP75-00001R000100120074-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 18, 1999
Sequence Number: 
74
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 31, 1966
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP75-00001R000100120074-3.pdf116.58 KB
Body: 
Wftflhi1V'.,A JA ~~? IAN -s I pMb3b D AND TIMES HERAL oP??Re?lease 2000/08/26.:. CIA-RDP75-00001 000 VT ~~~~?~i~4'+ OuL1ook? . ,;. ? By Joseph Kraft Left in. the Cold Well-founded misgiving on . the section of the State De- world as the chief testing the role of the Central Intel- partment that.'hcads up in ground .in the struggle for: igence Agency has inspired Secretary Rusk. Their ca- primacy. Instead of having I1C\V SCIltln7ent for a congres- __ can nrnAnptdnP rfpnsinn . to meet known and massive sional watch- dog commit- ltee. But that is ..like pro- scribing pills for ap,earth- iluahe.'. T h e', trou- b1e that af- flicts t he. CIA is ' the sama trouble that afflicts the military Kraft services comprise a Cold War Estab- ment, had to cope with shad; lishmpnt. owy movements, c a p a b i.e Not 'surprisingly, they of turning either toward na- have trouble adjusting to ? tionalism or communism. But instead of switching the change in' the Interna- , to ? more subtle tactics, the tional climate that has been agency in operations In In- at work since about 1958. donesia, Singapore, Cuba Their bureaucratic interest and in the Dominican Re- is to not come in from the public acted as if it still cold. Increasingly at odds faced the same old chat- and. with reality and with en- lenge from monolithic com- r lightened ? opinion, they munism. And when these more and more ? tend to set operations turned sour and up impenetrable barriers of . drew criticism, operation self-defense. self-defense came strongly into play. i l th i mp y s s TH7;' e For instance, the agencyl' i law firms, Dulles_bloug t o.., Union was in" so much trot 1--the.- agency a second wave ble that it made sense no Of -,bright ' and dedicated to try. to develop -East-Wes people to serve under the ,trade, first wave that had been' T 1-hi Mended t d -1-hi 'ended to d the general phenomenon. At department of disinforma the"liigil_tide..h cold war al l ?,.tion thus implying that al pia iJ50s,..~tt _1~ad. a special was' merely Rus place in the sun. Because its sian propaganda. It. Los director;-'Allen Dulles, was tered, if nothing more, th the -brother':of Secretary 'of publication of sj~y diaries State "John Foster. Dulles, stressing -the value o the agency. had immediate, ,espionage, and the flange ,informal_and_easy,access to eof p s eaceful contacts- ;witl ~- the highest ,quarters on .all, the Soviet Union. It put ou `matters of foreign, policy... economic statistics designe From 'the universities h and to show that the Sovie t washed . into intelligence ivy oIJp afing- similar.- ?ine . IL ld W W k d i t ng or ar ur wor He carved out for the agen- cy a special role as a fourth . I. arm of foreign policy re-.,.._ sponsible for para-military operations. Several of these opera- tions, notably, one in Iran, were ,brilliantly. successful, as was the development of the U-2 reconaissance air- ,cra(t? In at least some countries abroad, the CIA-' st 'tion e chief came to count for. more than' the?,_Ambassador. A huge- CIA ..headquarters was built near Wa$hington. All in all, for the:, CIA, the Dduble Dulles era was,,. a golden age-................ `' TIlE, CHANGED interna- tional- climate' that ? coin-, cided with the end of the :.-Double Dulles era featured .' Comm.unist...pluralism and a Williairi_..??Itaborn' who `ha~. proved to. have no flair fo Deputy Director. Richar II?elins,? a career professio - cated, but an organiz ltio man who has spent 20 yea at CIA headquarters, ma GIVEN. THESE formid - le self - defense mech nisms, it is foolish to ima - ine ? that a congression 1 group working part - ti e with only the most limit knowledge of the present o_. say; nothing of the pa 't- could exert any impact n ,the agency.,- CPYRGHT What Is required is a far more formidable enterprise -a long-term confidential study made under an un- doubted presidential man- date by a panel including representatives of the 'Exec- utive, the Legislature and the public, with a staff drawn from past officials of the agency who can ? go through files knowing what .to look for. To be sure, no President likes to accord that. kind of mandate to groups that, kind un- der his control. ? Still, the countervailing argument is very strong. If the President '! Is not himself the prisoner of? the Cold War Estab- lishment, most of the rest of us are. Their self-defense tactics are. a principal reason why it is almost impossible to generate meaningful d Oscusd- sion, and in that way opinion, on a subject of such vital public concern as the war In Vietnam. t py 1966, Publleheri mewsPIPer & ndlcat shift to the underdeveloped Approved For Release 2000/08/26 CIA-RDP75-00001 R 00100120074-3