INSIGHT AND OUTLOOK LEFT IN THE COLD
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00001R000100120074-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 18, 1999
Sequence Number:
74
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 31, 1966
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP75-00001R000100120074-3.pdf | 116.58 KB |
Body:
Wftflhi1V'.,A JA ~~? IAN -s I pMb3b
D
AND TIMES HERAL
oP??Re?lease 2000/08/26.:. CIA-RDP75-00001 000
VT
~~~~?~i~4'+ OuL1ook? . ,;. ? By Joseph Kraft
Left in. the Cold
Well-founded misgiving on . the section of the State De- world as the chief testing
the role of the Central Intel- partment that.'hcads up in ground .in the struggle for:
igence Agency has inspired Secretary Rusk. Their ca- primacy. Instead of having
I1C\V SCIltln7ent for a congres- __ can nrnAnptdnP rfpnsinn . to meet known and massive
sional watch-
dog commit-
ltee. But that
is ..like pro-
scribing pills
for ap,earth-
iluahe.'.
T h e', trou-
b1e that af-
flicts t he.
CIA is ' the
sama trouble
that afflicts
the military
Kraft
services
comprise a Cold War Estab- ment, had to cope with shad;
lishmpnt. owy movements, c a p a b i.e
Not 'surprisingly, they of turning either toward na-
have trouble adjusting to ? tionalism or communism.
But instead of switching
the change in' the Interna- , to ? more subtle tactics, the
tional climate that has been agency in operations In In-
at work since about 1958. donesia, Singapore, Cuba
Their bureaucratic interest and in the Dominican Re-
is to not come in from the public acted as if it still
cold. Increasingly at odds faced the same old chat-
and. with reality and with en- lenge from monolithic com-
r lightened ? opinion, they munism. And when these
more and more ? tend to set operations turned sour and
up impenetrable barriers of . drew criticism, operation
self-defense. self-defense came strongly
into play.
i
l
th
i
mp
y
s s
TH7;'
e For instance, the agencyl' i
law firms, Dulles_bloug t
o.., Union was in" so much trot
1--the.- agency a second wave ble that it made sense no
Of -,bright ' and dedicated to try. to develop -East-Wes
people to serve under the ,trade,
first wave that had been' T 1-hi Mended t d
-1-hi 'ended to d
the general phenomenon. At department of disinforma
the"liigil_tide..h cold war al l ?,.tion thus implying that al
pia iJ50s,..~tt _1~ad. a special was' merely Rus
place in the sun. Because its sian propaganda. It. Los
director;-'Allen Dulles, was tered, if nothing more, th
the -brother':of Secretary 'of publication of sj~y diaries
State "John Foster. Dulles, stressing -the value o
the agency. had immediate, ,espionage, and the flange
,informal_and_easy,access to eof p
s eaceful contacts- ;witl
~- the highest ,quarters on .all, the Soviet Union. It put ou
`matters of foreign, policy... economic statistics designe
From 'the universities h and to show that the Sovie
t
washed . into intelligence
ivy oIJp afing- similar.- ?ine .
IL
ld W
W
k d
i
t
ng
or
ar
ur
wor
He carved out for the agen-
cy a special role as a fourth .
I. arm of foreign policy re-.,.._
sponsible for para-military
operations.
Several of these opera-
tions, notably, one in Iran,
were ,brilliantly. successful,
as was the development of
the U-2 reconaissance air-
,cra(t?
In at least some countries
abroad, the CIA-' st 'tion
e chief came to count for.
more than' the?,_Ambassador.
A huge- CIA ..headquarters
was built near Wa$hington.
All in all, for the:, CIA, the
Dduble Dulles era was,,. a
golden age-................
`' TIlE, CHANGED interna-
tional- climate' that ? coin-,
cided with the end of the
:.-Double Dulles era featured
.' Comm.unist...pluralism and a
Williairi_..??Itaborn' who `ha~.
proved to. have no flair fo
Deputy Director. Richar
II?elins,? a career professio -
cated, but an organiz ltio
man who has spent 20 yea
at CIA headquarters, ma
GIVEN. THESE formid -
le self - defense mech
nisms, it is foolish to ima -
ine ? that a congression 1
group working part - ti e
with only the most limit
knowledge of the present o_.
say; nothing of the pa 't-
could exert any impact n
,the agency.,-
CPYRGHT
What Is required is a far
more formidable enterprise
-a long-term confidential
study made under an un-
doubted presidential man-
date by a panel including
representatives of the 'Exec-
utive, the Legislature and
the public, with a staff
drawn from past officials of
the agency who can ? go
through files knowing what
.to look for.
To be sure, no President
likes to accord that. kind of
mandate to groups that, kind
un-
der his control. ? Still, the
countervailing argument is
very strong. If the President
'! Is not himself the prisoner
of? the Cold War Estab-
lishment, most of the rest
of us are.
Their self-defense tactics
are. a principal reason why
it is almost impossible to
generate meaningful d Oscusd-
sion, and in that way
opinion, on a subject of
such vital public concern as
the war In Vietnam.
t py 1966, Publleheri mewsPIPer & ndlcat
shift to the underdeveloped
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 CIA-RDP75-00001 R 00100120074-3