GEHLEN: SPY OF THE CENTURY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100010043-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: April 22, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

' . 2 2 APR 1972
Ur/-\LrJ
/05/23: CIA-RDP75-0000'f R
ehien: Spy of the Century
by E. H. Cook idge
(Random House; $10)
CPYRGHT
CPYRG'H.T
The'General Was a Spy
by Heinz Hohne and Hermann Zolling
(Coward, McCann & Geoghegan; $8.95).
Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri,
which formally stated the theme of Act I
of the Cold War, a prologue was being
written and played backstage in Europe
by Americans and Germans. They had
already identified Soviet Communism
as Enemy Number One, not primarily
because Russia had Eastern Europe in
its-grip, but because Soviet Commu-
nism was satanic and was set on con-
quering the world. And as Hugh Trevor-
Roper remarks in his introduction to*
The General Was a Spy, "it is legitimate
to use Beelzebub to drive out Satan."
Beelzebub was willing. Both these spy
stories describe how and why, with the
collapse of the German armies, . the
Americans recruited Hitler's Chief of
Intelligence against the Soviet Union
and underwrote his postwar espionage
operations.
Reinhard Gehlen was a professional,
an experienced, single-minded anti-
Communist with exceptional contacts.
Those who hired him were not of the
breed of Henry Stimson, who once said
quaintly that gentlemen don't read
other people's mail. They were what
came to be called realists, and they
dominated US foreign policy for the
next quarter of a century. The US gov-
ernment secretly financed General Geh-
len to the amount of $200 million, and
HdLLdUb1!11U LIPS on Eastern Europe an
the USSR. Toward the end, it learne
that much of the information was us
Iess; and it learned something mom
disturbing: the Gehlen organization ha
been penetrated by the Soviets. By th
early '60s, Washington's interest ha
cooled.
The General Was a Spy is drawn froth
Nazi leaders. He waited until the end
and then escaped to Bavaria, in early
1945, taking with him files he knew
would interest theAmericans-to whom
he intended to surrender at a price. He
met with Brigadier General Edwin L.
Sibert, senior intelligence officer-of the
American Zone, who (report Hohne and
Zolling) "while fighting was still in
progress in France . . . had been pre-
-pared to make use of Adolf Hitler's
officers. in the cause of 'American strat-
egy" and who "had a most excellent
impression of him [Gehlenj at'once."
Sibert promptly took up with General
Bedell Smith, US chief of staff, Gehlen's
proposal to set up a German intelligence
service "financed by the US and directed
against the Soviet Union." Bedell Smith
"okayed" the project, according to
Hohne and Zolling, but did not inform
Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander,
who had forbidden fraternization with
Germans. After lengthy interrogation
in Germany, Gehlen was flown to
Washington.
series of articles written by two Germa Though friendship with Moscow was
journalists for Der Spiegel. Gehlen: Sp hen. official US policy, Cookbridge
of the Century is the product of a Euro oints out, Gehlen knew that "many
pean educated British journalist who enerals, above all General George V.
was himself an intelligence agent i trong, the chief of G-2 army intelli-
World War II and was imprisoned b ence, and Sibert, were very far from
the Gestapo. Hohne and Zolling offer egarding the Soviet Union as a future
more detailed and dispassionate ac Ily. In fact, a vastly different vision was
count and focus more sharply on the aking place at the Third Army head-
intricacies of the postwar intelligent uarters at Bad Toelz, near where he
network inside Germany; they are less Gehlenj had buried his ... files. There
revealing than Cookbridge, however, eneral Patton was dreaming of rearm-
on the American involvement and o g a couple of Waffen SS divisions to
the Nazi backgrounds of Gehlen' corporate them into his Third Army
associates. nd 'lead them 'against they Reds."'
Gehlen served any master who served aid Patton: "We're going to have to
his purpose, which was the undermin- ght them sooner or later. Why not now
ing and the destruction of Communism, hale our army is intact and we can
When it could no longer be doubted ick the Red army back into Russia? We
that the German armies were defeated, c in do it with my Germans.... They
Gehlen turned to the Werewolfs, the to those Red bastards." s
young terrorists who were to carry on hat, of course, went way beyond
after Hitler's collapse. The Werewolf a ything Gehlen's captors had in mind.
project had been discussed at one of ey wanted information; Gehlen had
Gehlen's last meetin
s
ith
h
g
w
t
e Fuhrer, i So, says Cookbridge, they treated
when he finally left his American super- whom Gehlen found "most
h
"
c
arming.
h in with great courtesy, "wooing him
visors and went to work directly for the They had also discussed Hitler's order . li e a wayward lass who can bring a
Bonn government, Mr. Cookbridge tells that "gramophone records with sound large dowry to offset the blemishes of
us, Allen Dulles gave him "a golden effects of combat noise and rolling tanks her past.... Gehlen bargained his way
handshake in appreciation of the great . . . be distributed to front line com- i to the gray dawn of Cold War espio-
work he had done for CIA; a gratuity of mands and played from dugouts as near n ge, conceding or compromising on
250,000 marks had been authorized. as possible to the Soviet lines." Hitler s me points, using pressures near to
Dulles added the not entirely seriously was mad, Gehlen was not. Yet Gehlen .'bl ckmail to gain others. It says much
meant condition that Gehlen should accepted this. order, as all the others, fo his shrewdness, self-assurance and
use the money to buy a fine house knowing it was too late to stave off p rsistence that he was able to take on
somewhere in the Bavarian mo t ins."
For the iear FC9X in@6se ty ~08) ob Fqrk At RDP7 00 0 G!0 0QOQ43a~of top rank-
AM no esert until there was in American experts." They agreed to
mountains of paper and thousands of nothing to desert from. He played no co errly subsidize "an autonomous