UTILIZATION OF THE CIA U-2R RECONNASSISSANCE FLEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74J00828R000100200021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2003
• Sequence Number: 21
• Content Type: PAPER

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UTILIZATION OF THE CIA U-ZR RECONNAISSANCE FLEET
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1966, after a joint SAC/CIA consideration of the possible
purchase of 25 aircraft, CIA contracted for only twelve U-2R vehicles
when SAC indicated they had no need. Before delivery however, high
level discussions resulted in the transfer of six of these vehicles to
SAC. Since that time, the Agency has done all R&D necessary to main-
tain a reliable reconnaissance system and has effected all procurement
for both fleets. CIA has maintained an effective
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not had the same requirements for sophisticated
systems, principally because the environment in which they have been
operating is not as hostile. Both organizations have maintained good
photo systems.
The CIA maintains a fleet of six U-ZR aircraft which are available
photographic
missions. At the present time, the
principal deployed unit, with two U-ZR aircraft, is on
pilots conduct missions along the coast
and at times over mainland Communist China. With the assistance of
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the U. S. Navy carrier forces and the
an additional capability for worldwide deployment has
been demonstrated.
The Strategic Air Command also maintains an additional fleet
of six U-ZR aircraft of which two U-ZRs are deployed against the
national requirement in Southeast Asia and the island of Cuba.
II. THE PROBLEM
It is recognized that satellites now collect a high proportion of
photography for strategic intelligence purposes
To supplement this capability,military and Agency aircraft are also
available for photography . It is therefore
necessary to review the total needs for intelligence information as well
as the efficiencies of management to determine if all of these capabilities
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aAS -~ o a 5 s e' s
are needed; The issue of this is the U-ZR fleet now
operated by CLAN ~ti ~~`( kt 4 E~ ,C@ - kPe
III. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Agency U-2 Program provides the U. S. a flexible overhead
reconnaissance system with unique capabilities for high resolution
photography,
system can react rapidly to world-wide crisis situations cheaply,
effectively, and at little political 'risk to the U. S. Government,
especially in cases wherein third country bases lare
utilized.
The Agency has developed a specialized organization and meth-
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U-2 operations
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This U-2 capability can be utilized on short notice with a reaction time
of approximately fifty hours anywhere in the world. The current
improved version of the U-2 has an average survivability better than
92. 5% over a single SAM site, even if it flies directly overhead, and a
survivability of about 99. 6% if attacked by MIG-21's. The actual mission
survivability can be made even higher by programming the flight path to
avoid SAM installations. Direct costs are approximately
operational mission.
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This program provides the U. S. Government with a low cost
option for meeting future crisis situations in areas other than the
more heavily defended areas of the Soviet Union.
IV.ACAPABILITIES
Agency U-ZRs have a mission altitude capability of
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operate from relatively small fields or from carriers and deploy
anywhere in the world to. be over the target about 50 hours after an
alert The standard camera configuration provides for a swath width
of 63 nautical miles, with 2300 n. m. of coverage in the flight direction.
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miles at a speed of
They can
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Other configurations provide capabilities which vary from horizon-
to-horizon coverage to pin point targeting having a^resolution.
The U-2 can respond to crisis situations anywhere in the world
within 50 hours. It can operate from friendly foreign bases, which
provide plausible denial, or from carrier decks to cover highly critical
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military targets or politically critical revolutions, migrations or
suppressive activities of governments. It operates cheaply, on a
timely basis, and can take advantage of weather breaks.
over China and all other nations, particularly in the procuring of
high value,
in. areas not having the capability_ of the Soviet Union, provide unique,
high value technical intelligence which enable us to define both
capabilities and operating techniques.
SAC U-ZR's have the same general capabilities as above but
because recent missions have not required operation in a hostile
environment,
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has not been an important target and therefore these systems have not
been. maintained at the state-of-the-art. All operate from established
U. S. military bases.
Of the next generation reconnaissance aircraft the OXCART is
in storage and the SR-71 is active in the Air Force. Both have photo
capabilities. The SR-71 is now flying missions in the Far
East. There is also some Air Force speculation that they will also
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be e-eroncr* flying in the Mid-East, as soon as additional funds are made
available.
Both the TAGBOARD and 147 H/T drones are also available for
photo missions. The 147 H/T having a resolution of 2 to 5 feet has been
used mostly for tactical reconnaissance. The TAGBOARD specifications
indicate that resolutions of two feet can be expected but no operational
film has been received as the only launch to date was lost.
V. UTILIZATION
The CIA fleet consists of four planes at Edwards Air Force Base
(Detachment G) and two at the Far East deployment base
All aircraft are maintained in an "operationally
ready" posture. Both bases have a capability for worldwide deployment
on a 24-hour notice and, depending on the deployment base distance,
could be airborne on an operational mission in about A hours
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after notification.
The CIA/OSA maintains
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American pilots operationally ready for overflight of any place on the
globe. There are informal agreements with the for use of their
island bases for staging, and the U-2 Agreement
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provides for coordination and cooperation on South China missions.
There are sufficient
Sufficient camera equipment
~ re maintained at all U-2 bases to
satisfy those requirements levied by the Intelligence Community.
The CIA mission currently requires the maintenance of a system that
will permit' Mainland China peripheral or penetration missions out of
and a worldwide deployment capability at
and at Edwards AFB. Within 50 hours of a deployment alert, Agency
aircraft can be over any target in the-world with the exception of the
more highly defended areas of the Soviet Union. It is the only covert
manned aircraft in the NRO inventory.
SAC maintains four aircraft at Davis-Monthon AFB for training
and support, one at McCoy AFB for Cuban coverage and one at Ben Hoa,
Vietnam, for use over Laos and Cambodia. Current considerations
would pull the McCoy vehicle back to home base,and make periodic
deployments to McCoy from there. The NRO report on this subject,
dated 7 November, also speculates that "continued U. S. withdrawal
from South Vietnam may cause SAC's U-ZR's at Ben Hoa to be withdrawn.
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VI. THE NEED
For Utilization:
It is obvious that present utilization does not take
advantage of all of the unique operating capabilities of the
Agency U-2P4, Although the situations in which they would
be used vary to a considerable extent, each one exhibits a
critical collection need which cannot be fulfilled by any;
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other system if covertness, non-attribution and responsiveness
are considerations.
Probably the most usual need would be to provide
photographic coverage of areas unavailable to satellites
because of nearly continuous cloud cover. Other vehicles,
or U-Zs operated by SAC, could also cover this requirement
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Typical missions which would require Agency U-2
activity would include surveillance of Mid-East war fronts,
particularly if apparent military activity is not commensurate
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with known capabilities. This might indicate greater Soviet
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SR-71 aircraft or
drones also can be used but confusion which could result
from flying military aircraft or missile-like drones could
bring-.serious repercussions. The utilization of military
pilots in U-2s would also be possible but would offer no
advantages in spite of the obvious disadvantages. Civilians
in SAC planes would fall into the same category although the
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disadvantages would be less. SAC could also arrange
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agreements with foreign countries
Certainly
the experience could be gained but the process would be long
and costly, both in terms of money and problems arising
from' inexperience.
For Responsiveness:
Assuming alIcapability is desired, what are the
virtues of Agency management? Initially, it would seem that
the long SAC experience in flying and maintaining aircraft
would be a considerable advantage. However, the Agency
has had even more experience in the operation of this
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particular vehicle and in addition has been required to
operate it in environments that were much more hostile.
This has forced research and development, both in collection
devices because they were unique in the area,
Because of this thin line
between aircraft loss and survival, the Agency has honed the
.whole system and operation to a fine edge. The consistant
display of this same professionalism in deployments is also
a factor in not only providing immediate coverage but also
VII. THE OPTIONS
Although the immediate issue is to make a determination on the
future of the CIA U-2 fleet, the problem must be considered in the context
of other reconnaissance capabilities such as the SAC U-2 fleet, the SR-71,
and the drones. All are certainly important vehicles for military
reconnaissance but the high costs of deployment of the SR-71 and the
continuous high costs of accruing and deploying expendable drones
essentially focus on the two U-2 fleets. 147 H/T Drones are recoverable
but poor resolution
removes them from
consideration. The options then seem to desolve flnto (1) a status quo,
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(2) consolidation under SAC, or (3) consolidation under the Agency.
If all are to be considered as possible options, however, it must be
recognized that no pre-conceptions must dominate. Specifically,
although seldom advanced as an argument, there is a general feeling
that the mission of the Air Force is to fly aircraft and thus the Agency
has little claim. Little recognition is given to the fact that the mission
ofthe Air Force deals with responsibilities, not vehicles, and that
specialized aircraft of all kinds are fob in the Army, Navy, Coast
Guard and Marine Corps. The mission of CIA to collect strategic
intelligence by covert measures is also one of these specialized
requirements.
Option I - The Status Quo:
The original "buy" of twelve U-ZR aircraft by the DNRO
for Agency requirements was predicated on an Air Force
statement that no requirement existed in that organization for
the "R" model. It was as obvious then as it is now that there
are not sufficient requirements to justify two management
oJc ~tst a~ot~~
systems for the requirement that existed. VirtuesAare
difficult to identify. Other facts pertain almost entirely to
economics, and the fact that the total military expenditure
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required to support thes aircraft are likewise extremely
difficult to ascertain. ` 4Ihe most significant factor beaming
on the separation of management of the two fleets is that in
reality only the operational activity is separated. Even.now
all research and development, as well as procurement for
all systems, is done by the Agency. Likewise, Air Force
maintains the warehouses and supply systems.
While the above would seem to indicate there is little
virtue in separate organizations and that some of the
assumed benefits of consolidation are already being achieved,
the 7 November report of the DNRO indicates that separation
is not advisable at this time. This report concludes that,
"Combining the two fleets has been examined from time to
time and the conclusions have been, and still are, that it is
not economical or palatable because of construction costs,
security problems, personnel transfers, political considerations,
mission assignments, etc. Certainly the consideration was
being thought of in terms of consolidation in SAC, as none of
these considerations pertain to the Agency.
I*llliakes any judgment on the virtues of military operation impossible. CIA
expenditures are entirely attributable and while they may be entirely
comparable to Air Force time costs, the fact that they are visible make
them more vulnerable.
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Option II - Consolidation Under SAC:
Consolidation under SAC is attractive to budgeteers
only because a large block of identifiable dollars can be
eliminated and a facade of the function continued with dollars
that are more difficult to identify. While a dollar comparison
is theoretically possible, the many variables related to grade
and rank, time in service, of men assigned to the project,
training costs, indirect costs of base facilities, etc. make
such a determination unrealistic.
Although the above is only an apparent virtue, there are
few others to recommend this option. SAC aircraft do not
have either the
to fulfill all requirements. Neither do they have trained
maintenance men to maintain the Agency aircraft or the
research and development base to continue improvement.
Contracting reaction time is measured in years instead of
months for design and procurement of new systems.
Particularly important is the lack of experience in
mounting
operations. The aircraft would always be
attributed to SAC and be manned by military pilots. None of
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Option III - Consolidation Under CIA:
The primary requirement for U-ZR aircraft is to provide
this country with a
laerial surveillance capability which
is instantly responsive, can survive in all environments
except the more highly defended areas of the Soviet Union,
No other vehicle in the nations current inventory can fulfill
these requirements and this has been the specific utilization
of the U-ZR by CIA since their procurement.
Savings cof- consolidation in the Agency would be
significant. As Cuban reconnaissance would stage directly
out of Edwards and Laos-Cambodia missions out of.
very little additional cost would .be involved. With
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such a small additional requirement all planes would not be
maintained in operational readiness but would be in flyable
storage at either Edwards
in hangar space now
available. There would be a slightly higher utilization of
pilots at no extra cost.
As both R&D and procurement for both fleets. is
currently an Agency function, there would be absolutely no
charge by a consolidation under the Agency. The only
function, other than operational control, not now exercised
by the Agency, is warehousing and supply ; although even
transport and distribution is now an Agency activity.
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WORKING DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR 303 COMMITTEE
1. As a result of concerns of the EXCOM and pressures.from
the BOB I have become concerned abuut the needs for a U-2R capability,
whether it is in the Agency, SAC, or both. To this end I have had a
review of the subject made and I am forwarding a copy for your
consideration.
2. After a review of the paper I find that while the cost and
support virtues of consolidation in the Agency are very appealing, the
most ,important consideration is the retention of a reconnaissance
capability which can rapidly deploy to any place in the world. I feel that
utilization of foreign basest
as' well as the launch and recovery from aircraft carriers on any of the
world's seas, gives us an important non-attributable capability.
It is my opinion that the availability of this flexible, quick reaction
capability for covert reaction to world-wide crises more than justifies
the cost of retentinn. I recognize that broad U. S. policy considerations
must govern U-2 operations and decisions, especially as far as over-
flights of China are concerned. And it is true that for the past few
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years we have been reluctant to allow overflights even with
manned aircraft. However, I think it is important to note that in
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times of crisis our attitude in this regard can change rapidly. It
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capability like the U-2 would
in my opinion become very important to the President. If we terminate
this program now, this option will be lost.
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