AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION N800X (342)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: February 25, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
N 800X (342
25 FEB 1966
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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION N80OX (342)
TAB
A. NARRATIVE OF EVENTS
B. CONCLUSIONS
C. LIFE SCIENCES NARRATIVE OF EVENTS AND COMMENTS
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
E. WRITTEN STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES:
F. FORM 711, USAF ACCIDENT REPORT
FORM 711b, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
FORM 5, PARTS I & II, PILOT'S FLYING TIMES
G. FORM 711c, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE REPORT
POEM 781, EXTRACTS
SERVICE BULLETINS NOT COMPLIED WITH
WEIGHT AND BALANCE CLEARANCE
INSPECTION OF ENGINE DEBRIS, REPORT BY P&W REP
H. FORM 711g, LIFE SCIENCES REPORT
I. ACCIDENT LOCATION MAP AND SCATTER PATTERN OF WRECKAGE
J. PHOTOGRAPHS
K. TAPE RECORDING TRANSCRIPTS OF WITNESSES STATEMENTS AND
INTERROGATION. (Separate, not attached)
25X1A
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AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT ARTICLE 342 (N800X) r.T
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS: Article 342, a U-2F model took off from Edwards North Base at 2 5X1A
1730Z 25 Feb 1966 to practice in flight refueling procedures in conjunction with a
KC-135 tanker from Beale AFB. The pilot of the U-2 was No fuel
was to be transferred from the KC-135, all hookups being dry. The altitude at which
the practice was to take place was 35,000 feet, within the Edwards restricted area
and this region was confirmed as being free of turbulence by a T-33 flight prior
to the IFS: practice. The total fuel on boAtd the U-2 at take-off was 690 gallons,
the sump and auxiliary tanks being full and the remainder of the fuel, 295 gallons,
being in the main tanks.
I. A total of nine dry hookups were completed and terminated with a practice
emergency breakaway by the U-2. The conditions were perfectly smooth at flight
altitude and the boom operator stated that the contacts were the best and
smoothest he had ever witnessed, in fact most of the contacts were made without
the boom operator even having to maneuver his boom, the U-2 pilot just sliding
gently into the contact position. At no time did the U-2 get out of the correct
position while in contact, with virtually no lateral corrections and just minor
vertical corrections on 2 or 3 occasions. On the very first contact the boom
operator noticed slight fuel vapor escape from the U-2 receptacle which
dampened the top of the fuselage for about one foot back from the receptacle.
Thereafter he noticed no vapor either on contacts or disconnects.
2. After the final breakaway, the U-2 dropped back and down and,moved out to
the right of the tanker and came alongside, some 200 feet off the right wing tip,
very slightly forward and above. The U-2 had the gust control in the up position
at this time as was the case from just after take-off. Speed during refueling
practice was 200 knots IAS and as the U-2 came alongside was 210-220.knots LAS.
The KC-135 captain did notice the wings of the U-2 flexing maybe one to two
feet but the co-pilot remarked that the wing flexing was very slight as the U-2
came alongside and then it was very stable. The navigator saw one little bounce
of the wings and from thereon all was smooth. The co-pilot also noticed that
the speed brakes were out when the U-2 was in formation but were retracted just
before or as the climb was commenced.
3. The U-2 stayed alongside for about one to two minutes and then commenced a
climb, estimated as a normal climb for a U-2 by the KC-135 observers and as a pull
up into the climb that produced less pressure on him than normally felt when
rotating the aircraft after take-off by the U-2 pilot.
4, Shortly after the U-2 started the climb away it disappeared from the captain's
view and was visible by only the co-pilot and the navigator who were watching out
of the right side of the tanker. It was visible to these two observers continuously
until the moment of disintegration with the boom operator able to observe the
condensation trail only. The co-pilot. and navigator stated that. the U-2 climbed
to about 500 feet to 1,000 feet above them, dropping back slowly before commencing
a turn to the right although the U-2 pilot did state that he performed a right turning
climb. As the U-2 had reached a 30 degree right bank the co-pilot noticed a fuel
spray which appeared to be coming from the underside of the fuselage close to where
the left wing is attached. The navigator also saw this, but thought the source was
somewhere between the left wing root and one third of the way outboard towards
? -a
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the wing tip. The navigator also noticed a smaller vapor stream front the left wing
tip, but was not certain whether these vapor streams occurred before, or at the
time of the breakup, Just one to two seconds later both of these observers saw
what they thought was almost certainly the left wing of the U-2 break off at the
wing root and fold up and back as one whole piece and drift from their view,
The remainder of the aircraft rolled sharply to the right and started to rotate
or spin. The co-pilot stated that the aircraft then virtually disintegrated, the
only two portions recognisable being a large portion of the nose (He later
pointed out a section on a model from the windshield forward.. In fact it was the
complete fuselage section forward of the wing leading edge) and the bare engine,
just as one would see it on a test standwith pipes and accessories attached to
it but nothing else and it appeared a yellow/gold color with no tail pipe attached.
He, (the co-pilot) did not notice anything of the tail or the right wing. He
later stated he could not be certain that it was the left wing that broke off initially
because he thought that if that was the case, then the remainder of the aircraft
should have rolled to the left instead of the right. However he reaffirmed the fact
that it must have been the left wing because it broke off at the place he saw the fuel
spray coming from and that because of his angle of view, he could not have seen the
right wing break off at the root as well as he could have seen the left wing.
5. After the navigator saw the left wing break off at the root ( which he said
seemed to occur at the instant the aircraft started the bank to the right) he saw
the aircraft roll more sharply to the right with a wobbling motion in a very nose
high attitude and then maybe the right wing break in half or more, followed by just
a 1:housand pieces, such as a jigsaw puzzle thrown in the air, the only distinguishable
item being the bare engine with nothing attached to it, drifting slowly down and
back from the tanker.
b. The boom operator was watching the U-2 contrail (he has a 45 degree view to
each side from directly aft) when the co-pilot shouted that the wing had come off.
Shortly afterwards he saw debris come past his window with just one unidentifiable
large piece and out of the debris appeared the pilot, sitting in his seat with his
back mostly towards him and legs tucked in, just as if he was sitting in a chair,
at about eye 'Level, This was the only object the boom operator then kept his eye
on. As the U-2 pilot drifted back and down he appeared to cross behind the boom
operator. The pilot was just about out of his sight when he saw what he thought
to be a small cloud of dust, The tanker then turned and the boom operator lost
sight of the U-2 pilot until the next time around when he saw the chute deployed.
At no time did the boom operator notice any fire. When he last saw the pilot
there was debris around him and could not detect specifically the pilot/seat
seperation. Very shortly after the break up of the U-2, the boom operator said
over the tankers intercom system that he had the pilot. The tanker captain
then broadcast the fact that they had a chute. This was corrected by the boom
operator who told his captain he had the pilot but no chute yet. The tanker
captain then broadcast this information. The boom operator may have seen the
chute open but the first positive information came from the accompanying T-33
aircraft, the pilots of which had been observing the refueling practice. At
the moment of disintegration of the U-2, the T-33 was turning for home and
was two miles from the incident. One T-33 pilot thought at first he saw
three contrails above the U-2, then that the tanker was shooting flares then
the realization that the U-2 had disintegrated. The other T-33 pilot saw
what appeared to be a phosphor bomb explosion with a number of objects
falling, trailing vapor and glowing for a second or so.
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7. These pilots orbited the debris and spotted the open parachute with one
wing falling leaflike about two miles from the pilot. The U-2 pilot was
seen to touchdown and in fact waved to the T-33 to indicate that he was in
good condition. There was a partial overcast in the area at the time and the
T-33 pilots had difficulty in relocating the downed U-2 pilot due to mountainous
terrain as well. However the U-2 pilot was transmitting on his emergency radio
and the KC-135 was orbiting the spot squawking "mayday" on his IFF. A rescue
helicopter was dispatched from Edwards main base within five minutes of the
occurrence and the U-2 pilot returned to WRSP-IV within two hours.
25X1A
Investigating Officer
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CONCLUSIONS-
1. The primary cause of the accident was the type of maneuver executed by the
pilot.
2. This maneuver was a right climbing turn at 35,000 feet at an indicated airspeed
of 210-220 knots (mach no. 0.63-0.66) with the aircraft in the clean configuration
and the gust control in the "UP" or "ON" position.
3. The positive "G" applied by the pilot was within the limits designated in the
pilot's handbook and the indicated airspeed was within the limit (240 KIAS) for the
type of aircraft configuration.
4. The left wing failed at the root at the same time as aileron was being applied,
(left aileron down). This application of aileron, at the same time as positive "G"
was being exerted, applied a twisting moment to the wing at the same time as it
was subjected to a bending momemt at a high airspeed. The design characteristics
of the wing are such that there is an aerodynamic tendency for it to twist leading
edge up about the flexural axis. Downgoing aileron exerted an opposing twist and the
resultant effect was that an additional up load was placed on the outer wing
causing it to bend upwards and thus produce a levering moment about the root
attachment which was the area of the initial structural failure.
5. The location of the fuel at the time of the accident was in the sump and the
auxilliary wing tanks, the fuel in the main tanks being exhausted. This placed
the weight of the fuel mainly inboard on the wings, thus allowing the outer wing
to bend further upwards, adding to the unfavorable wing bending moment exerted
by the aileron and "G" forces.
6. After the left wing broke away, the rest of the aircraft pitched nose up,
yawed and rolled to the right. The forces exerted during this motion were such
that the engine broke loose from it's mountings and through the lower fuselage.
Gyroscopic forces would have been very powerful. The right wing, with a portion
of the fuselage then broke away. Thus the complete middle of the fuselage was
gone and the forward fuselage, (gear bay, Q bay, cockpit and nose) and aft
fuselage, including all tail surfaces, (except the left horizontal stabilizer
and elevator) were recovered as complete units.
7. The left horizontal stabilizer and elevator were probably struck by the left
wing as it came off and have not been found.
25X1A
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LIFE SCIENCES COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Ejection from the aircraft was elected when disintegration
was obvious (pilot noted one wing had come off). His first action
was to assume the ejection position. When he reached for the ejec-
tion handle, he automatically went for T-33 handles. This instinc-
tively prompted action doubtlessly was due to numerous hours of ex-
perience aquired in the T-33 as compared. to the pilot's 11-2 exper-
ience. However, with over 1300 hours in the U-2, one cannot blame
inexperience. Dual qualification in T-33 and. 1T-2 is necessary and
it is felt that no amount of training will overcome an automatic
reflex to reach for the ejection handles of the aircraft with which
the pilot is more familiar. The pilot saw the canopy leave the air-
craft and. felt the boost of the seat firing. Seat separation was
without complication and evidence shows that no hanging-up of Q-445
seat pack and seat occured. Another automatic reaction was evi-
denced during descent when, after trying basic sky-diving techniques,
the pilot felt he could not be sure of how far he was above ground
and. elected to deploy the parachute. A predilection caused. him to
reach for a left hand D-ring. The D-ring on parachutes used in our
particular aircraft is located on the pilot's right. This automatic
reaction was not unexpected. No recommendation is made to change the
position of the D-ring. The zero lanyard causes faster opening than
human reaction for low altitude escape. Automatic function of the
parachute, activated. by the F-lB release assembly, is extremely re-
liable for high altitude. When the pilot saw he was nearing the
ground, he prepared. for the landing. The landing was uneventful.
While descending, the pilot noted that his right boot was
torn. The boot was a standard ten inch black boot. However, a knife
sheath had been sewn on the lateral surface of the boot. No knife
had been carried in the sheath and, although the sheath was torn,
the lace of the boot had also been snagged. The boot was ripped
posteriorly lateral to the left posterior seam. The tear extends
downward from the top of the boot for a distance of six inches. The
lacing and lateral surface of the boot snagged on some object in the
cockpit, presumably the canopy opening handle. This handle had been
bent and fractured.
A two inch gash and. green paint on the right side of the
helmet was incurred during cockpit buffeting and aircraft break-up
prior to ejection. The helmet was not lost even though the pilot
had. not lowered its visor. Credit for the retention of the helmet
is due primarily to its excellent fit.
During descent considerable body oscillation was noted and.
could not be corrected. by pulling risers, etc. Kit deployment in-
creased oscillation. The pilot elected not to cut the red marked
suspension lines. This action will decrease oscillation by spilling
a section of the parachute canopy.
A powder burn silhouette was found. on the pilot's cover-
alls and flight jacket in a pattern outlining the position of the
leather pad under the belt fastener. A small hole was burned in
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the flight jacket. Chemical analysis showed the hole was burned by
high velocity gas escaping from the release vent on the opening mech-
anism. Although this caused no harm to the pilot on this ejection,
it is possible that a hole could be burned in the pressure suit blad-
der on high altitude ejection. That would be fatal to a pilot.
During ejection, the Q-445 quick disconnect locking pin broke
at the point of entry into the lock. There is evidence that the pull
on the QD was indirect. The QD may have been hit by the lip of the
front of the seat bucket, breaking the release pin and jamming the auto-
matic oxygen pin. However, the pilot did have sufficient oxygen flow
for descent because the initial pull on the QD activated. his emergency
oxygen supply.
After landing, the pilot used his URC-l0 radio to contact the
rescue aircraft. His URT-21 rescue beacon was functioning automatic-
ally and causing interference with the UPC-10 operation until the pilot
realized. this and turned off the ITRT-21 beacon.
In summary, the ejection was totally successful and all Pers-
onal Equipment gear functioned. normally. It is to the pilot's credit
that he handled this entire emergency with complete composure and. was
at all times in control of the situation. Yo panic reactions were
present at any time. He was at all time? calm and "thought out" every
move.
Major, USAF, MC
Senior Flight Surgeon
25X1A
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TAB
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations of Investigating Officer:
1. The "G" limitations as indicated by the flight strength diagrams in
the pilots handbook be reduced when a rolling maneuver is being executed,
particularly at higher indicated airspeeds.
2. The fuel placement not to be such that a condition is arrived at
whereby the auxilliary tanks are full and the main tanks empty.
Investigating Officer
Recommendations of Senior Flight Surgeon,I
1. That ejection procedures for U-2 aircraft continue to be repeatedly
stressed to pilots.
2. That parachute utilization training be stressed to re-emphasize the
position of the D ring on our parachutes and cutting of red marked sus-
pension lines during descent to reduce oscillation. which allows directional
control.
3. That the canopy opening handle be redesigned to eliminate possible
snagging of pilot's clothing or gear on ejection.
4. That the prime contractor re-evaluate the lap belt with possible
redesign to prevent explosive flash from causing damage to the pressure
suit.
5. That the prime contractor re-evaluate the Q-445 quick disconnect to
insure positive action separation-
Senior Flight Surgeon
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
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S T A T E M E N T
1. On 25 February 1966 I was scheduled for a one hour refueling mission
in A/C 342. Since it was a low mission I was wearing light weight navy
flying suit with a T-shirt and long underwear, "jump" boots, flight jack-
et and P-4 helmet. Briefing, pre-flight, cockpit check, start and taxi
were normal. Before take off the seat pin, canopy jettison guard and
seat kit pin were removed; the low altitude escape lanyard was attached.
Take off at 0930 was normal. During the climb check I unlatched the low
altitude escape lanyard, selected the gust position and switched the main
t4nk pressurization switch from repressurize to normal.
2. I climbed to FL350 at a low power setting. During the climb I noted
that the trim was 8 degrees nose down which was unusual for 342 but not
for the fuel loading and cg for this flight. The tanker performed a
perfect rendevous at approximately 0950. I moved into position and made
approximately 9 dry hookups. All the contacts appeared to be smooth and
normal. The cockpit refueling lights also appeared to be working normally.
At approximately 1015 I performed a practice breakaway to the right.
3. After the breakaway I pulled up to the right side of the tanker to
assure the pilot I was clear of his aircraft. I was approximately 300
feet to the right, slightly above and ahead of the tanker. I was in this
position only a minute or so. During that time I was indicating about
210 knots, had the speed brakes out, gear up.and was still in the gust
position.
4. I retracted the speed brakes and initiated a climbing turn to the
right away from the tanker. As soon as I started adding aileron I felt
a slight shudder and immediately thereafter heard a loud crunching noise.
Immediately I was completely out of control of the aircraft and being
tossed vigorously about the cockpit. My first instinct was to right the
airplane but the yoke had no affect. I looked out the right side and
saw that the right wing was gone. I assumed the proper ejection position
and reached for the T-33 ejection handles. I realized my mistake and
reached for the U-2 ejection "D" ring. Although I was still being thrown
about the cockpit I had no trouble reaching or pulling the "D" ring.
The canopy appeared to eject normally; however, I felt very little impact
when the seat fired. The next thing I remember I was tumbling in space
and free of the ejection seat.
5. I tried using the sky diving technique to decrease the tumbling and
it worked better than expected. I couldn't force myself to wait for the
automatic timer since I had no idea of my altitude. I reached for the
parachute "D" ring over my heart and nearly panicked to find it missing.
I immediately found it on the right side and pulled it with both hands.
I felt a relieving but definite jolt when the chute deployed.
6. On the way down I was swaying profusely in about a 90 degree arc;
I was very cold and becoming nausious. I could see debris from the air-
plane floating down all.around me into a cloud deck below. My wrist
watch showed it was approximately 1023. Since I had taken off with a
wind of nearly 25 knots I was preparing for a rough landing. I tight-
ened my helmet chin strap, used the seat kit release handle to extend
the survival kit below me and removed the parachute release guards.
The cloud layer was very thin and only a couple thousand feet above the
ground. The terrain looked very mountainous and rough. I was drifting
backwards when I hit heels first but was able to immediately release the
chute. Although I took a good;jolt on the back of my head, I was conscious
and mobile and quickly got out of the parachute harness and waved that I
was OK to the T-33 that had followed me down. I made contact with the
tanker on the URC 10 but was unable to read them because of a background
signal caused by the URT 21. I also used the URC 10 to help guide the
rescue helicopter and I was safely on my way out within an hour of the
time of the accident.
25X1A
Adoo
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S T A T E M E N T
25 February 1966
CREW POSITION: Aircraft Commander, KC-135 Aircraft
1. I,
having first been advised that the purpose of this investigation is no
to obtain evidence for use in disciplinary action, or for determining
pecuniary liability or line-of-duty status, or to revoke commission or
remove from the active list under the provisions of AFR 36-2, or for use
before a Flying Evaluation Board, but rather is to determine all factors
relating to the accident/incident, and, in the interest of accident pre-
vention, to avert recurrence, do hereby make the following voluntary
statement.
2. , Aircraft Commander,
KC-135 for three and one half years, 2900 hours flying time, 1900 in
KC-135 occupying pilot's position, left seat KC-135, 59-1513 on 25
February 1966 at approximately 18182 when I disintegrated in flight.
25X1A
25X1A
3. After a roximately :30 minutes of practice air refueling with U-2
aircraft, II in Restricted Area R 2508 at FL 350 the receiver air-
craft called a practice breakaway which was successfully completed. He
then pulled up besides the KC-135 and flew formation at 220 KIAS for a
couple of minutes. Next he started a disappeared from my
25X1A
sight almost immediately the co-pilot, said, "his wing is
coming off", I said, "what?", reply "his wing is comin off, he's in a
spin he's disintegrating", at which time I called 25X1A
and a chase plane and told them had disintegrated in 25X1A
flight. I proceed down flying cover at 12,000' until 0 left the 25X1A
Area with low fuel. Then I went down to 8500' just above the cloud
tops. I made UHF contact on 2+3.0 with the pilot but could not under- 2 5X1A
stand him until I could get him to turn off his personal locator beacon
which was transmitting on the same frequency (2+3.0 Guard). I made
several calls to and to recovery "choppers" and again to
Qanother chase that was scrambled. After the pilot pickup I was
released to return to my home base.
4. I do not know why aircraft disintegrated. Also, there is a need to
brief pilots on the fact that locator beacon will jam emergency radio
if not turned off prior to transmission.
5. The above statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
SIGNATURE
25X1A
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S T A T E M E N T
25 February
19
CREW POSITION: Co-Pilot, KC-135 Aircraft
1. I, 903rd Air Refueling Squadron,
having first been advised that the purpose of this investigation is not
to obtain evidence for use in disciplinary action, or for determining
pecuniary liability or line-of-duty status, or to revoke commission or
remove from the active list under the provisions of AFR 36-2, or for use
before a Flying Evaluation Board, but rather is to determine all factors
relating to the accident/incident, and, in the interest of accident pre-
vention, to avert recurrence, do hereby make the following voluntary
statement.
2. I am KC-135 co-pilot, 600
hours total time, about 400 in this type airplane, location in plane
was co-pilot position.
3. I am On 25 February 1966,
I was co-pilot on a KC-135 at the time of the accident. I have 600
total time of which x+00 are in this type airplane, and I have been a
tanker co-pilot for approximately 9 months. At the time of the accident,
I was in the co-pilot's seat looking directly at the other aircraft.
The aircraft had finished practicing, and had pulled up on our right
wing to fly formation for about 1 minute. Then he pulled up in what
appeared to be a normal takeoff attitude for this aircraft for what I
thought was his climb back to altitude, then started a right bank. I
was looking at him all the time. The first thing I noticed was fuel
spray after his initial pull up, and it appeared to be coming from under-
neath the aircraft slightly aft of the wing, but very close to the wing
root where it is attached to the fuselage. I didn't think this odd
because I've seen these type aircraft takeoff before and known them to
siphon a little fuel and I didn't know where the fuel port or salve
drain was. The next thing I observed happed about 2 seconds after I
noticed the spray. His left wing buckled at the wing root and went
up and over the top and back of the plane. Next the airplane started a
moderately fast roll, almost a spin, to what I recall to be to the right.
Almost immediately the airplane seemed to tear apart in all directions
and then began to fall behind us. I noticed two main parts of the plane
(along with all the small debris), the engine, and a large section of the
nose which seemed to be pretty much intact; everything else just dis-
integrated. In my opinion, the aircraft was due to structural failure
of the airplane. It was not an explosion but more of a gradual disin-
tegration which increased rapidly when the airplane started rolling.
4. Omitted.
5. The ab ve statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
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S T A T E M E N T
25 February 1966
CREW POSITION: Navigator, KC-135 Aircraft
1. I, 903rd Air Refueling Squadron,
having first been advised that the purpose of this investigation is not
to obtain evidence for use in disciplinary action, or for determining
pecuniary liability or line-of-duty status, or to revoke commission or
remove from the active list under the provision of AFR 36-2, or for use
before a Flying Evaluation Board, but rather is to determine all factors
relating to the accident/incident, and, in the interest of accident pre-
vention, to avert recurrence, do hereby make the following voluntary
statement.
2. This is Navigator on KC-135 with
7 years rated service. I was standing behind the co-pilot's seat
watching at the time of the accident.
3. Call Sign II had just pulled abeam our right wing. At this
time a few comments were made between cockpits about the wo job
of refueling which he had just completed. Then I observed
climbing after a short climb he started a slight turn to the r .
I observed fuel or vapor coming from the left wing. Right then the
left wing buckled at the base of aircraft and left the aircraft. The
aircraft then proceeded to disintegrate. I lost sight of the pieces
as they passed too far behind the aircraft. After a turn, we spotted
a parachute and hovered until aid arrived.
4? I have no opinion as to why the left wing would come off the
aircraft.
5. The above statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
25X1A
25X1A
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 Approved For please 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447.8000100010064-1
S T A T E M E N T
25 February 1966
CREW POSITION: Boom Operator, KC-l35 Aircraft
1. I, 903rd Air
Refueling Squadron, having firs been advised a e purpose of this
investigation is not to obtain evidence for use in disciplinary action,
or for determining pecuniary liability or line-of-duty status, or to
revoke commission or remove from the active list under the provision of
AFR 36-2, or for use before a Flying Evaluation Board, bur rather is to
determine all factors relating to the accident/incident, and, in the
interest of accident prevention, to avert recurrence, do hereby make the
following voluntary statement.
2. I, age 37, boom operator on
Crew J-75, with seven years experience and 1800 flying hours. I
was the boom operator on KC-135A, 59-1513 on 25 February 1966.
3. I heard the co-pilot call on interphone "he has lost a wing". At
this time I was watching out the right side of the aircraft from the
boom pod and had the contrail of in sight. Almost the instant
the co-pilot made the statement above, saw debris and the pilot of
I watched him to see if the parachute was going to deploy but lost
sight of him as our airplane made a turn.
4. I completed approximately nine (9) dry contacts with I I and
all the contacts were in my opinion, excellent. I fras very
stable, in fact was one of the most stable receivers have every made
contacts with. I do not know what caused the accident.
5. The above statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
SIGNATURE]
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
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~' J
 Approved For lease 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B0044-49000100010064-1
S T A T E M E N T
25X1A
2 March 1966
I and myself had observed the refueling operations in
25X1A a T wi a ca of The entire practice refueling operation
had gone very smoothly. It a noted by both I I and myself 2 5X1A
that the indicated airspeed during the refueling had been 197 Knots. At no
time was the airspeed observed to be above 200 KIAS. The refueling U-2, 25X1A
3g~JA whose call sign was informed the tanker that he would make a break-
away maneuver during is art hookup. Upon completion of this he-informed
the tanker that he would come up along their right side. At this time l I
was flying the T-33 from the rear cockpit and he turned a ou
thirty degrees to the left and commenced a gentle descent towards North Base.
I was looking toward North Base when I heard a radio transmission that caused
me to look in the direction of the tanker. Slightly behind and about the
same altitude as the tanker it appeared as though a phosphorus shell had
exploded. I would estimate our position at this time as about one to two
miles left of and five thousand feet below the tanker. A number of objects
were falling in the sky in the area where it appeared that an explosion had
occurred. Several of these falling objects appeared to be trailing smoke or
vapor for a short time and the ones trailing smoke or vapor appeared to have
a phosphorescent glow which lasted for only a second or so. This appeared
to be fire. At this time I took control of the airplane and turned towards
the falling objects one of which appeared to be larger than all of the others
and falling more slowly. As we got closer to this object it appeared to be
one of the wings. From this time on no falling objects other than the pilot
I commenced circling in the general area of the
ere observed
i
i
.
ng w
s w
and th
25X1A falling object when spotted a descending parachute. I then
took up an orbit around a pammhute and once passed close enough to seethe
pilot waving to us. I continued this orbiting until the pilot was about to
enter the edge of an undercast. During the descent .nd I 25X1 A
observed the falling object enter the undercast at an estimated, wo miles
distance from the pilot. Also during the descent and just prior to the pilot
entering the undercast we observed the seat pack release and hang below the
pilot. Just as the pilot entered the undercast I headed the airplane towards
the the edge of the undercast and upon reaching the edge I made a turn and 25X1A
25X1A heard say, "There He Is". Just then I saw the pilot and ara-
chute touch own, headed the airplane towards this area and
and I both observed the pilot on the ground. I made several more passes
the area of the downed pilot before my fuel state requires me to return to
North Base for landing.
25X1A
25X1A
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 Approved Forelease 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B0044W$000100010064-1
S T A T E M E N T
28 February 1966
1. I was flying in a T-33 with off the wing of the 25X1 A
KC-135 and the U-2 during air re.LLLVJL.LVL9 U11 bruary 1966. We had
taken off one hour prior to the U-2's departure, and climbed to
35,000 feet in the refueling area to check the weather. The air was
smooth with no turbulence and there was none during the refueling
period.
2. The U-2 was airborne at 0930L and the first dry hook-up with
the tanker was made at 0950L. All of the succeeding hook-ups were
dry. would hold his position on the tanker for two or three
minutes an en back off and come in for another hook-up. All of the
hook-ups were accomplished with no problems encountered. In fact, on
about three hook-ups the boomer held the boom steady and flew
into the boom for his own hook-up.
25X1A
3. I would guess II made 8 or 10 hook-ups from 0950L to 1020L.
He called for a breakaway on the last one and pulled back and off to
the right of the tanker. This was not a rapid maneuver in any sense
of the word as we had pulled away from the tanker and were about a
mile and a half to the side and 3,000 feet be Also there was
some conversation between use the tanker, and about the hook- 25X1A
up.
4. As I looked up at the other two aircraft the U-2 was above and
to the right side of the tanker. I thought at first I saw three
contrails above the U-2, then I thought the tanker was shooting flares,
and then I realized the U-2 had disintegrated. There had been no
indication of the U-2 having any problems prior to this. It appeared
from my position that the U-2 had exploded. At the same time the
tanker crew called that a wing had come off of the U-2. We called
at the same time and informed them of the accident.
5. We started to circle the area and made about two orbits when we
spotted the parachute below us. Directly below the chute was a wing
falling somewhat like a leaf. We of course kept watching the chute and
lost track of the wing. There was an overcast with the tops at 8,000
feet. deployed his survival equipment about 2,000 feet above
the clouds in preparation for his landing. During his descent he was
swinging back and forth quite a bit. He disappeared in the clouds
so we swung to the east about a mile where it was clear and came in
under the clouds. We spotted II sitting on the gtound and he
appeared to be in good shape. The tanker had descended to the tops
of the clouds and set up an orbit over the pilot. They were able to
talk to each other on the emergency frequency of the UHF radio. Our 25X1A
fuel was getting low so we returned to Edwards and landed.
pp qKq - a ease /06/1~
E---7
 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
TAB
Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74RQ0447R000100010064-1
USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
(Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s).)
1966, March 25
2. VEHICLE(S)/MATERIEL INVOLVED
(TMS & Serial Nr., if applicable)
U-2F N80OX (342)
4. PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: STATE, COUNTY; DISTANCE AND DIRECTION FROM NEAREST TOWN. IF ON
BASE, IDENTIFY. IF OFF BASE GIVE DISTANCE FROM NEAREST BASE.
California, Kern, 35 NM EAST OF BAKERSFIELD
37NM North West Edwards AFB
7. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING OWNING VEHICLE OR MATERIEL AT TIME OF MISHAP
Major Command Subcommand or AF Air Division Wing
N/A I N/A NIA N/A
3. FOR GROUND ACCIDENTS ONLY
(Base Code and Report Serial Nr.)
Group
N/A
N/A
6.
DAY El NIGHT
El DAWN E DUSK
Squadron or Unit Name and Base Code
WRSP-IV North
Edwards AF
(List organizations of second vehicle, if they differ from Item 7 above)
9. BASE AND COMMAND SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not Abbreviate)
North Edwards AFB, California
1o.
25 1A
LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED
(For aircraft include operator and all other persons whether in plane or not. If more space is required to list all personnel, use additional sheet(s).)
Aero Injury
Last Name First Name M.I. Grade Service No. Assigned Duty Rating to Individual
CIV N A P Pi of inor bruising
11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT: Give a detailed history of flight, or chronological order of facts and circumstances leading to the mishap as applicable, the results of
investigation and analysis to include discussion of all cause factors listed, findings, and recommendations, and any corrective action taken. (Continue on reverse, if more space needed.)
See Attachment
25X1
12. AUTHENTICATION
DATE
SI
CERTIFICATION BY (1411e) TYPED NAME AND GRADE
17W ztre~ r- Zroved "o4449M2/06/18: I -RDP74B00447R00010001 0641-1e vl3
A U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 OF-669566
AF pOR62 71 1 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.
 To Q pTOVe pdrin cipaavcro tnvo ved. ro e` rac 'a''7 o"T ~e h7a'e n?Recon 000100010064-1
Flight Accident Resulting in Aircraft Damage Ky 1 U Accident Not Resulting in Aircraft Damage
Aircraft Non-flight Accident ^ ^ Air Force Aircraft Incident
2. Aircraft/Serial Number
N80OX
3, Type, Model, Series, Block No. 4. Assignment/Status Code (AFM 65-110)
U2F N/A
N/A
6. CLEARANCE:
From Edwards AFB Local) I To To
7. Filed: -
VFR -X VFR- ON TOP' IFR Local X Other Direct Airways (Controlled)
X Instrument
Contact Actual Sim. Other Unk.
If. ALTITUDE
DATA
Cleared Alt. MSL
35,000 Ft.
12. Fire and explosion data
a. Fire:
None-A- Inflight_Ground_
Result of grd. impact? Yes_ No_
b. Explosion:
None X Inflight- Ground
Result of grd. impact? Yes_No_
Altitude above terrain acdt se-
quence began29, 000 Ft.
14. (Ifanswer is "Yes," to either question, discuss under itetn 11, AF Form 711)
Violations ^ Yes ? No Breaches of air discipline ^ Yes ? No
15. PHASE OF OPERATION: e.g. take off roll, initial climb, normal flight, acrobatics, 16. TYPE OF ACCIDENT: e.g. gear-up landing, mid-air collision, abandoned aircraft,
landing approach, flareout fire or explosion in flight, undershoot, overshoot
Normal flight Structural Failure
17. WEATHER AT TIME AND PLACE OF ACCIDENT: (If a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer)
Sky conditions Visibility Wind direction and velocity Temperature Dew point
Clear Unlimited 265? 60 Knots -57?C -650C
Group
N/A
18. OPERATOR (Person at controls at time of accident)
a. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLF NAMF GRADE I COMPONENT I SERVICE NUMBER
Altitude MSL impact point
5, 000 Ft
c. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER
Frontor Left Seat X Rear or Right Seat AC IP P X CP Other (Specify)
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION =
Major Command Subcommand or AF Air Division Wing Group Squadron or Unit Base
N/A N/A I N/A N/A N/A WRSP-IV ( Edwards AFB, Calif
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION FOR FLYING
Major Command
N/A
N/A
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING
AND DATE RECEIVED
Pilot 13 Sep 1952
13. Airfield data: Applicable to takeoff and landing accidents occurring within 2 miles of airfield
Field elevation in use Ft. Composition of rnwy. Asphalt _ Concrete
Length of runway in use Ft. Other (Specify)
Length of overrun Ft. Composition of overrun (Specify)
Distance of touchdown from runway Ft. Surface condition. Dry_ Wet_ Icy_
Heading of runway x Other (Specify)
Conditions affecting occurrence; e.g., type of instrument or lighting approach aid used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gross
weight, forced landing
N/A
PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW)
Wing
L N/A
g. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING
AND DATE RECEIVED
FAA Commercial Pilot
19. OTHER PILOT
a. LAST NAME (Jr., II, etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION
Major Command Subcommand or AF
It. INSTRUMENT CARD
Type
Date of expiration
i. AFSC
Primary
Duty _
NOTE: IF MORE THAN TWO PILOTS ARE INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW) REPORT SAME INFORMATION REQUIRED ON ADDITIONAL SHEET FOR EACH.
AF DFOR 2 71 L PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.
EC l
Mins.
50
10. Mission of Flight
In flight refueling
dry hookup
Highest altitude MSL flown
36,000
Squadron or Unit
N/A
Type FAA
Date of expiration Indef
GRADE COMPONENT
Time flown highest alt.
Hrs. 0 Min. 01
Other weather conditions
None
N/A
i. AFSC
Primary N/A
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 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74BO0 lR000100010064-1
25X
20. FLYING EXPERIENCE (Attach copy of AF Form 5 for Pilot(s) involt'ed as outlined in AFR 127-4.)
ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDERS:
Pilot
Co-Pilot
Inst. Pilot
Acft. Cmdr.
Student Pilot
Give last names only. List all flight tinges to nearest hour.)
a. Total flying hours (Including AF tine, student and other
accredited time):
4270
b. Total Jet Time:
3761
c. Total Ist Pilot/IP hours, all Aircraft:
3761
d. Total Weather Instrument Hours:
289
0
7
e. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours this Model:
13
73
f. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours last 90 Days:
57
g. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours last 90 Days this Model:
28
h. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours weather and hood last 90 Days:
10
is Total Pilot hours night last 90 Days:
34
I. Total Pilot hours last 30 Days:
14
k. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours last 30 Days:
1$
I: Total 1st Pilot/IP hours last 30 Days this Model:
12
m. Date and Duration last previous flight this Model21 Feb 66
5
n. Date of last proficiency flight check:
2
Dec 65
21.
CAUSATIVE AGENCY
Cause Factors (Check one primary and all applicable contributing and probable factors.)
Primary Contributing
Probable
Primary Contributing Probable
Other Personnel
Operators
(.Specify)
Pilot X
Co-Pilot
Materiel Failure or Malfunction
Controller (Drones)
Engines
Crewmembers (Other than Operator)
Airframe X
(Specify)
Landing Gear
--- -
Other (Specify)
Supervisory Personnel -
-
(Specify)
?
Airbase or Airways
Weather
Maintenance Personnel
Misc. Unsafe Conditions
Type of pers. and orgn. level
(Specify)
Undetermined E
22.
DAMAGE
Damage to Aircraft
Damage Beyond Economical Repair
Manhours to Repair
Cost (Est.)
Destroyed ElMinor
El Substantial None
Yes No
N/A
N/A
Description of Damage (Describe briefly extent of damage to aircraft and any property damage incurred)
Aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Aircraft disintegrated in air. Aircraft fell in
uninhabited area in mountainous terrain. Slight property damage incurred while
recovering aircraft parts, no claims expected.
5
23. AUTHENTICATION (Signature and grade)
President
Accident Invest
Maintenance Officer
Medical Officer
AACS Representative
AWS Representative
Member
Recorder
Approved For Release 2002/06/
8: CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
AFp' 2 71 lb
Is S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1963 OF-669740
X1A
 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
1:45
4:30
1:45
5
U2G
SS
1
4:30
11
T33A
S8
6
1:45
2:00
1:30
17
U2F
S8
1
4:25
4:03
0:20
25
U2G
S8
2
1:50
1:50
FEB
8
U2G
S8
1
6:10
5:50
0:20
21
U2G
0
1
5:10
5:10
24
T33A
S8
1
1:40
1:40
24
T33A
S8
2
1:35
1:45
2:00
AGET
1:20
25
U2F
0
0:50
0:50 D
ESTROYED-Z
ION FATAL
ST ENTRY
616 :30
1 { ^, , C'EO NAME AND GRADE OF OPERATIONS OFFICER OR AUTHORIZED DEPUTY
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5X1A
 PILOT INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD
90
2
Approved >;L
-
RADIO
I
AFT
CLASSIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT COMMANDER TIME
APPROACHES
INSTRU-
FLIGHT
1
DATE
I
JI
TYPE
MODEL
SERIES
B
AUTH.
MISSION
SYMBOL
C
L
CONTRO
PILOT
TIME
D
A
RCR
COMMANDER
TIME
E
DAY VFR
F
DAY WEATHER
6
NIGHT VFR
H
NIGHT WEATHER
I
DATE
J
TYPE
K
RADAR
~1y
NON-RADAR
B
?d.E!NT
TRAINERS
N
S!MU-
LAT.OR
O
H P
1111
WXO
FOR
FCL
JAN
3
T33A
11
T33A
17
U
25
U2G
2
FEB
3
U2G
21
U2G
1
24
T33A
3
2
1
Z0 TOTALS THIS SHEET
7
6
3
2
1
TOTALS BROUGHT FORWARD
2,.
FROM SHEET NO. 89
393
275
115:00
56
78
63
242
22. TOTALS TO DATE
400
p
281
115:00
59
80
L 64
242
SECTION III - SUMMARY OF PILOT EXPERIENCE
TURBO-PROP
DUTY
A -
SINGLE
ENGINE
B
TWO
ENGINES
C
MORE THAN
TWO ENGINES
D
SINGLE JET
PROPULSION
E
MULTI-JET
PROPULSION
F
JET
ROCKET
6
ROCKET
H
ROTARY
WING TYPE
I
GLIDER
J
a
ENGINES
K
MORE THAN
TWO ENGINES
L
M
TOTAL
N
23. INSTRUCTOR PILOT
616:30
616: 30
24. FIRST PILOT
0:25
90:40
10:50
2573:40
3144.00
25. COMMAND PILOT
26. CO-PILOT
99:25
38:05
59:30
45:25
27. AIRCRAFT COMMANDER
23. RADIO CONTROL PILOT
29. TOTAL USAF RATED TIME
0-25
190e05
48:55
3249:40
511:40
2:10
PILOT COMBAT TIME
35. INSTRUCTOR
36. FIRST
104-20
37. COMMAND
38. CO-PILOT
39. RADIO CONTROL
40. A/C COMDR
41. TOTAL COMBAT TIME
104: 20
30. AF STUDENT PILOT TIME
265:00
REMAMS (Use reverse If more space needed)
SL CIVILIAN - OVER 450 HP.
28 Feb 66: Aircraft Accident: Bailout successful
32. FOREIGN MILITARY
rt
2:20
33. OTHER U. S. MILITARY
34. TOTAL FLYING TIME
4270: 15
X1A
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 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
TAB
Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
 Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE/MATERIEL REPORT
Use this form when AF aircraft accident/incident involves inadequacy, malfunction or failure of AF materiel.
1. AIRCRAFT TM & SERIAL NUMBER
2.
SPECIAL REPORTS DATA
56-6675
U-2F
a. Were Previous UR's Submitted on Factor(s)
Involved?
^ Yes n No
b. No. and Date of UR's Submitted as Result of This Accident (Attach copy)
None
c. Is TDR Requested?
^ Yes ?No
d. No. of T.O.'s Not Complied With at Time of Accident (List T.O. Nos, and titles on
separate sheet(s)-Tab K)
See attachment
3.
AIRCRAFT HISTORICAL DATA
Item
Aircraft
Part, Component or Accessory
Identification of Aircraft/Part, etc.
56-6675 U-2F
Air Force Acceptance Dote
18 AUG 56
Toted Flight Hours
2961.6
Last Overhaul Date
29 AUG 64
Overhauling Activity (Name and location)
L. C s C s VAN N
TYS, CAL.
Hours Since Overhaul
561.3
Hours Since Last Periodic Inspection
106. 1
Date of Last Periodic Inspection
20 NOV 65
Type of Last Periodic Inspection
200 HOURS
4. ENGINE HISTORICAL DATA
(Complete a separate column for each engine involved. Also, complete a separate column for each power plant component involved.)
Installed Position
SINGLE ENGINE
Engine Model and Series
J75-P13
Engine Serial Number
-
P-Er1209,
Total Engine Hours
2 4 ,
Number of Major Overhauls
0
Hours Since Last Major Overhaul
0 NEW
Date of Last Overhaul
N/A
Overhaul Activity
N A
Date Last Installed
26 FEBR 65
Hours Since Last Installed
2 1 . 8
Date of Last Periodic Inspection
N/A (WAS DUE AT
00 ENG HRS
Type of Last Periodic Inspection
N/A
Fuel (Type and octane rating)
MIL-F-2552 -B
5. FIRE DATA
(To be completed when fire or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground impact. Indicate: P-Probable or K-Known, in squares below.)
a. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING
THE FIRE
b. IGNITION SOURCE
C. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL
Electrical System
Propulsion System
Electrical System
Static Electricity/
Lightning
Cargo
Hydraulic Fluid
Fuel System
Other (Specify)
Pneumatic System
Other (Specify)
Electrical Insulation
Lubricating Oil
Hydraulic System
Propulsion System
Explosives
Other (Specify)
Pneumatic System
Unknown
Unknown
Fuel
Unknown
d. AIRCRAFT FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM
e. FIRE/OVERHEAT WARNING
Fixed
Portable
Fixed
Portable
Fire Detector
Overheat Indicator
Extinguished Fire
N Neotar Fire Activated and Not
Operated Properly
Reduced Fire
If Discharged, Chemical
Used
Not Operated, but Near Fire
No Effect When
Discharged
If Discharged, Amount
of Chemical Used
Not Operated and Not Near Fire
Activated but Did Not
Discharge
Other Pertinent Info.
Not Installed
Not Activated but
Near Fire
Other (Specify)
t.
SHUT OFF PROCEDURE
RESULTS OF ALLOWING FIRE TO BURN OUT
g. EFFECT OF FIRE
MARK ONE
Extinguished Fire
Catastrophic
Reduced Fire
Increased Severity of Mishap
No Effect
No Change in Severity of Mishap
Not Fyccomplished
Unknown
Unknown
AF DOR62711 c
PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.
 6. LOCATION OF IN
ITIAL FIRE
-
pre
ribl
ease 2002106118 : C
:!-
-
r e
Known
Probable
Baggage Compartment
Aft of Firewall
Wheel Well
Bomb Bay
Forward of Firewall
Cargo-Passenger Compartment
Cockpit/Crew Quarters
Rocket Pod
Other (Specify)
Engine Section
Tire/Wheel/Brake
Unknown
7. MISCEL
LANEOUS CHEMICA
L EXPLOSION DATA
Known
Probable
Known
Probable
Initial Ignition Occurred in an Explosive Manner Prior to Ground
Impact.
Intensity of Explosion Was Sufficient To Cause or Appreciably
Contribute to In-Flight Airframe Break-Up.
Explosion Occurred After Fire and Before Ground Impact.
Other Significant Data (Specify)
Explosion Occurred Subsequent to Ground Impact.
Unknown or Not Available.
8. AIRCRAFT MAINTENAN
CE OFFICER'S A
NALYSIS AND SPECIFIC ACTION TAKEN
Describe difficulties involved and relationship of the various components to the accident. Describe specific action taken. For Fire Data describe the fire and/or chemical explosion.
Cover in detail any noted deficiencies, malfunctions of fire detecting and extinguishing equipment, or questionable procedures. When discussing specific equipment, give the name of
manufacturer, part numbers, etc., and state whether or not a UR has been submitted. Include any additional information or opinion of possible value to future technical analysis of this report.
Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
 25X
25X
25
J RATE
LAST NAMA
GRADE-
1SERVICE NUMBER
A (ORGANIZATION AND STATION. IF TRANSIENT)
(PRINT PLAImev.
FTO MAR z 781 PART-1
USE AS
DIRECTED
LOCALLY
/- I
LOCATION
ACFT T/M B
AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.
B0~ ND FLIGHT CONDITION SYMB IN UPPER LEFT
IN UPPER RIGHT BOX. ENTER TIME
FLOWN IN LINE THEREUNDER.
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 Approved For Jease 2002/06/18: CIA-RDP74B00447QP00100010064-1
Service Bulletins not complied with at time of accident:
TITLE
Wing Hole Covers - W.S. 160
Improved Canopy Latch Handle
Nitrogen Bottle Gage - Relocation
Stall Strip Drain Hole and Tube
1045 Addition of
Disconnect
Monitor of Autopilot Manual
Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP74B00447R000100010064-1
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