A SHORT HISTORY OF CIA INTERVENTION IN SIXTEEN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000400170054-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: March 1, 1972
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

EAR'S
Approved For Release 20119'A-RDP74B00415R000400170054-7
A Short History
of CIA-1 ntervention
in Sixteen
Foreign Countries
In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant
pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The
National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security
Council, the Department of Defcn,' , fhe Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act
provided the Agency with five principal duties:
1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concern-
ing intelligence.
2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intel-
ligence matters.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national
security and disseminate it to other government departments.
.4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as
the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally."
3. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC
would direct.'."
In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency'Act,
allowing the* agencyto disregard laws that required disclosure
of information concerning the organization, to expend funds
without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures
with.no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to
make contracts and.purchases without advertising.
With such unprecedented au-
thority, with unlimited access to
money,; with liberty to act with- f
ut regard to scrutiny or review
y either civilian or governmental
rganizations, the CIA has become a self-
fontained state. One observer ranks the CIA as
he fourth world power, after the U.S, Russia, and
hina.
Partly because of the CIA's special "secret"
status and partly because of the laziness of the press,
the total history of CIA intervention in foreign coun-
tries has never been reported. What you read instead
are fragments-an attempted bribe in Mexico last
July, an assassination in Africa last November.
What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but
not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's
record is as erratic and contradictory as that of
any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you
-do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the
CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit
murder, defoliation and drug addiction for
Political, ends. Look at the record:
~{:Fnr RplPace 2005/07/1.3: CIA-RD074BI
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA FIY48?M4$R(?004041 064xVe Bolivian people and
STAT
Mohammed Mossadegh, Iran
Army took the reins of power from the National Revolu.
tionary Movement and appointed Antonio Arguedas as
Minister of the Interior. Within two months he was ap-
proached by United States Air Force Colonel Edward Fox.
Fox told Arguedas to resign his new post or economic aid
to Bolivia would be suspended. Soon after his resignation
Arguedas was approached by a known CIA operative and
asked to co-operate with them in a secret mission, and in
return the CIA, 'working behind the State Department's
back, pledged to restore Arguedas as Minister of the In-
terior. When Arguedas was back in office the CIA requested
that he exercise authority on an American mining claim.
When Arguedas claimed that he could do nothing, the CIA
attempted to frame him with pro-Castro/Guevera docu-
ments. Luckily Arguedas saw the ploy and related the. entire
story at a press conference held in Peru several days later.
BOLIVIA: 1971 A CIA "Brain trust" was formed for the
specific purpose of gathering together exiled leaders of
several Latin American countries. Victor Paz Estenssoro,
former President of Bolivia,' was contacted by the Agency
while residing in Lima, Peru. A revolt was arranged to re-
turn Paz to power. But the agency's plans went unexpectedly
awry when Colonel Hugo Banzer took over the office just
prior to Paz's triumphant return.
BRITISH GUIANA : 1962-66 CIA operations in British
Guiana revealed the extent to which the Agency has pene-
trated the mainstream of American life. Cheddi Jagan, the
Marxist-oriented Premier of British Guiana was not trusted
by the US. The CIA through operatives in AFL-CIO affil-
iated unions supported lengthy strikes in this small South
American country in their eventually successful effort to
overthrow Jagan. Approximately $1,000,000 of American
union and government money was channelled through the
CIA-controlled affiliate unions.
BRAZIL: 1965 Organized labor again became a tool of the
CIA in its effort to break up the politically active labor unions
of Brazil. Masquerading as the International Federation of
Petroleum and Chemical Workers, the CIA funnelled
$30,000 into various Brazilian petroleum unions, persuad-
ing them to join vt ith the Interamerican Regional Organ-
ization of Workers, ..i AFL-CIO affiliate. So far the CIA has
been successful in its efforts.
CHILE: 1970 With Marxist-leaning Salvador Allende as
President, Chile is currently beyond the bounds of CIA
activities. The policy of the agency is to "wait and see." The
CIA hopes that Allende's socialization program will go sour
with the peasants within the next year and a half, and that
the country will be ripe for a takeover by Allende's pred-
ecessor, Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat.
CONGO: The CIA, fearing Soviet influence on the new
republic, chose to support Joseph Mobutu as their champion
ver Patrice Lumumba, whom the agency claimed wasepAT
much influenced by the Communists. Although there is`iib
direct evidence there have been many implications that the
CIA was instrumental in Lumumba's murder. Many of the
CIA and State Department personnel were later moved
nearly en masse from the Congo to Laos under the assump-
a Ave r Release 2005/0.7/,
ion that similar situations required similar solutions.
-RDP74B00415R000400170054-7 't I r,c~ec?
 STAT
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000400170054-7
move against Guzman in June of 1954 with L ` John F. Kennedy
of expropriating 225,000 acres of United
Fruit Company holdings. The U.S. started to
COSTA RICA: 1954-56 Jose Figueres. was a moderate
socialist who became President of this small democratic
country in an open election in 1953. His presence was
particularly bothersome to the CIA because of Figueres'
government policy allowing asylum to anyone who desired
it. The CIA accordingly saw this as a strain upon their in-
telligence gathering and surveillance capabilities. To get
rid of Figueres the CIA engineered a twofold plan; first, to
create embarrassment within the Communist Party, and
second to somehow link Figueres with the Communists. The
first succeeded in creating confusion within the State De-
partment, since the straight diplomats hadn't been informed
of the plan; and the second failed entirely. The agency also
managed to work at cross purposes with the US Ambassa-
dor, who at the same time had been urging President
Eisenhower to invite Figueres to Washington in order to
lend him a measure of prestige.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 1962 Through contacts with
the CIA made by the American Con>ulate, two prominent
landowners and former politicians conspired with the help
of the CIA to assassinate Rafael Trujillo, the arrogant dictator
of this small Carribbean nation.
EGYPT: 1952 Seeing no advantage in supporting the de-
caying monarchy of King Farouk, the CIA played an import-
ant role in support of the revolt that placed General Naguib
and?Gamal Abdul Nasser at the head of the country. Nasser,
though, proved to be more independent than the US govern-
ment would have liked; so the State Department convinced
President Eisenhower to refuse American aid in building
the Aswan Dam.
GUATEMALA: 1954 One of the most tragic examples of
CIA intervention in foreign affairs was the Guatemalan
Revolution of 1954. Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, the popularly
elected socialist President of the small country was a man
marked by the CIA. Guzman had become too friendly with
the Soviet Union, and had committed the unpardonable sin
monist." Approved ForRelease 2005/01`3 CIA B00415R000406170054-7
and prepared to unload 2,000
tons of Czechoslovakian arma.
ments. The Arbenz govern-
ment fell in ten days and
Castillo-Armas' repressive
regime took over, fully sanc-
tioned by the CIA. One of
the first actions of the new
government was to appoint
"defense committees" which
could meet in secret and
declare anyone a "Com-
patiently for the right moment-to move
against the Arbenz government. That
moment came when a Swedish
freighter docked at Puerto Barrios
trained men in Honduras and waited f?
trained Guatemalan Colonel, the agency
the CIA calling the shots. Supporting and Allan Dulles, U.S.
 INDONESIA: 1958 Washington became annoyed at Presi-
STAT
Cheddi Jagan, British Guiana
dent Sukarno's leftist tendencies. He had'become friendly
with the Soviets, began expropriating huge tracts of former
Dutch properties, and welcomed a Communist coalition into
his Jakarta government. With the wild riches of the In-
donesian Archipelago at stake, the CIA took to the air to
strike at the Sukarno government. Once again the familiar
scenario emerged: the State Department denied everything
while the CIA flew its B-26 bombers out of the southern
Philippines, raining bombs on the small islands populated
by Indonesians partial to Sukarno. When one American
pilot was shot down over Ambonia in the Spring of 1958,
the State Department in Washington was left to answer for
the CIA.
IRAN: 1953 Mohammed Mossadegh, the Shah-appointed
Premier of Iran, bowed to popular sentiment and nation-
alized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in
1953. The action spawned a boycott of Iranian oil and the
economy began to falter. In the face of these conditions, the
British and American governments decided that Mossadegh
would be better done away with. Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt,
the grandson of Teddy, illegally entered the country and
began organizing CIA operatives to overthrow Mossadegh.
Roosevelt did his job well. Mossadegh? was promptly ar-
rested and the Shah returned from unofficial exile in Rome.
The incident also worked well for American business. The
British. lost their monopoly and a consortium of Gulf Oil,
Standard Oil and Mobil Oil received 40 percent of the con-
cession in a reorganization of the former company. Roose-
velt later left the CIA officially to take a position with Gulf.
IRAQ: 1958 The CIA was lesss successful in Iraq than it
was in Iran in 1953. The revolution killed King Feisal but
the new government. was faced with a series of revolts from
various tribal factions who were angered at the murder of
Feisal. This instability was encouraged by the CIA, who
actively supported the tribes. Because of the oil companies,
it was mandatory to maintain a friendly pro-Western
government in Iraq, so the CIA'worked to offset the Arab
Unity cries beaming from Radio Cairo by setting up many
of their own clandestine stations.
JORDAN: 1958 King Hussein's pro-Western sentiments
had shackled pro-Arab factions within the country and
weakened the all-Arab alliance. The CIA stayed in Jordan
to protect these sentiments and successfully repulsed two
separate rebellions against the crown.
i LAOS: 1960-present Since the French withdrawal from
Indo-China in 1954, Laos has been in turmoil. The CIA
___ __ -
f
s. i
na
e activity
o
e
o
g
over the past 20 years in Laos. In December, 1959, the
high-living right-wing military leader, Phoumi No-
souvan, was assisted by the-CIA in overthrowing the
US State Department-supported government of Phoui
Sananikone. Using rigged elections inApril 1960, the
CIA was able to keep Nosouvan in power. When
Nosouvan himself was overthrown by a determined
young paratrooper, the CIA assisted Nosouvan in set-
ting up his military government further down the Me-
knng in the province of Savannaket. The State De-
partment sided with the paratrooper, tong Le.
Approver or Releag 2005/07113: CIA-RDP74BOO415R000400170054-7 r,t ; r c
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP74B00.415R000400170054-7
with the North Vietnamese incursions onto Lagttan
territory, the CIA has been actively trying to organize the
hilltribe people who are scattered throughout the moun-
tains of Indochina.
PORTUGUESE ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE.
1965 A number of planes were flown from the United
States to Portugal for use against black liberation move-
ments in these countries.' During a rather bizarre trial, the
two men apprehended openly admitted, just as Francis Gary
powers had before them, that they worked for the CIA and
,that the planes were flown across the United States and
through Customs with the full knowledge of a number of
government agencies. Seven planes eventually reached Africa.
URUGUAY: 1969-71 Using martial law to quell the
student and worker disturbances in this bankrupt country,
President Jorge Pacheco Areco, with the assistance of in-
country CIA operatives, is pressing- 'or an amendment to
the Uruguayan constitution which ..uauld allow him to run
again for President.
VIETNAM: 1955-present The CIA has been involved in a
myriad of activities since the CIA's predecessor-the Office
of Secret Services-left the Indochinese theater soon after
WW II. The Agency's influence has permeated the entire
range of US policy in Vietnam. It was the CIA which at first
developed the "intimate" relationship between President
Diem and Madame Nhu. It was also the CIA which plotted
with the Buddhists several years later to have Diem assas-
sinated.
The CIA was designed to collect intelligence, but as the
scope of the war expanded, so did the agency. The CIA
originated the "pacification effort" and agents were given
carte blanche to make it work. With CIA funds they formed
Revolutionary Development Cadre teams assigned to per-
form "good deeds" for the villagers. But their real function
was to collect intelligence and serve as militia.
The Agency also set up the Vietnamese FBI and works
clo el with the USAID people to co-ordinate police
s
y
activities at the village level. They were previously involved E{ Ngo Dinh Diem, Vietnam J. Z
hlands of Cen-
Hi
h
i
d
g
e
n t
s
gnar
with the. training of lviontatral Viet-Nam but have since turned that responsibility over
to the Special Forces. The CIA organized intelligence col-
lection systems which could be co-ordinated with mobile
CIA troops (The Provincial Recon Unit-PRU).
This short history of CIA activities defines three charac-
teristics of the Agency's operations: i )~ hat tl ci4. use
any means.to_achieve it goal&42).#hca s_gools are c Utra=
Actory and often only self-interested43) .a.nd._.tbat rn pursrt-
,ing .the;. goals,-the - agency frequently contracts alliances
c thal_ dominates
thW, are, even in terms of the realpoli
CIA thinking, self-defeating to the UnitecLStgtps.
The game goes on, because eve allow it to. In the past,
perhaps our acquiescence has been based on a feeling
that it only happens over there, that CIA subversion has
had no material effect at home. But in the light of recent
research by Peter Scott [see pages 35 to 42 ] and others, it
begins to look like the CIA is also a crucial force in the sub-
version of American culture. The means?
Heroin addiction. The CIA's natural ally? The National
Crime Syndicate. Thegoal? Who knows? -Victor. Bedoian.
Approved For Release 2005/07/1.3: CIA-RDP74B