ANDREAS PAPANDREOU MEETS THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000400170035-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: April 22, 1968
• Content Type: OPEN

April 22,
7 J prove U CjIgLe ~)1r5 L/ I~1~3CSIZll - RC?P 4B00415~ JR0 0400kl00F n1 to ,...
[From the Flynn., iOhio, Chronicle-Telegram,
Mar. 16, 1968]
"No one has yet invented a way to finance
government without cost to the taxpayer,
there are only ways of putting off the day
of reckoning."
'That. fact of economic life Is pointed out
again by Son. Harr; P. Byrd, Jr., (D-Va.) in
an article In Spotlight, a publication of the
Committee for Constitutional Government,
Inc.
'fie article was written before the gold
crisis developments of the last few days, but
it is especially timely in view of that crisis.
"No government," Sen. Byrd wrote, "can
play a constructive role in the lives of its
citizens except on the basis of economic
strength. It is no, that dollars are more
important than people and their needs. It 1s
simply that without a sound dollar, all pro-
grams and projects financed by the govern-
ment will be undermined."
Sen. Byrd's warring deserves thoughtful
consideration by all Americans, The day of
reckoning may be nearer than most Ameri-
cans have believed.
[From the 6tauntan, Va., Leader, Apr. 4,
1968)
The Senate would have won considerable
applause had it also written into Its excise
tax bill the proposal of Sen. Harry F. Byrd,
Jr., D-Va., to ban loans to countries trading
with the Communist enemy in Vietnam.
Andreas Papandreou Meets the Press
H:ON. DONALD M. FRASER
OF MINNESOTA
IN TIIE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, April 22, 1968
Mr. F'RASER. Mr. Speaker, on March
10 the .guest on the National Broadcast-
ing Co.'s "Meet the Press" was Andreas
Papandreou, chairman of the Panhel-
lenic Liberation Movement and former
Greek Cabinet ineluber, Mr. Papandreou,
who was freed in December after 8
months' imprisonment, spoke forcefully
for restoration of liberties in Greece and
against, the oppressive military rulers
who have governed for more than a year.
It is particularly fitting that Mr. Papan-
dreou's comments be reprinted at this
time, because yesterday, April 21, was the
anniversary of the coup that 'plunged
Greece into darkness.
The "Meet the Press" interviewers
were Robert Novak, of the Chicago Sun
Times, Philip L. Geyelin, of the Wash-
ington Post, and James Robinson and
Lawrence E. Spivak, of NBC. Edwin New-
man of N]3C was the moderator. The full
text of the interview follows:
Mr. NEWMAN. Our guest today on "Meet the
Press" is Andreas Papandreou, the exiled
Greek political leader who is coordinating
the Greek resistance movement. Mr. Papan-
dreou was a member of the Greek Cabinet
and Parliament, an;i he served as chief aide
to his father, George Papandreou when he
was Prime Minister.
A former naturalized American, Mr. Pa-
pandreou was all economics professor at the
University of California before he returned to
Greece In 1963 to enter politics.
He was charged with high treason under
the government of King Constantine and
later arrested by the military junta, He was
recently released from prison and has just
arrived in this country on a visit.
We will have the first questions now from
Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member of
the "Meet the Press" panel.
Mr. SPIVAK. Mr. Papandreou, in your speech
before the ADA last night, you said, "I must
add that the U. S. Embassy in Athens gave
strong moral support to the King and the
Greek c:-tablishnient In their violation of the
democratic processes In Greece, thus paving
the way for the military coup of April 21,
1967."
Are you charging the United States with
responsibility for the coup?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. The United States Em-
b:-.,;y I charge with historic responsibility,
not necessarily Involvement in the coup it-
self. Actually coups don't occur accidentally.
An atmosphere has to precede a coup, and
the U.S. Embassy, I think, participated in
creating the atmosphere that led. to the coup,
Mr. Spivak.
Air. SPIVAme. You went further. The Wash-
ington Post quotes you as saying that the
"present Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Pa.
adopoulos, 1s probably the first CIA agent
who has managed to be come a Prime Min-
ister."
Are you saying that the United States
helped put hint in power?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. That is a fact, what I said
In Oslo. Namely, Mr. Papadopoulos was the
key coordinator of the Netsainas KYP, the
KYP leader in Greece. KYP is the CIA of
Greece, the Greek CIA. Papadopoulos was
the contact man with the American CIA.
And I add that the American CIA finances
the Greek CIA directly, not' via the Greek
`Government, as Air. Sulzberger himself, has
1 disclosed in an editorial in The New York
LTimes.
Mr. SPIVAK. Are you saying that the United
States could have prevented the coup?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. The United States might
not have been in a position to prevent the
coup, but the United States could surely
have ov,'rthrown the junta, had it wished.
Mr. SPIVAK. Do you say now that the
United States ought to help overthrow the
dictatorship?
Mr. PAPANDRFOrr. No less than that, Mr.
Spivak. I would, however, qualify by saying
surely it should not assist the Junta, and
the recent exhibitions of friendship, and
the U-8 S. RI>osevelt, the recent statements
of Admiral Horatio Itivero in favor of the
Junta in Greece surely shocked the demo-
cratic forces of Greece that ame struggling
for a free country, for a country that can
take its place among the western nations.
Mr. SPIVAK. Mr. Papandreou, when you look
back to the period when you and your father
ran the government, do you find you too may
have been to blame for the coup to some
degree? -
Air. PAPANDREOU. Mr. Spivak, no one is ever
free, totally, of some historic responsibility.
No one. And It is not for are to judge whether
I am or not. It Is for others to judge.
Mr. Gr;YELIN, Mr. Papandreou, I understood
you to say that you thought we should have
moved in and thrown the junta out in the
first instance. flow do you do that?
Mr. PAPANDIFOU. This is more complicated
than that, Air. Geyelin. If the United States
did not lend its moral and material support
to the government of the junta, the junta
would collapse of its own weight, for it has
no strength among the Greek people, and it
has no strength in fact among the Greek
armed services.
Mr. GEYaLIN. Was there no danger of a civil
war at that time?
Alr. PAPANDREOU. Of course not. The junta
has charged that the Communists had arms
with which they would threaten to overtake
the country. In the ten months of their gov-
crnment they have not been able to discover
one single cache of arms. And, after all, the
Democratic Center forces were overwhelm-
ingly In the majority in Greece.
Air. GFYEI,TN. Is it your view now that Iho
Communists are Posslbly netting Si roni;er
although you apparently believe there wan
no threat at the time of the coup? no you
think the junta is creating a threat?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. I should think that as
time goes; on it is quite likely that the flare
extremist forces in the country will becoia
dom Inan t.
Mr. GECELIN. All you woul,l have us do now,
as I understand it, is what? Withdraw rccug-
nition from this goverinnerrt or withdraw all
aid? What would you have us do, specifically?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. Let me put it this way:
Recognition is a formal thing. Sometimes one
recognizes even govcrnnientss it doesn't like.
First of all: to stop the display of errthrr-
sinanr, love and affection for the government;
second: to stop shipping arms to the Junta
with which they subjugate the Greek people.
After all, what are the Greek people to say
when the alliance which they joined to pro-
ect their freedoms arms this mafia, these
ew officers, to keel) the country in bondage.
Mr. NOVAK. Following up Air. Geyelln's
question about extremist elements in the
resistance, Mr. Papandreou, the goverrrment-
controlled Greek newspapers are now con-
tending that your call for a united llbera-
tion front is in effect an invitation for the
Communists to cooperate with you, is that
correct?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. Mr. Novak, the Panhel-
lenic Liberation Movement, which I have the
honor to lead today, calls upon all Greeks,
not upon parties, not upon party platforms,
to join in the effort to overthrow the Junta
and establish on a permanent and solid basis
a democratic process, democratic instl tutlons.
Those Greeks who wish to offer time, effort
and their life in the effort to establish demo-
cracy in Greece-which, after all, is the key
principle of the Western World-those Greeks
are all welcome. None excluded.
Mr. NovAx. Even if they are Communists?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. I will not look at the files
of an individual. Any individual who wishes
to offer his services for democracy may offer
his services. We do not form a front among
parties. We merely call upon the Greeks to
join the effort to one single objective: over-
throw the junta and establish a democratic
government where the Greek people freely,
with judicial protection, may express their
views and run their own country. .
Mr. NovAK. As far as not forming a front
among parties Is concerned, as .I understand
it, the leader of the Greek Communist Par-
ty, the TIKE, speaking from Rumania, bad
endorscal your purposes.
Do you rebuff that endorsement or do you
refuse to in any way collaborate with him?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. My position, Mr. Novak,
I have made very clear. The Panhellenic Liberation Movement is a coordination of re-
sistance movements. It is not a collaboration
among parties.
Mr. NOVAK. Going back, Mr. Papandreou,
in April, at the time of the coup, sonic of
the colonels clahned that if you had-if the
elections had taken place and the Center
Union Party had won, you would have in-
vited Communists into the government in a
coalition popular front. Was that charge
correct or not?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. Afr. Novak, why should it
be valid--after all, our party had 53 per cent
of the vote in '64, On the basis of objective
estimates, we would have had more than 63
per cent of the total national vote In '67.
Why would any party invite any other party
to collaborate when it can run the country
on the basis of its own strength? So the ques-
tion itself is not a sensible question-not
your question, but the question that has been
put and which you transmit.
Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Papandreou, you have
made some very serious charges saying that
the central Intelligence Agency of this coun-
try is directly supporting the junta leaders,
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and you have said you would bring out proof
of these charges, When could we see these
proofs?
Mr. PAPANDREOt7. When did' I make the
charge that it Is supporting? And in what
fashion did I make the charge?
Mr. IionrresoN, You said the Prime Mints-
ter Papadopoulos was in the pay of the CIA.
You said that the Minister of Coordination-
Mr. PAPANDRCOO. Not in the pay. What I
said was that Mr. Papadopoulos was the con-
tact man between the Greek CIA and the
American CIA and that the American CIA
financed directly the activities of the Greek
CIA, not via the government, n question
which as Minister to the Prime Minister I
raised--one of the reasons In fact that I have
been charged, early, as being anti-American,
a charge that is false, [but] I am against
interference of the Irresponsible agencies in
the internal affairs of other countries.
Mr. Rourrasore. Mr. Papandreou, as far as I
can see from your country, you have had no
support there. The Center Union Party has
denounced you, Karamanlis, probably one of
the most famous Greek exiles, has not come
to your support. The Royal Family has not
come to your suport. Where Is your backing?
Mr. PAPANDItEOU'. Mr. Robinson, the Center
Party has never denounced me. One man
dared say something under the pressure from
the junta, and lie has been scratched from
books of the party oiaicially in Greece. Mr.
Spanuriggas who made this statement is no
longer a member of the Center Union. As for
Mr. Karainanlis, I don't need Mr. Karamanlis'
support. He is the bead of a different party.
As for the Flag, he has no business support-
ing anybody, 1-ne included.
Mr. ROBINSON.:trir. Papandreou, when you
went to the United States Embassy In Athens
a few weeks ago to get it visa
Mr. PAPANnm:otr. No, not to got a visa; I
got my visa In Paris.
Mr. RonxNSors. The United States Embassy
anyway reported back to this government
here that you gave them assurances that you
would not indulge in political activities while
in this country. Is this true?
Mr. PAPANnaLOU. Quite to the contrary,
there was no discussion about what I would
be doing. When asked by Mr. Pattakos, the
Deputy Premier of the junta what I would
do abroad, I said I would be true to myself;
you know my history and you can guess the
rest. And airy discussion with Mr. Talbot had
nothing to clo with my own personal plans.
Mr. SPIVAIC. Mr. Papandreou, as you know
you have been called far left by some and
Communist by others. Ilow do you describe
your politics?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. My politics can be de-
Scribed in very few words. Politically I am a
fanatic democrat. I believe in the Bill of
Rights, the freedom of speech, of press, of
syndicalist and political organization.
I believe, second, in a judicial system which
is independent of the executive and can pro-
tect the citizen from police and arbitrary
executive intervention.
Socially and economically, I am what you
may call a New Dealer. Insofar as foreign
policy is concerned, I believe that Greece as
a member of the western alliance ought to
have it voice in matters that atrcet its own
future. It should not be it satellite, but an
ally. And I do want to register my great
chagrin, Mr. Spivak, that today this alliance
that Greece joined to nrotcct its freedom is
supplying the junta with arms. This is un-
acceptable, bir. Spivak.
Mr. SPlvmr.. Would you under any circum-
stances support it Communist regime in
Greece or would you fight It as you are now
fighting the Junta?
Mr. PAPANORrou. I am against totalitari-
anism of all forms, Mr. Spivak, and this is
something that Is in the record. I shall fight
for freedom no matter who threatens it.
Mr. GEYi,?r.rer. Mr. Papandreou, when you
attack the United States government for its
policy in Greece, are you talking about Pros-
ident Johnson's policy or the Secretary of
State's, or are you suggesting that there are
agencies such as CIA that are out of control
and beyond the effective discipline of the
government?
Mr. PAI'ANDREOU. I have myself been very
puzzled to understand the way the political
process leads to a policy, a foreign policy. I
am aware from my experience In Greece that
the various agencies of the U. S. government
Itave often not been In accord and that often
the more irrerponslble elements make out-
tho rc.,p>onsible elements being forced to fol-
low a fait accompli.
Mr. GLYCLIN. Would you have its now cut
off economic assistanrce of all kinds to the
junta at the expense of the people in order
to weaken them?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. Indeed I would. For the
Greek people have to bear one'kind of sacri-
flee or another. One is the economic sacrifice
for the short run. But if the junta were to
survive because of economic and military
support of the West, then the sacrifices would
be much greater for they would have to en-
gage in an active resistance effort, very costly,
very costly indeed to Greece, Europe and the
free world as well.
Mr. Ciaysrr.rri. The junta is making a cam-
paign now through a public relations agency
In this country to attract private AJner?ican
investment. What is your advice to those
potcntisi investors?
bir. PAPANDREOU. Stay out, for when we re-
turn to Greece, we shall question all those
who decided to help tiro junta during this
period.
Arr. NOVAIK. Mr. Papandreou, in your ad-
dress to the ADA last night, you said that
the jucuta did not even have the support of
the Army last April. Do you feel that there is
still lack of support In the Army, and that
is the ba:.is for a possible counter coup today?
AIr. PAPANDREOU. Yes, Mr. Novak, I believe,
this quite deeply, because the Greek Army
today resorts the fact that it Mafia, using
the, in 111gencc appcu.2taus at its disposal,
has to icon over con trol, has sacked over 2000
NATO-trained officers, and Is attempting
through intelligence methods and through
political Coll, rnitr sri in every unit to run the
Army. There is no longer an Army in Greece.
It is a setup of political ellques. The Army
resents this and will have the opportunity
itself', we believe, to upset the junta.
Mr. NovArc. Why didn't the Army then
respond to King Constnntine's attempted
coup in December? In fact, why didn't the
people, if they were as anti-junta as you
say-why didn't they respond to the King in
December?
Mr. l'sy'swutrou. It is a monument of mis-
management, Mr. Novak. The Army, itself,
had not been alerted. The King, himself,
decided suddenly on the date of the coup,
in response to Mr. Karamanlls' appeal to the
Greek people the 9th of December--I think
the King became concerned that Mr.
Karanranlis would make the coup and chose
to male it very rapidly himself to prevent
Karcumanlis front carrying through a coup
against the Junta. It was so badly managed.
And, first of all, how would the people know?
Ire didn't even have it radio station. A taped
statement from Larissa, a second-rate sta-
tion, reached some Greeks.
Now, of course, I have to add that the
IIng could have stayed there and fought.
lie could have. In Macedonia here were mill
tary forces ready to fight and win. As for the
Greek people, the King Is not a symbol they
carp easily follow after the events of July,
19G5, and thereafter.
Mr. Novnir. Are you suggesting that If Mr.
Karam:tnlls had led the coup, if It had gone
as you say it xfvs originally planned, that
it rnii;ht have been successful? .
Mr. PAPANORsXRT. HIS record is far superior
to that of the Ifing. I think it might have
been better.
Mr. Novnrc. One thing I don't quite under-
stand is that in the Nazi occupation in
World War II there were repeated incidents
throughout the villages of Greece against
the occupation forces, even though it meant
death. Why are there no such incidents
against the junta if the people are against
the junta?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. It Is not quite true there
Is no resistance in Greece, Mr. Novak.
Publicity is a little difficult to get. Let's
not forget we have 4,000 prisoners today and
heavy convictions; we have mass firings of
Army officers and civil servants. What do
these things suggest? Why the tortures to-
day? One should read the Amnesty Interna-
tional Report, Mr. Novak, to know the extent
to which this junta has r;urpassecl the Nazi
techniques in psychopathic punishment and
torture, things which are not well known
abroad, for the public relations firms, In-
cluding the Litton firm, which has turned
out to be nothing else but a public relations
firm for the junta, managed to put a cover
of secrecy over cvlcat happens in Greece.
Mr. Roumsou. Mr. Papanclrcou, you were
a very prominent personality in Greece. Don't
.you think it is strange that the junta let you
go?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. I do indeed. I think it is
one of their critical errors. They will regret
it.
Mr. ROi INSON. Might they think that you
lire not particularly dangerous to their-
Mr. I'APANDREOU. I think that this is what
they thought, and it is not for ace to judge
whether I am or not, but I believe they will
regret this mistake.
Mr. TtoneNsoN. Did you give the junta
assurances that you would not engage In
political activity when you went abroad?
Mr. 3'APANn,IEOU? Quite to the contrary.
None. Quite to the contrary. I said flatly that
I would return to the Greek political life
when the people called for me. Quite to the
contrary. I have made the opposite state-
ment.
Mr. ItonmsoN. These statements you are
making abroad, does this not endanger your
father?
Mr. PAPANDREOU. It endangers my father,
indeed, and possibly myself,
I think that I should mention to you to-
day, Mr. Robinson, that. a government news-
paper asked that the prosecutor* In Greece,
the public prosedutor, visit my father and
task him whether he allies himself with inc or
not. If lie allies himself with me, then he
has to be charged before a court niarti:il
with high treason. II he disowns are, then,
of course, this nncans something for his
political-his great political and historic
career. This is the kind of people they are,
and so far as my personal safety is con-
cerned--you asked earlier about evidence.
Well, I have evidence. It is In a safe and it
is my security.
Mr. RoarNsoN. Mr. Papandreou, just before
the coup d'etat last year, you made it Speech
where you charged that the CIA formulated
American policy, and you criticized this policy
for trying to Isolate the Soviet bloc from
making gross errors in Vietnam, in Latin
America and with our allies in NATO. Do you
still stand on these charges?
Mr. I'nPANnar.ou. I have made--it is not a
charge; it is an observation, and it is an
observation which I believe objective and
which I make with a great deal of s;rdrrecs,
Mr. Robinson, because I have lived and
worked and enjoyed my life here for 22 years.
I, along with many Others who today are
Americans-I our no longer one-feel that the
foreign pxrlicy formation process Ili this coun-
try does not satisfy the rules of democratic
government which exist in all other sectors.
The checks and balances which are so Inn-
portant in all democratic processes in your
country don't work in the case of forcil;n
policy. 'T'he Pentagon and CIA and State De-
partment bureaucracy play more of a role
than they should. This is my point, amp it
Is it point of critical importance to the st.rvi-
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21 July 1968
>eDi dIaa ]?'I.1PIiL~n :1IvOiCl
_??JHE Truman Doctrine, giving the the same way I believe the "Greek and the establishment of a reliably' reason for American interven- problem" may be defined as being anti-Communist regime in?Athens.
tion in Greece 'in 1947, con- basically an American problem-the But the end of the civil war in
trasted two ways of life. One, it said, product of a foreign policy distorted 1949 did not mean the end of
is "base 9 upon the will of the majori- by a phobia about Communism. American involvement in Greek af-
ty ... free elections, .. . freedom from An analogy may be drawn between fairs. Washington continued to bol-
political oppression," and the second- Greece and Vietnam. The United ster and "guide" the various Athens
"relies upon terror and oppression States intervened in both countries, governments, expending a total of
su,4)ression of personal free- .. essentially for the same reason. The $1.4-billion in military aid between
d' the
bl
hi
'
e
s ena
t
Moms." After 20 years of overt and "domino theory" was propounded in 1950 and 1367.
covert American intervention,' after ' each Case. "1f Greece goes," the the-
the expenditure of over $3.5-billion ory said, "then Turkey and the Arab
and the
world and Italy also will go
ize and
o
t th
b
,
p
p
ou
e s
in a country a
Illation of Illinois, the result has been entire Mediterranean will be lost." Greek affairs than did members of
the triumph of the second way of And "if Vietnam goes, the rest of the State Department. The American
l
so WILL hu,. 1- uw.? r
life. Indochina a
I point this out, not to denigrate land and Indonesia and Burma, until decisions concerning the weaponry
the Tru.nan Doctrine (it is forAmeri- all of Southeast Asia is lost." and structural organization of the`
can citizens to make appraisals and, There has been one basic differ- 'Greek Army and has exercised,'.;
if necessary, reapp aisals), but rather ence, of course, between Greece and through the palace, a considerable
to emphasize what few Americans Vietnam. The Soviet Union remained influence on promotions among Greek
realize---the exteni: and the. repercus- neutral regarding Greece but has officers.
:;ions of United States intervention in sent larj;c-scale aid to North Vietnam. A number of personal experiences
The National Advisory Moscow has accredited a new Greek brought home to me the nature and
f
irs
k
t
a
..
, .e
af
C orninission on Civil Disorders has Ambassador and has extended its' extent of this outside intervention in
defined the "Negro problem" in the commercial agreements with the junta our domestic affairs. In 1960, for
United States as being basically a Government. And whereas Tito closed instance, when I was on leave of
white problem-the product of a _ his frontiers to the Greek revolution- absence from my position at the
society infected by white racism. In aries, Mao has vied with the Russians University of California and serving
in providing assistance of all types to as economic adviser to the Bank of.-:
North Vietnam, including laborers, Athens, I was visited by the head of
3~ AS PA.'ANDREQU served as
D._puty M;nistcr for Econom;c Coord;na- foodstuffs and arms. During the the C.I.A. in Greece. His purpose
Con in 1964 and 1965 in his fathu's Greek civil war, the United States was to persuade roe-to pressure my
(cabinet. Pievloitiy, he had stcdicd atr' ? was able, without committing any father, a leader of the centrist par-
Hariard and for several years taught eeo? fighting units, to get what it wanted ? ties, to accept a C.I.A. -sponsored
ro: ,ice at various American universitiaa. -that is , th3 defeat of the insurgents c1-iaage is the Greek elcet.oral system -
partment ahd of the C.I.A. to play
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weeks of the coup the newspaper
columnist Marquis Childs informed
his readers of the Johnson Adminis-
i esigned to disfranchise the 3c: tration's relationship to it. The C.I.A..
I said I doubted that my father would. according to the columnist, reported
the imminence of a cou
whereupon
p,
support the plan, for, although he
was strongly anti-Communist, he did a top -secret meetin ; of "military,
have respect for the democratic sys- intelligence, State, all the powers
tem. The C.T.A. official stood up dealing with the Greek problem" was
abruptly, pointed his finger at me. held in Washington.
and said sharply: "You tell your "The solemn question," Childs
father we get what we want!" wrote, "was whether by some subtle
` Some years later, when I had left political intervention the coup could
my academic career in the States, be prevented. . . . The consensus
entered Greek politics and was sere- around the table, after some hand-
ing as an elected Deputy and as a wringing and agonized appraisals of
member of the Cabinet, I discovered the consequences, was that no course
that the C.I.A. was free to operate as ' of action was feasible. . . . Walt
it wished in Greece, and that neither Rostow, the President's adviser on
I nor my colleagues could effectively national security affairs, closed the
control it. The Greek C.I.A., the meeting with these words: '1 hope
It;.Y.P., was financed directly by its you understand, gentlemen, that what
American counterpart rather than by we have concluded here, or rather
the. Athens Government, so it was have failed to conclude, makes the
virtually an appendage of its foreign future course of events in Greece
paymaster. inevitable.'
IIE 'result of 20 years of such
relations between Washington and
Athens was the junta coup of April
21, 1967. It is perhaps not a coinci
dence that the head of the junta, Col.
George Papadopoulos, was the liaison
O between the C.I.A. and the K.Y.P.
and that one of the two other leaders,
ligence officer of the K.Y.P. It is
also notewgrt.h.y that within three
Whatever the origins of the coup
and history doubtless will yield
further interesting revelations--the
fact remains that the present dic-
tatorship represents the failure of
United States policy in Greece. Rule
by junta, after all, is the precise op-
posite of the democratic aspirations
enunciated in the Truman Doctrine.
Furthermore, it is generally agreed
that the junta is intensely unpopular;
the continuation of U.S. support for
first anniversary of the coup, The
was patently a dictatorship a year
ago is still patently a dictatorship;
and the saddest thing is that the
chances of eventual bloodshed are
probably increasing." -
UNITED STATES assumptions and.
policies regarding Vietnam have been
reappraised and apparently modified
.
i A similar reappraisal is urgently
needed regarding Greece before th
e
Vietnam tragedy is repeated there.
Such a reappraisal will require that
certain widely accepted myths be
Myth No. I is that democracy was-
a failure in Greece, that the Greelc
people are not ready for democracy
.
In view of recent sensational devei
;opment.5 in the United States, this.
charge is at least piquant. The fact, _
of course, is not that the Greeks are
un
prepared for democracy, but rather
3
that they have ever been allowed
by their foreign "protectors" to prac-
tice it. In 1941 the British Minister
to Athens,- Sir Edmund Lyons, :Mated:
"A Greece truly independent 'is an
absurdity. Greece is Russian or
ct,A
the dictatorship is likely to lead to is nghsh;, and since she must not by
another Vietnam in Greece. On
The Papcrndreous: Andreas, seen with his wife and two of their children in Paris, left, and his father
George, 79, a former Premier of Greece and leader of the lefiisf Center Union party, Cotlr
men were arrested shortly after the coup-and the elder Papandreou spent part of his confinement
in a ,hospital, tight, When the right-wing junta declared an amnesf/ Andreas went into exile,
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Russian,. it is necessary that she be
English...."
This great - power' Rea ,,olitih per-
sists to the present day. One example
was the agreement itr October, 1944,
between Churchill and Stalin dividing
the Balkans into spheres of mathe-
matically graded influence: In Ru-
mania, there was to be 90 per cent
Russian influence; in Bulgaria, 75 per
cent Russian influence; in Yugo-
slavia, 50 per cent Russian and 50
per cent British influence, and in
Greece, 90 per cent British influence:
What has happened in Greece and
in the other. Balkan countries since
World War II has much more to do
with such pie-slicing than with any
alleged unpreparedness for self-gov-
ernment. In this connection, it is
relevant to note that-the correspond-
ents of the German. magazine Stern
have reported that the C.I.A. con-
ducted a secret poll of Greek polit-
ical attitudes iu March, 1957. The
poll indicated that if elections were
held as scheduled on May 2.,8 the
Center Union and the left would
receive 63 per cent of the votes. Is
it far-fetched to assume that the rea-
son for the 1957 coup was a deter-
mination to forestall such a political
outcome? And does it not follow that
the ultimate cause for the present
dictatorship is not that democracy in
Greece was malfunctioning but rather
that it simply was not allowed to
function when the' people's will
appeared to threaten certain vested
interests, both domestic and foreign?
G~yu
d~ HE second myth about Greece is
that her people are generally apa-
thetic and accept the junta. This
contention appears to be justified
by the lack of any armed resistan.ce,
though this lack compromises the
validity of the junta argument that
the coup was designed to forestall
an imminent Communist uprising. If
arrests for "subversion of the social
order" and barbaric torturing of pris--_
oners, which have been described in
a report of "Amnesty international"
signed by Anthony Marreco of the
British bar and James Becket of the
American bar.
To repair its tarnished image the
junta has engaged the'services of the
New York public relations firm of
Thomas J. Deegan Company, Inc.,
which handles the Time Inc. and
Coca-Cola accounts. For a reported
fee of $243,000 a year, the Deegan
concern is arguing that perhaps there
have been occasional excesses in
Greece but "there are no Use Koch
lampshades," and so the country
qualifies for a Coca-Cola bottling
plant-"the symbol of peace and
freedom."
The Anti-Dictatorship League of
Greek Officers has circulated among
3,000 officers a proclamation de-
nouncing the junta as "r, major na-
tional disaster" and calling for "the
complete restoration of democratic
institutions in Greece." And on April
LURNING from myths to realities,
the immediate task is to get rid of
the military mafia, which, despite its
populist rhetoric, has merely frozen a
bankrupt and discredited status quo.
The end of military domination is the
objective of the '.:nhellenic Libera-
tion Movement, which I am honored
to serve as chairman of its national
council. The movement comprises the
resistance organizations committed
.to the liberation of our country and
to the restoration of the -sovereignty
of our people th.r free elections
for the Constituent Assembly and the
establishment of. a government re-
flecting the will of the nation. The
fundamental rights of citizens are to
be guaranteed by a bill of lights, by
18 The Guardian quoted an "ex-
perienced journalist" who went to
Greece to evaluate public opinion
as having said: "I knew they were,,
unpopular. But--damn it!--I couldn't
find anyone, apart from their place-
men, who now supports them."
The third myth about Greece is
that she has no future because of
inadequate human and natural re-
sources. Quite the contrary, one can
easily establish that Greece has nat-
ural resources far richer than those
of Israel and capable of supporting
the population at a much higher liv-
ing standard. Greece also has trained
personnel to exploit her natural re-
sources, but they are unused and
being driven out of the country. The
the colonels' contention is true, why
have they been unable to discover a
single cache of arms during the year
they have been in power?
In any case, developments in .i
Greece since the coup all point to
popular alienation rather than coop- stifled national talent and. Ueativity.
eration. Despite frantic efforts, the
junta has not been able to win the
support of any outstanding politician
or. intellectual. This isolation has led'
the junta to step up its mass purges,.
6 U. . policies regcaE cling Vietnra t.
I have been recappresisccl asacl capfaclrei:?ifflgr
mlociliffiiecl, ,I ss filar reea, 6*raisut is
needed wegsarcliiag Greece aeffare tvze .
Vietneaxan trcagrclj is repeated fiiaexe.99
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real Greek problem is not inadequate
natural and human resources, but a
fossilized establishment which has
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an independent judiciary and by Greece does need a new constitu-.
armed forces subject to the authority,
of a duly elected civilian government. i
f
The struggle for freedom will suc-
ceed because the. alternative is not
viable; the junta has no answers to
the problems of Greece. It offers
merely an archaic religiosity and an
atavistic chauvinism. In a countr
y
in which the incredibly obsolete
school system is a fundamental ob-
stacle to modernization, the Minister
of Education has banned miniskirts
for girls and long hair for boys, has
oraered Sunday church attendance,
and
and
has proscribed "indecent" films
magazines. Because of the men-
ace of surrounding Slavs and Com-
munists, said this official, "the first
and greatest aim of all schoolwork
is the cultivation of the'nationalistic
and Christian conscience of stu-
dents."This is all strongly reminis-
cent of Chiang Kai-shek's drive to
revive the moral precepts of Con-
fucianism. But just: as Confucianism
was found to be irrelevant to the
problems of modern China, so hyper-
orthodoxy is irrelevant to.the prob-
lems of modern Greece.
HE junta has survived to celebrate
its first anniversary' only because of
direct and indirect support from the
0 United States. Greece and Finland
are the only countries exempted from
the ban on American investments
abroad. The World Bank, which re-
fused a loan to the parliamentary
Greek Government, extended to the
junta a loan of . 512.5-million, and ?
this despite the refusal of the Euro-
Not being able to comprehend this
the democratic nations of Europe. It
needs a constitution that will guaran- logic, the Greek people naturally
tee basic human rights, give the wish that American policy -makers /.
widest possible freedom to political would devise some less devious '
expression and activity, separate means for satisfying the democratic."'
church from state and centralize the aspirations of their foreign policy.
country fiscally and administratively. , HE NEW YORK MIES has been
But a referendum is not the method-
under which a constitution should be
adopted for it is innately totalitarian.
After the liberation of Greece, a free-
ly elected constituent assembly should
i
formulate and adopt a new constitu--:!
tion, one that will lay the foundation
for a free and open society.
When Secretary of Defense Clark .
M. Clifford urged Congress on May
17. to approve a resumption of full-
scale military aid to Greece, he justi-'
tied the-request by pointing to "the
ferment existing today in Eastern ELI?
rope" and adding: "If the nations of i Eastern Europe are beginning to feel a
greater desire for freedom, we would do well not to rock-our boat in that
region. If we front with our. allies, ;
it would offer encouragement to
(Eastern Europeans). It would give
them incentive to free themselves."
more straightforward regarding U.S.
motives. It had this editorial corn-
ment:
"Washington has decided to do
everything it can to provide the
Athens junta with' the prestige and
respectability it has hungered after
since its putsch of last April.
'The reasons given for this course
are drearily familiar:
States Cannot risk a
NATO's southern flank
In other words, the "incentive" for
democracy in Eastern Europe is U.S. -'
support for dictatorship in Greece!
pean Investment Bank to extend
? r-' credits -to Greece until the restora-
i ..tion of democracy. As soon as the
dictatorship announced plans for a
referendum on a new constitution,
Washington hastily volunteered an
official "welcome," while neglecting
the right of private assembly, abol-
ishes trial by jury, allows unlimited
detention before trial and curbs free-
dom of the press. And when the junta
leaders are asked when their consti-
tution will come into force or when
parlimentary elections will be held,
they reply, "When the aims of the
revolution are accompished."
regime defines as Communists, limits
to note the prevailing martial law-
and the patently fraudulent nature of
the proposed constitution. This doe-
urnent excludes those whom the
mere is no aoUO inat we releren-
dun, scheduled for September, is an
effort to forge permanent bonds for
the Grcclts. The constitution will not
be a subject for debate for the refer-
The United
vacuum on
endum will take place under martial %a=C.7 YOOTVJ?:%.
Premier Georgic Papadopoulos celebrates the 'anniversary
law, with the public: intimidated and of the coup he led in April, 1967, by dancing with the Royal Guard. The regime
democratic leade'rp~pi de o elea3~l1fM15/ ~/$3t 1 1-yf~;~r7r DQ4 FFaR9f~0,f~ ~~f 1 $ rol la~ehs of Grp ?-
tortured.
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expanding Soviet influence in the are infinitely more alert and polit
Mediterranean; the colonels are a ically conscious.-Which means, more
fact of life and Washington will get specifically, that support for the
more moderate performance out of Athens junta not only will fail to en- - .
them by displays of friendship than courage democracy in Eastern' Eu-
il
f
by maintaining correct but cool rela-
tions.
"It is questionable. however,
whether the Greek armed forces,
purged of more than 200 experienced
i officers, could fill any meaningful weeks before the colonels seized
NATO role. And it is ridiculous to power, I set forth my views regard
argue that the United States needs , ing the international position of
the colonels more than the colonels
need the United States... .
" he United States will be risking
not only its reputation and goodwill
but an clement of its long-run se-
curity if it becomes involved in the
unsavory business of. helping to
maintain the Greek' dictatorship in
power."
This critique exposes a basic flaw
in the policies of the United States
and of the 19th century's Great
Powers. This flaw is the mechanistic
l
y
geopolitical view of Greece as simp
a strategic'base in the Eastern Medi-
terranean. The trouble with geo-
political reasoning is that it subordi-
nates--and often ignores-the po-
?litical half of the word. It overlooks
the fact that a base ix not merely a
geographic position, it is also a
people. Without the active support
of the people, the _ base cannot en-
dure.
a
rope or anywhere else, but will
even to protect United States inter-
. ests in Greece.
On March 1, 1967, barely six -
Greece as follows:
"Greece, as a developing nation,
a nation barely emerging from. a
semicolonial status, is extremely
sensitive about its national inde-'
pendence, its freedom to chart its
own international political course, its
right to pursue freely its own na-
tional interests without placing in a
quandary its allied relationships. We'
do not raise the question concern-
in" the participation of Greece in the -
NATO alliance. But at the same time
we demand that Greece be recog-
nized as an independent nation
which, pursuing its own particular
interests, has chosen to be a mem-
ber of the Western alliance.
- "Greece refuses the status of a
poor relative or of a satellite. It
insists on its right, while executing'
its obligations as an ally, to deter-
mine its own course. It affirms its
right to expand its commercial, eco-
nomic and cultural relations with all
cizing the assumption of Tory policy -i . other nations, independently of the
that it was to Britain's interest to bloc to which they belong. It as-
preserve the Ottoman Empire (and signs special importance to develop-
Ottoman rule over the Balkan Chris- ing good relations with its Balkan
tians) as a barrier against Russian neighbors, the countries of the Near
expansion to the Mediterranean. and Middle East and the new nations
Gladstone maintained instead that of Africa. It insists on its right to
"the breasts of free men" constituted follow closely developments in the
the most effective resistance against European area, where a reduction of
Russia. His contention was borne out
repeatedly when independent Balkan
states were created and, to Britain's
surprise, proved i:o be fiercely na-
tionalistic and resistant to 'Russian
tensions, a rapprochement among
nations of the East and West and a
new approach to European solidarity
are taking place. But above all,
Greece insists that its allies cease
control rather than tools for Russian interfering in its internal political
expansion.
Gladstone has also. been proved
affairs."
1 remain convinced that this state-
correct by developments since World ;Went defines properly not only the
War 11. -Though Churchill and Stalin , fundamental interests of the sover-
arranged for stipulated degrees of eign Greek nation but also the legiti
British and Soviet domination in the mate interests of all great powers..,
Balkans, the Balkan peoples have re
jetted such determination of their
fate by foreigners, whether Rus-
sians or Westerners. Surely policy-
makers with any sense of his-
tory must realize that if Gladstone's
plea for "tiro breasts of free men"
was valid in the 19th century, there
can be no question as to its validity
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Gladstone pointed this out in criti-
INCE the terrible assassination
of Senator Robert Kennedy, this ?
stand takes on an urgent impor-
tance. Senator Kennedy was an
ardent foe of the Greek military die-
tatorship. Ile stated in March that
if he were elected President he would
cut off all military aid to- the junta.
He was against violence as a way
of. life. I think it is time that those
of us who believe as he did, who
treasure the basic rights of man,
whether we be Greeks, Americans,
Britons or Swedes, form an alliance
to protect these rights and to fight
with all means the disease of fascism
and totalitarianism which is eating
into the free world. When countries
such as the United States or other
NATO nations send arms to the mili-
tary clique in Greece to be used to
subjugate a people, then they are en-
couraging brutality and force every-
where and sowing the seeds which
will eventually destroy their own in-
stitutions, In the name of Robert
Kennedy, let us try to stop this hor-
rible sickness. Eir'
V o '
O ttt
 G
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Li Elu~ u+at~, .
.~.yy {yam +'`? --Troops before a Government
building during the coup. Papandreou says junta leaders were close
to the Greek . inteiiiigence apparatus, which the C.I.A.-
supported.
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 D12
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4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W.. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016. 244-3540
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF ( SEE PAGE 10 )
PROGRAM Firing Line STATION WETA TV
NET Network
April 30, 1972 8:00 PM
Washington, D.C.
FULL TEXT
WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.: Mr. Andreas Papandreou'-
did I get that wrong?
ANDREAS PAPANDREOU: No, it's okay.
BUCKLEY: Sorry. Was an American citizen for a while.
He was automatically given citizenship when he served in our
armed forces during the Second World I ;gar. Arid in any case he
had attended Harvard University and gone on to do graduate work
in economics. In fact, he became a professor of economics and
headed the department at the University of California at Berkeley,
when suddenly he felt the call of Greek politics, ditched it
all, and went back to Athens in 1959. A few years later he
was a minister in his father's cabinet and the leading Greek
noncommunist leftist.
But late one night in April, five years ago, a grow,)
of colonels staged a coup and democratic government, once again,
was terminated in Greece. Mr. Papandreou was kept in prison
for about eight months and then released.
He is once again a professor of economics, this time
at York University in Toronto. He has written a book about
his experiences in Greek politics, Democracy at Gunpoint, and
has another book coming out on what he calls "creative capitalism".
Meanwhile he continues to apply such pressures as
he can against the government of the colonels. He is particularly
active in the lobby that seeks to influence Congress and the
White House to put pressure on the colonels to democratize their
government. Which seeks also to deprive the Greeks of military
aid in the event that they do not do our bidding.
I should like to ask, 111r. Papandreou, do you believe
that the United States government should deny economic or military
aid to all nondemocratic powers?
OFF1 pproved174arrRelease 20D5.d 17ddrl:.G&ArRE 74BOD4MR0004OL 17003&8,CAao
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War strategic games that are ruining not only us but the world
and you...
BUCKLEY: But you can't be.
PAPANDREOU: ...as well.
BUCKLEY: You can't he left out. You'd be gobbled
PAPANDREOU: Well, look. What do you think we are
BUCKLEY: Well...
PAPANDREOU: We are gobbled up by the Pentagon right
(loth men talk at once)
BUCKLEY: I think, if I may say so, that's your superstition.
PAPANDREOU: If -- superstition?
BUCKLEY: Absolute superstition.
PAPANDREOU: Let me give you some facts, sir.
BUCKLEY: Okay.
PAPANDREOU:__hl,.__ I._ Rostov, February 1967, subcommittee
of the Security Council of the United States, reviewed the Greek
situation. Conclusion: the Center Union and Papandreous will
win in May '67.
BUCKLEY: Oh, I -- everybody agrees...
PAPANDREOU: That being...
BUCKLEY: Sure. Everybody knows that.
PAPANDREOU: ...against the interest of the United
States, proceeds Mr. Rostow, therefore necessary to move toward
a dictatorial solution in Greece. Source, because you like
sources: Marquis Childs' syndicated column, plus oral confirmation
by Marquis Childs to me in person, Spring 1968. Available in
print.
BUCKLEY: To say that Marquis Childs said it doesn't
mean that it's true. But...
PAPANDREOU: All right.
BUCKLEY: ...but let's -- let's oblige it...
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17
PAPANDREOU: All right. Ne.xt...
BUCKLEY: Go ahead.
PAPANDREOU: ...who made the coup in Greece? Five
men. I can reel off their names. It don't make much sense;
Greek names are difficult to pronounce if you're not a Greek.
But the five men -- I'll reel them off -- Papadopoulos, Makarezos
(?), Patakos (?), Hadzipatro (?), Foralis (?). This is the
group.
Of the five, the four members of the Greek intelligence
agency. Therefore of the five, the four members necessarily
and inevitably of the CIA. The coup was a CIA coup. And it
was a Pentagon supported one.
We hope that by next fall an army officer who has
escaped the junta to' which he belonged -- we hope, I say --
will be secure enough abroad to he able to give testimony to
personal participation in Greek uniform of CIA personnel, as
in Cambodia and as in Laos.
By the way, it might be of -interest to you that the
overthrow -- the officers who overthrew Sihanouk in Cambodia
were trained in Greece by Papadopoulos. Just as you may be
interested to know that the Italian neofascists, the MSL in
Italy,.is getting today,its guidance by the junta. And there
is now documentary evidence of this in Italy.
The famous general who tried the coup a l i ttl e while
back -- not general but prince, in fact, Borgese (?), Borgese
is now in Corfu, working very closely with the Greek junta and
preparing the next few moves in Italy.
So we're talking about a pattern here...
BUCKLEY: fir. Papandreou, I wish -- I wish that the
CIA were one half as powerful as you depict it as being. We
would have much less difficulty throughout the world.
I do know that Papadopoulos was investigated as far
back as 1958 because it was suspected that he was involved in
a coup. I also know that there are coups in Greece before CIA
was invented.
BUCKLEY: It's the obvious, it's the ordinary thing
in Greece...
PAPANDREOU: The ordinary? .
BUCKLEY: ...not the extraordinary thing.
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IN TIDE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T1
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V.
VICTOR L. MARCHETTI,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 179-72-A
MAY
?~ J ; .i}
ALEXANDRIA, y_IRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER .
The United States. has filed a .complaint
seeking to enforce specific performance of a con-
tract it made with the defendant. The complaint
asks for a permanent injunction against disclosure
by the defendant, his agents, servants, or employees,
assigns, and all others in concert or participation
with him, of information obtained by him while an
employee of the Central intelligence Agency (CIA),
all in violatign of that contract.,
The controlling issue in the case,.as set
forth in defendant' s - rial brief (p. 16), is "whether
the facts are to be judged according to the First
Amendment doctrine or according to the common law
of contracts." It is the Court's'view that.it should
be viewed according to the latter.
Upon beginning his employment with the
United States, the defendant executed the following
two secrecy agreements:
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"SECRECY AGREEMENT
23 March 1955
Date
1. I am aware of the fact that the
Central Intelligence Agency by reason of
the sensitive nature of its work, must
observe very strict security measures.
2. I agree to honor the requests of
the Central Intelligence Agency relative
to my application for employment or
rendition of services whether it be
accepted or rejected.
3. 1 agree not to inform anyone that
I am being considered for a position in
the Central Intelligence Agency, unless
specifically authorized by a representative
.of the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. I,agree not; to disclose processing
procedures.I have observed in the Central
Intelligence Agency.
5. 1 agree not to discuss by name or
otherwise, any individuals'with whom I have
talked in the course of my application for-
employment to the Central intelligence
Agency.
/s/ Victor L. Marchetti
Signature
/s/ William E. Greenip
Witness
"SECRECY AGREEMENT
1. I, Victor L. Marchetti, understand that
by virtue of my duties in the Central
Intelligence Agency, I may be or have been
the recipient of information and intelligence
which concerns the present and future security
of the United States. This information and
intelligence, together with the methods of
collecting and handling it, are classified
according to security standards set by the
United States Government. I have read and
understand the provisions of. the espionage
laws, Act of June 25, 194#3, as amended, con-
cernin,g the disclosure. of information relating
to the National Defense and I am familiar with
the penalties provided for violation thereof.
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112. :L acknowledge,' that I do not now, nor
shall I ever possess any right, interest,
title or claim, in or to any of the informa-
tion or intelligence or any method of
collecting or handling it, which has come
or shall come to my attention by virtue
of my connection with the Central Intelligence
Agency, but shall always recognize the property
right of the United States of America, in and
to such matters.
3. I do solemnly swear that I will never
divulge, publish or reveal either by word,
conduct, or by any other means, any classified
information, intelligence or knowledge except
in the performance of my official duties and
in accordance with the. laws of the United
States, unless specifically authorized in
writing, in each case, by the Director of
Central Intelligence or his authorized repre-
sentatives.
4. 1 will at all times comply strictly with
the Central Intelligence Agency Security
Regulations and appendices thereto, which I
have read and understand.
5. 1 understand that no-change in-my assign-
ment within the Central intelligence Agency
will'relieve me of my obligation under this
oath and that the. provisions of this oath
will remain equally binding on me after the
termination of my services with the Central
intelligence Agency.
6. I take this obligation freely, without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand'
and seal this 3 day .of Oct. 1955.
/s/ Victor L. Marchetti (SEAL)"
When he ' terminated his employment in 196 9, he executed
the following document:
am about to terminate my
association with the Central Intelligence
Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my
duties with that Agency, I have been the
recipient of information and intelligence
which concerns the present and future
security of the United States of America.
.1 am aware that the unauthorized disclosure
of such information is prohibited by the
Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794),
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and by the National Security Act of 1947
which specifically requires the protection
of intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, :C
SOLEMNLY SWEAR, W"L'T"r.IOUT MENTAL RESERVATION
OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE
OF DURESS, AS FOLLOWS;
. 1. 1 will never divulge, publish, or
reveal by writing, word,:conduct, or other-
wise, any information relating to the
national defense and security and particularly
information of this nature relating to
intelligence sources, methods and operations,
and specifically central Intelligence Agency
operations, sources, methods, personnel,
fiscal. data, or security measures to anyone,
including but not limited to, any future
governmental or private employer, private
citizen, or other Government employee or
official. without the express written coA.sen.t.
of. the Director of Central Intelligence. or
his authorized representative.
2. I have been invited to submit in
writing any monetary claims which I may have
against CIA or the United States Government
which may in any way necessitate-the dis-
closure of information described herein. I
have been advised that any such claims will
receive full legal consideration. In the
event, however, that I am not satisfied with
the decisions of CIA concerning any present
or future claims I may submit, I will not
take any other action to obtain satisfaction
without prior written notice to CIA, and.then
only in accordance with such legal and
security advice as CIA will promptly furnish
me.
. 3. I do not have any documents or
materials in my possession, classified or
unclassified,. which are the property of, or..
in custodial responsibility of the Central
Intelligence Agency, having come into my
possession as a result of my duties with
the Central intelligence Agency, or other-
wise.
4. During my exit processing and during
my period of employment with the Central
Intelligence Agency I have been given an
opportunity to report all information about
the Agency, its personnel, and its operations
which I consider. should receive official
cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any,
information, which it is my duty in the
national interest to disclose to the Central.
Intelligence Agency, nor am I aware of any
violations or breaches of security which I
have not officially reported, except as set
forth on the reverse side of this sheet or.
on other attachments.
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5. :C have been adv:Lscd that in the
event :C am called upon by 'Cali:: properly
constituted authorities to testi.: y o.r pro-
vide information which I am pledged hereby
not to disclose, .C will notify CIA
iarallydiately; I will also advise said
authorities of my secrecy commitments to
the United States Government and w:i.ll re-
quest that my right or need to testify be
established before I am required to do so.
6. 1 am aware of the provisions and
penalties of the Espionage Laws, Act of
June 25, 1948 (18 USC secs. 793 and 794)
and am fully aware that any violation on my
part of certain matters sworn to by me under
this oath may subject me to prosecution under
the terms of that Act, and that violation of
other portions of this oath are subject to
.appropriate action, including such dissemi-
nation of. the violation as the circumstances
warrant.
I have read and understand the contents of
this oath and voluntarily affix my signature
hereto with the full knowledge that this
oath was executed for the mutual benefit
of myself and the United States Government,
and that it will be retained in the files
of the Central intelligence Agency for its
.future use or for reference by me at any
time in the.future that I may be requested
or ordered to testify or disclose any of
the matters included within the scope. of
this oath.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and. seal
this 2 Sep 1969.
/s/ Victor L. Marchetti (.SEAL) .
Signature",
Subsequent to termination of his, employment
the defendant authored an. article entitled "Twilight
of the Spooks." He sent this article to a magazine
publisher. Subsequently he 'visited and submitted the
manuscript to six other publishers. With one of -these
he ultimately signed a contract for., its publication
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and received an advance on royalties. The article
has never been submitted "to the CIA, nor has consent
of its Director or his authorized, representative
been obtained for the, revelations contained in the
article.
Specifically the Court :Finds that at least
five of the items mentioned in the Karamessines
affidavit and testified to by Karamessines on the
stand as appearing in the defendant's article "Twilight
of the Spooks," were classified; and, at least.three
items which were taped for television interv.iws, also
fit that category. Attempts were made by the defendant
to show that the material was improperly classified;
that it was information which was publicly known any-.
wayi and. that, contrary to the Karamessines affidavit
and testimony,. revelations of the type made by the
defendant would not compromise the security of the
United States or endanger its intelligence operations.
Objections.'to these attempts were uniformly sustained
by the Court during trial. It was the view of the
Court at trial, and still is,.that it is not the role
of the Court to determine whether material should be
classified or whether, even if classified., its
revelation is immaterial. Nor should the Court make
a determination as to the validity of the CIA's judg-
ment on the compromise vol non of this country's
security and intelligence operations. By contract
the defendant has relegated that decision to the, CIA.
As pointed out-,in the testimony of Karamcssines,. on
the subject of whether the information is already'
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public, it is one thing to have: unconfirmed report.,
rumor, suspicion and speculation as the source of
such information. It is quite another thing to.
have such' information revealed by a person who
'bears the credentials of a former CIA employee.
Even though the in:Eormation is incorrect,' it in
some instances was sufficiently close to the truth
to be damaging. But damaging or not, it was in-
formation obtained by the defendant as a result
In the opinion of the Court the contract..
takes the case out of the scope of the First.
Amendment; and, to the extent the First Amendment
is involved, the contract constitutes a waiver of
of his employment with CIA, and consequently its.
,revelation is restricted.
case from New York Times Co. v.-United States, 403'.
U.S. 713 (1971), and render it no more than a usual
dispute between an employer regarding the reveler-
the defendant's rights thereunder. It is.these
documents that the Court feels distinguish this
obtained by that employee during
his employment. Consequently,.there is no prior
restraint and no such heavy burden on the United
States to show irreparable damage to the country
as was imposed by New York Times.
There is no suggestion that the secrecy
agreements were the product of any fraud or duress
or that the defendant was not fully competent at the
time of their execution.
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to avoid his contract by arguing that the First
Amendment gives him rights which transcend any
contractual obligations which might be imposed
by the United States, and argues further that the
United States cannot be considered a traditional
The Court finds that, contrary to the
documents' proscriptions, the defendant has divulged
and published and revealed, by writing and by word,
:information relating to the national defense and
security and information of that nature relating
to intelligent sources, methods and operations,
both classified and otherwise, without first obtain-
ing consent of the CIA.
The defendant does not contest that he has
made the revelations and admits, that., at leas-,some
of the information in the article he gained as a
result of his employment with CIA. Indeed, he trades
upon his former connection with the CIA as putting
him in a unique position to-reform the intelligence
gathering community of the,United States. He seeks
employer but must only operate within the prohibitions
of the First Amendment,, any contract to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Defendant. cites no case which holds that
the United States may not be viewed as an employer
with the same contract rights as any other employer
and this Court is unwilling to so hold.
In the Court's view the United States has
made its cast: for specific performance when it shows
the contract, a breach thereof, and the inadequacy
of monetary damages.
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The defendant further contests the juris-
diction of the Court, principally on the ground
that there is no specific authority for a Federal
Court to award injunctive relief for threatened
danger to national security. This argument, how-
ever, fails along with the failure of the First
Amendment argument. 28 U.S.C. ? 1345 clearly gives
the District Court original jurisdiction of all
civil actions.
A permanent injunction will be issued,
identical in terms to the temporary restraining
order heretofore entered. It is so ordered, and
such,an injunction will be entered upon presentation.
Alexandria, Virginia
May 19th, .1972
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