A CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000400030046-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: June 30, 1972
• Content Type: BOOK

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
Approved For Release 20052D~/$jrJ qg?Z'RDP74.BOO415R000400030046-1
On June 1 of this year an official of the
US Central Intelligence 'Agency paid a visit
to the New York offices of my publisher,
Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was
Mr. Cord. Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assist-
ant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the
CIA official in charge of providing covert
financial subsidies for organizations such as'
the ? National Student Association, En-
counter Magazine, and the Congress for
Cultural Freedom).' Mr. Meyer urged sev-
eral of his old friends among Harper and,
Row's senior management to provide him
with a copy of the galley proofs of, my
history of. the international narcotics traf-
fic, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast
Asia. In this book I :how the complicity
of various US agencies--particularly the CIA
and thz, State Dep'artmerit-in ? organizing
the Southeast Asian. drug traffic since the
early 1950s.
'Mr. Meyer presented one of Harper and
Row's senior editors with some documents
giving' the CIA's view on the Southeast
Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave.
lie said,. "You wouldn't want to publish a
book that would be full of inaccuracies,
.embarrass the United States government, or
get you involved in libel suits, would
domea p
Alfred W; MCCoy
the galley. proofs to the CIA could set a
dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken
First, Amendment guarantees concerning
freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of
what I had 'learned of the CIA's operating
methods in Southeast' Asia I' was convinced
that the Agency was capable of using
unethical means-such as coercing my
sources into retracting statements they had
made to me about US complicity in the
international narcotics traffic-in order to
induce Harper and Row to withdraw the
book from publication.
After a week of negotiations, however,
Harper and Row told me that they would
not be ivilling to publish the book. unless I
agreed to submit the manuscript to the
CIA. Faced with what I believed would be
lengthy delays if I took the book to
another publisher and . the prospect of
losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisa-
beth Jakab, with whom I had worked
closely, I capitulated. Thus began more'
than 'two months of lengthy negotiations
between' the CIA, Harper and Row, and
myself. Most of what happened during
these elaborate negotiations is in the corre-
spondence reprinted below. I' have added ,
introductory notes to explain some of,the
attending circumstances.
you.
'Harper and Row's management promised considered collectively, this. exchange of
to, consider Mr. Meyer's request and sum-' letters provides us with another important
moned me from Washington, DC, where I reminder-perhaps the first since, the Na-
was then testifying before the Senate tional Student Association scandals of
Appropriations Committee on my findings .1967-of the contempt this most clan-
after eighteen months of research into the destine of our governmental agencies has
Southeast Asian drug traffic. This research for the. integrity' of the press and publish-
included more than 250 interviews with ing industry. As the CIA's letter of Jul'
5. July 1972
gene agents in Europe and Asia. ' effectively my analysis of its role in the Dear Mr. Thomas:
A international heroin traffic during the last. Mr. Cord Meyer has asked me to
a meeting in New York on the quarter century. Since the CIA simply had respond to your letter to him of June 30th
afternoon of June 8, Harper and Row's no plausible defense against this charge, it in connection with the book, The Politics
president, Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, and its tried to impose prior censorship in order to of Heroin in Southeast Asia, by Alfred W.
senior vice president,- Mr. B. Brooks avoid public scrutiny of its record. If it McCoy.
Thomas, told me that they had decided was not already clear, it now 'should be As you are no doubt aware, Mr. McCoy
provide the CIA with a copy of the galley ey obvious to publishers that the Agency testified on ' 2. June 1972 before the
proofs prior to publication for the follow- -cannot be regarded as a responsible critic Foreign Operations Subcommittee 'of the
ing reasons: when its public image is seriously threat- Senate Appropriations Committee. His test:
First, the CIA would be less likely to ened by what is. written about it. mony included allegations concerning sup-
seek a temporary court -injunction barring port of the international opium traffic by
publication of the book if the Agency were U. S. agencies, including the Central Intel-
given 'a chance to persuade itself that ligence Agency, and numerous other allega-
national security' was. in no way endangered j tions concerning participation in the opium
by portions of my book;. and secondly, 1 In this letter, written after Cord Meyer, traffic by both Americans and local per-
Harper and Row felt that a responsible Jr.'s visit, Harper and Row asked the CIA sonnel in Southeast Asia.
publisher should have enough confidence in, for official confirmation of their interest in In the light of the pernicious nature of
the veracity of any of its particularly seeing the book. Since the CIA had never drug traffic, allegations concerning in-
so books to show them to any before been quite the
so willing to defend the drug of the U. S. Government therein
reputable , critic for comment prior to itself publicly, neither Harper and Row nor or the participation of American citizens
publication. I expected to hear anything more from the
should be made only if based on hard
At frst I disagreed App"'* PbFRe" %%-2005/O6122 CIA-RDP74BO04e1 RQeQ40o030o*6~-1hat no reputable
and Row's decision, arguing that submitting C (7nt iilJ ~rc'a. -
June 30, 1972
Cord Meyer, Jr.
-?1523 34th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20007
Dear Mr. Meyer: .
I understand from Messrs. Canfield; Sr.
and Wyeth that you have expressed an
interest in being shown the manuscript of
our forthcoming book, The 'Politics of
Heroin, by Alfred W. McCoy.
Before making any determination with
respect' to your request, I would appreciate
it if you would confirm it to me in
writing, indicating to the extent you deem
appropriate any reasons you may. have for
making such a request.
Sincerely,
[B. Brooks Thomas
Vice President and General Counsel'
Harper &'Row, Publishers, Inc.]
2The CIA, in reply, challenged Harper
and Row by stating categorically that it
could rebut all my charges 'about its
complicity in the international narcotics
traffic. We were surprised, however, that
the CIA made no reference to ."national
security" as one of its concerns in.request-
ing to review the. manuscript. Rather, the
Agency made its request purely on grounds
of government privilege.
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
 publishing house would wish to publish` Washington Evening Star on the same Row's Ic al staff has twice combed the
such allegations witho}~tp? l1e?jltl}tI*8g@n20W@W22 [,~p~l4BOO44, QA QW39i@A6t1re. There is no
really making a serious effort to discredit
on this basis that Mr. Meyer talked to Mr.
Canfield and 'Mr. Wyeth. -It is Mr. Meyer's
understanding that they agreed with this
position and, therefore, said that a copy of
the galley proofs would be made available
to us. If this were done, we believe- we
could demonstrate to you that a consid-
erable nuifiber of Mr. McCoy's claims about reporters about the negotiations with
this Agency's alleged' involvement 'are, to- CIA. (Harper and Row had told me it
tally false and without foundation, a num-
ber are distorted beyond recognition, and
o: is based on convincing evidence. We
of alone in this position as the Bureau
of ;Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs also
considers Mr. McCoy's claims to be essen-
tially based on rumor or hearsay.
Mr. Nelson Gross, the Secretary of
State's Senior Advisor and Coordinator for
International Narcotics Matters, wrote on 8
June 1972 to Senator Proxmire, the Chair-
man of the SubcommitteeI before which
Mr. McCoy appeared, and refuted a number
of Mr. McCoy's major allegations. In testi-
mony before an informal congressional
panel of U. S. Reprirsentatives in New
York City- on . 9 June 1972, Mr. Gross
again. - refuted allegations
McCoy but in more detail.
made by Mr:
Ordinarily this Agency does not respond
'.lie criticism. However, in this case
under the, strongest directives to
and are
Use . U. S. Government's effort
the international narcotics traffic
bending every effort to do so. We'
believe we-cannot stand by and see baseless
criticism designed to undermine confidence
in that effort without trying to , set the
record straight. This, of course, in no way
affects the right of a publisher to decide
what - to publish. I find it difficult to
believe, however, ? that a ? responsible pub-
lisher would wish to be associated with an
attack on' our Government involving the
vicious international drug traffic without at
least trying to ascertain the facts.
I trust I have made quite clear our
reason for, asking to see the text of Mr.
McCoy''-s book prior to publication and
have also- given you reason to consider
your own responsibilities in this matter.
Sincerely,
Lawrence R. Houston
General Courisel
3 When I was shown. the CIA's 'request I
told Harper and Row. that the CIA, by
failing to mention national security as. its
.major reason for requesting the right to
review the galley proofs, had undermined
the' logic- behind Harper and. Row's stated
reasons for submitting the galley proofs to
the-Agency. When Harper and. Row told
me that it still wanted . to, have the. book
reviewed by ? the CIA, I withdrew my
consent in the letter that -follows. More
significantly, the strident tone of the CIA's
letter of July 5 to Harper and Row-which
me and suppress my book..
I believed I stood very little chance of
countering the CIA's pressures successfully
so long as negotiations remained private. I
flew to Washington, DC,. on July 16-the
day before I delivered this letter to Harper
planning a press conference, about.
the
was
the
New Haven, Connecticut
July 17, 1972
Mr. B. Brooks Thomas.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
Dear Mr. Thomas: -
I cannot agree to the request by the
Central Intelligence Agency to receive -an
advance copy of the page proofs of my
book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast
Asia:
I believe that a fundamental principle is
at stake. A basic tenet of our democracy is
that government agencies - are subject to
public scrutiny. Our democracy cannot long
survive if powerful government agencies
have the right to review and possibly
censor criticism before it reaches the Amer-
ican people.
The American people have the freedom
to read and the right to information from
diverse sources, and the right. to judge for
themselves what to believe. No government
agency can try to abridge these rights and
this fundamental freedom in any way.
I believe that th! CIA's actions in this
case constitute an interference in- our
author-publisher relationship and I feel
strongly that submitting the manuscript to
the CIA for prior review is to agree to
take the first step toward abandoning the
First. Amendment protection against prior
censorship. I cannot agree to this.
My further reasons for refusing to sub-
mit-the book to the CIA are as follows:
1. The public's right to know is best
served by publishing the book-as it now
stands. The CIA has the right to respond
to it publicly and to seek legal redress of
any grievances. ? . .
2. The CIA has no legal right to review
the boo'~k.
3. The. CIA may ask for changes or take
legal action to block or. delay the book.
4. The CIA may take extralegal actions
to delay the book or.have it changed. The
visits by the CIA to Harper and Row, the
telephone calls, ' and the letters are extra-
legal attempts by the CIA to harass and
intimidate me as d my publisher. There is
no reason to doubt that further such
actions might be taken by the CIA at some
future date.
S. The book has already been thorough-
ly reviewed by Harper and Row and has
As you well know, the book implicates
the CIA in the narcotics traffic which is
rampant in Southeast Asia. Thousands of
American GIs fighting in Vietnam have
become heroin addicts and Southeast Asia
is fast becoming the major source of heroin
entering . the. U. S. The CIA', thg State
Department, and the whole U. S. apparatus
in Indochina is aiding and abetting this
narcotics traffic on three levels: .
1. providing political and military sup-
port for officials and political factions
actively engaged in the drug traffic' without
pressuring them to stop the traffic;
2. concealing evidence of our Southeast
Asian allies' involvement in the narcotics
traffic;
3. active involvement-Air America air-
craft chartered by the CIA have been
transporting opium harvested by the CIA's
tribal mercenaries in Laos:
These points are made in the book and
have also been made publicly when I
testified before the Senate Foreign Opera-
tions Subcommittee on June 2, and the
Congressional Inquiry Regarding Inter-
national Narcotics Traffic on June 9, as
well as. appearing in an article I wrote for
the. July issue of Harpers magazine.
The State Department, the CIA, the
U. S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, and Air America have made public
statements refuting my charges. Although
these statements partly contradict each
other and further substantiated my charges
of concealment, I believe that the public is
best served by a full and open airing of
the debate. I -stand fully behind my charges
and I have provided further- documentation
to ' the Senate Foreign Operations Sub-
committee and have responded to the
CIA's refutations in a letter to the. Wash-
ington Evening Star. My full findings are
contained in the book which is the-result
of one and a half years" work and more
than 250 interviews around the globe. It
should be published as it stands. The CIA
has- already denied -my charges, and giving
them the book to review is like asking the
U.S., Army to review My Lai [My Lai 4 by
Seymour Hershl.
I ask that Harper and Row stand with
me on this decision. I have asked the
advice of friends, lawyers, journalists, Con-
gressional staff people, and other publishers
and they agree that the American people
and the publishing industry will be best
served by not 'turning over page proofs of
the book to the CIA for advance scrutiny.
Harper and Row has invested much time,
energy, enthusiasm,. and money into the'.
successful completion of this book. Our
common goal is to present the facts 'to the
American people. Cooperating with' the CIA
which has been involved in the drug traffic
in Southeast Asia violates common sense.
coincided with the publication of a CI been approved for publication. Academic
rebuttal to some of APP 9rVtdlIFt e#eer-ec2N5/O6/22rpcCIA 74800415R000400030046-1
examined the manuscript and Harper and con'L1nued
 Unfortunately, I cannot agree with your forced to make a choice between the two,
order' to stop 4p*1tWed RCtf'i e4a9"2O015dO6R2e: ?kkSR?$ +7c4BOQ4ei5ROOU0039Q46w?dat that choice
from Southeast Asia, all agencies involved violated if Harper & Row were to accede must be.
will. first have to admit there is a problem. to. the request of the C. I. A. that they be
They will have to admit past mistakes, not, allowed to read a copy of your manuscript
cover them up. Honesty and, forthrightness before publication, and given an oppor-
are in order. I do not accuse the U. S. tunity to persuade us that certain state-
government of intentionally fostering the" ments made are factually incorrect if they
narcotics traffic. This involvement, however, believe that to.be the case.
Sincerely,
B. Brooks Thomas.
has been the consequence of putting top` You state in your letter that to submit . New Haven, Conn.
priority on U. S. military and political goals the manuscript under such circumstances is James Fox
in Indochina to the detriment of anti- .,to agree to take the first step toward
narcotics work. As long as our Asian allies abandoning the First Amendment protec- Harper and Row, Inc.
fight the war, U. S. officials tolerate tion against prior censorship". With this New York, N. Y.
governmental corruption, Narcotics traffick- statement I respectfully, but emphatically, Dear Jim,
ing has not been treated differently from disagree. No one has asserted any right to As you instructed me this afternoon, I
currency manipulation, stealing U. S. aid, or review the manuscript, they have only will outline in this letter agreements that
black maaketeering--all. of which are ram- made a request which we are perfectly free you and I reached in our respective
pant. to ignore. Nor has anyone suggested that, capacities as author and-legal counsel for
Any change in the status quo will come having read it, they can force us to make Harper and Row on the evening of July
from the public pressure which results from changes in it which we do not agree of out
a full airing of the controversy. I hope that own free will. Indeed, in his letter to me, 17-July' 18, 1972. As you yourself told me
the public, will be able to see my book, a copy of which you have seen, the last evening and again this afternoon, these
uncensored, on the scheduled September 13 General Counsel of the Ca. I. A. freely points outlined below are an integral part
publication date. . admits that we, and we 'alone, are free to of the agreement between Harper and Row
decide whether and what to publish. He and myself signed this afternoon. You have
also
Yours truly, seeks only the opportunity to persuade us led me to believe that these points are
Alfred W. McCoy of his view. Certainly the freedom to myself .sole basis for negotiations betwe n
myself and Harper & Row if and when the
4. c4c 5 The following letters from Brooks
Thomas to me and from nup.. to his
assistant ' James 'Fox, . were written
on one day, July 18, when I came to New
York determined to break with Harper and
Row for agreeing to provide the CIA witha
-copy of the galley proofs. For 'twenty-one
hours, from 4:30 PM on -July 17 until'
1:30 PM on July 18, 1 negotiated with
Harper and Row executives. They made it
clear that they would not publish the book
unless the CIA' could first see it.. I finally
agreed to 'submit galley proofs to the CIA
only after Harper and Row guaranteed to
protect the integrity of the book from any
retractions the Agency might obtain by
bringing pressure on my sources.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
July 18, 1.972
persuade is as central to our democracy as CIA comes forward with criticisms of the
anything else. To call it. censorship is, I
author's, manuscript. The agreed conditions
submit, to leap to a conclusion not are as follows:
supported by the facts Qf?'the case. [Here I outlined six specific situations in
You are right, of. course,, in calling which Harper and Row would accept niy
attention to the fact that the C. I. A. is notes and sources as the definitive author-
requesting a prior review of the manuscript ity when considering the CIA's objections.!
and not just the right to read it upon If for any reason these conditions we
publication like anyone elae. Although this worked out together are not acceptable to
certainly makes the request an unusual one
and one not to be taken lightly, I believe the you please inform me prior to ? submitting
that there are present factors make manuscript to the CIA so that we can
or-in-
such a request not unreasonable in the clarify any minor misunderstanding or in-
cidental phraseology problems that might
light of the circumstances.
. Your book makes, as we all know, have risen from my transcription of the
serious ? allegations concerning support of notes from our negotiations of this morn-
mg. As
the international opium traffic by U. S. you are well 'aware. I am totally
agencies, including the C. I. A. We have opposed to turning the book over to the
CIA since I feel that it sets a most
confidence in your scholarship, and our dangerous precedent and could seriously
own investigation has satisfied us that your weaken First Amendment freedoms if the
work is well documented and thorough. If CIA actually succeeded in removing mate-
we did not think so
we would not want rial from the book. Submitting the manu-
,
Mr. Alfred W. McCoy to publish it, and we do, But this does not script for the CIA's review is bad enough,'
New Haven, Connecticut mean that it is utterly inconceivable that but submitting to censorship of material
Dear Mr. McCoy: the C. I. A. may tell us something we -do would be totally unacceptable to-me.
Thank you for your letter of July 17, know, or correct a fact which, if left I have only acceded to Harper and
,
1972, which was delivered to me by hand uncorrected, might do irreparable harm to Row's determination to give the book to
last night. someone. To rule out this possibility, the CIA because you have told me that
I fully agree with your' statement that a however theoretical it may be, is hardly unless I did so you would categorically
basic tenant of our democracy " is that the role either of responsible, journalism or, refuse to publish the book. The working
agencies are subject to of responsible scholarship. It costs us relationships I have with persons at Harper
government public nothing to listen, and we think we. have an and Row are irreplaceable and the delays
scrutiny. I subscribe also to your belief obligation as responsible publishers to do involved in going to a new publisher would.
that the American' people have the freedom so. I should add _ that we consider. this to most certainly delay production so long
to read and the right to inform themselves be a position based upon strength, and not, that' the American people would be denied
from diverse sources, and the right to judge upon weakness. - this information until after the November
for themselves what to believe. These lights, Many of us here have invested consider-' elections. Thus, I have capitulated to
are not only basic ? to our democratic
society, but of course absolutely funda- able time and energy in your book, not management's demands for what [consider
the least of whom is your editor. Her important pragmatic reasons. But I have
mental to the profession of publishing. enthusiasm' for the work is as great as-ever, done so with the assurance that the above
Harper & Row would hardly have endured and the same is true for the -rest of us as considerations- would be the basis on which
for over 150 years as one of the leading, well. We want very much to publish it. But the CIA's criticisms are 'reviewed. Since we
publishing houses in 'the English-speaking, we want even more to live up to the have agreed that these ground rules for
world without a kee~p ~w qg o
rights and a willin nBs o s 'an u 3 fte1a+ slen2~9la6;rns}bbDtaasRWR74BQO41l5'f ftO A? 8 ible forthcoming
g ~o s an up for
publishing house as we see them. If we- are
,
them when they are threatened. 'continued
 criticisms are absolutely necessary for a signs. Thus, I feel it is very possible that. is amply documented and that Mr. McCoy's
har.iionious rclationshitA1Vp ove6 F6 FRele r? nZQQf06a3resCAA-t fr IDP17*MO445R 400 46cnroach. On this
when we might have to deal with the
igency, I consider it imperative that they
be mutually agreed upon before the CIA is
sent a copy of the book. If.I.do not hear
from you in the next few days on this
matter, I ' will assume that you have
assented to my rendering here of our
agreements.
Also, let me repeat once more that
although I am willing to admit that every
author makes a number of minor factual
errors which must be corrected, I remain,
as does Harper and Row, convinced that
the book is fundamentally sound. Thus, I
am rather unwilling to consider changing
material at this late date. Having studied
the CIA's method's for the last year and a
half I have learned that their stock and
trade, like that of all such agencies of any
nation which plays the international espi-
'' "T. game, is lies, deception, carefully
led misrepresentation of the past,
documents, and falsified statements
acquired under pressure. Given the CIA's
past history of conduct which violates the
normal ethical 'standards for most govenr
mbntal institutions, I am not likely to be
impressed with any CIA evidence which
controverts my knowledge of a given topic.
Also given the rather dubious record of
.disturbing contradictions in statements
made - by government officials trying to
controvert my Congressional testimony on
the Southeast Asian drug traffic (vide,
statements in my supplementary testimony'
to the $enate Appropriations Committee), I
have become aware that the truth is no
barrier for government officials who try to
+ ! rcdit what I'am -saying.
c n a1F of this, I intend to defend my
:.rk with great vigor when the agency
presents its criticisms. Since I feel that
people at Harper and Row know less about
the subject than myself and are generally
unaware of the Agency's operating
methods, it is very possible that disagree-
ments might arise when considering the
CIA's criticisms. If this happens and Harper
and Row wants to make deletions or,
alterations I cannot accept then I feel that
I will be forced .to refuse to make such
alterations or deletions. If that happens; I
hope Harper and Row will still be willing
to publish the book. If Harper and Row
decides to drop the book rather [than]
resist the agency's criticisms, I will inevi-
tably find myself on the, street looking for
a new house. I hope that won't happen
but I am prepared to live with that
possibility. You have already spent more
than 7 working days,- going over the
book-line by line, footnote by foofnote-
and my editor Elisabeth. [Jakab] has spent
weeks reviewing the manuscript for accu-
racy as well as style and structure.
Although management has expressed con-
fidence in the work, they do not have the
same experience and thus cannot have the
material I know. is valid. If this.happens t',
will be forced to refuse, and Harper and
Row may subsequently refuse to publish
the book. Thus, as we approach these
negotiations we should do so in- a spirit of
mutual confidence, but should simul-
taneously be aware that the same kind of
philosophical and experiential differences
which made Mr. Thomas advocate. turning
the . book over to the CIA and myself
oppose such an idea may again lead to a
confrontation. I have yielded at, this point
because I have been willing to, sacrifice
principle for the sake-of publishing ob-
stance. Having sacrificed principle, 1 do not
feel that Harper and Row can expect me
to sacrifice substantive portions of my
book as well. But if we, part, let us part
amicably.
Thank you for your consideration in
wading through this necessarily long letter.
I remain,
Your would-be author,
- Alfred W. McCoy
6&70n July 20, one day after the fol-
lowing letter from ' Mr. Thomas was
mailed, an agent of the CIA arrived
in the New York offices of Harper
and Row, signed for a copy of the-page
proofs, and carried there. off to the CIA
campus in Langley, Virginia, for review by
"more than one component of the Agen- ?
cy." On the next day, )he CIA's general
counsel wrote the following acknowl-
edgment of receipt which contained the
most revealing statement by the CIA about
its intentions ("if the decision is made to
publish"). The CIA was saying, in effect,
that its criticism would so thoroughly
discredit my thesis that Harper and Row
would.'voluntarily withdraw the bQok from
publication.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
July 19, 1972
Lawrence R. Houston, Esq.
General Counsel'
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Houston:
Thank you for your letter of July 5;
1972 in connection with our forthcoming
book, The- Politics. of Heroin in Southeast
Asia, by Alfred W. McCoy.
We share your belief that no reputable
publishing house would wish to publish
allegations concerning support of. the inter-
national opium traffic by U. S: agencies
without having been assured that valid
supporting evidence for such allegations
exists. We have read Mr. McCoy's manu-
script. very carefully from this standpoint,
and have had it read as well by several
distinguished independent experts in the
field. We have also read the testimony of
Mr. Gross to which you advert in your
basis, and mindful of our obligations as
well as our rights as responsible members
of the publishing community, we have
decided tor proceed with publication of the
work.
Despite our conviction that the work is
both scholarly and well documented, we
are aware that damage might be caused by
factual inaccuracies, and we do not wisji to
foreclose your agency from a fair oppor-
tunity to persuade us prior to publication
that such inaccuracies do in fact exist.
With a view to permitting you such an
opportunity, I will send you under separate
cover within the next day or two page
proofs of the' manuscript which are just
now being received from the printer. These
proofs are being sent to' you with the
understanding that, by accepting them, you
agree to the following conditions, which
are required by. our agreement with Mr.
McCoy:
1. You will make copies only if and to
the extent that they are'absolutely neces-
sary in order to have the manuscript read
in the time provided;
2. Any comments will be submitted to
us in writing not later than seven calendar
days after the manuscript is delivered to.
you;
3. The manuscript will be treated as a
confidential matter between the CIA and
Harper & Row and neither if nor 'any
comments concerning it will be made
available by the C),A to anyone outside
that agency.
I wish to emphasize that by making this
manuscript available to you on a voluntary
basis, we do not mean to imply that we
will make changes., in the work simply`
because you request them, or even because
you believe the statements made to be
harmful to some agency of our govern-
ment. On the other hand, we will be
grateful to you for bringing to our atten-
tion any factual errors which you believe
Sincerely,
B. Brooks Thomas
Central In telligen cc Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
21 July 1972
Mr. B. Brooks Thomas
Harper.& Row, Publishers,. Inc.
Dear Mr. Thomas:
Thank you for your letter of July 19th
concerning Mr. Alfred 'W: McCoy's book,
The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia.
The page ' proofs just arrived late this
afternoon, and we . are grateful' for the
opportunity you are giving us to review the
manuscript. We have no difficulty with the
conditions you set forth in your letter.-We
will make a' limited number of copies. as
same deep-seated confiderAh pp "' """ more man one component or the Agency
the ones who will be ma ing ~fin al deci R ~ eCSI[fr2O 61t i : dmlAfE t P 4BID(, [1 ~RQO{4Q P 0 ~6m1teriat and the
the evidence availabje to us, including the time is very short. I trust we can do a
foregoing, we are persuaded that the work complete review within the seven calend:tson u jflled,
 drys you mentioned, but if there is any _ Pursuant to our agreement, we have statements such as "according to several
difficulty I will be in 3r IT bFZe[6 d20i5t061'$2 M4` A LPT4B 1 0 0~'OD464age leaders'...
manuscript and our c nients will be.-Polities of Hera'n in Southeast Asia. A claim" (page .263), "According to reports
confidential. Of course, if the decision is
made to publish, thereafter the material is
in the public domain and we will feel free,
if we see fit to do so, to comment.
It is not our intention to ask- you'to
make changes-in Mr. McCoy's book even if
we believe some of the statements might
be harmful to the Government. It is
possible that we might find some statement
which is currently and properly classified in
the interest of national security. If so, we
will consult with you, but we believe this
is highly unlikely. Our primary interest is
in the validity of the evidence with which
Mr. McCoy supports his allegations.
Sincerely,
Lawrence R. Houston
General Counsel
8 After' the CIA
for a week, a
reviewed the book
CIA courier from
Langley, Virginia, arrived at Harper and
low's New York offices in the late
afternoon of July 28 with the statement
that follows. What is perhaps most reveal-
ing about it is the sharp contrast between
the brash confidence, of the CIA's earlier
assertions ("We believe we could demon-
strate to you that a considerable number
of Mr. McCoy's claims... are totally false
and without foundation. .. "if the deci-
sion is made to publish ...") and the weak
tone of their actual criticisms. My editor,
Elisabeth Jakab, found the CIA's criticisms
laughably "pathetic,"' while B. Brooks
Thomas told the New York
Agency's objections "were
and we found ourselves
whelmed by them."2
Times that ,the
pretty general
rather under-
complete and detailed review and analysis later received by the U. S.' Bureau of
would take weeks, but I -believe we have Narcotics" (page 244), "Chinese merchants
been able to identify enough important in Vientiane reported that",(page 281), and
aspects to bear out our original concern as others. In the enclosed annex, we have
to the statements it might make about commented on our investigation of the
CIA, . facts behind certain of these statements.
The theme of Mr. McCoy's book . is We have, by no means made an exhaustive
contained on page 8: "Unlike some na- review of every such statement in'-the book
tional intelligence agencies, the CIA did not but send these to. you in order to
dabble in the drug traffic to finance its 'demonstrate our belief that your con-
clandestine operations. Nor was its' cul- fidence that. Mr. McCoy's scholarship "is
pability the work of a- few corrupt agents, beyond reproach" is not well founded.
eager to share in, the enormous profits. The
CIA's role in the heroin traffic was simply Our difference with Mr. McCoy is no
an inadvertent but inevitable consequence mere debate over the excellence of his
of -its cold war tactics." Ills theme is scholarship. Mr. McCoy's charges against
further spelled out on page 14, where he
CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have
says: "American - diplomats and secret
been involved in the narcotics been, repeated by editorial writers through-
agents traffic have 'at three levels: (1) coincidental com- out the' nation and could create au ac-
Plicity by allying with groups actively myth that CIA has been involved in
? y the drug traffic. The truth is that CIA has
engaged in the drug traffic; (2) abetting never been. involved in the drug traffic and
the traffic by covering - up for known
is actively engaged in fighting against it. We
heroin traffickers and condoning their in
volvement; (3) and active engagement in believe that the effect of Mr. McCoy's,
the transport of opium and tieroin. It is book is to do a disservice -to this fight and
that America's to dishearten the many sincere people in
ironic, to say the least
,
heroin plague is of its own making." CIA who are at least as concerned about
CIA's position can be simply stated as this menace as Mr. McCoy. On 14 April
follows: 1971, 'Mr. Helms, Director of Central
Intelligence, said to the American Society
a. The opium trade has existed in ' of Newspaper Editors:
Southeast Asia for generations. This
trade depended upon the market, and
until recently the market for South-
east Asian opium was in . Southeast
Asia. The increase in the opium trade
and the appearance of heroin were a
result of the increased market, in part
due to the presence of large' American
military forces in Vietnam.
b. CIA at no time allied' with,
abetted or engaged in the drug trade
in Southeast Asia. From its earliest
days in Southeast Asia, CIA- took
steps to ensure' that it would not be
involved in the drug trade.
How then can one account for the sharp
disparity in tone', In the week intervening
between the CIA's letter acknowledging
receipt of the page proofs on July 21 and
the delivery of the Agency's statement on
July 28, the journalists I had talked to, as
well as others, published reports . about
what was happening to the book, breaking
the silence that had shrouded' negotiations
from the beginning. A three-part series by
Seymour Hersh on the CIA's efforts to.
discredit. my work appeared in the New
York Times on July 22, July 24, and
July 28; a sharp editorial in the Washington
Post on. July 26; and a strong, hour-long
NBC "Chronolog" television documentary
on July 28. The CIA seems to have responded
to unexpected criticism from the press and
television by toning down its claims to Harper
and Row and withdrawing, into its
customary sileoce.3
Central intelligence
Washington, D.C.
There is the arrant nonsense, for
example, that the Central Intelligence
Agency is somehow involved in the
world drug traffic. We are not. As
fathers, 'we are as concerned about the
lives of 'our children and grandchildren
as are all 'of y.ou'. As an Agency, in
fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing
the foreign roots of the drug traffic
for the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are
helping with a solution; we know we
.are not contributing to the problem.
This statement remains valid today.
Sincerely,
Lawrence R. Houston
-General Counsel .
ANNEX
Air America
There are repeated allegations by Mr.
McCoy of Air America involvement in the
transportation of opium.
We believe the statement Mr. Paul Velte,
Managing Director of Air America; made
on, 2 June 1972 in response to these
allegations labelling them as "utterly and
absolutely false" clearly expresses the com-
pany ahd CIA views on this matter. This
c; When this drug trade became a
matter of concern to Americans, as
distinct from a local Southeast Asian
problem, CIA engaged in a variety of
programs to attack it. These efforts
are by no means totally successful,
but they have had substantial impact.
Mr. McCoy supports his theme by citing
a large 'number of allegations, assertions,
and interpretations. From an examination
of these, it is plain that Mr. McCoy has
limited his citations to those supporting his
thesis, and he appears to have ignored
available :information which , might con-
tradict it. In the unsettled, and in many
circumstances of Southeast
rimitive
areas
,
p
Agency Asia, rumors and unsupported assertions are
20505 common, and' the first requirement of
28 July 197Z: serious intelligence operations, scholarly re-
Mc. B. Brooks' Thomas search or responsible journalism is to check
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. such assertions against other evidence and
obtain as ob'ective a total picture as
Dear Mr. Thomas: Approved'For Reoils .ZQAalri '2 DcUA-sRLDRtt4B(k0415R000400030046-1
continued
 statement is attached.
Recently a CIA off' r Van Pao t d. The production'
~1F0~ ` od Release 2005/06/21: CIA-RDP74B00OA OA& ' q cdl and forwarded
Ouane Rathikoun whom ited as a source In many instances Mr. ?dcCoy accuses
on Page 278 by Mr. McCoy concerning Ait General Vang Pao of being involved in the to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dapgerous
America involvement in transporting opium. opium traffic. He cites as specific sources Drugs (BNDD) in Washington, D. C. This is
h"political protection" of the type
General Ouane categorically denied that Air the BNDD, a village leader, and General hardly ar McCoy alleges. Mr. America was in any way involved in such Ouane Rathikoun.
traffic. General Ouane said the charge was We have no evidence indicating that Ger Su Yang
ridiculous and that there was no need for General Vang Pao is involved in the
drug traffickers to draw upon-Air America A similar failure to attempt verification
g Laotian drug trade. Because his forces.are of information from a doubtful source
facilities because they had their own., the principal Laotian deterrent to North appears in.. connection with Mr. McCoy's
's
Strict controls have been in effect Vietnamese aggression, many U. S. Govern- account on page 289 of an interview with
throughout Air America's 'presence in ment personnel have been in constant Long oPot n district officer, Gee Su Yang.
,Southeast Asia and these are being 9m- a contact with General Vang Pao for. a .This is an account of how American
proved as we learn. more of the traffickers' number of years. No evidence has come to
patterns and mgrs operandi. helicopters flew from Long Tieng to Long
i light connecting him with narcotics traffick- Pot to take opium back to Long Tieng.
mg. Within the last two weeks, Ger Su Yang
On the contrary, General Vang Pao has was interviewed by an officer of this
'Managing Director of Air A erica ,
. strongly supported the anti narcotics legisla- Agency designated for-'this purpose. Ger Su
"Mr. Alfred W. McCoy today told the lion passed by the Lao National Assembly Yang denies making any statement regard-
Senate Foreign Operations, Committee: 'in in 1911 and, as a leader of the Meo, has ing Muong officers arriving at Long Pot to
Northern Laos, Air America aircraft and done his best to influence the tribal groups collect 'opium harvest fQr transport back to
to abandon their traditional growth of the
helicopters chartered by the U. S. CIA and Long Tieng in American helicopters. ' .
USAID have been' transporting opium har- opium poppy and develop substitute Crops Ger Su Yang spoke of two Americans,
vested. by the agency's tribal mercenaries and new forms Of livestock to provide one of whom apparently-was Mr. McCoy,
on a regular basis.' daily sustenance and income. who visited his. village, but .lie said they
"This statement'is? utterly and absolutely Further, most of northeastern Laos is were interested - in village fife and 'h(4 did
AA and' USAID have cooperated in a . not under General Vang Pao's control but not discuss the sale of opium with them.
:.':city program.whicheffectively prevents actually in the hands of the North Viet- lie added that Long Pot grows only
the carriage of drugs on any of the airline's namese. General Vang Pao obviously has no enough opium for local consumption, but
.equipment. This program is constantly control over the crop cultivation there, and neighboring villages grow tiiore for sale. He
being reviewed to make sure that drug cultivation of any crop in that area is said all the opium sold in this sector was
smuggler cannot misuse the company's extremely difficult because of the ongoing sold to Muong Kassy and Vang Vieng but
facilities. There is an intensive program of hostilities. never to Long Tieng, Knowing the pro-
inspection of both passengers and cargo The BNDD has informed us that it has clivity of individuals in this area to say
carried out in close collaboration with local no credible evidence implicating Vang Pao what they think the questioner wants to
and U. S. authorities. At up-country sites, in the narcotics traffic w}tiich is contrary to hear, we do not have too much confidence
inspectors inspect all baggage of passengers the allegations made by Mr. McCoy on in what Ger Su Yang told our interviewing
and crew members departing from their pages 244 and 248/9 of his book. officer. Our point' is that Mr. McCoy
stations. All cargo placed aboard up- On page 289 Mr. McCoy cites' a 'village accepted his word without any apparent
country sites is inspected' by members of leader in Long Pot, Ger Su Yang, to attempt at verification of his or other
the inspection service. All baggage of support his allegation against Van- Pao. villagers' stories. In addition, the Meos of
persons. departing Vientiane on AA, CASI The Long Pot sector has traditionally the Long Pot area are not only anti-Vang
and Lao air development are inspected, refused to accept Vang Pao's leadership and Pao but have on occasion collaborated with
has -maintained relationships with the the Pathet Lao.
e boarding passengers refuse to submit Pathet Lao between peaceful coexistence
to inspection or are found to have contra- KMT Irregulars
b to and inspection
their possession, they are denied and active collaboration. This casts doubt
on the objectivity of his testimony. Mr. McCoy's charge that CIA's relation-
,the right
are to turned board the aircraft and their
Finally, General Ouane Rathikoun, one ship with the KMT was a key factor in the
eh thesse e over
hies. ngs na Through these es of Mr. McCoy's principal sources, has ?latter's involvement in the opium trade is
and d related local
lated Lao measures,
attempts by individuals to carry opium on recently been questioned by an officer of without foundation. CIA's early contacts
this Agency .and was very adamant in with the KMT ceased in August 1951 and
conmpany.. airplanes have been detected and
prevented, These small time-?smugglers and asserting that Vang Pao had 'not been since that date the Agency has' had no
involved in the drug traffic. He stressed the
users are the ~ greatest threat and the substantial contact with KMT irregulars in
security inspection service has constituted fact that opium cultivation in Xieng Burma or elsewhere.' Opium production in
an effective deterrent. Khouang had collapsed to the point where the area where the KNIT irregulars located
"Through its many years in the Far opium users must buy elsewhere. after the fall of China in 1949 had long
East, AA and its employees have been well Paramilitary Activities existed and was not, as suggested by the
aware of the dangers of drug use and the, and Heroin Refineries author, started by the irregulars. That they
drug traffic. It has been the policy of the ultimately became involved appears to have
company and its -many loyal employees to Wherever there have been refineries in been -motivated. by survival rather than any
do everything in their power to oppose any areas in which there is some American. other known reason.
.traffic in drugs; To this end there has been influence, action has been taken to elim-
The Mafia
close cooperation between the company , mate them. In spite of this, Mr. McCoy
and U. S. and local authorities concerned states on page 301, "In 'fact, there are Mr. McCoy presents the theme that there
with the drug problem. some American officials who believe that has been an association of the U. S.
"If Mr. McCoy or any other individual Chao La only works with the CIA to get Government with Sicilian and Corsican
can bring any proof that any ~rir America guns (which he uses to buy 'opium, from Mafia types in the past and that this has
employee has been connected in any man Burmese smugglers) and political protection somehow been responsible for the fact that
ncr with the drug traffic a for his opium refineries." With the access those types playa large role in the illegal
g ppropriate dis Mr. McCoy claims to have had, he should narcotics traffic today. The argument sim-
ciplinary action will be taken and the 11 matter referred to the { pprQ edrfTiarR v a bee~j( ~~ Qy l 7 041V5R ooo4obd$U '~herc have been
g( ilt ~nfifea relinery operated~iy C7mao
continue
 Mafia groups, just AmfiyeUprli ile c A~01~2is: PI&FAQ,,~r~4Qf 413,,1 0904 43
in an i 0046ntcrview witli a, staff
Chinese and other groups, who have been that ' Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains un- correspondent of the Christian Science
famous for participation in smuggling and shaken and we do not see any reason for Monitor reported on July 27, 1972. In that
other . illicit traffic for centuries. They making any changes in the text. I am interview. Mr. Gross stated, inter alia, as
appear wherever large illegal profits can be appending hereto a list of the points made follows:
'made, and the existence of governmental in your memorandum to us, together with
authority whether passive or antagonistic an explanation of our reasons for believing "Sure; Air America was probably used
as a vehicle for some transit, just as'
often has little effect on their activities. We ? in each case tlfiat no change is either' all commercial and military aircraft
do not believe Mr. McCoy has made a case necessary or appropriate. probably were, until the fall of 1970
contrary.
As you correctly point out in, your when we really became aware of the.
letter, Mr. McCoy's theme is that the CIA's narcotics problem in the area."
Support for U.S. Narcotics
Control Efforts Overseas
On page 350, Mr. 1vlcCoy states that the'
U. S.. Bureau of Narcotics' attempts to
conduct investigations in Laos were blocked
by the Laotian government, the State
Department, and the CIA. BNDD reports
that, `... programs to effect control' of
narcotic trafficking could not be initiated
without Laotian national drug 'control laws.
Ambassador Godley was instrumental in
assisting the Laotian government to forniu-
late such laws which became effective in
November 1971. BNDD agents were
assigned to work in Laos in December
1971, soon after the law became' effective.
1tNDD is unaware of any opposition by
CIA in this. process. Rather, CIA has
assisted in furtherance of the 13NDA mis-
sion in Laos."
As part of his thesis that the U. S.
Government is covering up. for local offi-
cials who' may be engaged in narcotics
traffic, Mr. McCoy .states on page 218 that,
"the CIA avoids gathering information on
high-level involvement, and even in its .
closed=door sessions with 'high Embassy
officials discusses only minor pushers and
role in the heroin traffic has been prin-
cipally inadvertent and a consequence of
other tactics' wh ich it has pursued. I believe
that this ' theme Is 'amply documented
throughout the book and that'it constitutes
an eminently reasonable assessment of the
effect of the Agency's activities in this
area. We regret, as you do, the fact that
some writers have this-characterized the
allegations which Mr. McCoy makes in the
book. With this fact in mind, we believe
that the best service we can render the
author, the CIA and the general public is
to publish the book as expeditiously as
possible, and that is what we intend to do.
I would like to take this opportunity to
thank you for your courtesy to us and for
honoring the conditions which we imposed
when we sent you the manuscript.
Sincerely,
B. Brooks Thomas
Appendix to Letter
of August 4,11972
to Lawrence R. Houston, Esq.
Air America
auu-- hula I~, a.utujJCLciy wniuc, ~~~ Your Comment
M. McCoy 'makes this serious charge.
apparently on the word of an unnamed 1. Statement of Paul Velte June. 2, 1972
ti;.mbassy official, who may not have had labelling McCoy allegations relating to Air
access to such reports. Mr. McCoy could America "utterly and absolutely false."
easily have ascertained the facts. He appar- Our Response
ently made no real attempt to do so.
I. Mr. Velte's statement refers to Mr.
After talking with me and. seeing my' McCoy's testimony before the Senate Far-
notes, Harper and, Row's legal department cign Operations Committee. The statement
prepared the following rebuttal to the CIA. referred to does not appear in the book.-
This rebuttal. is simply a. point-by-point Mr. McCoy believes that Mr. Velte's state-
response to the CIA's objections and does ment may well be accurate as of the date
not go into some of the broader issues it was made. Ile does not believe that it
raised by the Agency's statement. I will accurately reflects- conditions in the period
comment on this later. ` 1965-1967 to which the passage which
does appear. on page 278 of the book
refers. ' . -
fIarper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
August 4,
Lawrence R. Houston, Esq'.
General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Houston:
Thank
Your Comment.
1972 2. You* state. that Gen.
has recently denied that Air America was
in any way involved in transporting opium.
Our Response '
Vang Pao_
Your Comment
1. You state that the BNDD has
credible evidence implicating Vang Pao in
the narcotics' traffic, contrary to the state-
ments made on pp. 244 and 248-9 of the
text.
Our Response
1. The source of Mr., McCoy's statements is
an .interview lie had in New Haven, Con-
necticut on November 18, 1971 with a
present employee of the BNDD, who stated
that BNDD had received a report implicat-
ing Vang Pao. Because of the circumstances
under which the interview was given, Mr.
McCoy refuses to disclose the name of the
employee. involved, but we have satisfied
ourselves that such an interview
and that the statements referred
fact made.
Your Comment' ,
.2. You state that Ger Su Yang's
took place
to were in
on page 289 is not credible because the
Long Pot Sector has traditionally refused
to accept Vang Pao's leadership and has
maintained friendly relationships with the
Pathet Lao.
Our Response
2. The description of 'the system by which
Moo mercenaries 'purchase opium from
villagers in the Long Pot area is based not
only on the interviews with Ger Su. Yang
described on page 289, but also on inter-
vipws with the 1-leadmen of Nam Suk
Village and Nam Ou Village, both of which
were conducted on August 21, 1971. We
believe that their credibility is a highly
subjective matter which is best evaluated
by the. interviewer in a face-to-face meet-
ing.
Your Comment
3. You state that Gen. Ouane Rattikone
has recently been questioned and is ada-
mant in asserting ? that . Vang Pao has not
been involved in the drug traffic.
2. Mr. McCoy interviewed Gen. Rattikonc ' Our Response '
you for your letter of July
1972 together with its enclosures.
28,
Together with the author, we have now
completed a thcnough review of the com-'
ments made in your letter and in the
enclosures, checkingA
McCoy's manuscript an;
in Vientiane, on September 1, 1971. We' 3. Mr. McCoy does not rely primarily on
have seen his notes, and are satisfied that.. Gen. Rattikone in connection with the
he accurately transcribed what was related assertions made about Vang Pao's involve-
to him on that occasion. Support for this '
ment with the drug traffic. In any event, it
allegation is also derived from Mr. McCoy's would not be at all surprising if Gen. ?
interview with Geri, Thao Ma in Bangkok Rattikone's asccrtions
to a representative of
a
Irov 1i'l rAelteastt Vv/ 1Q>,-RQR BQ04 0 0a 0d4bcc~ly different from
otes. Based upon 01/g3on e rn orma yon re gave, to Mr. McCoy.
confirmed by Nelson Gross (whose earlier
testimony is relied upon in your letter of
 Paramilitary Apgpitottteed
-and Heroin Refineries
Your Comment
Our Response
For PeWaAo,24Q5/06/22 : CIA-RDP74BOQ41 QQ849 4A-lthe statement
1. You state that the CIA has identified
and dismantled a heroin refinery operated
by Chao La and that this contradicts Mr.
McCoy's assertion that Chao La received
political protection for his refineries.
Our Response
1. While in this area, the'author was told
by retired CIA personnel, local CIA mer-
cenaries, Baptist missionaries, and hill
tribesmen that a heroin refinery operated
near Ban Nam Keung from 1965-1971. The
author believes that this is ' the refinery
which was confiscated by the CIA last year
and which is referred to at p. 346 of the
text. The same sources informed the author
that another refinery operated near Ban
Ilouei Tap in 1970-1971. Both refineries
were located in areas where there was
American influence.
Ger Su Yang
'~ ~m,nent
mate that an officer of the Agency
red Ger Su Yang, who - admitted
talking to 'Mr. McCoy but. denied having
discussed the sale of opium with him. You
go on - to state that you do not have
confidence in what Gei Su Yang told your
state that Mr.
not have accepted his word
any attempt at verification.
Our Response
'McCoy should
either without
1. The author does not base his account
on page 289) of American helicopters fly-
ing opium from Long Pot to Long Ticng
solely on his interview with Ger Su Yang.
The author spoke to many villagers in
Long Pot and in neighboring villages who
confirmed Ger-Su Yang't story. In addi-
tion, the author obtained similar informa-
tion from Ron ' Rickenbach, a former
USAID official in Laos, General Ouane
?'= ttikone, and General Thao Ma, a former
+unander of the Royal Laotian Air
ioice. More recently, the author has been
advised by some-British' television journal-
ists who have recently returned from the
.2. You state that since Augusts 1951 the on page 350 is a BNDD agent familiar with
CIA has had no "substantial" contact with the investigations referred to. We have
KMT Irregulars. questioned Mr. McCoy about this source
Our Response ?
2. At pp. 305-8 the -author describes a
number of contacts the CIA had with KMT
Irregulars in 1962 and later. The principal
sources for these passages are William
Young, a former CIA employee; U Ba
Their, a Shan rebel leader, and various Yao
tribesmen interviewed by the author (cf.
ftn. p. 208). Under the- circmistances, we
do not find fuch testimony to be incred-
ible or the contacts described insubstantial.
.Your Comment
3. You state that opium production in"the
rcas where the KMT Irregulars located
after the fall of China was not, as
suggested by the author,, started by them
but had existed for a long tinge prior
thereto.
Our Response
3. We cannot find in the text any assertion
to the effect that the . KMT Irregulars
started opium production in the areas in
which they settled after the fall of China.
The author does say (pp. 126-7) that the
KNIT greatly expanded the opium trade in
the Shan states, a statement with which.
you do not appear to disagree.
Your Comment
1. You state that Mr. McCoy Mates that
"there has been an association of the U. S,
Goverment, Sicilian and Corsican Mafia
types in the past" and that this has
"somehow been responsible" for the fact
that these types play the role they do in'
narcotics traffic today.
Our Response
1. Mr. McCoy does assert that during the
War and shortly thereafter the Government
associated with the Sicilian and Corsican
underworld- for reasons having nothing to
do with the illegal narcotics traffic. Mr.
McCo
clearl
re
d
it
i
i
h
y
y
gar
s
as
ron
c t
at one
area that these activities are accurately result of such associations was a rebirth of
described by him. A former State Depart- these groups and tht~L' subsequent involve-
ment official has also confirmed to the
author that his account is correct. ment in the narcotics trade; but we do not
believe it is .a fair inference from the book
KMT Irregulars.
Your Comment '
1. You state that the author's charge
to state that the U. S. Government has
"somehow been responsible" for this result
that simply because it has been such in
the "CIA's relationship with the KMT was
a key factor' in the latter's involvement in which
the opium trade" is without foundation.
?
Our Response,
causal sense of the words, as
there can be little dispute.'
Support for U.S: Narcotics
Control Efforts Overseas
find in the book any Your Comment
and are satisfied that lie exists and that he
made the statement in question, although
Mr. McCoy has requested that lie not be
identified for his - own protection. The
statement attributed to this source is not,
of course, necessarily inconsistent with the
statement that the BNDD, in Washington is
"unaware" of any opposition by the CIA.
Your Comment
2. You quote the author's statement' on
page 218 that the CIA avoids gathering
information on high-level - involvements,
even in sessions with high Embassy offi-
cials, and discusses only minor pushers and
addicts. You ? state that the assertion is
untrue, and criticize Mr. McCoy for having
made it on the word of an unnamed
Embassy official who may not have had
access to the facts.
Our Response t .
2. The source of the statement on
page 218 is a Foreign Service Officer,in tile
U. S. 'Embassy in Sa-; .)n who was inter-
viewed in the presence of a BNDD ' em-
ployee and another Embassy official. Mr.
McCoy has disclosed their identities to us
but asked that we keep such information
confidential in order to protect the individ-
uals involved. We are satisfied that the
assertion is amply corroborated in view of
the circumstances. of the interview.
Ill.
The quality of the CIA's defense-and most
important, the methods the Agency em-
ployed in concocting it-provide the strong-
est evidence of the folly of allowing
government agencies to help decide what
will be published. In fact, the CIA's letter
consists of little more than flat, unsub-
sta ntiated denials, evasions, and half-truths, as
well as false denials by my sources in
Southeast Asia that were obtained only
after the CIA brought considerable pressure
on-them, as 'I shall show.
A. KMT .(Nationalist Chinese) Irregulars:
The CIA attempted to rebut my detailed
history of KNIT-CIA collaboration in the
Golden Triangle region of Southeast Asia
during "the last twenty years by. flatly
asserting that there has been "no substan-
tial contact with KMT irregulars in Burma
or elsewhere" since August, 1951. (What
exactly does the CIA mean by "substan-
tial" anyway?) Yet in making this denial
the CIA simply ignores the evidence in my
book that the_KMT paramilitary units were
employed by the CIA as mercenaries in
northwestern Laos in 1961. It conspicu-
ously avoids commenting on my account of
the
to
statement that the CIA's relationship with 1. You cite Mr. McCoy's. statement on
the KMT was a "key factor" in the latter's page 350 that the BNDD's attempts to
involvement in the opium trade. The au- conduct -investigations in Laos were blocked
thor don state (p. 306) that there was a by the Laotian Government, the State
"peculiar symbiosis between opium and Department, ?and' the. CIA and quote a northeastern Burma throughout
espionage" in the aciiviliVAMPONflo~t~2ekbVtet2Q9~i/06d2~IDCIA?R 74BOO Q 01ty - X461-1stated that the
inference which we believe is amply sup- that they are "unaware" of - any such CIA intelligence teams, set up to carry out
ported by the evidence cited. opposition by the CIA. patrols inside southern China, were based
n n n i? i rill n,
the close collaboration between CIA intclli-
 in Burmese. outposts used by KMT military the commander-in-chief of the Royal Lao-
,.I was afraid. I didn't know what was
caravans for opium s tan An ua I said I knew
.9tt9I $v99J Renease 0 b$1 I by 49601 5FW00140t808004e . .
section of the book on the connections 3.6 tons of heroin annually (estimates of """""`' ,
sked if it's true the Am
"Pe also i
between CIA espionage operations and the
Golden Triangle opium trade, it did not get
a word of comment from the Agency.
Then, curiously, after categorically deny-
ing any "substantial" contact with the
KMT paramilitary units in the Burtma-
Thailand borderlands, the CIA critics felt
compelled to apologize for KMT- involve-
ment in the opium traffic ("That they [the
KMT units] ultimately became involved
appears to have been motivated by survival
rather than any other known reason").
These are the harshest words the CIA can
find for flip single most powerful opium
and heroin trafficking organization in the
world.
According to the reports of. a former
CIA agent cited in my bod,'- these KMT
units, with their vast mule- caravans and
intricate purchasing network, control -almost
90 percent of northeastern Burnia's ' enor-
mous opium exports and most of.northern
Thairand's illicit harvest-equivalent to more
than one third of the world's entire illicit
opium supply. ? Moreover, these KMT units
have been operating Large heroin labora-
tories in their headquarter compounds
along the Thai-13dnnese border- l'aboraforics
p{oducing heroin for both GIs in South
Vietnam and addicts here in - the United
States.
B. The Mafia: I find it somewhat un-
-.nerving that the CIA is so confident of its
immunity to 'public scrutiny that it no-
longer even bothers to contest the fact that
it provided important political support for
both the Sicilian Mafia and the Corsican
narcotics syndicates of Marseilles. It is
sharply significant that by refusing to
comment on evidence in my book; the CIA
is in effect admitting for the first time that
it was allied with the founding father of
the . Marseilles postwar heroin industry,
Barthelemy Guerini.
C. Paramilitary Activities and Heroin
Laboratories: Once again the CIA attempts
to flatly deny my analysis, this time citing
a transparent half-truth. Although it is true,
as the CIA claims, that the heroin labora-
tory at Narn Keung in northwest Laos
voluntarily shifted its location in mid-1971
when US officials brought pressure for it
to do so, this opium refinery had in fact
been operating since 1965 with the full
knowledge and tacit consent of the CIA. It
was owned by one of-the Agency's. most
prominent mercenary commanders. in north-
ern- Laos, Major Chao La. This laboratory
was opened in 1965 near a highly classified
CIA base -used' for training tribal com-
mandos for cross-border rnissioris into
southern China. Rather than disrupt opera-
tions at this opium refinery, the local CIA
agent moved his training base in order to
maintain the security of his operations.
Moreover, the huge refinery at Ban
total current US consumption range from
six to ten tons a year.) and supplied most
of the heroin for GI addicts in South
Vietnam. Moreover, large shipments of its
output stamped with its distinctive Double
U-0 Globe brand label have begun turning
up in the United 'States. And yet the CIA
did absolutely nothing about it. .
D. Get Su Yang: By far the most
disturbing aspect of the CIA's rcvicw-
worse than all its half-truths and false
denials-was the pressure it applied on the
Meo district officer, Ger Su Yang, to
coerce him into retracting statements lie
,had made when he described to me the
role of Air America, the CIA's charter
airline, in northern Laos's opium trade. .
In August of last year I visited Long
Pot, Get Si Yang's village in northern
Laos, with an Australian . photographer,
John Everingliam, and a Laotian inter-
preter, Thin Manivong. After spending a
week in the village we learned that not
only had Air America been shipping opium
ouf of Long Pot, for the last two years bust
that the CIA had halted shipments of
needed refugee- supplies to the district
because Ger Su Yang had refused to send
any more young men to a certain death as
CIA mercenaries. In ' order to pressure
USAID into sending food to the slowly
starving village, we made public the CIA's
withholding of rice.4 Shortly afterward a
senior USAID refugee officer close to the
CIA threatened the life of my interpreter.
Officers in ? the CIA's secret. army visited
Long Pot ? village to advise Ger Su Yang
that he 'would be arrested and taken away
if any more news came out of Long Pot.
The ultimatum was delivered in such a way
as to Convince Ger, Su Yang that?he would,
never come back alive if that happened.
Needless to say., Get Su Yang was more
than apprehensive when a CIA helicopter
arrived in his village sometime this Jul'
and CIA mercenaries ordered him aboard
the aircraft foi a flight to CIA headquar-
ters in northern Laos. Coincidentally, my
photographer, John Everinghani, arrived in
the, Long Pot area the very day that 'Ger
Su Yang returned from ?his ordeal and so
we have a remarkably complete report of
what actually passed between the CIA and
this Meo district officer.
According to Everingham's account, Get
Su Yang reported that lie was interrogated
for over an hour by a "short, fat," rather
irate American in a building ' near the
runway at CIA headquarters. Ger Su Yang
later recounted to Everinghani the follow-
gain I
didn't know what was best to say. So I
said 1 didn't know if it was true or not."
How ftiglitened and infmidated Ger Su
.Yang had been is revealed by his last
question to Everinghani:
"Do you think they will send a heli-
copter to. arrest me' or send Vang -Pao's
-soldiers (CIA mercenariesi to shoot me?"
Whether these pressures
derived directly from the
on Ger Su Yang
CIA's review of
my book, this incident provides
ample
evidence of the dangers inherent in pro-
viding manuscripts to the CIA-or any
other government security agency-prior to
publication. Once the material is published
and. in the public domain, it is both more
difficult and less -profitable for the CIA to
pressure sources to. withdraw their state-
ments. The damage has largely been done.
.However, if the CIA thinks it might induce
a publisher to withdraw an embarrassing
book from publication, then it is obviously
worth the Agency's time 'and trouble to
secure such. retractions.
Harper- and Row went ahead with publi
cation 'of the book in its original form.
And, in fact, Harper and Row's manage- -
ment accelerated its production schedule
and brought it Pitt on August 1.7-a month
ahead of schedule.
All's well that ends well? Not quite.
First, it remains to be seen what precedent
this, incident may or may not set for the
publishing industry. In- this case it is
fortunate for inc and my book that the
CIA was unable to 'convince my publisher
to make any changes; the CIA's review was
much 'less fortunate for my informants in
'Southeast Asia. If America's publishers are
not careful to defend their -own constitu-
tional pterogatives, then the CIA, for one,
seems only too willing to help them wither
away. If publishers. will now refuse to
cooperate when the CIA calls, then perhaps
mine has been a worthwhile test case.
Secondly, in 1969-before significant nuin-,
bers' of GIs started using heroin in Viet-
nani-this country had, an estimated
315,000 heroin addicts. Three years later
that estimate has nearly doubled. Early this
year the government estimated that there
.were almost 600,000 addicts in the United
States. p
t For details on Cord Meyer, Jr.'s career ' see
R. Harris Smith, OSS (University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1972), pp. 372-375; New York
Times, 'March 30, 1967, p. 30.
ing details of the interrogation. 2New York Times, August 9,
"The American [CIA agent] asked if I
had a photo' of you [L?'veringhain], if I ?Village Voice, August 24, 1972.
knew how contact you in Vientiane. It was -
easy to see the American was angry. that 4Washington Post, August. 31, 1971.
you had come to Long Pot to talk to ire.
Houei Tap in northwest Laos also. operated
for almost two years A" thoute b d*
turbed by the CIA b 4ty o'elease 2005/06/22 :CIA-RDP74B00415R000400030046-1