JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300230078-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 78
• Publication Date: July 3, 1972
• Content Type: NOTES

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Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 2
Monday - 3 July 1972
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5. (Unclassified - GLC) Placed a call to Mr. Robert Lang, Adminis-
trative Assistant to Representative Les Aspin (D. , Wis. ), to talk with him
about the Congressman's letter of 27 June to the Director on the subject of
alleged Agency involvement in the illicit drug traffic in Southeast Asia. Lang
referred me to Mr. William Broydrick, of the staff, who he said was handling
this matter. I told Broydrick we had just received the Congressman's letter,
and they no doubt had the Director's interim reply to the letter as it was
printed in the Congressional Record (he acknowledged they did). I told him
we were most interested in obtaining the additional information which Aspin
said he had acquired from Alfred McCoy. I said we were most anxious to
fully investigate these allegations and put them to rest. He said he would
be happy to give us the information and we will pick it up from their office
on Wednesday morning. Broydrick commented that he and another member
of the staff who were working on this subject had top secret clearances and
were anxious to get a full briefing on this subject. I told him once we received
the information and had conducted our investigation we planned to be back in
touch with Mr. Aspin and see where we went from there. Broydrick asked if
we had talked with McCoy and I told him we had not to my knowledge but having
been present at McCoy's testimony before Senator Proxmire's Subcommittee
and at his press conference thereafter, I had the impression that McCoy was
not particularly interested in talking with Government officials. In this connection
I cited his response to a question as to whether he had discussed his allegations
with Ambassador Godley. He responded he saw no point in talking with Godley
since he knew what his position would be with respect to the allegations.
6. (Unclassified - GLC) Received a call from Mr. Luis Valleja, an
intern in the office of Representative J. J. Pickle (D. , Texas), in connection
with their interest in talking with someone about the Agency. I told Valleja
of our office, plans to be in touch with them on Wednesday.
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cc:
O /DD C I
Acting Legislative Counsel
Mr. Houston Mr. Thuermer Mr. Clarke
DDI DDS DDS&T EA/DDP OPPB
*ARMY and STATE Department review(s) completed.
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Dear Congressman Aspin:
STAT
As you may know, recently I testified before the Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee concern-
ing my research into drug traffic in Southeast Asia. I believe
that U.S. officials are covering-up massive drug traffic in
Southeast Asia and concealing the evidence of the involvement of
our Southeast Asian allies. Since my testimony, both the State
Department and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)
have publicly attacked my findings. I stand fully behind my
testimony and believe until the basic facts are admitted, heroin
will continue to pour into this country from Southeast Asia.
I am enclosing a detailed rebuttal of statements by both the
State Department and BNDD which reveal that the American govern-
ment is not only covering up the evidence, but at the same time,
various government officials are contradicting one another.
My complete findings will be published in a book entitled The
Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia by Harper and Row in August,
19.72. The book is 720 pages. in manuscript, and the documentation
and transcripts of interviews are several times that. I will be
happy to make this documentation available to you.
I hope that you will continue your efforts to attack the problem
of drug traffic in Southeast Asia. Until this is done, thousands
of American soldiers and citizens will continue to suffer from
heroin addiction.
If any of this information is of help in fighting the drug traffic,
please feel free to use it. '
Sincerely,
Alkred McCoy
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. DRUG TRAFFIC FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA
Nelson Gross, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator
.for International Narcotics Matters, tried to cover up the drug traffic from
.Southeast Asia, by telling a Congressional Inquiry on June 9, 1972 that,
"Southeast Asia is not a major source of heroin on our market. . . We
estimate that probably only five percent, certainly no more than 10 percent
of the heroin presently flowing to!the' United States originates in Southeast
Asia."
The available evidence shows that this is untrue. John Ingersoll,
Director of BNDD, told this committee last year that, "Our addict population
could be satisfied by some 50 to 60 tons of opium." There is a 10 to 1
reduction in the refinement of opium to heroin; 50 to 60 tons of opium yields
5 to 6 tons of heroin. The BNDD broke up a Filipino courier ring in 1970
which had smuggled 1,000 kilos (2,200 pounds) of Hong Kong heroin into the
U.S. during the preceding 12 months. This one ring, working for. one of the
five major heroin dealers in Hong Kong, accounted for approximately 20
percent of the BNDD's estimate of total annual U.S. consumption. Additionally,
Gross is contradicting the General Accounting Office which reported
that:
The Far East is the second principal source of heroin entering the U.S.
.......... .
In the past, heroin produced in the Far East was consumed in Hong
Kong and elsewhere, but recently significant quantities were reported
to be smuggled into tho United States via the Philippines and Canada.
(Observations and Data Concernin Illegal'Entry of'Narcotics, staff
paper of the GAO, May 21, 1971)
II. INVOLVEMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN GOVERNMENTS
State Department spokesman Gross also tried to conceal the involvement
of our Southeast Asian allies in his statement to the Congressional Inquiry:
Equally sensational and, as far as we can ascertain, unsubstantiated,
is the charge by Mr. McCoy that high government officials in Thailand,
Laos and South Vietnam 'are actively engaged in the heroin traffic and
are protecting the region's powerful narcotics syndicates.
The State Department, however, should be aware that the U.S. Army
Provost Marshal reported that high ranking members of South Vietnam's
government were in the top "zone" of a four-tiered heroin trafficking pyramid:
Zone 1, located at the top or apex of the pyrami.d, contains the
financiers, or backers of the illicit drug traffic in all its forms.
The people comprising this group may be high level, influential
political figures, government loaders, or moneyed ethnic Chinese
members of the criminal syndicates now flourishing in the Cholon
sector of the City of Saigon.:! The members comprising this group
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are the powers behind the scene who can manipulate,. foster, protect,
and promote the illicit traffic in drugs. (Office of the Provost
Marshal, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam;'The'Drug Abuse
Problem in Vietnam, 1971, p. 6)
Again Gross is contradicting the findings of other government agencies.
Newsweek of July 19, 1971 reported that, "Attorney General John Mitchell
agreed that government officials-have been involved in the Southeast Asian
heroin trade." John Warner, Chief of the Strategic Intelligence Office of
the BNDD, in an interview with the Washirigtoh'Evening Star, June 19, 1972,
acknowledged that, "Corruption is a way of life in Southeast, Asia.' It'
reaches to all levels." The article continued, "The weeding out of Asian
officials heavily involved in the dope traffic, as well as the strikes against
the traffickers themselves are all fairly recent."
Gross also said, "As for Ouan Rathi.koun (Ouane Rattikone). . . we are
not aware of anything more than unsubstantiated allegations concerning his
past and present complicity. With regard to his 'control' of the 'largest
heroin laboratory in Laos,' once again, all we have is allegation."
Thus Gross continued the myth of innocence fostered by the State
Department and the U.S. Embassy in Laos. However, John Warner confirmed my
charges by admitting for the first time Gen. Ouane's involvement.
Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian
Army, had consolidated several opium refineries into one, and with
his army, controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for'
years, Warner said.'(Washington'Evening'Star, June 19, 1972)
John Warner countered my testimony Iy.calling U.S.'Ambassador to Laos,
G. McMurtrie Godley, "one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-narcotics
program in Laos." However, in December, 1970, while American troops in
Vietnam were being decimated by Laotian heroin; while Gen. Rattikone was
Laotian chief staff and his involvement as? well as the location of the heroin
laboratories was common knowledge among even the most junior U.S. officials;
Godley wrote to an American journalist who had complained that Laotian offic-
ials were involved in the drug traffic:
Regarding your information about opium traffic between Laos and the
United States, the purchase of opium in Southeast Asia is certainly
less difficult than in other parts of the world, but I believe the
Royal Laotian Government takes its responsibility seriously to prohibit
international opium traffic.-However, latest information available to
me indicated that all of Southeast Asia produces only 5 percent of nar-
cotics which are, unfortunately, illegally imported to Great Britain and
the U.S. (James Hamilton-Patterson, The Greedy War [David McKay Co.,
Inc., New York, 1,571] , pp. 275276.
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Warner also claimed that Gen. R,attikone "was forced to retire in July,
1971. We have political clout in the area and Ambassador Godley exerted it."
This directly contradicts the State Department. The July 21, 1971 Newsweek
reported that the State Department said the timing of the retirement of
Gen. Rattikone was "sheer coincidence." Newsweek's?Vientiane correspondent
and diplomatic sources told me that Ouane's retirement had been planned for
over a year, and Gen. Rattikone, who admitted his involvement in the narcotics
traffic, flatly denied that there had been any pressure on him to retire.
IV. CIA AND AIR AMERICA INVOLVEMENT
Nelson Gross quoted the Managing Director of Air America, who called my
charge that Air America aircraft have been transporting opium "utterly and
absolutely false." Air America's involvement has been confirmed by Gen. Ouane
and by Gen. Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air Force, who refused
to carry opium for Gen. Ouane.
I spent six days in August, 1971 in the opium-growing Meo village of
Long Pot, Laos. Ger Su Yang, the District officer, told me:
Meo officers with three or four stripes [captain or more] came from
Long Tieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters,
perhaps two or three men at one time. The helicopter leaves. them
here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come
back here and radioed Long Tieng to send another helicopter for them.
They take the opium back to Long Tieng.
This account was verified hy.everyone I talked with. Ger Su Yang also
reported that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Flora Lewis,
writing in The Washington'Post on July 23, 1971, said:
The CIA has changed its rules in an attempt to stop the use of its
private airline, Air America, for transport of drugs [opium and
heroin] in Laos. Although only two months ago CIA director Richard
Helms adamantly denied there had been any agency involvement in this
traffic, he is now said to have told a secret Congressional hearing
that there was involvement but it has stopped.
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John Warner contradicted his superior, John Ingersoll:"Despite some
testimony on Capitol Hill that much of the massive flow of heroin moving
through Latin America on its.way to the United States comes from Southeast
Asia, Warner said there is no indication yet that any Southeast Asian
heroin has been transshipped through Latin America;"'(Washiri ton'Ev g
eriin
Star, June 18, 1972).
V. SOUTHEAST ASIAN HEROIN THROUGH LATIN AMERICA
Ingersoll told this committee'last year that "Intelligence on the flow
?,of heroin from Southeast Asia through South America and Latin America is
inconclusive, but indications are that it may be considerable." (Ingersoll,
letter to Senator Proxmire, Chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Senate Committee on Appropriations, July 12, 1971, reprinted in Foreign
Assistance and Related'Programs'Ap~ro riatioris'FY'1972, Committee on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate, p. 614
VI. NO EVIDENCE
The Star reported that John "Warner said he-had seen nothing of an
evidentiary nature from McCoy 'other than gossip, rumors, conjecture and old
history.'"
I have given this committee a copy of a U.S. government document
implicating Gen. Ngo Dzu. Mr. Warner is well aware of this evidence.
He should also be aware of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division
(CID) reports dated January 6, May 12, and July 10, 1971 which provide
ample details on Gen. Ngo Dzu's involvement in the heroin traffic.
The U.S. government knows who is trafficking in drugs in Southeast
Asia, but does not act. It says it lacks the hard evidence to crack down.
I say the problem is a lack of will rather than a lack of evidence. The
Phoenix program with its gigantic intelligence apparatus was carried out
by the U.S. in Vietnam to kill and imprison suspected enemy agents. Sus-
pects were not given trials, hard evidence was not required. I do not con-
done the Phoenix program, but it does indicate what the U.S. can and will
do to keep friendly generals in power. The fact that there is no comp-
arable effort to stop heroin trafficking shows that the U.S. puts political
and military goals in Southeast Asia far ahead of stopping the drug trade.
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CID Documents
The Criminal Investigation Division of the Army has a criminal inves-
tigative file on General Dzu which contained at least three CID documents
,as of mid-July 1971. These three documents are in the'form of reports
prepared and transmitted by a CID operating detachment to higher CID=head-
quarters. The information in the reports was developed by the CID operctionns,
unit from sensitive, confidential sources.
Document #1 -- dated January 6, 971. The source reported that Gen.
Dzu and Dzu's father were involved in, narcotics trafficking, and that Gen.
Dzu made use of his personal aircraftito transport the drugs. The source
also provided the names of several other individuals involved with Gen. Dzu
in the trafficking operation, including the ARVN provost marshal in Qui Nhon,
certain South Vietnamese naval officers, a South Vietnamese judge, and an
officer of a South Korean Division.
Document #2 -- dated May 12, 1971. The source alleged that Gen. Dzu's
father, Ngo Khoung, was trafficking in, heroin with an ethnic Chinese. The
source named dates and places, as well as certain Saigon principals in the
operation, including a former special assistant to President Thieu.
Document #3 -- dated July 10, 1971. The source reported that Gen. Dzu
controlled a sizable heroin trafficking operation through several individ-
uals, including his mistress, Mrs. Tran Thi Khanh.
Below is the,letterhead of the document reproduced on the next page.
CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMAND, VI ETNA?M1
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222
Office of The Assistant Chief Of Staff, CORDS
10 dune 1971
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i
SUBJECT: Alleged Trafficl