SOVIETS PROTEST SAIGON BUILDUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 21, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/11/01 :CIA-RDP73409Mrpie00020019-3
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE .4?1 PAGE
IN
The Washington Merry-Go-Round ,
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Nov. 21, 1972 B 15
. .
Soviets Protest Saigon Buildup
By Jack Anderson
Strictly speaking, the U.S.
has not violated any under-
standing. Not until the shoot-
ing stops does the proposed
agrbement call for a halt of
military shipments (except for
replacements) into South Viet-
natn.
In an obvious effort to
strengthen President Thieu's
liand before the cease-fire
goes into effect, the U.S. has
macy isn't exactly uncommon.
swamped Saigon with sup-
plies. The deliveries of war-
planes and helicopters, in par-
ticular, has transformed the
South Vietnamese Air Force
into one of the Worlds' largest,
with a new total of 4850 air-
craft.
The Soviets -have charged
this violates the spirit of the
truce negotiations. They point
mit that the North Vietnamese
can't match the sudden U.S.
buildup and, therefore, have
been placed at a last-minute
wiLlo.17122a.ve tested
b. ' to over
ta4canth Vietnam in anticipa-
tieweta cease-fire.
This has put the Soviets on
the spot, since they gave Ha-
noi a guarantee of U.S. good
faith. The Soviets Also quietly
pressured Hanoi to end the
fighting. They went so far as
to imply that Soviet military
aid might be curtailed if the
war drags on.
disadvantage. This has caused
Hanoi to question the Soviet
guarantee of U.S good faith.
Footnote: U.S. re onnais-
sance fli hts and electronic
wawa Ape deteg no
gavitairatt.luararat.4.sup-
tveut the north, into
$6111.til-3riatzlain?
ae?,s?14,j,atax.w e d
sources claim PrelideAUTizon
erns-e-crrge`aqt understand-
fthary that We7,7x.s.
NyaapallitasasuiliAL21Eu-
Tiltsgilinese_are&alicr to
have the UhS..inaintain a mili-
raiLjazcF.ence in_Eurazpr to
gLaw Ssylet,larges Amy from
der. The The _President assured
Cliou tIere would be lin-Amer-
iarinillitarY withdrawal froln
Eti h -reductions
are lien*, conai ci** Our
Thebrces say President's as,
surance can't be deseribe,d as
a secret agreement but, more
accurately, a secret, informal
understanding.
U.S. Bribery?-It has been
whispered around the White
House that bribery was used
to overcome President Thieu's
opposition to a cease-fire.
There is absolutely no indica-
tion he, was paid off, himself.
But our sources have official
knowledge that other South
Vietnamese lea der s were
slipped money to helper-
suede Thicu to go along with
the U.S. cease-fire agreemept,
in Saigon.
This sort of black-bag diplo- rector, James Miller, admitted
mac yisn't exactly uncommon
Our sources have heard
Philip Habib, for one, tell pri-
vately how he bribed opposi-
tion leaders when he was the
top political officer at the U.S.
Embassy in Saigon in 1965-67.
Now Ambassador in Seoul, Ha-
bib was heard to say he used
to carry "a little black bag" in
Saigon. "From that little black
bag," he is quoted, "we bought
out any opposition." While
Henry Kissinger was trying to
sell the cease-fire to Thieu,
Habib left his post in Seoul
for a rush trip to Saigon. A
spokesman denies that bribery
played any part in these Sai-
gon negotiations. He would
say only that Habib flew to
Saigon to discuss "Vietnamese
matters" with Kissinger. Ha-
bib couldn't be reached for di-
rect comment.
MUST Musn't-An impor-
tant scientist in the Manned
Underseas Science and Tech-
nology Office, part of the
Commerce Department, is also
a principal officer of a com-
pany which furnishes MUST
with midget submarines.
MUST rents submersibles for
undersea research. One of the
half-dozen "science coordina-
tors," who participates in the
decision on whether to rent a
midget sub is Dr. Robert F.
Dill. }Ie also happens to be a
founder, director and major
stockholder in General Ocean-
?graphics, a Newport Beach
Calif., firm. MUST'S deputy di-
to us that he was aware of
Dill's relationship with Gen-
eral Oceanographics but
claimed Dill "exerted no un-
due influence" on decisions to
rent the company's subs. Dr.
Dill was unavailable for com-
ment.
Naval Sabotage-Sabotage
in the fleet has become so se-
rious that Navy security engi-
neers are studying ways of
locking on the metal plates
which cover inspection holes.
Sailor saboteurs have removed
the plates and thrown in dirt
or metal shavings to foul gear
boxes and other moving parts.
The damage slows or stops the
ships and costs thousands to
repair.
CIA Echoes-CIA agents ac-
el ..1.7477--1:117.11T...743177n
traffic in Southeast Asia can
MirdbiiSotatroli-Trtiiinflrec-
etirfirlreT16" yea r'g -WV itrthe
slltiTA/11,rtrieoltraffitt of
421EV'S'elv7teLIILLbook
"The OSS in Wqrk War II,"
antrOrrifilard-M7iitoff Wfi te s
th"artISFgnts .P:arkalirgd
i""-naliliirina with silv-e-Floins
and, oiritiFtnrar VET ttp a-
nese Kachin irregulars. "If
there was any mOTII-Mttler-
ZiZ-writes ITymliff,-10 ex-
OS,S_tran
overcome by-tfie realitrer'of
war an-d-fiiiTitary opet-71-0s."
C 1972, United Feature Syndicate
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE css PAGE al
The Washington Merry-Go-Ronnd
WASHINGTON POST Honda,., Am,. 20, 1972 B 7
Investigation Can Be a Big Weapon
By Jack Anderson
ears we have reported
vesiraret
feder
ors
?
en e.T9du.iiis could be
arriTTS1711Y5fie wEo deals with
the government or makes out
a tax return.
It has kgcojoo
fre- ractice i con-filcts
arja...and
for the gov-
dis-
the
s. e power of in-
ve iga ion, which is supposed
to be used for the good of the
citizens, is ,often_used insteact
to intimidate, coerce and
istrike back at persons who
challenge the rulings or op-
pose the policies of govern-
ment.
Government files are liter-
.ally crammed with the life his-
tories of wholly innocent citi-
zens. These files are loaded
With derogatory information?
true statements, deliberate
lies, idle gossip?whispered
into the ears of eager govern-
ment gumshoes.
FOIAb3b
The dirt these gumshoes
pick up- on people is swept
into dossiers which are freely
exchanged between federal of-
fices. This gives an alarming
number of government em-
ployees access to the raw files.
If the subject happens to be a
prominent urson, the gossip
from his files travels swiftly
in titillating whispers.
The Secret Service, for ex-
ample, recently wanted to
know more about a famous
singer. A request for informa-
tion brought in a deluge of
raw allegations from various
government agencies.
The FBI had a full file on
the singer, a black woman, al-
though she has been accused
of no crimes and isn't likely to
commit any. the CIA
Eihmitted a ,cerifidentia run-
nits with
Wiautionar note:
Sex File
"BezumuLtriu., na-
ture of this information and
2Lir , Or
glassaLiatzl fuitii?without
ljagjarammonaralleinat-
.ce."
aving cleared its con-
sc.igam t e to
?j2a*m_it unsubstantiated
aft .A400.06.1.4.
charges about the singer's
ricco, .en al
ssau,L;_agsjzsz th ee-
pare memo, "advised . . . that
her escapades overs as and
hsr?...29.1e morals were said to
beEhe
sursaltakttLijat_abitaliad
.lurid sex life in Paris and
described her as
laalP1Q111"ialaw juenua..: ? ? ." on nit
,e4t on
pout her sex activities, with
these addecr7"Omments:
"Another informant described
her as having a very nasty dis-
position, a spoiled child, very
crude, and having a vile
tongue. The informant states
subject was not well liked by
most actors and actresses
working with her. The inform-
ant, states she is a very self-
,shallow person who
erately upstages and
scues actors working with
her...
"The informant states' that
subject did not associate with
very many Negroes and often
bragged that she had very lit,
tie Negro blood. The inform::
ant states that those vibe
work with subject know from
experience either to play up VS
her or to keep their distance
to avoid subject's treachery.'
..../L4p2.1Fesfrian stressed, and
3Le..,11411A-Carriiiiarihal, hP
141,,,,sjagant . keep -DX.> on
American citizens, except for
securay_filen. ,,its_own?per-
wee,. Th,c informagoxabout
the singer turned up in an-,
This illustrates, neverthe-
less, how promiscuous the
traffic in unproved allegations
has become inside the govern-
ment:
Footnote: Even the National
aeMITZ"ArintVviarre=lup-
ale limiLita .a.ctivities to
,71?
' iterj-J3g.,.. foreign codes,
utagausuutarjaLdwut ..the
laazi.e.=..wgrAlingtaLIQ.Irocts
1 cif foreign -lugagIcazia?aluzit
41?416.....
1 ,.s,;; . 972, United Feature Syndicate
, .
t er--`n=r7"?"7"7,,,,t.90
--
D , 2114pQS4E4_ ? a
ana.thai,ad.not ite.tla7Pri qr
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? THE WASHINGTON POST DATE/ 141.-11- PAGE
The Washington Merry-Go-Henna tRE VASITINGTON POST Tuesday, Oct. 17, 1972
C 15
Nixot,i Forces Accused of Dirty Tricks
By Jack An erson
en in power don't relish
having their cozy relation-
ships exposed, and their
sotace of money bared, and
their errors and embarraSs-
ments publicized.
is not surprising, there-,,
fore that the Ncxon Mminis-
tration doesn't like this col-
umn. So the President's dirty
trieks department tried to
-play a few tricks bn us.
e dirty tricks operation,
Otherwise known as the "Of.
fensive Security i'rogram ot
tha Ninu Forces," was estab-
lished chiefly to bewitch and
befoul Democratic presidential
candidates. It was fundedout
of a secret, fluctuating Repub-
lican slush fund.
The Washington Post has
charged that the dirty tricks
included forging_phony letters
to embarrass the Democrats,
leaking false information to
the press, tailing family mem-
bers of Democratic presiden-
tial candidates and throwing
campaign schedules into dis-
array.
The Watergate, incident?
hteaking into Democratic
Filly headquarters, tapping
party leaders' telephones and
sUallrig_party documents?was
part of this sor id operation.
dirty tricks
were piffled by Political opera-
tives and government gum-
shoes alike. Their objective
aptarentlY was two fold (1)
to discredit the column by
errnining our crdibi1ity;
and p' ghut o mar sources.
A host of investigators par-
ticipated in the project. Gov-
ernment agents, watching
through binoculars, from a
twarpy knoll, staked ont my
house. With walkie-talkies,
they directed waiting govern-
ment security ears to tail me
wherever I went. Sources in-
side the Justice Department
,provided me with the descrip-
tictn.s , ancl license_ nurnhqs
of the cars. So it didn't take
long to locate them lurking in
hiding places near my home.
McCord's Report
The President's campaign
security chief, James W. Mc-
Cord Jr., joined in the inves-
tigation. In an "interim re-
port" to the White House, he
accused Me of "close associa-
tion with the operating arm
of the Democratic Party."
Ironically, a Democratic Party
spokesman later accused me
of close association with Mc-
Cord's operation after we pub-
liShed an embarraising memo
m party files.
Sources inside the White
House, meanwhile, warned us
of attempts to discredit the
column. Not long afterward,
the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs called a
press conference. We were
tipped off that the bureau
ld challenge our story
about Thailand's great opium
hoax.
The Thai authorities
considerable whoop-de-d00
staged a million-di-311er opitlili
burning to dramatize how they
were cooperating with the U.S.
crackdown on drugs. We re-
ported, however, that they
really burned cheap fodder
mixed with opium.
Nixon aides went to elal3O-
rate lengths to knock the
story down. They prepared
pages of refutation for the
press, set up a movie of the
opium burning and produced
an "expert" to testify how
wrong we were. Not only
narcotics officials but White
House and Justice Department
aides were involved in the
arrangements.
fa_ ram wivanee
tuLay associate Le's Whitten
stgazaja_aillie mess con-
Lierence with a Stack of secret
4C1,45,, downents and detailed
alate,s_trarti_ather cTocuments.
- ? e Med evidence ri:ht from
hat the Thais had burned
er inffe-a-Calplu-7nrilm
-infitration spokesmaa
siteepishLy admitted thaLUncle
Sam hnd.paid a cool $1 milli=
the PAIM,
Air Force Attack
More recently, the Pentagon
furnished the editors of Air
Force Magazine with material
for a blistering attack on us.
They challenged our report
about Air Force research on
a laser beam that would ex-
plode the eyeballs of enemy
soldiers at a distance of more
than a mile. Blinded soldiers,
research noted, would be
of a burden to a fight-
g force than dead soldiers.
We based our story on a
copY Of the actual study, which
speaks more than five times
of the violent effects of laser
beams on eyeballs. Twice, the
'study cites "massive blast"
effects; in another place, it
tells of a "micro-explosion" in
the eyes. The water fluids in
the' eyes, adds the study, would
"rise to about 100 degrees
Centigrade" ? the boiling
point.
Although we had a copy of
the' study, we also contacted
two Air Force researchers at
Wright- Patterson Air Force
Base where the research was
reviewed. They would confirm
only that they had been in-
volved in classified research
on laser weapons.
Finally we located the phy.-
sician-researcher. Dr. Milton.
Zaret, who directed the study.
for the Air Force. To make
sure our story was absolutely
accurate, we read it back to
him word-for-word. He sugges-
ted a few minor technical
changes, which we made.
After Air Force Magazine-
called our story false, we.
reached editors Claude Witze
and John Frisbee. The attack
on us was written by Witze
who admitted he had never-
seen the study he accused us
of misrepresenting. He also.
had never tried to reach the
scientist who prepared it nor,
for that matter, had he bother-
ed to seek our side of the
story.
"My understanding was that
(the Pentagon version) was the
whole package," said Witze.
"I rely on them fairly heavily."
(c_i? 1972, United Fektuie Syndicate
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'TC???
ariLar 'TO Vtki (2-00/7.. s.e.
0 ow; 3aril iggetiggictuRoonoigummota, death and details of his
ran counter to the report, the premier said,
The report was entitled "United to Win Still
greater Viotories,.." The Party Central Com-
mittee had earlier rejected a draft that Lin
Piao had had prepared for him by Chen Po-ta,
a former secretary of Mr. Mao and a Politburo
member who was a militant leader of the
Cultural Revolution and has since disappeared
amid -denunciations.
A Plot Without Action
Seeing his path to the succession endan-
?gent Lin Piao began plotting with "a small
hari,c1bal -nr sworn conspirators" to assassinate
Mr. Mao and try to seize power, according to
Premier Chou. No attempt was actually made
on the party chairman's life, however. "He
didn't dare to put his plot into practice because Why Now?
it was only the scheme of a very small handful Why did Premier Chou decide now to en-
of people," Mr. Chou continued. "It was only gage in the first public discussion of the Lin
after Lin Piao fled that we got hold of material Piao affair by any Chinese leader? One can
concerning his conspiracy." only guess. A possible explanation is that the
- -Last September Lin Piao became "afraid purge of Lin Piao's suspected followers has
that his designs had been exposed" and pre- been completed, that the Chinese people have
pared to flee on short notice, the premier said. been carefully informed and that they have
Although Lin Piao as defense minister had the taken the news calmly. In addition, China may
authority to order a plane for his own use, he now want the world to see that the plot wasn't
instead had his son, Lin Li-kuo, deputy head of widespread, that it was coped with easily, that
the air force's operations department, arrange China has nothing to hide and that the matter
to have a British-M.ade .Trident aircraft se., should cease being a source of conjecture. That
cretly sent to him at Peitaiho, a seaside resort would fit in with China's desire to project to
to the east of Peking. the world an image of calmness, stability and
respectability.
Some foreign specialists accept the Lin Piao
story, others are openly skeptical, while most
suspend judgment. The skeptics question
whether Lin would have plotted to kill as re-
vered a national figure as Chairman Mao or
would have tried to flee to the Russians, whom
he had been outspoken in denouncing in the
past. They suggest that Lin Piao might have
been pulled from his pinnacle of power by
Chairman Mao, Premier Chou and other lead-
ers and, when he wouldn't go quietly, done
away with. Then, they speculate, a group of his
close followers might have tried to flee by air,
were pursued over the Mongolian frontier and
shot down. All this is pure speculation, of
course.
"What Puzzle?"
"About this jigsaw puzzle . . . ," began one
TUtn .ruye- American editor, addressing Premier Chou
1971, with a few conspirators but without even after the tale was told.
the navigator or radio operator, who had be- "What puzzle?" the premier ,interrupted.
come_gware of the order that no planes were to "There is no puzzle about it. I have' told you ev-
take off. The plane headed for Outer Mongolia, erything. It's much clearer than your Warren
where Soviet influence is strong. But "when report on the assassination of J. F. Kennedy."
the plane got there, it failed to spot the runway "It's a puzzle to us," the editor replied.
Later, after the premier expressed skepti-
cism that Lee Harvey Oswald had been the
sole assassin of President Kennedy, ?T. Edward
Murray of the Detroit Free Press, president of
?Bow can, the premier be sure that Lin Piao the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
was among the nine bodies? he was asked, told him: "You just have a conspiratorial '
"Our embassy people were accompanied to mind."
the spot by officials from the Mongolian for-
eign ministry, and they took photos there," he
replied. "Although the bodies were burned,
they were not completely destroyed, and it was
still possible to identify them."
-After the .order grounding all aircraft, an-
other group of conspirators took off in a heli-
copter and tried to flee abroad but never
reaglied the border, the premier said. It was
forced, to land by Chinese aircraft and "after
the fowced ?landing.* innitto
ieaseaafiliGitlattisaQ1L is
round .evidence of their plot," Premier Chou
ire Told You Everything,' He
'Tells I.J.S. Newsmen in China;
?But Some Experts Doubtful
AiiiEd.4 Platio.
t Didiotor- 0 f,7*E trA.a,'STREiT SOURNAI:
,a--,--Preniter,r dhoti divnIged
details of the Chinese governments version of
the downfall and death of Lin Piao, who was
,,Tse-Aing's designated successor until
tember of last $'ear.
; inese, hafiald earlier.. merely that
_ ,in a plane_ crash while
trying to flee the country after an unsuccessful
got to assassinate CommunistParty Chairman
Mao ind_seize power. TheinoW-detailed tale of
mystery and intrigue -rivals-adriielitiire fietioii.
th_ he freShly added details there are
Ore ign- -iraf ion '&1
lii`st-Tiiat
te'fin Pia.O'Slo7
tree- our-ane u-minute mee mg
aiojjrorn the ikiierkah
ety of laewspeam o"cs--.11r_. m7ating
place arreire tion room of .the' great
e an lagecritit the srnall
rnornin
or s TNT, a ar o e saiiThr 'Tar
th-Thrtan la? a air eau n ?e rat-18-
,4 -11-v filfcciattranscryt harEeen pre-
andIfie-pr mire/. faff?ofiooRgelf for
iteirStai
g67e7nrinTiTTe'S-
15-layzre-mmrtm-ii` '
Ls. a nelVed- his cons " because
e eve_ at ha could really Sucae-4
_14-t " ''`rnalt
rytqltthen we criffcized witErri-Ehe pafty-t-h-e
oris-flifinjilk-alid-folifiCar by Lin
ieft 'couleniit ori airy lOnger:?
ecorne'ffise-
tiOe., The_preinTer say',_ Toreign-Spe-
4Iists aAatitstde China fieliere lh
liaVe the explariatiOW:-Ille-iltt-lbbbtultural
'neVo.futina "had lef1t,ha COiLiaLL:irilsf'. Party 'arid
:ci.fldli4n....governmentirriretui'eg disarray:fai-
l:Owing T!.e4- Otiajd, -affaela-On. Tor elitist
atfl,,f4pgs tut. mdcrthti.: ti5;1:97s-e7t6ii:c1-1 With
th In0P1,;, ariVP41110"tii-i'vr4-0,
yirt 'galled id
'to, reitb--r. 04i ..qPITe,e2 country rarniirlg'
and _ bad assurne4 poWer China s
plzilti" economic and social institutions.
Pfe..4r:MICOT,i hef_gali 16 rebuild -the
pat' aridThe goirtritierithilrealie'ra4; the
,undotibtecily was a Struggle over how much-au-
thority over civilian. institutions would remaini
in the hands of,q-, '''and 'how Much would'
? r4?t6. party _authorities. qAairnian Mao'
threw his suppoit-lo 117 Pieniler and T in
,
Piao's future star_ - cloudy. Foi-
eign of tlie-s_ChWe'gcene also believe
41.# oaffaTeT1T7'd"ecISion to seelc in.
r,e ,avtei,o s The a'rly as Apiil
U. s said, .1.. splibizeillapcw fcte
2+4-9-
156tt, e alronaY Tran-("tfcinires that
- _
Vt'aslerg=77"."', imme Mat actually
alleged conspiracy have never been published
In the Chinese press. In fact, denunciations of
his shortcomings have never referred to him
by name, but have lumped him in with another
leader who fell from grace earlier. "Liu Shao?
chi and other swindlers? is the code phrase,
with Lin Piao represented by the latter refer-
ence.
But the premier said party and government
officials were told about the plot, and later or-
dinary citizens were informed, presumably at
meetings of their local farm, factory or neigh-
borhood organizations. "Now the entire
Chinese people know about this matter," he
said. "All ordinary citizens, and even children,
know about it."
"As soon as he secretly ordered an airplane,
the move was reported because it was not ir
accordance with our country's normal proce-
dures," the premier said.
When -bffibials asked Lin Piao's wife, Yeti
Chun, whether a plane had been ordered, she
Met it, and this showed he Was up to some-
thtrig7 But at that time we were not sure how
Wthe S-C-heme was," so all airplanes in the
country-were ordered grounded, the premier
satctHe continued: "In these circumstances, as
he had a guilty conscience, he thought his plot
had been exposed, so he fled in great haste by
the plane moved there secretly, fearing that he
?
might be caught if he fled too late. Actually,,
we dtd not at all think of arresting him, we
only wished to know what he wanted that plane'
for."
The plane took off on the night of Sept. 12,'
of_the airport and its fuel was nearly ex-
hausted,. so it had to try a forced landing." It
caught fire in the attempt, and all nine persons
aboard were_burned to death, the premier said.
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE c?t-1 PAGE
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Oct. 12, 1972 G19
Kissinger's Command Is a Hot Spot
By Jack Anderson
coded _messages
flgoL inte as ion r m
m snirT71'?1"31
po ? e
niost urgent telegrams are
funneled into Henry Kissin-
ger's command post in the
White House. Digests of over-
light intelligence reports are
lelivered each morning to
'resident Nixon.
1stam_anurge,141112.Legg41-1,0
httiiatzagceflo4_1.12,L*,are
oregnr_gis:
New Offensive??Privately,
-rem Kissinger is optimistic
ibout the prospects of a
!ease-fire in Vietnam. Yet in-
tercepted messages indicate
that North Vietnam is prepar-
ing for a renewed offensive.
Our military intelligence has
found no trace, however, that
Russia hap replaced the tanks
and artillery the North Viet-
namese lost in their spring of-
fensive. They were able last
spring to sneak heavy hard-
ware into South Vietnam vir-
tually undetected. But the
best available intelligence sug-
gests that both Russia and
China have cut back military
shipments to North Vietnam.
Hanoi's military preparations,
therefore, may be for a lim-
ited attack upon a political
target, perhaps even Saigon it-
self. But no one really knows
whether the guns will be si-
lenced or booming when the
voters go to the polls on Nov. 7.
Soft on Thieu?Hanoi may,
be softening slightly on its
arch enemy, President Thieu.
In the secret truce talks,
North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho
has emphasized that the Saigon
regime must be dismantled and
replaced by a tripartite gov-
ernment dominated by neither
side. But he has indicated that
Saigon can choose anyone it
wishes to the new government,
that neither side should have
a veto over the other's ap-
pointments. The implication is
that Hanoi would not object if
Saigon appointed the hated
Thieu as a member of the tri-
partite government.
Mao's Vow?China's supreme
ruler, Mao Tse-tung, told visit-
ing Japanese Prime Minister
Kakuei Tanaka fiercely that
the Chinese would resist to
the death any encroachments
by Russia. A.LIZ=2.64a,jk
.Aggro-Tanaka talks
agotes old =m7mg
China would sacrifice its on
ution. He citea the tate ot nis
former heir apparent, Lin
Piao, who died in a plane
crash fleeing to Russia after
attempting a pro-Soviet coup
against Mao.
gill 0 0_1 Onnosition?The
Cr:0
ral Inch-
oiTs?thift inese Premier
Lfliz1ai is still ejaraintek
Eng onnosition inside Peking's
ruling circle. Chou's of-00-
M s arelt upset over his policy
of detente with the United
States, Japan and the West.
They contend that the detente
has hurt China's cred41V
with revolutionary f oree 81
around the world.
Soviet Shipments?A classi-
fied State Department analy-
sis charges that Israel's forays
across her borders against the
Palestinian guerrillas have
given the Soviets a pretext for
strengthening their foothold
in Syria and Iraq. Military
shipment have been sent not
only to Syria and Iraq but to
the Palestinian guerrillas di-
rectly. Contrary, to press re-
ports of a Soviet "airlift" to
Syria, however, the airlift
consisted of only four
transport planes, which have
ceased to make regular deliv-
eries. But the shipments,
though no more than token
military aid, have had the ef-
fect of strengthening Soviet
bonds with the Arab hotheads.
The analysis concludes, never-
theless, that Russia wouldn't
likely risk war for Syria, Iraq
or any other Arab country.
African Wildman?The 'ef-
forts to placate Uganda's wild-
man, General Idi Amin, ap-
pear to have backfired. He has
ordered the Asians, who had
become the backbone of Ugan-
da's economy, out of the coun-
try. He has made impossible
demands upon neighboring
Tanzania. He has made and
broken promises to visiting
mediators. He has imposed
harsh martial law upon his
country, charging that Tanza-
nia, India and even Britain are
planning to invade his small
country. For the sake of black
African solidarity, a host of
black African leaders have
Made pilgrimages to Uganda
to placate General Amin. But
p renozkluvgestt J11
autent,inn_ha,s_mczglyxiDoed
difaujja, aiLlzysy.
Castro "Uncouth" ? Intent
gence reports acknowledge a
rise in anti-U.S. feeling.
throughout Latin America,:
But apparently Cuban Dicta;;
tor Fidel Castro's attempts to"
exploit U.S. unpopularity for
his own purposes have failed.
A typical message from our
defense attache in Ecuador,
where Castro visited last year,
describes the top Ecuadorean
military brass as anti-U.S. but
also anti-Castro. The message
quotes them as calling Castro
"uncouth" and "not the great
leader that many people con- '
dider him to be."
Cuba-Panama Friendship?
A .peret CIA cable, reporting
?fficer
o "
cluotesjatp gs, saving that ''the
Cobaai?goxernment_m_ierally
sopperts?the_ __Manama:A
General
nz,
atna.c...2=1121,....ie head of
Patteea..lut?w
nd
encourage Torrijos to
? I I
? II
er o A ;1in4 ? 1-
..e44:_sjrue ci t at .
ists in PanaThTia7fo'e?M?ir7ina-
ma-Cuba Friendship Society,
which could promote friend-
ship with Cuba, put pressure
on Torrijos from the left and
possibly be used as the center,
for certain unspecified Cuban
activites."
? 1972, United Feature Syndicate
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
25)(11....MME
NEW YORKAMBeflel For Re!easel:2AM 146415/3-14.1300415139,61Q1320020014
WAR RAINMAKING
SUBJECT OF SUIT
U.S. Said to Violate Patent
in Indochina Project
By ANTHONY RIPLEY
Special to The New York Time.
WASHINGTON, Oct. 3 ? In
inuaicecl lawsuit fjjed
hete?more_tban.....threa?seeeks
aga??e. manufacturer of
equipment char,ges_that
the United States is making rain
Jn oc in with a device he
leyepted. in violationfliis
natent rights.
Bernard A. Power, president
of the Weather En gineering
Corporation of Canada Ltd. and
its United States subsidiary,
Weather Engineering Corpora-
tion of America, estimated that
1.9-million of the devices ? ex-
plosive canisters filled withsil-
ver iodide crystals ? had been
produced for use in Southeast
Asia.
Secretary of Defense Melvin
R. Laird told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on April
18 that the Defense Department
had not conducted any rainmak-
ing activitiesover North Viet-
nam.
Second Denial by Laird
On July 3, The New York
times reported secret use of
cloud-seeding over North Viet-
nam and South Vietnam and
Laos, quoting both civilian and
military sources in the Govern-
ment.
Then, in a news conference
July 6, Mr. Laird was again
asked about any seeding opera-
tions. He repeated his denial
concerning military operations
over North Vietnam and de-
clined commenton the situa-
tion elsewhere.
Mr. Power said by telephone
from Montreal, that the com-
pany was seeking $95-million
for "full recovery of profits"
for the devices, which he said
cost $50 each.
Mr. Power said the estimate
was based on the length of the
monsoon seasons over Indo-
china and the size of the area
Involved, which he said he
thought was the Ho Chi
Minh trail netwcirk. The
use covered the period from
1967 to present, he said.
Tested in Newfoundland
Mr. Power said that the
three-pound explosive canister
and the method of dropping it
from a plane into the clouds
was tested in a demonstration
at Harmon Air Force Base in
Newfoundland in November,
1966, with military observers
from Canada and the United
States on hand.
The suit contends that in Dec-
ember, 1966, the company of-
ficers got in touch with Walt
W. Rostow, who at the time
was Special Assistant to Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson.
Mr. Rostow referred them to
Cot Robert N. Ginsburgh of the
Air Force, who at that time was
on Mr. Rostow's staff. He is
now a major general in charge
of Air Force public informa-
tion.
The suit alleges that Mr.
Power and Dewitt S. Copp,
Washington representative of
the company met with Colonel
Ginsburgh "and disclosed the
details of a plan to close in-
filtration trails to South Viet-
nam while at the same time
greatly reducing the loss of
lives normally attendant with
the conventional procedures of
attempting to close the trails
by bombing."
That plan, the suit alleges,
was to make the trails impass-
able through excessive rainfall.
At the time they described
their patented devices, exhibited
models and discussed both tac-
tical and strategic use.
e telephone in
'
VAW:a MOW, if .U01 WPM Fr:
f rwrrilj ,cvntract wit
'enanin of Defense but ha
_ColoneLMs-
e United States
o t e
wTthout itching
on
we wo hear
Nothing u The iiaiNTITMl;"
later-Power said.
Sought Information
In March, 1971, he said, he
first heard that weather modi-
fication was being used in
Southeast Asia in an article by
Jack Anderson, the columnist,
and decided to see if his device
was involved.
Since April, 1971, the suit
alleges, the company has met
with the General Counsel's of-
fice of the Defense Depart-
ment trying to work out the
matter to no avail.
"To date," the suit alleges,
"the Department of Defense
has been either unable or un-
willing to supply plaintiffs with
any information on the pro-
cedures or structures used in
the weather modification pro-
Approved geriRelease 2001/11/01 :
When the matter of military
rainmaking came to light again
this year, Mr. Power said, he
was advised to file suit seeking
to examine docttments and
question witnesses about the
matter.
Device on Paperboard Tube
The device itself is a paper-
board tube wrapped with ex-
plosive cord that contains
silver iodide. Protruding from
one end is a lanyard that is
attached to a delay fuse and
three blasting caps.
The lanyard is attached to
the inside of an airplane and
the device shoved by hand
through a hole in the plane's
body, jerking the lanyard out
to start the time fuse. It falls
into the cloud and explodes,
releasing the silver iodide cry-
sent e
CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
25X1A
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415Z:700020019-3
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 7-1+ -7Z, PAGE
Jack Anderson
Soviets, Syrians
Fight Peace Bid
4,14-Tra.LICAEZTZE,_ixasaL
flpim that the Soviet Union's I
culuitinLatia,Saii02gui- a
41u t,...UalaAto block
die East peace settlement.
By expelling Soviet forces
from Egypt, Sadat had ma-
neuvered into position to get
some concessions from Israel.
Indeed, there were signals
from Tel Aviv that Israel
would be generous about re-
turning captured territory.
The Israelis made it clear,
however, that they intended
to keep the strategic Golan
Heights which they seized
from Syria. The Syrians,
therefore, would have noth-
ing to gain from a peace set-
tlement.
Egypt and Syria are part-
ners, with Libya, in an Arab
confederation ,j3ut the Cen,-
,tral Intelligence Agency, in
secret reports from Dania's-
sus has Ouoted President
Assad as making deroga.tory
Kgruat ithautAlle_Egyptaris.
Not long after the expul-
sion of the Soviets from
Egypt, the Kremlin sent an
urgent, hand-carried message
to Assad. The message, ac-
cording to the CIA, warned
that Syria couldn't afford to
follow Egypt's example and
strip the country of Soviet
protection. This would leave
Syria vulnerable to an Israeli
attack, the message report-
edly declared.
Not only did Assad heed
the message and keep his So-
viet advisers, but he agreed '
to bring more Soviet military
equipment and technicians
into the country.
The intelligence reports
suggest that the Kremlin
seeks to block an Egyptian-Is-
raeli accord?because it
could only be arranged by
U.S. mediation. This would
increase American influence
In the area and leave the So-
viets out in the cold.
THE SOVIET overtures to
Syria, incidentally, have also
has a side effect upon Syri-
an-American relations. Pre-
viously, the Syrians had
shown signs of wishing to im-
prove their relations with the
United States.
An intelligence report tells,
for example, how the Syrians
in July, 1969, communicated
with U.S. Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs
(BNDD) agents in Beirut
through an Italian diplomat
that they would agree to a re-
sumption of cooperation with
the United States on narcot-
ics matters.
Subsequently, according to
the classified document, "two
visits to Damascus by BNDD
agents were conducted cor-
dially and in exchange of in-
formation was initiated."
America t dlOotiati 'Worn
Abanon Ind Jordan were
ilso allowed to travel in
;yria. But suddenly, on Sept.
), Maj. Richard Barrett, an
assistant U.S. military at-
tache in Jordan, was arrested
as he was driving through
the Syrian countryside.
And David McClintoch,
chief of the political section
at the U.S. embassy in Jor-
dan, was manhandled by Syr-
ian border guards when he
tried to cross the border. He
was turned back and had to
be driven out of Syria in an
Italian embassy car.
Castro's Denial
WE RECENTLY quoted
Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel
Castro as saying that Chile's
President Salvador Allende
was "physically spent" and
that other Chilean leaders
"live too well."
This has brought a roaring
denial from Castro, whose
private opinions of Allende
weren't intended for outside
Approved For Release.2171fik1k14/011ad_ P74B00415R000300020019-3
all, are supposed to be Marx-
ist comrades.
We COpiPri _cagt,r44_40,,
marks verbatim from a se_Erpt
ilAk.e.g_dettAccolint of his
meeting with pro-Castro lead-
"During the morning of 3
December 1971," began the
cable, "Fidel Castro and Ar-
mando Hart, member of the
central committee of the
Communist Party of Cuba,
met with a very few nationals
who are strong sympathiz-
ers of the Cuban revolution
in the residence of the Cuban
ambassador in Santiago."
As we reported earlier,
"Castro said he is worried
about Allende because the
latter is physically spent. Cas-
tro also observed that U.P.
[Allende's popular unity
government] leaders live too
well and are not under suffi-
cient tension to take the of-
fensive."
Here are some additional
quotes which we didn't in-
clude in our original story:
"Castro commented that
there is an ideological weak-
ness within the U.P. coali-
tion. The U.P., he said, does
not have a good grasp of the
problems which are involved
in a revolutionary process ...
"Castro stated that the
Communist Party of Chile
(PCCH), which he called the
spinal column of the Popular
Unity government, was too
conservative and said that it
must become more radical
and move to assume the role
of the vanguard of the U.P."
? 1972. United Peature Syndicate
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Sept. 8,1972 D 19
Aid Sought for Crusading T enn.Editor
By Jack Anderson
During the early morning
hours of August 23, an arson-
ist set ablaze the two-story of-
fices of a Tennessee newspa-
per whose crusading editor,
Dan Hicks Jr., had dared to
print the truth about corrupt
county politicians and law-
breaking bootleggers.
It wasn't the first violence
against Hicks since he took
over the weekly Democrat in
the small rural town of Madi-
sonville, Tenn., in 1967. He has
been firebombed, shot at twice
and assaulted by two hired
hooligans. Equipment has
been stolen out of his newspa-
per office.
But the soft-spoken editor
hasn't been intimidated. "If I
have to print this newspaper
elsewhere and drop it on this
town from an airplane, I'll do
it," he told us,
Ever since John Peter Zen-
ger was thrown into a dun-
geon in 1735 for publishing a
critical story about the gover-
nor of New York, editors like
Dan Hicks have defied gun-
men and government men
alike to print the truth.
In his small corner of East
Tennessee's wild-boar country,
Dan Hicks is fighting for free-
dom of the press. This isn't a
right that belongs just to edi-
' tors. Rather, it is the right of
very American to pick up a
\
pen and express his griev-
ances.
We believe Dan Hicks' fight,
tierpfore. is every American's
fight. So let us all help hi
raise the $20,000 it will cost to
replace his ruined equipment.
Contributions can be sent to
him at P.O. Box 8, Madison-
ville, Tenn., 37354.
The Marxist Brothers
' idel Castro has
b... _ _eqn critical. in ?pri a e, I
ile,:z.sAly4121. Allen .
Not only has Alien e *
failed
to impose Marxism upon Chile
with the necessary force and
to keep the people in fear of
the government, complained
Castro, but Allende is "physi-
cally spent."
The leaders he has brought
to power in Chile also "live
too well" and "are not under
sufficient tension," said Cas-
tro.
?Tari.,...CALLIUL.....cauraliStacior
putidedat he really
thiautrpsf Aire' ricre?Tviirli?ffe
taa.T.1-41-41.-
Ur. Castro actually made
some of his remarks to Al-
lende's face but spoke more
sharply behind his back.
Hard-core Communist lead-
ers gathered for a secret ses-
sion with Castro on December
3 at the home of the Cuban
ambassador in Santiago.
t s
el-
ency, wQe..seet
0 US.
"Castro said the U.P. (Al-
ende's Popular Unity govern-
ment) does not have a sat
front to face the opposition,
which he claimed is growing
rapidly," declares the CIA re-
port. "Castro added that the has not yet acted against the
ituation in Chile is rapidly .P. because Allende his;
approaching a critical stage .. .
"Among the factors listed tayed within the constitution.
y Castro, which could precip- "Castro added that he had
tate the crisis and a confron- told the President all of this,
ation with the opposition, was but that Allende did not re
breakdown in public order. .spond.
his, he said, could come
about at any time because the
opposition, especially the mid-
dle class, has lost its fear of
the government,
Allende's Health
"Castro opined that a gov-
rnment must have fear if it is
o control the country," the
IA report continues. "An-
ther factor listed by Castro
as the possible deteribration
f Allende's health, Castro
aid he is worried about Al-
lende because the latter is
physically spent.
"Castro also observed that
U.P. leaders live too well and
re not under sufficient ten-
ion to take the offensive. In-
ertwined into the overall situ-
ation is that the U.P. has a
minority complex,' which af-
ects its judgment.
"In relation to the Chilean
armed forces, Castro said that
Allende is chasing an illusion
by thinking that he can count
on the Chilean military to de-
fend his government during a
critical period. He said Al-
ende is completely mistaken
in this regard.
"He classified the Chilear
armed forces as anti-commu
nist, and said that the militar:
"Castro then complained u
that he thought the U.P. was
not really happy with the re-
sults of his visit, despite the
fact that he did everything the
P. leaders wanted. He said
he believes he helped the U.P.
y his presence, but he added
hat many U.P. leaders are of
he opinion he stayed too long?
and talked too much.
"Castro said he felt that his.
December farewell gather
-
g had been a disaster, be,
ause all of his efforts in
hile had been directed to-
ard getting the masses be-
id the U.P. However, there
was no mass turnout for the
arewell and some people even
eft the gathering before he
ad finished speaking."
1972. United Feature Syndicate
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NEW YORKAllpilMfr gd For ReleasBROpi/ kl-ile,41300415p9R10002001q-it
25X1A
'65 Reports on Outlook for War
By U.S. Intelligence Community
Section of Pentagon papers dealing with reports on outlook for Communists'
activities, April 22, 1965. . .- of
t.12.6J,Inited States intelligence 1111.? ? ??? ?? in
analysts' explanation, which introduces comments by Adm. William F. Raborn
flr JJLfl, rperniiveitigence.
If present U.S. policies continue with-
out the introduction of large addi-
tional forces or increased U.S. air ef-
fort, the Communists are likely to hold
to their existing policy of seeking vic-
tory in the local military struggle in
South Vietnam. They will try to intensi-
'y that struggle, supporting it with
tdditional men and equipment. At the
et.rne time, D.R.V. air defenses will be
trengthened through Soviet and per-
aps Chinese aid.
If, however, the U.S. deepens its in-
olvement by increasing its combat role
rid intensifying its air effort, the intel-
gence officers believed:
. . . that the Vietcong, North Viet-
= and China would initially. . . try
offset the new enemy strength by
epping up the insurgency, reinforcing
e Vietcong with the men and equip-
mt necessary. They would likely count
time being on their side and try to
rce the piecemeal engagement of U.S.
ops under conditions which might
g them down in jungle warfare, hop-
to present the U.S. with a de facto
-rtition of the country. The Soviet
Union . . . would almost certainly ac-
quiesce in a decision by Hanoi to inten-
sify the struggle.
This lack of any real prospect of
"give" on the enemy's part was also
confirmed by Admiral Raborn, shortly
after he had succeeded John McCone
as Director of Central Intelligence. On
the day of Raborn's swearing-in (April
28), the President had given him a let-
ter from McCone which McCone had
handed to the President as his last
official act. The President had asked
Raborn to prepare his own comments
on McCone's views. Raborn's comments,
circulated to Secretaries Rusk and Mc-
Namara on May 6, included the fol-
lowing:
Our limited bombing of the North
and our present groundrorce build-up
in the South are not likely to exert
sufficient pressure on the enemy to
cause him to meet our present terms
in the foreseeable future. I note very
recent evidence which suggests that our
military pressures are becoming some-
what more damaging to the eneray
within South Vietnam, but I am inclined
to doubt that this damage is increasing
at a rate which will bring him quickly
to the conference table.
With particular reference to Mc-
Cone's recommendation that the U. S.
add much heavier air action against
the North to its planned combat force
deployment to the South, Raborn indi-
cated his agreement, and expressed his
belief that such an action would have
the following consequences:
The D.R.V. is, in my view, unlikely
to engage in meaningful discussions at
any time in coming months until U.S.
air attacks have begun to damage or
destroy its principal economic and mili-
tary targets. I thus concur with the
U.S.I.B.'s judgment of 18 February 1965,
that, given such U.S. punishment, the
enemy would be 'somewhat more like-
ly' to decide to make some effort to
secure a respite, rather than to intensify
the struggle further and accept the con-
sequent risks.
And then he added the following
advice:
Insofar as possible, we should try
to manage any program of expanded
bombings in ways which (1) would
leave the D.R.V. an opportunity to ex-
plore negotiations without complete loss
of face, (2) would not preclude any
Soviet pressures on Hanoi to keep the
war from expanding, and (3) would
not suddenly produce extreme world
pressures against us. In this connection,
the timing and circumstances In which
the bombings were extended northward
could be of critical importance, partic-
ularly in light of the fact that there
have been some indications of differing
views between Moscow, Peiping and
Hanoi. For example, it would probably
be advantageous to expand bombings
after, not before, some major new VC
move (e.g., obvious concentration for
imminent attack on Da Nang or Kon-
tum) and after, not before, any current
possibilities of serious negotiations have
been fully tested. And such bombings
should not be so regular as to leave
no interval for the Communists to make
concessions with some grace. Indeed,
we should keep in mind the possibility
of a pause at some appropriate time,
which could serve to test the Communist
intentions and to exploit any differ-
ences on their side.
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
NEW YORK TIMES DATE ltit) hi -1
Secret History Affords
Insights on Negotiations
By NEIL SHEEHAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 27 ? settlement. Among the ma-
The Pentagon papers volumes lor points are these:
on the secret diplomacy of the The volumes do not indicate
Johnson Administration show
that Hanoi and Waashing-
ton could not reach a peace
settlement because they coal
not compromise their basic dis-
agreement over who would
hold power in South Vietnam.
These four volumes of the
secret history of the Indo-
chnia war reveal that Hanoi,
despite mounting levels of ?
punishment, was adamantly_
clincing to its long-term ob- Cmjzjsts would ad ere to
jeotive of unifying Vietnam un- ' e
der a Communist form of gov- risinE level of mill unish-
emment. ? - histo shows ? . by
. ? tt.A an y American power.
of 11.11anoi conducted relatively
ng same pnvate
? 3740&i. diplomacy sayingvirtifal-
lt?hat-kATIC-in public.
rf6 lack 4,14amai?isras...stlilling_to_sn-
wo romise onl to the extent of
emedi-ving **a ? an a ace-say-
? .. ? ... aiil iae111/
any miss
Peal/lite there may have been
. ? ... ell
probleilmliaLriTillirMither side
e ? 0 ? The
was willing to compromise on
the basic substance of its posi-
tion.
What misunderstandin did
exis seems o - a ? a mo e
th art of V/ash-
a i ;aaarentl could
some
?e un
ria
clin
#
?
ail ? #
0 .
to
US
its
am
. ?
? # a ?
ec
sta
es
an
ommunis
'des or shorta
re
ou
ows
een
o in
ive
* - ? "
? a MatillnimirliM -
.? Geoid-MA.17/1h r?,
at.?the
wa
' for reasons o su
stan5e. ' lo-
aatss..alachinery.
When The New York Times South.
published its series of articles
on the Pentagon papers last
June and July, it did not possess eanailte the these four four volumes of the 47- 1 ' ar ace-s ving
volume Pentagon study..4p- means the
term
# - ? I - .?
I' 0' . ? . a a . a).
rom
snd.....a_nDsZmung
chievement of its long-
II
? ?
sed-
the
en WashiagLop zirloke
' !-1/411.1 ?
SU-
4141161. 6:f=ktexe o?? ge
rizi1 ilib
.alataitA4.4.1asIs...i.adavssin,414
sazkzted columnist. A on
mance
ntion.
empt to
e 41Se
b-
neWSpaper nromari 1-4#
er, for
ted
ta
a ,nc? ? 11,gns. Rather, it seems
ub- to have regarded the peace
derson's movement as evidence of a
n. fundamental political weakness
Attitudes Clarfied in American policy that would
tell against Washington in the
The volumes on the negotia- end.
tions begin with events in mid- Washington in turn tended
1964 and end with May of ,act m-
1968, shortly after President munist interm lanes su as
Lyndon B. Johnson made pos-Wre="-"h"ff.3:arta1wo-ere
=
sible the opening of the Paris c e can iczwin
talks by limiting the bombing V.iatuam.
of North Vietnam to the area ..1Lagjunjaing_LUILe North
south of the 20th Parallel and ears to have increased
currently announcedhisdecision ?t mum ion to
not to seek another term. =Lime_ itece of
Pentagon history doesagifying_iietna-7i?n. in?fd?er its
s ovineTdaShip.
it it does reveal much a out !he unwillingness to coin-
pie Itaitudes of both sides, the promise on basic positions was
jac,..tirjr_dawmay_lid evident reports on the first
vihy.....thgLama.zat.agagh....a diplomatic contact made in
1.
PAGE
The New York Times
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, left, acrid Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the
Soviet Union at the Soviet mission here in 1967. When they conferred in Vienna in
May, 1965, Mr. Gromyko told Mr. Rusk Soviet Union "will not negotiate about Vietnam."
June of 1964 through J. Blair
Seaborn, the Canadian member
of the International Control
Commission for Vietnam, and in
the first bombing pause, for
five days in May of 1965, which
was code-named Mayflower by
the State Department.
On June 18, 1964, more
than six months before the first
air attacks on the North, Mr.
Seaborn orally conveyed a
message from the Johnson Ad-
ministration to Premier Pham
Van Dong of North Vietnam, ac-
cording to the history. The
message said, according to the
Pentagon account, that the
United States was determined
to preserve a non-Communist
South Vietnam and threatened
North Vietnam with "the great-
est devastation" if Hanoi did
not halt the Vietcong guerrilla
rebellion in the South and if the
conflict intersified.
The Pentagon history says
that Premier Dong "laughed
and said he did indeed appre-
ciate the problem." He is re-
ported to have replied that
while North Vietnam "will not
provoke the U. S.," apparently
through overt-intervention,
Hanoi would continue to sup-
port the Vietcong and "We
shall win."
He is reported to have pro-
posed as a "just solution" an
American withdrawal from the
South and the creation of a
neutral regime there in accord-
ance with the publicly an-
nounced program of the
Vietcong.
Dean Rusk, who was then
Secretary of State, is shown to
have reflected Washington's
attitude of no compromise on
its essential demands in a con-
versation with the Soviet Am-
bassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin,
on May 11, 1965, at the outset
of the Mayflower bombing
pause.
Mr. Rusk noted, in a cable-
ram relating the conversation,
which the Pentagon historians
quote, that Mr. Dobrynin asked
seems to have caused, despite
the constant hope of Washing-
ton that the pressure would
force Hanoi to compromise its
basic objective, is strikingly
evident in remarks attributed to
Premier Dong in conversation
with two French scientists in
July, 1967, when the bombing
was at its height.
The two scientists, Herbert
Marcovich and Raymond Au-
brac?Mr. Aubrac was a friend
of the late President Ho Chi
Minh?went to Hanoi as inter-
mediaries for the Johnson Ad-
ministration. Their mission was
arranged and supervised by
Henry A. Kissinger, then a Har-
vard professor and now Presi-
dent Nixon's adviser on na-
tional security.
U.S. Power Acknowledged
if the pause meant "any change
in the fundamental U S.posi-
tion."
"I replied that it did not and
that this should be no sur-
prise," Mr. Rusk is said to have
written. The Soviet Union then
refused to deliver to the North
Vietnamese a secret message
that amounted to an ultimatum
to call off the Vietcong and
withdraw fro mSouht Vietnam
or face more American bomb-
ing.
The stiffening of the North
Vietnamese determination that
the escalation of the bombing
The message they carried to
Hanoi was essentially the same
as the earlier ones.
Premier Dong is quoted as
having replied that Hanoi knew
that "U.S. power is enormous
and the U.S. Government wants
to win the war.
"President Johnson is suffer-
ing from a pain and this pain is
called South Vietnam," he went
os. "Therefore we think that at-
tacks on the North are likely to
increase. We have made provi-
sions for attacks on our dikes;
we are ready to accept war on
our soil. Our military potential
is growing because of aid from
the U.S.S.R. and other socialist
countries."
"Now I shall talk to you
about negotiations and solu-
tions," Premier Dong is said to
have continued. "We have been
fighting for our independence
for 4,000 years. We have de-
feated the Mongols three times.
The United States Army, strong
as it is, is not as terrifying as
Genghis Khan."
He again replied to Wash-
ington that the solution for the
United States was to withdraw
from South Vietnam and permit
the establishment of a neutral
regime there, according to the
history.
"To theextent they believed
each other, the two sides were
amply forewarned that a pain-
ful contest lay ahead," the
Pentagon historians write in
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their opening chapter on the
secret diplomacy. "Even so,
they were not inclined to com-
promise their way out.
"They held very different
estimates of the efficacy of
U.S. military might. We thought
its pressures could accomplish
our goals. The Communists did
not."
25X1A ,k,???
THE WASIWle raase 2001/11/01 : ci#ARA'rergailittEF6230002pgs.1 15 I 3
AIifl\IFilele
1
The Washington Merry.Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, June 27,1972 Bi5
The Government Secrecy Syndrome
By Jack Anderson
_The custodlans of govern-
egt cenrats arp anashipg
pit tneth agiain nvpr our Ac-
cess to the still-secret ? ortis ns
""rthe
s ow ow Lyndon Johnpon
.latil412?bring4tessura-upan
Hanoi to
Se
He would would withhold the
bombs for awhile, hoping this
would encourage the North Vi-
etnamese to negotiate. Then
he would let the bombs fly
again when he thought they
needed some prodding.
Sometimes, he stepped up
the bombing at crucial stages
of the secret negotiations. Re-
peatedly, Hanoi would halt the
talks because of the military
pressure.
After his retirement, Presi-
dent Johnson published selec-
tive excerpts from the secret
papers to demonstrate how
right and reasonable he had
been. He omitted the , por-
tions that made him look
wrong and unreasonable.
President Nixon also re-
leased sensitive information,
strictly for political reasons,
about Henry Kissinger's se-
cret Vietnam negotiations.
The President used the ?infor-
mation to reply to his critics.
Jae_nnEgLio.slasdLos;
unatiatuawst be reengnized for
at it is. It is is I ess
: grrecuti ?MTrri=
the government to make a
see) of ,vhjteeJt
c1asi& documents has been
2.1atti1P°rep 'Pimp 01-
evetion.
Not only does the govern-
ment sweep its bungles and
blunders, its errors and em-
barrassments under the se-
crecy labels. But our entire
foreign policy and defense
posture remains secret except
for what the federal establish-
ment thinks is in its own inter-
est to make public.
The tragic, bitter lessons of
Vietnam have shown the fate-
ful consequences of allowing
any president to exercise
power in spendid isolation be-
hind the double walls of exec-
utive privilege and official se-
crecy.
We will continue, therefore,
to publish information that
the government seeks to hide
from the public by classifying.
Soviet Role
The unpublished Pentagon
Papers, for example, shed new
light on the Soviet role in the
Vietnam negotiations: The
Kremlin, after showing no in-
terest In settling the war, sud-
denlradopted a different atti-
tude In 1967. Soviet Premier
Alexei Kosygin made the new
attitude known during a Lon-
don visit.
"The British were first star-
tied, then delighted to find
Kosygin eager to play an ac-
tive role as intermediary be-
tween the U.S. and Hanoi
?" state the papers. "There
was definitely a sharp change
from previous Soviet reluc-
tance to play the middle-
man. . . .
"What produced this change
in Soviet attitudes? Were they
acting on DRV (North Vi-
etnamese) behest? Or were
they now willing to put pres-
sure on Hanoi in pursuit of
their own?
"Only a little light is shed
on these questions by the ma-
terials relating to Kosygin's
stay in London. He was appar-
ently willing to transmit pro-
posals for DRY consideration
more or less uncritically.
While he argued the general
merits of the DRV's side of
the war, he did not try to bar-
gain or alter specifics of the
proposals transmitted to
him. . . .
"What is more striking is
that he did not reactlidversely
to the substance of the princi-
pal de-escalatory proposal
under discussion?the termi-
nation of all DRS, infiltration
and supply into SVN in ex-
change for a U.S. halt on at-
tacks on the .North and in
troop level augmentation.
Intercepted Call
"Entirely apart from the se-
quence in which these steps
would be taken, their long-
term result for- th
piste would be extremely ad-
verse militarily. Yet on Feb.
la, he was overheard (by tele-
Phone intercept) to tell Brezh-
nett (the Communist Party
chief) of 'a great possibility of
achieving the aim, if the Viet-
namese will understand the
present situation that we have
passed to them; and they will
have to decide...'
"In a retrospective discus-
sion with Thompson (then the
U.S. Ambassador) in Moscow,
Kosygin expressed a jaun-
diced view of the rule of me-
diators, saying they either
complicated the problem or
pretended they were doing
something when in fact they
were not.
"He had stepped into this
uncomfortable spot in London
because 'the Vietnamese had
for the first time stated they
were ready to negotiate if the
bombings were stopped uncon-
ditionally; this was the first
time they had done so....'
"How much the Russians
had hoped in fact to accom-
plish during Kosygin's Lon-
don trip is impossible to
know. They apparently har-
bored few expectations after
his return. Kosygin complain-
ed to Thompson about the
'ultimatum' implied in the
final proposal he transmitted
to Hanoi from London, saying
that he knew it was hopeless
the minute he read it. . . ?"
This incident illustrates how
little influence the Kremlin
had over the North Vietnam-
ese. It was the beginning, how-
ever, of an increased Soviet in-
terest in ending the Vietnam
War.
C 1972. 'United Feature Srattleats
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THE wAsEAV69-1,
8V1VdMease 2001/11/01 : C1kARiET7e1041A1146661a0020A.1313
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, June 26, 1972 B 11
3 Hanoi Lessons Still Unlearned
By Jack Anderson
The history of our secret ne-
sot14tigns with /fanoi contcains
some ? ainful lessons which
The a omzin details a
?
pear in e unpui ? ?
tions of the Pentagon Pap erg,
which Daniel Ellsberg Care-
WV withheld from the press.
Prpident Nixon, heweve7,
as u, ev_er_l_mpre
sensitive
IMMIAZin t e su res d
itftlts. e us ice preparing to use
these papers in its prosecution
of Ellsberg. There appears to
be no legitimate reason, there-
fore, for continuing the se-
crecy.
Zgaye a con.v_of_the
nulaishest Pentagon Paner,s,
which give chronological ac-
ount of our ? ?lomati frus-
in
s ? ? ,IrTionMait
? ? ? ?V . Here are
the lessons, whic seemed to
us to be the most compelling;
Lesson No. 1?Ex-President
Lyndon Johnson orchestrated
the bombing of North Vietnam
in careful synchronization
with the peace negotiations.
He alternately suspended and
escalated the bombing in an
effort to influence the negotia-
tions. Invariably, this seemed
to produce the opposite effect
in Hanoi than Mr. Johnson had
intended. Yet President Nixon
is now using the same strat-
egy.
Lesson No. 2?The North Vi-
etnamese, whether on the bat-
tlefield or at the peace table,
never lost sight of their ulti-
mate goal; control of all Viet-
nam. As the unpublished pa-
pers put it, "Who shall govern
SVN is what the war is all
about."
Lesson No. 3?With a pa-
tience unknown in the West,
the Hanoi leaders are pre-
pared to ?await and outlast
all enemies. "We have been
fighting for our independence
for 4,000 years," Premier
Pham Von Dong told interme-
diaries who approached him in
1967 with a peace offer. "We
have defeated the Mongols
three times. The united States
Army, strong as it is, is not Is
terrifying as Genghis Khan."
Lyndon Johnson's game of
now-we-bomb-now-we-don't, ac-
cording to the peace papers,
repeatedly backfired.
An exchange of peace mes-
sages through the Poles, for
example, ended abruptly with
the bombing of Hanoi on Dec.
13-14, 1966. Soviet Ambassador
Anatoly Dobrynin later re-
viewed with Secretary of State
Dean Rusk why the contact
had been broken off. "The
bombing was just before that
date," Dobrynin explained Ha-
noi's response, "meaning the
U.S. thought it could pressure
Hanoi to talk."
The papers quote a Soviet
diplomat as saying the North
Vietnamese regarded bombing
of their homeland as an effort
"to get Hanoi to talk." The re-
fusal to talk while the bombs
were dropping, he Said, "was a
direct response" to the U.S.
position.
Nevertheless, President
Nixon has now stepped up the
bombing again as a means of
wringing concessions out of
the Hanoi leadership. But he,
too, is finding the North Viet-
namese fiercely stubborn.
Their attitude is expressed in
a secret quotation from Pre-
mier Pham Van Dong.
"President Johnson is suf-
fering from a pain, and this
pain is called South Vietnam,"
the North Vietnamese Premier
told peace emissaries in 1967.
"We agree that the situation
on the battlefield is decisive;
the game is being played in
South Vietnam.
"From the newspapers we
see that some people want to
confine the war to the South.
However, the White House
and the Pentagon seem deter-
mined to continue the war
against the North. Therefore,
we think that attacks on the
North are likely to increase.
'We have made provisions
for attacks on our dikes; we
are ready to accept war on our
soil. Our military potential is
growing because of aid from
the USSR and other Socialist
countries....
"We fight only when we
choose; we economize on our
resources; we fight only for
political purposes."
The lessons outlined in the
unpublished Pentagon Papers
should be studied carefully by
those who still are seeking
peace in Vietnam.
C 1972, United Feature Syndicate
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25X1A
NEW YORkPPIISXA For Release MI11/01? cou-For7e30041 5 RWISRAO 2 0 0 1 9-3
U.S. Attempted to Ignite
VietnamForestsin'66-67
By ROBERT REINHOLD
spccial to The New York Times
MISSOULA, Montana, July 16?Wellrinfnrmed civilian
nd militar so st s "a i? a ?? 1 to
clear awa enem -controlle for ? es
made a numb. .of roncertecl
?????....?????????ii*
attempts to Jiij iire
%tam? jiLatt.L._iam during 1966
AILIZZLIlejapj=_Eall,ati-
matel abandoned, they,..said,
because the sL_ti?al
The project was undertaken
with the collaboration of fire-
prevention experts from the
United States Forest Service.
They were detached from the
service's Northern Forest Fire
Laboratory in Missoula and, ac-
cording to some reports, from
the Pacific Southwest Forest
and Range Experiment Station
in California.
Area Is Defoliated
In the final atteiscalIe.d ,
laperal?TroriPinki_ROlpe, an area:
ailasaut..Xx_sigs of the cit of
Pljjjacielphia was d ' and
barallar.decls,nesium
bombs in in Iroliti?langle
region northwest of Saigon, an
,area where the Allied pacifica-
tion program had never suc-
ceeded in eradicating Vietcon
influence. fin Pallier at empt
aialeaLlt-a-auggIde.CLaglallarer
s1u.--164/S-11.Ulahee-r-aLion
i?leararaiad_Eaceat. The results
of the two attempts was so dis-
appointing that no further ef-
forts were made.'
"It produced a lot of smoke
and not a whole heck of a loti
of fire at all," said a Pentagon
spokesman, who confirmed that
the fire attempts took place
under the Johnson Administra-
tion. He called them "test
projects aimed at determining
the feasibility of jungle-clear-
ing by burning," and added
. Continued on Page 2, Column 2
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Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
Continued From Page 1, Col. 2
that he could not provide fur-
ther details of -1,11e_p.L....-oject,
akich was conducted by the
Wvanced Research Projects
kgeney a high-levpt research
Def_ense. ..12epart-
Concern Over Environment
The disclosure comes at a
time of mounting concern
among some scientists and Gov-
ernment officials that years of
defoliation, bombing and burn-
ing have inflicted irreversible
I damage on the Vietnamese en-
vironment. Only _recently was
it??diaclusaLtimt the United
The target of the fire storm
efforts were rare and desirable
mahogany trees that many for-
estry experts consider a poten-
tially valuable resource for the
Vietnamese economy.
Had the burning succeeded,
according to interviews with a
number of experts on tropical
vegetation, the trees would
probably have been destroyed,
replaced possibly by less useful
bamboo and other coarse vege-
tation.
One military officer familiar
with the project defended it
on strategic grounds. Saying
that the areas?War Zones C
and D in Tayninh and Long-
khanh Provinces? were Viet-
cong staging areas, he asked,
"When you're fighting a war,
do you want to save trees
or lives?"
At the same time that the
American foresters were trying
to set forest fires, other United
States Forest Service special-
sts were at work helping to
mild Vietnam's primitive log-
;ing industry and to improve
imber management techniques,
mder contract with the Agency
'cr International Development.
Sought to Try Again
4uslugl.....t4 fire_ storm
urces?LiaaLsaiii-
Laz4offidaks_augges.tecl_that? it
a am if better methods
=y'
ested that for and- Ot er
-311T:Voiirre?s-ur-
vPveri to determine if fire
? ?
0 00 ' ?
be employed as
eapon.
Interviews with fire experts
suggest that the project was ill-
fated from the outset. "No way
?too wet," remarked William
R. Beaufait, a Forest Service
expert in the setting of pre-
scribed fires to control timber
forests, in his office here.
Fire storms are a fearsome
and little understood phenome-
non. A fire storm, unlike an
ordinary conflagration, packs
tremendous energy. It sucks in
air from all around, creating a
convection column and mighty
whirlwinds. What results re-
sembles a cyclone and it is cap-
able of ripping out bridges and
300-foot trees like matchsticks.
Its demand for oxygen is such
that people in the area perish
from asphyxiation: this oc-
curred during the Allies' World
War II bombings of Dresden
and Hamburg, in which more
than 200,000 died
Although the methods of
starting and controlling fire
storms are not well understood,
the foresters were asked to ad-
vise the military on the best
conditions ? in terms of sea-
son, wind, rainfall, tempera-
ture, moisture content of vege-
tation and other factors. Civil-
ians in Vietnam during the pe-
riod from 1965 to 1967 report
having seen Forest Service per-
sonnel at the Advanced Proj-
ects Research Agency com-
pound in Saigon.
White House Role Unclear
It could not be learned if
the project nad the approv
of President Johnson, but ac
cording to a former high-rank-
ing military officer, "The pro
cedure was to get clearanc
from the White House on any-
thing like this?'
A forestry contingent, work-
ing under contract to the r
search agency, was believed t
include Craig Chandler, now in
Washington as director of for-
est-fire research for the Forest
Service, and Robert W. Mach,
a scientist at the fire laboratory
here who has studied the mech-
anisms of fire spreading and
the relationship of wildland
fires to ecological systems.
Mr. Chandler was formerly
with the Pacific Southwest sta-
tion in Berkeley, Calif., which
participated in fire storm ex-
periments in the early nineteen-
sixties. He acknowledged that
he had been to Vietnam, but
referred questions about his
functions there to the Pentagon.
A document that is still se-
cret is believed to contain the
details of some of the early
work by the foresters. It is
titled "Forest Fire Research?
Final Report, Phase I, Volume
1, U. S. Department of Agri-
culture, Forest Service. ARPA
Order Number 818. January,
1966."
The burning was necessari-
ly keyed to the dry season in
South Vietnam which lasts
roughly from January to April.
The target was what botanists
call a double-canopied tropical
rain forest. Double-canopied
means that there are two levels
of vegetation, the upper being
the tops of tall mahogany trees,
called Dipterocarpus, and the
lower being smaller bushes and
trees. Such a cover provides
effective concealment for
troops, but the area is not oth-
erwise inhabited.
Spraying With Herbicides
Although the forest is wet
even in the 4:1Ty season, the
foresters theorized that they
could create enough fuel for
burning by first killing the
leaves by spraying with chem-
ical herbicides. This task was
carried out by Operation Ranch
Hand, the 9ir Force code name
for the defoliation operations.
The incendiaries were dropped
by other Air Force planes.
The burning project was de-
scribed by a former command-
er of Ranch Hand, Lieut. Col.
Arthur F. McConnell Jr., in an
article he wrote in 1970 for
the Air University Review. The
article was heavily censored,
but an uncut draft has been
obtained by The New York
Times.
According to Colonel McCon-
nell, the first burning, Oper-
ation. Sherwood Forest, was
tried early in 1965. He
described it as "a massive at-
tempt to burn out a defoliated
section of the Boiloi Woods
in the hopes of denying the
enemy an extremely vital base
camp area."
"For the next year," Colonel
McConnel contnued, "several
fire storm projects similar to
the BoiLoi Woods effort were
made in conjunction with the
Vietnamese Air Force. While
the attempts to ignite the de-
foliated area met with limited
success, the effect of the de-
foliant itself significantly im-
proved visibility for observa-
tion."
Flew 225 Sorties
In support of the final fire
storm effort in April, 1967, he
wrote, his squadron flew "ap-
proximately 225 sorties and de-
livered over a quarter-million
gallons of herbicides on se-
lected target areas in War
Zones C and D."
According to other sources,
the undergrowth was ignited,
but the fire did not spread to
the 70-foot high upper canopy.
Since this third and final at-
tempt was carried out under
the most favorable conditions,
the project was abandoned as
unfeasible.
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THE wthRemseletrarykst9gse 2001/11/01: CIARepliariakkGairaxmAE
AVisit to aJecret American Base
in Thailand
By Peter Smith
Pacific News Service
PHITSANULOK, T ha 1-
land?In a U-shaped bend
of a small river about 15
miles cast of this northern
district capital lipq a sporat
p.S4 militprx traininR base
known as Camp Saritsana.
Near the point where
had been told to turn off
the road to find the camp,
a Thai waitress in a small
restaurant said that there
were usually about 1,000
Thai soldiers at the site,
but that most had just left.
She also told me that 10 or
15 Americans were station-
ed there, and that planes
landed on an average of
five times a day.
As I walked along the
river away from the high-
way, the whine of diesel
generators guided me until
I saw several concrete and
wooden buildings, a 100-foot-
high water tower, and a
generator shed. Further up,
a steel suspension bridge
carried truck traffic across
the river. The scene re-
minded me of places where
I had served in Vietnam
and Thailand.
At Saritsana, U.S. Army
Special Forces train Thai
soldiers for combat in
neighboring La o s. Since
the early 'Ns, CIA-financed
Meo mercenary armies, led
by their most powerful
chieftain Vang Pao, have
been fighting in Laos, and
estimates of the number of
Meo men killed run as high
as 50 per cent Inaeplace
these losses, the ,Unffid
Atates..--Ims?baen?trainialg
Taals_far_lb&witaLtjuze
'?,eggie training and
tke fact that Thai1?ff1as
kma.. laglif.g.n?oo.s to Laos
bave
Senate Report
But a U.S. Senate sub-
committee on security agree-
ments and commitments
abroad reported last year:
'The
Thai irreg1arpro-
eram .
1. ? 11 along
ar
pgagrajn in The IA
_esandiWflore
jn tritArri ortritgarns
a a es
their salary, aubwances (m-
e urairardatinsaraftts), Irrrd
oiSelatioiliff-00-ats in Lads."
These Northern T h i
aPeak a dialect similar to
Meo dialect, and they are
easily integrated into \Ting
Eaallorces. -
At the camp, I was stopped
at the main gate by three
Thai guards, who called their
commanding officer, a Thai
special forces sergeant ma-
jor, on the phone. When I
told him I had once served
with the U.S. Special Forces
in Thailand and just wanted
to talk with some Americans
on the base, he said, "Sure,
come on." One of the
guards got on the back of
my motorcycle and we drove
to headquarters.
The 50-acre site is divid-
ed roughly in the middle by
an airstrip. Heavy woods
surround the base. Ten bar-
racks for Thai soldiers were
on the left side of the en-
trance road. Elsewhere on
the grounds were 41 Thai spe-
cial forces headquarters, a
jump tower and cable rig for
Parachute training, a drying
loft for the parachutes, and
several maintenance build-
ings.
'Air America' Sign
41-fttar..-clieckinghe
Illai_sergeazt_mgam.ihe
Agad_ /oa me, a,cross he
runwa tp._1 huildin mark-
oTj,,rter line which
1ieFOerftlniskon45. fort.l_Te
, tb,rougtionLaia. My
Thai escort ushered me in-
to a U.S. Special Forces
team room, where five men
were having their morning
beer. All wore civilian
clothes or jungle fatigues
without insignia or name
tag, a frequent tip-off that
people are engaged in ac-
tivity which might not
square with formal pro-
nouncements of U.S. policy.
Scattered among the
usual pin-ups and memor-
abilia of home were other
signs. One said: "No war
was ever won wish modera-
tion and civility. KILL1"
Another said: "Make war,
not peace. War is the final
answer."
The men were polite, al-
most painfully so. They did
not mention their mission,
and when I expressed in-
terest they changed the
subject.
Finally one of the men of-
fered to escort me to the
gate, and I followed his
truck out and waved to the
Thai guards as I left.
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NEW YORK TIMES DATE rtsruz
PAGE
U.S. Said to Break All of Soviet's Codes
By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 15?The
United States is reported to
have refined its electronics in-
telligence techniques to the
point where it can break Soviet
codes, listen to and understand
Soviet communications and
coding systems and keep track
of virtually every Soviet jet
piano or missile-carrying sub-
marine around the world.
"We're able to break every
code they've got," a former
analyst in the National Secu-
rity Agency, one of the most
secret of the Government's
many intelligence agencies, is
quoted as saying in the August
issue of Ramparts magazine,
which is published by Noah's
Ark, Inc., 2054 University Ave-
nue, Berkeley, Calif.
The former analyst, whose
name was not given in the arti-
cle, was an Air Force staff ser-
geant who was discharged from
military service in 1969 after
three years of overseas duty as
a communications traffic ana-
lyst for the agency in Turkey,
West Germany and Indochina.
He uses the pseudonym of
Winslow Peck in the article
Some Corroboration Found
Mr. Peck, who is 25 years
old, was recently interviewed
by a correspondent of The New
York Times in California. Ex-
tensrve likeleppident checking
in Washington with sources in
and out of the Government who
were familiar ,with intelligence
roboration of many of his reve-
lations. But experts strongly
denied that the United States
had broken the sophisticated
codes of the Soviet Union or of
other foreign powers.
The national security agency
headquarters is at Fort Meade,
near Baltimore. It has nearly
100,000 employes ? most of
them military personnel ? and
spends slightly less than $1-
billion a year. Unlike the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the
N.S.A.'s primary purpose is the
collection of information?most,
of it through advanced tech-
nology ? but it rarely, if ever,
tries to evaluate the importance
of the information or analyze
it.
The Ramparts article says that
matters has resulted in the cor- Continued on Page 3, Column 1
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?
Continued From Page 1, Col. 7
the United States has encircled
the Communist world with at
least 2,000 electronic listening
posts on land or on naval ves-
sels or aircraft.
United States electronically
equipped aircraft, according to
the article, are constantly pene-
trating the air space of the
Soviet Union, China and other
Communist countries to pro-
voke and record their radar
and signal techniques to de-
velop countermeasures against
them.
This claim has been chal-
lenged here by independent
Government intelligence ex-
perts, who said that there have
been no authorized, as distinct
from inadvertent, violation of
Soviet or Chinese airspace by
the United States since the U-2
flights of the early nisiteen-
sixties. The experts said that
satellite photography has re-
placed aerial overflights, con-
ceding, however, that United
States electronic intelligence
planes often fly along Commun-
ist borders to provoke reaction
and collect signals.
In the California interview,
which was recorded on tape,
Mr. Peck described his early
life in Joplin, Mo., his enlist-
ment in the Air Force in 1966
when he was 20 years old,
his subsequent recruitment by
the security agent, his special-
ized training, his promotions
and his three years of duty
overseas. He was discharged
in California in November,
1969, and says he turned down
a $10,000-a-year job offer by
the Central Intelligence Agen-
cy. He decided-instead, he says,
to work to end the Vietnam
war.
Tells of TV Monitoring
A highlight of Mr .Peck's dis-
closures include a report that
in 1967 during his duty in
Turkey the agency monitored
a live Soviet television contact
between Premier Aleksei N.
Kosygin, who was in tears bid-
ding an emotional farewell to
the astronauts Vladimir M.
Komarov.
Mr. Komarov was then in
orbit in the spacecraft Soyuz
I, which was still two hours
from re-entry into the earth's
atmosphere. According to Mr.
Peck's account the astronaut
h.td just been informed by
Soviet ground control thatt he
braking parachutes designed to
bring his spacecraft safely to
earth were malfunctioning and
that there was no hope of
saving him.
Soyuz 1 crashed on Soviet
territory on April 25, 1967, and
Mr. Komarov was killed. He
was posthumously granted a
second Order of Hero of the
Soviet Unoin and is buried in
the Kremlin walls.
Mr. Peck also said that dur-
ing the 1967 Arab-Israeli war,
the United States electronic in-
telligence ship, the Liberty,
was ordered near the Israeli
coast to intercept details of
Israeli military intentions.
The ship was attacked on
June 8, 1967, by Israeli jet air-
craft and torpedo boats?an
incident that cost 34 United
States dead and 75 wounded
and which President Lyndon B.
Johnson later described in his
book, "The Vintage oPint," as
a "heart-breaking episode." Be-
fore the attack, he said, the
Liberty learned that General
Moshe Dayan, the Israeli De-
fense Minister, intended to
order his forces on to Damas-
cus and Cairo.
Tells of Johnson Pressure
? Mr. Peck stated that Presi-
dent Johnson then brought in-
tense pressure on Israel to halt
further troop movement and
warned Premier Kosygin on the
"hot line" against what ap-
peared to be an imminent So-
viet airborne operation from
bases in Bulgaria against Israel.
Intelligence sources here said
they were unable to recall these
details but a veteran of 30
years service in intelligence
said of Mr. Peck:
"He's obviously familiar with
N.S.A.?its organization, opera-
tions and many of its tech-
niques. But no sergeant in his
early twenties would know how
intelligence is handled at the
White House level, what N.S.A.
material is used or discarded
by the President or more than
just the fringes about C.I.A.
operations."
During his year of duty in
Vietnam, from November, 1968,
to October, 1969, Mr. Peck,
said, he participated in airborne
electronic sweeps in Thailand
in support of C.I.A. operations.
The C.I.A., he said, was using
unmarked attack bombers
flown by C.I.A. "spookies" and
based at Udorn to punish Meo
tribesmen who had clashed
with Thai Government troops
over control of their traditional
areas.
The United States depended
on a friendly Thai Government
for important air bases and
other facilities useful for the
Vietnam war, Mr. Peck noted,
and thus was prepared to as-
sign the C.I.A. surreptitiously
to help the Thai Government
suppress internal disorders.
Neither the N.S.A. nor the
C.I.A. would comment today.
Senior Government intelli-
gence officials who were shown
transcripts of the Peck inter-
view discounted parts of it but
corroborated others.
David Kahn, author of "The
Codebreakers," (published by
Macmillan in 1967) and a lead-
ing authority on cryptoanalysis,
said in a telephone interview
that the Ramparts article "rep-
resents much new information
that rings true to me and seems
correct." However, he chal-
lenged some points, specifically
Mr. Peck's assertion that the
agency's experts are able to
"break every Soviet code with
remarkable success."
Top-grade Soviet Foreign
Ministry code systems "have
been unbreakable since the
nineteen thirties" Mr. Kahn
said. He added that it was
"highly unlikely that they have
switched to breakable codes."
Mr. Peck's contention that
"information gathered by N.S.A.
is complete" implies a false
importance, Mr. Karin said. The
N.S.A. does, he said, "solve"
many nations' diplomatic codes;
but these are countries of the
third rank and provide only
"indirect clues to Communist
intentions."
Mr. Kahn noted that "what
we are doing in this field the
Russians are doing and, con-
trary tot he Ramparts state-
ment, they are very good."
He pointed out finally that
the "thrust of the article, that
the N.S.A. threatens peace, is
incorrect."
"I believe that in the existing
world of two armed camps,"
Mr. Kahn said, "N.S.A. can pro-
vide more light, more truth?
and this can lead to better
evaluation of situations and so
to more realistic responses.
N.S.A. is not like the C.I.A.,
which can foment revolutions
and can indeed threaten peace."
The interview contains a
lengthy question-and-answer
passage that Mr. Peck con-
ceded, in his interview with
The Times, was hurriedly pre-
pared at a time when he was
"extremely rattled."
details of hitherto suspected
but obscure details of elec-
tronic eavesdropping around
the globe resulted, he said,
from opposition to the Vietnam
War and from a hope that
others doing similar clandes-
tine Government work would
"come forward and say what
they know. "He concedes that
his disclosures about the
agency may involve him in
legal tangles.
"I know the FBI knows who
I am," he said recently. "I'd
like to avoid publicity but I'm
willing to go through trial and,
if I have to, I'll go to jail. I
don't like the idea of going
to jail. It scares me. But I no
longer feel the oath that I
made when I was released
from duty to never say any-
thing about what I did is bind-
ing on me."
No Comment From Admiral
Senior agency officials, in-
cluding Vice Adm. Noel Gayler,
the director, are reportedly
highly disturbed by Mr. Peck's
interview. The agency is part
of the Defense Department.
Admiral Gayler, who has been
named commander in chief of
the Pacific Fleet after three
years as director of the agency,
is to be succeeded in a month
by Lieut. Gen. Samuel C. Phil-
lips, an Air Force space spe-
cialist. Direction of the agency
is normally rotated among the
three armed services.
Neither Admiral Gayler nor
Defense Department officials
could be induced to comment
for publication. However, other
intelligence sources agreed that
the Ramparts material con-
tained nothing that would en-
danger national ? or crypto-
graphic?security.
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THE WASHINGTON POST
CIA-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
DATE ir.11.) "I Z.- PAGE 6 -7
The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, June 8,7972 G7
Nixon. Brezhnev Can Be Trusted
1
By Jack Anderson
No transcript was kept of
the face-to-face meetings be-
twen President Nixon and So-
viet party chief Leonid Brezh-
nev in the Kremlin.
As an act of trust, the Presi-
dent didn't even bring his own
interpreter into ?the confer-
ence room but accepted Brezh-
nev's
After each session, Mr.
Nixon methodically tran-
scribed his recollections of the
discussion. His personal notes
constitute the only U.S. record
of the historic Nixon-Brezhnev
talks.
From a source with access
to these notes, here are some
of the highlights:
On the eve? of the Moscow
meeting, the strategic arms
limitation talks were still
snagged in Helsinki over So-
viet unwillingness to halt con-
struction of missile-carrying
submarines. But the President,
alone with Brezhnev, leaned
forward and said: "Dammit,
let's settle it."
Then they hammered out
the important agreement to
limit nuclear weapons. At one
point, Mr. Nixon jokingly sug-
gested that Russia could sub-
stitute its mammoth SS-9 mis-
siles for submarines, since the
new monster missiles resem-
ble submarines in both size
and shape.
"How do you know?" de-
manded Brezhnev gruffly. For
r,ussia has tried to keep its
ls secret from the world.
The Prpstdent renlied that
Vez....Ln_ty. as well be Mk
ith on7T?T6tItV7p-
nn. since ild-61-50-ex-
cglleat...121elligeace.. Perhaps,
he said, the Soviets might
wish to mount SS-9s on their
submarines.
"This would sink the sub-
marines," snorted Brezhnev.
"That is exactly what I had
in mind," cracked Mr. Nixon.
The President found Brezh-
nev to be a hearty host but a
hard negotiator. In the end,
however, Mr. Nixon concluded
that "the man can be trusted."
Peace Code
Perhaps even more impor-
tant than the nuclear arms
agreement, in the President's
opinion, was a 12-point pact
"to remove the threat of war"
and "to promote reduction of
tensions in the world." He
felt this codified the new
Soviet-American relationship
and established the rules for
avoiding future military con-
frontations.
The pact was proposed by
the Russians and resisted at
first by Mr. Nixon. He
changed his mind, however,
and decided it could be an in-
strument for peace. He per-
sonally drafted the 12 points
between sessions in Moscow,
and Brezhnev accepted most
of the President's language.
Mr. Nixon drove himself re-
lentlessly in Moscow, averag-
ing only three to five hours of
sleep the first six nights, as he
followed the endless hours of
bargaining with meticulous
notetaking and painstaking
preparations for the next ses-
sion.
He was bouyed by his suc-
cess and left Moscow ex-
hausted but exhilarated. He
told aides jubilantly that he
felt more confident than ever
of an enduring peace. The
Moscow meeting, he genuinely
felt, had made the world a
safer place.
During a subsequent visit to
a Leningrad castle, the guide
showed the President some
trick mirrors and a spot where
the acoustics made a few hand
pats sound like great ap-
plause. Mr. Nixon gleefully
made funny faces at himself
in the mirrors, then he an-
nounced: "I am going to ap-
plaud myself."
He patted his hands and
beamed happily when the
magnified applause roared
back.
Footnote: Even Andrei
Grechko, the dour Soviet de-
fense minister who reportedly
had opposed the Nixon visit,
warmed up to the Presi-
dent. While Mr. Nixon was
standing at attention for the
Soviet honor guard, he felt a
tap on his shoulder. It was
Grechko, who made a good-
humored crack about the
marching soldiers.
WASHINGTON WHIRL
Chaotic Society?President
Nixon has told subordinates
that he still believes in fiscal
responsibility and will return
to a tight budget immediately
after the election. He will
begin, he suggested, by cutting
ex-President Lyndon John-
son's Great Society programs.
Mr. Nixon has already drafted "
a list of 110 federal programs
that he believes should be re-
pealed or, at least, turned over
to local governments He will
charge that the programs were
hastily conceived and poorly
administered. He also intends
to warn, in effect, that the
Great Society will wind up in-
stead as a Chaotic Society,
with the workers taxed be-
yond endurance.
Headlines and Footnotes?
President Nixon's fund raisers
have drafted a blacklist whose
campaign contributions will
be turned down. The list in-
cludes shady operators and
former donors who demanded
too much for their money...
The President's foreign policy
czar, Henry Kissinger, is qui-
etly promoting New York's
Gov. Nelson Rockefeller for
Secretary of State .. . Admiral
Hyman Rickover; the crusty
father of the nuclear subma-
rine, has never given a hang
for naval starch and dress.
The other day, he wore civil-
ian clothes ventilated by a
gaping tear in his pants.
1972, United Feature Syndicate
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, May 49, 1972 t23
U.S. Moves May Reunite Russia, China
By Jack Anderson
There Is evidence in the se-
cret U.S. cable traffic that
President Nixon's military
moves in Vietnam may be
driving the two great Commu-
nist antagonists, Russia an
China, back together.
We have been able to trace
the dismaying developments
I through secret documents,
which the White House has
carefully withheld from both
Congress and the public.
These documents show that
the Kremlin reacted to the
Chinese-American rapproche-
ment by making Its own secret
overtures to Peking last Au-
gust. The Soviets worked
through Lin Piao, the acerbic
defense minister, who has
been designated by Mao Tse-
tung to become his successor.
Encoeraged by his Soviet
contacts, Lin opposed inviting
President Nixon to Peking and
advocated restoring the
Chinese-Russian partnership.
This put Lin in direct conflict
with Premier Chou En-lai,
who had issued the invitation
to Nixon.
Lin lost the showdown and
mysteriously disappeared. The
crafty Chou spread the word
to the party faithful that Lin
had died in a plane crash after
attempting to assassinate Mao.
Chou's version, which was
whispered around China and
reached CIA ears, had it that
Lin attempted to waylay Mao
on the way home from South
China by train last August.
Knowing Mao's itinerary
would take him through
Shanghai and Wuhsi, Lin al-
legedly arranged an assassina-
tion party in Shanghai and aft-
erward planned to blow up a
bridge in Wuhsi to wreck
Mao's train. Both plots failed,
according to the story, and
Lin attempted to flee to Rus-
sia by jet on Sept. 13. The
plane supposedly crashed in
the Wenteukhan area of Mon-
golia.
The whispers of the plot to
kill Mao, who has deity status
in China, apparently was in-
tended to cow Lin Piao's sup-
porters. So monstrous was the
thought of assassinating the
great Mao, in Chinese minds,
that the Lin faction was sup-
posed to be intimidated into
silence.
But the opposition to Chou
continued to simmer under
the surface, and the Russians
quietly pressed for better rela-
tions The plenum of the So-
viet Central Committee, in an
unpublished action last No-
vember, sought to restrain the
ideological struggle against
the Chinese.
Still, other events inflamed
Chi nese-Russian relations
until the State Department re-
ported in a confidential sum-
mary last December: "Sino-So-
viet international polemics as
distinct from domestic propa-
ganda have risen to the
highest level since 1969
. . . Peking, however, hail
so far avoided whipping up
a war scare Within China,
and it appears to be attempt-
ing to restrict increased ten-
sion with Moscow to verbal
fireworks on international
questions."
Significantly, Chou is in
charge of China's interna-
tional affairs and, therefore,
was responsible for the rising
rhetoric. President Nixon's air
attacks upon North Vietnam,
however, have made it awk-
ward for Chou.
China and Russia have been
competing for Hanoi's favor,
as the two titans of commu-
nism maneuver for influence
In Southeast Asia.
Rivalry, in Hanoi
The Central Intelligence
Agency, in a secret report, has
declared: "Following Dr.
Henry Kissinger's July visit to
Peking, Chinese Premier Chou
En-lei made a secret visit to
Hanoi to reassure the Govern-
ment of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam (DRV) of
continued Chinese support.
"The Chinese emphasized
their support by increasing
their assistance to the DRV
for the 1971-72 period. This in
turn resulted in an increase in
Soviet assistance to the DRV
for the same period. .
"The DRV expressed its ap-
prehension to Chou regarding
a U.S.-Chinese detente and
stated that the DRV is still
suspicious about President
Nixon's visit to Peking."
In view of the Chinese-Rus-
Sian rivalry in Hanoi, Nixon
undermined Chou and justi-
fied Lin's position by orderiAts
air strikes against North Viet-
nam. This has strengthened
Lin's survivors inside the
Chinese policy councils.
As a result, Lin's idea of re-
pairing Chinese-Russian rela-
tions is gaining support. At
the United Nations, for exam-
ple, the relations .between
Chinese and Russian delegates
are warming.
A Soviet delegation, on tour
of China, has also been re-
ceived with unaccustomed
cordiality. In return, there was
no Soviet denunciation of the
Chinese at the Lenin Day cele-
bration on April 21.
There are now hints of
Chinese-Russian cooperation
to route war supplies overland
to North Vietnam. If this de-
velops, the mining of the
North Vietnamese harbors will
cost the U.S. far more in
world strategy than is likely
to be gained on the Vietnam-
ese fighting fronts.
ej 1972, United Feature 5rndloste
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE 11
The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, May 15, 1972 D15
Red Carpet for Nixon Slightly Pale
By. Jack Anderson
Secret intelligence reports
declare that President Nixon's
high-risk military moves in
Vietnam have undermined
those in both Moscow and Pe-
king who want to ease ten-
sions with the United States.
Although there had been no
visible opposition to the Presi-
dent's trip to Peking and invi-
tation to visit Moscow, the
Central Intelligence Agency
claims the detente was fierce-
ly resisted inside the policy
councils of both governments.
To protect our sources, we
cannot quote directly from the
CIA documents. The CIA
maintains, however, that the
decision to invite Nixon was
by no means unanimous in
Moscow or Peking.
Citing "reliable" sources,
the CIA claims the Soviet mil-
itary hierarchy has opposed
doing business with Nixon. De-
fense Minister Andrei
Grechko, apparently, has be-
come the principal spokesman
for this faction inside the
Kremlin.
The Russian marshals, ac-
mrding to the CIA, are eager
,o share credit in Hanoi for
:he North Vietnamese sue-
ceases. For the military equip-
ment, which has smashed the
South Vietnamese defenses,
was made in Russia.
The Soviets, in the bidding
against the Chinese for influ-
ence in Hanoi, had offered the
North Vietnamese a $110 mil-
lion military loan. Gen. Vo
Nguyen Giap, the North Viet-
cided to spend it for tanks,
heavy artillery and anti-air-
namese military genius, deci-
craft missiles.
The Soviet military brass
would like to see a setback for
U.S. Interests not only in Viet-
nam but the Middle East. The
CIA warns that the Russians
may counter U.S. moves in
Vietnam with new initiatives
in the Mediterranean.
The CIA offers fewer specif-
ics about the opposition within
the Chinese leadership to the
Chinese-American detente.
But bitter opposition, says the
CIA, is simmering beneath the
surface.
Laird's Good Humor
Our recent columns on the
misuse of the Pentagon auto
fleet has drawn a good-humor-
ed reaction from Defense
Secretary Mel Laird and or-
ders from on high to start
Obeying the regulations.
But the Pentagon bigshots,
as usual, are reading the regu-
lations to suit their expensive
tastes, not to save the taxpay-
ers' money. Result: most of
the staggering waste contin-
ues.
We told, for example, how
gon cars, intended for use
only on pressing official busi-
ness, had become a luxury lim-
ousine service for military po-
tentates and their congres-
sional friends.
Laird, meanwhile, still has
two limousines at his constant
call in case one should de-
velop motor trouble. His spe-
caw aesistant, Carl Wahace, is
also picked up each morning
and delivered home each eve-
ning by a military chauffeur.
The men who toil in the
Pentagon garage, however,
were getting the word to put
an end to excursions that vio-
late regulations. This, presum-
ably, meant stopping the prac-
tice of routinely chauffeuring
members of Congress around
Washington.
But when the motor pool
tried to follow orders, it found
itself in hot water with the
Pentagon's congressional liai-
son office, which is responsi
ble for keeping the military's
popularity rating high on
Capitol Hill.
The clash between military
regulations and congressional
relations was quickly resolved
in favor of keeping the Con-
gressmen happy. The soldiers
who man the motor pool were
ordered to provide whatever
the congressional liaison of-
fice wanted.
So military vehicles con-
tinue, for example, to bring in
large quantities of liquor from
the Pentagon's Washington
supplier so there will be
plenty to serve to thirsty Con-
gressmen when they attend a
military reception or take a
military flight.
The fact that such trips in-
volve an apparently illegal
transportation of liquor across
the Virginia border from
Washington doesn't bother the
Pentagon brass.
Apparently, the abuse of
military cars is not cord med
to Washington. At the U.S.
naval base in Bermuda, for ex-
ample, the brass ride around
in full-size American sedans
despite the fact that such
large cars are legally forbid-
den to other residents of the
resort island.
? WM United Feature Syndicate
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11.6 Wdeibt-i1iNCT-201\1 .t)Ub
The Washington Merry-Go-Roan&
iiui
. A-RDP74600415R000300020019-3
PACzi.,'
THE VASHINGTON POST Wednesday:111.,ay, 10, 1972 B15
'Brainwash' Attempt by Russians?
By Jack Anderson
aklaaa,...in the Ceptral Inte1-
alanaL12.stet
files is an account of a possi-
X4_59,at_Attgant
to "brain-
ersonnel
erious
The fantastic details are
contained in a file marked
"Operation Pandora," which
describes how the Russians
bombarded our embassy with
eerie, low-radiation impulses.
Their secret intent, it was sus-
pected, may have been to alter
the personalities of our diplo-
mats.
The bizarre story began in
1945 when a Russian pres-
ented Averell Harriman, then
our ambassador, with a hand-
some carved Great Seal of the
United States. Harriman
proudly hung it in the em-
bassy.
The seal contained a tiny
electronic eavesdropping de-
vice, which monitored conver-
sations inside the embassy
until 1952, when it was de-
tected. From this shocking dis-
covery Came urgent orders
that all embassies must be pe-
riodically checked for elec-
tronic signals.
In the '60, U.S. security men
discovered the strange micro-
wave impulses, some steady,
some pulsating, directed into
our Moscow embassy from a
neighboring building.'
The CIA quickly learned
that Russian medical litera-
ture suggested Microwaves
can cause nervous tension, ir=
ritablility, even disorders.
They speculated that the Rus-
sians were trying to drive
American diplomats stir crazy
with the waves.
Neither the Cia nor the
State Department had the fa-
cilities to ?test the effects of
the silent rays on human
beings. At the Pentagbn, how-
ever, the super-secret Ad-
vanced Research Project had
worked on electronic sensors
and other weird projects
The agency quietly began a
study, under the direction of
-Richard Cesaro, into the ef-
fects of microwaves on people.
Cesaro gave the project the
code name, "Operation Pan-
dora," and called in a physi-
cian, Dr. ?Herb Pollack, and
two crack military scientists,
Dr. Joseph Sharp of Walter
Reed Army hospital, and engi-
neer-microwave expert Mark
Grove of the Air Force.
Sharp and Grove, supplied
with the microwave data moni-
tored in the embassy, dupli-
cated the embassy environ-
ment, using monkeys for dip-
lomats.
The monkeys actually were
trained to perform tasks and
then were rewarded with food,
much as embassy employees
might be rewarded with a dry
martini at the end of the day.
The monkeys were studied
night and day for months at
Walter Reed, while a collat-
eral experiment was con-
ducted on rabbits by consult-
ant Dr: Milton Zaret in his
own laboratory.
In the embassy in Moscow,
meanwhile, no one except the
highest diplomats and security
men were aware of the secret
microwave drama.
By 1967, the scientists felt
they had watcned the monkeys
long enough for a tentative
reading. Some felt there were
signs of "aberrant behavior"
caused by the microwaves, but
the majority disagreed. Only
the rabbits showed clear
changes?in their heart rate?
which Zaret attributed to heat
from the rays.
The disagreement on psy-
chological changes were sent
to.. a top secret reviewing
board, which also could reach
no absolute conclusion that
the rays affected the monkeys'
minds
Nevertheless, the suspicion
lingered, and the White House
decided that even if the micro-
waves were not "brainwash-
ing" embassy people, they
should be halted. It was also
suspected that the wayes
might be part of some radical
new surveillance technique.
At the June 1967 Glassboro
meeting between President
Lyndon Johnson and Soviet
Premier Aleksei Kosygin, the
question of the microwave
rays came up. One informant
Insists Johnson personally
asked Kosygin to end the ray
bombardment, although other
sources say the request was
made at a lower level.
By 1968, most of Cesaro's
scientists were convinced that'
the microwaves were not psy-
chologically harmful and the
embassy experiments ended in
early 1969.
The brilliant work done by
the team, however, has now
led to important research on
the effects of microwaves. So
far, tests show high radiation
can injure eyes, genital organs
and perhaps other parts of the
body. But, as yet, there is no
conclusive proof that low-level
radiation is harmful.
Footnote: We have spoken
with Cesaro, Pollack, Sharp,
Zaret and Grove. All acknowl-
edged they worked on "Opera-
tion Pandora," but all refuse
to go into details. As Sharp
put it: "Pandora was classified
in those days and still is."
Auto Pollution
The Environmental Protec-
tion Agency has eased up on
the car makers, all very se-
cretly, so they can spew more
exhaust into the atmosphere
than federal law allows.
The Clean Air Act requires
a reduction of at least 90 per
cent in poisonous exhaust
emissions by 1975. But it has
been left up to EPA Adminis-
trator William Ruckelshaus to
implement the law.
Ruckelshaus's first proposal
was so weak that Ralph Nader
and other environmentalists
raised an almighty howl. On
the other side, the auto mak-
ers, led by General Motors,
claimed it was too tough.
Publicly, EPA defended the
proposal, but behind closed
doors, the agency caved in to
General Motors.
?1972, Publishers-Nall Syndicate
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, May 8, 1972
D15
U.S. Beats Russia in Capsule Chase
By Jack Anderson
With all the drama of a TV
thriller, an American helicop-
ter and Soviet trawler raced
at top speed recently for a
missile capsule that had
plopped into the stormy Atlan-
tic.
The dramatic dash took
place on March 18 off the Vir-
ginia coast. In a hairbreadth
finish, the copter trium-
phantly retrieved the capsule
from the ocean a couple of
minutes before the trawler
reached the spot.
The missile was fired on
March 17 by the National Aer-
onautics and Spaee Adminis-
tration from Wallops Island,
Va. This was a classified mis-
sion for the Atomic Energy
Commission to measure how
cloud moisture erodes projec-
tiles, including America's nu-
clear missiles.
The small, cloud-probing
missile soared into the atmos-
phere, then jettisoned its cap-
sule about 20 miles offshore
into turbulent international
waters. The capsule contained
secret instruments and a horn-
ing beacon. But recovery from
the high waves was impossi-
ble.
Next day, the waves had
calmed, but the beacon was
dead. For half a day, NASA
planes searched for the bob-
bing object. Finally, a fixed-
wing scouting plane spotted
the capsule and hovered pro-
tectively over it.
Rushing toward the capsule,
however, was a Soviet fishing
boat. The Soviets have outfit-
ted many of these ships with
the latest electronic monitor-
ing equipment. The boats fish
for sea herring, mackerel and
U.S. secrets along the Ameri-
can coast.
At the approach of the traw-
ler, NASA hastily ordered a
rescue helicopter into the
race. The clattering copter
and the straining trawler al-
most converged on the prize at
the same time. But the copter
reached the capsule ahead of
the boat and dropped down in
the waves, while the American
crew expertly fished the cap-
sule from the seas in the nick
of time.
At Wallops Island, a NASA
spokesman confirmed our ac-
count of the sea chase. The
trawler may have been moni-
toring the homing device, or
the Russians may have been
attracted to the spot by the
hovering U.S. plane. But the
spokesman acknowledged "our
guys were uneasy."
For the Russians to have
filched the capsule with its
cargo of American secrets
from under NASA's nose, he
conceded, would have been
highly embarrassing. "But," he
said, "there's nothing we could
have done. Those were inter-
national waters."
Nixon Document
The mystery of billionaire
Howard Hughes' $205,000 loan
to President Nixon's brother,
Don, still has some loose ends
that need tying up.
When this column exposed
the loan 12 years ago, Richard
Nixon stated: "I had no part
or interest in my brother's
business. I had no part what-
ever in the negotiation of this
loan."
From the records of the Los
Angeles County Courthouse,
however, we have obtained a
16-year-old document which
seems to dispute Mr. Nixon's
'statement. This is a lease of
the bit of land owned by Mr.
Nixon's mother, Hannah,
which was used to secure the'
Hughes loan. The lease was
made out to Union Oil Com-
pany of California and is part
of the complicated loan ar-
rangements.
It is signed by Hannah
Nixon, and the faded stamp
shows it was notorized by Wil
ham A. Ridgely in Washing-
ton, D.C. At that time, Ridgely
worked in the Senate financial "
office, as he still does.
Only a senator or the presi-
dent of the Senate could have .
approved Hannah Nixon's use
of Ridgely's office for notarii-
ing. As Vice President, Mr.
Nixon was then president of
the Senate.
Ridgely told us he vaguely
recalled going to Mr. Nixon's
house to do notary work.
'That could have been the I
time," he told us.
In any case, it appears that
Mr. Nixon, or someone in his
office, sent Hannah Nixon to
Ridgely to get a lease notar-
ized on Oct. 12, 1956?at the
same time Mr. Nixon said he
"had no part whatsoever in
the negotiation of this loan."
1972, United Feature Syndicate
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25X1A
THE WAS PRB ase 01 : CI6RVE741$1401456M90029411e4
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, April 14, 1972 C39
...R 1
Kremlin Financing Latin Revolution
By Jack Anderson
4h ICremlin ha asked Cu-
12/121 dictatoF'Yfdil-CiStFo'to
try tn reaain control over
Lulu American revolutionai,
Jziagaltat&-ai2d-las-na/13114d
nay all the cost. involved."
This is the secret finding of
tbe Centre 1" Intemgence
Agency whia has mit t. ? ? -
er-the-iieasiv-eicees-trae. its
alitkats...11-Euralle?auri-Staah
Azarziaa.
In an earlier column, we re-
ported that Castro had moved
his Latin American Libera-
tion center from his embassy
In Paris to his embassy in
Santiago, Chile. IliaaMiati.2n,
AgrArgin" .1,..ILAJO
?tit weverywhere
saxs..the..C.1.?azille...fizajaced
last-tke,cev4etar
Citing information that
came directly from Cuban
Intelligence officer Enrique
Benavides Santos in Paris, the
teuads:
"Renavides said that
throurh Cuba. the Soviets_will
suguangLarmaarsagjaama_or
uth cipemerl _appropriate in
situaa--aamilxies?tiasauglactut
Latin Ainclica.
"Aaseastiag--to?RenailitteA
tite_somie' ts have told Cuba
i.thay will 'ploy ftw,, evarythingl,
=i;iHevcid6ierally
ical
peeps.
"iiampAidaa...atraaglx_t,,LaRpa-
rust roh.. hat pot are the best means of social; swer and what I can't," he
e but still fay- 1st power in weak, backward roared. "Tell him I won't talk
to them!"
Footnote: "No-fault" is sched-
uled for secret hearings in a
few days before the Senate
Commerce Committee.
Ors armed revo u on e
ery-
Soviet-Cuban Strategy
The new liberation center
in Santiago, says the CIA,
',4v via
Qulla...aluL2AL2-lar.ge-tple in
thajigaz_SguziatLuhan_atrategY
fer-Latin-America.
"Representatives of Latin
American revolutionary
groups now in Chile," the CIA
adds, "are currently preparing
a campaign of increased re-
volutionary activity with the
support of Cuba."
At leact one revolutionary
in ta a
eirf!rtly frnm 1-he soviet
lireettr?-A-saursa?imaide......t,he
Ciwat.e.realao-craumunist-maaa.
?
000
ear poor tr. Hip c.:1].tp.rialan
Ceerrrrarrist-Party-(.PG-T.)."
From a member of the Cu-
ban delegation at the United
Nations, meanwhile, the CIA
learned that at least some
Cuban leaders "are doing
some re-thinking on basic re-
revolutionary tactics.
"There is some theoretical
opposition to the 'Che Gue-
vara' theory, which favors
supporting native insurrec-
tionists and anarchists in poor
countries."
"Instead', support is growing
for the Chilean formula,
which maintains that tradi-
tional democratic procedures
countries.
"It is in countries like Bra-
zil," the CIA quoted the Cu-
ban delegate as saying, "that
stronger active measures
should be taken."
'No-Fault' Ruckus
When a self-styled consum-
ers group in New York City
tried to keep Sen. Frank Moss
(D-Utah) from talking about
"no-fault" insurance at their
inaugural Meeting Moss angri-
ly canceled the speech.
The "consumers group" is
made up of wives of members
of the American Trial Law-
yers Association.. The associ-
ation is busily lobbying against
"no-fault" because it will re-
duce lawyers' fees by an esti-
mated $1 billion.
But the wives have agreed
to back product safety bills
which don't cut into their fur
coats and their husbands' Cad-
illacs. So they wanted Moss to
speak.
The ladies' lawyer Herman
Glaser called Moss' office to
make the final arrangements
and said a press conference
would be held at the meeting.
As Moss' secretary Dolly
Plumb recalls it Glaser left in-
structions that if the press
asked about "no-fault," Moss
was to reply: "I have no com-
ment to make on this point."
When the senator was told
about this, he exploded. "No-
body tells me what I can an-
Washington Whirl
WHALLEY FOOTDRAG2,."
John Woodcock Jr., assistant
district attorney of Blair Coun-
ty in Pennsylvania, has beet.
stymied in his investigation of-
Rep. Irving Whalley's kick-
backs by the House Clerk and:
the Justice Department. The
clerk, Pat Jennings, has passed,
the buck to the do-nothing
House Ethics Committee, and
the Justice Department haS
dodged Woodcock's questions.
Ironically, Woodcock and Whal-
ley are both Republicans.
,..SELB=S?grajaive
pogilifie_d_ classified infor a-
ti'n which we believe
1 I But
give away secret battle plariV,
weapons information, fiRelli-
getsea-aourzea...ar_atuer_aditi.:
ra."te....s.egrer&JIRLAILY...,of-
reful climbed
into a taxicab the o her a
s-
op-oir.fs the Unksecret Per-
f. la - two Nay rril_F:
rive ? -r
. s wen us a
o W a l,ey
W our
?
I
ailed
acco
nt
e c e
?
en
on sourc
I. $1-
n on
OU $
II $6 Iai
r.
. 1972, United Feature Syndleatel
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Ao,Appsqvg114FlooRglease 2001/11/01 : CIARQP7i6411145R0?0300020AM3
Walters Okayed
For CIA Post
Army Maj. Gen. Vernon An-
thony Walters, 55, was ap-
proved by the Senate yester-
day Els deputy director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, a
post which puts him in charge
of most of the day-to-day
workings of the agency.
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I
CONGRESS
SETS 1111A. INQUIRY
Role Another Target
but Doubt Is Voiced
By JUAN de ONIS
Special to The New York Tlipes
SANTIAGO, Chile, March 30
?X,14 Clean Congress has de-
? - ? to investigate ?ast actri-
- ? 11141U - ? . ? en-
- ers7411f1M111.? dtp ? d
Intern. twee e e. on d
?.7127.tmoir in - rt-
. , - ? Atari (;?
tcrgart, I rriViireMM
taking nffie, in 1i)7
Both the Senate and the
Chamber of Deputies called for
the investigation after Hernan
del Canto, Minister of the In-
terior, had reported on what
he said was a plot by retired
military officers and a small,
right-wing opposition party to
overthrow Dr. Allende last
week.
The investigation will be
conducted in the Chamber of
Deputies. However, the anti-
Marxist Opposition, which con-
trols the Congress, questioned
the evidence the Government
has presented on both the
C.I.A. activities and on the
supposed plot.
The main opposition party,
the Christian Democratis, an-
nounced that in protest it would
organize a march open to "all
democratic parties." The march,
it said, would also serve to
demonstrate opposition to the
refusal by Dr. Allende's lett-
wing Government to authorize
a march by women 10 days
ago and another by privale
organizations Tuesday.
While Congres agreed to an
investigation of the C.I.A. in
Chile, a court of appeals re-
leased on $82 bail the president
of the Fatherland and Liberty
movement, Pablo Rodriguez
Grez, a lawyer who was ac-
cused byt he Government' prose-
cutor of fomenting the plot last
week.
A retired general, Alberto
Green Baquedano, and two re-
tired junior army officers are
being held in the plot, which
the Government has said called
for the assassination of Dr.
Allende.
OM
The investigation of the
C.I.A. and the International
Telephone and Telegraph Cor-
poration, which has large in-
vestments here, stems from
purported I.T.T. documents
made public by ,Jack Anderson,
the syndicated Washington
columnist.
The documents, which sug-
gest that I.T.T. employes, some
of whom were in contact with
the C.I.A. in Washington, tried
unsuccessfully to promote a
military coup to keep Dr. Al-
lende from taking office, have
caused a political storm here.
Ex-C.I.A. Director cited
John A. McCone, a former
director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, has confirmed
that executives of International
Telephone & Telegraph Corpo-
ratiom had discussed moves
against President Salvador Al-
lende Crossens of Chile, the
magazine Business Week said
today.
cCone, nowa member
= Vb
- of the'.'"ard Of directors
and its executive committee,
w.a.a_onoted as saving he had
bPP11-l and
"th
cnmnae a
n a o the ut ited
it
lock the e
lp
Far from disavowing the au-
thenticity of the memorandum
published by Mr, Anderson,
Mr. McCone said they were
written by I.T.T. staff mem-
bers, according to Business
Week.
I.T.T. spokesmen have denied
as "without foundation in fact"
allegations that the company
had panned or participated in
any plots against Dr. 'Allende
in an effort to protect its
properties in Chile against ex-
propriation.
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, March 30,1972 K11
CIA Papers Show Anti-Allende View
By Jack Anderson
In earlier columns, we
quoted from internal memos
to show how the International
Telephone and Telegraph con-
glomerates and the Central
Intelligence Agency plotted
together unsuccessfully to
block President Salvador Al-
lende from coming to power
in Chile.
Unlitive now obtained secret
caajarjalUaZalaill
at leastwas
ermi
1-11e copmunists to turn
lite. a ha an ft". afirritlip
+.+inn fhrniiahout South
a.
Thelatest secret intelligence
Leports bear out the CIA's con-
!ern, These reports that Cuban
lictator Fidel Castro has
.urned his embassy in San-
iago, Chile, into "the principal
uba9 center for support of
,atin-A merle an liberation
novements."
This Cuban liberation center
llegedly "provides financial
nd logistical support and
uidance to the subversive
(roups operating in other
r,atin American countries."
The CIA also charges that,
President Salvador Allende
vhrougli lesser government of-
icials has apparently' given
his approval for Cuba to main-
tain contact with these subver-
sive elements in Chile."
Castro has formed a special
Directorate 10 r Liberation
whose mission is ' to foment
Communist revolutions around
the world. It is staffed, accord-
ing to the CIA, by hundreds
of tough, trained intelligence
officers under the command
of Manuel Pineiro Losado, who
is known by the code name
"Barba Roja."
The Latin American section
is directed by a man known
as "Ariel," whom the CIA
identifies by two names he
has used in the past, Juan
Carretero Ibanez and Ruben
Cabrera Marquez. From Ha-
vana, he directed the late Che
Guevara's rag-tag guerrilla
operations in Bolivia in 1968.
The chief of the liberation
team in the Cuban embassy in
Santiago, according to the
CIA, is Manuel Martinez G
lan, who goes by the cod
name "Manolo." He is a ye
eran Communist intelligence
officer who is reportedly in
charge of all clandestine ac-
tivities in the Santiago em-
bassy.
"The presence in Santiago
of `Manolo' and 'Arid,'" de-
clares a secret CIA report,
"are indicators of the import-
ance attached to the continued
Cuban government interests
and active support of the ex-
port of the revolution."
Castro used his embassy in
Paris as "the principal center
concerned with providing vari-
ous types of support to Latin
American liberation move-
ments" until Allende allowed
him to open an embassy in
Santiago. "Communications
between the Cuban officers
in Santiago and guerrillas
operating in other countries,"
says the CIA, "is accomplished
by radio.
"On occasions an officer
will be dispatched from Ha-
vana to make contact with
one or more of the guerrillas.
Explosives in the form of plas-
tics are carried in false bot-
toms of suitcases by the travel-
ing officers."
Footnote: The Cuban em-
bassy supports various sub-
versive groups throughout
Latin America, but the CIA
identifies as "the most nota-
ble" the notorious Tupamaro
terrorists who operate in Uru-
guay.
pruce Goose Revisite
Billionaire Howard Hughes'
vintage plywood flying boat,
the "Spruce Goose" is about
to lumber into the news again.
A team of General Services
Administration ofifcials has
secretly visited the hangared
monster to try to figure out
what to do with it.
Although GSA owns the
eight-motored giant, renting it
to Hughes for about $800 a
month, Hughes guards re-
quired the officials to sign in,
then barred, them from going
inside the plane. They were
kept 20 feet away on the
grounds that maintenance
work was in progress.
Resigned to Hughes' strange
ways, GSA regional head Rich-
ard Laws complied. Laws
sighed, "It's a beautiful thing"
when he saw Itha air relic
which is bigger overall than
either the 747 or huge C-5
transport.
GSA is considering giving
the ivory-colored behemoth,
which Hughes test flew one
time only 25 years ago, to a
federal, state or municipal
museum. If none will take it,
GSA may sell it for a novel
restaurant, as a low-speed air
transport, or ,as a tourist at-
traction such as the London
Bridge or the Queen Mary.
Thus, the Hughes book hoax
controversy is finally stirring
the government to dispose of
he venerable seaplane slum-
ering in its huge humidity-
controlled hangar in Cali-
fornia.
Gravel vs. Kleindienst
Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska)
has confided to friends that
he will vote firmly against
elevating Richard Kleindienst
to Attorney General. '
Gravel was dubious before
the ITT hearings. Now, he
says, he is convinced that
Kleindienst is unsuitable as
the nation's number one law
enforcer.
(..)A 1972, United Feature Syndteate
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