KISSINGER: I AM GETTING HELL...FROM THE PRESIDENT'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2001
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 5, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020016-6
:24.1(e,kt.r
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020016-6
A 8 tlEzebooskiy., fr:5,79
THE WASHINGTON POST
KissingeiffteAlli Fiwttirigi
Following is a treeSeriPt
of the secret documents
turned over to The Washing.
ton Post yesterday by Synth-
caled columntst Jack Ander-
..
SECRET SENSITIVE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Refer to: 1-29643/71
DOWNGRADED AT 12
YEARS INTERVALS
(Illegibiel
Not Automatically
Declassified
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM FOR
IIIICORD
SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting
on India/Pakistan
Participants: Assistant to
the President Inc Nation-
al Security Affairs-
Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State-
John N. Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defense
-David Packard
Director, Central Intelli-
gence Agency-Richard
M. Helms
Deputy Administrator (AID)
Maurice .1. Williams 11
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff-Admiral Thomas
Moores
Assistant Secretary of State
1NEA1-JosePh J. Siaca
Assistant. Secretary of De.
fence (ISA;-IL Warren
Nutter
.kssislant Secretary of State
;IOo-Ssmoel DePatma
Principe, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense
fISAI-Arnfistead L Set
den jr.
Assistant Administrator
iDINESA)-Donald G.
MacDonald
Time and Place: 3 December
1971. 11110 hours. Situation
Room. White House.
SUMMARY:
Reviewed conflicting re-
ports about major action in
the West Wing. CIA agreed
to produce map showing
areas of East Pakistan oc-
rupied by India. The Presi-
dent orders bold on issuance
of additional irrevocable
letters of credit involving
599 million. and a hold on
further action implementing
the $72 million PI, 480 cred-
it. Convening of Security
Council meeting planned
contingent on discussion
with Pak Ambassador this
afternoon plus further clari-
fication of actual situation
in West Pakistan. Kissinger
asked for clarification of
ci spoilt interpretation
with
KthsINGEIC I am gerung
hell every hall hour from
oth Prthellcin that we are
not tieing tough enough on
India. He has just called
ale again. He does not ba.
lieve we are carrying out
Iris wishes. He wants to tilt
in favor of Pakistan. He
feels everything we do
comes out otherwise.
HELMS: Concerning the
reported action in the West
Wing, there are conflicting
reports from both sides and
the only common ground is
the Pak attacks on the Am-
ritsar, ilathankat, and Srin-
agar airports. The Paks say
the Indians are attacking all
flung the border; but the
Indian officials says this is
a fie. In the East Wing, the
action is becoming larger
and the Poke claim there are
now seven separate fronts
involved.
KISSINGER: Are the In.
seizing territory?
11 E 1. MS: Yes; small bits of
thrritory. definitely.
SISCO: It would help ii
You could provide a map
with a shading of the areas
occupied by India. What is
happening in the West-is a
toltioale attack likely?
MOORER: The present
',del, is puzzling in that
the Paks have only struck at
three small airfields which
do not house significant
numbers of Indian combat
aircraft
HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's
speech at 190 may well an-
nounce recognition of Ban.
gla Desh,
MOORER: The Pak attack
is not credible. It has been
made during late afternoon,
which doesn't make sense.
1Ve do not seem to have suf.
(gloat facts on this yet.
KISSINGER: Is it possible
that the Indians attacked
first, and the yaks simply
did what they could before
dark in response?
MOORER: Tubs Is certain,
IY possible.
KISSINGER: The Presi.
dent wants no Inure irrevo.
cable letters of credit issued
tinder the $99 million credit
He wads the $72 million
PI, 480 credit also held.
WILLIAMS: Word will
soon Oct around when we
do this, ifites the President
understand that?
KISSINGER: That is his
order, hut I will check with
the President- again. If
asked, we can say we are
reviewing our whole era-
TIOnlie program and that the
granting of fresh aid is being
suspended in view of condi-
tions on the Subcontinent.
The next issue -is the UN.
CHURN: The Secretary is
calling in the Pak Ale)ae.
Seder this afternoon, mil
the Secretary teens townrd
making a U.S. move in the
UN, soon.
KISSINGER: The Presi-
dent is in favor of this as
soon as we have some con-
firmation of this large-
scale new action. If the
U.N. can't operate in this
kind of situation effectively,
its utility has come to an
end and it is useless to
think of U.N. guarantees in
the Middle East.
SISCO: We will have a
recommendation for you
this afternoon, after the
meeting with the Ambassa-
dor. In order to give the
Ambassador time to wire
home, we could tentatively
plan to convene the gem,
KW Council tomorrow.
KISSINGER: We have to
take action. The President
is blaming me, but you
people are in the clear.
SISCO: That's ideal!
KISSINGER: The earlier
draft statement for Bush is
too evenhanded.
SISCO: To recapitulate,
after we have seen the Pak
Ambassador, the Secretary
will report to you. We will
update the draft speech for
Bush.
KISSINGER: We can say
we favor political accommo-
dation but the real job of
the Security Council is to
prevent military action.
SISCO: We have never
bade reply either from Ko-
sygin or Mrs. Gandhi.
WILLIAMS: Are we to
take economic steps with
Pakistan also?
KISSINGER: Wait until
I talk with the President.
He hasn't addressed this
problem in connection with
Pakistan yet.
SISCO: If we act on the
Indian side, we can say we
are keeping the Pakistan sit.
uation "under review."
KISSINGER: It's hard to
tilt toward Pakistan if lye
have to match every Indian
stop with a Pakistan step.
If you wait until Monday, I
can get a Presidential de.
Melon.
PACKARD: It should be
easy for us to inform the
banks involved to defer ac.
don inasmuch as we are so
near the weekend.
KISSINGER: We need a
WSAG in the morning. We
need to think about our
treaty obligations. I remem-
ber a letter or memo inter-
preting our existing treaty
with a special India tilt.
When I visaed Pakistan in
January 1962, I was briefed
on a secret document or oral
understanding about contin-
gentles arising in othar than
the SEATO context. PUrhaps
it was a Presidential letter.
This was a special inl arose-
pft the 1010
bilateral agreement
Prepared by:
is/initials
James H. Noyes ,
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern, African
and South Asian Affairs
Approved:
Illegible signature
for G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of De.
fense for International Se]
curdy affairs
Helms: Soviet
Backing India
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
CM-1360-7
SECRET/SENSITIVE
SECRET-SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chief of Staff, U.S. Amid'
Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine
Corps
Subj: Washington Special
Action Group Meeting on
Indo/Pakistan Hostilities; 4
December 1971.
1. Attached for your Info.
mation is a memorandum
for record concerning sub-
jest meeting.
2. In view of the sensiti-
vity of information in the
NSC system and the detail-
ed nature of this rnemoram
dum, it is requested that
access to it be limited to a
strict need.toKnow basis.
A..F.ogt2Nairman, JCS:
Captain, U.S. Navy
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Regarded Unclassified
when separated from
Classified enclosure
SECRET SENSITIVE
THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
5 December 1971
MEMORANDUM
FOR RECORD
Subject: Washington Spec-
ial Action Group Meeting on
Indo.Pakistan Hostilities; 4
December 1971
1. The NSC Washington
Special Action Group met in
the Situation Room, The
White House, at 1100, Satur-
day, 4 December to consider
the Indollakistan situation.
The meeting was chaired by
Dr. Kissinger.
2. Attendees
a. Principals:
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Dr. John Hannah, AID
Mr. Richard Helms, CIA
Dr. G. Warren Nutter.
Defense
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt,
JCS
Mr, Christopher V a n
Hellen, State
b. Others:
Mr. James Noyes, De.
fenee
Mr. Armistead Selden,
Defense
Rear Admiral Robert
Welander, OJCS
Captain Howard Kay,
OJCS
Mr. Harold Saunders,
NSC
Colonel Richard Ken.
nedy, NSC
Mn, Samuel Hoskanson,
NSC
Mr, Donald MacDonald,
AID
Mr. Maurice Williams,
AID
Me.Tthu"ereLegiAma,
State
Mr. Bruce halogen, State
Mr, David Schneider,
State
Group 4
Downgraded at 3-y ear
intervals; declassified
after 12 years
3. Summary. It was de.
cided that the US would re-
quest an immediate meeting
of the Security Council, The
US resolution would be in-
troduced in a speech by Am.
bassador Bush as soon as
possible. The USG [U.S.
Government] UN approach
would Sr tilted toward the
Pak. Economic aid for Pald-
stan currently in effect will
not be terminated. No re-
quirements were levied on
the JCS.
4, Mr. Helms opened the
meeting by indicating that
the Indians were currently
engaged in a no holds
barred attack of East Paki-
stan and that they had
crossed the border on all
sides this morning. While
India had attacked eight
Pak airfields there were still
no indication of any ground
attacks in the West. Al.
though not decreeing a for-
mal declaration of war Pres-
ident Yahya has stated that
"the final war with India is
upon us," to which Mrs.
Gandhi had responded that
the Pak announcement of
war constituted the ultimate
folly. The Indians, however,
had made it a point not to
declare war. The Indian at.
tacks have hit a major POL
[Petroleum oil-lubricant]
area in Karachi resulting in
a major fire which will
likely be blazing for a con-
siderable length of time,
thus providing a fine target
for the Indian Air Force.
Mr. Helms indicated that
the Soviets were increas-
ingly supporting India. He
atoned, however, that the
Soviet assessment is that
there is not much chance of
a great power confrontation
Is the current crisis.
5. Dr. Kissinger remarked
that If the Indians have an-
nounced a full scale inva-
sion, this fact must be re-
flected in our UN statement
I. Mn. Helms indicated
that we do not know who
started the current action,
nor do we know why the
Pelts hit the four small air.
beds yesterday.
7. Dr. Kissinger requested
that by Monday the CIA
prepare an account of who
did what to whom and when:
I. Mr. DePalma suggested
that if we refer to the In.
dian declaration In our dis]
cession in the UN, that we
almost certainly will have to
refer to remarks by Yahya.
S. Dr, Kissinger replied
that he was under specific
instructions from the Presi-
dent and either someone in
the bureaucracy would have
to prepare this statement
along the lines indicated or
that it would be done in the
White House.
10, Mr. Helms referred to
the "no holds barred" re.
mark in the official Indian
statement and similar re-
marks that were being made
from the Pak side.
11. Dr. Kissinger asked
whether the Indians have
stated anything to the effect
that they were in an all out
12. Mr. Helms said that
the terminology was "no
holds barred."
13. Dr. Kissinger asked
what the Paks have said.
Mr. Helms said the termi-
nology was "final war with
India." Dr. Kissinger sug-
gested this was not an objec-
tionable term. It did not
seem outrageous to say that
they (the Pak. were trying
to defend themselves.
19. Dr. Kissinger then
asked what was happening In
the UN, to which Mr. De.
Palma responded that the
UK (United Kingdom). Bel-
gium, Japan and possibly
France were joining for a
call for a Security Council
meeting. The Japanese had
detected some slight tilt in
our letter requesting the
meeting. The Japanese pre-
ferred a blander formula-
tion. We have not, however,
reacted to the Japanese.
15. Dr. Kissinger asked to
see the letter and requested
that it be promulgated ill
announcing our move In the
UN. to which Mr. DePaima
responded affirmatively.
If. Dr. Kissinger stated
that while he had no strong
view on the letter. our posi-
tion most be clearly stated
Is the announcement.
17. Dr. Kissinger stated he
did not ease how third per.
ties might react, so long as
arillewo.111108-'010 wash.. Po.
Copy of one of domments given to The Washington Post,
Ambassador Bush under-
stands what he should say.
18. Dr. Kissinger said that
whoever was putting out
background information re-
lative to the current situa-
tion is provoking Presides-
tial wrath. The President is
under the "illusion" that he
is giving instructions; not
that halo merely being kept
apprised of affairs as they
progress. Dr. Kissinger
asked that this be kept in
mind.
IS. Mr. DePalma indi-
cated that he did not yet
know whether the Security
Council would be convened
in the afternoon or evening
(this date). However, the
first statementS at the meet-
ing would likely be those by
the Indians and Palm. He
suggested that Ambassador
Bush should be one of the
first speakers immediately
following the presentation
by the two contesting na-
tions. He felt that the im-
pact of our statement would
be clearer If it were made
early. Dr. Kissinger voiced
no objections.
If. Mr. De Palma asked
whether we wanted to get
others lined up with our res.
elution before we intro-
duced it This, however,
would take time. Dr. Kissin-
ger suggested rather than
follow this course, we had
better submit the resolution
as thickly as possible, alone
If necessary. According to
Dr. Kissinger the only move
left for us at the present
time is to make clear Our po-
sition relative to our gammen
strategy. Everyone knows
how all this will come out
and everyone knows that
India will ultimately occupy
East Pakistan. We most,
therefore, make clear our
position, table our resotu-
don. We want a resolution
which will be introduced
With a speech by Ambassa-
dor Bush. If others desire to
come along with us, fine;
but in any event we will
table the resolution with a
speech by Ambassador
Bush.
21, Dr. Kissinger condo-
ued that it was important
that we register our Posi-
tion. The exercise in the UN
is likely inks an exercise in
futility, inasmuch as the So-
viets can be expected to
veto. The UN, itself, will in
all probability do little to
terminate the war. He sum.
marized the foregoing by
saying that he assumed that
our resolution IS the UN
will be introduced by a
speech and there will be no
delay. We will go along in
general terms with refer-
ence to political accommoda-
tions in East Pakistan but
we will certainly not imply
or soggest any specifics.
such as the release of Mujib
[Shiekh MujIbur Rahman].
22. Dr. Kissinger asked
how long the Indians could
delay action In the Council.
Mn. DePalma said they
could make long speeches or
question our purpose. Mr.
Van Hellen sold that they
would draw out as thng as
possible which would allow
them to concentrate on the
situation in East Pakistan,
Mr. DePalma said that they
could shilly-shally for three
or four days which, Mn,
Helms stated, would be long
enough for them to occupy
East Pakistan. Mr. DePalma
stated that we could always
try to force a vote. Dr. Kis-
singer reiterated that there
was no chance in getting
anything useful in the UN.
23, Mr. DePalma sag.
gested that in all likelihood
one side or the other will
veto.
24. Concerning the matter
of economic aid, Dr Kissin-
ger stated that the Presi-
dent had directed that cut-
off was to be directed at
India only. He Indicated,
however, that he wanted to
read the announcement to
the President on that the lat-
ter would know exactly
what he might be getting
into. Al his point Mo. Wil-
liams asked whether some
mention should be made in
the statement exptatning
why aid for Pakistth ie not
being cut off, Dr. Kissinger
said that information would
be kept for background
only.
25. Mr. kVilliams said that
the Department of Agrie.
ture indicated that the price
of vegetable all was weaken-
ing in the United States;
thus cutting off this PL.4130
IFood for Peace] commodity
to India could have reper-
cussions on the domestic
market He asked, therefore,
whether all could be
shipped in place of vheat.
DT. Kissinger said that he
will have the answm to that
by the opening of busIness
Monday.
26. Dr. Kissinger then
asked for a brief ',Mown
on the military situation.
Admiral Zumwalt responded
that he thought the Peke
could hold the One in East
Pakistan for approximately
one or two weeks before the
logistics problems became
overriding. fie expected the
Soviets to cement their posi-
tion in India and to push for
permanent usage of the
naval base at Math. He an-
ticipated that the Soviets
immediate short range
objective would he to gain
military advantages through
their current relationship
with India.
27. Dr. Kissinger indicated
that the next meeting will
convene Monday morning
(Dec. 6/
/s/ H. N. Kay
H. N. KAY
Captain, USN
South Asia/MAP Branch,
J5
Extension 72405
Bangle Desh
Plight Noted
SECRET SENSITIVE
THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
6 December 1971
MEMOR ANDUM FOR
RECORD
Subject: Washington Spe-
cial Action Group Meeting
on Inds-Pakistan Hostilities;
6 December 1971
1. The NSC Washington
Special Action Group met in
the Situation Room, The
White House at 1109 Mon-
day, 8 December to consider
the Indo-Paldstan situation.
The meeting was chaired by
Dr. Kissing..
2. Attendees
a. Principals:
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Mr. David Packard, Defense
Ambassador th Alexis John.
son, State '
General William Westmore-
land, JCS
Mr, Richard Helms, CIA
Mr. Donald MacDonald, AID
b. Others;
Mr. Christopher Van Holten,
State
Mr. Samuel DePatrna, State
BrUce Lanigen, State
Mr. Joseph Sims, State
Mr, Armistead Selden, Do-
Mr. James Noyes, Defense
Mr, Jahn Waller, CIA
Mr, Samuel Hoskanson, NSC
Colonel Ric hard Kennedy,
NSC
Mr. Harold Saunders, NSC
Rear Admiral Robert Welan-
der, OJCS
Captain Howard Kay, OJCS
Mr. Maurice Williams, AID
3. Summary. Discussion
was devoted to the massive
problems facing Bangle
Desk as a nation. Dr. Kissin-
ger Indicated that the prob.
lent should be studied now.
The subject of possible mili-
tary aid to Pakistan is also
to be examined, but on a
very close hold basis.' The
matter of Indian redeploy-
meat from East to West was
considered as was the legal.
ity of the current sea "block-
ade" by India.
4. Mr. Helms opened the
meeting by briefing the cur.
rent situation. He stated
that the Indians had recog-
nixed Bangle Dash and the
Poke had broken diplomatic
ties with India. Major tight.
lug continued in the East
but India is engaged in a
holding action in the West.
Mr. Helms felt that the Indi-
ans will attempt to force a
decision in the East within
the next ten days. The Indi.
ans have almost total air su-
petlority now in the East
where they can employ ap-
proximately a hundred of
their aircraft against Pak
ground forces and logistic
areas. The Indians, however,
have not yet broken through
on the ground in East Paki-
stan. Major thrust of the In.
dies effort in East Pakistan
is in the northwest corner of
the province. The airfield at
Dacca is all but closed, The
Indians are registering only
minor gains in the Jessore
area, but they claim to have
taken Kamaipur. In the
West Indian activity is es-
sentially limited to air at-
tacks. The Paks appear to be
on the offensive on the
ground and have bunched
air strikes in the Punjab.
Overall, the Paks claim six-
ty-one Indian aircraft de-
stroyed: the Indians claim
forty-seven Pak planes, In
naval action one Pak de
-
strayer has been sunk by
the Indians and another
claimed sunk. The Indians
also claim the sinking 01 000
Pak submarine In eastern
waters. Moscow Is Increas-
ingly vocal in its sulthort of
India and Is not suthorting
any UN moves to halt the
fighting. The Chinese press
made its strongest attack on
India this morning.
5. Dr. Kissinger then
asked for a military assess.
ment questioning how long
the Paks might be able to
hold out in the East. Gen-
eral Westmoreland re-
mended that it might bean
much as three weeks.
S. Dr. Kissinger asked
what is to be done with
Bangle Deal). Mr. Helms
stated that for all practical
Pare0SeS it is now an Info.
Pendent country, recognized
by India.
I. Ambassador Johnson
suggested that the Pak
armed forces now in East
Pakistan could be held hos-
tage. General Westmoreland
reenforced this by noting
there was no means of ?vac-
lotting Well Pak forces from
the East Wing, particularly
in view of Indian naval su-
periority.
8. Dr Kissinger stated
that the next state of play
Will involve deterthning
our attitude toward the state
of Bangia Desh.
S. Mr. Williams referred
to the one and a half mil-
lion Urdu speaking (Biharl)
people in East Pakistan who
could also be held hostage.
10. Dr. Kissinger asked
if there had been already
been some massacre of these
PeoP19 liss-111999?ew-widet-
t550 he certainly thinks
1.o. Dr. hissmger
asked Si we could do any-
thing, to which Mr. Williams
stated that perhaps an Inter-
national humanitarian effort
could be launched on their
behalf. Dr. Kissinger asked
whether we should be nail.
lug attention to the Plight
of these people now. Mr.
Williams said that most of
these people were, in fact,
centered around the rail
?enters. that they are urban
dwellers and that some ef-
forts on their behalf might
now well be started through
the U.N. Dr. Kissinger stag.
gested that this be done
quickly In order to prevent
a bloodbath. Mr. Slam stated
that while the U.N. cannot
do anything on the ground t
ited from West to East, and
that it would probably take
It least a week to move one
infantry division. It might
take as much ass month to
move all or most of the In-
dian forces from the East to
the West.
if. Mn, Sisco said that the
long term presence of In-
dian forces in Bangle Desh
would have to be addressed.
Mr. Van Holten remarked
that should the Indian army
remain more than two or
three weeks after the situ.
tion In East Pakistan is
wrapped. up they would, in
fact, become a Hindu army
of occupation In the eyes of
the Bengalis.
17. Mn. Van Holten raised
the problem of the return of
the refugees from India. In-
asmuch as Bangle Dash is
predominately Moslem, the
return of 10 million ref.
gees, most of whom are
Hindu, would present an-
other critical problem.
18. General Westmoreland
suggested that the Indian
position in the West was sot
unadvantageous. He briefly
discussed the order of battle
in West Pakistan and sug-
gested that the Indians were
in relatively good Shape. He
said that he expected the
major Pak effort to be to-
wards Kashmir andt be Pun-
jab. The Indians, he felt,
will be striking toward
derabad so as to cut the
main LOC (line of communi-
cation) to Karachi. He did
not think that the Indians
necessarily plan to drive all
the way to Karachi. He also
suggested that the ctdrent
Indian more in that direu
lion could very well be di-
versionary in order to force
She Paks to pull reserves
back from the Kashmir
IS, Mr. Packard asked
about the POL (Petroleum
oil lubricant) supply situat
lion far Pakistan. Mr. Helms
said that at the present time
II looked very bad. The over-
land. LOC's from Iran, for
example, were very tenuous.
20. Mr. Williams sug-
gested that the reasons for
the Indian thrust to the
south was essentially politi-
cal. Inasmuch as the Indians
do not want to fight on the
border they will have to
give ground in Kashmir. In
order to ward off parliamen-
tary criticism, Mrs. Gandhi
may be going for some Pak
real estate In the South.
21. Dr. Kissinger Alien
asked about UN initiatives.
Mr. Sisof ssid that we Are
now .eorwin, the bituniion
with Ambassador Bush Two
Secnrity Council resolutions
have been vetoed by the So-
viets. However, there is a
ground swell building in
New York for an emergency
session by the General A.
sembly to be convened
under the provisions of the
"threat to Peace" mech.
nissn. The crisis could be
moved into the Assembly
through a simple majority
vote. '
22. Dr. Kissinger and Mr.
Slew agreed that any reso-
lution 'introduced:into the
Gtherait Assembly must res
; twin tvdo key elements; cease
fire, and .Withdrawal of mill.
lacy forces. Dr. Kissinger
.agreed that our UN delega-
tion has handled the situa-
tion extremely well to date.
Mr. Sisco said that although
it is very 'likely that the cri-
sis will be introduced in the
General Assembly, we roust
remember that there are 106
countriesrepresented
therein and we ean 'expect
all .sorts of pressures to be
generated. Mr. DePalma
suggested that when die re.
-elution is in the
Assembly there will be a
new twist, i.e.; the Indians
will berm longer terribly in-
terested in politiest accom-
modation. By that time that
Issue will have ceased to be
O problem.
33. Mr. DePalma said that
a Council meeting was
.heduled for three-thirty
today-and at that time we
could try to get the Council
to let go of the issue in
order do transfer it to the
'Assembly. it being quite ob-
vious. that we are not going
to get a cease fire through
Ike Security Council,
24. Dr. Kissinger asked if
we could expect he General
Assembly to get the Issue by
the end of the day, to which
Mr. DePalma replied that
hopefully this will be the
CaSe.
25. Dr. Kissinger said that
we will go with essentially
the same speech in the Gen-
eral Assembly as was made
in the Security Council, but
he would like something Pet
in about refugees and the
text of our resolution.
26. Dr. Kissinger also di-
rected that henceforth we
show a certain coolness to
the Indians; the Indian Am-
bassador is not lobe treated
allot high a level.
27. Dr. Kissinger then
asked about a legal position
concerning the currnat In-
dian naval "blockade." Mr.
Sisco stated that on lave
protested both inci :twits In
wh 'oh American silos have
been involved. Hew., no
formal proclamation wiper.
end.), 1105 been madr in
terms of a declaration of a
war, that it is essentially
still an undeclared war, with
Roe Indians claiming power
'ion could be'focused on this
situation through the Gen-
eral Assembly.
11. Mr. Williams referred
to the 300,000 Bengalis in
West Pakistan, and that they
v ere in some jeopardy. Mr.
Siam odd that this hutment
-Klan issue could be a very
atttractive one for the Ge.
sl Assembly and that we
would begin to focus on
Assembly action. Mr. Mao-
Donald cited as a possible
precedent the mass move.
went of population from
North Vietnam in 1954
12. Returning to the oil'
01551 picture, Mr. Williams
stated that he felt that the
orimasy thrust of the Indian
army would be interdict
Chittagong and cut off any
supply capability still exist-
ing for the Poke in the East.
He said that he felt that the
major thrust of the Indian
army In the East would be
to destroy the Pak regular
lathes. He felt that a major
lob would be to restore or-
Cer. within the East Inas]
much as it will be faced
with a massacre as great on
any we have faced in the
twentieth century.
13. (thneral Westmore]
land suggested that the In.
Mans would probably need
ftree or four divisions to
continue to work with the
Mukti HAIM: the remainder
would be pulled out to as.
Oil the Indian forces In the
West.
14. Mr. Siam opined that
the Indians would pull out
most of their troops once
the Pak threes are disarmed,
inasmuch as the Indians will
be working with a very
friendly population: thus.
they will turn the military
efforts over to the MAK
Bahini as quickly as possi-
ble. He felt that the extent
and timing of Indian with.
drawal from East Pakistan
would depend to a large de-
gree on developments in the
West.
15. In response to a ques.
tion. General Westmoreland
stated that Indian transpor-
tation capabilities were lb.
to exercise their rights of
beligerency. State would
however, prepare a Path, no
the legal aspects of the
Issue, Ambassador Johnson
said that so far as he was
concerned the Indians had
no legal positthn to assert a
blockade.
28. Dr. Kissinger asked that
a draft protest be drawn UP.
If we considered it Illegal,
we will makes formal diplo.
made protest. Mr. Sin. said
that he would prepare such
a protest.
29 Dr. Kissinger then
asked whether we have the
right to authorize Jordth or
Saudi Arabia to -transfer
military equipment to Paki-
stan. Mr. Van Holten staled
the United States cannot
permit a third country to
transfer arms which we
have provided them when
we, ourselves, do not author-
ize sale direct to the alit
mate recipient, such as Paki-
stan. As of last January we
made a legislative decision
not to sell to Pakistan. Mr.
&ace said that the Jerdent
ans would be wbakening
their own position by such a
transfer and would probably
be grateful if we could get
them off the hook. Mr. Sisco
went on to say that as the
Paks increasingly feel the
heat we will be getting
emergency requests f rom
them.
30. Dr. Kissinger said that
the President may ward to
honor those requests. The
matter has not been 'Kellett
to presidential attention but
it Is quite obvious that the
President is not inclined to
let the Paks be defected.
Mr. Packard then said that
we should look at what
could be done. Mr. Since
agreed but said it should be
done very quietly. Dr. Kis-
singer indicated he would
like a paper by tomorrow (7
Dec).
31, Mn, Sisco suggested
that what we are really in-
terested in are what sup-
plies and equipment could
be made available, and the
modes of delivery of this
equipment. He stated that
from a political point of
view our efforts would have .
to directed at keeping the '
Indians from "extinguish-
ing" West Pakistan.
32. Dr. Kissinger turned
to the matter of aid and re-
quested that henceforth let
lees of credit not be made
irrevokable. Mr. Williams
stated that we have
gentled general economic
aid. not formally commttted,
to itolla which redints
Iced l to $10.9141. (lc sug-
gested that what we have
done for Pakistan 01 the
same category does not be]
come contentious inasmuch
as the Indians are now mo-
bilizing all development aid
for use in the war effort,
whereas remaining sod for
East Pakistan is essentially
earmarked for fertilizer and
humantarian relief. A ease
can be rade technically, pa'
tidally and legally that
there is a difference be-
tween the aid given India
and that given to Pakistah
33, Dr. Kissinger said to
make sure that when talk.
log about cutoff of aid for
India to emphasize what is
cut off and not on what is
being continued.
34. Dr. Kissinger then
asked about evacuation. Mr.
Slaw said that the Dacca
evacuation had been abort
ed.
35, Dr. Kissinger Inquired
about a nossible famine in
East Pakistan. Mr. Williams
said that we will not have
a massive problem at this
time. but by next thring
this witl quite likely be the
case. Dr. Kissinger asked
whether we will be an-
nealed to to bail out Bangle
Desh. Mr. IVIlliams sald
that the problem would not
be terribly great If we could
continue to fannel 140 tons
of food a month through
Chittagong. but at this time
nothing is moving,. He fur-
ther. servo-Med that Bangle
Desh will need all kinds of
heln in the future. to which
Amh. Johnson added that
Borden Dealt will be an
"thernattonal basket case."
Dr. Kissinger said. however,
it omIt nnt necosorily be our
hoot:et erne. Mr. Williams
via there ts thing to be
nood of masoilio assiotance
end resettling of refugees,
transsors of othulatIon. and
sooding the nonutation. Dr.
K'scinfthr sifPgested thAt
stert studying this
orotinto rioht nooy.
Cf
tho the todisns hsd
rernost.,
1,77S
rid 01 mash. The so.
00 One frost tri7d 7:11,11;;;M47:
tho refero-rn. This has oro.
,ths9 sore, edth a reser]
f-ntr of foreign currency.
Dr Kissinger also asked
101.1 this nroblem be looked
00 tnmnrrow to determine
nrovlde
cnnimPlitlPs in iieu of cash.
O"noOoeot.o.solItn cot net
We wradd
fivn
On nrovlde material
"7 Tha 7,70117 wt's then
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020016-6
/s/ H. N. Kay
FL N. Kee
Contain, USN
South Asia/
MAP Branch. ..13
Extension 72400
Three Crucial Dates'
MUSKIE, From Al
panion and Muskie neighbor
at Kennebunk Beach, and
long-time Muskie aides and
advisers Berl Bernhard, Ge-
orge Mitchell, Don Nicoll
and Milton Semen
As always, Muskie did lit-
tle talking, but went around
the room asking each man's
views. Harriman was first,
and he declared the Presi-
dent Nixon's methods would
backfire, that Muskie should
pick a few issues and stick
to those but make a deter-
mined, nearly open run for
the top office. By all means,
he should run.
"I'm an old man, and I
tion't want to die with
Richard Nixon in the White
House," said the 78-year-old
patriarch of the party.
There was general agree-
ment Mr. Nixon was vulner-
able and that Muskie was
the one Democrat with the
stature and credibility to
make the liberal position
make sense in opposition.
But prior to the 1972 race,
Muskie was faced with seek-
ing re-election to the Senate
in November, 1970. There
was much discussion of the
proper blend of the presi-
dential buildup with the si-
multaneous Senate race in
Maine.
Characteristically cau-
tious, Muskie was reluctant
to go very for down the trail
leading to the White House.
After nearly three hours of
talk, Clark Clifford, who
likes to speak last, summed
up the consensus. Some first
steps toward staffing the
presidential drive should
now begin, but quietly and
slowly at first.
"You don't have to decide
everything today. There is
lots of time," Clifford de-
clared.
Muskie made no commit-
ment at the close of the
meeting, but it was clear to
everyone that a bridge was
being crossed. It was agreed
that Muskie would institu-
tionalize his effort to ex-
plore the presidential bid,
opening the first s m a 11
downtown office as a staff
center for this purpose and
raising funds to support a
growing exploration.
Within a few weeks. some
$7,000 in campaign money
Viet Policy Correct,
Marines' Chief Says
U.S. Vietnam
By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
policy "was Going into Vietnam "kept I
correct" and the war itself our word on the international
reaped economic and strategic scene, our commitment to
friends who see things as we
dividends, the new Marine do," the nation's top Marine
Corps commandant said in a said.
Pentagon press conference
yesterday.
Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr.,
56. the 25th commandant of
the corps, made those remarks
when asked if he believe the nomically as well as strategi-
Vietnam War had been "worth cally in a geographic sense to
it." Specifically, he said: have friends in that area."
"I do believe that the policy As to whether this was
was correct of getting the Vi- worth the billions the war
etnamese country, both the po- cost, Cushman said "I don't
litical and military sides, in really feel qualified to an-
such shape that they could swer."
reach their own decisions as Turning to his coming four
to how they wished to be gov- year stewardship of the Marine
erned and not permit it to be Corps, Cushman said he will
forced by an invading army hew to the course of being
from the North. lean and tough. He said the
"I do believe that," Cush- biggest single problem loom-
man added, "and I do believe ing in the corps' future was re-
that we succeeded, and that cruiting enough qualified men
we're withdrawing now at the to maintain the current force
asroper time." level of 206,000.
Asked how Vietnam was im-
portant to US. strategic inter-
ests and what the war "bought
us," Cushman replied: "I be-
lieve it may be important eco-
left over from the 1968 vice
presidential drive was trans-
ferred to a new account am-
biguously labeled "Muskie
Election Committee" (which
might refer to Maine or to
the nation at large.) From
this day forward, the Mus-
kie presidential campaign
was scarcely ever in doubt.
Whatever his disclaimers
(usually accompanied by 2
grin), he was off and run-
ning.
It was a long and often
rocky trail that brought the
shy son of a Polish immi-
grant tailor from Rumford,
Maine, to a starting gate po-
sition as the favorite for the
Democratic presidential
nomination in 1972. Like the
political path of many
American leaders, the Mus-
kie trail includes many acci-
dental turns, some detours
and a considerable number
of lucky breaks.
A mere glance at the sur-
face facts demonstrate that
this is an extraordinary can-
didacy in many respects.
According to the tradi-
tional wisdom of American
politics, the Democratic
Party would be most
unlikely to choose as its 1972
standard-bearer a Roman
Catholic from a predomi
nantly Republican state in a
far corner of the nation, a
state with only four elec-
toral votes and no city over
65.000 population.
Moreover, Muskie is nei-
ther rich nor the favorite of
the rich; until four years
ago he was virtually un-
known to most Americans;
he has no interest group
(such as organized labor) en-
thusiastically behind him.
He has little experience in
foreign affairs and, except
for some reputation as a pol-
lution fighter, is not widely
known for any particular ac-
complishment or political
stand.
In a sense, he is every-
body's candidate and no-
body's candidate. There are
few strong objections to him
from any segment of the
Democratic Party or voting
public, but there are also
few ,enthusiastic backers.
Muskie's chief assets now
are the absence of powerful
rivals, his understated per-
sonality that projects a spe-
cial serenity and decency
through the powerful politi-
cal instrument of television,
and the widespread impres-
sion that his appeal would
be likely to unite most fac-
tions of the Democratic
Party and simultaneously
deny Mr. Nixon the support
For Release
r ma
gure
of the independent "ticket-
splitter," votes the Presi-
dent must have to will a sec-
ond term in the White
House.
Whether all this will en-
dure or perish in the con-
frontations of the primaries
and beyond is an unanswer-
able question. But as of
today Muskie seems to have
first crack at the Demo-
cratic nomination. If he can
maintain his appeal to
Americans when they come
to know him better, he is
likely to be nominated?and
would he a very serious
threat to Mr. Nixon this
November.
As national leaders go, Ed-
mund Sixtus Muskie started
late. Born in 1934, he was a
virtually unknown small
town lawyer until age 40,
when he was elected
Maine's first Democratic
governor in two decades. In
that year (1954), Richard
Nixon was vice president of
the United States. Hubert
Humphrey was a controver-
sial and well known U.S.
senator and Henry M. Jack-
son was taking a prominent
role in the Senate hearings
on Joseph McCarthy after
more than a dozen years in
Congress.
After two terms as gover-
nor, Muskie came to Wash-
ington in 1953 as the first
Democratic senator from
Maine in nearly half a cen-
tury. He was a quiet, uncon-
troversial, hard-working sen-
ator, well-liked and re-
spected within the institu-
tion but little known out-
side.
Muskie's first natio nal
fling was in 1964, and it was
both modest and synthetic.
He was facing a re-election
campaign in Maine that fall,
and staff aides thought it
would do him some good at
home to be mentioned as a
possible vice presidential
running mate for President
Johnson. The aides spread
the word that Muskie was
the logical choice, because
of his ethnic background
and New England regional
aiipeal. Johnson never seri-
ously considered him, but
Muskie's name was often
mentioned in press specula-
tion.
Muskie's big chance came
when Hubert Humphrey
chose him as the Democratic
vice presidential nominee in
1968. Muskie did not cam-
paign for the job; Hum-
phrey picked him largely be-
cause no faction of the party
objected to him, he was
: CIA-R1113004151Z0a0002,016-6
Decision
compatible us le s
compatible personally and
politically, and yet had a
contrasting and appealing
style.
"I went for the quiet
man," Humphrey said later.
"I know I talk too much.,.
two Hubert Humphreys
might be one too many."
During the fall campaign,
Muskie's "cool" approach
won him much acclaim as a
welcome contrast to all
three men sharing the na-
tional tickets ? Humphrey,
Nixon and Spiro Agnew.
Democratic Party planners
and the press gave Muskie
unusual attention as a coun-
terpoint to Agnew, who was
considered the weak link in
the GOP ticket. Muskie
emerged from the campaign
well known and well liked,
and there had been kindled
in his mind the weighty am.
bition known in Washington
as "presidential fever."
The man from Maine
traveled widely in early 1969,
making 57 speeches in 22
states in the first three
months of the year to test
his charm. By summer, he
was discouraged. People
were cordial and he was
welcome, but he received lit-
tle press attention and the
polls showed Ted Kennedy
far ahead as the first choice
of Democrats for the next
presidential nod.
Muske had come close to
giving up when the accident
at Chappaquiddick changed
everything. By the fall of
1969. Muske was convinced
that Kennedy was:out of the
race. ,
The Jan. 4, 1970, meeting
with his advisors confirmed
Muskie's determination to
make a serious bid for the
Democratic nomination.
That spring, the downtown
office was opened to pre-
pare for a national race, and
later that year Muskie hired
Robert Squier as his televi-
sion consultant, ostensibly
for the Maine senate cam-
paign that fall.
Once again, it was televi-
sion that propelled Muskie
into a national leadership
position. On election eve,
President Nixon chose to
purchase 15 minutes on na-
tionwide TV to make a par-
tisan "law and order" appeal
for Republican candidates in
the' form of a political rally
speech he had given several
days earlier in Phoenix. It
was a scratchy and unpro-
fessional tape and an appeal
that seemed narrow and un-
presidential.
After the Democrats
learned that Mr. Nixon was
buying time, party leaders
chose Muskie to give a
reply. The Muskie answer, a
fireside chat from Maine
written in part by veteran
ghostwriter Dick Goodwin,
conveyed a low key yet ring-
ing indignation. Even Re-
publicans conceded that the
back-to-back political ap-
peals constituted a grave
setback for the President
and a triumph for Muskie.
The President's poll
ratings dropped. Muskie's
jumped. Easily re-elected to
the Senate, he had been
given a major boost toward
his party's nomination.
Still, Muskie was a man of
caution. Some of his advis-
ers urged him to "put the
heat on" early in 1971 to try
to sew up commitments for
the Democratic nomination.
The senator decided other-
wise. He felt his popularity
after the election eve per-
formance might be a passing
thing; he didn't feel he had
the organization in place or
the financial backing in
place to move quickly.
Instead, he went to the
Middle East, the Soviet
Union and Europe to build
his foreign policy creden-
tials and continued his
slowly growing effort to win
support.
Last summer and fall, Mr.
Nixon made a political come-
back with his wage-price
freeze, his newsmaking
opening to China and other
surprising actions. And in
September, Muskie made a
costly political slip in Los
Angeles, where he told a
meeting of black leaders
that he did not believe the
American people would vote
for a ticket with a black as
the vice presidential candi-
date. Mr. Nixon called Mus-
kie's remark "a libel on the
American people," and the
senator's Democratic rivals,
who had been buildings
strength in 1971, began to
exploit it.
THE WASHINGTON
Wednesday, Jan. 5, 192
POST \
A7
Yesterday Muskie for-
mally joined the race for
the Democratic nomination.
He has the generally ac-
knowledged front-runner
but was by no means a sure
winner. Like many experi-
enced politicians. Muskie has
a fatalistic streak in rum, an
inner voice that reminds
him that nobody can predict
the breaks and whatever
will be, will be.
"You work hard and you
get some breaks and you try
to build some momentum,"
the senator mused yester-
day. He worked hard on the
announcement speech for
television and if that goes
over well?he said he had
an idea that it would?it
should help. Whatever hap-
pens, he has nothing to lose
?he never planned that he
would spend decades in poli-
tics, and he certainly never
planned at the beginning
that he'd have a chance to
be President.
He has prepared himself
as well as he knows how,
and now is ready for the
trail ahead. "Whether or not,
I can really meet the test of
the presidency I don't sup-
pose I would know unless I
were elected to that office,"
he told Maine newsmen in
Portland yesterday. "But by
the end of the campaign sea-
son, I ought to have a better
idea?and the country ought
to have a better idea. That's
what a campaign is all
about.
McGovern Enters Primary in N.H.
Sen. George S. McGovern
(D-S.D.) formally entered the
New Hampshire presidential
primary yesterday, promising
front-runner Sen. Edmund S.
Muskie (D-Maine) a "very.
very tough fight" in the March
7 contest.
"I'm not under any illusion
it will be easy to pull a Mc-
Govern landslide in the state
where Ed Muskie is right next
door," McGovern said in Con-
cord, N.H. "But I don't con-
cede him this state or any
other. I think we're going to
do very well."
MeGovern's New Hampshire
backers, who have been organ-
izing for the fight since early
last year, filed petitions with
about 2,000 signatures to place
his name on the ballot.
Muskie is scheduled to file
here on Thursday. Sen. Vance
Hartke of Indiana filed yester-
day and Los Angeles Mayor
Sam Yorty's supporters are to
<
Commentary by Ms.
Patricia McCoy, Re-
presentative for
Vogue & Butter-
ick Pattertis.
?
fe;
Vogue Pattern 8202
file Thursday. That will com-
plete the four-man field vying
for 18 Democratic convention
delegates and the psychologi-
cal advantage of winning the
first primary.
Polls taken in New Hamp-
shire last year gave Muskie
anywhere from 3-to-1 to 5-to-1
margins over McGovern, with
almost half of the voters pre-
ferring other candidates or un-
decided. No polls on the
Hartke and Yorty strength
have surfaced. !
Meanwhile, Endicott Pea-
body, former governor. of Mas-
sachusetts who announced last
week he will run for vice pres-
ident, filed his nomination pa-
pers yesterday in the New
Hampshire Democratic pri-
mary. "I am running fpr the
vice presidency," he said, "be-
cause it is time that the peo-
ple had a say in who should be
elected to the second most im-
portant public office in the
land."
, In Tilton, N.H., Rep. Paul
McCloskey (R-Calif.) charged
that President Nixon is pursu-
ing the bombing of North
Vietnam to keep the South Vi-
etnamese government from
. falling until after the 1972
' U.S. elections.
He told a high school audi-
ence, "President Nixon insists
that we continue to prevent
: the unification of Vietnam."
In Columbus, Ohio, Sen.
Robert Taft (R-Ohio) an-
nounced that he is withdraw-
ing as a favorite-son candidate
for President and now hopes a
unified delegation pledged to
President Nixon will be cho-
sen from that state.
In Miami, Rep. Shirley
Chisholm (D-N.Y.) began a 5-
day campaign tour by telling
University of Miami students
that "domestic war will break
out in this country unless the
Vietnam conflict is soon
ended." Mrs. Chisholm, who is
expected to announce her can-
41.1.???????
WT
FASI
didacy for the Democratic
presidential nomination soon,
said. "Vietnam is being esca-
lated and the American people
are wondering what hap-
pened."
Also touring Florida yester-
day was Sen. Henry M. Jack-
son (D-Wash.), who predicted
that retention of Vice Presi-
dent Spiro T. Agnew on the
Republican ticket this year will
be an asset to Democrats in
November.
He said many positions
taken by Agnew "are state-
ments in over-kill and will
work adversely on the Nixon
administration." He also pre-
dicted that Southerners will
not "throw their vote away" by
casting ballots for Alabama
Gov. George C. Wallace. Wal-
lace has indicated he will enter
the Florida primary and ob-
severs there believe he would
run strong in the northern con-
gressional districts that Jack-
son hopes to carry.
WCADIDWAER
OMI-IF2.0P
YOUR OW\
COUTUR
HON S--OW
41/1,==?MIN
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show, these Stehli knit fabrics will be available in our
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Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020016-6
a
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-R 011,11.1!000300020016-61
THE WASHINGTON POST
DATE PAGE
-
-1,11
y Sanford J. Ungar
,Virp,5141oii-lbsT?
Syndicated columnist Jaelt Anderson, in a
inalOr chaftenge to the secrecy surrounding
ITS. "policy in the Indo-tiakistani lagt night
The WaShington Post the full texts of
-doCiiiriblitc describing meetings
e SeChritrtraiiircil's Washington
etforrar6up1W8ACI. ?
indicate that Henry A. Kis-
'rreSident national security ad
initrifeted goveininent agencies to take
rd line with India in public statements and
te'actienS during last month's war on the
an subcontinent.
Andersonyeleased the documents after Kis-
singer told rePeiiiii-MondaY "during an air:
- ?,b(ntie conVersation en route to the Western
White House in an Clemente that the col-
utntlitst, in stories based' on the materials, MI
taken out ef context" remarks indicating PEr
the adMinistration was against India. ".
Among the significant statements bearing'
-
DOCUMENT,V'roin`
tri,./
want to honor 'tnoSe rectums:
The matter has not been
brought to Presidential atten-
tion int it is quite obvious that
the President is not inclined to
let tbe- Paks be defeated."
After getting the documents
from Anderson, The Post de-
ckled to print the full texts in
today's editions.
Anderson said he would
make the documents avail-
able to other members of the
press 'today, and he invited
Sen. '3 W Fulbright, chair-
man of the Senate Foreign
iteiations Committee, to use
them as the basis for an in-
vestigation of U.5 policy in
South' Asia. '
FuIbrfght, out of Washing-
ton during' the congressional
recess,Teould not be reached
for cottiment.
' Tingelumnist also suggested
that other members of Con-
gresi' Alight wish to investi-
gate government security clas-
sification policy.
ers iiare
on U.S. -Policy in the documents were the
following:
? itssINGtR: I am getting hell every half
hour from the President that we are not being
tough enough on India. He has just called me
again. He does not believe we are carrying out
his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakis-
tan. He feels everything we do comes out
otherwise."
? "Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was put-
ting out background information relative to the
current situation is provoking presidential
wrath. The President is under the 'illusion'
that he is giving instructions; not that he is
merely being kept apprised of affairs as they
progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept
in mind."
? "Dr. Kissinger also directed that hence-
forth we show a certain coolness to the In-
drargr-thr Itiaan -Ambassador is not to be
treated at'teitiettb a level."
, ? IrDrIntrising-ef 7. asked whether we
bave the T-iM-to- authorize Jordan or Saudi
Wit -of the significant Itare-7
ingatAln the three documents
rtitentier Sit 'night ha
ready appeared in Anderson's!
column, which is distributed to i
700 newspapers, including The
Washington Post.
The Justice Department ac-
knowledged yesterday that the
FBI is investigating the nature
of the security leak that led
to the disclosures.
But Anderson, who said he
will write several more col-
umns based on the documents,
pointed out that no govern-
ment agent had visited him
and that he had received no
request to halt publication.
The Post has not received any
such request either.
Pentagon sources said an-
other Investigation la inider-
way by military ' security
agents. They said the scope of
their, investigation would be
narrow because "very few peo-
ple" have access to minutes of
the meetings.
Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pak-
istan. Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (deputy
assistant secretary of state for South Asian
affairs) stated the United States cannot permit
a third country to transfer arms which we
have provided them when we, ourselves, do
not authorize sale direct to the ultimate re-
cipient, such as Pakistan."
? "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of
state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs)
suggested that what we are really interested in
are what supplies and equipment could be
made available, and the modes of delivery of
this equipment. He stated from a political
point of view our efforts would have to be
directed at keeping the Indians from 'extin-
guishing' West Pakistan."
? "Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the
Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be-:
getting emergency requests from them .
Dr. Kissinger said that the President mat,i,
See DOCUMENTS, A9, Col, 1 72e
Texts of documents. Page AS
ergoir, in an interview
with The Post, said he also
had cores of cables to Wash-
ington from the U.S. ambassa-
dors to India and Pakistan, as
well as numerous other docu-
ments bearing. .on American
policy.
He showed this reporter a!
briefcase with about 20 tile
folders, each containing some;
of the documents.
Anderson declined to namel
his sources, but suggested that,
they occupy high positions ini
the Nixon administration.
"If the sources were Menti-
fled," he said "it would em-
barrass the administration
more .than it would me. It
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HENRY A. KISSINGER
coolneSs to India
would make a very funny
story."
Since the controversy last
year over release of the Penta-
gon Papers, a top-secret his-
tory of U.S. policy in Vietnam,
Anderson said, his sources had
become more, rather than less,
willing to disclose classified
material.
The texts obtained by The
Post provide substantial de-
tails of the back-and-forth
at Special Action Group meet-
ings among representatives ative of The Post, showed that
of the White House, State
and Defense departments, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, Na-
tional Security Council, Joint
Chiefs of Staff and the Agency
for International Development.
The three texts are:
JACK ANDERSON
. .. releases documents
d possession of the four Kissinger said, howeve r,
-R150741300415R00133000200113.-Bie United States, "which
ernment as the most sensitive, in many respects? has had a
Those volumes dealt with U.S.
diplomatic contacts throu gh
other, nations for a negotiated
settlement of the Vietnam war.
After government su its
against The New York Times,
The Washington Post and
other newspaper had worked
their way through the federal
courts, the Supreme Court de-
clared on June 30 that the gov-
ernment had not proved its
contention that publication
would endanger national se-
curity.
In releasing the documents
last night, Anderson said "I
don't think the public should
have to take either my word
or Dr. Kissinger's" about
whether his columns had
By the time a the second quoted fhe documents "out of
context."
meeting, the war had spread
through East and West Paki-
stan; by the third meeting,
Mrs. Gandhi had announced
India's recognition of Bangla-
desh, formerly East Pakistan,
as a sovereign country.
The Post obtained type-
written copies of photocopies
of the documents in Ander-
son's possession
Anderson's copies, which
were inspected by a represent-
? A "memorandum for rec-
ord" about a WSAG meeting in
the Situation Room of the
White Hotise on Dec, 3, by
James II. Noyes, deputy as-
sistant secretary of defense for
Near Eastern. African and
South Asian affairs. it was ap-
proved by G. Warren Nutter, as-
sistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs,
and NV a? printed on his station-
ery.'
? A memorandum for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their
stationery, Concerninga. meet-
ing on Dec. 4, by Navy' Capt.
Capt.
Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer.
? Another memoran4uni,
Kay on JCS stationery about
a meeting on Dec. 6,
The first of the three meet-
ings was held on the. opening
day of full-scale hostilities. be-
tween India and Pakistan.
That was /he day Pakistani
aircraft launched' a series of
strikes against Indian air-
fields on the western border.
Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi immediately ,ploclaim-
ed her counlApprimaxt Fein-
footi ng."
the original documents were
stamped "SECRET SENSIT-
IVE" at the top and bottom
of each page.
Anderson said he hoped his
column's on the Indo-Pakistani
situation, and now the release
"I invite reporters to com-
pare Dr. KisSinger's state-
ments at the secret strategy
sessions with the transcript of
Dr. Kissinger's background
briefing to reporters on Dec.
7.,,
That "background" talk be
came public when Sen. Barry
Goldwater (R-Ariz.) placed it
in the Congressional Record,
to the surprise of the White
House.
In the meeting with news
men on Dec. 7, Kissinger said,
"First of all, let us get a num-
ber of things straight. There
have been some comments
love affair with India, can only
with enormous pain accept th,,
fact that military action was
taken in our view without ade-
quate cause . ."
State Department officials:
denied yesterday that any in-
vestigation of the leak was un-
derway there. Other sources
at State said no one there
had been required to under-
go lie detector tests, as in
some previous security invest-
igations.
Anderson said, however, that
his sources told him investiga-
tions were being conducted at
State, Defense and the White
House, reportedly under the.
coordination of Robert C.
Mardian, assistant attorney,
general in chargq of the Jus-
tice Department's Internal Se-
curity ,Division.
A Just i c e Department
spokesman said last night,;
however, that "assistant at-
torney generals don't coordi-
nate investigations." If any !
prosecution were initiated, he!
added, that might fall into
"Mardian's bailiwick."
!
"If Mardian's investigating;
me," said Anderson, who took!
over the "Washington Merry-1
Go-Round" column from the;
kite Drew Pearson, "I'm go-1
lug to investigate him." 1
"I have an idea I'll know!
more about him than he'll
know about me," Anderson
that the adrninistration is added. "He can take his to al
anti-Indian This th totally in- grand jury and I'll take mine
of the documents, would pro-
"
'yoke a "showdown" on thee accurate . . Jo the public."
government classification sys-
tem.
He said he had been
"timid" originally about quot-
ing from the documents, but1
later quoted more extensh7ely
when he became convince? of
the "colossal blunders" of U.S.
policy.
Invoking his own view of
what might harm, national sec-
urity, he said he would not
release the exact texts Of
cables, "just in' Case they
would be useful to crypt 0-
graphers." ? '
Anderson said the doc-
uments should not have been
classified in the first place.
He said they showed that
"Kissinger is surrounded by,
secrecy. He is treated like a
new weapons system."
T h e.. Anderson documents
differ from the Pentagon Pa-
pers in that his disclosures
cover current diplomatic ac-
tivities, rather than history.
None of the newspapers that
RelelagestateMitiffil oCIAeRDP74B00415R000300020016-6
47-volume Pentagon Papers
, ,Aproved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R00=0020016-6
NEW YORA. TIMES ATE 4;1A1/72".
The?lin.dersorilrApers-
By TOM WICKER
The retnarkable series of documen-
tary excerpts now being published by
-ethe columnist Jack Anderson is a pub-
Ilc of the first order. Since
4the authenticity of these documents
Alas not been denied by an obviously
.discomfited White House, they pro-
..vide a valuable glimpse into the mak-
-Ing of policy?in this case, a policy
_that to many Americans seems disas-
trous..
- More than that, the Anderson papers
"uggest the extent to which the Gov-
ernment can, and does, mislead the
public in the pursuit of what the
'resident and his advisers may de-
' ilde is the national interest. They
'-show again the abundant use of secu-
iity classification to keep the public
In ignorance. And they demonstrate
that publication is one of the few re-
inaining checks on the foreign policy
' pbwers of the imperial Presidency.
The papers make one thing per-
fectly clear?that President Nixon,
with the aid of Dr. Henry Kissinger,
let-Out deliberately to put the United
States Into a position of support for
Pakistan at whatever cost. "We are
not trying to be even-handed," said
Dr. Kissinger to high Administration
officials.
- That might have been a proper
course for a nation opposing, say,
Hitler's expansionism. In the complex
situation on the Indian subcontinent,
Pakistan's obvious weakness?if noth-
.ing else?made self-defeating a policy
of all-out opposition to India. That the
brutal excesses of Pakistani repression
of the Bengalis was overlooked, to the
point where all aid to India was to be?
suspended while clandestine means of
rating the Paks were sought, is sim-
-*Ply repugnant to the American con-
:adience?or ought to be.
Besides, nobody in Washington both-
ered to make clear to the public that
'Washington was not being "even-
'banded." Thus its condemnation of
India sounded more like a considered,
fair analysis than a deliberate, pur-
poseful policy; and that is the kind of
-Avatnpy ground in which credibility
'gaps are dug.
That is even more true of the in-
stance documented by Mr. Anderson
in which Dr. Kissinger and others
sought to transfer to Pakistan arms
-already delivered to Jordan?while
-maintaining the public posture that
arms were not being supplied to either
Varticipant in the war! That is entirely
worthy of the men who brought you
`..le-enforced protective reaction."
So was the public pretense that an
'American carrier task force in the Bay
of Bengal was there to evacuate threat-
ApprevtleilkottsRVIetaget2130(1q111/01
Ieged in the Anderson papers) that its
IN THE NATION
actual mission was to divert Indian
ships and planes and thus to weaken
the Indian drive against East Pakistan.
Nor do the various stories now being
advanced to explain these and other
Administration actions seem to hold
much water. If, for instance, the task
force actually was there to stop India
from overrunning West Pakistan, too,
as Administration leaks now suggest,
nothing in India's actual behavior
toward West Pakistan seems to have
warranted such action; nor is it likely
that one carrier task force could have
been so effective a deterrent; and, in
any case, the American people still
were being misled about the deploy-
ment of their forces.
And if, as other articles have sug-
gested, Mr. Nixon's intent really was
to solidify an American alignment with
China, also a supporter of Pakistan,
against the Soviet Union, the curious
results are that Soviet power on the
subcontinent is vastly extended, as a
result, and American influence hi India
Is at lowest ebb. If we now are closer
to China than we were, what sugges-
tion was there in their acrimonious
history that Peking and Moscow were
likely to be soon reconciled? In order
to gain face in China, did we really
need to lose our shirts in India?
Thus, behind the facade of secrecy
and security which shields so much
of the Government's purposes and ac-
tivities in the world, a policy that was
dubious at best was shaped to Mr.
Nixon's personal dictates, and pre-
sented to the public as something other
than what it was. But the valuable
documents Mr. Anderson has been
publishing must have been supplied to
him by someone with access to them
who believed either that that manner
of making policy, or the policy itself,
or both, ought to be exposed to the
American people.
How else could that be done, except
by publication? And if it is to be main-
tained, as the Nixon Administration
did in the Pentagon Papers case, that
stamping "Top Secret" on the Govern-
ment's memos and minutes makes
them immune to publication and su-
perior to the First Amendment, then
security classification becomes an all-
encompassing means of concealing
whatever the Government wants to
conceal.
It took years for someone to chal-
lenge that arrogant privilege, in the
case of the Vienam war; but it has
happened much more quickly in the
India-Pakistan case. Maybe the Gov-
ernment is now finding its own offi-
64131AMBP1481210414MCMIN N620016-6
Ineptitude be shrouded in "security."
PAGE el)
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NEW YORK TIMES DATE 41-.7)1/41N/-2-4 PAGE (0
Columnist Says Nixon Pressed*Policy Against India
By TERENCE SMITH
SPea10.1 to The New York Times
XASHINGTON1, pl. 3 Pai?
urious" "th
' s \ .t. ? .
NIZ11 # ?
e r
rit Inoia-Pa istan w. or at
.; in: a s on:er s .no a:.
170111111111oora, V-74. immirailm
. ?
ma:
St
erson renorted
According to Mr. Anderson,
Mr. Kissinger directed that all
United States officials "show a
certain coOlness" to the Indians.
"The Indian Ambassador is not
to be treated at too high a
level," he is quoted as having
said.
d? ? I .1 s in Mr. An-
?
? rson s co mn o w ? Id
? ? ?
Mr. Anderson quoted Henry
A. Kissinger, the President's ad-
viser on national security, as
having told a meeting of senior
Administration officials: "I'm
getting hell every half-hour
from the President that we are
rt,!:+eing tough enough on In-
S , I .
rri
d
ag
with
rAtenlithe tlioloahts
publishgclo miff e as see al
S.
His column is syndicated to
700 newspapers, 100 of them
overseas. Mr. Anderson took
?
over the column on the death
of his colleague Drew Pearson
in September, 1969.
ation of the re
Me ? * I
? ? .1 w 1.0 r. As? ? - ?
. . I
se
eigasiels.
Government sources con-
firmed today that an investiga-
tion had been started by the
White House to determine who
leaked the classified doduments.
The sources said the new, in-
vestigation, reportedly being
conducted by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, is directed
at Individuals in the State and
Defense Departments and on
the National Security Council
staff who have had access to
the notes quoted by Mr. Ander-
son.
? ? ? ? ? ...I I
? al ? ? lt
.*** nrstr:Ic
rorarpriby
rppre-
e-
. cine Int- Mew to-
* %,1 ? I- Se ? St'
h
- ? - ?Aarmiatrm adszatar,-,-
. I ? ? I meetm:s o
- a # ?
I 4,11 Erie.
I. nrzario
.1.. ? : in=
?? ??
? ? dill 44
a
ng
? :a-
gs
vierra.held.i,u4Aajaggein7.xr?
Notes by Pentagon Aides
The notes he has published
so far, the columnist said, are,
from those taken for the De-
fense Department and are
signed by two Pentagon offi-
cials.
he had
e-
and
two
ocumen s mc I: sin
oyetth r svs-
e col mnist field. "Ev-
singer does?even
? --Plt-
irags..eta,aaape.LL.:sgr..r.at-=aats_not
l-4a publis i't'-"4- ,Jn.. a
UMW:WY!'
Mr. Anderson said neither
he nor members of his staff had
yet been questioned by Gov-
eniment investigators, but that
he had "positive" information
that the F.B.I. had already in-
terrogged individuals at the
White House and State and De-
fense departments in an effort
to discover who had provided
him with the documents.
Aide Declines Comment
Gerard L. Warren, the acting
Press Secretary at the White
House, declined today to say
whether an investigation' had
been ordered. He also declined
all comment an the Andersen
columns.
In the column published to-
day, Mr. Anderson quotes froin
notes taken during the Wash-
ington Special Action Group's
meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and
Dec. 8.
th r t session he quotes
often-
tr.14...pagiligeUCC..14? sa
platting warn rlit`re en-
? in nnAnkls-barred at-
ajiir_Ltnat
t'Ir'rurgo ?pr
on-all-si4es."
"Dr. Kissinger remarked that
if the Indians have announced
a full-scale invasion," the col-
umn continues, "this fact must
be reflected in our U.N. state-
ment."
On Dec. 4, Mr. Kissinger is
quoted as having said, "On AID
matters the President wants to
proceed against India only."
He was referring to the Agency
for International Development.
This instruction was ampli-
fied on Dec. 8, when, accord-
ing to the column, "Dr. Kissin-
ger stated that current orders
are not to put anything in the
budget for India. It was also
not to be leaked that AID had
put money in the budget only
to have the 'wicked' White
House take it out."
On pee. 4, the Administra-
tion ded its aid program
in In
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Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP7413MR1304020016-6
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE PAGE I 1
The Washington Merry-Go-Round VASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 4, 1972
Arabs Disagree on War Renewal
By Jack Anderson
Egypt s 01110 attaelS
Tulel,-And has ?tad Asso-
ciates, "I would not expect too
1680 from the Egyptians." lte
added fiercely that the Egyp-
tians "will never again pull
us into a war and leave utij
the lurch."
' Next time, he !Ede _Ire-
ans will be ready. 'When3he
blow comes," he said,
"whether Egypt or Israel
startS it first, we will seize the
opportunity and fight."
The secret intelligence re-
? ort, telling of Asad's conver-
ation, emphasized that he
sed the Arabia word
lamm a" which means
'when," not "if."
His army chief, Gen. Mus-
tafa Tales, is also quoted in
the secret cable as telling his
military colleagues tersely;
"There is no other choice. We
must fight and we will fight."
He acknowledged that "all
the Arabs combined are
weaker than Israel." But he
vowed the Syrians, at least,
would fight anyway "if not to
gain a victory, at least to keep
the war case hot between us
and Israel."
As he put it: "If the Arabs
had continued to fight Israel
after their successive defeats
in 1948, 1956 and 1967, rather
than turning their backs in de-
feat, many world leaders would
have changed their policies"
toward the Arab-Israeli dis-
pute.
Military Moves
Significantly, Syrian troops
and armor have been spotted
moving "through Damascus
heading south," and the Syri-
ans are reported to be "seri-
ously preparing for new hostil-
ities with Israel."
The Egyptians, meanwhile,
have been shouting the loud-
est about resuming the war.
But in private, Gen. Mahmud
Tuharai, the Egyptian-army's
operations chief has told inti-
mates that "any major at-
tempt at crossing the Suez
Canal is bound to fail."
Declares a secret cable: "Tu-
hami said that President
Anwar Sadat, when threaten-
ing Israel with an all-out war,
was bluffing and ... informed
the army of this.",,
Tuhami suggested that the
army might "carry out small-
scale commando attacks" but
that these raids "would be
carefully controlled so as not
to cause over-reaction from
the Israelis."
The Egyptian high com-
mand, he said, was "very con-
cerned that Israel would take
advantage of Sadat's threats
to carry out a preemptive
strike which would destroy
the Egyptian army and air
force."
The U.S. has renewed its
efforts, meanwhile to set-
tle the Arab-Israeli dispute at
the truce table rather than the
battlefield. American diplo-
mats have spread the word, ac-
cording to a secret report, that
"we could not be complacent
about future Egyptian military
moves if no political progress
is achieved."
Footnote: The Syrians belit-
tle the Egyptians in private
but fight with the Jordanians
in the open. Yet an intelli-
gence cable quotes President
Asad as commenting wryly
"that perhaps the Syrian
army would find itself along-
side the Jordan Arab army as
the only two armies which
would fight Israel fiercely."
Washington Whirl
Ulterior Welcome?Those
Welcome Wagons, laden with
bounties for new arrivals in
neighborhoods across the na-
tion, are under investigation.
The Federal Tiade Commis-
sion has evidence the smiling
hostesses, in some eases, have
been doubling as private eyes
for the business firms whose
free gifts they pass out. Some
hostesses allegedly have been
reporting back the age and
make of cars, the condition of
carpeting and the financial af-
fairs of the families they visit.
Chairman Miles Kirkpatrick
has written Rep. Ogden Reid
(R-N.Y.) that the FTC is look-
ing "into the various practices
of Welcome Wagon, Inc." The
company has denied that occa-
B11
sional snooping by its cheery
young ladies is company pal
icy.
Top Secret Jokes--Whei
the National Security Agency
is not clacking out classifiec
messages in code over its
closely-guarded teletype ma
chines, the electronic far(
tends to get a little gamy. Dur
tog a recent slack period, dig
nified security officials werE
astounded to see their tele
types rattling out more thai
200 words of the vulgar olc
joke that begins, "Once upol
a time there lived a man whc
had a mad passion for bean
. . ." The officials discovere(
that clerks had been telliru
each other dirty jokes on ths
secret circuit when it was no
being used for transmittim
cryptographic intelligence re
ports.
Strange Economics?Th4
purpose of President Nixon's
economic program is to keel
costs down. Yet the Genera
Accounting Office recent]:
use the new economic regula
tions to keep prices up. Th.
National Graphics Corp. of Cc
lumbus, Ohio, was low bidder
on some government bindim
and printing contracts. But
the company, because of al
oversight, had failed to sign j
pledge certifying it was in lin(
with the President's economis
orders. Its low bid should havt
spoken for itself. But insteag
of giving National Graphics I
chance to correct its oversight
the GAO gave the contract ti
the second low bidder at a lost
to the taxpayers of $4,500.
' Bell-McClure Syndicate
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 5,..JR7N PAGE JP
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, :Tan. 3, 1972 B
Secret Minutes Dispute Kissinger
By Jack Anderson
We can now document fro
secret White House minutes
our charge that presidential
braintruster Henry Kissinger
lied to reporters when he told
them the Nixon administration
wasn't anti-India.
Contrary to Kissinger's
statement to the press, the
minutes show that President
N4c0n not only ordered a pro-
Pakistan policy but became fu-
rionp with his subordinates for
not taking a stronger stand
against India.
"I am getting hell every half
hour from the Presj.dent that
we are not being tough
enough on India," complained
Kissinger at the Dec. 3 strat-
egy session.
Three days later, accordin
to the minutes, Kissinge
"directed that hencefort
we show a certain coolness t
the Indians. The Indian am
bassador is not to be treate
at too high a level."
The India-Pakistani conflict
was reviewed almost daily by
a crisis team known as the
Washington Special Action
Group. Here's a typical ex-
cerpt from the secret minutes
for Dec. 4:
"Mr. Helms (the CIA direc-
tor) opened the meeting by in-
dicating that the Indians were
currently engaged in a no-
holds-barred attack of East
Pakistan and that they had
crossed the border on all
sides ... Although not decree-
ing a formal declaration of
war, President Yahya has
stated that 'the final war with
India is upon us' . . .
"Dr. Kissinger remarked
that if the Indians have an-
nounced a full scale invasion,
this fact must be reflected in
our U.N. statement.
"Mr. Helms indicated that
we do not know who started
the current action ...
"Dr. Kissinger requested
that by Monday the CIA pre-
pare an account of who did
what to whom and when.
"Mr. DePalma (Assistant
State Secretary) suggested
that if we refer to the Indian
declaration in our discussion
in the UN, that we almost cer-
tainly will have te refer to re-
marks by Yahya.
he was under specific instruc-
tions from the President, and
either someone in the bu-
reaucracy would have to pre-
pare this statement along the
lines indicated or that it
would be done in the White
House.
Kissinger's Semantics
"Dr. Kissinger asked
whether the Indians have
stated anything to the effect
that they were in an all-out
war.
"Mr. Helms said that the
terminology was 'no holds
barred.'
"Dr. Kissinger asked what
the Paks have said. Mr. Helms
said the terminology was final
war with India.' Dr. Kissinger
suggested this was not an
objectionable term. It did not
seem outrageous for the Paks
to say they were trying to de-
fend themselves ..."
Later in the meeting, Kissin-
ger instructed: "On AID mat-
ters, the President wants to
proceed against India only."
The secret minutes of the
December 8 meeting shed
"Dr. Kissinger replied_that. more light on this:
"Dr. Kissinger emphasized
that the President has made it
clear that no further foreign
exchange, (surplus) commodi-
ties or development loans
could be assigned to India
without approval of the White
House.
"Mr. Williams (Deputy AID
Director) stated there was no
problem of anything sliding
through.
"Dr. Kissinger inquired
what the next turn of the
screw might be.
"Mr. Williams said that the
only other possible option was
taking a position concerning
AID material currently under
contract. This, however, would
be a very messy problem inas-
much as we would be dealing
with irrevokable letters of
credit...
"Dr. Kissinger stated that
current orders are not to put
anything in the budget for
India. It was also not to be
leaked that - AID had put
money in the budget for India
only to have the 'wicked'
White House take it out."
C 1972, Bell-McClure Syndicate
--a
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 144 ran 1.." PAGE er).7
A
Jack Anderson
Peace Prospects
In Indochina War
THERE IS a glimmer of
hope that the outbreak of
fighting in Indochina may be
followed by serious negotia-
tions for peace.
Intelligence reports claim
that Communist cadres have
been alerted to expect a pro-
longed ceasefire and peace
negotiations.
The military step-up in
Laos, Cambodia and South
Vietnam just possibly could
be a Communist maneuver to
Improve their bargaining po-
sition.
But the intelligence ex- "
perts are skeptical. Cautions
a secret Intelligence Informa-
tion Cable:
"It seems doubtful that
(Hanoi) is actually consider-
ing the declaration of such a
ceasefire. (Hanoi) may, how-
ever, be considering a 'de
facto' ceasefire and be using
the argument. . .to make the
current VC situation more
palatable to the lower level
cadres and to rebuild their
morale."
The ground fighting in all
three countries, meanwhile,
has been intensified. Intelli-
gence reports contain
guarded hints that the Viet-
cong may attempt another
limited Tet offensive in
South Vietnam at the end of
the month.
But the most serious mili-
tary threat is aimed at Laos.
Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma, in desperation,
called for American bombers,
including giant B-52s, to slow
the enemy advance.
The request was forwarded
by McMurtrie Godley, the
American ambassador, to the
Pentagon. Adm. Thomas
Moorer, the Joint Chiefs
chairman, approved a B-52
strike and submitted his rec-
ommendation in a top-secret
memo to Defense Secretary
Laird.
"Ambassador Godley has
requested a B-52 strike . . ."
wrote Moorer. "The proposed
target area has been identi-
fied as a major istkWed
complex which wil d used
to support life new enemy
units now moving west...All
source intelligence has re-
vealed a significant increase
in enemy activity in the tar-
get area..."
The raid, identified by the
code name "Arc Light," was
okayed. The returning B-52
crews reported that their
bombs caused 'six secondary
explosions."
Fighter-bombers also began
hitting targets in Laos. But
the North Vietnamese unex-
pectedly struck back with an-
tiaircraft missiles and Mig-21
fighter planes.
The United States, in re-
turn, retaliated by sending
. _
waves of bombers over North
Vietnam. (We had reported a
year ago that the Pentagon
was keeping its contingency
plans updated for bombing
the North.)
It is evident that fighting
escalates much easier than
negotiating.
Flood Warning
EARLY 0 N E Saturday
morning last August the peo-
ple of Bound Brook, N.J.,
awoke and saw the sunshine.
The heavy rains from hurri-
cane Doria had apparently
passed; a crisis had been
avoided.
Hours later the waters
were six feet high along Main
Street in Bound Brook.
Scores of businesses and
homes, including Mayor Sam
Patullo's dry cleaning store,
were wiped out. Rising rap-
idly and without warning,
flood waters from the Green-
brook River cost the small
town $17 million in damages.
Luckily no lives were lost.
The scene in Bound Brook
is not unusual. Each year
floods strike hundreds of un-
preNit totem-unities, driv-
ing 75,00if Americans from
their homes and causing $1
billion worth of property
damage.
But, for Bound Brook at
least, the next time the
floods come the citizens can
expect to be prepared. The
National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration
(NOAA) plans to install a
simple inexpensive device up-
stream that will alert local
officials that the Greenbrook
River is rising.
The fail-safe flood alert
system, which costs only
about $2,500, operates like a
bulb in a toilet tank. The rap-
idly rising currents trigger a
small sensor which is con-
nected to a telephone line.
Once the sensor is triggered,
sirens will go off almost in-
stantaneously in the police
station in nearby Plainfield.
Originally, NOAA planned
to place 100 of these new
small units in flood-prone
areas around the country, but
budget cutbaeks have forced
the government to Alva
units in only a dozen areas
along the Eastern Seaboard.
Footnote: J-Tec Associates,
a small Cedar Rapids, Iowa,
firm specializing in environ-
mental instruments, helped
develop and build the new
flood-control devices. On J-
Tec's board is engineer Ed
Nixon, the President's shy, in-
trospective younger brother,
who has a keen interest in
oceanography and eavirop-
mental ORM
_ Ihreause?
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE ( PAGE
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Jot. 1, 1972 B 7
U.S., U.N. Damaged by Indian Blitz
*- By Jack Anderson White House? strategy session chimed in CIA. director Rich-
Pakistan wasn't the only
oser of the bloody, two-week
mar over BangladeSh. The In-
Ilan blitz also badly damaged
seppwo bigger victims.
We have already shown
from the secret White House
Papers that the United States
suffered a strategic defeat.
Thanks to President Nixon's
bungling, Russia has emerged
as India's partner, and the
United States is out in the cold
on the Indian subcontinent.
The other big loser is the
United Nations, which failed
dismally to keep the peace be-
tween India and Pakistan. The
U.N.'s impotence, as it groped
for an international consensus
to end the struggle, caused
President Nixon's foreign pol-
icy adviser, Henry Kissinger,
to blurt at a secret White
House meeting:
"If the U.N. can't operate in
this kind of situation effec-
tively, its utility has come to
an end, and it is useless to
think of U.N. guarantees in
the Middle East."
America's U.N. Ambassador,
+George? Bush, suggested in one
secret report that Secretary
General U Thant's ineffective-
ness might be attributed to
"physical strain due to his re-
cent illness." But Kissinger
put the matter more bluntly
by calling the U.N. wrangle a
"farce."
Kissinger made clear his
contempt for the U.N. at a
on Dec. 4.
"We will have difficulty in
the U.N.," suggested Samuel
DePalma, the State Depart-
ment's specialist in interna-
tional organizations, "because
most of the countries who
might go with us do not want
to tilt toward Pakistan to the
extent we do."
"We have told the Paks we
would make our statement,"
replied Kissinger. "Let's go
ahead and put in our own
statement anyway regardless
of what other countries want
to do. We need now to make
our stand clear even though it
has taken us two weeks of fid-
dling."
Kissinger's Comments
The secret minutes con-
tinue: "Dr. Kissinger (said) it
was important that we register
our position. The exercise in
the U.N. is likely to be an ex-
ercise in futility, inasmuch as
the Soviets can be expected to
veto. The U.N. itself, will in
all probability do little to ter-
minate the war."
At this point, Kissinger de-
clared: "Nothing will happen
at the Security Council be-
cause of Soviet vetoes. The
whole thing is a farce."
"The Soviet tactic will be to
stall, as they do not want a
cease-fire yet," agreed Christo-
pher Van Haien, another
State Department expert.
DePalma said the Winn
"could shilly-shally for three
or four days"?long enough,
ard Helms, "for them to occu-
py East Pakistan.
Footnote: When Indian
troops threatened Dacca, Sec-
retary General U Thant's first
reaction was to evacuate the
U.N. mission.
This brought stern, secret
instructions from State Secre-
tary Bill Rogers to Ambassa-
dor Bush: "Request U.S.U.N.
(U.S. delegation) to convey to
SYG (Secretary General) or
appropriate senior official our
deep concern regarding deci-
sion of SYG to withdraw all
U.N. officials from East Paki-
stan as demanded by Indian
government.
"In earlier message from
Dacca, U.N. group in East Pak-
istan was cited as having been
instructed by U.N.N.Y. (U.N.
headquarters) to 'defer evacu-
ation of U.N. officials so they
may be in place for possible
assistance in arranging cease-
fire.
"Suggest in course of discus-
sion you stress critical role
which U.N. can play in pro-
tecting human rights and seek-
ing peace during current cri-
sis."
Washington Whirl
Reverse Justice?We re-
ported earlier that the Justice
Department was trying to re-
duce a U.S. Court of Claims
commissioner's damage recom-
mendation to a Miami Herald
photographer named Doug
Kennedy who was wounded by
American Marines in. the Do-
minican Republic six years
ago. The court recommended
Kennedy receive $100,000. Sub-
sequently, however, he was
stricken with cancer. So the
Justice Department promptly
sought to cut down his award
on the ground that cancer had
reduced his We expectancy.
Now Kennedy has died and
his wife and child need the
award more than ever.
PX Blues ? Three separate
surveys taken by the Penta;
gon, a civilian research firm
and the Army itself have turn-
ed up widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the ?multibillion-dol-
lar commissary system. The
Pentagon study found "custom-
ers rated commissary service
unsatisfactory." The civilian
survey Showed 76.9 per cent of
commissary customers wanted
a better selection. The Army
discovered that, out of eight
aspects of military life, the
commissaries and post ex-
changes ranked seventh. Mean-
while, despite revelations of
waste and corruption in the
system, the generals in charge
continue to assure Defense
Secretary Mel Laird that all
is well.
Dole's Dunning --- Sen. Bob'
Dole (R-Kan.), the brassy Re-
publican National Chairman,'
has sent out letters soliciting
$50 and $75 contributions for
the Senate campaign of his
old pal, Sen. Bob Griffin (t-
Mich.). But the letters were
sent to non-Michigan money
men, thus angering other GOP
candidates who see the dun-
ning as poaching on their
homestate preserves.
1972, PtEll-McClure Syndicate
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1 JAN 1972
Probe Is On
'To Find Leak
To Anderson
Associated Press
U.S. officials said yesterday
a security investigation is
under way to find out who
"leaked" to a columnist inside
Information about White
House gtrategy sessions early
this month concerning the In-
dia-Pakistan conflict.
The officials, who declined
to be identified by name,
voiced concern about the pub-
lication of the material by col-
umnist Jack Anderson.
Anderson columns have
been quoting from what An-
derson says are classified re-
ports. They deal in part with
suggestions by some adminis-
tration officials that some
countries such as Jordan be al-
lowed to transfer U.S.-fur-
nished arms to Pakistan.
The administration did not
engage in such transfers, and
maintained its embargo on
weapons deliveries to Paki-
stan.
Some of Anderson's mate-
rial is said to come from meet-
ings of the special action
group that deliberated U.S. In-
dia-Pakistan policy at the
White House during the first
days of December.
The group is led by presi-
dential adviser Henry A. Kis-
singer, head of the White
House National Security
Council staff, and includes
senior representatives from
concerned agencies such as
the State Department, the De-
fense Department and the
central Intelligence Agency.
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19/
lrhe Wasiltington 111erro-Round
U.S. Show of Force in I ay of Bengal,
By Jack Anderson
Throughout the Indian-Paki,
sten War, the American peo-
ple once again were misled by
their leaders.
Secret documents dispute,
for example, the White House
explanation for dispatching a
naval task force to the Bay of
Bengal.
Official spokesmen empha-
sized that the task fo-ce's
main mission was to evacuate
American citizens from embat-
tled Dacca.
We have studied the secret
White House papers dealing
with the two-week war. These
make clear that the task force
?including the aircraft car-
rier Enterprise, the most 'pow-
erful ship in the Navy?was
sent into Indian waters as a
"show of force."
? This provocative naval de-
ployment was intended (1) to
compel India to divert both
ships and planes to shadow
the task force; (2) to weaken
India's blockade against East
Pakistan; (3) possibly to divert
the Indian aircraft carrier
Vikrant from its military mis-
sion, and (4) to force India to
keep planes on defense alert,
thus reducing their operations
against Pakistani ground
troops.
The evacuation of American
citizens was strictly a second-
ary mission, adopted more as
the justification than the rea-
son for the naval move.
Here's how the "Top Secret"
orders to the task force were
finally worded; "Situation:
U.S. citizens may have to be
evacuated from the area af-
fected by the present India-
Pakistan conflict. The situa-
tion may also arise which will
require the presence and utili-
zation of a CVA (carrier) to
ensure the protection of U.S.
interests in the area . . .
"Mission: To form a contin-
gen,w evacuation force capa-
ble of helo (helicopter) evacua-
tion of civilians, of self protec-
tion, and of conducting naval
air and surface ops (opera-
tions) as directed by higher
authority in order to support
U.S. interests in the Indian
Ocean area."
Secret Excerpts
Meanwhile, those anony-
mous aides, who whisper the
latest word from the White
House into the cars of news-
men, have stopped pretending
that the task force was in-
tended to evacuate stranded.
Americans.
Now the aides are leaking
the story that President Nixon
had learned of the Soviet-In-
dian plans not only to lop off
East Pakistan but to dismem-
ber West Pakistan. The task
force was ordered into the In-
dian Ocean, according to this
line as a deterrent.
But this, too, is a distortion
of the information contained
in the White House papers.
Here are excerpts from the
"Secret Sensitive" strategy
session that took place in the
White House's fabled Situa- risk to West Pakistan.
tion Room shortly before the
decision to present a "show of
force" in the Bay of Bengal:
"Mr. Helms (the CIA chief)
opened the meeting by brief-
ing the current situation . . . It
is reported that prior to termi-
nating present hostilities, Mrs.
Gandhi intends to attempt to
eliminate Pakistan's armor
and air force capabilities . . .
"Assessing tne situation in
the West, General Ryan (the
Air Force chief) indicated that
he did not see the Indians
pushing too hard at this time,
rather they seem to be content
with a holding action.
"Dr. Kissinger (the Presi-
dent's chief foreign policy-
maker) suggested that . . . if
the Indians smash the Pak air
force and the armored forces,
we would have a deliberate In-
dian attempt to force the dis-
integration of Pakistan. The I
elimination of the Pak ar-
mored and air forces would
make the Paks defenseless.
Scare Tactics ?
"It would turn West Paki-
stan into a client state. The
possibility elicits a number of
questions. Can we allow a U.S.
ally to go down completely?
Can we allow the Indians to
scare us off? . . .
"Mr. Sisco (assistant State
secretary in charge of Asian
affairs) stated that if the situa-
tion were to evolve as Dr. Kis-
singer had indicated, then, of
course, there was a serious
Sisco doubted, however, illatt
the Indians had this as their
objective ..
"Dr. Kissinger stated th4
what we may be witneSsing
a situation wherein a ,countrt
(India), equipped and , sup-i
ported by the Soviets, may be
turning half of Pakistan iLitg.
an impotent state and the
other half into a vassal .
One could make a case, he
argued, that we have done ev:
erything two weeks too late in
the current situation
"Mr. Packard (deputy De-
fense secretary) stated that
perhaps the only satisfactory
outcome 'would be for us to
stand fast, with the expecta-
tion that the West Paks could
hold their own.... :
"Dr Kissinger said that we
are not trying to be even
handed. The President does
not want to be even handed.
The President believes that
India is the attacker . . .
"Dr. Kissinger said that we
cannot afford to ease India'
state of mind, 'The lady' is
cold blooded and tough' and
will not turn into a Soviet sat-
ellite merely because of pique;
We should not ease her mind.
He invited anyone who o13%,
jected to this approach to take
his case to the President"-
Next day, preparations were,
made to send a task force into
the Bay of Bengal to confront
both Soviet and Indian wart,
ships.
Bell-McClure Syndicate
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Approved For Release 2001/11/01 :GIA-RD149001116075000130Alat6
THE WASHING TON POST
By Jack Anderson .
Publication of the secret
Pentagon Papers exposed, all
too late, the miscalculations
and misrepresentations that
entangled the U.S. in a jungle
war in faraway Vietnam.
Without waiting for history
to overtake the Indian-Paki-
stani war, therefore, we have
decided to publish highlights
from the secret White House
Papers dealing with the crisis.
These papers bear it variety
of stamps?"Secret Sensitive,"
"Eyes Only," "Specat (special
category) Exclusive," "Noform"
(no foreign dissemination)
and other classifications even
more exotic.
Yet asUndshirigry the docu-
_ _
ments contain almost rio infor-
Mation that could possibly
jeopardize the national secu-
rity. On the contrary, the secu-
rity labels are used to hide the
activities?and often the blun-
ders?of our leaders,
We believe the public is en-
titled to know about these
blunders.
Here are our conclusions
from studying the White
House Papers:
Blunders Cited
? President Nixon, appar-
ently because he liked Paid-
Stan's strongman Yahya Khan
and disliked India's Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi,
placed the U.S. on the side of
a minor u--
t
against the WO Dili
mocracy. There
e atinecT
a un, ers Are
the U.S. against the I3engalis, week war, the White House sein relative to the provision
scrambled around for some of F-104s to Pakistan . . .
"Ambassador Johnson (Am-
bassador-at-large) said that we
must examine the possible ef-
fects that additional supplies
for Pakistan might have. It
could be that eight F-104s
might not make any differ-
ence once the real war in
(West Pakistan) starts. They
could be considered only a
token. . .
"Mr. Packard stated that the
overriding consideration is the
practical problem of either
doing something effective or
doing nothing. If you don't
win, don't get involved . ."
The following day, a secret
message was flashed to Am-
bassador to Jordan L. Dean
Brown: "You should tell King
Hussein we fully appreciate
heavy pressure he feels him-
self under by virtue of request
from Pakistan. We are never-
theless not yet in a position to
give him definite response.
Whole subject remains under
Intensive review at very high
level Of USG."
In New Delhi, Ambassador
to India Kenneth Keating re-
ceived a copy of the secret or-
ders to Brown. Keating sent
an anguished message to
Washington, pleading: "Any
action other than rejection (of
the plan to ship planes to Pak-
istan by way of Jordan) would
pose enormous further diffi-
culties in Indo-U.S. relations."
Waal& print aclAtiopal ex-
cerpts-1=i the Mute House
P.abors=?ialature etA,14461
Bell-McClure Syndicate
whose freedom Yahya had
brutally repressed. He over-
turned their free election,
jailed their elected leader and
sent troops to terrorize the
populace.
? The President gruffly ov-
errode the advice of the State
Department's professionals
who urged him to use his spe-
cial influence with Yahya to
stop the Pakistani perseeution
and to grant the Bengalis a
measure of autonomy. When
the Indian Army finally came
to the aid of the Bengalis, the
pros pleaded with Mr. Nixon
to remain neutral if for no oth-
er reason than Pakistan looked
like a sure loser. Instead, he
supported the repressor and
associated the 'U.S. with Paid-
stan's eventual humiliation.
? In a fit of petulance, the
President sent a naval task
force to tlie Bay of Bengal and
risked a; military confronta-
tion with Soviet warships.
? As a reward, the Russians
are expected to seek military
bases on the subcontinent.
"The Soviet military ambition
in this exercise is to obtain
permanent usage of the port
of Visakhapatnam," suggested
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the
Navy chief, at a secret strat-
egy session. An intelligence
report also declares that Bang-
ladesh, the new Bengali state,
has "already offered military
bases in Chittagong to the So-
viet Union in exchange for
way to rush arms shipments to
Pakistan. This would have
been a violation of our own
1965 arms embargo a- gainst
both India and Pakistan.
Secret Minutes
Here are excerpts from the
"Secret Sensitive" minutes of
Kissinger's White House strat-
egy sessions:
"Dr. Kissinger asked
whether we have the right to
authorize Jordan or Saudi
Arabia to transfer military
equipment to Pakistan," de-
clare the Dec. 6 minutes. "Mr.
Van Hollen (Asian expert,
State Department) stated the
United States cannot permit a
third country to transfer arms
which we have provided them
when we, ourselves, do not au-
thorize sale direct to the ulti-
niate recipient.
"Mr. Sisco (Assistant State
Secretary in charge of Asian
affairs) went on to say that as
the Paks increasingly feel the
heat, we will be getting emer-
gency requests from them. Dr.
Kissinger said that the Presi-
dent may want to honor those
requests . . .
"Mr. Packard (Deputy De-
fense Secretary) then said we
should look at what could be
done. Mr. Sisco agreed but
said it should be done very
quietly."
The Dec. 8 minutes pick up
the subject again: "Dr. Kis-
singer referred to an expres-
t the height of the two- sion of interest by King Hus-
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THE WASHINGTON POST DATE
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
4?.
THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Dec.28, 1971
Allies in---CaiiibodiaSctidlneompete4k
By Jack Anderson
' The Vietnam story, like a
rerun of a bad movie, is re=
peating itself across the bot-
der in Cambodia.
Cambodian strongman Lon
Nol has plunged his govern-
ment into disarray. His top
aides have sought, in vain, to
persuade him .to step down.
Now they are talking omi-
nously of a coup. ?
The military effort to stop a
Communist takeover is floun-
dering. Communist forces
have new surrounded Cambo-
dia's eapitel, Pnesii Penh, on
three 'sides.
The U.S., typically, is trying
to sole the crisis hy rushing
more supplies, to 'bailout Lou
Nol. Because of .congressional
opposition, some supplies are
being sneaked through the
back door byway of Indone-
sia. The U.S. -is Also bringing
pressure Upon other allies to
come to Lon Nol's aid.
A secret intelligence report;
meanwhile, describes him as
"a sick man, both physically
and mentally . His memory
s faulty, and he tends to make
nap judgments without refer-
nee to anything anyone has
old him,"
No less than American Am-
assador Emery Swank, in a
report intended for official
U.S. eyes only, has criticized
'Lon Nol's haphazard, out-of-
hannel and ill coordinated
conduct of MilitarY opera-
tions."
Swank blames recent Cam-
bodian military reverses, cost-
ing "substantial losses of men
and equipment," upon "inef-
fective leadership and tactics."
Another intelligence report
describes most Cambodian
general officers as "simply in-
competent." It states that only
one top general, besides Lou
Nol, "has the ability and force
of personality to exercise lead-
ership" at the Chief of Staff
level.
Cambodian Corruption
He is identified as Brig.
Gen. Srey Selman, now ChM-
bodia's defense attache in Dja:
karta, the Indonesian capital.
But the report adds sadly that
"Srey Saman'a personal au-
thority is diluted by 4 ton.4-
ency toward fhiancial eorrup-
tion."
Two other top officers, Brig.
Gen. Sosthene Fernandez and
Brig. Gen. Mao Sum Kbern,
are also called "technically
competent." But the report
charges "both have personal
weaknesses which prevent
them from exercising effective
control over unit commanders.
"Sosthene Fernandez is an
inveterate gambler, while Mao
Sum Khern compulsive
womanizer. Neither activity is
in itself ,disqualifying, but
these two cam., so TOMO tion
is consumed and so much cor-
rupt activity is required to
nance the activity that they
have lost an essential tneasnre
of t-h& respect , required to
exert realleadership."
The persbnnel 'chief; Brig.
Gen. Peolina Var is atcused
by the report of sending
inspection teams, which are
bought Off by commanders of
the &fits whose payrolls they
are supposed to verify."
These sound . distressingly
like the secret reports of
enc e and corruption that U.S.
South Vietnamese incompet-
officials have tried to keep
from the public.
The Communist drive on
Pnoni. Penh, according to U.S.
estimates, was entended as a-
psycheIogical rather than a
military, Peeration. APParent-
, the Communists never ex-
pected any real military suc-
cess but intended to withdraw
to their former position after
harassing the city. ,
Carebodi4n bungling, how-,
ever, has turned a hit-and-run
psychological attack into a
real military threat.
Secret Assessment.
Declares one secret military
assessment: "Enemy forces
have continued to maintain
pressure on Pnom Penh. Their
presence ,in strength has gen-
erated concern; yet govern-
ment forces to date have been
unable to react effectively . . .
. "The. enemy's efforts appear
direOted at psychologically
trol4g the morale of the Pop-
ulace while gradually weaken-
ing and demoralizing (Cambo-
dian) units around Pnom Pen-a2,
. . (Cambodian) failure tb
take aggressive action has 'al-1
lowed (the enemy) to attempt 4
to keep up the momentu
both in the capital area
elsewhere in the country. ..
These dispatches read Ilk
the secret reports that caz
out of South Vietnam during
the 1960s.
, Footnote: Lon Nol's top min-
isters called on him at his rest; 2
dence on Dec. 7 and suggested'
that he relinquish some of big r
authority. "Lon Nol rejected
these proposals out of hand 2.."
reports Amabassador Swank.
Rueful Bhutto
Pakistan's new President
Zulfikar All Bhutto and. Is-
raeli Foreign Minister Abba
Eban ended up side hy side at..,
the United Nations dinner?,?
honoring outgoing Secretary,
General U Thant the other 2,
night.
The UN had passed over-
whelmingly the ceasefire reso-
lution proposed by Bhutto -
end the wax between India
and Pakistan. The resolution,
of course, came too late to
stop India from seizing control,
of East Pakistan,
Eban congratulated Bhuit,9..^.?
on the solid majority he had?--,,e,
gotten for the ceasefire resolu-
tion. Replied Bhutto ruefully:: e
"I would rather have the tern-
tory without without the resolution,
than the resolution without .,
the territory."
Bell-McClure Syndicate
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020016-6
25X1A
pprove or e ease
.1?nc---yawas.s.-4 n-1
Jack Anderson
1/11/01 : CbtapiT4244001)3000201Bik6E
Stans, Navy Join
In Press Baiting
BAITING the press is be- t
coming the Nixon administra- 1
tion's favorite indoor sport.
Throughout the govern-
ment, the lesser lights are
taking their cue from Presi-
dent Nixon who has un-
leashed Spiro the Terrible to
pummel the press and has
dispatched the FBI to investi-
gate such individual offend-
ers as TV newsman Dan
$ehorr.
Latest to take a bead on a
reporter is big-game hunter
Maurice Stans, the stoutheart-
ed Secretary of Commerce,
who was mightly annoyed '
over an Associated Press story
linking him to a U.S.-subsi-
dized paper plant.
The AP Charged that his
Stans Foundation had ac-
quired an interest in an ob-
scure Thai paper company,
which was benefiting from
U.S. governinent handouts.
Stans' side of the storY was
included, dutifully, in the AP
account.
But the Secretary was not
appeased. He tried to under-
mine the reporter who dug
up the facts, H. L. Schwartz
III, by writing a private let-
ter to his boss.
The letter, in effect, in-
vited AP general manager
Wes Gallagher to reprimand
Schwartz. Stans said he
hoped "Mr. Schwartz will be
properly reminded of his re-
sponsibilities to the facts."
Stans called the AP man "ir-
responsible" and complained
he was "without respect for
the truth."
Columnist Silenced
IN ANOTHER case far
from the national spotlight,
the Navy brass have shut up
a, crusading columnist on the
weekly Glynn Reporter in
Brunswick, Ga. The paper is
owned by an outspoken Con-
servative, Bill Williams, who
opens his pages to all opin-
ions.
Once his little paper was
fire-bombed by, he
thinks, left wing radicals.
But one of the paper's most
popular features was a lib-
eral column, caktlpTC0Mtd1For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000300020016-6
tore into the establishment.
-
rne conimnist," who wrote
under the pen name "Lucky
Langston," called the Glynco
Naval Air Station in Bruns-
wick "a haven for passed-
over Navy flotsam." Offi- (
cers there, he suggested,
"look like the crew of a ship 1
stricken With scurvy."
His hot eolurrin set off some r
short fuses at the naval in- a
stallatiot. Officers suddenly c
descendell upon advertisers (
and demanded that they can- t
cel their ads in Bill Williams'
pasp ienre-
the small town's
Prosnerity depends largely
upon, the Navy, the angry of-
ficerrawing a big stick. Sev-
eral,rnerchants quickly killed
or reduced their advertising
in the paper. Others stuck
with the embattled publish-
er-editor, and one appalled 4
advertiser doubled his space.
But the loss was more than
the paper could afford. In an
emotional meet1nel3il1 Wil-
liams an?' Iittekr Langston
I
'greed that the paper 1acl to
saved. On Dec. 2, Lucky
note:
"Lucky Langston dies in
this edition . . . His prema-
ture )ounalistic death was
caused by censorship, im-
posed after heavy economic
intimidation of this newspa-.
per."
Footnote: Glynco Naval Air
Station's commanding offi-
cer, Capt. Carlos Stafford,
conceded his officers were in
the wrong and assured us he
didn't "sanction" their retal-
iation against the little news-
paper. He admitted, however,
that he had neither investi.-
gated the incident nor &stip-
lined the offenders. Nor, he
added, did he plan to do so.
NATO Secrets
GEN. ANDREW'
PASTER,
PASTER, the supreme allied
commander in Europe, is pri-
vately squawking to his supe-
riors that American NATO
officers should not be re-
quired to testify before a
House subcommittee investi-
gating our NATO commit-
ment's.
The hearings, which will
resume shortly,' are being
held in Brussels by a subcorn-i
mittee headed by Rep. MI-
liam Randall (D-Mo,) Several
U.S. officers' with NATO re-
sponsibilities have been asked'
to testify.
In a confidential cable de-
livered under seal to Joint
Chiefs Chairman Adm.
Thomas Nloorer, Goodpaster,
passed on with his concur-
rence the text of a message
from Adm. Horatio Rivera
Jr., commander of the allied
forces in Southern Europe.
"I strongly urge," wrote
Rivero, "that U.S. officers at-
tached to NATO commands
not be required to testify f or-
really before the subcommit-
tee."
Rivero said, "I believe it
would set a bad precedent to
accept the premise thatT the
legislature of one of the
countries of the alliance can
call up a NATO commander,
whether or not of its own na-
'tonality, and question him
or his staff . . .
"I would, for instance, be
most reluctant to appear, be-
fore the defense committees
of the Italian parliament,
which include substantial
communist representation.
,"If C1NCSOUTH (the Ai-
led Command in Southern
Wrope) were to appear for-
nally before a U.S. congres-
ional committee, it would be
lifficult to justify refusal to
to so in the case of any 'ta-
lons furnishing forces or
;taff personnel for the South-
!rn Region."
Goodpaster notes simply
"A- concur with these
--
, - aeJ1:41ciure iffridicate'
'.2444
L.
171Sii I liGT Ofi
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round
Uneasy Christmas in the
By Jack Anderson
The secret intelligence re-
ports?those dreary epistles of
modern scripture?bear a
,grim Christmas message from
the Holy Land.
They tell of war prepara-
tions along the Suez, of Soviet
naval vessels moving into
Egyptian ports, of a plot to
kill Jordan's King IIussein, of 1
assassins dressed in religious ,
garb, of bickering among the !
Arabs.
The beaches along the Suez
are empty, the crumbling, ar-
tillery-pitted villas deserted.
Underfoot, the soil is tawny
and acrid, its dust bitter on
the tongue. To the Israeli and
Egyptian patrols who eat the
dust, it has the taste of death.
The Egyptians train daily,
under Soviet supervision, for
amphibious operations. Russia
has supplied them with moto-
rized rafts, portable bridges
and minefield sweeping equip-
ment. One Intelligence report
?
ypuans can lay
nine bridges, each with a 60-
ton carrying capacity, and two
smaller ones, each with a 12-
ton capaity, across the Suez,
On the east bank, Israeli
troops wait for them in steel
tunnels and underground
bunkers buried beneath tons
of sandbags. The bunkers are
reinforced with rails from an
abandoned Egyptian railroad.
From elsewhere in the Mid-
dle East, other intelligence re-
ports add to the story. Three
Egyptian officials, for in-
stance, were spotted earlier
this month inspecting Saudi-
Arabian airfields. An intelli-1
gence report explained that:
Egypt's President Sadat had
arranged with Saudi Arabia's'
King Faisal "to relocate!
Egypt's civil air fleet in Saudil
Arabia if hostilities were re-
newed."
Soviet Build-Up
Soviet cruisers, destroyers,
submarines and amphibious
craft, meanwhile, have been
quietly assembling In the
Egyptian ports and anchor-
ages of Alexandria, Port Said,
Kithira and the Gulf ef Sol-
lum,
Declares a naval Intent-
geace repc.A:t: 'Ile return of
combatants and amphibious
units to ports and anchorages
in the Eastern Mediterranean
re-establishes the Soviet naval
presence, which was with-
drawn in late October."
The Israeli assessment of
"Egyptian capabilities and in-
tentions" has been flashed to
Washington by Walwori h Bar-
bour, the U.S. ambassador in
Tel Aviv.
"Egyptian deployment along
(Suez) canal," he cables, "gives
Sadat option to open fire at
any time with very little fur-
ther preparation."
however, he added, Israel
"has no intelligence that Egyp-
tians intend resume firing
within any specific time
frame."
On this troubled Christmas
eve, Bethlehem remains much
as it did when Mary and Jo-
seph first halted before the
inn and, finding no room,
oly La
sought shelter in the stable. It
is a huddle of flat-roofed stone,
houses, clinging to the bleak
Judean hillside. Its narrow
streets still echo to the clatter-
ing heels of heavily laden don-
keys.
The stars seem to shine
brighter over Bethlehem than
anywhere on earth, and the
memory of Jesus is fresh and
breathing, But not far away,
assassins disguised as Chris-
tian priests are reported to be
preparing ambushes for Jorda-
nian ministers and royalty.
"The plans include the adop-
tion of Muslim or Christian
priestly disguise to use when
appropriate or necessary,"
states an intelligence report.
Mystery Man
The plotters are directed by
a mystery man, known as
Fakhri al-Amari, who operates
out of a top-floor flat in Bei-
rut. An intelligence report
states that the downstairs en-
trance is guarded by at least
four armed guards. No one is
admitted until he has called
Amari personally from down-
stairs, then at least one guard
physically accompanies the
visitor to Amari's flat.
Amari is described in the in-
telligence reports as chief of
the "special services section"
of the underground Fedayeen
movement. He is responsible
"for assassinations, kidnap-
pings, sabotage and other acts
of terrorism."
His top target is King Hus-
sein, who smashed the Feday-
een in Jordan. Amari, accord-
ing to an intelligence report,
is "still working on his plan to
'get' King Hussein of Jordan
the .next time the latter trav-
els outside Jordan. Amari be-
lieves that the King's next trip
will be to Paris."
As fronts, the assassins have
used a travel agency, handi-
craft shop and small grocery
store in Amman, the Jordan
capital. They reportedly hope
to obtain information on the
King's travel plans from a
pilot for the Royal Jordanian
Airlines.
The defeated Fedayeen,
meanwhile, are scattered
throughout the Arab world.
Many are nursing their
bruises in Lebanon not far
from the Biblical seaports of
Tyre and Sidon.
Declares an intelligence re-
port: "The unedifying specta-
cle of confusion, dissension
and bitterness that pervades
the Fedayeen leadership al-
most certainly has caused
added malaise among the com-
mando rank-and-file . . .
"Reports have mentioned
jealousy and disturbances de-
veloping between Fatah ele-
ments long stationed in South
Lebanon and those recently
arrived from Jordan and Syria,
and we have reported gun-
fights between Saiqa comman-
dos encamped in the central
sector."
On that great parchment of
mankind, the Holy Land where
the Savior's sandaled feet
once trod, there is this Christ-
mas only precarious peace and
little good will toward men.
Bell-McClure Syndicate
Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP74600415R000300020016-6
25X1A
THE ?t3tugsgfAIS,FoRi\?Ing,001/11/01 : CIA-ROT:TT:MI gatile29(1161AGE c-2.4
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Dee. 22,1971 C 21.
HHH Declines to Rebut L.Ill Memoirs
By Jack Anderson
In a stern private memo to
his staff, Sen. Hubert Hum-
phrey, (D-Minn.) has turned
down suggestions that he
strike back at Lyndon John-
son, who, in his Memoirs,
sometimes made himself look
good at the expense of his for-
mer vice president.
Humphrey was asked to
write a review of LBJ's mem-
oirs. Some staff members
urged him to use this device
to set the record straight and
tell how his advice on Viet-
nam was ignored by Johnson.
Humphrey rattled off a
quick reply, which was put
into memo form intended for
the eyes of his aides only.
"It has been suggested that
such a review," he said,
"would give me an opportu-
nity to criticize the book, par-
ticularly on Vietnam, and in
that fashion win some political
friends. I'm not going to do it!
I will have nothing to do wit
It!
"Lyndon Johnson has been
my friend for more than 20
years. We helped each other
as senators, and we worked to-
gether when he was majority
leader. He helped me become
majority whip.
"Muriel and I have been
close to him and Lady Bird.
He selected me as his vice
president, and he helped me
in my campaign for the presi-
dency.
"There are always those
who try to get me to publicize
our differences on Vietnam. I
can't see what good that will
do the country. He read my
memos and listened to my
point of view. He had no obli-
gation or responsibility to fol-
low my judgment.
"He was the President, and
surely those who know any-
thing about our government
must realize there can only be
one official voice in the execu-
tive branch. It is the Presi-
dent's, not the vice presi-
dent's.
"I will not now be party to
any scheme to cut up Lyndon
Johnson.. . I insist that every-
body associated with me un-
derstand my point of view on
the subject of Lyndon John-
son. This point of view is to be
strictly adhered to regardless
of olitical consequences."
Chinese Puzz.1-7-7
Our cloak-and-dagger boys
in Hong Kong have come up
with additional evidence that
Lin Piao, the missing Chinese
defense minister and heir ap-
parent, died in a plane crash
after attempting to assassinate
Mao Tse-tung.
The episode was triggered,
reportedly, by Mao's move to
bring the army back under
party control.
In the course of restoring
order after the Red Guard
rampages of the 1960s, mili-
tary men had moved into key
positions. But Mao sought to
restrain them by citing one of
his oracular sayings.
"The party commands the
gun," he decreed. "The gun
must never be allowed to corn
mand the party." The ailing
Lin Piao, perhaps egged on by
his military underlings, is said
to have resisted.
Painstakingly, our Hong
Kong hawkshaws have put to-
gether the pieces in the great
Chinese puzzle. Here's the pic-
ture that has emerged:
Last August, Mao returned
from a visit to South China by
train. Lin Piao, knowing Mao's
itinerary would take him
through Shanghai and Wuhsi,
arranged an assassination at-
tempt in Shanghai. It failed.
Lin then planned to blow up
a bridge in Wuhsi to wreck
Mao's train. This, too, failed.
Mao left his train at Wuhsi and
hurried to Peking, arriving
there on Sept. 12.
He ordered the immediate
arrest of Gen. Huang Yung-
sheng, the Army chief of staff;
Gen. Wu Fa-shien, the Air
orce commander; Gen. L
Tso-peng, the Navy politic
commissar; and General Chi
Hu-tso, the deputy chief of
staft
Mao gave them 10 days ta
confess.
Meanwhile, Lin had been
preparing to flee to Russia on
Sept. 13. He apparently got
wind of the arrests and took
off on Sept. 12 from Haipien
airfield in a British-built Tri-
dent jet liner.
Mao gave orders, according
to one report, for the Air
Force not to pursue Lin's
plane. It crashed, neverthe-
less, in the Wenteukhhan area
of Mongolia.
On Sept. 24, the arrested
militarY leaders were summa-
rily removed from office, and
special "case groups" were
disptached to the various re-
gions to investigate and purge
other disloyal officers.
As for old Mao, he came up
with another proverb. "The
enemy is nothing to fear," he
recited sadly. "What hurt me
most was the arrow fired by
my ally and his smiling face
after I was wounded."
Footnote: This account of
Lin's disappearance comes
from informants who are con-
sidered reliable. It should be
kept in mind, however, that
the Chinese are masters at
planting tidbits of information
in such a way that they can
be pieced together to form a
wholly erroneous picture.
Bell-Mctilure Syndicate
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Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP74600415R000300020016-6
THE WASHINGTON POST DATE 24 N.C.:1 I PAGE'
The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASEINGTON POST Tuesday, Dec. 21, 1971 E 15
U.S. Task Foree Didn't Frighten India
By Jack Anderson
The dramatic appearance of
a U.S. naval ,task force in the
Bay of Bengal on the eve of
the Pakistani surrender, it
now appears, didn't intimidate
India at all but merely
strengthened her ties with
Russia.
In New Delhi, Soviet Am-
bassador Nikolai M. Pegov
gave India secret assurances
that "a Soviet fleet is now in
the Indian Ocean and ... will
not allow the Seventh Fleet to
intervene."
He also promised, in ease of
a Chinese attack across the Hi-
malayas, that Russia "would
open a diversionary action in
Sinkiang," In short, he prom-
ised Soviet military action
against both the U.S. and
Chita If they intervened on
Pakistan's side.
The fascinating story of big-
power intrigue during the In-
dian-Pakistan fighting .1?..taid
di omatic dispathes
It was precisely this sort of
secret maneuvering that got
the U.S. deeply embroiled in
the Vietnam war before the
American people realized
what was going on.?tgatglive
Is in the pbllc Interest,
ts
-iseas-tiaa.sectaLdocaLaltla
In earlier columna, We told
bow presidential adviser
Hem/ Hissinger assured re-
porters the U.S. wasn't anti-In-
dia At the same time he was
Instructing government nolieY-
makers to take steps against
India.
"The President does not
want to be evenhanded," Kis-
singer emphasized at their se-
cret strategy sessions. "The
President believes India is the
attacker."
Wrong Side
The State Department's pro-
fessionals argued that, mor-
ally, the U.S. should be on the
side of the Bengalis, who
wanted their independence
from Pakistan. The experts
also warned that President
Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy
would only drive India into
Soviet arms.
Kissinger gruffly disputed
CI* saying of India's Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi: "The
lady is cold blooded and tough
and will not turn India into a
Soviet satellite merely be-
cause of pique."
Heeding Kissinger and dis-
regarding the professional ad-
vice, Mr. Nixon took a tough
stand at the United Nations
against India and ordered the
Seventh Fleet to send a task
force Into Indian waters.
This was definitely intended
as a "show of force," although
the flotilla had the additional
mission of evacuating
stranded Americans from em-
battled Dacca if the need
arose.
Plans were made, mean-
while, to arrange provocative
leaks in such places as Dja-
karta, Manila and Singapore
of the task force's approacli.
By the time the ships had as-
sembled in the Malacca Strait,
both the Indians and Soviets
were well aware they were on
the way.
This merely served to bring
India and Russia closer to-
gether. A secret intelligence
report, giving a "reliable" ac-
count" of Soviet Ambassador
Nikolai Pegov's conversations
with Indian officials, declared:
"Pegov stated that Pakistan
is trying to draw both the
United States and China into
the present conflict. The So-
viet Union, however, does not
believe that either country
will intervene.
"According to Pegov, the
movement of the U.S. Seventh
Fleet is an effort by the U.S.
to bully India, to discourage it
from striking against West
Pakistan and at the same time
to boost the morale of the
Pakistani forces.
"Pegov noted that a Soviet
fleet is now in the Indian
Ocean and that the Soviet
Union will not allow the Sev-
enth Fleet to intervene.
Soviet Threat
"If China should decide to
Intervene," said Pegov, "the
Soviet Union would open a di-
versionary action in Sinkiang.
Pegov also commented that
after Dacca is liberated and
the Bangladesh government is
Installed, both the U.S. and
China will be unable to act
and will change their current
attitude toward the crisis."
Another intelligence report,
giving the secret details of So-
Deputy Foreign Minister
Vasily Kuznetsov's mission to
India, indicates there had
been some Soviet impatience
over the pace of the Indian
blitzkreig.
Kuznetsov, after his arrival-,
in New Delhi on Dec. 12, told'a
Indian officials that the Kreirt-7,
lin was "impatient with the
dian armed forces for their in
ability to liberate Bangladesh
within the ten-day time frame
mentioned before the out
break of hostilities."
Kuznetnov pointed out, ac-
cording to the secret report,
that Soviet opposition to a
cease-fire "becomes more Un-,
tenable
tenable the longer the war
goes on in the east.
"While Kuznetsov said the
Soviet Union will continue to
use its veto to stall any efforts -
to bring about a cease-fire for
the present, he stressed the
importance of quick and deci-
sive Indian action in liberat-
ing Bangladesh in the shortest
time possible.
"Kuznetsov delayed his
scheduled return to Moscow
because he is awaiting special
instructions from Leonid
Brezhnev, general secretary of
the Soviet Communist Party,
regarding India's request that
the Soviet Union sign a de-
fense agreement with the Ban-
gldesh government after So- -
viet recognition of Bangldesh.
"According to Kuznetsov,
Brezhnev was not in Moscow ?
when Kuznetsov sent him the -
request for guidance."
The American people, mean-
while, are entitled to straight
talk from their leaders.
;
Be12-McClnre Syndicate
_
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THE WAIAffflterMil?f PjMe 2001/11/01 : DATE
i4Brtjapesr4o9o2o02)6AE .gtf
The Washington Merry-Go-Round
THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Dec. 20, 1971 B ii
Hussein: 'Help or I'll Go on a Ghazou'
Jack Anderson
5? Jordan's King Hussein, in a
secret, letter to President
Nixon, has threatened to go on
a '`ghazou"? a Bedouin raid
against neighbors?unless the
U.S. bails him out of a finan-
cial hole.
The plucky Hashemite king,
sick with grief over the recent
assassination of his loyal
Prime Minister, angry over
Intelligence reports that the
Palestinians plan also to mur-
der members of the royal fam-
ily and plagued with problems
of state, has turned to Mr.
Nixon for solace.
Hussein's letter to the Presi-
dent was delivered by diplo-
matic pouch.
"Dear Mr. President," wrote
Hussein, "May I reiterate my
gratitude for your message of
sympathy and condolence on
the tragic loss of my closest
friend, the Prime Minister cf
Jordan, Wasfi Tell, who paid a
very expensive price for his
devoted service, integrity,
courage and dedication to the
preservation of Jordanian
tional unity . . ."
But the king sought m
than sympathy from
Nixon.
"There has never been a
time when Jordan needed fi-
ncial aid as it does today,"
added. "The minimum aid
ecessary to cover the deficit
this (fiscal year) 1971 and in
the first half of (fiscal year)
1972 is U.S. $20 million and
U.S. $40 million, respectively.
We have now exhausted every
resource of our own for meet-
ing these deficits . . .
"Only external aid can pro-
vide Jordan with the nerve
and strength to continue to de-
fend its principles and ideals,
and to continue its pursuit of
a just and lasting peace.
"Otherwise, we might have
to go on a ghazou, an old
Arab tribal custom, and get it,
Sir, from some quarter or
other in this neighborhood,
possibly causing you a prob-
lem which may be even more
serious than the one I am now
posing, or otherwise, as the
case may be.
"Truly, Mr. President, I do
not know what else we could
do . . The importance of this
aid to Jordan's viability, sta-
bility and continuity all com-
pelled me to request your per.
sonal consideration in inter
vention in this issue."
Grand Old Polluters
A federal study of ghetto
pollution, intended partly to
get black votes for President
Nixon, has backfired against
some of the GOP's Grand Old
Polluters in industry.
The study recommends a
federal crackdown on such Re-
publican,campaign loyalists as
the oil tycoons, automakers
and chemical producers. Even
the official who authorized the
study, Environmental Protec-
tion Administrator William
Ruckelshaus, is taken to task
for failing to relieve city pol-
lution.
The idea of studying the ef-
fects of pollution on the poor
was dreamed up in the office
of Morris Sydnor, a tough-
minded black who works for
Ruckelshaus.
In a briefing paper intended
for Ruckelshaus' eyes only,
Sydnor contended that Repub-
lican blacks "want results that
they can point to when they ,
go back to their communities."
The Nixon administration is
doing nothing "significant" or
"measurable," he wrote,
against ghetto pollution. The-
efore, "a promise of action
and commitment to achieve
results," he urged "is a must"
With a bow in the direction
_of the 1972 campaign, he sug-
gested Ruckelshaus should
promise some practical action
by July 1, 1972?just in time
for the political campaign.
Agreeing, Ruckelshaus pre-
sented the idea to black city
leaders at a White House
meeting on June 30. Seven
days later, Sydnor was given
the green light to go ahead
with the study.
Clean Sweep
A thick report, entitled
"Our Urban Environment and
Our Most Endangered Peo-
ple," now has been coin-
pleted'. We have already
published excerpts from a con-
traband copy, describing how
solid waste, vermin-ridden
water, pesticides, smog and
noise have become the dis-
eased "Five Horsemen" of the
urban poor.
The unpublished report
winds up with 40 recommenda-
tions. Most costly would be a
I $50-million drive, called "Op-
eration Clean Sweep," to clean
up the ghettos. Three-men
commando teams in 20 big cit-
ies would go though the ghet-
tos gathering thetrash that
sanitation departments let
stand in the streets.
Bell-McClure Syndieste
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The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Dec. 17, 1971
Lou Nol at Center of Cambodia Crisis
By Jack Anderson
While world attention Is riv-
eted on the clash between
India and Pakistan, secret dip-
lomatic dispatches reveal that
another grave crisis has de-
veloped in Southeast Asia.
A series of military reverses
and the refusal of Cambodian
premier Lou Nol to curtail his
dictatorial powers has led sev-
eral of his top lieutenants to
the brink of resignation.
What's more, intelligence re-
ports disclose that there is
now considerable doubt about
the premier's mental and
physical condition.
One intelligence report
quotes a high Cambodian gov-
ernment source As Saying:
"The recent military reverses
appeared to have caused Lon
Nol to? take leave of his
senses."
The same source is quoted
as saying that on Dec. 1. and 2
'during a helicopter tour of
the Kompong Thom combat
area, Lon Nol suffered a syn-
cope (in the French connota-
tion, this includes heart fail-
ure) from which he `recovered'
only after two days of inten-
sive care."
Whateier the truth about
the premier's health, there can
be no doubt that his recent be-
havfor has seilOusly alienated
a truniter of top government
officers, including Prime Min-
ister Sir* Matik and Chief of
State Chong Keng.
Intelligence sources have in
formed the Y S Embassy in
Phnom Penh that these two
officials and several others
met with Lou Nol on Dec. 7
and urged him to "relinquish
active direction of governmen-
tal and political affairs and be-
come Cambodian chief of
state." This would make him a
mere figurehead.
"Lou Nol replied that he did
not intend to be chief of state
at this time, that he did not in-
tend to be chief of state under
the new, constitution and that
he would be Prime Minister
and head of government under
the new constitution as under
the old," reportS the intelli-
gence dispatch.
The crisis led U.S. Ambassa-
dor Emory Swank to fire off a
confidential cable to Washing-
ton, expressing hope a com-
promise might be reached but
containing a pessimistic sum-
mary of the situation.
"At issue," the cable says,
"are not only Lou Nol's highly
personal and arbitrary meth-
ods of operation but very pos-
sibly the future of his govern-
ment should Sink Matak and
others choose to resign.
"The dilemma which Sink
1V/atak and these contenders
face, however, is that none of
them would appear to be a'po-
'litically viable substitute for
Lon Nol, with all his faults."
Intelligence Items
Since intelligence ?reports
can't always be verified,.,7.et
use the Central Intelligkce
Agency's rating svfem.
source's reliab is -reed at-
phabetically from A to r, and
the content is given a numeri-
cal rating from 1 to 6:
Egyptian Preparations (A-2)
?Israeli intelligence has cor-
roborated reports that Egypt
Is making preparations to re-
sume hostilities "in a few
weeks." The Egyptians report-
edly have in mind only. "lim-
ited" military action. Israeli
authorities have spread the
word, however, that hostilities
couldn't be kept limited.
Chinese Intervention (A-1)
?The Chinese have been mak-
ing weather checks along the
Sino-Indian border since Dec,
8. This unusual interest in the
weather has made the Indians
highly nervous, causing them
to issue anxious charges about
Chinese "troop movements" in
Tibet. Both the Indian and So-
viet military attaches in Kat-
mandu, Nepal, have asked the
U.S. military' attache whether
he has picked up any reports
of Chinese troops moving to-
ward the border. But at this
writing, no unusual move-
ments have been spotted.
Boat Pollution
In its December issue,
Sports Afield makes a stirring
appeal to end the "flagrant
ruin of our woods, water and
air by men without foresight
or conscience."
Elsewhere in the same issue,
the magazine attacks us for
that outboard motors,
The exception of the nOw-
cc
models, gush 100 million
Aa?
gallons of gunk into our-Ava-
ters every year.
The defense of motor!)
pollution was written by
boating editor, Zack T
who neglected to mentlo
he has been wined, dined
-
junketed by the same motor-
boat makers he now defends.
They have flown him to "con-
ferences" from Arizena to
Florida. Sometimes, they have.
handed him a first-class eh
ticket; other times, het has
flown on chartered planes. ,
Putting up the money for
his travel, meals and hotel ex- ,
penses, not to mention free- ,
flowing refreshments, has
been such outboard makers as -
Mercury and Chrysler. He has
responded by licking the fuel
pump that feeds him.
Taylor rushed to the de-
fense of the boating industry,
Incidentally, without bother-
ing to cheek his facts. He ac.,
cused us, for example, of tak-
ing our 100-million-gallon
pol-
lution figure from the mak*
of an anti pollution device.
In fact, the figure came
from a federal report, dated
September, 1970, entitled
"Contribution of Marine Out-
board Engines to Water Pollu-
tion." The report declares for
all to read:
"An estimate of the tOtat
amount of fuel discharged by
outboard engines would be
froth 100 million to 200 million
gallons." We selected the
lower figure for our article.
Bell-IdaClure Syntlicats
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