THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1972 (SOUTHEAST ASIA) PART I

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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1972
(Southeast Asia)
PART 1
BEFORE 1HE
'COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Internal Security
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 App TydflaVQ5Rtil,TlCEI OF COMMUNISM IN 1972 48-5
THE (Southeast Asia)
PART 1
HEARINGS
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Internal Security
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-498 0 WASHINGTON : 1972
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 5.5 cents
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t't MMITTE1' ON INTERNAL
I'\ITEI) STATES ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE*,
Itl(`IIARD II. ICHORII, NIti,ouri. Chairman
t`LAUI)E PEI'l'Eit, Florhla JOIN %I. .1SSIIIROOK, Ohio
ItICII:ARDSON PREYER. North Carolina w )(31-:1t 11. ZION. Indiana
ROBERT F. I)RiN.A:t, liassaehtrxettsr Fl.ET('IIl?;R TIIOJII'SON. Georgia
1IF.VDEl J. DAVIS, South Carolina JOAN t6. ;4CIIMIITZ, California
IkjN.iLlr G. SAxDERS, chief Counsel
Rn IIARD L. SCjjuLTz, AssoCfate Ohief Uounscl
.II.YREIr M. Ntrrl.E. L egislatlt'C Counsel
Jolti F. 1.EWt3, Goordtnrting Editor
ROBERT M, IIORSER, Chief Investigator
11ILI,IASI G. SHAW, Rcecareh IJireclor-
IrE11'Ipr WHITE. Minority Legal Counsel
IIERISRT ROMERRT)IN, Minority Chief Inccstigalor
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CONTENTS
May 25, 1972: Testimony of-
Page.
Edgar DI. Buell-----------------------------------------------
7761
July 20,1972: Testimony of-
Charles Louis Weldon________________________________________
7779
Appendix I: Committee exhibits---------------------------------------
7805
Appendix II: Statement of Congressman John G. Schmitz titled "Com-
munist Involvement in the Golden Triangle Opium Traffic"----------
7817
Index ---------------------------------------------------------------
i
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The House Committee on Internal Security is a standing committee
of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the rules of the
House, adopted pursuant to Article I. section 5. of the Constitution of
the United States which authorizes the House to determine the rules
of its proceedings.
lt(Ll:5 ADOPTED IIY TILE 921) CONGRESS
I louse Resolution 5, January 22. IM 1.
RESOLUTION
Resolved. That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-first
Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the I4?glslative Reorganiza-
fion Act of 1946, its amended, and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.
be, and they are hereby adopted as the Rules of the House of Representatives of
the Ninety-second Congress ? * ?
* * - r r s
RULE X
STANDING COMMITTEES
1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES
* ? r r
i 4
PULE XI
11. Committee on Internal Security.
(a) Communist and other subversive activities affecting the internal security
of the United States.
(b) The Committee on Internal Security, acting as a whole or by subcommittee.
is authorized to make investigations from time to time of (1) the extent, character,
objectives, and activities within the United States of organizations or groups,
whether of foreign or domestic origin, their members, agents, and affiliates, which
seek to establish. or assist In the establishment of, a totalitarian dictatorship
willin the United Slntes, or to overthrow or alter, or assist in the overthrow or
alteration of, the form of government of the United States. or of any State thereof.
by force. violence, treachery, espionage, sabotage, insurrection, or any unlawful
means, (2) the extent, character, objectives. and activities within the United
States of organizations or groups, their members, agents, and affiliates, which
incite or employ acts of force. violence, terrorism, or any unlawful means, to
obstruct or oppose the lawful autliorily of the Government of the United States
in the execution of any law or policy affecting the internal security of the United
titates, and (31 all other questions, including the administration and execution of
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any law of the United States, or any portion of law, relating to the foregoing
that would aid the Congress or any committee of the House in any necessary
remedial legislation.
The Committee on Internal Security shall report to the House (or to the Clerk
of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation,
together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.
For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Internal Security,
or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places
within the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has
adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpena or otherwise, the at-
tendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books,
records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents, as it deems
necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the
committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chair-
man, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or
member.
28. (a) In order to assist the House in-
(1) its analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of the application, administra-
tion, and execution of the laws enacted by the Congress, and
(2) its formulation, consideration, and enactment of such modifications
of or changes in those laws, and of such additional legislation, as may be
necessary or appropriate,
each standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the appli-
cation, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject
matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.
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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM IN 1972
(Southeast Asia)
Part 1
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY,
Washington., D.C.
PUBLIC HEARING
The Committee on Internal. Security met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m.,
in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Hon.
Richard H. Ichord, chairman, presiding.
Committee member present : Representative Richard H. Ichord of
Missouri.
Staff members present : Donald G. Sanders, chief counsel, and
DeWitt White, minority legal counsel.
The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.
The committee meets today for the purpose of holding hearings
under the ordered hearings concerning theory and practice of com-
munism. Under the Reorganization Act, the minority is entitled to 1
day of hearings, and those hearings today are for that purpose.
I understand, Mr. White, you have Mr. Edgar M. Buell.
Mr. Buell, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee. I under-
stand you will testify concerning your 12 years' experience in the
country of Laos.
Mr. BUELL. I guess that is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you first rise and be sworn, sir.
Raise your right hand.
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. BUELL. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Please be seated.
Counsel is recognized to proceed.
Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. WHITE. Would you please give your full name, Mr. Buell?
Mr. BUELL. Edgar M.
(7761)
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1[r. Wiiim. Would you tell us when and where you were born and
something about yotu early' life before you wentto Laos?
Mr. IIa r:I.t,. I was born on a farm, near Ila miltott, Indiana, in 1913.
on the same faint Illy father and my great-grandfather were born on.
and my son is oil it presently.
I went to Laos. and I was a farmer. practically retired, when I went
to Laos in 19(10.
Mr. 1Ca t err:. In what capacity did you go to Laos?
Mr. Iluur:a.t.. With tilt- International \ ohutteets for Service.
Nil'. IVIH3?a:. Would sou give us a brief description of that organiza-
tion
1I r. But:I.t.. I think. to describe International Volunteers for Serv-
ice is very silnple. Very few people in this room. -I doubt, know what
International Volunteers for Service really is and what it was. But it
was a group of volunteers that volunteered to go into foreign lands,
intdeveloped areas, where they have really no finances, and usually
they would be contracted nut to some other agency, such as 1` .S. All),
which they had in Laos.
I was it black sheep at that time. 1 don't have thegreatest education
in the world. I had quite a time getting through high school. I was the
first to go with the organization without some type of it degree.
We are all very proud of Itt-S in them days and even today because
there is no question that it was the forerunner of the Peace ('ores. I
think dtte to any going it has made it possible for a lot of young peo-
ple, and older people even, to get into these organizations that do have
experience other than education.
ti1r. li'ttrrr:. l[owr? long did you stay with IVS?
.Nil,. Bu F,1,11. tiea i ly 2 year's. 'T'hen I went with the AID department.
Ml'. it'atrrF:. Is it true you went in as a Foreign Service Reserve
Officer in .1Id) wit It a rat liceselliorgrade?
?ale. BU ELL. a.. No, I went ill at a very low grade. I very- quickly
worked all) to a senior grade.
.Nil-. lea"itrrr;. And you have been in that capacity ever shire then.
have you ?
tlr. Ill 1'e.; ill) nut ii this present assigmtnnt I got.
yir. WIrr?rr:. Now, during this 12-year period, is it true that you
were in very close contact with the contmttntst forces in Laos and had
art ol)portu[lit y to observe their theory and practice of communism?
Mr. Bu a?a.r..Oh. 1 would say yes.
1-I r. 1'1"iu'rr:. What area were you stationed in, in Laos. Mr. Buell
Mr. Bar:I,t.. Tat t tae northeast section.
Mr. WHITE. Would YOU point it out to is on the map there, the gen-
eral area
1Ir. Brr:t.a.. This arcs right here. starting here and coming right up
around to I)ien Ilion ]'I'll.
11r. W ttt?IE..knd out your northeast. You did have communist forces.
(lid you not'
Jl r. B,-t:.t.. oh, yes. ill the early days.
Mr.'4X'ttrrr'...knd after that. what was on your northeast there? Did
you have an opportunity to observe there how the communists take
over territory?
1Ir. IIa r;I.I.. ()it, sane. 'that must remember most all of my work in
theist clays ryas behind enemy line. So you have got the enemy all
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around you. And, of course, we worked with this great little le
General Vang Pao, who even still continually keeps taking back=,
that the communists take over. They take an area this year, an
gets it back next year, which gives you a very good chance to obserrvv
what the communists did. Yes, I observed that closely.
Mr. Wm'ru. What were your principal functions in those early days
from 1960 to '62?
Mr. BUELL. Building schoolhouses, getting them seeds-vegetable
seeds, and so forth-clothing, just to help them to survive; as they
would be run off by the communists, they would always lose prac-
tically everything they had.
These are terrific people we worked with. They stay in there and
fight. When they heard somebody scream, they didn't run; they would
stay and fight to the end. Because of this, they would come out with
just what they had on their back, and you would get them started
again.
At the same time, you would always start building schools or dis-
pensaries, which we are very proud of. We probably have one of the
better medical programs of this type in all the world. I won't back up
from any of them. So you would start your medical programs and
your educational programs immediately, usually on the ground. We
didn't build hospitals, we didn't build schools out of U.S. commodities,
but we supported them and we would train these people to help with-
stand this communist aggression as it would come against them.
Mr. Wrrrrr. Would you classify these people that you were helping
as refugees from communist aggression then?
Mr. BUELL. Oh, yes, a hundred percent.
Mr. WiIITE. About how many refugees did you have to deal with in
this period of time, say 1960 to '62?
Mr. Bu1:LL. Well, around '62 to '64, we had in north central Laos
pretty close to a half-million people-450,000.
Mr. WIITTE. What was the makeup of these people, Mr. Buell? Were
they all of the same ethnic background or were there various ethnic
groups represented?
Mr. BUELL. No ; that is a good question. I think that especially back
here in Waslnngton and some places such as Vientiane, in north Laos-
that is the capital city-they get the feeling that they are all from this
Meo tribe of people that we hear about, and now, I understand, they
are called the Nemung people; they want to give them a better name or
something. But they are far from being all Moo people. General Pao
himself, also, for the record, is a Moo. Many people that have a little
opposition to General Vang Pao and maybe to his program and to our
program say lie was it boy that came in from Thailand or something,
but he is 100 percent ethnic Meo.
The Meo tribesmen in this group we worked with probably didn't
represent at the most more than 25 percent of the people. But in the
early days where it became known as the Moo program and Pop Buell
a Moo lover was because the Meo was the first on their own to try to
withstand the communist aggression.
Mr. WTI r . Can you tell us the techniques that were employed by the
communists there to take over additional territory ; what would be a
typical communist tactic? For example, did they attack at night and
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7764
refugees out into the jungles, and so forth? What were their
Iues?
B1?Fa.r.. You work in different periods. The communists are
pretty smart cookies. as you know. They work according to the problem
at hand. This year is not the same as last year, next year is not the
same as it was this year; and it is all according to w'iat they need.
what their needs may be. They way need rice-the communists may
need rice in the worst way. If they need rice. they definitely will attack
where there is rice territory: they will definitely take the people. be-
cause when they get the rice they want the people to grow the rice for
them, which also in turn carries so much of your porter work. This
is like a tax. You are taxed-if things are normal, you are taxed so
many portering days for the year.
1S r. 1 'Iirm. Is this a kind of forced labor?
Mr. Br'F.i.r.. Yes, it is forced labor. In other instances they might
not need rice at all. and they might need just the territory and terrain.
and people is the last thing they want because, if they get the people
in that instance. they would have to take care of them and that would
be, porters. If they need people bad enough, there is no tactics that
they will not itse-they will use any tactics to get them.
Mr. WIr1Ti:. Can You give us some information about their technique
of driving individuals-I am thinking of one instance I heard about
where the communists drove about 6.0U[} people out of a village at
night and into the jungle and followed them and massacred large
numbers of them,
'Mr. BUE.i,r,. This is a case by itself. I think. I think this took place
in 196.3-I think late '113. It was really the first big drive that. the North
Vietnamese made into Laos. Right outside of Ban Ban, which is close
to the Vietnamese border, we had a hospital set up in there and we
were going real strong. But their main objective here was to prove,
once and for all, to the Meo people how strong they were; that the
Meo, who at this time felt they was pretty good guerrilla fighters and
pretty strong-to prove to them, once and for all, "Buddy, we are
the power, and you had better come on or this is what will happen."
They had been fighting back and forth for about 6, weeks, and the
Meo had been Bolding their own pretty well. and then they came in
with enough force that they really had-civilians had to leave, and
this is when they got caught in this battle that you can read about.
and the final slaughter was pretty' close to 2.000 people. at least 1.500
that was killed any way possible.
Mr. IVIIrrF:. And these were civilians. were they not?
Mr. BuLr.r.. Yes, all were civilians.
'Mr. Wnrrr. 1, narmed civilians. I take it.
'Mr. Brr_i,L. Yes. I was iii on this myself. General Vang Pao and I
helped feed these people all the way. They stopped for a rest period
of 3 or 4 hours.
Mr. W1JTTE. Is it correct that many of these people were disem-
boweled with knives and other things?
Mr. Buri.i., I don't say many; you only have to do it to one out of a
couple or UU; I would not say many, no. This is very common in
northeast Laos, this is very common in Vietnam. this is a very com-
tuon practice, very common.
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Mr. WHITE. And did a number of these people die from disease and
accidents incident to their flight?
Mr. BUELL. Yes; after this 2,000 we still lost about 15 to 20 percent
afterwards, after we got them- to where we could handle them and
take care of them.
Mr. WHITE. Did you have medical assistance at the time of this
massacre?
Mr. BUELL. We were just beginning; a man by the name of Dr.
Weldon had just arrived, and we had just then begun to get differ-
ent medicines and antibiotics and we could start caring for there-not
in no big way at all, but until then we had very little; here we had
started.
Mr. WITITE. Prior to the arrival of Dr. Weldon and his wife, whom
I understand is also a physician, Were you very active in the field of
first aid and necessary surgery and things of that kind?
Mr. BUELL. Yes.
Mr. WxrvE. Did you have occasion to perform amputations in this
connection?
Mr. BUELL. Yes, I did.
Mr. WVH1TE? Were these, at least in many cases, the result of com-
munist boobytraps, land mines, and things of that kind that the Meo
people stumbled onto?
Mr. BUELL. Yes. In them days, of course, the communists learned
this, too; they had not enough power to whip the Meo; the Meo was
just as smart as they was. The boobytrapping deal could really get
them. The Meo was not up on this. It was a communist best weapon
to get them at that time.
Mr. Wrua. What kind of things did they boobytrap?
Mr. BUI:LL. Oh, anything: human beings, rice-rice is a real good
one-any kind of food. Of course they had their pitfalls; they would
boobytrap anything.
Mr. Wyirm. You must have had some fear and trepidation when
you performed your first amputation; didn't you?
Mr. BUELL. Yes.
Mr. WHITE. But it was a successful one?
Mr. BUELL. Really not that much, too, really not that much.
Mr. WurTF;. It was a successful operation?
Mr. BUELL. Not as much as I would now, not after I have seen other
people do it and see how it should be done.
Mr. WIIITE. Well, the patient lived in that?
Mr. BUELL. In most instances, yes. You see, in each little battle super-
stition comes into your work there. Those tribes in the north were not
and still are not accustomed to using the knife.
Mr. WrnTE. Prior to some of these operations of yours, these people
had no medicine oi- no surgery ; did they?
Mr. BUELL. Very little, very little at all. Yes; I will have to say
they had their own herbs, and so forth, out of the jungle and used
with their opium, and, believe it or not, some of their forms of medi-
cine and drugs-as you know, grandmother came from Germany and
hers wasn't too bad,.and theirs wasn't too bad, but nothing compared
to what we had. They have a couple or three drugs that I still, in fact,
if I can get them, I will use out in front of ours.
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7766
%\T lirr:. `I'lle conliltunists frecltuently use the term ''delnc,cracy'
Mr.
in describing their governments at, being the "lwol)lv's deulocracy.
what did you observe ill this connection? Would yotl say that the
ci,itlillllitist rci Uuies in Laos were democratic
Mr. I3T-iaa.. I)t'tuocratic Its fau? as what the cottnntinist calls their
democratic form of government. 1 feel ill most instances in It waartorn
c?ountrv-and the war is still going on: it has been all these years--
that the coiuuilmists' forth of government was a fair communists'
democratic forth of government, which is not easy to lire under. But
if on clo obey or gt, aping with it., 't'ort can live. you are never going
to*et ahead, hut volt can live under it ,in(] goat Will never be very
bi~hly eclttcatccl. only tilt, ones that they choose. But it would still
It, better than no form at all. But it is one long was from being even
P'?PIc here---could
what a foreland Lao or as 'I'Itai -not saying Its
call it delltocracy.
JIr. ICtu'ri~. Did they ha'-e an elective ),,roc?ess there in the conluni-
uist-occttliiecl Laaos' ''W'ere their Public officials elected
Mr. 13t ~a.t.. I )o vu tit the village level itself only.
.NI r. ?\\ II I.I.F. Not above the village level
Mr. Iiui:t.i.. No. It was make-believe. and even in the village level
it was very ditiicitlt to even lie a vutcr.
The ('il_ti 1tAI,vx. At that I,oint. Mr. ('owtsel, let me understand
Mr. Buell. Now, yoat were riot in the I':1111't Lao-controlled territory.
volt were not tvorkingihere"
Mr. I have treated 1'atht,t Lao, I Ito me given them medicine
and I have given them rice. When volt are talking atbtntt Pat bet Lao.
you are talking a about twt, diiTerent things--1'atltet Lao and Viet-
CHAIRMAN.'fire area of the rnuiitry where von were working
was not cotltrolled by 1'aatI let Iato
:dir. RciLL. Nn.
'i'hc ('tIA1vm.'x. l'roceecl, Please.
.Nil-. Wnrrr:..ks I understand it. you testified that You were behind
coltltluUnist lines much of the time.
Mr. Iit'r:Lt.. Most of the tittle.
1I r. IS"iirrr:. `i'hi was not it hard-and-fast line ~
MI'. But-m.. No.
11r. W itrrr. It sort of ebbed and flowed: did it not
1Ir. lit 'There is never it hard-aand-fast lime until the c?otrtnili-
uists once take over. If you will notice. hack through the years, when
they make it line, we doil't cross their lines. When them and its together.
makes lines. they lean cross, but we don't.
`I r. Wti 1Chat is the attitude of the colanntill ist rove rill Itent there
in Laos concerning religion'
Mr. I3t cia.. The communists?
Mr. Will-m. Y q". I )o they permit f reedonl of religion ?
Mr. No type no type whatsoever, not any. This is bad, too.
You see religion when voil come back to your democracy, especially
Your Buddhist people well, the Men people, anybody, this is part
of your democracy.
Mr. Wittig.. Flow about freedom of movement within communist-
held areas?
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Mr. BUELL. In no way--we have very much trouble getting help for
our own operation to work. We have to know what is going on back
in there, too, and it is awfully hard for our people to get contact with
their own relations, maybe 6 months, and this is on the ground, where
you would think it would be easy to get contact. They don't move out.
Mr. WHITE. They are not permitted to?
Mr. BUELL. No, no, no. This is why I again-whenever there have
been any communist soldiers taken prisoner-the Vietnamese, Pathet
Lao, whatever you want to call it--that is why it is so hard to get
information about them, because they just move one direction and
that is all they know, that little job they have to do.
Mr. Wilrrn. Let us recapitulate a little bit, Mr. Buell. When we
talk about "communists in Laos," what people are we speaking of ?
When we use the term "communists in Laos" as a political force or a
military force, what are we speaking of ? Are we speaking only of the
Pathet Lao, for example, or are we speaking of the Vietnamese or
North Vietnamese or a combination of these; and has this changed
from, say, 1962 up until the present time?
Mr. Bui LL. As you know, say `55 to '60, '62, we had what we
called the Pathet Lao. Now, I don't know, I don't think it should
be, anyway, I don't, the Pathet Lao were not communists, they
just were not communists, that is all, what we think of communists
as North Vietnamese communists or Chinese communists or Russian
communists.
Mr. WHITE. When you say "we," you mean the people in Laos?
Mr. BUELL. Yes. We might get to shooting guns here; it is the
people of Laos, yes. But then you must say in '62 or '63, when they
ran into the problems, we ran into problems, America and others, and
he had to turn to somebody for help, so there was only one way to
turn, and that was to the communists for help, and the communists
are the ones that helped him; so this is where the Pathet Lao deal
comes in, and I got. to kind of believe that where the lines have not
been drawn, and say there were no war tomorrow, that the remaining
people that are Pathet Lao would still just be Pathet Lao; they would
not be communists.
It is a political party, like Democrats and Republicans, and they
would still be that way if the North Vietnamese would get out, we
would get out, and everybody else would get out; it would come back
to that. I don't think there is a chance of that. But after Souphanou-
vong had to go and get support from the other side, okay, then, he kept
needing help so bad that there had to be other peoples come in to
run their own show.
We are pretty much on that ourselves; we should be, anyway. We
give a couple of million dollars away and we like to know how that
is spent. So in order to do that, the North Vietnamese had to bring
people in to run their show. Now, remember, that is 12 or 15 years ago,
and when the North Vietnamese began to run their schools, and so
forth, they were built and the teachings and the propaganda in them
was communist, which now, 15 years later, there are no longer Pathet
Lao, you might say, running this government.
Mr. WHITE. Is this really a communist military government of that
area?
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Mr. BuFLL. Yes, I would call it. so.
Mr. T' urru. Even though it may be enforced by civilians?
Mr. IHrFI,L. I would call it so. I think von have to make a little differ-
ent break there between there and North Vietnam itself. I think. pro[)-
ably, the communist-run form of government. in Laos is probably
more military run than in North Vietnam itself.
Mr. IVnrri. Did the North Vietnamese withdraw their troops from
Laos after the 1962 agreement, when most, U.S. if not all F.S. forces
were withdrawn?
Mr. Btji.f,. I will have to say no.
Mr. WiIrrE. They did not?
fir. Bran,. I will say no.
Mr. \%TIIITF. Did they withdraw any significant number of troops
from Laos, that, is. the communists?
Mr. BuFLL. Numberwise in no way could I quote. They did wvith-
draw some troops. but I will have to say a lot of theni remained. I ani
talking about northeast Laos. Remember this always when I am talk-
ing; this is northeast Laos.
Mr. WIrrTE. To go back for just it moment again, Mr. Buell, when
you first went to Laos you took up the languages or dialects used by
the population ; did you not?
Mr. BUEI,L. Yes.
Mr. WiirrF. How many dialects do you speak there?
Mr. BUF.i.L. The first one was no trouble when I went, to Laos; it was
the nicest little country you ever saw. I was on the Plain of Jars, and
I learned the Lao language, which was important. Then when things
hit the fan I had to go with these hill tribes, and this is where I learnt
the Meo language. And then from there. of course, now, if you speak
Laos, you can easily learn Thai; and I can speak four other tribal
languages pretty good.
Mr. WIUTE. How many different ethnic groups are there in north-
east Laos, sir?
Mr. BUELL. In northeast Laos there is about 15 different ethnic
groups.
Mr. Wm,iu. Would you name some of those for us?
Mr. BisELL. Is irst. yon have got your ethnic groups of Thai, which
are much different. than what we think of Thailand; there are red
Thai, white Thai, black Thai. I VP have the Lao Tong, we have some
Ekaio, there are three different classes of Meo people, and you have
some Yao. Most of your Yao is in the west, and we don't have them in
the north. We have two groups of ['hinese ethnic groups that come
down through from Hannan. and then you have about three different
types of what we call just Lao ethnic groups.
Mr. WHITE. When the communists take over a community, what tech-
nique do they use to gain control of the community? Do they attempt
to do this through the village chief. for example, or what happens?
Mr. BrFia.. If they are coming in working-and I have worked di-
rectly with some of their agents-they work no different than we do.
In fact. I have got to say that I hopefully learned quite a lot from their
methods. They come in naturally and ask if they want schools and
explain what the schools are to them. In most instances back up until
11361 or '62. schools were nearly an unheard of thing in the mountain
areas.
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Naturally, well, they think maybe they do want schools, and they
will help them to build a school and they will help them to build
bridges across the streams that they have walked across for genera-
tions, and little things like this. They will bring them in different types
of seeds. And one of the big things they do, if they tell them they are
going to bring them a handsaw and an ax that day to build a bridge,
that ax and handsaw is there the next morning. If they tell them they
will bring them a dozen pencils tomorrow, then the dozen pencils is
there. They don't need a world of paperwork, you know, or a lot of
hearings and things like we have in order to even decide a little subject
right or wrong ; it is done. This works.
If they are getting opposition, then they have to use the rough
methods which kills him. And they work with the village chief when
they are doing it that way, but when they come to the rough deal,`they
work with the village chief in a different way; they just then kill him.
Mr. WmTE. What do they do after they kill the village chief then?
Mr. BUELL. "This is it. You do now what we tell you to. You give us
so many of these girls to go with us, and you raise us so much rice, and
you agree to what we are telling you or we will be back with the next
phase."
Mr. WirITr. Do they make a practice of capturing women, taking
away girls?
Mr. BUELL. Yes, yes ; very much so, very much so.
Mr. WIIITE. What is the purpose of this?
Mr. BUELL. Mostly nurses, schoolteachers, and, as I have said before,
the North Vietnamese makes good use of their womenfolks, much dif-
ferent than, as far as I am. concerned, other places in Southeast Asia.
I would say maybe they started sooner.
Mr. WrrmTE. In what respects do they do this?
Mr. BurLL. They do use them more; again I can't say this about
our own area now, but they started, they was the first to start using
women as nurses, as medics in the fields, as schoolteachers. When I
first arrived in northeast Laos, there was not a woman schoolteacher;
the Vietnamese had already done this.
Mr. WHITE. You mentioned General Vang Pao. Did he launch an
attack, a counterattack really, against the communists in northeast
Laos about 1965?
Mr. BUELL. Yes, all the way up; terrific-terrific.
Mr. WHITE. how successful was he?
Mr. BUELL. The Vietnamese at this time had not been clear into
northeast Laos so strong; he launched an attack against the Pathet Lao
and backed them clear back into Sam Nua city all the way, and this is
when the Vietnamese, in turn-they was up there, and the Vietnamese
had the borderline, and this is when the Vietnamese really came in, in
force, and the Pathet Lao started running toward Vientiane.
Mr. WHITE. Did this military activity by General Pao have the
effect of engineering a large number of Vietnamese troops?
Mr. BUELL. Yes.
Mr. ZVrrrri.. These troops might otherwise have been engaged pre-
sumably in South Vietnam?
Mr. BuELL. Not at that time, not then, not at that point; later on,
yes, but not then.
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Mr. Witrrr:. Do you consider General Vang Pao as an individual who
is only defending his homeland and his people, or is he fighting in addi-
tion for some principle such as anticommunism?
Mr. BuFi t.. Ile hates communism : probably, next to me, he hates it
worse than anybody in the world.
Mr. Wttrrr:. You know General Vang i'ao very well, (to you not?
Mr. Brm.i,. Yes: it is a father-and-son agreement.
Mr. WH erE. He calls you "father"?
Mr. Buta.i,. 'l'hnt is right. If(- loves his people. General Pao does
know what democracy is. Ile is a very highly self-educated man. In
the early beginning. I would say that when he took over-and he had
to take over. somebody had to take over-that he was more or less
righting for his people and northeast Laos, but soon that, little world
.move([ so fast. not only for niee but for his thinking, that he could see
what Would happen.
It(, began to Bear about the U.N. and the United States, and so forth.
and to answer your question. T would like to say it like I heard a gen-
eraI from (he U.S. about it)G:y or '1G. A fter we got run down from the
north, he. asked what -did he need, did he want a lot of men-this was
the third time they got offered nien. I mean GI's from the United
States- did he want that. what did lie need to help: and his answer to
this man was: "Sir. we don't need your boys: all I need is for you to
supply me. When I say 'supply,' I meats supply me with anything I
need, and you will not have to send your boys."
Mr. IVitrrr:.This was General Pao speaking?
Mr. Itrra,t,. Yes. "I feel what. I am doing is my part. of fighting for
what the free world is fighting for. You have got people in Germany.
you have people in Africa. now you have got people in Vietnam. This
is what I feel T am doing for the free world." I think this well answers
this question.
MY. Wu e n :. This was General Pao speaking?
Air. Brri,r,. Yes, his own words.
The Cn.xnr%r.%s. At that point. Mr. Counsel. the Forth Vietnamese
units to which you refer, where are they. in what. section of Laos arc
they now operating?
Mr. I3rt:t.t,. Again. in northeast Laos they have control. TTere we
are right here. coming up into China: here is Dien Bien Plitt: here
is Stun ?Wewt, a cite up in Sate Newt. and here is your border. They
now have control of everything right across that. At one time I had it
hospital up in here. At one time I had it headquarters right there.
The CHAIR-MAN. Do they operate solely as North Vietnamese units
or are they mixed with indigenous communist forces?
Ir. Bt?t:t.i.. Mixed-well. as far as I am concerned they are all
North Vietnamese. But if yon are talking about ethnic groups. they
are with them, yes. but to the they are all North Vietnamese. In this
area up here there is no Pathet Lan there.
The CHAIRMAN. I have heard there are often Cliitiese advisers with
the North Vietnamese forces. Do you know whether that is true or not?
Mr. I3t r;i.i.. I would say possibly: I myself have never seen a dead
Chinese adviser. I have never seen what I would call a dead commu-
nist Chinese soldier. Now. I think people get this wrong. In north-
east. ILaOS we have t'liinese.
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Mr. WHITE. Indigenous Chinese?
Mr. Burrs,. Right, that work with us. Some people might get that
wrong. Now, about 2 years ago, not too far from what was my head-
quarters then, there were five Chinese killed-I did not see them ;
General Pao saw them-which could have been advisers, but the num-
ber of advisers down in any area that we have ever worked in, I have
just about got to say that there is none.
Now, our people that are up in there, our own people that have been
taken over by the communists, now that the Chinese has got working
advisers, techniques, and so forth up in this area-we have really never
had Chinese that much.
As far as these problems over here, that is an altogether different
story ; that has been known for years what was going to happen there,
the road coming down there ; and that is Chinese, as far as I am con-
cerned, China owns that part of Laos.
The, CHAIiuIAN. Proceed, Mr. Counsel.
Mr. WHHITE. Would it be accurate to say, from your experience and
observation in Laos, that the North Vietnamese communists there
have been following Mao's concept of power coming from a gun barrel?
Mr. Burrs.. Pretty much so, yes; pretty much so-not all the way,
but pretty much so.
Mr. WHITE. Are there relief programs? I think you have indicated
they do have some sort of a relief program. Are they pretty well lim-
ited to what you have said?
Mr. Burrs.. The communists?
Mr. VV11I17;. Yes.
Mr. Burrs,. Yes; they have relief programs and they are limited.
Your relief programs-naturally anything that is done or worked
with is-in some form, in turn, helps them. out very much. For instance,
the big takeover we had in the area a couple or 3 years ago was
hundreds of sewing machines in a cave. I know the communists gave
out sewing machines. Sewing machines were not only to help the
family, but to make clothes for the soldiers. For crops, they give
them fertilizers and give them better seeds but, in turn, they are taxed
to turn them back.
Dir. WHITE. What kind of percentages tax do they impose?
Mr. Burrs,. It can go according to the troubles and times. It can
go up as high as 60 and 70 percent, and when a percentage is put on,
it is god; you have a poor crop or a big crop, you still get whatever
that percent is.
China is it. little bit better than what the Vietnamese is. China, of
course-I would rather live under China's communism, period, than
I would under North Vietnamese'.
Mr. WHITE. Why is that, would you say?
Mr. BUELL. They are just not as rough ; they are a little more human,
much more so.
Mr. WIIiTE. You mentioned opium a while ago, Mr. Buell. We are
interested in the possible communist exploitation of opium in attempts
to subvert not only the U.S. forces in South Vietnam, but also possible
exportation, either directly or indirectly, to the United States. I under-
stand that opium is a common agricultural crop, or has been. When
you first went to Laos, what was the situation in regard to production
of opium in the area in which you worked there in the northeast?
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7772
Mr. Bt-h:[.[.. I kind of liate to continent on this, because I think f
hate opium and drags and some of these heroin much snore than a lot
of people hack here that talk about it. and pretend they do. I kind of
got the name of helping the people of northeast Laos growing better
opium in the early days, which is not ton far from being true. But it
was their sole way of making a living. It was their only product they
had that they could sell or trade. 'I'hert' was no roads: there are still
no roads. It would he good to tell them to raise a lot of corn and other
things, but be sure, Mr. Congressman and Senators, tliat. yon have
got vehicles, and so fort II. to ('ai'ry it on out. Our main opium territory
was tp her' in the northeast, all in through here, from here across to
here. coming up here just like that-; that was env opinni territory.
Mr. Will What makes good opinni territory:'
Mr. I3rraa.. It is all determined by the ground, climaate-ground and
c?lirnatt'; it is a sweet soil and a cold. rainy season, not monsoon rain
season. lint as I drew that line, if you can see, that now all belongs to
the enemy today. I'll(, opium that northeast Laos itself now grows, the
people on the government side, is not anywhere near enough for their
own use.'I'he people there themselves Iliat used to grow opium and sell
it actually have to import Opium to use.
1Ir?. AVrn?rr-:. Front whence do they import this opium?
Mfr. i;t-i?:r,r.. It comes from the north: []lost of it (lot's come from
the north that Iher use themselves because it is so initch cheaper than
it is from the south or from the west.
I think it is interesting to note that we feel that in northeast Laos
in the past- -I was going to say 12 but. I will say 15 years-that. the.
use of opinni has decreased possibly Its percent., at least (tO percent, 60
to TO percent, has actually decreased-- the use of opium.
The ('ii.wil; wr-ws. What. is t he reason for that, Mr. Bite] I
Mr. BUELI,. I would say it is practically all education, education on
their own part, that they have seen the= Westerner- many of them
have seeii Wester-ii people now-slut. you can live to be older than 30
years old or 35 years old if roil do a little more and take a little better
rare of your hod I., T'liev have seen. without the use of it., that you not
Only become a better citizen, you become a better soldier, you become
a better ever _vthing, you cats become a scholar.
and also I won't. cut our drug program short.. Our drugs have done
wonders to help. Because. opium, the main part of it-they never did
use opium like we think of it, as whiskey or something in the taverii-
they used it for medical purposes, and'sonie would get hooked on it.
lint. our riiedieal pro{n itiu has done wonders.
Ali. Isn't. it trite that opinni was one. of their basir.medicines,
particularly for people witIi lingering illnesses, tuberculosis, cancer,
and thing, of that kill(] ?
Mr. BI"i:r.r.. Very true, and it works.
.Ir. W iirrr:. It kept the patient, sedated ?
All. Ili mi.. It worked. When I say "it. worked," I don-t mean it
Cured him, but it. took care of the pit in, which is the way it should be.
Mr. Witerr:. I Ins opium been used as a method of suicide
Mr. BE-ELI.. ()It. yes: I here is no question about that, it is at real good
one. Abxrrit that much. on the top of that pencil, that black part, will
just.about. take care of anybody.
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Mr. WiriTE. That is a pellet about the size of a bean?
Mr. BUELL. Yes; take that and in a couple of hours you have had it.
Mr. WHITE. This is swallowed?
Mr. BuEr r . Yes. This still goes on. A Mco or your hill tribes will not
shoot themselves or have an act of violence; there is no suicide like
this. They have a tree weed in the jungle even more powerful than
opium that they use for suicide.
Mr. Wurru. Back again to this massacre that we were speaking of a
while ago, was this opium method of suicide used by many of those
people?
Mr. BUELL. They were just killed; kids were pounded against stones
and killed; there were several people that shot their own people; this
still goes on. These people are so damned strong against communism,
especially a Meo, that if people cannot keep up on the trail, old people,
they will kill them, they will kill their own people before they will
let them stay behind.
Mr. WnrTE. And be captured by the Communists?
Mr. BUELL. Yes; that is absolutely true.
Mr. WrrITE. Back now to the opium thing, can you make an estimate
of, say, the total tonnage of opium that has been grown in northeast
Laos there in the province, say, in times of peace when maximum pro-
duction was possible ? Could you give us an estimate ?
Mr. BUELL. All of north and northeast Laos, which we will call my
area, which takes this up in here, is completely a guess, and when I
say "completely a guess,' 10 ton, 30 ton, probably a hundred tons.
Mr. WinrE. Would not exceed a hundred tons .
Mr. BUELL. No more than that.
Mr. WHITE. And this could be reduced by conditions of war,
could it?
Mr. BUELL. That is right. I would say that would be the peak that
you could get in peacetime; I would say this would be their peak. Be-
cause when they are growing opium-these people didn't grow opium
knowing that this piece of ground would grow just as good opium as
this. Because they are great land lovers, they love their land, they will
not abuse their land just to grow an extra crop. They grow what they
need to take care of their own needs that year. They are not like us
Americans, to hog the market; next year corn will be a big price, so
they double their corn allotment ; they don't do it that way. That would
be about the amount for a normal, peaceful year, I would say; no
more than that.
Mr. WHITE. Is the opium poppy difficult to cultivate?
Mr. BUELL. Very, very difficult to cultivate; it is hard to keep grow-
ing. You have to even be careful when you hoe it. Everything is done
by hand. When you hoe it you have to be sure the ground is not too
wet to turn the plant. As I have said before, it is the hardest plant,
I think, on earth. I don't think there is a plant on earth that takes as
much out of the soil as opium.
Mr. WHITE. How about the harvesting of it?
Mr. BTJEL L. This is very, very difficult.
Mr. WHITE. How is this done? Would you tell us about it?
Mr. 13UELL. The opium poppy-first you have to seed the opium
poppy, which you all have seen poppies; it is the same thing. After
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the petals fall off, they have little knives that they go around in the
morning and split just a little hairline open in two or three places on
t hat little poppy head, and they do that early in the morning while
it is cool. and when the sun comes up, that will bleed out your raw
opium. And this will last for about a week on one little head, that is
ltow nianv times you have to go and come back. And then what is
also difficult about it is that. the crop never matures at the same time
like we think of our wheat crop or other crops; it can extend as much
as a month or G weeks to get the whole crop harvested.
Ml'. WIIrrE. Does raw opium have a limited shelf or storage life
or can it be kept indefinitely?
Mr. Bi.-F.i.,,. No, it can't. It should be sold at the end of 2 years. It
lies deteriorated very little at the end of 2 years. But the end of the
third year. it- has deteriorated by 70 to 80 percent, and by the fourth
year you might say, as far as selling, absolutely worthless.
Mfr. 1 'itrrr:. Is the quality of opium grown there. in the northeast
part of Laos. particularly, of good q~uality opium?
JTr. Brr:t.i?. So they say. probably- sonic of the best in the world.
That is northeast Laos. Down in the south. further down, where we
are at now, what we grow is very. very poor. But that up there is good.
For instance. you could take :, kilos of opium-one out of there and
one out of west Laos or Burma-and have theta on the market and you
could get. nearly twice as much for a kilo if they know it is from there.
Mr. All of this territory is presently in the. hands of the
N ortlt Vietnamese communists. is it- not
Mr. Buiu.i,. Practically all of it. 95 percent.
Mr. Wiirur;. And. to your knowledge, is this opium being exported
from Laos to North Vietnam?
fr. BUELL. No. I can't say. If I was saying-I have no pictures, I
have nothing on it---I would say most of it is going up into North
Vietnam in the raw opium form.
Mr. WHITE. And does this exceed the demands or the requirements
of the North Vietnamese for opium?
Mr. Buri,i.. This I would have no idea : I really wouldn't. Again, if
North Vietnam is growing any opium, which I don't know--I am sure
you people probably can find this out some way-if they was growing
any opium-I know pretty well where their opium land is-it could ex-
ceed their use if they had a good crop of opium and was growing opium
on the opiunp lands, but this I don't. know.
Mr. WrirrE. You don't know whetlier or not- the North Vset-
ilamese ----
Mr. Bum,i,. I am wire they have got enough opium, because, again.
the North Vietnamese are pretty strict on their opium laws. After all,
an opium addict is looked down on in North Vietnam about like they
are looked down on in my area. You don't only go so far into using
opium in that world.
Mr. Wiirrr:. If they had exportable surpluses there in North Viet-
nam, where would t liese be exported ? Could these be sent down the
1-fekong River to South Vietnam. for example?
Mr. l rrf;la.. Not in my area von couldn't.
Jti?. But from North Vietnams?
Mr. Bum.L. I would say they would not be going down the 111ekong
in North Vietnam: they could be going down the No Chi 'Minh Trail.
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It doesn't take much to carry opium; a kilo of raw opium is a bundle
only about that big around, and it can turn into quite a few shots some-
where along the line.
Mr. WHITE. Do you ].snow of any distilleries in your area there for
distilling opium into heroin?
Mr. BUELL. I don't think there is a distillery in my area. I am sure
that General Vang Pao would not allow a distillery. Since we have
got into the Drug Act ourselves in Laos, trying to stop the flow of drugs
down the Mekong River and out of Burma, General Vang Pao prob-
ably is one of the greatest cooperators that we have got.
If you had asked me that question 5 years ago, I could have taken
you right to three distilleries myself in Vietnam, which we don't own
any more, and one down in Xieng Iihnong, and I could have taken you
to three over on the west side. But I would not say myself that there is
not one existing; they could exist on the west side. But where I was
they don't exist, and I know there is none in my territory, which could
very easily be done. General Vang Pao could easily be making an _
agreement with the North Vietnamese, which is nothing uncommon in
Southeast Asia, to get the raw opium down to him, and he has all the
protection that a man would ever need to get it out, but he absolutely
really controls the opium.
Mr. WIIITE. He is not doing that?
Mr. BUELL. Oh, no, no, absolutely. There was a day that he was,
lie was in it; this is when it was a way to make a buck, bootleg days.
Mr. WrriTE. In those days, it was not illegal, was it, to grow opium
or to transport it?
Mr. BUELL. It was just the same as it is now, still illegal, but they
just ignored the laws; there was no law enforcement. Those people
didn't know what law was-that kind of law. There wasn't anybody
in the world to tell me what to do; that is my ground, a farmer, and
the farmer is pretty damned independent.
Mr. W1r1'rE. Mr. Buell, we have read reports in the newspapers that
American-controlled transportation may have been used for transport-
ing opium in Laos. Would you have any opinions on this?
Mr. BUELL. Did you ever read that I transported any?
Mr. WHITE. No, sir, I never did.
Mr. BUELL. Well, I probably have. I will say it plainer. I have.
And you would have, too, and the chairman would have, too.
Mr. W111ITE. Would you explain this to us?
.Mr. Buxri. There is no roads in north Laos. There was; there is no
more. That is another thing the communists always takes care of, the
roads, they seal up the roads. Again, as I say, opium comes in small
packages and you can have your year's crop in one pocket. So I am
sure that there have been times when our Ambassador or when we
had Congressmen from the United States visiting over in north Laos
who had their own airplanes chartered and they was with the Prime
Minister or with General so-and-so and shaking his hand and going
around with him, that they brought out opium themselves. Yes, there
has been opium brought out on United States aircraft in these ways;
but I am the first to say that as far as Air Continental, Air America,
or any of our planes that ever made any type of a business or knowing
deliberately that they was bringing out opium in northeast Laos, I
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have to say absolutely no to that. There is instances where opium has
been brought out on our planes. definitely.
Mr. AVIIITE. But that was without kn(wledge-or intent?
JIr. BU ELL. 'I'hlat is right. I have read these things in the news-
papers also, and it is just it bunch of pope}cock. that is all. We have
rot, better Americans over there thaan that.
Mr. WIrrrE. Would you tell as just it word or two about the Weldons
as a medical tealii over' there?
Mr. 13rr:r,1,. Of course, you don't like to blow your own horn. They
are just a pair of wonderful people and as devoted and dedicated
pretty near their lives to helping the people of all Laos. It so happened
that I)I-. Weldon. when he first carne to Laos. fell in love with the north-
east and north Laos pi'ogr'ain, that they have gone all over Laos. There
cannot be too much said about them.
The medical program--Dr. Weldon right now is working much on
this drug program that is going on. doing a wonderful jot,-he has had
much hearing on. When we talk about the use of drugs and about the,
medical program, and so forth. in Laos. much credit has to go to him.
Mr. Wrrrrl.. Before the Weldons came to Laos, was the 'I'ons Dooley
hospital or Ilospitals operating in Laos?
Mr. Itt~Fa:r.. We had the Ton, Dooley hospital over on the Mekong
River: it was operating over there. I am sure, had Toni Dooley lived
;and had tinge, that he also would have had a big program in Laos.
Mr. WHITE. How (lid his program or what they have attempted to
carry on since he died, how did that compare with the program run by
the Philippine Brotherhood-in size and effectiveness. I would say.
Mr. BUELL.. Don't forget I urn a little prejudiced. I Ihink we can run
a medical program better than the Philippines do. They are good. I
have. had Philippines work for me very much. but the Philippines
really never had a program. Their program was always, which it is
still today, under the supervision of ])I,. Weldon. and they do a fine
job. All the money that is used by the Philippines in Laios is F.S.
money. It is calledOperation Brotherhood. and I think that probably
we. do a little better training even than what the Philippines can do.
Mfr. Wnm:. What kind of religious programs are being conducted
in Laos now. Mr. Buell? Do we have clergymen over there that are
doing missionary work?
Mr. BTTF,LL. The French have been in there for years and years. a
couple hundred French Catholics. I have a couple of Catholic priests
that work with me in the north that are (people out of this wail: they
would both be elected to Congress: they should be somewhere. anyway.
We do have another Protestant organization that is the Christian
Alliance--I think it is an organization of several Protestant groups--
that. also does a very fine job. and we all work together.
Our All prograto helps haul them around even. and if I need a
good kTD worker to go out in the field with me someday. I might just
call on Father Bouchard to go and do it. or I might call on this Prot-
estant preacher. and they will go out and do it and still not sell their
goods that mach.
We have another group working with its now and doing us a lot of