JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL,MONDAY - 16 OCTOBER 1972

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Release Date: February 10, 2004
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• Publication Date: October 16, 1972
• Content Type: NOTES

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92d Congress i
2d Session f
HOLD FC)i? RELEASE
THJOCT121972 Aivl
BOMBING AS A POLICY TOOL IN VIETNAM :
EFFECTIVENESS
A,STAFF STUDY
BASED ON THE PENTAGON PAPERS
PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN :RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82-2910 WASHINGTON : 1972
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., Virginia
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas
CHARLES H. PERCY. Illinois
CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff
ARraua M. Kum? Chief Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
Preface-----------------------------------------------------------
v
Introduction------------------------------------------------------
1
1
Interdiction----------_
Shifting Rationales--------------------------------------------
1
Objectives and Methods----------------------------------------
2
The POL Debate----------------------------------------------
3
Evaluation of Interdiction--------------------------------------
7
Bombing an underdeveloped country-------------------------
7
Bombing vs. foreign aid------------------------------------
10
Adapting to bombing
12
Punishing the North-----------------------------------------------
14
Breaking Hanoi's Will---------------------------------------------
1
5
Bombing as an Aid to Negotiations------------------------------
18 17
Boosting morale---------------------------------------------------
19
Conclusion----------------------------- ---- -- - --
Appendix: "Negotiations, 1964-1968: The Half-Hearted Search for Peace
in Vietnam." Preface, Table of Contents and Correspondence Relating
21
to Study No.4-------------------------------------------------
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PREFACE BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT, CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
In 1968 the Department of Defense completed an eighteen month
study of "United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967," popularly
known as the "Pentagon Papers." The existence of this classified 47
volume study became known to the public through newspaper reports
in June 1971. In September the Defense Department declassified
large portions of the first 43 volumes. The other four volumes remained
classified on the grounds that disclosure of the materials they cover-
the history of negotiations-would be detrimental to the national
interest.
In September 1971 the Committee on Foreign Relations began a
detailed study of the Pentagon history and related materials. The
study was initiated under the authority of S. Res. 140, agreed to July 24,
1971, for the purpose of inquiring into the origins and evolution of
the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, with particular reference to lessons
for U.S. foreign policy making that might be drawn from the Pentagon
history. Three staff researchers, Robert E. Biles, Robert M. Blum,
and Ann L. Hollick, have been engaged in. a careful review of the
7,000 pages of documents and analysis included in "United States-
Vietnam Relations." They have had at their disposal both the classified
and unclassified versions of the Pentagon Papers. In addition, they
have drawn upon. corroborative printed materials and interviews with
individuals involved in the events under study.
Study Number 4 of this series, "Negotiations, 1964-1968," by
Robert E. Biles was based on the still classified diplomatic volumes of
the Pentagon Papers and, hence, was itself classified "Top Secret."
But because of the importance of the events covered in this study, I
requested the cooperation of the Department of State in declassifying
the staff study in whole or in part. After a frustrating exchange of
letters and telephone calls covering more than five months, the State
Department refused to cooperate in even partial declassification of the
study. The Department's position remains adamant today, even
after the publication of the substance of the diplomatic volumes in
national newspapers. The unclassified preface and table of contents to
"Negotiations, 1964-1968" are provided in the appendix of this study.
"Bombing as a Policy Tool in Vietnam" by Robert E. Biles examines
the effectiveness of the bombing of North Vietnam in achieving the
goals set for it by those involved in making the air war policy. Focusing
on the period of intense bombing from 1965 to 1968, the study examines
the intelligence and defense community's own "in-house" studies of the
air war. It finds that of the five major goals set for the bombing only'
one has been achieved. The bombing has succeeded in making North
Vietnam pay a high price for her support of the war in the South.
But the air war has not stopped the flow of supplies to the South,
broken Hanoi's will, or forced the North Vietnamese to negotiate an
end to the war. The gains in U.S. and South Vietnamese morale from
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VI
escalation of the bombing, have always proved fleeting. There are
several reasons for the failure of the bombing to achieve its goals.
North Vietnam, an agricultural country with little industry, provides
few major targets for air attack; the North Vietnamese have pproved
highly determined and extremely resourceful in adapting to the damage
done by the bombing; and North Vietnam's allies have provided suffi-
cient aid to more than offset the losses from the bombing.
Throughout the war, the claims made for strategic and interdiction
bombing have consistently exceeded their accomplishments, and the
extravagance of the rhetoric supporting the current air offensive
against the North has a familiar ring. The bombing of North Vietnam
has been a costly one in terms of pilots lost, civilian casualties, damage
to our international standing, and riches expended. The failure of the
bombing to achieve the goals set for it makes that high cost a very sad
waste.
The material which appears in this study does not necessarily
reflect the views of the Committee or any member thereof.
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BOMBING AS A POLICY TOOL IN VIETNAM:
EFFECTIVENESS
INTRODUCTION
Bombing has served several functions during the course of the
Vietnam war: close support of troops engaged in combat, interdiction
of enemy supplies and reinforcements, and strategic bombing to
reduce enemy capabilities. By far the most controversial aspect of
United States bombing policy has been the interdiction and strategic
bombing. In their name, the United States has bombed South Vietnam,
North Vietnam, and supply lines in neighboring Cambodia and Laos.
Critics have contended that interdiction and strategic bombing have
been unsuccessful and immoral acts, that they cost too much, and
that they do violence to America's reputation abroad. Supporters of
the bombing reply that it has at the very least made it very costly
for North Vietnam to support the war in the South and has saved
American lives. If it has not been as successful as expected, it is
because of restrictions on tar ~e.Tts and the graduated increase in the
bombing, which gave North Vietnam time to adapt. The purpose
of this study is to evaluate these arguments and thereby to improve
our understanding of strategic and interdiction bombing as a policy
tool in the Vietnam war. The study covers the period from 1965 when
the regular bombing, of North Vietnam began, to 1968 when it was
halted in an attempt to promote a negotiated settlement.
The objectives to be gamed by bombing North Vietnam have varied
during the course of the war, but they can be summarized as follows:
(1) to reduce the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam,
(2) to make North Vietnam pay a high cost for supporting the war in
the South, (3) to break the will of North Vietnam, (4) to affect ne-
gotiations for an end to the war, and (5) to raise U.S. and South Viet-
namese morale. Individual objectives have been combined, down-
graded, and re-emphasized. At times the official, public objective has
differed from the Government's private objective. But each of these
goals has played an important role in the debate over bombing policy.
INTERDICTION
SHIFTING RATIONALES
When the bombing of North Vietnam began in early 1965, the
public rationale was the reduction of the flow of supplies and men to
the South. In the words of the Pentagon history of the war:
The public was told that NVN [North Vietnam] was being
bombed because it was infiltrating men and supplies into
SVN [South Vietnam]; the targets of the bombing were
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directly or indirectly related to that infiltration; and the
purpose of attacking them was to reduce the flow and/or to
increase the costs of that infiltration. Such a rationale was
consistent with the overall position which morally justified
U.S. intervention in the war in terms of NVN's own inter-
vention; and it specifically put the bcmbing in a politically
acceptable military idiom of interdiction.'
In private, however, the rationale for the bombing was a mixture
of complex and. often conflicting objectives. The situation in South
Vietnam seemed to be falling apart. The bombing of the North, it
was hoped, would boost morale in the South, show the determination
of the United States, and break the will of the North to continue its
aggression. Again in the words of the Pentagon history:
Target selection had been completely dominated by poli-
tical and psychological considerations. . Relatively little
weight was given to the purely physical or more directly
military and economic implications of whatever target
destruction might be achieved.
With the gradual acceptance, beginning in March [1965]',
of the need for a militarily more significant, sustained
bombing program, serious attention began to be paid to the
development of a target system or systems that would have
a more tangible and coherent military rationale. The first and
most obvious candidate for such a target concept was that
of interdicting the flow of men and supplies into South
Vietnam by striking the lines of communication.'
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS
The objective of an interdiction program, of course, would be to
reduce the capability of the Communist forces to operate in South
Vietnam. Guesses as to the effect of the interdiction of aid from North
Vietnam varied widely. Admiral Sharp, commander of Pacific forces,
predicted in a January 12, 1966, message to the Joint Chiefs of 'Staff
that a properly executed bombing program "will bring the enemy to
the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from lack of
support." I A more moderate but still optimistic view was taken in a
Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) of July 23, 1965. The
SNIE estimated that a bombing program which included destruction
of the petroleum facilities and military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong
area together with sustained interdiction of the lines of communication
from China could reduce communist capfi,`bilities in the South. It
reasoned that:
If additional PAVN [North Vietnamese Army] forces were
employed in South Vietnam on a scale sufficient to counter
increased U.S. troop strength [which the SNIE said was
"almost certain" to happen] this would substantially in
I U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense Task Force, Vietnam, United States
Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 (Washington: Government Printing Office 1971), IV.C.7.(a), "Volume I
The Air War in North Vietnam," p. 8 (hereafter cited as U.S. Vietnam Relations).
3 Ibid., IV.C.3., "Evolution of the War: The Roiling Thunder Program Begins," p. 74.
3 CINCPAC 1202052 Jan. 1966 ibid., IV.C.7.(a), p.32. Sources are frequently not shown in the GPO edi-
tion of U.3.-1. fetnam Relations. but because the footnotes were recently declassified by the Department
of Defense, they are cited in this study.
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crease the amount of supplies needed in the South. The
Viet Cong also depend on supplies from the North to main-
tain their present level of large-scale operations. The accumu-
lated strains of a prolonged curtailment of supplies received
from North Vietnam would obviously have an impact on
the Communist effort in the South. They would certainly
inhibit and might even prevent an increase in large-scale
Viet Cong military activity, though they would probably
not force any significant reduction in Viet Cong terrorist
tactics of harassment and sabotage.-'
The physical reduction of North Vietnam's support for the war
in the South could be accomplished by four :methods: (1) the destruc-
tion of war-related industry and war-supporting facilities such. as
weapons production and petroleum storage facilities; (2) general
debilitation of the North Vietnamese economy and thereby its ability
to support the war effort; (3) attacking the lines of. communication
so that supplies are slowed, stopped, or destroyed; and (4) destruction
of the North Vietnamese military. During the course of the war, all
four methods were tried, but as will be seen none proved successful
in accomplishing the goal of reduced support for the war in the South.
THE POL DEBATE
In the early stages of the bombing of the North, some critics
claimed that the program had failed to achieve its objectives because
of restrictions on the targets that could be struck and the piece-
meal nature of the escalation. It was argued. that because the in-
crease in the bombing was gradual, North Vietnam had time to adapt
itself to the bombing, replenish and disperse its stock, diversify its
transportation system and improve its defenses.b One CIA report, for
example, noted in early 1966 that-
almost 80 percent of North Vietnam's limited modern indus-
trial economy, 75 percent of the nation's population, and the
most lucrative military supply and LOU targets have been
effectively insulated from air attack.'
Most of this line of criticism of the bombing program stemmed, in
the words of the Pentagon history-
from basic disagreement with an air campaign centered upon
a tactical interdiction rationale rather than a punitive ration-
ale more in keeping with strategic uses of air power, a cam-
paign in which the apparent target was the infiltration
system rather than the economy as a whole.... This kind
of criticism of the bombing concentrated on the most con-
spicuous aspect of the program, the strikes against fixed
targets, and it faulted the program for failing to focus on
the kinds of targets which strategic bombing had made
familiar in World War II-power plants, oil depots, harbor
facilities, and factories.'
4 SNIE 1"-65,23 July 1965, "Communist and Free World Reactions to a possible U.B. Course of Ac-
tion," ibid., pp. 10-11.
s JCSM 41-66, 18 Jan. 1068, ibid., p. 32.
6 CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining objectives in North Vietnam," ibid., p. 17.
' Analyst's comments, ibid.
82-291 0-72-2
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In response to this criticism, Secretary of Defense McNamara at
first questioned the effect strategic bombing would have on the infil-
tration effort and stressed the risks of widening the war if such targets
were hit." Eventually, however, he agreed to the bombing of North
Vietnam's petroleum facilities. According to the Pentagon history,
the failure of these attacks to reduce either infiltration or logistical
support from the North apparently tipped the balance in McNamara's
mind against any further escalation of air attacks against North
Vietnam. "The attack on North Vietnam's POL [petroleum] system
was the last major escalation of the air war recommended by Secretary
McNamara." 9
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were strong proponents of bombing North
Vietnam's POL system. In November 1965, they proposed a major
program of air attacks against it. "Attack of this system," they
argued, "would be more damaging to the DRV [Democratic Republic
of (North) Vietnam] capability to move war-supporting re-
sources ... than an attack against any other single target system." 10
As the Pentagon history explains:
It is not surprising that the JCS singled out the POL,
target system for special attention. NVN had no oil fields or:
refineries, and had to import all of its petroleum products, in''.
refined form.... Nearly all of it came from ... the USSR
and arrived by sea at Haiphong, the only port capable of con-'
veniently receiving and handling bulk POL brought in by
large tankers. From large tank farms at Haiphong with a' capacity of about one-fourth of the annual imports, the'
POL was transported by road, rail, and water to other large
storage sites at Hanoi and elsewhere in the country. Ninety-'
seven percent of the NVN POL storage capacity was con-
centrated in 13 sites, 4 of which had already been hit. The
other 9 were still off limits. They were, of course, highly
vulnerable to air attacks."
In making their recommendation that North Vietnam's POL
system be attacked, the Joint Chiefs emphasized the interdiction
effects. "POL-fueled carriers," they said, were the "principal vehicles"
for transporting supplies to South Vietnam and Laos. Moreover, POL
was becoming increasingly important to the effort in the South. With
five confirmed and two suspected North Vietnamese regiments in
South Vietnam, there was an increasing load on the supply system.
Roads were being improved and increasing numbers of trucks were
being imported. Finally, "recuperability of the DRV POL system
from the effects of an attack is very poor." 12
The record in the Pentagon history of what the intelligence com-
munity was telling policy makers during the POL debate is incomplete.
Thus, we do not know the full range of debate nor the impact that
intelligence may have had on the decision to increase the scale of
bombing. Nevertheless, examination of the information available in
' Testimony before Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, Aug. 4, 1965, and ;House
Committee on Armed Services, Aug. 8, 1965, and Background briefing for the press, Oct. 21, 1965, ibid.,
pp. 18-19.
s Pentagon historian's comments, ibid., p. 138.
107C5M 810-66, "Air Operations Against the North Vietnam POL System," 10 Nov. 1965, ibid.,, p. 65.
11 Pentagon historian, ibid., pp. 65-66, citing 1-3 in collaboration with DTA, "Attack on the North Vietnam
Petroleum Storage System--A Study," 23 April 1966 revised 22 Dec. 1966.
17 JCSM 810-86, 10 Nov. 1965, ibid., pp. 66-87.
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the Pentagon history does provide some insights. The intelligence
community was initially skeptical of the Joint Chiefs' claim that at-
tacking North Vietnam's POL facilities as part of an intensified
program would substantially reduce the North's capacity to support
the war.13 There was some dispute within the intelligence commu-
nity as to just how effective the proposed bombing would be in
interdicting the flow of men and supplies. But it appears that there
was a tendency on the part of the intelligence agencies to accom-
modate their estimates to the growing pressure to increase the level
of bombing- 14
There is no indication in the Pentagon history that any of the major
intelligence agencies believed that the bombing of the North could or
would reduce the level of support for the war in the South below its
then current level. Rather, the agencies placed their hopes in punishing
North Vietnam and in possibly breaking her will. The most optimistic
view of interdiction bombing was that the damage to North Vietnam's
economy and transportation capacity might set an upper limit on the
amount of support she could provide for the war in the South. Such a
hope was predicated upon intensified air attacks, destruction of POL
facilities, bombing both military and industrial targets in the Hanoi/
Haiphong area, and mining North Vietnam's harbors. But even such a
heavy program of attacks, the intelligence agencies concluded, would
not prevent North Vietnam from providing levels of support for the
war substantially higher than those of 1965.'5
What, specifically, did the intelligence agencies feel could be
accomplished by a more intensive bombing campaign? First, Hanoi
would have to pay a high penalty for her support of the war. She
would suffer considerable economic disruption and destruction. The
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the
three service intelligence agencies even held out the hope at one point
that the intensified air strikes combined with the increased U.S. troop
commitment might eventually break Hanoi's will.18
While all the intelligence agencies seemed to agree that the air
attacks would increase the burden and costs of supporting the war,
there was no agreement that they would break Hanoi's will. In
December 1965, the Board of National Estimates characterized
Hanoi's will to persevere in the South as virtually unshakeable in the
short run and extremely tough even in the long run. In the words of
the Board, "They continue to believe that time is their ally and that
their own staying power is superior."17 The Bureau of Intelligence and
Research in the State Department argued that "Hanoi would be less
and less likely to soften its opposition to negotiations and at some
point it would come to feel that it had little left to lose by continuing
the fighting.""
The POL strikes finally began on June 29, 1966, and continued into
the fall. They were initially hailed as highly successful. During the
first month, for example, they reportedly destroyed 70 percent of
13 Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent for the Board of National Estimates, "Prob
able Reactions of the DRV, Communist China, and the USSR to U.S. Air Attacks on Petroleum Storage
Facilities in North Vietnam," Nov. 27, 1065, ibid., p. 68.
14 Pentagon historian's commentary and citations, ibid., pp. 68-1211.
13 SNIE 10-2-65, Dec. 10, 1965, "Probable Communist Reactions toe U.S. Course of Action," ibid., p. 72
SNIE 10-1-88, "Possible Effects of a Proposed U.S. Course of Action on DRV Capability to Support the
Insurgency in South Vietnam," Feb. 4, 1966, ibid., p. 76; and CIA SO No. 08440/66 "The Effect of Destruc-
tion of NVN Petroleum Storage Facilities on the War in SVN," June 8, 1966, ibid., p. 123.
16 SNIE 10-2-65, Dec. 10 1065, ibid. pp. 72-73.
17 Memorandum for the hirector, c/IA, from Sherman Kent, Dec. 2, 1965, ibid., p. 69.
18 SNIE 10-2-65, Dec. 10, 1965, ibid., p. 73.
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North Vietnam's bulk petroleum storage capacity.19 However, as' the
Pentagon history relates, by September both the CIA and DIA were
in general agreement as to the failure of the POL strikes."20
What became clearer and clearer as the summer wore on :1
was that while we had destroyed a major portion of North
Vietnam's storage capacity, she retained enough dispersed
capacity, supplemented by continuing imports (increasingly
in easily dispersable drums, not bulk), to meet her ongoing
requirements. The greater invulnerability of dispersed POL',
meant an ever mounting U.S. cost in munitions, fuel, aircraft'
losses, and men. By August we were reaching the point at
which these costs were prohibitive.
It was clear in retrospect that the POL strikes had been a
failure. Apart from the possibility of inconveniences, inter-
ruptions, and local shortages of a temporary nature, there was
no evidence that NVN had at any time been pinched for
POL.
The real and immediate failure of the POL strikes was
reflected . in the undiminished flow of men and supplies
down the Ho Chi Minh trail to the war in the South.21
There were several reasons for the failure. First, "NVN's dependence
on the unloading facilities at Haiphong and large storage sites in the
rest of the country had been greatly overestimated." 22 Bulk imports
continued; tankers simply stood off shore and unloaded onto barges.
More oil was also brought in already drummed; thus, it was con-
venient for dispersed handling and storage. Second, "the difficulties
of switching to a much less vulnerable but perfectly workable storage
and distribution system, not an unbearable strain when the volume
to be handled was not really very great, had also been overestimated." 23
The key point was that "NVN's adaptability and resourcefulness
had been greatly underestimated." 24 The effectiveness of the strikes
was further offset by an unanticipated result of the bombing:': the
North Vietnamese were highly successful in using the strike$ to
extract larger commitments of economic, military, and financial
assistance from the Russians and Chinese. 5
Secretary McNamara, according to the Pentagon history, "made no
effort to conceal his dissatisfaction and disappointment at the failure
of the POL attacks." 26 In January 1967 he testified before a joint
session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees
that-
I don't believe that the bombing up to the present has
significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could contem-
18 DIA Special Intelligence Summary, "NVN POL Status Report," 1 Aug. 1966, ibid., p. 141.
20 Ibid., p. 143.
21 Pentagon historian's analysis, ibid., pp. 141-42.
22 Pentagon historian's analysis citing CIA SC No. 04442/67, "The Rolling Thunder Program, Present,
and Potential Target Systems," Appendix A, January 1967, ibid., p. 142.
28 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. Also citing SNIE 13-66, "Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation,"
Aug. 4, 1966.
26 USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against
North Vietnam, 1966," ibid., p. 144.
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plate in the future would significantly reduce, actual flow
of men and materiel to the South. 21
EVALUATION OF INTERDICTION
During the course of the bombing of North Vietnam, a number of
studies of its effectiveness were made. Two of the most important
were carried out in 1966 and 1967 by a group of leading government-
oriented scientists under the auspices of the JASON Division of the
Institute for Defense Analyses.28 According to the Pentagon history,
the first study had a "powerful and perhaps decisive influence in
McNamara's mind." 29 Both studies strongly criticized the effective-
ness of bombing as a policy tool in the war effort. The 1967 JASON
study, for example, concluded that "the U.S. bombing of North Viet-
nam has had no measurable effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and
support military operations in the South." 11
The studies found that the bombing had not reduced the flow of
supplies to the Communists in South Vietnam. In fact-
Since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder air strikes on
NVN, the flow of men and materiel from NVN to SVN has
greatly increased, and present evidence provides no basis for
concludin that the damage inflicted on North Vietnam by
the bombing program has had any significant effect on this
flow. In short, the flow of men and materiel from North
Vietnam to the South appears to reflect Hanoi's intentions
rather than capabilities even in the face of the bombing.?'
Moreover, Hanoi's ability to support the war had not been decreased
by the bombing. Rather, "its abbility to sustain the war in the South
has increased." 32
The failure of bombing to interdict the flow of men and supplies to
the South is attributable to at least three factors. First, North Vietnam
is an underdeveloped country, which makes her far less susceptible to
the strategic effects of bombin. Second, the vast majority of ma-
terial support for the war originates not in North Vietnam but in
Russia and China. North Vietnam serves essentially as a conduit for
the supplies. Third, the Communists have shown great resourcefulness
and determination, while we have tended to overestimate the capa-
bility of our bombing.
BOMBING AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY
As an agricultural country, North Vietnam provides an extremely
poor target for air attack. In the words of the Pentagon history
analyst-
The theory of either strategic or interdiction bombing
assumed highly developed industrial nations producing
large quantities of military goods to sustain mass armies en-
27 Quoted in The Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1967t ibid., p. 145.
as Institute for Defense Analyses Report, IDA TS/HQ88-49, "The Effects of U.S. Bombing on North
Vietnam's Ability to Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect,"
Aug. 29, 1986 and IDA, JASON Division, "The Bombing of North Vietnam" Vol .I "Summary," IDA
Log No. TS/1?IQ 67-217, Dec. 16, 1967, ibid., pp. 149-55 and U.S.-I ietna.m Relations,,IV.d.7.(b), "Volume II:
The Air War in North Vietnam," pp. 122-27.
29 U.S.-Vietnam Relations, IV.C.7.(a), p. 149.
39 IDA, "The Bombing of North Vietnam," Dec. 18, 1967, ibid., IV.C.7.(b), p. 123.
ei Ibid., p. M.
as Ibid.
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gaged in intensive warfare. NVN, as U.S. intelligence
agencies knew, was an agricultural country with a rudimen
tary transportation system and little industry of any kind,
Nearly all of the people were rice farmers who worked the
land with water buffaloes and hand tools, and whose well-
being at a subsistence level was almost entirely dependent
on what they grew or made themselves. What intelligence
agencies liked to call the -modern industrial sector" of the
economy was tiny even by Asian standards, producing only
about 12 percent of a GNP of $1.6 billion in 1965. There
were only a handful of "major industrial facilities." When
NVN was first targeted the JCS found only 8 industrial
installations worth listing on a par with airfields, military
supply dumps, barracks complexes, port facilities, bridges,
and oil tanks. Even by the end of 1965, after the JCS had
lowered the standards and more than doubled the number
of important targets, the list included only 24 industrial
installations, 18 of them power plants which were as im-
portant for such humble uses as lighting streets and pumping
water as for operating any real factories.
Apart from one explosives plant (which had already been
demolished), NVN's limited industry made little contribution
to its military capabilities. NVN forces, in intelligence
terminology, placed "little direct reliance on the domestic
economy for material." NVN in fact produced only limited
quantities of simple military items, such as mortars, grenades,
mines, small arms, and bullets.33
Moreover, such arms and munitions as were produced in North
Vietnam were made in small workshops, which provided poor targets,
rather than in larger, more vulnerable arsenals. "The great bulk of its
military equipment, and all of the heavier and more sophisticated
items, had to be imported." 34
In short, North Vietnam's industry did not provide a rewarding
target for air attack. Meaningful targets were few, and those' that
existed were critical to neither the viability of the economy nor the
prosecution of the war in the South.
Much of the damage was to installations that the North
Vietnamese did not need to sustain the military effort. The
regime made no attempt to restore storage facilities and
little to repair damage to power stations, evidently because
of the existence of adequate excess capacity and because the
facilities were not of vital importance.35
"The idea that destroying, or threatening to destroy, NVN's
industry would pressure Hanoi into calling it quits seems, in retrospect
a colossal misjudgment." 38 The idea, however, was based on an
apparently plausible assumption about the rationality of North
Vietnam's leaders, which according to the Pentagon history analyst,
the U.S. intelligence community appeared to share.
This was that the value of what little industrial plant NVN!
possessed was disproportionately great. That plant was pur-
83 Ibid., N. C.7. (a), pp. 54-55.
34 Ibid., p. 55.
as IDA TsII-IQ66-49, "The Effects of U.S. Bombing," Aug. 29, 1988, ibid., pp. 152-53.
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chased by an extremely poor nation at the price of. consider-
able sacrifice over many years. Even though it did not amount
to much, it no doubt symbolized the regime's hopes and
desires for national status, power, and wealth, and was prob-
ably a source of considerable pride. It did not seem unreason-
able to believe that NVN leaders would not wish to risk the
destruction of such assets, especially when that risk seemed
(to us) easily avoidable by cutting down the insurgency and
deferring the takeover of SVN until another day and perhaps
in another manner-which Ho Chi Minh had apparently
decided to do once before, in 1954.17
Experience, however, did not bear out this assumption. The North
improved its air defenses, laid aside its economic development plans,
and made necessary adjustments. Imports were increased to offset
production losses; bombed facilities were in most cases simply aban-
doned; and large vulnerable targets such as barracks and storage
depots were dispersed and concealed. The North Vietnamese appeared
willing to accept the loss of the small industrial base rather than reduce
their support for the war in the South.
The bombing and the strain of supporting the war in the South
have caused considerable dislocation in the labor force of North Viet-
nam. By 1968, as many as 475,000 to 600,000 civilians including women
and children were working to repair the damage done by the air-
strikes, while another 110,000 military personnel were assigned to air
defense duties.38 Military induction standards were apparently also
lowered, and there were reports of 15 year old villagers being con-
scripted to fight in the South.
It appears, however, that the North has been able to meet its man-
power needs. A study by the Systems Analysis Office of the Depart
ment of Defense reported that 90% of the North's manpower needs
were met by normal population growth.l9 The same study found that
the bombing also increased the supply of labor. Thirty-three thousand
workers were released from their work by the destruction of North
Vietnamese industry, and another 48,000 women were made available
for work on roads and bridges in the countryside by their evacuation
from the cities. Similarly, North Vietnam as an underdeveloped coun-
try had many underemployed who could be used to repair war damage
without. reducing production. Finally, an estimated 40,000 Com-
munist Chinese were thought to be employed in maintaining North
Vietnam's road and rail net. The Systems Analysis Office study con-
cluded "it appears that the North Vietnamese government is not
likely to be hampered by aggregate manpower shortages." 40 The
Pentagon contribution to the NSSM 1 also held that "In spite of these
extra demands, it appears that NVN has enough manpower to con-
tinue the war at the high casualty rates sustained in 1968." 41 The
Si Ibid. citing CIA/DIA, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam,"
SC No. 68437/88, June 1, 1988.
n Draft of National Security Council, "National Security Study Memorandum 1," 1969, in Congressional
Record, Vol. 118, No. 77 (May 11, 1972), p. E5010 (hereafter cited as NSSM 1). Another study put the total
manpower diversion over a three year period at 750,000. OASD (SA) Economics & Mobility Forces paper,
"The Bombing-Its Economic Costs and Benefits to North Vietnam," Jan. 2, 1968, attached to Alain
Enthoven Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense Subject: "The Economic Effects of Bombing North
Vietnam," Jan. 2, 1988, in U.S. Vietnam Relations, IV'.C.7.(b), p. 130.
n OASD (SA) Economics & Mobility Forces paper, "The Bombing," Jan. 2, 1968, in U.S. T letnam
Relations, IV. C.7. (b), p. 130.
40 Ibid. pp. 130-81.
N NSSM 1 in Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 77 (May 11, 1972) p. E5063.
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State Department contribution was more optimistic but concluded
that "there is no evidence that manpower shortages in themselves were
becoming acute enought to prevent Hanoi from continuing its poli-
cies." 42
BOMBING VS. FOREIGN AID
The second factor contributing to North Vietnam's ability', to
continue aiding the war in the south is the large amount of military
and economic aid received from Communist China and the Soviet
Union. The second JASON study, submitted in December 1967,
concluded :
NVN has transmitted many of the material costs imposed
by the bombing back to its allies. Since the bombing began,
NVN's allies have provided almost $600 million in economic
aid and another $1 billion in military aid-more than four
times what NVN has lost in bombing damage. If economic
criteria were the only consideration, NVN would show a
substantial net gain from the bombing, primarily in military
equipment.
Because of this aid, and the effectiveness of its counter-
measures,
NVN's economy continues to function. NVN's
adjustments to the physical damage, disruption, and other
difficulties brought on by the bombmg have been sufficiently
effective to maintain living standards, meet transportation
requirements, and improve its military capabilities. NVN
is now a stronger military power than before the bombing.43
A study by the Systems Analysis Office of the Department of De-
fense reached a similar conclusion. "Over the entire period of the
bombing, the value of economic resources gained through foreign aid
has been greater than that lost because of the bombing." 44 The study
concluded that North Vietnamese standards of living may have
declined but that food supplies had been maintained with only a
slight decline. Overall, "the North Vietnamese are not badly off, by
past North Vietnamese standards or the standards of other Asian
countries." 48 With respect to the capital stock destroyed by ',the
bombing-
It is not certain that Russia and China will replace North
Vietnam's destroyed capital assets through aid programs,
thus absorbing part of the bombing cost themselves. How-
ever, they could do so in a short period of time at relatively
small cost; if economic aid remained at its wartime yearly
rate of $340 million and half were used to replace capital
stock, North Vietnam's losses could be replaced in a year.48
Similar conclusions were also reached in the 1969 National Security
Study Memorandum 1. "It is generally agreed that the bombing did
not significantly raise the cost of the war to NVN. This was because
42 Ibid., No. 76 (May 10, 1972), p. E5000. Emphasis in original.
T ietnam Relations, IV.C.7.(b), p, 125.
43 IDA, "The Bombing of Ncrth Vietnam," Dec. 16, 1967, in U.S.
OASD (SA) Economics & Mobility Forces paper, "The Bombing," Jan. 2, 1,968. Ibid.,
p. 128.
43 Ibid., p. 129.
46 "If the capital stock, is replaced, the economic cost to North Vietnam of the bombing will be the cumu-
Iative loss of output from the time the bombing began until the capital stock is fully replaced. Even this
probably overstates the cost, however. Even if the pre-bombing capital stock, were only replaced, it Would
be more modern and productive than it otherwise would have been." Ibid.
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production facilities outside of NVN were not targetable." 47 Estimates
as of January 1969 placed North Vietnam's losses of capital stock,
military facilities, and current production at $770 million. But eco-
nomic and military aid from Communist allies totalled $3 billion 48
The key consideration so far as bombing policy is concerned, then,
is the fact that North Vietnam serves as a funnel for the transit of
military aid from other Communist countries to the Communist forces
in the South. Attention should thus be focused on North Vietnam's
capability to transport men and supplies to the South rather than on
its ability to support the war economically.
The North Vietnamese transportation system is primitive and super-
ficially appears highly. vulnerable to air attack. But it has proved to be
highly flexible and Its capacity has greatly exceeded the demands
placed upon it.49 Because the North Vietnamese transportation system
is based to a large degree on crude roads, trails, and waterways rather
than on highways and railroads, it provides relatively few lucrative
targets for air bombardment. This is particularly true of the southern
half of North Vietnam and the trails through Laos. A March 1966
report by the CIA argued:
The rudimentary nature of the logistic targets in the
southern part of North Vietnam, the small volume of traffic
moving over them in relation to route capacities, the relative
ease and speed with which they are repaired, the extremely
high frequency with which they would have to be restruck-
once every three days-all combined to make the logistic
network in this region a relatively unattractive target system,
except as a supplement to a larger program. A significant
lesson from the Rolling Thunder program to date is that the
goals of sustained interdictions of the rudimentary road and
trail networks in southern North Vietnam and Laos will be
extremely difficult and probably impossible to obtain in 1966,
given the conventional ordnance and strike capabilities
likely to exist.60
The debate as to the effectiveness of bombing in interdicting the
flow of supplies from the North was reflected in the 1969 National
Security Study Memorandum 1. The U.S. military command in
Saigon (MACV) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) felt that the
bombing had succeeded, while the Department of State, CIA, and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSI)) felt that it had failed.
The debate over the attempt by MACV to block two key roads near
the passes from North Vietnam into Laos in late 1968 illustrates the
differences between the two views. According to the summary of
NSSM 1-
MACV finds it has effectively blocked these roads 80% of the
time and therefore caused less traffic to get through. OSD/
CIA/State agree that enemy traffic on the roads attacked has
been disrupted. However, they point out that the enemy uses
less than 15% of the available road capacity, is constantly
4' NSSM 1, in Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 77 (May 11, 1972), p. Eb003.
4' Ibid.
4' Pentagon historian's commentary, U.S.-Vietnam Relations IV.C.7.(a), p. b6.
ao CIA SC No. 0828/06, 'The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining objectives in North Vietnam," March 1966,
ibid., p. 82.
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expanding that capacity through new roads and bypasses,
and our air strikes do not block but only delay traffic.
Besides blocking the roads, our bombing destroys material
in transit on them. JCS/MACV and. OSD/CIA agree that we
destroy 12% to 14% of the trucks observed moving through
Laos and 20% to 35% of the total flow of supplies in Laos.
To MACV/JCS, the material destroyed cannot be replaced
so that our air effort denies it to the VC/NVA forces in South
Vietnam. In complete disagreement, OSD and CIA find that
the enemy needs in SVN (10 to 15 trucks of supplies per day)
are so small and his supply of war material so large that the
enemy can replace his losses easily, increase his traffic flows
slightly, and get through as much supplies to SVN as he wants
to in spite of the bombing."
It seems that on balance the interdiction bombing in southern North
Vietnam and Laos has made the North Vietnamese logistical effort
more difficult, costly, and time consuming but that it has not pre-
vented Hanoi from meeting the supply needs of the Communist forces
in the South.
The northern half of North Vietnam, however, would seem to offer
more lucrative transportation targets, particularly railroads and har-
bors. In 1966, approximately two-thirds of North Vietnam's imports
arrived by sea and the bulk of the remaining third by rail from China.52
Again, there was a sharp split between MACV and the Joint Chiefs on
the one hand and the CIA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
on the other. MACV/JCS believed that if all imports by sea were
denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia were attacked
vigorously, the North Vietnamese would be unable to obtain enough
war supplies to continue. OSD and CIA, however, felt that the over-
land routes alone could provide North Vietnam enough material to
carry on even in the face of an unlimited bombing campaign.83
The mining of North Vietnamese harbors and the current intensive
bombing of the North should provide a test of these arguments. Be-
cause no reliable data is yet publicly available, it is impossible to judge
the interdiction effects of this bombing. However, considering the pre-
vious adaptability of the North Vietnamese, it seems probable that
they will adjust to the bombing and continue to support the war in the
South, albeit at higher cost and with greater delay in the movement
of supplies. The capability to wage large scale conventional warfare
with armor and heavy artillery, as in the spring 1972 offensive, may'! be
considerably reduced.
The third factor reducing the effectiveness of the bombing of the
North has been the resourcefulness and determination of the North
Vietnamese. During the massive bombing of their petroleum facilities,
for example, they proved quite resourceful. Distribution was switched
from bulk to barrels and decentralized without a major reduction in
capabilities. The North has also adapted well to the continuing attacks
on the transportation system. According to the Pentagon history-
at National Security Council, NSSM 1, "Summary of Responses to NSSM 1-The Situation in Vietnam,"
in Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 76 (May 10, 1972) p. E4981.
a2 CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes," 'March 1966, in U.S.-Vietnam Relations, IV.C.7.(a),
p. 82.
as NSSM 1, in Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 76 (May 10, 1972), p. E4981.
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Several hundred thousand workers were mobilized to keep
the transportation system operating. Miles of by-pass roads
were built around choke-points to make the system redun-
dant. Knocked-out bridges were replaced by fords, ferries,
or alternate structures, and methods were adopted to protect
them from attack. Traffic shifted to night time, poor weather,
and camouflage. Shuttling and transshipment practices were
instituted. Construction material, equipment, and workers
were propositioned along key routes in order to effect quick
repairs. Imports of railroad cars and trucks were increased
to offset equipment losses.54
The second JASON study concluded that because of such counter-
measures, North Vietnam "has become increasingly less vulnerable
to aerial interdiction aimed at reducing the flow of men and material
from the North to the South." 11
Coupled with the adaptability of the North Vietnamese has been
a tendency to over-estimate the capability of U.S. bombing. The first
JASON study concluded in 1966:
Initial plans and assessments for the Rolling Thunder
program clearly tended to overestimate the persuasive and
disruptive effects of the U.S. air strikes and, correspondingly,
to underestimate the tenacity and recuperative capabilities
of the North Vietnamese. This tendency, in turn, appears to
reflect a general failure to appreciate the fact, well-docu-
mented in the historical and social scientific literature, that
a direct, frontal attack on a society tends to strengthen the
social fabric of the nation, to increase popular support of the
existing government, to improve the determination of both
the leadership and the populace to fight back, to induce a
variety of protective measures that reduce the society's
vulnerability to future attack, and to develop an increased
capacity for quick repair and restoration of essential func-
tions. The great variety of physical and social counter-
measures that North Vietnam has taken in response to the
bombing is now well documented in current intelligence
reports, but the potential effectiveness of these counter-
measures was not stressed in the early planning or intelligence
studies."
The second JASON study concluded in 1967 that because of foreign-
aid, and the effectiveness of its countermeasures, NVN's economy
continues to function. NVN's adjustments to the physical damage,
disruption, and other difficulties brought on by the bombing
have been sufficiently effective to maintain living standards,
meet transportation requirements, and improve its military capa-
bilities. NVN is now a stronger military power than before the
bombing and its remaining economy is more able to withstand
bombing. b7
'4 U.S.-Vietnam Relations, IV.C.7.(a), pp. 58-57.
HIDA, "The Bombing of North Vietnam," Dec. 16, 1967, ibid., IV.C.7.(b), p. 124.
^a IDA TS/HQ66-49, "The Effects of U.S. Bombing," Aug. 29, 1966, ibid., IV.C.7.(a), p. 154.
57 IDA, "The Bombing of North Vietnam," Dec. 18, 1967, ibid., IV.C.7.(b), p. 125.
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PUNISHING THE NORTH
Although seldom stated explicitly in either memoranda or official
statements, an implicit goal of the bombing has been the punishment
of the North for its support of the war in the South. A relatively
explicit statement of the goal was given by Secretary of Defense
McNamara in 1967 in a list of what he considered to be the three
objectives of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam: "To
make clear to the North Vietnamese political leadership that so long
as they continued their aggression against the South, they would
have to pay a price in the North." 68
The goal is often stated in terms of increasing the cost of the war for
the North. A March 1966 CIA report argued for increased bombing of
northern North Vietnam because it would inflict more pain on the
regime and increase the cost of the war. The key argument was:
The flow of military logistics supplies from the USSR and
China cannot be cut off, but the movement could be made
considerably more expensive and unreliable if authorization
is granted to attack intensively the rail connections to Com-
munist China and if the three major ports are effectively
rnined.69
As has been shown above, the bombing has caused severe damage and
disruption to the domestic economy of North Vietnam. Many thous-
ands of civilians have been evacuated from the cities or diverted to
repairing damage done by the airstrikes. The civilian population has
suffered considerably. National Security Study Memorandum 1
reports that-
Individual citizens suffered many hardships. While the total
supply of goods in NVN increased, individual standards of
living declined. Food was rationed and consumer goods were
scarce; and air raid warnings disrupted the lives of the popu-
lace and forced many to leave their homes. Moreover, it has
been estimated that approximately 52,000 civilians were
killed in NVN by U.S. air strikes.60
While there is a natural desire to impose hardship on an enemy,
such a goal seems unsupportable on either moral or policy grounds.
The moral implications of mere retribution should require no explana-
tion. By the same token, the high cost of the bombing to the United
States in terms of lives and materiel makes such a policy undesirable.
Simply raising the cost of the war to the North serves no policy end
unless it has a pay-off in terms of impeding the ability of the North to
support the war or increases the likelihood of the North's deciding to
end the war. Hence, retribution is usually linked to interdiction or
putting pressure on Hanoi's will. The preceding discussion has indi-
cated, however, that the bombing has not stopped the flow of supplies
to the South. The question then becomes what effect the bombing
has had on Hanoi's will to continue the war.
sa Ibid., p. 123.
by CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes," March 1966, ibid., IV.C.7.(a), p. 82.
65 NSSM 11n Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 77 (May 11, 1972), p. E5063.
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BREAKING HANOI'S WILL
One of the most pervasive justifications for the bombing of the
North is the belief that in some degree the bombing will put pressure
on the Hanoi leadership to terminate the war. According to the
Pentagon history of the conflict, this was the original purpose of the
sustained bombing of the North, although the public rationale was
generally put in terms of North Vietnam's capability to continue the
war e' An interagency task force known as the NSC.Working Group
concluded in late 1964 that-
The nature of the war in Vietnam is such that U.S. ability
to compel the DRV to end or reduce the VC insurrection
rests essentially upon the effect of the U.S. sanctions on
the will of D RV leadership to sustain and enlarge that
insurrection, and to a lesser extent upon the effect of sanctions
on the capabilities of the DRV to do so.62
The contention that bombing would put increased pressure on Hanoi's
will played a major role in the arguments of the JCS for the highly
unsuccessful attacks on North Vietnam's petroleum facilities in
1966.63 With the relative failure of bombing: to achieve the goal of
interdicting the flow of supplies south, the goal of breaking Hanoi's
will became more prominent. In arguing for continued bombing,
presidential assistant for national security, Walt Rostow wrote in a
1967 memorandum-
We have never held the view that bombing could stop
infiltration. . We have held the view that the degree
of military and civilian cost felt in the North and the diver-
sion of resources to deal with our bombing could contribute
marginally-and perhaps significantly--to the timing of a
decision to end the war.64
Although the reasoning is seldom explicit, the argument that the
bombing would affect the will of Hanoi's leadership is generally
based on three suppositions. First, the bombing would so reduce
North Vietnam's capability to successfully prosecute the war that
Hanoi would: either sue for peace or substantially reduce the level of
warfare. Second, the leadership would decide that the level of destruc-
tion visited upon the North Vietnamese economy was greater than
the gain from supporting the revolution in the South. Or third, that
the morale of the North Vietnamese populat:ion would so deteriorate
that the leadership would be forced to seek relief from the bombing
through negotiations or reduced support for the forces in the South.
Examination of the results of the bombing indicates that none of
these suppositions have been borne out in practice. The bombing
has made support of the war in the South more difficult and costly
but has not reduced North Vietnam's ability to prosecute it. The
damage to the North Vietnamese economy has been substantial and
development plans have been postponed. But aid from Russia and
China has more than offset the damage inflicted by bombing. In such
e1 U.S.-Vietnam Relations, IV.C.7.(a) p. 3.
e' NSC Working Group on Vietnam Southeast Asia), "Section I: Intelligence Assessment: The Situation
in Vietnam," Nov. 24, 1964, pp. 6-8 (in State Department Materials, Vol. IV), ibid., IV.C.2.(c), p. 10.
es Pentagon historian, ibid., IV.C.7.(a), p. 86.
e~ Memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Others from Walt W. Rostow, "U.S. Strategy,
in Vietnam," May 6, 1967, In New York Times, The Pentagon Paper.9 (New York: Bantam Books, 1971),
p. 574.
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a situation, it seems probable that Hanoi's relationship with her allies
is more important than the bombing in the leadership's determination
to continue the war. And according to the 1966 JASON study by
government-oriented scientists-
Hanoi's political relations with its allies were in some
respects strengthened by the bombing. The attacks had
the effect of encouragingg greater material and political
support from the Soviet Umon than might otherwise have
been the case. While the Soviet aid complicated Hanoi's
relationship with Peking, it reduced North Vietnam's depend-
ence on China and thereby gave Hanoi more room for
maneuver on its own behalf. 5
Available evidence indicates that the great hardships placed upon
North Vietnam's population by the bombing and the cost of the war
in the South have lowered popular morale but not to the degree that
support for the war is threatened. Evidence of the deterioration of
popular morale as of early 1968 came from reports of Spanish repa-
triates who lived in North Vietnam from 13 to 19 years, a decree on
the "punishment of counterrevolutionary crimes," and the appear-
ance of a widespread black market." According to the CIA contri-
bution to the 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 1-
There were some indications in late 1967 and in 1968 that
morale was wavering, but not to a degree that influenced
the regime's policies on the war. The regime was quite
successful, however, in using the bombing threat as an
instrument to mobilize people behind the Communist war
effort. There is substantial evidence, for instance, that the
general populace found the hardships of the war more
tolerable when it faced daily dangers from the bombing than
when this threat was removed and many of the same hard-
ships persisted. Concern about maintaining popular morale,
and, in particular, discipline and unwavering support for the
needs of the war appears to have grown markedly in the
past year when most of the country was no longer subjected
to bombing. Since the 1 November bombing halt over the
entire country, Hanoi has put great stress on countering
the widespread tendency of the people to relax their efforts.
Concern of this kind is reflected almost daily in North Viet-
namese publications and broadcasts as the regime has used
exhortation, criticism, and the threat of coercion to sustain
support for the needs of the war in South Vietnam 87
Similarly, in commenting on civilian hardships in North Vietnam,
the military contribution to NSSM 1 stated:
There is no evidence to suggest that these hardships reduced
to a critical level NVN's willingness or resolve to continue
the conflict. On the contrary, the bombing actually may
have hardened the attitude of the people and rallied them
behind the government's programs. Firm population con-
trols and a steady flow of propaganda from Hanoi have
66 IDA TS/IQ68-49, "The Effects of U.S. Bombing," Aug. 29,1966, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, IV.C.7.(a)'
p. 153.
as NBSM 1 in Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 76 (May 10, 1972), p. E4999.
67 ibid., No. 77 (May 11, 1972), p. E5010.
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been credited with helping to maintain support for the
regime. There is some evidence, however, indicating that
morale and support for the war in NVN has declined signifi-
cantly since the bombing halt.68
The experience in bombing North Vietnam, then, appears to once
again demonstrate that an attack by a clearly foreign power tends to
increase support for the indigenous government and to increase social
cohesion in spite of the hardships created by the war.
The persistence of the view that Hanoi's will can be broken by
bombing seems inconsistent with what is known of the North Viet-
namese leadership. 'Most of Hanoi's top leadership is composed of
long-time revolutionaries who were intimately involved with Vietnam's
struggle for independence from the Frenci. Their struggle lasting
over 30 years indicates a tenacity and will not easily broken. More-
over, as both communists and nationalists, they apparently believe
that they have a mission to liberate what they consider to be the
southern half of their country. -Their statements during the long period
of negotiations leave little doubt that they think that time, inter-
national opinion, the weight of history, and their own commitment
will bring them victory.
A convincing perspective on the effect of the bombing on Hanoi's
will was provided by the 1966 JASON study:
The indirect effects of the bombing on the will of the
North Vietnamese to continue fighting and on their leaders'
appraisal of the prospective gains and costs of maintaining the
present policy have not shown themselves in any tangible
way. Furthermore, we have not discovered any basis for
concluding that the indirect punitive effects of bombing
will prove decisive in these respects.
It may be argued on a speculative basis that continued
or increased bombing must eventually affect Hanoi's will
to continue, particularly as a component of the total U.S.
military pressures being exerted throughout Southeast
Asia. However, it is not a conclusion that necessarily follows
from the available evidence, given the character of North
Vietnam's economy and society, the present and prospective
low levels of casualties and the amount of aid available to
Hanoi. It would appear to be equally logical to assume that
the major influences on Hanoi's will to continue are most
likely to be the course of the war in the South and the
degree to which the USSR and China support the policy of
continuing the war and that the punitive impact of U.S.
bombing may have but a marginal effect in this broader
context. 9
BOMBING} AS AN AID TO NEGOTIATIONS
Related to the belief that bombing would break the will of Hanoi's
leadership is the belief that bombing would aid in negotiations with
the North. Bombing was expected to play essentially two roles with
respect to negotiations. These were expressed by Assistant Secretary
e8 Ibidp. E6063.
ao IDA Ts/HQ66-49, "The Effects of U.S. Bombing," Aug. 29, 1966, U.S: VietnanmRelations, IV.0.7.(a)
p. 152.
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1s
of Defense John McNaughton in a 1966 memorandum: "The purposes
of the bombing are mainly: . . . b. To bring about negotiations (by
indirect third-party pressure flowing from fear of escalation and by
direct pressure on Hanoi). c. To provide a bargaining counter in
negotiations (or in a tacit `minuet')." 70
The preceding discussion makes clear that the bombing of North
Vietnam has not brought about a willingness of the North Vietnamese
leadership to make fundamental negotiating concessions. Morever,
bombing appears to take second place to the military situation in the
South in Hanoi's calculations. However, it appears probable that the
desire to end the bombing played some role in the decision of Hanoi
to accept the U.S. offer of negotiations in 1968. Such was the eon-
census of the national security agencies in the 1969 NSSM 1.71 The
bombing may, however, have contributed to the failure of other ne-
gotiating tracks, such as the 1966 contacts through the Polish repre-
sentative to the International Control Commission, the direct contacts
in Moscow in 1967, and the direct contacts in Rangoon December
1965-February 1966.72 It thus remains a moot point whether the bomb-
ing contributed to the possibility of formal talks between the two sides.
No doubt, the bombing of the North represents a bargaining chip
in negotiations, but its value is uncertain. In spite of its prominence
in public statements by both sides, the uncertain role of bombing in
the course of negotiations from 1965 onward, the relative ineffective-
ness of bombing in either stemming infiltration or breaking the will
of the North, and the predominance of concern with the course of the
war in the South indicate that in terms of extracting major conces-
sions, bombing is a bargaining chip of relatively low value.
BOOSTING MORALE
A final purpose of the bombing of North Vietnam, according to
Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton, was to sustain U.S. and
South Vietnamese morale.73 A similar view was echoed by Secretary
McNamara in 1967.14 To a degree this objective was achieved. The
retaliatory strikes in 1964 and the sustained bombing begun. in early
1965 probably contributed to some degree to boosting the morale of
the hard pressed South Vietnamese government. As the second JASON
study found in 1967-
There had been an appreciable improvement in South Viet-
namese morale immediately after the bombing began and
subsequent buoyancy always accompanied major new esca-
lations, of the air war. But the effect was always transient,
fading as a particular pattern of attack became a part of the
routine of the war. There was no indication that bombing
could ever constitute a permanent support for South Viet-
namese morale if the situation in the South itself was ad-
verse.75 (Emphasis added.)
70 McNaughton 2nd Draft, "Some Observations about Bombing North Vietnam," Jan. 18, 1966, in
McNaughton Book n, Tab DD, ibid., p. 34.
71 NSSM 1 in Congressional Record, Vol. 118, No. 76 (May 10, 1972), pp. E4977 and E4986, and No. 77
(May 11, 1972), p. E6012.
72 "Negotiations, 19644-1968," a staff study based on the Pentagon Papers prepared for the use of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, Study No. 4 (Washington, Aug. 9, 1972).
78 McNaughton 2nd Draft, "Some Observations about Bombing North Vietnam," Jan. 18, 1966, U.S.-
ietnam Relations, IV.C.7.(a), p. 34.
71 IDA, "The Bombing of North Vietnam," Dec. 16,1967, ibid., IV.C.7.(b), p. 123.
73 Ibid., p. 126.
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19
CONCLUSION
This study of the effectiveness of the air war against North Vietnam
in achieving the goals set for it by those involved in making the bomb-
ing policy necessarily neglects many relevant considerations. These
include civilian casualties, the international impact of the bombing, the
risks of escalation and provoking Chinese or Soviet intervention, the
costs of the bombing, captured airmen, and the consequences within
the United States. But in so doing, the study places in a starker light
the high hopes held out for the bombing and the small results actually
achieved.
Throughout the war, the results of the bombing of North Vietnam
have consistently fallen far short of the claims made for it. The bomb-
ing began with the expectation that it would break the will of the
enemy-although many questioned its capability to do so. When
Hanoi showed no signs of weakening, the rationale shifted toward
interdiction, but this goal, too, proved unobtainable. Many suggested
that this failure was because there were too many restrictions. If
such targets as the North's petroleum facilities were attacked, it was
argued, Hanoi's capabilities would be sharply reduced. But again
North Vietnam proved capable of adapting; the will of the Hanoi
leadership held strong. Again bombing failed to fulfill the promises
made for it.
This study should conclude with two warning notes. First, the focus
of this study has been on interdiction and strategic bombing of North
Vietnam during the period 1965-68. It does not consider tactical air
support, which has been relatively successful in achieving its goals.
Neither does it consider the current air war against North Vietnam,
which is far heavier than previous offensives. No reliable information
is yet available on its success or failure.
Second, the experience in Vietnam cannot be readily transferred to
other situations. In overcoming the effects of the bombing, the North
Vietnamese have had certain advantages which may not apply to
other cases. The leadership has shown great tenacity and high motiva-
tion, as well as exceptional ingenuity and adaptability in coping with
the effects of the bombing. The evident control and organization of
the society, together with apparently high popular support have made
possible this tenacity and adaptability. Equally important has been
the willingness and ability of other Communist countries to provide
sufficient military and economic aid. The location of North Vietnam
has also been of considerable importance. Bordering on an ally, China,
North Vietnam could not be blockaded; land transportation routes
were available. Moreover, the proximity to China long tended to
moderate U.S. escalation of the air war because of the fear of Chinese
intervention. The common border with South Vietnam and the rela-
tively unpopulated and heavily foliated border area with Laos facili-
tate infiltration and make interdiction bombing more difficult. The
original guerrilla nature of the war long reduced the amount of supplies
which had to be infiltrated, thus reducing the burden on the North.
And finally, the underdeveloped nature of the Vietnamese economy
has provided relatively few valuable targets for bombing.
These caveats notwithstanding, this study calls into serious question
the efficacy of strategic and interdiction bombing against a highly
motivated guerrilla enemy in an underdeveloped country. Bombing
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20
appears capable of raising the costs of war to an enemy in such a
situation, but it cannot be depended on to weaken his will or to sub-
stantially reduce his activity by interdicting his supplies. Compared
to the damage to U.S. prestige and the internal division created by the
bombing policy, its meager gains must be seriously questioned.'
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Next 15 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP74B00415R000100120019-4
Met with Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff, Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, regarding Senator Fulbright's 3 October
letter to the Director asking for whatever documents we might have
regarding the effects of bombing on North Vietnamese capabilities.
(This was a followup to an 18 September Fulbright request for an alleged
Agency estimate on the subject mentioned by Tad Szulc in the 13 September
New York Times.) I reminded Marcy that, as stated in the Director's
letter to Fulbright on 22 September, there was no Agency estimate
corresponding to the description contained in the Szulc story. I said
we obviously couldn't undertake to give Fulbright everything we had
relating to the effects of bombing and the ability of North Vietnam to
carry on. Marcy admitted that the latest Fulbright letter represented
a "fishing expedition" but asked whether we couldn't respond by letter
which said simply that "the current Agency assessment is that the
bombing has had such and such an effect. " He said we could, of course,
classify such a letter as highly as we wished. I said we'd see what we
could do.
25X1
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(/ i-` ..,.,, -% Iy
J. W. FULBRIGHT. ARK., CHAIRMAN
'OHN SPARKMAN, ALA. GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT. CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO JOIIN SHERMAN COOPER, KY.
'STUART SYMINGTON, MO. JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I. HUGH SCOTT, PA.
GALE W. MCGEE, WYO. JAMES B. PEARSON, KANS.
EDMUND 8. MUSKIE, MAINE CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR., VA.
CARL MARCY, CHIEF OP STAFF
ARTHUR M. KUHL, CHIGP CLERK
Cnf.eb'Stccez Zonate,
COMNIIT IZa ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
October 3, 1972
The Honorable
Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Helms:
On September 18 I wrote you that I would appreciate
it if you could arrange to have a Central Intelligence
Agency report, which Mr. Tad Szulc of the New York Times
reported had been made available to him, also made avail-
able to me. You replied on September 22 that after a
thorough review of your files you were unable to identify
any Agency report which fit the description given by
Mr. Szulc.
I would assume that there are reports, studies,
analyses, notes, memoranda or documents characterized
in some other way prepared in August by your Agency
which assessed the effects of the bombing on North
Vietnamese military capabilities. I gather from your
letter that you do not know which intelligence officials
made available which particular document to Mr. Szulc.
Since you are not able to identify any particular Agency
document, I would appreciate it if you could arrange to
make available to me whatever documents were prepared by
the_Central Intelligence Agency on this subject in August.
Sincerely yours,
. W. _ Fulbright
Chairman
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rExecutive Registry I
22 S.P191Z
The Honorable J. W. Fuibright, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
My dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your letter of 18 September
requesting that we make available to you a CIA report
mentioned by Mr. Tad Szulc in his New York Times article
of 13 September. A thorough review of our files fails to
identify any Agency report which fits the description given
by Mr. Szulc. Since we do not know the identity of the
"intelligence officials" cited in the article, we are not able
to specify the material to which your request refers.
Sincerely,
. Ric~lard liar
Richard Helms
Director
Distribution:
Orig. Addressee
1 -DCI
1 - DDCI
1~~- Ems./Dir
C -ER
1 MOGC
1 "C
~ OLC:
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-"i
 Approved For Release 20"d4Y6~ Y17':6W-IkbO~4t00415R000100.120019-4?
20 September 1972
MEMORANDUM .FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Senator Fulbright's 18 September 1972 Letter
1. I have just received (from Mr. Maury) a copy of Senator Fulbright's
18 September 1972 letter to you asking for "the Central Intelligence Agency
report, on which Mr. Szulc's (13 September) article was based."
2. As you may be aware, a similar (probably identical) letter has
25X1
been sent to the Secretary of Defense. Shortly after lunch today (20 September),
and before I was aware that Senator Fulbright had written you,
of DIA called me to solicit help in preparing a DIA memorandum for Secretary
Laird to assist the Secretary in answering a letter from Senator Fulbright.
According to Fowler, Fulbright had asked Laird to identify and furnish copies
of the DIA and CIA reports mentioned in Szulc's 13 September New York Times
article. has probably not seen the actual letter, hence his account
of it may not be completely accurate.)
. 3.0 said a thorough search of DIA's records and files had
.failed to turn up any DIA report or study similar to that described by Szulc.
He then asked if there was any such CIA report. If so, could he please have
the title, date and (if at all possible) a copy. In levying this request, 25X1
grumbled a bit saying that the Agency never seemed to send DIA our Indochina
studies any more, hence DIA did not know what we were saying or producing.
I ignored that crack and not wishing to sprinkle any gasoline on that ember,
simply told 0(fudging slightly) that we too had searched our files and
had no candidate for the Szulc leak. I also told him (truthfully) that the
Szulc article had no verbal echoes of any prose we had ever produced and,
further, we had never thought or written in terms of a two-year time frame,
hence any paper pitched to that period could not possibly have come from us.
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 4. thanked me, adding that DIA was equally mystified by the
two-year reference, since that was a time frame they had never used either.
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then said he would recommend that the Secretary tell Senator Fulbright
he (Laird) had checked both DI 's and CIA's records, could locate no such
document and, hence, was unable to comply with the Senator's request. Here
I blew a sharp whistle, saying that for form's sake and to keep wires from
getting inadvertently crossed it would be much better if Defense handled any
senatorial (or other) queries only with reference to its own material, without
commenting on the Agency. Should we receive a similar letter from this, or
any other, Senator, we -- in turn -- would not comment on Defense.
said he agreed, would amend his recommendation accordingly and again
thanked me for my help.
25X1
25X1A
Specia Assistant tor Vietnamese Affairs
cc: Mr. Colby
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r
 4pprQ ed; FQr Release 2004/03/17 CIA-RDP74B00415Rb00100120019-4
-.:, N.J. 1
~a:.:;: caurc:{, I.J ,~o JC.HN 0,42:e:a\N s^oPeR, KY.
. lla~tT tiY!.11`.'~: ? `,10. J\CO:] IC. JAVII'3. N.Y. Cl.l1~K1RYf } I L , f ?1. FIJGH snorr, VA. I~r 9 l S, ( 1^ t 'r (~!)
C.~LG `.Y h' .. :,L lO. J\>?1 !"3 fl, F - \iRON, KANS. 1. fJ ?,. 'Y -+.y (
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LL
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k:1.IlINO :. l,i~l i~;l_ , tAAI^J!i CFI\RL.rJ H. PZ rPCY, I
WILLJA!.I D.:i,1`.ti3, t ..W. -
., .i:L !?F\:ZGY, CFI[ F OF 3iYAFP
A. KUHL, CIIIZF CLEIt}{
MMar ? Richard Helms
Director,' Central
Intelligence Agency
C,Tas.hington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Helms:
COMMITTE::E ON FOR'EIGN RELATIONS
k`WASHINGrON, D.C. 20510
Sep;-.ember lr;, 1972
I am writing in regard to a -report in the September
lath issue of the New York Times by Tad Szulc, a copy of
which is enclosed. The report refers to."separate but
concurring" studies prepared late last month by the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency
reporting that the North Vietnamese can sustain the fight-
ing in South Vietnam "at the present rate" for the next
two years despite American bombing.
The New York Times story stated that: "The substance
of the reports was made available to the New York Times
today by highly placed intelligence officials." I would
appreciate it if you could arrange to have the Central
Intelligence Agency report, on which Ir. Szulc's article
:ias based, also made available to me.
Sincerely yours,
Chairman
;1culbi ght /
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o
1-9 OW .F': UL01 W 1611"' R ~: .
By TAI) SZULC
Spedai to The New York Times
his country's two principal in-
`ic.,,
ti'iI1 wncn kat,cnriesR, ltav i5:
eludied in recent reports sub-
to the W;Bite House'ttiat
not can sustain the fighting
in South Vietnam at the pfes-
tint rate" for the next two years
iiespite the heavy American
bombing ,of North Vietnam.
separate but concurring
reports,_ prepared late last
tvnonth the Central In. 1-1
Agency and. the et'ense;
I%I:elligence Agency ;clecla ed
1,1iat although the heavy bomb
inn in the North since last'-7iJpril
tiad been successful iniil.t'ing;
itesignatcd targets; it had-fail'ed'
to meaningfully slow th`e
of men and equipment to South;
Vietnam.
A high-ranking intelligence
oi~iciai, along with others inter-
viewed this week, said, how-'
ever, that if the North had not
been heavily bombed, the North
Vietnamese could have doubled .
their operations and would
have been spared heavy losses.
"They have not been hit
fatally," he said, "but they acre .
slowly bleeding to death-even
if it takes two more years."
't'lie two intelligence agencies
Isaicl in their reports, which
were prepared for the National
Security Council, 1-1u1t I.ho over-
all re`+ull!a vii' ('he houohdnt; to
Babe hn\'r h(,en dllinlipn-indlnl;
heeun+.e ul' North Vie(ilunlc;ae
".tut iaelir!i" in keeping; troolvi
and supplies niovinh ilespi(0 t.hii
air attacks, 'Ft ~, ;~?lib ;la of
Continued on Page N2, Column 1
Approved
NEW YORK TIMES
L41U IUIJV1 LJ waJ lunuu av u" a.
tg, The New York Times tod~ y
.by highly placed intelligence
c,-s.
jnc5e offlct3ls~,ci>iirl~ daily
Lntelhgence estirnates as well as
the bombing reports, said that
all the indications were that the
mmunists were preparing
new "high-point" offensives
fik,rough out South Vietnam, v t t-
irr 30 .days
Following are -the highlights
of the current intelligence esti-
mates and findings made avail-
able by the intelligence offi-
cials:
4t, ,ome 20,000?fl'csJ,,L_ North
Uietna}nesg t1'a.op .iave infil-,
trated into south Vietnam in
the last six weeks, making an
approximate total of 100,000
regular soldiers there. Only one
training brigade is said to re-
main in North Vietnam.
4111}e, North Vietnamese now
have_ the ighest . nttmh i "of
regular .t ro-ops in the - Mekong
River da, southwest of Sat-
gon,'since the start of the war.
The total was - estimated at;
20,000to 30,000 incn compared
with 3,000 a year .ago. Most of
the infiltration has occurred)
since the start of the Commu-1
nist offensive Mardi 30-and;
intelligence officials said that
the delta now was "our biggest'
problem," as pacification pro-.,
grams had become seriously
threatened.
BOA Xtird petroleum pipeline
has 'been eonipl'clidbetween'
the Chinese fron(ier railroad
terminal of T'inpeiarr and
Ilanni, I'ho work hel;,uo in May,
after the Unileil Stales mined
Haiphong-harbor, but the ccnn-
pletion of the third pipeline be-
eame known only in recent
days.
Vietnamese leave
lxadt aildillanail pipelines south-
v an~ci from llanoi to supply
"'forces ill ,; int.ii Viet inns.
Iwo 'ii..1hpin ri;;i,tairpdipwil to
Inelligence officials, discuss-
ing the reports of the two
agencies, said that it was virtual-
ly impossible for air strikes to
cut the pipelines, which are
four inches in diameter. Two
officials said that whenever a
pipeline was hit, North Vietnam-
ese technicians turned it off
at pumping stations while rapid
repairs were made.
As for railways from China,
they said, the North Vietnam-iI
ese have to a large extent
neutralized the effects of the)
bommbing by marshaling all
avaiiae'roliing stock and man-
power.bl
The officials said that the
North Vietnamese "ant tactics"
involved moving supplies by
rail up to a bombed-out bridge
or a severed highway. The sup-
plies are then reportedly moved
by river barges, truck, bicycle
or back pack to railroad cars
waiting beyond a damaged sec-
tion of the track or a destroyed
bridge, and reloaded. At the
same time, it was noted, labor
units repair the tracks and
bridges.
`Officials' Conclusions
what they termed "a major ef-
fort" by the Communists to
bring troops and supplies into
the Mekong Delta through Cam-
bodia's Chup plantation area,
the so-called Parrot's beack
area of Cambodia, which juts
into South Vietnam west of Sai-
gon, and Route 1, the main
highway from Saigon to Pnom-
penh, Cambodia.
United ,tates intelligence
estimates are that since the
start of the Communist offen-
1e con ll QD_r-sar_hcd_: by sive at the end of March in the
tl-, mtelli&ence,agencies,,. offa- northern part of South Viet-I
ials said, was that the ' alit nam, the North Vietnamese
t ctics" tised in the moveinci t and the Vietcong have lost
qQ~t suplilics aid. the th,>:ce fzn 100,000 dead on the battlefield
Gl^,.rMioiipdipelines had. nib,:, nd in bombing attacks. The
ab1cd.the North Vietnamcs.V to South Vietnamese toll is put
I= p their-forces fighting. at 25,000 to 30,000.
hey said that frequent pilots' But intelligence officias cm-
reports of "secondary explo- phasized that both sides had
sions" along the infiltration suffered equal "qualiitative",
trails and the capture of arms losses in officers and noncom-,
and munitions caches-a 143- missioned officers.
ton cache was reported found
by South Vietnamese troops
last week-suggcsted that rna-
teriel continued moving south.
wcrd.
The "secondary explosions"
ore said to indicate that inu-
nitions depots or loaded trucks
have been hit while other far.
hove been under a1tlnck,
'I'IU+ oi'fieW said the pre=
diet oils of new rnemy offen,
lives din'iiip, Sepleniher null Off.
teher were hosed on III(, de-
Irloyinent of troops suul_hw+uil,i
the "prepaial.ion of linllacl"ir,lcl!:
by demolition unit olhcr now
technical units, captured duce-,
mciit.s and information froni de-
fectors and prisoners of war.
Them officials mpliaalzed
#lut. Ashen Vnilnv. I
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