LETTER TO MR. JOHN A. BROSS FROM ALEXANDER H. FLAX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00283R000100090022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For a ease
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
? TOP SECRET 9-1
IS) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dear John:
These are the papers I propose to send to
the EXCOM as a basis for discussion of the options
for OXCART phase-out or retention which we dis-
cussed the other day in relation to Dick Helms'
meeting with the president's Foreign, Intelligence
Advisory Board.
Sincerely,
Mr. John A. Bross
Deputy to the DCI for National
Intelligence Programs Evaluation
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
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CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING OXCART PROGRAM PHASEOUT
The actions initiated by the BoB/DoD/CIA Study of
November 1966 which resulted in the President's decision to
phase out the OXCART Program in FY-1968, were based on a
number of premises as to the operational, technical, political,
and cost factors which affected the value of continuing this
program even after a substantial military reconnaissance capa-
bility with similar vehicles (SR-71's) became available.
Although, in accordance with the original decision the removal
of the OXCART aircraft from-flight status was to have been com-
pleted by December 1967, and phaseout was to have been completed
by the end of FY-1968, several circumstances, including deploy-
ment of the aircraft to Southeast Asia, resulted in slipping
the original plan. Some of the basic premises on which the
phaseout decision was made have recently been questioned, and,
since a considerable period of time has elapsed since earlier
consideration of the issues involved, it is appropriate to
review them once more. In any event, the OXCART Program is
now at a critical point with respect to retaining all or some
of the aircraft in operational status beyond June 30, 1968,
or finalizing the decision to cease flight operations with
the remaining OXCART aircraft by June 30, 1968 and to place
the aircraft in storage thereafter.
In what follows, the various factors and issues affecting
the OXCART phaseout decision are briefly outlined. The tech-
nical and operational implications of the differences in the
OXCART and SR-71 air vehicles and sensor systems are omitted
since these have been extensively treated in earlier NRO
documents.'
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THE REQUIREMENT FOR VARIOUS TYPES
OF COVERT OVERFLIGHT CAPABILITY
(1) Probability of requirement for high-performance
covert overflight of highly defended areas (i.e., where U-2R
or drone overflight is not practical) is the expected fre-
quency of use: of the capability and its vai.ne in relation to
the cost of maintaining it, sufficient to justify the cost of
maintaing it?
(2) Probability that civilian overflight will be the
only covert overflight authorized.
(3) Possibility of providing covert civilian overflight
capability as an adjunct of SAC operation (of either SR-71's
or OXCART aircraft) under DoD management. Would this be
equally acceptable from a political viewpoint?
(4) Overseas basing. Are there foreign areas where
CIA operations with the OXCART aircraft would be acceptable
but military covert operations would not be? Is the converse
true in some areas? Is the relative acceptability of CIA vs.
military operations dependent on whether there is already an
overt U.S. military aircraft operation at the base used or in
the same country?
Would the continued OXCART operation under CIA management
be more responsive to National intelligence requirements than
SAC reconnaissance operations using SR-71's or the OXCART
aircraft?
Conversely, is the OXCART operation less responsive to
the needs of the Department of Defense,. particularly where
overflight coincides with or precedes military operations?
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Further, in uses such as North Vietnam where-covert opera-'
tion is not a consideration, is the necessity to apply covert
security measures to an operation which would otherwise be
non-covert, a handicap to effective military utilization of
the capability and reconnaissance products?
Does the CIA channel for command and control of covert
overflight operations provide to National authorities greater
and more direct control of operations in sensitive situations
which may require sudden and unexpected changes in plans?
Also, is the CIA reporting of operational incidents and un-
anticipated situations which may be of concern to National
authorities more direct and timely thanDoD's or, is DoD
command and control to be preferred since it would provide
for better integration with other DoD operated sensitive
reconnaissance activities in the same areas and might lead
to better overall assessments of local situations in light
of all related activities?
A useful covert overflight capability depends in large
measure upon constantly developing and adapting equipment,
tactics and operational procedures to insure an acceptably
low level of vulnerability for the overflight aircraft. In
the CIA all of the organizational elements required for
analysis and reaction to new threat situations are essentially
co-located and under the direct control of relatively few
senior people without numerous intermediate levels of manage-
ment and command. However, in many operational areas such as
tanker support, logistics and airlift, overseas base operation
and personnel, the OXCART program is dependent on DoD support.
In the DoD, while SAC as an operator of the reconnais-
sance activities is under direct control of the JCS, and SAC
has within it certain organic technical and operational sup-
port capability, other supporting elements such as DIA, NSA,
Air Force Security Service, Air Force Systems Command (the
System Program Office and the Foreign Technology Division) are
coupled to the operation by various direct and indirect ties,
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some of them involving several intermediate layers of command
and management. In this respect, the support of SAC strategic
reconnaissance activities is not greatly different than the
support of other military operational acti:v:i.t i;nn. Oh 1;110 25X1
other hand, there is within the DoD a much broader base
support than Thus, for example,
ay be drawn from other DoD programs
25X1 , i out the restraint of covert security, in-theatre
support for the SAC in such areas as communications, command
and control and base operations, can be more economical and
efficient. The question is whether currently provided support
is adequate for maintaining a highly invulnerable reconnais-
sance capability in the face of changing threat environments.
If necessary, it would be possible to simplify and make more
direct the channels for technical and operational support of
SAC reconnaissance by other DoD elements. However, SAC has''
not expressed either the need or desire for modifying present
arrangements.
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