OXCART/SR-71 INFORMATION FOR EXCOM MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74B00283R000100090003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 19, 1967
• Content Type: MF

19 December 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . OXCART/SR-71 Information for EXCOM
Meeting
1. This memorandum is for your information only.
2. The EXCOM meeting scheduled for 1600 hours
and theifsche
anydrevastonse-
20 December 1967 was called
out of the OXCART program
in earlier decisions should earlier wYasouremovalwill
that the schedule agreed or early February so
OXCART from Kadena in hate Jr and assume responsibility
that the SR-71 could be in place
15 February. It was further
for North Vietnam missions by
? reed that we would mh 68 and o thattallaaircraftlwouldt 25X1
31 March 19 19
0
through
aced in storage immediately racticablearch and
closed as soon thereafter as p
3. During the last couple of months a number of activities
have been carried out to determine readiness of ththee
to take on the mission and or ues-
capabilities of the OXCART aof?thehvulnerability of
tions addressed were a comparison the two aircraft in theeofntheecamerasnandtotheroonh
Vietnam, and a comparison d and board equipment. Both studies have beenbcompldted and we
presume that the EeOMswill tzingrthelresults of the
t iie results. A Pap
USAF review(s) completed.
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0 NRO review(s) completed.
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studies has been made available for our review.
4. On the question of vulnerability, we went into
the study knowing that the OXCART had a significant
advantage in that it had three different proven jamming
systems available for use with an option to use any
appropriate combination of two on a given flight. The
SR-71 had no proven countermeasure system available for
use. As a result of the debates on vulnerability, the
SR-71 project office looked into a wide variety of equip-
ment and at the moment appears to have settled on using
one of our jammers plus a new Air Force jammer that is
in the experimental stage. In a computer simulation it
appears that if these jammers actually perform to
specification they will remove any advantage we had on
vulnerability and in fact some numbers would argue that
they might provide a slight improvement. It is important
to stress, however, that one of these jammers had never
been put on the SR-71 and our experience shows that a large
number of technical problems have.to be resolved before
reliability is assured. Therefore, on this point we must
note that if the jammer arrangement works as planned, the
SR-71 will probably be able to survive in the North
Vietnam environment, but based on our experience we think
it foolish to commit the aircraft until thorough testing
has been completed. We have serious doubts that such
tests could be accomplished before the February date.
5. As to the so-called sensor evaluation, the com-
parison is clearer. Our camera covers some 63 miles in a
single swath with resolutions varying from about 1-1/2
feet directly under the aircraft up to about 4-1/2 feet
at the edges. Of course this isa proven capability with
22 missions flown and only 1 case in which a part of the
mission did. not result in a completely satisfactory camera
operation. The SR-?71 has 3 camera systems plus a
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ven ona cameras are called: Terrain Objective
Operational Objective, and Technical Objective. 'The first
of these, the Terrain Objective, is a mapping system and
has no significance as an intelligence gathering device.
The Operational Objective has about the same resolution
as our camera but covers only some 23 miles even.though
2 cameras are used. The Technical Objective was designed
to be a high resolution system to allow spot coverage of
individual targets
The tech camera cl even come close to
performing-up to specifications and I think it will be
agreed that it has'no real capability to be helpful on the
North Vietnam coverage.
To ac ieve compara e
coverage e would have to fly two to three times
as many missions. More important, however, is the fact
that our schedule has been totally dictated by weather and
it just isn't possible to fly three times as much as we
have been doing unless you want to fly 2 or 3 aircraft on
the same day. Our experience indicates that such a schedule
would require 6 or more aircraft at Kadena rather than
the 3 which we have been using. In any case, the cost per
target coverage would clearly go up and we think by a
factor of 3 or more.
6. I presume that a number of questions will be
directed to you by Mr. Nitze. I have tried to anticipate
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 a few of the most likely to help you in responding.
a. QUESTION: Is it possible for the Agency to
continue-`moo operate the OXCART beyond the dates when
operations are now scheduled to be terminated?
b. ANSWER: Yes, it is possible to continue
operationsh the OXCART program if the decision
to extend is reached now and additional funds are
made available. However, even at this point in time
our capability is becoming marginal indeed. We have
already phased out 101 people and no replenishment is
planned. Extension would necessitate immediate steps
to acquire additional qualified personnel, particularly
from the U. S. Air Force. Our spare parts picture
is also marginal and orders placed even today would
not provide various critical parts for several months.
We would probably have to resort to cannibalism of
some other aircraft until new parts are delivered.
Although the contractors have been extremely co-
operative, they, too, have been losing key personnel
who are not interested in tying a career to a dying
program. The contractors will need heat to keep
enough qualified people on the program. The period
involved in an extension is very critical. I feel
strongly 3 months, i.e., through the end of the fiscal
year, is the absolute minimum practicable and I
consider it debatable whether an extension should be
accepted unless for a considerably longer period. A
day-to-day operation of this program is just not
practical and I think we have been extremely fortunate
that the morale of the people has remained sufficiently
hi
gh to support a reliable operation. One more short
extension in my view is a bit too much and have great
a. QUESTION: Would you consider it a serious loss
if the OXCART is brought home and the SR-71 is not
successful in carrying out the type missions now being
flown?
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b. ANSWER: Yes, it would be a significant loss
in that s ou d the SR-71 for any reason fail to
provide the coverage now provided by BLACK SHIELD
we would no longer have the present degree of con-
fidence in our ability to detect the introduction of
offensive missiles in North Vietnam. This in itself
would be a serious intelligence gap; however, in
addition to the loss of an offensive missile search
capability, considerable information would be missing
on the status of North Vietnam surface-to-air missile
units, the pre-strike and post-strike coverage needed
for target planning and bomb damage assessment, and
the broad coverage of the North Vietnam logistics
network. Admittedly, low level reconnaissance could
fill some of the requirements, but at the likely
additional expense of aircraft and crews. Coverage
of the highly-defended Hanoi area would be sharply
curtailed and intelligence on the road and rail net-
work from Communist China would be seriously restricted.
BLACK SHIELD support to tactical operations has been
significant. The status of targets would be acquired
only with additional risk of more aircraft and crews.
a. QUESTION: How much additional money would be
required tO continue the OXCART program through the
end of this fiscal year?
b. ANSWER: It is estimated ew
NRO funs Wou d be required. Since has
already been allocated for FY 68, this would -,raise
the total NRO FY 68 funding to The
Irequirement for new funds is, therefore,
roughly proportionate to the total operating cost for
68.
noted that the total FY 68 estimate of
I u
is substantially below the
estimate which we previously submitted and now fore-
cast as a normal budget for 1 year. This is because,
in consonance with phaseout guidelines, we have allowed
our stocks to diminish well below the operating level
we would have normally maintained. In addition, during
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this fiscal year we have eliminated many modifications
and updating of items that would normally have been
undertaken. The additional costs for the 3 months'
extension are as follows:
Total 3 Months'
FY 68 Extension
Aircraft maintenance and overhaul
Engine maintenance and overhaul
Maintenance modifications and overhaul
of airborne systems, etc.
Operation and maintenance F
Pilots?salaries and equipment support
FY 68 totals
Less already allocated
New funds required
a. QUESTION: How much would a full year's extension
of the program cost?
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b. ANSWER: An a he OXCART Program for
-`-' ould be n NRO funds plus
for fuel, and in CIA costs.
(This is identical to the proposed annual budget which
we presented to you on 11 December 1967.) The detail
of the funds' requirement is as follows:
Aircraft maintenance and overhaul
Engine maintenance and overhaul
Maintenance modifications and overhaul of air-
borne systems, included: cameras, navigations,
countermeasures, etc.
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Pilots' salaries and personal equipment
Total
Fuel
CIA Costs
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Operation and maintenance
a. QUESTION: Do you think it likely that require-
ments for -` use of this type aircraft will develop in
areas other than North Vietnam?
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b. ANSWER: I think our planning must be on that
assumption. ou.will recall that there was a recent
request from the Commander-in-Chief Pacific to cover
North Korea with the OXCART but that request was dis-
approved by the 303 Committee. We certainly have
continued concern about our lack of photographic
coverage of South China and a situation could develop
which would dictate the use of a more advanced air-
craft there. We are still flying the U-2. b t s
restrictions and limitations have increased. As the
CHICOM Air Defense capability improves we may find
it impossible to operate the U-2 in certain parts of
China. Although I recognize that various drone
programs have been scheduled to help fill this gap,
it is my impression that none of these programs appear
to be able to take the job on today and I gather that
some of the developmental programs are having difficulty.
In addition to the Far East, I have continuing con-
cern about.the Middle East and believe we may well face
situations there in the next couple of years that will
demand extensive aerial reconnaissance. Since the
Russians have already provided good defensive equip-
ment to some of the countries of concern in this area,
I would have the same, or maybe even greater concern,
for use of U-2s or drones in that area.
a. QUESTION: Is there any real difference between
a CIA reconnaissance effort using civilian pilots and
a purely military reconnaissance program using military
pilots?
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b. ANSWER The answer to this question depends
on the world situation at the time and the actual
individuals who make up the 303 Committee. I personally
believe that there are times and situations when the
government would be willing to approve manned recon-
naissance'overflights under civilian auspices while
they would.not approve a similar operation using military
equipment and personnel. I continue, therefore, to
be concerned about totally giving up the capability
to exercise that option should the need arise. I base
this not so much on whether the pilot is a military
officer, but much more on the command control system
that would be in use. As you know, we literally direct
our manned reconnaissance program right from the
Headquarters Building and I can personally intervene
at any time even after the operation is underway. A
significant side benefit is that the people directing
the missions and the people doing the actual analysis
of the information are in constant contact and each
has a clear understanding of the other's problems,
limitations, etc. I don't see a practical way for this
kind of close relationship to exist if the operation
is carried out under regular military procedures.
Deputy Director
for
Science and,Technology
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