HITS IKE ADMISSION OF U-2 ORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R000200560006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 27, 1952
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

_ II I FP.IR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/10/25: CIA-RDP74-00297R000200560006-6
U s Ike.
Ex-Official
It Mistak
in Policy
? BY WALTER MORAN
tailease Tribune Press knife]
.Washington, July 26-iformer
President Eisenliewer'S deci-
sion to shoffckr-iesponsibility
for the U:2 spy plane flight over
Russia m-may, 1960, was
scribed 'today as lhe of
greatest diplomatic and
cal, mistakes in American
tory.
Thittlit The considered opinion
of .4ig4rew ]3,.erding, former as-
isbiift:secretary of state for
?public affairs in the Eisen-
hower. administrntion, ,In
book, "Foreign_ Oil:in and
You,'? published today by Dou-
bleday & Co.
ii3yewthessmir_rast, Bea
fwj ,li ting
ent _ennedyld
sumption of the unffridetilo
has& of, tile American ilpon-
sored 'invailen of rale admi-
rable, altho it was a major dis-
aster for the United States, in
world opinion, ?
it might later be?and the
United States high In the (pin-.
ion of the world. In that pond.'
cal euphoria generated by Pres-,
ident Eisenhower, the American
people might ,well have called,
upon his principal lieutenant
[Richard M. Nixon] to continue
the trend."
Expects More Summits
Belling holds summit confer-
ences are not the best Methods
of conducting foreign affairs,
bi4, . &Ares they are here to
stay, d that they will become
ma requent, rather than less,
of greater speed and
eomfort in travel. He also be-
lieves that diplomacy will be-
come more and more personal-
, with growing' exchanges
fs of state andlor-
,
ends the state de-
partment and its methods. He
acknowledges that too many of-
idials and go ..ent agencies
?about , 'volved in the
formulatiow can foreign
poliOy. He ? formulation
of some policies, discussing the
beneficial and the faulty.
Berding urged taking ? the
long, calm view" of foreign
policy, and predicted that the
struggle with, the communist
elite in Moscow 'and Peiping
might last half a century.
-
1
Cites Russian Response
He said? President Kennedy's
"honest public recognition [of
the disaster] smooths some of
its sliarper edgee,", adding that
"humility by the mighty shines
with double. brightness.'
*does not demonstrate
threrEfereilSinisibility was
narElie.:nboWer't4 but argues
that N. should not tave as-
sumed it personally because it
gave-IthSelan Premier Nikita S.
Khrushchev an excuse for call-
ing off the American Presi-
dent's projected return visit to
Russia.
"Here, I believe, we had the
greatest opportunity since tbe
lelshevik revolution of 19I7 to
Andrew Berding
get across to the soviet les.
a concept of Aericin
and the
Berding
"Other 'Pretexts P le"
"For one thing, we had the
dynamic capacity Of the
dent to
trowd*''i ussians
would ard hiih,
would have been- charmed by
him, hundreds vaeuld have
talked to hint liersOnallY? Mr.
Khrushchev mid not have pre-
vented great ovations by the
soviet peoples."
Berding acknowledged that
Khrushchev might have seized
upon some other pretext to
keep Eisenhower from geing to
Russia and making speeches in
MOSOW, Leningrad, and Kiev,
as was planned. He doubts that
even Khrushchev Would have
dared the unfavorable world re-
action that would have followed
cancellation on a slight pretext.
As it was, the torpedoing of
the Paris summit conference
and' the cancellation of his Rus-
sian visit was, in Berding's
opinion, "a personal tragedy"
for Eisenhower?a man of war
who svas at heart a man of
"threw a dark
h. iker the remaining
of his administration."
boesn't La Mame
n-
pe presidential de-
er than to gay it was
a coin ination of White House
and state, department view-
points.' He also acknowledges
it was forced, in considerable
part, by inept state department
and other official statements
after the U-2 was shot down
over Russia.
"If that decision had not been
made there would have been a
summit conference, the Presi-
dent would have gone to the So-
viet Union and on to Japan, re- ,
ceiving from millions of people
a reverberant ovation as a man
of peace," Berding said.
"The declining months of his
administration would have
wafted by inv an aura of good
...
ILLEGIB
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/10/25: CIA-RDP74-00297R000200560006-6