TWO STUDIES ON VIETNAM THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE VIET CONG THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1965
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Rele
State Dept. review completed
t '-'eV
0050002-1
V. $ . INT(?AMATION AG Y
TWO STUDIES ON VIFITNA14
No. 65-SM-122
November 1965
IPS/SM/HB
I
The Origins and Nature of the Viet Cong
II
The Origins and Nature of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam
NOTE TO PAOIS AND INFO OFFICERS:
The attached two articles are from Studies on Vietnam, an information hand-
book published in August, 1965, by the Government.of Australia's Department
of External Affairs, which has granted permission for reprinting in USIS
publications. If reprinted, each article must carry the notation: This
study is one of a series pre aired b the Government of Australia's Deart-
meet of External Affairs.
LENGTH: Each article contains approximately 3,500 words
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
 Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
(Editor's note: This study is one of a series prepared by the Government
of Australia's Department of External Affairs.)
THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE VIET CONG
The questions are continually asked whether the Viet Cptug and the
National Liberation Front represent a strong indigenous movement;. whether
they have the genuine support of the people of South Viet Nam; whether
they are more nationalist than Communist; and whether they are the rally-
ing point for true Vietnamese nationalism in the South.
Vietnamese Communist Party
Before the questions can be answered a brief account is required of the
history of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Historically, before the
Japanese overran the area, the Communist Party of Indo-China under Ho
Chi Minh covered the area of the component States of Viet Nam (Tonkin,
Annam and Cochin China) and, as well, Laos and Cambodia. Traditional
Vietnamese predominance within the Indo-China communist movement was
reasserted after the war. In March, 1951, a meeting was held between the
Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao and Khmer (Cambodian) Liberation Committee,
described by the pro-Viet Cong author Wilfred Burchett in his book
Mekong Upstream " (page 113) :
" On March 3, 1951, there was a Conference of representatives of the
Khmer National United Front and parallel organizations which had been
set up in Viet Nam and Laos. It was decided to set up a Viet Nam-Khmer-
Lao Alliance which called on the people of the three countries to co-
ordinate their fight to defeat the colonialists. It was on the basis of these
decisions published on March 11, 1951, that Vietnamese volunteers later
entered Cambodia and Laos to fight side by side with the Khmer Issarak
forces-by then the Khmer National Liberation army and the Pathet
Lao forces."
At the Geneva Conference of 1954, the representatives of Khmer and
Lao " resistance movements " were in a subordinate relationship to the Viet
Minh, and the senior Viet Minh military representative signed the Cam-
bodian and Laotian cease-lire agreements on their behalf. According to
Bernard Fall, '" the effective satellization of the Cambodian and Laotian
Communist movements under Vietnamese aegis was clearly illustrated at
the Geneva Conference of 1954."
Within Viet Nam, through the technique of spearheading a nationalist
movement, and with substantial Chinese material help, the Vietnamese Com-
munist Party was successful in taking over the lead in the nationalist revolu-
tionary struggle against the French. Its influence was at work over the
whole of Viet Nam and not simply in the North, although the Geneva
Agreement of 1954 confirmed its authority in the North only.
From 1954 onwards, under the leadership and control of the Vietnamese
Communist Party, North Viet Nam developed a strong military establish-
ment, converting the former guerrilla force into a large, trained standing
Army. The North Vietnamese Forces now possess technical skills and know-
ledge for conventional operations as well as the background experience of
guerrilla' warfare and political indoctrination. Its aims and activities have
not been confined to North Viet Nam.
In Laos, where racially the Vietnamese are distinguishable from the local
peoples, indeed are disliked and feared by the local people, North Viet Nam
has nevertheless maintained constant pressure and interference against the
legitimate Laotian Government through assisting the dissident Pathet Lao
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
 Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
THE, ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE VIET CONG
with Vietnamese cadres and troops. In a recent statement Prince Souvanna
Phouma, the neutralist Prime Minister of Laos, who has intimate, personal
knowledge derived from direct association with the Pathet Lao, declared:
" It is true that North Vietnamese troops have played a leading part
in the fighting during the civil war which has been going on for more than
20 years as -I myself can confirm from the time I spent in Khang Khay.
The Pathet Lao who at the start had only two battalions or about 1200
men at their command can hardly claim they were in a position to over-
come Government forces of more than 20,000. Indeed if the Pathet Lao
have` not disappeared from the scene it is because of the support they
have received- from their North Vietnamese ally, who has maintained,
armed, trained and officered the Pathet Lao forces in their guerrilla activi-
ties. Here lies the secret of the interminable crisis of Laos. There is no
need to look any further for the reasons why a political party, originally
made up of an insignificant handful of Marxist revolutionaries, should
have survived."*
If North Viet Nam is prepared to commit itself to such a degree in Laos,
it can be no surprise that it has so deeply involved itself in South Viet Nam
where, in fact, some areas were always strongholds of the Vietnamese Com-
munist Party. While the Geneva Agreement drew a demarcation line
between North and South and provided for the existence of separate admin.is-
trations in the two zones, the leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party
in Hanoi never saw this as deterring the prosecution of what they call the
" Vietnamese revolution ", that is the struggle for communist control of the
whole of Viet Nam. The emergence of a non-communist Government in
the South, in the nature of things, was almost bound to be faced with the
challenge of Communist insurrection and attack.
Background of the Viet Cong
The post-war environment of Viet Nam, South as well as North, offered
favourable circumstances to a militant and revolutionary movement. The
period was characterised by the disturbance of war and violence; by a back-
ground of alien colonial rule which had failed to produce an effective
successor nationalist administration; by traditional rural indifference, if not
aversion. to a remote, urban Central Government; and by the existence of
ethnic minorities living in conditions of isolation and backwardness. :In
respect of communications, roads, bridges and railways, the conditions for
rapidly knitting together the country did not exist. The greater part of the
country being deep swamp, rain forest, or jungle, provided great advantages
of natural cover for a guerrilla movement. The Communists, veterans in
guerrilla tactics and organization in an Asian environment, were experienced
and knowledgeable in using and exploiting these conditions.
After the Geneva Agreement of 1954 was concluded, it has been estimated
that about 100,000 persons moved to the North, under the provisions on
free movement of peoples and regrouping, while other hard core Com-
munists remained and hid their weapons. Those who stayed organized
secretly and from the outset developed a campaign of subversion and
sabotage but not on a scale which was a serious security threat. Many of
those who went North, Southerners by birth and Communist by conviction,
were further trained and indoctrinated within the Party, taking part in the
work of consolidating the Party control over the North.
We can only speculate as to why North Viet Nam waited until 195'9
before committing itself to the stepping-up of insurgency on a vast scale in
* " North Vietnamese Interference in Laos" issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Vientiane, 5th December, 1964.
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
 Approved For-Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF 71-!1 VIET CQKG
the South. The reasons may have included the fact that South Viet Nam
had not fal'?n apart and disintegrated (and, on the contrary, was making
economic progress) ; and they may have been related to compulsions at
work withiii the Communist leadership in Hanoi. We don't precisely know.
At some t'.me In 1959 Hanoi decided to intensify the insurgency in the
South ana persons of Southern origin in the North Vietnamese Armed
Forces, na,w with more than five years' service in the Army, highly trained
in conventional and guerrilla operations, were sent to special politico-military
training camps and then infiltrated into the South. The great majority had
served with the Viet Minh in the struggle against the French. They became
the backbtgne of the Viet Cong movement in the South and provided it with
an experienced revolutionary organization and leadership. They came to
the South, indoctrinated with the Marxist ideology of the North Vietnamese
region, with a sense of mission of throwing out the " American imperialists "
as they had the French before them. (It should be noted that the American
military advisory mission in the South numbered only between 600 and 700
men in the middle of 1961.
These men, too, were the fathers, elder brothers, or uncles of younger
men in the South, many of whom-according to prisoner reports-regarded
them as heroic Viet Minh fighters against the French. As is to be expected
with a movement which is Communist in origin, Communist control has
remained absolute. It is estimated from the interrogation of prisoners that
almost all the officers of the Viet Cong regular force are Party members.
Membership of the People's Revolutionary Party of South Viet Nam and
the Vietnamese Communist Party, the Lao Dong, based on Hanoi, is inter-
changeable and seniority in one counts as service seniority in the other.
(For a discussion of the People's Revolutionary Party see the companion
study, " The Nature and Origins of the National Front of Liberation of
South Viet Nam ". )
Out of total population of 15,000,000 in the South, the Viet Cong
number in the neighbourhood of 160,000. Some 45,000 are in regular
military combat units and about 15,000 are in regular rear supporting units
and reserves. There are from 80,000 to 100,000 irregulars who take part in
guerrilla fighting in their own provinces. Since 1959, over 40,000 persons
have joined the Viet Cong through infiltration from the North. More
recently, the infiltrees have been persons of Northern and not Southern
descent, as this source of Southern manpower has been depleted. (Entire
formed units of the North Vietnamese Army have also been introduced in
the co'irse of this year, but they are outside the scope of this study.)
Recruitment and Expansion of the Viet Cong
How have the Viet Gong attracted and maintained recruits? As already
stated, the process of building the movement began from the existence of
the large number of professional Communist cadres and their re-activation
in a skilled revolutionary organization in the South. Once begun, the Viet:
Cong effort was organized along standard Communist lines; with prospects
of advancement within the structure for the capable recruit; and with the
exercise of a disciplinary system of the " cell. " or " three-three " group.
Such units were used earlier in the Chinese Communist Army. Under the
leadership of the most politically mature and experienced man, these groups
of three live, work and confide fully in each other and pledge their
inseparability " in work, combat and death ". Criticism and self-criticism
sessions are held daily, usually at the " three-three " cell level, but
occasionally even up to the battalion level,
:3
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
 Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP74-00248A000500050002-1
THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE VIFT CO IG
Some areas in the South, for exa.mpc the