LETTER TO(Sanitized) FROM BRIAN HESSLER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000500100006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 26, 1970
• Content Type: LETTER

BILL BRO K COMMITTEE ON
9D DISTRICT, TEN d-oved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP73B00296R00050010000~A~ COMMIT ERRENCY
115 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
PHONE. [phone]
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
June 26, 1970
JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE
This came in the mail. Thought you might be in-
terested.
Very truly yours,
41
i"~~-ate
BRIAN HESSLER
Administrative Assistant
BH:oh
enclosure
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 Spread patriotic a ar ess. 'r ul this ' sue o IFE LINES. for 25~.
A P A T R I O T I C
VOICE OF FREEDOM
LIFE LINES
Vol. 12 #75
June 26, 1970
Cuba's Spy Network
OI1afl1QcatX.QJj),cjgo, 32, was born
in Cuba's Oriente Province. When Fidel
Castro captured the attention of hopeful
Cubans as a colorful rebel leader op-
posing Batista, Orlando Castro (no relation
to Fidel) joined the rebel army. After
Batista fled, Orlando Castro was recruited
into the intelligence organization known
as the General Directorate of Intelligence
(DGI) which has agents throughout Latin
America. DGI has since grown to the point
of placing agents in European countries
and even in Stockholm.
Orlando was sent to Paris to handle
the day-to-day flow of agents passing
through from capitals all over the world
as they practiced their trade-gathering
information from contacts from Africa to
Peru.
He defected to the United States when
he requested asylum March 31, 1969, at
the American Embassy in Luxembourg.
He was summoned to testify before the
Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Internal
Security Oct. 16, 1969.
"I disassociated myself from the Cuban
revolution because it delivered Cuba as a
colony of the Soviet Union. I saw an economy
floundering, maintained only by the tre-
mendous sacrifice and long hours of labor
of the average Cuban who wanted a better
life for his children. I saw a people
deceived."
In his testimony, printed in the Sub-
committee report, Communist Threat to the
United States Through the Caribbean, Part.
20, Orlando revealed the DGI's heavy-
handed influence in guerrilla activity in
Castro's
Latin America andthe "new tactics" govern-
ing guerrilla warfare since Che Guevara's
misadventure and death in Bolivia.
One of the best examples of DGI
guerrilla-oriented operations was to ex-
filtrate Col. Francisco Caamano Denofrom
Europe to Cuba in October 1967.
Caamano was the president of the Red-
backed government in the Dominican Re-
public following the Dominican revolution
of April 1965. In October 1967, Caamano
disappeared from his military attache post
in London.* He disappeared because he went
to Cuba with the help of the DGI.
What happened was this. He disappeared
from The Hague where he was visiting the
night of October 24, 1967. He came to
Paris the next day where Orlando Castro
saw him. Orlando's role was to watch
Caamano walk down the street to make
sure that he wasn't followed. When he saw
that he was not, he waved to another opera-
tive who was waiting in a nearby cafe and
who telephoned ahead to an important DGI
officer known by the pseudonym., Armando,
who was waiting a few blocks away.
Armando had come from Havana to
Paris especially to direct the Caamano
operation. He was accompanied by Julian
Lopez Diaz, the Dominican Republic desk
officer of the DGI, and both of them had
entered France with false passports and
went to Geneva a few days before Caamano
arrived in Paris, returning in time for
*Leftwing and rightwing figures had been shuffled out
of the Dominican Republic in an effort to remove "disturbing
influences" after U.S. troops landed in Santo Domingo in April
1965.
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 Caamano's arri0RFrRY8AJ;ff %%a VRP61i 91
stop for Caamano and Armando who left
Paris by train on October 26th. Orlando
knew about the operation, because he had
to fly to Prague on October 27 to deliver
Armando a passport which he had forgotten
and left in Paris. Armando, who used two
false passports in this operation, needed the
forgotten one to get from Prague to Havana.
It is interesting to note that during this
operation Caamano wore a toupee and had
shaved his mustache. This whole operation
as well as subsequent activities of Caamano
was known as "Operacion Estrella."
The most important thing Orlando re-
members about Julian Lopez is that he ran
a very ad operation in Mexico-which led
to the Mexican authorities forcing him to
leave the country in 1966. Julian Lopez
was supporting the shipment of arms to
revolutionaries in Guatemala across the
Mexican-Guatemalan border. The Mexican
authorities discovered this and arrested
Julian Lopez who was carrying thousands
of dollars at the time. Orlando is hazy
about this venture, but was told by DGI
colleagues never to discuss the operation
in front of Julian Lopez or to mention
it to him. Apparently Julian Lopez became
nearly hysterical anytime the operation was
mentioned.
Orlando says DGI support of revolu-
tions is shown by past activities in Vene-
zuela. He became aware of some of these
operations while in Paris. During the first
three months of 1969, he knew of 15
Venezuelans who came through Paris from
Caracas on their way to guerrilla training
in Cuba, but personally participated in op-
erations with nine of them. He helped mem-
bers of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Cuba return via Paris
from a tour of duty with the Vene-
zuelan guerrillas. He arranged lodging,
got money to buy tickets to fly to Prague
and obtained Czechoslovakian visas to
Prague. All the Cubans were traveling on
false Venezuelan passports.
9jjraHDFJo3WRW 0-VRWRWR because the
guerrillas were exhausted and discouraged
by lack of success. He expected the Venezue-
lans to quit, and only the Cubans could main-
tain the guerrilla struggle. Guerra said that
it was necessary to start guerrilla actions,
in order to provoke Caldera's government
into repressive measures. Only in this man-
ner could the Venezuelan guerrillas be
forced to continue the struggle.
Guerra and others commented criti-
cally on a split in the Venezuelan guerrillas.
They said that Douglas Bravo was not a
real revolutionary and they even suspected
that he used Cuban-supplied money to buy
a factory and an apartment house. They also
said that Luben Petkoff,_ a._ fQxmer. aide of
Bravo, was nowfightingunder Cuban leader-
ship. They mentioned that Petkoff wasn't
that good a soldier but at least he followed
Cuban leadership. The leader of the Vene-
zuelan guerrillas who followed the Cuban
line was a Cuban known by the pseudonym
of "Antonio."
"Antonio" arrived at the Machurucuto
landing in May of 1967 and had earned
the respect of Venezuelan guerrillas be-
cause of his "combative spirit" and leader-
ship qualities.
(A number of Cuban guerrillas were
landed by sea at Machurucuto, Venezuela,
in May 1967. Some of the Cubans were
killed at that time and some escaped into
the mountains. The ship which landed the
guerrillas was the Cuban fishing vessel,
Sierra. It is still an active ship of the
Cuban fishing fleet.)
There has been. a great deal of public
speculation about changes in guerrilla
strategy since the failure of the Cuban
operation in Bolivia in 1967 and the death
of "Che" Guevara. Orlando discussed the
strategy with the central committee mem-
bers who came through Paris and with
Armando Lopez after his return from his
important trip to Havana during the winter
of 1968-69. Orlando prepared a summary
of this strategy:
Orlando discussed strategy in Venezuela
with Orestes Guerra Matos, Central Com- "The strategy of fidelismo for the export
mittee member, other. Cubans and Venezue- of the revolution to Latin America has
lans. Guerra told Orlando that Venezuela's not changed, but the tactics have. There
pacification p rojg0 v 'c9 #oj a t `3I~:'1 : eW-R&PT%~2'6ERt% R 1010& "ntity, which
 TESTIMONY REVEALS:
Don't Look Now Senores-your Cover is Broken!
Orlando. It is interesting to note that all
ambassadors to Africa are actually DGI officers.
In fact, nearly all Cuban officials, if not all, in
Africa are DGI officers under Ministry of Foreign
Relations cover. -
Mr. Sourwine. All the ambassadors in Africa?
Orlando. All the ambassadors in Africa are
DGI officers except that of Syria, I believe....all
ambassadors are center chiefs, I know that because
they all passed through Paris.
Mr. Sourwine, Why Africa? Why are all the
ambassadors actually DGI officers?
Orlando. Because the DGI is interested in
fomenting revolutions in Africa, but Ministry of
Foreign Relations has no interest in Africa because
there are no commercial or diplomatic objectives
in black Africa. -..
In Paris, the DGI recruited Francisco Ramos,
the counselor, as a DGI collaborator. This recruit-
ment was considered very important because it
was the first one.... Ramos' DGI pseudonym
is "Flores" and he now owes his loyalty to the
chief of center, not the ambassador, even though
the ambassador doesn't know, it.
Mr, Sourwine. Anything you wish to add on
the DGI in Europe?
they want to turn into quality. This is in
regards to the number of guerrillas that
will go to Cuba for training. Past mistakes
and failures have made them meditate
very much in this sense.
"Current and future guerrillas will be
carefully and meticulously selected. What
shall not be repeated in the future: anarchic
and massive training of guerrillas; training
Orlando. I know a few officers. The DGI
chief of center in Vienna, Austria, is Armando
Galan.
Mr. Sogrwiue. II'hy would the DGI want- a
center in I'icnrrl?
Orlando. 1 really don't kuote except to repeat
that the DGI is very arrrbitious. I hear they are
going to open it DGI center in Stockholm evert.
Mr. Sourwjne..4Ir. 'ar_ barltia (Sit bconnrrr.zttec-
Chief Investigator), do you know anything about
that?
Mr. Tarabochia. Well, I think that has hap-
pened. The DGI officer in The Hague, Aldo
Rodrigue. Camps, ;vas just transferred to Stock-
Kohn. Undoubtedly, he is opening up the espionage
center in Stockholm....
Orlando. The DGI has very large centers in-
Paris, Madrid, Rorne, and Mexico City. There are'
one- or two-man posts in nearly alI other countries
where Cuba has any foreign policy objectives.
London, Vienna, and African countries are some
examples. Also, I was told that there are in'ipQrtant
DGI centers in Canada and New York. I was
told that every officer assigned to the Cuban
United DJlssion in New York, except the per-
manent representative (Alarcon), is a DGI of-
ficenric
for Leonel Brizola, the former Brazilian
governor; training of guerrillas who might
be capable of disobeying fidelismo, such as
Thiago de Mello, former Brazilian diplomat.
From past experiences they will continue
with the training of natives from every
Latin-American country, but surely under
the slogan of 'less quantity and more
quality.'
of men who respond to guerrilla leaders who "Cuban combatants will be sent only when
do not follow the Cuban line and disapprove a guerrilla has reached the advanced stage
sending Cubans to Latin America; training and when the natives themselves `ask' for
of guerrillas who follow Douglas Bravo's them. But if Fidel is interested in a specific
line; training of men who maintain a passive country he will always find natives who
attitude, such as the ones who were trained will ask for the help of Cuban combatants,
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 Approver ae e( 1 }SCObeRtW7kiM9&0&b'0100006-0
LIFE LINES
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"The Cubans are under orders to stay
no matter what, even in cases like Vene-
zuela, where Douglas Bravo, the guerrilla
leader, fears that the Cubans will try
to direct the guerrilla and, therefore, has
categorically stated that he does not accept
the Cubans. In spite of that, the Cubans
remain there under the command of a
Cuban named Antonio. This is what Cuban
comandantes of the Central Committee
have said when they stopped in Paris after
several years with the Venezuelan
guerrillas.
"Cubans will go to the guerrillas as
simple soldiers, without rank and without
demanding `political and military com-
mand,' for they are under instructions to
control the guerrillas by their political and
guerrilla warfare knowledge. This is how
the leaders will emerge. Example, Antonio
in Venezuela.
"They will not repeat the impositions
of Che, who said in Bolivia: `I am the
political-military leader of the guerrillas.'
"They will not give an international
character to the guerrillas until the unit
the conditions themselves at the right time
and whenever it is to their advantage.
"They are going to continue helping
guerrilla movements in several countries,
which will cause a division of forces. In
this way there will be no possibility of
destroying a successful but isolated revo-
lution. Here they will follow Che's theory
of creating `one, two, many Vietnams.'
"Fundamentally, the revolution is made
in the countryside and not in the city be-
cause the political-military command of
the guerrillas has to be in the countryside.
The political command 'in the city and the
military command in the countryside is
disastrous. According to Fidel, he is not
opposed to urban guerrillas, but neither
does he think that this is fundamental.
"Surely there is going to be a change in
relations between Fidel and the oldpolitical
parties. In his agreement with the Soviets
he promised he would not publicly defame
those parties. The Soviets warned Fidel
that public criticism of the old Communist
parties was creating anticommunism in
Latin America; also, because they are well
organized, they cannot be excludedfromthe
struggle.
has reached a solid, advanced stage. The "Because this is a recent agreement it
natives themselves must be the first ones is impossible to know much about it, but
to ask for help from other revolutionary the results will be seen in actual
movements. Sure! The Cubans will create practice."**
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