CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE RE: MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

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October 5, 1971
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Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Oi:tobr 5, 1971 winding down this war when, since the administration has taken office, it has sustained one-third of all the casualties in this war-one-third. That is winding down the war? I can only think of the statement made--and I salute my colleague from Vermont for underscoring the crassness of it-that if the President does end the war he has still promised to pull the rug out from under the doves after July 1, because that will be a political ploy as- sociated with his reelection. How terrible to make a statement-if Members want to defend this person making the statement, they can-but how terrible it must be to realize the full import of a statement that says, in April 1971, "I will pull the rug out, some time in 1972, from under the doves." What happens is that, in the mean- time, we are maiming and crippling so many human beings, until it is conven- ient or advantageous to pull out that rug. To my mind, that is the greatest im- morality that can be perpetrated. I think we would have greater honesty and greater justice if, as the Senator from South Carolina alluded, we took an H- bomb-one could not do it because we have already dropped more bombs on Southeast Asia than three, four, or five H-bombs-but if we took an H-bomb and laid Indochina waste completely, then we are sure that we would win, sure that we would be giving those people freedom and democracy although there would not be anyone there to enjoy it. That is, of course, exactly what we are doing now. The reason why we cannot use H- bombs to annihilate these people is that it would be morally incomprehensible to us. It would find no moral approbation anywhere in the world. In fact, it would place upon us a blot of unbelievable pro- portions. So what do we do? We do not use H- bombs, because that 'would be doing it too quickly, too efficiently, and too intel- ligently. So over a period of time we drop conventional bombs--bombs of a sort that when we realize the quantity of them, we can-appreciate it. During the Second World War we dropped over 2 million tons of bombs. During the Korean war, 600,000 tons. We have already amply surpassed that in Indochina. We have amply surpassed our bombing record of World War II and the Korean war. Upon this little country we have dropped several equivalent hydrogen bombs in terms of destructive energy. Yet no one stands up and rails about it. Why? Because the bombing of Laos was concealed from the American people; 350,000 sorties were concealed from the American people and basically from Congress until March of 1970. In the past 12 years we have doubled our efforts at bombing Laos. People have the gall to stand on the floor and say that we are winding down the war. The only reason we do not use our intelligence to do this efficiently is because we cannot find the moral appro- bation. I submit that moral approbation is not there either when we do it on a piecemeal, surgical basis. That moral ap- probation will not be there, 5, 10, 50 or 1,000 years from now, because this part of American history will stand out as our darkest hour. Mr. President, I yield the. floor and yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered? Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I request the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there a sufficient second? There is not a sufficient second. Mr. STENNIS. W. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER, Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays are ordered. The question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 433) of the Senator from Alaska. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I an- nounce that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Okla- homa (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Sen- ator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Me- GOVERN), the Senator from New Hamp- shire (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WIL- LIAMS) are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) would vote "yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTis), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent. The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness. The Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) are detained on offi- cial business. If present and voting, the Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Nebraska IMr. CURTIS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TowER) would each vote "nay." The result was announced-yeas 19, nays 64, as follows: I No. 250 Leg.I YEAS-19 Bayh Hatfield Moss Brooke Hughes Nelson Cranston Inouye Pell Eagleton Kennedy Proxmire Fulbright Mansfield 8chweiker Gravel Mathlas Hartke Metcalf NAYS- -G4 Aiken Ervin 'e Cy Allen Fong adolph Allott Gambrell -t; .,)coff Anderson Griffin t+ ..h Baker Gurney r ?c be Bennett Hansen >tt Bentsen Hart -,r 47th Bible Hruska ?,) irkman Brock Humphr)'y tir ong Buckley Jackson ?i) Lftord Burdick Javits i Innis Byrd, W. Va. Jordan, N.C. 3 evens Case Jordan, Idaho - evenson Chiles Magnuson mington Church McClellan t oft Cook McGee I ?imadge Cooper Miller I 'urmond Cotton Mondale I coney Dole Muskie V Picker Dominick Packwood S 'ung Eastland Pastore Ellender Pearson NOT VOTING r Beall Fannin I' cIntyre BelImon Goldwater tontoya Boggs Harris ^ , undt Byrd, Va. Hollings ewer Cannon Long dliams Curtis McGovern So Mr. GRAVEL'S amend nont (No. 433) was rejected. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. Pry ;i tent, I move to reconsider the vote -.vhereby the amendment was not agr. =e.i to.. Mr. THURMOND. M President, I move to lay that motion ,r the table. The motion to lay or tie table wasi agreed to. REFERRAL OF A BILL 70, COMMIT- TEE ON THE JU A?.;IARY Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, i': esident, I ask unanimous consent that 1 ,ill introduced today by the Senator . rI in West Vir- ginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) Cl mitting com- mercial banks to under r.te water and sewer revenue bonds be referred to the Committee on the Judi ?i: ry. I think I have cleared this matte, a.I around, and I make that request. The PRESIDING )k F'ICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there objet ;o n? The Chair hears none, and it is s . )rdered. MILITARY PROC it ',EMENT AUTHORIZAT!, S, 1972 The Senate continuer with the con- sideration of the bill (1 L. 8687) to au- thorize appropriations i 1 ring the fiscal year 1972 for procure) aeoit of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, t acked combat vehicles, torpedoes, an ether weapons, and research, develo) meent, test and evaluation for the Ar m d Forces, and to prescribe the aut< )) !red personnel strength of the Selecte;?.eserve of each Reserve component of ? if Armed Forces, and for other purposes. The PRESIDING 0 p [CER. Accord- ing to the previous ord -, the Senate will now proceed to cons :t( r amendments Nos. 447, 448, and 449 b' tie Senator from New York (Mr. BucxL Y ; . What is the please- of the Senator from New York? Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. iD esident, I yield to the Senator from 1V )I tana. AMENDMENT 0 447 The PRESIDING Ol F CER. The clerk will read the amendmf - l Mr. STENNIS. Mr. r nsident, may we Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 S 15874 Approved For eW g96ffi0L1 Rffl WW73ft" V0003000800 "- 5, 1971 Fiscal 1972 Cut Program spend- ing (bil- lions) below level (per- cent) Hold at level (per- cent) Increase level (per- cent) 1. National defense-- 76.0 57.0 36.0 7.0 2. Foreign aid ------- 4.1 81.6 16.4 2.0 3.Space ------ ----- 3.3 57.4 34.6 8.0 4. Farm ------------- 9.6 39.0 47.8 13.2 5. Public works 2.3 14.2 54.7 31. 1 6. Housing and urban develop- ment----------- 3.7 16.7 38.1 45.2 7. Education-------- 5.2 13.2 46.4 40.4 8. Health___________ 3.1 5.0 40.1 54.9 9. Social security_..__ 4.3 5.0 43.0 52.0 10. Welfare---------- 11.4 48.4 35.2- 16.4 11. Veterans--------- 10.7 9.0 59.4 31.6 CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time fixed for the transaction of routine morning business has expired. MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE A message from the House of Repre- sentatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its read- ing clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 10880) to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide improved medical care to veterans; to provide hospital and medical care to cer- tain dependents and survivors of vet- erans; to improve recruitment and reten- tion of career personnel in the Depart- ment of Medicine and Surgery, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate. MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972 The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state. The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropria- tions during the fiscal year 1972 for procure- ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces and to pre- scribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve com- ponent of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. AMENDMENT NO. 433 The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). There is a time limitation of 2 hours on the amendment. Without objection, the text of the pending amendment will be printed in the RECORD. The amendment (No. 433) is as follows: TITLE VI-CESSATION OF BOMBING IN INDOCHINA SEC. 601. (a) No funds authorized or appro- priated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, oy otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Viet- nam, and the Kingdom of Laos. (b) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Repub- lic of Vietnam unless the President deter- mines any such air operation to be necessary to provide for the safety of United States Armed Forces during their withdrawal from Indochina. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi- dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time 1)e equally charged against both sides. -The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- out objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alaska. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, while we deliberate today in this Chamber Amer- ican planes will ease into the sky over Southeast Asia. They will drop tons of explosives, guided to the flesh of hu- man beings by the most elaborate and impersonal technology. Hovering over Laotian rice fields, the A-119 Stinger gunship can put a piece of shrapnel into every square foot of an area the size of a football field. On the ground are 3 million Laotians, the heaviest bombed people in the his- tory of warfare. They will huddle in their caves and field trenches, and some will die. Many will not see the sun for months, fear keeping them in their covered bunk- ers during daylight hours. In the name of America the planes come. Over the past 10 years 700,000 Laotians have been made refugees, tens of thou- sands have been killed or wounded, and hundreds of thousands forced to live much of the time in caves and trenches. The bombing raids also come in the name of the U.S. Senate, until we legis- late otherwise. The war is not winding down for the peoples of Indochina. Since the much heralded bombing halt over North Viet- nam, the planes have not come home. They have simply shifted their targets into Laos and Cambodia. The bombing has continued at 100 tons an hour, 2,400 tons a day. The rate of civilian casualties and refugee genera- tion, indicative of the overall level of violence, has if anything increased dur- ing the last 2 years. Recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees reveal that since the invasion of Cambodia nearly one quarter of that country's popula- tion-1,500,000 people-have become re- fugees. In the last few months in South Vietnam more refugees have been created than at any time since the 1968 Tet offensive. The bombing of North Vietnam has been resumed. As recently as September 21 an armada of 250 U.S. planes attacked targets in the North, and this raid was followed on successive days by two more so-called protective react a strikes. At present the bombing of o th Vietnam has reached an average every 4 days, and actor Vietnamese reports 106 v tion to missile sites hav The Meatgrinder in Vietr taken 325,000 civilian live more than a million sin' whirling. As the Sout Minister of Information 1968, South Vietnam has 1 by an alien air force tha with the very land of Vi The amendment I straightforward. Let us s ing, not just partially ov nam but in all Indochit those strikes inside Sout. monstrably related to the withdrawing troops. Is it i of the Senate to contini those planes? An Orwellian transform place in our military polic Due to public pressure , are slowly coming -home leaving an automated war is every danger, as Noam warned, that we intend tc of Vietnam into an auto machine. Computer tech small number of troops craft and artillery are c destructive presence that hover over Southeast Asi come. In the midst of thi confused, pacified by ti troop levels, yet vaguely ti tinuing reports of devasta Eluding recognition, I techno-euphemisms of n-, is the reality of our poi ordnance"-a rather dull sounding term until one r( the use of napalm against "Harrassment and i1 rather light-hearted term derstands that it represen hurling of destruction int These antiseptic words ror-filled realities, and ti- vent public judgment. strike"-one pictures a d benevolently removed frog side. But the cancer is thr World War II the cancer and the operation was ti tion." In the name of many executions are taki the air in Indochina It is the enormity of oil clouds it. If we were wroi we were. Nothing will br who have died, or the lost eyes and ears. But I.et ur selves at least to stop ti those who remain. How the people of Lhis c people, industrious people people, could have come tc struction on another nat to comprehend. Orwell in 1 "1984" depicts such earn: suit of technology gone from common experience. to surrealistic nightmares. intervened in Indochina able reasons-even that is but at some time the macs control and we could not Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 late of once J- g to North 11 >es in addi- aeen struck. =.r t, which has t nd wounded 1965, is still Vietnamese c :nmented in ?e'1 devastated .,:'erns at war E am. f r is quite o' the bomb- r North Viet- a--except for ,'ietnam de- e urity of our ?a ly the desire to send out it on is taking i t Indochina. .n,erican boys 1'it they are o"hind. There C homsky has t tin the land a.ted murder .( "logy and a -x anning air- :;ting a U.S. r my literally or years to he public is diminishing 'uoled by con- ic!).. sdten in the Ii ary speech, "Selective Lind technical tl_zes it masks it man beings. e -diction"-a u ttil one un- s the random angle areas. ~b uscate hor- r 'by circum- 4 urgical air 'eased cancer > tie country- p,asantry. In w is the Jews, `final solu- U terica, how g place from iistake that now wrong .? back those 'r:rls and legs, commit our- bombing of u ^try, a good a id generous v sit such de- al is difficult s masterpiece as the re- tu d, removed s ving reality JA a may have of commend- Li'stionable- Ir a got out of u:?n it off. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 S 15882 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Oct, ) i' 5, 1971 winding down this war when, since the administration has taken office, it has sustained one-third of all the casualties in this war--one-third,. That is winding down the war? I can only think of the statement made-and I salute my colleague from Vermont for underscoring the crassness of it-that if the President does end the war he has still promised to pull the rug out from under the doves after July 1, because that will be a political ploy as- sociated with his reelection. How terrible to make a statement-if Members want to defend this person making the statement, they can-but how terrible it must be to realize the full import of a statement that says, in April 1971, "I will pull the rug out, some time in 1972, from under the doves." What happens is that, in the mean- time, we are maiming and crippling so many human beings, until it is conven- ient or advantageous to pull out that rug. To my mind, that is the greatest im- morality that can be perpetrated. I think we would have greater honesty and greater justice if, as the Senator from South Carolina alluded, we took an H- bomb-one could not do it because we have already dropped more bombs on Southeast Asia than three, four, or five H-bombs-but if we took an H-bomb and laid Indochina waste completely, then we are sure that we would win, sure that we would be giving those people freedom and democracy although there would not be anyone there to enjoy it. That is, of course, exactly what we are doing now. The reason why we cannot use H- bombs to annihilate these people is that it would be morally incomprehensible to us. It would find no moral approbation anywhere in the world. In fact, it would place upon us .a blot of unbelievable pro- portions. So what do we do? We do not use H- bombs, because that would be doing it too quickly, too efficiently, and too intel- ligently. So over a period of time we drop conventional bombs-bombs of a sort that when we realize the quantity of them, we can appreciate it. During the Second World War we dropped over 2 million tons of bombs. During the Korean war, 600,000 tons. We have already amply surpassed that in Indochina. We have amply surpassed our bombing record of World War II and the Korean war. Upon this little country we have dropped several equivalent hydrogen bombs in terms of destructive energy. Yet no one stands up and rails about it. Why? Because the bombing of Laos was concealed from the American people; 350,000 sorties were concealed from the American people and basically from Congress until March of 1970. In the past 12 years we have doubled our efforts at bombing Laos. People have the gall to stand on the floor and say that we are winding down the war. The only reason we do not use our intelligence to do this efficiently is because we cannot find the moral appro- bation. I submit that moral approbation is not there either when we do it on a piecemeal, surgical basis. That moral ap- probation will not be there, 5, 10, 50 or 1,000 years from now, because this part of American history will stand out as our darkest hour. Mr. President, I yield the, floor and yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. President. have the yeas and nays been ordered? Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I request the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there a sufficient second? There is not. a sufficient second. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The year and nays are ordered. The question is on agreeing to the amendment (No. 433) of the Senator from Alaska. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I an- nounce that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Okla- homa (Mr. HARRIS). the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS), the Sen- ator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Me- GOVERN), the Senator from New Hamp- shire (Mr. MCINTYRE). the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WIL- LIAMs) are necessarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) would vote "yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) , and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are necessarily absent. The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness. The Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL) and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) are detained on offi- cial business. If present and voting, the Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL), the Senator from Delaware (Mr. BOGGS), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. CURTIS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), and the Senator from Texas (Mr. TowER) would each vote "nay." The result was announced-yeas 19, slays 64, as follows: l No. 250 Leg.] YEAS---19 Bayh Hatfield Moss Brooke Hughes Nelson Cranston Inouye Pell Eagleton Kennedy Proxmire Fulbright Mansfield Schweiker Gravel Mathias Hartke Metcalf NAYS--S': Aiken Ervin 'ercy Allen Fong 'Zandolph Allott Gambrell f.ibicoff Anderson Griffin Moth Baker Gurney axbe Bennett Hansen Scott Bentsen Hart math Bible Hruske iparkman Brock Humphrey Spong Buckley Jackson 'Stafford Burdick Javits Stennis Byrd, W. Va. Jordan, N.C. Stevens Case Jordan,Idah' Stevenson Chiles Magnuson Symington Church McClellan raft Cook McGee Talmadge Cooper Miller Thurmond Cotton Mondale I'unney Dole Muskie _Neicker Dominick Packwood ti oung Eastland Pastore Ellender Pearson NOT VOTING - 7 Beall Fannin vlcIntyre Bellmon Goldwater svIontoya Boggs Harris vlundt Byrd, Va. Hollin{-:s Cower Cannon Long Nilliains Curtis McGovern So Mr. GRAVEL'S amen( .r ent (No. 433) was rejected. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. Pi -s dent, I move to reconsider the vot+ -whereby the amendment was not agi --e?1 to.. Mr. THURMOND. 141 President, I move to lay that motion -)I the table. The motion to lay or *: le table was agreed to. REFERRAL OF A BILL T J COMMIT- TEE ON THE JU. >I?2IARY Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. 'i esident, I ask unanimous consent that I ill introduced today by the Senator f 'oan West Vir- ginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) t .,r:hitting com- mercial banks to under r; to water and sewer revenue bonds be re "'erred to the Committee on the Judi(.a.y. I think I have cleared this matter tt around, and I make that request. The PRESIDING C 'ICER (Mr. HUGHES). Is there object o_? The Chair hears none, and it is so o'dered. MILITARY PROCL I,iMENT AUTHORIZATIO w:. 1972 The Senate continued v ith the con- sideration of the bill (H. 8687) to au- thorize appropriations d r ng the fiscal year 1972 for procurem n of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, 1 racked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and t ier weapons, and research, developn el t, test and evaluation for the Arm d Forces, and to prescribe the autho, z ?d personnel strength of the Selected .e-verve of each Reserve component of th, t rmed Forces, and for other purposes. The PRESIDING OF! 1 ER. ER. Accord- ing to the previous order. -l e Senate will now proceed to consid( amendments Nos. 447, 448, and 449 by ti .e Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY . What is the pleasure f the Senator from New York? Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. Pl.ns.dent, I yield to the Senator from Mon a la. AMENDMENT NO 9,1 The PRESIDING OFF] ] R. The clerk will read the amendment. Mr, STENNIS. Mr. Pre cent, may we Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 o ctobei- 5, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 'iacnen destroyed 85 percent. Dresden, Germany, was destroyed 98 percent with sir power. The German people were warned ahead of time and innocent citi- zens left these cities prior to the satura- tion bombing. I know what air power can do. We could have laid North Vietnam bare, if necessary. Instead of that, we lia: ve been fighting with one hand behind our back while American soldiers are 'being _iilled. 45,000 ground troops have besn killed. Mr. GRAVEL. We have dropped more bombs in Indochina than we dropped in the Second World War. The Senator is right--in destroying Aachen, they destroyed the factories- that made the guns. if we want to destroy the factories, we have to go to the Soviet Union and China. That is where they are being ina de. Mr. THURMOND. We could have stopped those guns from coming in by bombing the ports or by placing an em- bargo there, or we could have stopped those guns by controlling the importation from the Soviet Union. We did not have to o to the Soviet Union. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. THURMOND. Furthermore, many of the bombs dropped in Vietnam were dropped in forests and on other insig- nificant targets. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. GRAVEL AMENDMENT Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to state my position on the amendment proposed by the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). I have decided to vote against the amendment, because, on bal- ance, I think it would be a mistake to single out this one aspect of U.S. military activity in Indochina. For some years now I have been working as hard as I can to bring an end to all U.S. combat in- volvement in Indochina. So far, those of us of this persuasion have not been able to make our view prevail in law, or in the councils of the executive branch. Until we can succeed in stopping this whole war-this tragic, misconceived, wasting war which is eating at the vitals of our Nation-I cannot in good con- science tell the President and our mili- tary commanders that one particular aspect of the war is what is bothering us and must cease first. I think this bomb- ing program probably falls in the cate- gory of the kind of military decision which the Commander in Chief and his professional commanders have a claim to deciding from their own perspective. It is their responsibility to make the tac- tical and strategic decision about the actual fighting of the war. It is the Con- ggress' duty and prerogative to make the broader, overriding policy decision. of whether or not to authorize war. Yor this reason, Mr. President, I want to make it clear that my decision to vote ute in the President. I have no con- fidence in the President of the United States on this issue. I think what is being done here is immoral to a magnitude not yet approached in the history of man. It will go down in history as an act com- parable to the "final solution" in Ger- man,. I think this is something that v-e will hang our heads in shame about for a long time. I could understand the false patriotism associated with ground troops, or patrio- tism cissociated with the immediacy >f our boys' lives. But when we talk about a war, a surgical kind of war at a distance, where we can hold ourselves not respon- sible for the annihilation and eradica- tion of human beings and the destruc- tion of great countries, then I think vee have fallen to a low ebb. I have no confidence in the President because he comes forward with the fal- lacious and weak argument that they need it militarily. when any literate per- son who reads the facts in the Penta- gon papers, the facts in the studies, knows that there is no logical, intelli- gent base for military action of this sot~. It has no military benefit. So, if it has no military benefit, one should at lea.: C have the brains not to do it-at lea~e save the money. The cost of destroying a truck on the Ho Chi Minh Trail is $100,000. That is the cost of destroying a single vehicle th it probably, in reality, cost only $3,000. I submit that is a "great" situation to b ,e in, to let the enemy produce a truck whieli costs S3,000 and then we place a burden on our gross national product to the tw:e of $100,000 matched against it. Any fool can see that over a period of time we would lose that war. We talk about bombing being needed to crush the enemy. How ridiculous. In- tcrviews. not by mysef, but interviews by the military on the scene, demonstrate that prior to the bombing of Laos, volun- tarism there was 30 percent, but after the bombing, voluntarism was 100 percent. Obviously, any fool cari realize that if lie is going to get killed sitting at home, or is going to get killed fighting the enemy, he might as well fight the enemy. Why sit there and let yourself get shot. So, of course they al i volunteer. That is something which has been conclusively proved in the Pentagon Papers; that is, the more we escalate the bombing, the more we develop the resolve of these peo- ple to fight on against us. That is not something psychologically unusual. It was made abundantly clear to us in the Second 'World War when the British, at the time of the Battle of Britain were being annihilated by the Nazis. Did- the British capitulate? Of course not. The bombing of England brought the British people to their finest hour. It is doing the same thing to the people in Indochina today, and history will record this as their finest hour. It will also record this as our bleakest hour. Then we find ourselves in Nurembuxg where we pontificated and said that civil- ian destruction with very little military value was immoral and wrong and should be condemned. But that is exactl- what we are doing today in Laos. The words of Telford Tay- lor, the American chief prosecutor in Nuremburg, are long ago and far away. It is not convenient morally to apply the same standard we did to Herman Goer- ing, Albert Speer, an I Rudolf Hess. That was the standard for them, but we have a different standard for ourselves. That, I submit, is human-part of hu- man nature. How :interesting, how ridiculous, how stupid to think the t the $162 million asked for in this budget to be appropri- ated to bomb Laos is greater than the gross national product of the country of Laos. That tells the story about the size of this Nation of ours, the power of this Nation with respect to a small nation, that we can, out of hand, without even thinking: about it, appropriate enough money for bombs greater than the total productive capacity of all the human beings in Laos. Now, Mr. President, let me address my- self to one area in which many Members in this Chamber take shelter: Supporting the President because it is patriotic and we have to do it to end the war, because the war is being wotnd down. He is not doing that one bit. What he is doing is changing the character of the war. What he is doing is changing it from a ground war, where we are in- volved with our bloody hands, and taking it and making it an air war where we do not see the blood, where we can pontifi- cate about our ideology. Of course, it does not strike anyone as intelligent or proper--what is the difference in fight- ing communism in Southeast Asia or fighting it in Moscow or fighting it in Chile or in Cuba? We are caught in our our dichotomous idiocy. Containing com- munism today is bankrupt. We have no choice but to coexist To think that in- telligent people really believe that we are Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 S 15880 Approved For MMIJOR 73 16 00030008008(5.P t( .(,, 5, 1971 Ho Chi Minh Trail, is not susceptible to quantifiable subdivision between that which is necessary to the safety of US troops (with- drawing or not) and that which might serve some other immediate purpose. The enemy supplies and men moving southward on the Ho Chi Minh Trail are all threats to the safety of US troops in South Vietnam. Hence, it is unreasonable to authorize bombing for the protection of US forces in South Vietnam but not elsewhere. US air operations in Cambodia are intended primarily to interdict the flow of supplies to be used against US and allied troops In South Vietnam. These operations are strongly en- couraged by the Cambodian government which receives a secondary benefit from the air strikes. Since the closure of Sihanoukville, the North Vietnamese have been forced to rely on the supply routes in Northeastern Cambodia to support their aggression in southern South Vietnam and Cambodia. While these routes are not directly threatened by allied ground forces, they are open to air attacks which significantly impede the flow of munitions and weapons. If this proposed amendment were to become law, the South Vietnamese and our withdrawing forces would again be affectively faced with a large communist sanctuary in Cambodia. The proposed amendment would intrude into matters properly within the constitu- tional authority of the President, as Com- mander-in-Chief, to direct US military oper- ations in Southeast Asia. Certainly the co- ordinated use of our forces is a well estab- lished principle of the Commander-in-Chief powers. The proposal to proscribe one arm of the military from functioning, leaving the others to operate as cripples, is a direct attack on the President's authority. This proposed legislation would severely limit our ability to implement effectively the Nixon Doctrine that calls for sufficient flex- ibility to meet changes in the local military situation with an adequate response. As he indicated about Indochina in his 25 February 1971 foreign policy report:: "A negotiated set- tlement for all Indochina remains our highest priority., But if the other sides leaves us no choice, we will follow the alternative route to peace-phasing out our involvement while giving the region's friendly countries the time and means to defend themselves." The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. THURMOND. 11 am pleased to yield. Mr. GRAVEL. May 1: ask the Senator where the President gets the authority to bomb, as Chief Executive, if he chooses to bomb? Mr. THURMOND. I cannot hear the distinguished Senator. Mr. GRAVEL. Where does the Presi- dent of the United States get the power to go bomb? We had no troops in Laos, and all of a sudden he decided to go bomb. Where does the President of the United States get that kind of power? Mr. THURMOND. The Communists were in Laos, in Cambodia, and in Thai- land. They carried the war to these coun- tries. As has been stated, this Is not a war just confined to South Vietnam and North Vietnam. The Communists took this war to Viet- nam, The Communists took this war to Laos. The Communists have been pene- trating Thailand. Therefore, when they see fit to carry this -war to other coun- tries, we have to go where the fighting is, in order to protect our own men and to protect our national Interest. Mr. GRAVEL. By that logic, would it not be logical that we at least bomb the areas where the factories are that pro- duce the guns that are used to kill Ameri- can boys? Should we not do that? Mr. THURMOND_ Mr. President, it is my judgment that this war could have been brought to an end long, long ago. I think we should have bombed the fac- tories in North Vietnam that are pro- ducing arms to kill American men. I think we should have closed the sanctu- aries long, long ago. I think we should have closed the ports long, long ago. I think we should have closed the Ho Chi Minh Trail long. Iona ago. I will say now that I have not ap- proved the manner in which this war has been fought. I have not approved of fighting with one hand tied behind our backs. I have been one who takes the position that America should not go into a war until we have to: but once Amer- ica gets into a war, we should have the backing of every patriotic American. Fur- thermore, we should use our full force- Army, Navy, Air Force; all the power we have-to win the war quickly, to crush the enemy.and bring the American boys home. I realize that this has not been done. I realize that is the reason why many young people have become disheartened about this war and have turned their backs, so to speak, on this war. I think the way this war has been fought has been a great mistake. But Mr. Nixon in- herited this ',var. When did the war start? It started back under President Ken- nedy. It was carried on under President Johnson, who at one time had between 500,000 and 600,000 fighting men over there. President Nixon has been trying to bring the war to a close. I am not trying to defend him. I would condemn him just as much as anyone else if I felt it were justified, because our country must come first, regardless of party and partisan reasons. it is my firm belief that this war should have been ended years and years ago, and we would not have lost all these lives over there. We have lost more than 45,000 men in ground fighting. We have lost approximately 1.400 in the Navy. We have lost approximately 1,000 in the Air Force. If this war had been fought the way we fought World War II, there is no question in my mind that most of these lives could have been saved. I repeat: we should not go into a war until we go into it to win and to put into it the power we have, and we have not done that in Vietnam. Mr. Nixon is trying to wind it down. He is winding it down. He has brought more than 300,000 fight- ing men home, and he is bringing them home on schedule. But why would the Senator from Alas- ka handicap him, if the President feels the need and Mr. Laird feels the need and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps feel the need to bomb in a certain place to save Ameri- can lives? Why would the Senator want a law passed. by Congress saying that he cannot do it? He is the commander in chief, and he must be given the flexibility. In the first place, I do not think you have the constitutional authority to do it. Second, if you did ha .. ,he constitu- tional authority, I do not i nk you ought to handicap the Presid ?r , the Com- mander in Chief, and hai I lap the mili- tary men in taking the t! its necessary to protect our men as we c withdrawing from South Vietnam, Mr. GRAVEL. I shoui( I ke to pursue the logic of the Senator v h respect to the constitutional uowei a ad authority to bomb. I could buy the 3-gic, that we have to protect our boys a ,c therefore we have to bomb. The Sen.. ' c went on to say that we should lust a . , ell bomb the factories. The arm, for i , Pathet Lao and for the North Viet : a nese do not come from Cambodia or i :us or, for that matter, from North Vietr su a. They come from the Soviet Union a a . China. The PRESIDING OFF C R. The time of the Senator from Sou `i Carolina has expired. Mr. STENNIS. I y ,eld 2 c itional min- utes to the Senator. Mr. GRAVEL. So if tli - 'resident has the power to go into a a ,tral country such as Laos and bomb ii the interest of saving the lives of our b+ :n why can he not bomb the Soviet Uni a because they are manufacturing the gt. Ai that are kill- ing our boys? Why can h, i At do that, or should he do it? Mr. THURMOND. Thi 1 s an entirely different question. The f :t'ps as neces- sary. If the government i Laos and the government of Cambodia 1-id the power to protect themselves ap ii at the Com- munist troops coming in t fey probably would have done that. Bi. i fey evidently did not do it. If they dii j., they would' open themselves to the u uonsibility of allowing this fighting to o an there. The Communist troops in t c e countries, who are stationed there a id are fight- ing our men and doing :1 they can to kill our soldiers, have no is lit to protec- tion and no right to cI< in, they are in a neutral country. Thee Gent there as trespassers. They went t e e, I am sure, against the will of tho, ii countries. If they had the permission he countries, that makes it even worse. With respect to bombii he factories, there are gun factories .r?1 war plants in North Vietnam, and ti e, should have been bombed. I agree w ii the Senator .on that, if he favors tha r osition. They should have been bombe ;-ing ago. The concrete plants and tl a powerplants should have been bomb( continuously. The gun plants shoo d have been bombed continuously. Ei r-, warmaking industry in North Vietni in should have been destroyed. I was in World War I. and I saw Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 October 5, 1971Approved Fo~ I S~Qa?N/OABLOhEE&-FP7 %2?f R000300080084-9 S 15879 because he says he needs it. We just go along on that basis. I do not understand what insanity be- sets this body if we can do that so read- ily, because this body is made up of good people, kind people, generous people, great Americans; but, by some quirk of fate, because of some psychological aber- ration, we sit here party to a bombing process that is annihilating thousands and thousands upon thousands, even mil- lions of Asians far away from our shores. I do not understand this. I think we can only leave it to the study of sociologists in future decades to elicit what happened to our moral sensibilities, what happened to our humaneness, what happened to our ability to even see and discern right from wrong-something that apparently this body is unable to do. Mr. President. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum on my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The :PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from South Carolina. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the pending amendment, No. 433, offered by the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr, GRAVEL), would deny funding under the pending bill or any other law to con- duct aerial warfare in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, North or South Vietnam, ex- cept in South Vietnam to insure the safe withdrawal of American troops. This amendment, if passed, would se- riously damage U.S. efforts to impede communism in Indochina until our allies Mere are able to handle the job alone. At present military forces of North Vietnam have invaded and are trying to overthrow the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Local forces in each of those countries are try- ing to defeat the North Vietnamese. U_S. air operations are essential in Laos if the flow of Communist soldiers down the Ho Chi Minh Trail is to be held in check. U.S. air operations are essential in Cambodia if the Cambodians are to be given sufficient time to build up military forces to repel the North Viet- namese invaders. U.S. air operations are essential along the borders of North Viet- nam if intelligence indicates military moves are developing which would en-. danger the safe withdrawal of U.S. troops. Mr. President, besides these obvious military reasons for defeating this amendment, there is the constitutional question. Does the Congress have the right to tie the hands of the Commander in Chief so that one arm of our military forces, the ground element, is denied the aid of another arm, the air element? I think not. This amendment should be soundly defeated, so that the coordinated use of our forces may be applied in a zone where American soldiers are stir' deployed. The Senate should also consider that with the present U.S. withdrawal of U.S. forces nearly two-thirds complete the advantage in Indochina is shifting toward the aggressor. As this Nation continues to bring U.S. troops down to minimum levels in 1972, the dangers to our remaining forces in- crease, Even with a planned timetable of withdrawal, the President is assum- ing greater risks each day. He, there- fore, needs the maximum flexibility in transferring the entire combat responsi- bility to our allies in Indochina. Mr. President, this amendment could insure the eventual victory of North Vietnam over South Vietnam, Cambodia. and Laos. I urge every Senator to weigh carefully the effects of the amendment. In my judgment, it is one of the most: dangerous amendments yet offered in the Senate concerning the war it Indochina. As we step out of the war in Indochina we must not turn our backs on our own men or the soldiers of our allies. I urge the Senate to reject this amendment. There is no question but that the De fense Department strongly opposes thi,y amendment. I ask unanimous consent that the DOD position on the Gravel amendment be printed in the RECORD following my remarks. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withou c objection, it is so ordered. (Sec exhibit 1.) Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, a just want to say in closing that I canno-, understand why anyone, any Member of this body, would offer this type of amend- ment. If we have any confidence at all in President Nixon, if we have confi- dence in his-sincerity, his patriotism, and his judgment, which is based on the ad- vice of military experts; if we have con- fidence in Mr. Laird and the Secretarie. of the services; why would anyone offer this type of amendment to say "You can- not bomb," if President Nixon, Mr. Laird, and the Chiefs of Staff of the armed services say "we need to bomb at thi i time and at this place to save Americani lives?" To me, the amendment is ridiculous. .1 hope the Senate will kill it promptly. iEXFIIBIT I (Adding Section 601 to FIR 8687, an Act to authorize appropriations during FY 72 fo- procurement, etc., for the Armed Forces. EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENT The proposed amendment would demo funding "under this or any other law" to conduct aerial warfare in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, the Democratic Peoples Republi., of Vietnam, or the Republic of Vietnam ex- cept that such warfare may continue in RVN if the President determines it necessary to safe withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indo- china. 000 POSITION DOD strongly opposes the amendment, the objective of which is to legislate the end Of U.S. participation in the resistance of North Vietnamese aggression in Indochina by the elimination of crucial air support for U.S. and friendly forces there. U.S. support for the legitimate governmen : of Laos, Cambodia and the Republic of Viet- nam h as been expressed in part by the provi - sion of operational military support in order to counter the aggression from North Viet- nam. The direct military support has been accompan,ed by public pronouncements of our objective of frustraing the takeover of its neighbors by North Vietnam. Precipitate termination of our air efforts would raise doubts about our adherence not only to this objective but to others which might test our determination, even touching our more formal commitments as *well. An action by the Senate such as this would impact severely on the governments concerned. While the Government of Thai- land would not be endangered, nor for that me.tter are we bombing; there, it would be compelled to consider a new and less friendly diplomatic: alighment. The will of the Royal Lao Government to defend itself, already undermined by years cf strife against the more numerous and well-equipped North Vietnamese invaders, would be gravely af- fected. Cambodia's brave! and determined resistance to this same North Vietnamese Invader would be less effective with the weak- ened and uncertain U.S. support implied In this amendment. Finally in South Viet- nam, where the President has long since me. de clear the essential U.S. objective in South Vietnamese people to determine their own politiical future without outside inter- ference," the ability to achieve our objective would be damaged. The objective has been incorporated in various policy statements directed toward achieving a peaceful solu- tion in Vietnam and Indochina, a peace in which the peoples of the region can devote themselves to development of their own so- cieties. While the proposed amendment does not attack this objective, rather simply im- posing obstacles to its achievement, one result of the amendment would surely be to weaken Vietnamese determination. 'We must consider there the outcome, surely adverse, for our Southeast Asian friends and allies. Our long sought objective of restor- in?; the arrangements envisioned in the 1962 Geneva Agreements for Laos would not be attainable if we were abruptly to cease aerial warfare. North Vietnam would have a greatly reduced incentive to settle along these lines and the Royal Lao Government would be without leverage. The meager,Lao forces cannot alone defend against the North Vietnamese invasion, and. must depend on the U.S. for the direct effects of the assist- ance and the diplomatic advantage as well The proscription against US bombing sup- port for the Cambodians exposes the develop- ing Cambodian Army to a risk of major losses by opposing superior forces without adequate supporting weapons. The Cam- bodians have no heavy bombing capability of their own-only 16 T-38 aircraft used for close air support, and a limited number of artillery pieces. Our military support is es- sential to the GKR's resistance of the North Vietnamese and the preservation of their neutrality. In Vietnam it is the Defense view that Vietnamization is progressing satis- factorily.:[t should be noted that the RVNAF has made great strides i.n assuming increas- ing responsibility for conducting combat op- erations even while the US has deployed ap- proximately one-third million (332,800) military personnel. As the RVNAF steadily achieve a greater capability and self-reliance, it is considered extremely disadvantageous to submit the Administration's Vietnamization programs to an arbitrary curtailment of air support. In the wider conitext, disengagement of US forces together with the winding down of war-related violence in South Vietnam is being steadily achieved. The furtherance of these objectives is dependent on a rational policy which places US national interests In- volving realistic solutions ahead of chimeri- cal. panaceas. Vietnamization is a rational policy leading to the successful achievement of essential US objectives. The overwhelming proportion of US bomb- ing, and certainly all directed against the Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 15878 Approved For F~7ik ~~ Rtqg,~MZ313 W6f0030008008 Ptc r 5, 1971 judgment. Let us make clear we are not dealing with nuclear weapons. We are dealing with conventional weapons. Mr. GRAVEL. What is the difference in these millions of tons of bombs and using a few hydrogen bombs? Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senator has a military question there. We are in this war, and we are trying to get out. If we withdraw our weapons they can continue with their actions unless we are going to have an abject surrender and desert these people over there that we have been helping. With great deference to the Senator, that is the best answer I can give. Would the Senator yield to me for a minute? Mr. GRAVEL. I yield. Mr. STENNIS. I am compelled to leave the Chamber briefly. I ask unanimous consent that when the Senator concludes I may yield to the Senator from Illinois, or yield to him now, who will speak in opposition to the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Illinois is recognized. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I have lis- tened with great interest to the debate this morning. I intend to vote against the amendment of my distinguished col- league from Alaska. I would not presume to be a military expert in this war. I did serve as a gunnery officer in the Naval Air Corps in World War II. I have been in Vietnam several times and in Vien- tiane. I have accepted highly classified brief- ings on this war, and none of those brief- ings has convinced me at all that we should ever have gone into this war in the first place. I think :it is a tragic mis- take that we did so. But we are there and this is what this administration faced. They could not reverse the decision which involved over a half million of our men being there when the President took of- fice. The President is Commander in Chief of our Army, Navy, and Air Force. He an- nounced his avowed policy to remove our forces, and he is staying exactly on schedule. Every single commitment the President made to withdraw our forces he has kept or exceeded. It is my sincere hope and my prayer that when the Pres- ident announces late in October or No- vember the next schedule of with- drawal, we can step up the rate consider- ably. But as long as we have American forces in Vietnam, and we have over 200,000 men there, I would not want to tie the hands of the Commander in Chief and I would not want to tie the hands of the man who has the avowed policy of taking our men out of Vietnam at the soonest possible time consistent with their safety. I feel that the bombing provides an element of safety to those men and con- tinues to insure the highest rate of with- drawal. Without it I do not see how we could stem the flow of forces coming in from the North, and I do not see how we could stem the flow of their supplies. I do not see how we could keep the initia- tive and not relinquish the initiative to them Therefore, despite the fact that I dis- like this war as intensely as any Member of the Senate and have consistently op- posed any escalation of the war, and have supported every possible deescalation, I back and support the President's overall program of getting out. I commend him for what he has done. I am not going to tie his hands in any way and take away any support he can provide for the safety of those forces as they withdraw because I want to give him the possibility of with- drawing at a faster rate than we are. For those reasons I intend to vote against the amendment of my colleague from Alaska. I yield the floor. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining? The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. AL- LEN). The Senator has 26 minutes re- maining. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as I may require. The PRF'~T^?"= OFFICER. The Sen- recognized. think the President is doing the best he can. Second. I think our presence there continues to e immora takes 3 years Or I uvm down this wax I just cannot buy it. I cannot abdicate my responsibility as a human being and wash my hands of it like Pilate, and say the President is leading us and I have to agree with him. I do not agree with him. Since the President took office and ini- tiated his plan of winding down the war we have suffered one-third of our casual- ties. So I cannot quite buy that theory that we are doing the best possible. I do not see how stopping the bombing will increase the flow of troops. In fact, the truth. a; evidenced by the Pentagon papers and independent studies, shows that the more bombing of the people, the more increase there is in troops that they send down to fight us. Why would it not be more intelligent for them to volunteer in Laos to fight Americans rather than to stay where they are, to be bombed. If we want to stop the flow of troops, the best way would be to stop the bombing. They do not want; to get their heads shot off. Why should they get pressed into serv- ice if they could live in safety in Laos and Vietnam? So the theory that this will de- crease the flow of troops is bankrupt, it always has been bankrupt, and always will be bankrupt, as was proven in the Battle of Britain. The more the people are bombed, the more they are forced to fight. This is a wrong course of action, but we should realize also when we do it that we condemn millions of people, mil- lions of innocent peasants, who offer no threat to us, either as a nation because of their large numbers. or as a fighting force. The tools of war do not come from Laos, Cambodia. North Vietnam; they come from China, and the Soviet Union. So if we really wanted to follow an in- telligent approach to fighting this war, we should at least save the money and attack the source. But that is not the case. This is an intricately woven situa- tion in which we find ourselves. First, we find umbrage for our immorality in the intricacies of the situation. I say immorality, bec it there is not a person on this floor v.u can give me proof, who can give m .n argument, why we should bomb the ._ )eople. If it is to protect our troops, i u . amendment provides the ability to pr ,t, ct our troops. The President can bomb iur troops are immediately involved in 3-utheast Asia. Since we have no Am( ii an troops in Cambodia and Laos, ob, o isly there are no American troops to p r ect. But if we are involved in the test c loading our troops on planes and sl p to get them out, obviously we do nc lave to bomb these other places. Obviously we do not ? is ve to go for 3 or 4 years bombing th, o other places. But that is not what is i ig on in Viet- nam today. Eventually tie American people will appreciate w 21 is going on. We take some troops out - c we can mini- mize the casualties of An i can boys and so we can escalate the ar ,o mt of casual- ties of Asians. That is wr_ t, aas happened in the bombing of Laos ii t to last 2 years by the 100-percent incrf a ,,a in bombing activity. I cannot find any res a , any ration- ale, why anybody in this hcdy would ab- dicate his moral respon. b lity to some- body else when it comes life, and that is what we are talking .)~ ut in South- east Asia and Indochina c lay. The mil- itary experts, the Secret vs i of Defense, the chief of the Marine v )rps, psycho- logical studies of ?he p o le who have been bombed, prove, by :L, . possible in- dications, that bombing ineffective as a military tool, totally a ?fective as a military tool, and that i really does nothing but annihilate i? broad civil- ian population. That th evould be the case, and that in the ft c;c of this logic we would put aside thh, l ?oof and put aside this logical argume t, Lion and say, "Well, the Chief Executi e Df this coun- try feels that he needs ti e bombing and that this is a good polic nd he stated publicly that, regardles )f what the troop levels are going tc b . he has the right to bomb," is difncul t understand, and yet we go along wit' i 1,-at. It is interesting that o, i iquiry by the Senator from Missouri (I jr SYMINGTON) and his subcommittee we a ve an Ameri- can Ambassador, M_?. Sul, is n, who, when asked under what cir' u stances the United States could bot ;b these coun- tries, answered that it :v.,s under the President's authority tr r)ake foreign policy. What an intere ,1 ig reflection upon a democracy-a d 'mocracy in which the President or ti e '~;hief Execu- tive, on a whim, can ord .? -.he killing of thousands and thousand.? o people. And the Congress can condo? it by saying, "He is the Chief Execute e. and this is a part of his way'to condi. at that foreign policy." What a total cop-out \Jhat a total moral cop-out on the pa ?t of this body and on the part of the ingress to sit back and find umbrage u d-ir the simple fact that he can do it. l:L )rdering the bombing we rub salve c er our minds and say, "Well, he says e needs it for military reasons." But, of ;o .arse, we have proof readily available tc u that it has no military purpose. Wei _f (long simply Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 Approved For Release OUQ~/OTC -BDPR?46R000300080084-9 S 15877 October 5, 1971 CONGRESS solution." I see no difference in the type of bombing we have going on today. That this Senate could stand here and call for the water to wash our hands, means in this very instance that we are party to the killing of human beings. I just can- not buy that argument, because if we have a criminal who is President of the United States, we should at least have the moral quality to recognize it, point to it, and ask for its correction. Perhaps the Senator from Mississippi could give me some other technical rea- son why we are doing this. However, I cannot see it at this point in time. The Senator has no argument for the bomb- ing other than that they want to bomb. That is not moral when human life is at stake, Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, we start with the fact that we are at war and have been at war there for years. We are now in the process of withdrawing as rapidly as we can within reason and commonsense. I am assuming that will continue. It has been successful so far. There are many problems that go with it. That is obvious. Right on top of that policy, if this amendment is agreed to, we would be saying in the hard, cold letter of the law that no funds authorized or appro- priated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target what- soever within the Republic of Vietnam unless the President determines any such air operation to be necessary to provide for the safety of U.S. Armed Forces dur- ing their withdrawal from Indochina. That would be an abandonment of our policy of trying to hold down the trans- portation of supplies over the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It would be an abandonment o all of these policies that go to pro- tect our forces. With all due deference to the Senator, I think it would be contradictory. If we are going to do this, I would then say that we should throw in the towel and get out before nightfall if possible. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, we are not supposed to have any troops in Cam- bodia. We are not supposed to have any troops in Laos. We are not supposed to have any troops in North Vietnam. The only place we are supposed to have troops is in South Vietnam. And that is the place where I make the provision that if the President thinks it is necessary he can bomb. Would the Senator tell me why we are bombing these poor people in Laos and Cambodia off the face of the earth? What reason do we have for doing it? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I was alluding in my remarks to South Viet- nam. of course. I have already pointed out the reasons that it is done in these other areas. It is because of supplies. I think that perhaps they have an occa- sional raid in North Vietnam. As long as we are over there, already engaged in battle, it is pretty obvious that it is likely to happen. We have told them all the time that we were not promising not to bomb under any circumstances. There was a question about the understanding of our right of surveillance, and so forth, going back to 1966. It is corect, I think, that there were The Senator now has changed that those conditions. There was an under- theory an says a TF"Pf om standing that we would have the right of ?m. r a rn ogle, 7177 surveillance, we no om rle? a nit "-- I would not want the Chief Executive bomb Cuba to say that as long as we are engaged " -6"UIS. Mr. President, the over there we will never bomb North Vietnam under any circumstances. Cer- tainly we ought not to tie his hand. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I hope that the Senator from Mississippi does not mean to leave the impression that we are on_y bombing there slightly. Mr. STENNIS. The Senator means North Vietnam? Mr. GRAVEL. Yes. I think the record shows that every 4 days we have been striking North Vietnam. And the record shows that under this administration we have doubled the amount of bombing in the little country of Laos. As we are with- drawing troops, we are turning up the rheostat of this immoral bombing. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I do not apologize for any new raids. There are facts that they are based upon. How- ever, if the Senator will get the North Vietnamese troops out of there and no longer let them be a menace to our boys and our departure, if he can get them out of there in some way, I would be willing to join him in his amendment. However, they are there, and they are going to stay there. I do not remember whether it is classified as to how many are there. Two divisions are there as a minimum. That much is not classified. Mr. GRAVEL. Does the Senator mean two American divisions? Mr. STENNIS. No. I mean two North Vietnamese divisions. What are we going to do, just pat them on the heads and say it is all right? We have to do some- thing to keep them on the defensive a much as we can. We are paying the bil to -keep them on the defensi.ve,. to keep them Lied up. And they are keeping our allies tied up. That is why we have to have the potential there that I have been referring to. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, perhaps if the Senator from Mississippi will not join me on the basis of moral commit- ment, he might join me on the basis of logic and intelligent action. We have been bombing in Laos for 7 years. The greater part of Laos is now controller. by the Pathet Lao. The more we bomis them, the less successful we are. Per- haps we should change our tactics. Per- haps if we change our tactics, we might: be more successful. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Sen- ator is proposing that we get out and stole all activity there. I think they would double their forces there within a few weeks if we just stated, "We will leave you alone." That is the situation. If we stop fight- ing them, they will be heading for Thai- land ard all of that area within 15 min- roc h domino tt ieory anTca i e' off rwt 'aFey ou Real; with fire s a omen " believing in the domino theory. I have not only not believed in it, but - I- have also said that I would not subscribe to it. If that theory were correct, we would all be lost and not know it. I think our situation over there now is that with all of these North Vietnamese troops in there, if we withdraw the only effective way of opposing them, they would double up their forces and they would get all of the key areas of Laos. They are already there. They already have part of it. Part of Laos is already in their hands. We would not have to have any domino theory for them to get the rest of Laos. I think it is rather obvious that the pattern is to get Thailand, too. That is just the situation that exists. I am not saying that we should aug- ment the forces there and protect Thai.- land and every other country. I under- stand the Senator's amendment here in- creases in a lot of ways the things that our boys would have to do if we were to stop all the bombing. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I would like to find out what ,he increase would be. The only task that I know that our boys have is to wind down and get out. Under the present administration, it has taken 3 years so far. Perhaps the Sena- tor from Mississippi could elaborate on what increased tasks be American boys would :have if we were to stop the bomb- ing of Laos and Cambodia. I do not see where there would be an increase in the tasks. :I would like to also put forth a ques- tion, and the logic is very simple. My friend, the Senator from. Mississippi, says that troops are stationed in Laos. Our studies indicate that for every military casualty we get, we cause 50 civilian casualties. If we pursue the same logic which was followed at the Nuremberg trial by our chief prosecutor, any act that has extreme civilian consequences, re- gardless of the amount of military bene- fit.. is reprehensible. This is something that we fly directly in the face of. :I would like to address another point to the Senator from Mississippi, and that is, very simply, that any analysis of the bombing, the effectiveness of the bomb- ing, is tied to the destruction of the pro- ductive capacity of as country to wage war; otherwise, bornb_ng as we are pro- secuting it in Southeast Asia is a policy to annihilate the entire population. It could be done in this way with a hydro- ge:a bomb. The President may yet advo- cate that. But if we want to go to the source of the productive capacity, the fighting strength these people have with guns and arms, we would have to bomb China and the Soviet ijnion because that is where their supplies come from. Why waste all the money there, at a cost of $33 billion thus far, when we are doing something very ineffective militarily? I pose that as a question to my col.- rya mr- "'?=r7Teas league. would-go ommunis . Mr. STENNIS. That is Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 S 15876 Approved For 6Q00300080084j9 so-called gook rule which haunted the Calley trial has far more profound impli- cations for the air war. On the afternoon that the U.S. helicop- ters and attack planes accompanied the South Vietnamese into Laos, the Presi- dent issued a statement on our environ- mental crisis. Within it, he quoted from T. S. Eliot's "Murder in the Cathedral": Clean the air, clean the sky, wash the wind . . . It would have been revealing for the President to have quoted further: The land is foul, the water-is foul, our beasts and ourselves are defiled with blood. A rain of blood has blinded my eyes . . . Can I look again at the day and its common things and see them all smeared with blood, through a curtain of falling blood? We did not wish anything to happen. Let us stop the bombing, withdraw our troops and begin to "take stone from stone and wash them." Mr. President, I yield, the floor. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is the pending order of business before the Senate? The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The amendment of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how much time do I have in opposition to the amendment? The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Fifty- seven minutes. Mr. STENNIS. I yield myself 10 minutes. Mr. President, I have read with the utmost interest and concern the amend- ment offered by the Senator from Alaska. I admire his fine interest in the subject and his compassion. It is consistent with his desire to end this war. However, I think that the immediate realities of the situation would compel Senators, however much they might be in sym- pathy with these objectives, to reject the amendment. An analysis of this amendment shows that the military aid we supply to the small nations mentioned in the amend- ment would be cut off. We could not supply them with money or military aid if any of it was going to be used in this bombing. In other words, Cambodia would. be affected to some degree in using our military aid in doing some bombing. They would be cut off from doing any bombing in defense of their own country, so far as our military aid was concerned. The same is true with respect to Laos. We are giving them military aid, and have been, and they, too, have some capacity in the air. So under this amend- ment, that would be precluded. The amendment reads: Sac. 601. (a) No funds authorized or ap- propriated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or other- wise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Kingdom of Cambodia, the King- dom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Kingdom of Laos. So, whether intended, or not, it gets right ' into the heart of their military programs which, under the conditions, need to be augmented and thus relieve us. Another point is that the very atmos- phere of this amendment runs contrary to what we did here yesterday. We had a very good debate of 5 hours and most of that time was used discuss- ing aid to Laos. the activities there, the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and bombing in North Vietnam. After the debate, all that money provided for the purpose of the bombing was excluded from the operation of the amendment. The original form of the amendment ex- cluded bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but the last version adopted expressly excluded from its limitations the bomb- ing in North Vietnam. We do not like to have to do those things but the situ- ation over there demands it or they will march right on through Laos and absorb those people there. By the way. in debate yesterday, I meant to point out that the Kingdom of Laos is over 1.000 miles from its north- ern to its southern borders. That is just about the distance from Chicago to New Orleans-1,000 miles long. The popula- tion of Laos is only 2.8 million. Yet they have all that, borderline, all that terrain, all that area to be protected. Of course, they cannot protect themselves. But anyway, back to the subject here, we had this whole matter of the bomb- ing generally by our own forces under review yesterday, and then mlitary aid to the Laotian Government, and all of that was approved by an overwhelming vote here yesterday afternoon, the full budget amount requested for all those activities and our military aid in that whole nation of Laos. and also no limit of any kind to be put upon the amount that could be spent of our money on bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and also in northern Laos. So I think. Mr. President, that that is the deciding factor, that if we come along now and put on this limitation through this amendment, it would be totally inconsistent with what we did yesterday. We would have two programs going, one for bombing and one for not bombing. We will be cutting off the one here that is entirely in control of these people that live in these countries and one that they are carrying out with their manpower. In other words, we would be cutting off those who are doing some- thing for themselves and putting the burden, so far as the bombing is con- cerned, on the shoulders of our own pilots. I do not believe the Senate wants to do that. Let me conclude my remarks by saying that I note here the Senator's amend- ment was prepared prior to Septem- ber 23, 1971, and it was introduced on that day. Not knowing when it would come up, or when the other amendments would come up, the Senator did not have the picture before him that we are faced with today. So, very respectfully, I urge the Senate not to adopt on 2 successive days two contradictory programs and ex- pect the conferees to be able to bring back both of those from the conference. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need. I do not believe we will use all the time. I should like to ask a simple, funda- mental question: Why do we have to bomb at all? Mr. STENNIS. It is l Senator. It was brough yesterday that most of northern Laos is what v A great deal of it in port cover for the men flghtin It is really not bombing sense. Mr. GRAVEL. Let m amendment would permi Mr. STENNIS. It is si bombing. It is mixed ii bombing of the Ho Chi h obvious what that is for the soldiers trying to within its limits. North another trail further to ti can travel on better: sc trying to push us back ders of Thailand. Thus, there with our bombs, no' the trail but also to prot men there. Mr. GRAVEL. It I c( amendment, it is made a that if it is to protect ti' we would permit the be that exclusion. But I do it, in the face of statemi Shoup, Mr. McNamara. fgence accounts rely orte ALML.Ll we are 'really i war, as the Presid the Senator from Mississ; this body, why do we h thousand miles avay fi troops are? I just do not u I do not understand wi bomb over over there i, getting out. Mr. STENNIS. The think, is that this is pi even though it is in the i wound down. If we with( ing from all of this area mentioned the Ho Chi h9 just say that we are not but will stop it by law, ti nam-with all our men, South Vietnam-would b our cause much worse. vastating, if we are going are going to withdraw ors and say "Now you can hi not going to hit back ar way." I think that would render. I want us to gc the best way we can. but tect our rear while we ax Mr. GRAVEL. If I c, again. I have a prol'ision ment to protect our rear , to protect our troops. Th fication-the only exce amendment. But the only get from the Senator froi simply that because the f United States has a polio must go ahead and bomb. ate must have no in'lepen or no independent moral in the form of a question from Mississippi. I liken t that which existed in I where they had the chant into power through the e; as our President did. but went on to commit. the crimes in. history, includ 5, 1971 i, of the war. z ut in debate 1e fighting in call bombing. 'c rn Laos is air c n the ground. n the ordinary ay that my t at. a ring. Some is ogether. The t h Trail-it is Then we have c id that trail r;iitnam wants vest, one they tsat they are v and the bor- have to go in o ily to destroy our f ighting rill clarify my u idantly clear fighting men, n wing. I make -.(t understand ii s by General and the} `tel- i i the ePa- `tl Tr VOTaly fig o e out ,n 3. tells us and q i indicates to, five to bomb a r t where our s erstand that. v we want to e are really f?: t answer, I t of the war, c cess of being a w the bomb- s iw-we have a i Trail-and ung to bomb, i North Viet- =till there in +ble to make ould be de- say that we ,inches now, is but we are nore in this if partial sur- aut of there have to pro- aving. idd restate it r my amend- ce leave and is the quali- c rn in that -r essage I can .fississippi is e ident of the .o bomb, we in the Sen- ]c-.lt judgment . I say this 0 the Senator situation to a zi Germany ,I i? who came .c ion process, a chancellor r ,fist heinous i! the "final Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73WQg2kfP000300080084-9 October 5, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - "icture the battlefield in Laos. Light spotter planes at 2,000 feet; A-IE, A-26 sand I,-28 prop bombers, AC-47 and AC- 130 gunships. flare ships and rescue heli- cotlte:rs at 5,000 feet, F-4, F-105 and B- -r jet fighters and jet reconnaissance aircraft at 10.000 feet; KG-135 super- tai.kers at 20,000 feet; C-130's filled with electronic gear designed to coordinate lha bombing at 25,000 feet; B-52 bombers at 30,000 feet; C-130's of Hillsboro con- trol overseeing the entire.. operation at 35,000 feet and SR-71 reconnaissance a rcraft at 70.000 feet. And oil the ground is the Laotian poosantry. Listen to their reactions and thoughts as recorded in refugee inter- vi ews.. 'he planes came like birds and the\bombs clike rain. Another- < There wasn"t any night when we thou ht we'd live until morning ... never a morniifg we thought we'd survive until night. And another- 9:.just stayed in my cave. I didn't see the sunlight for two years. What did I think ahout? Oh, I used to repeat, please don't let tlei planes come, please don't let the planes come, please .. . And another- =3efore the village was beautiful and filled with happiness and there was a large field of fruit trees. But when I left my village all I saw were the holes of the bombs and the burning houses and the people who had died so pitifully. And another- Our lives became like one of the animals who search to escape the butcher. And this continues every hour-200,- 000 pounds of bombs, every 9 days the equivalent of one Hiroshima. From 1965 to 1969, 70 tons of bombs for every square mile of North and South Vietnam were dropped, 500 pounds for every man, woman and child. In just the first 5 months of 1971 there were 780 million pounds of bombs dropped over Southeast Asia. PART II The airwar is not even militarily ef- fective. Secretary of Defense McNamara revealed in 1968 that it could at best re- duce the flow of supplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail by only 10 percent to 15 percent. At a cost of over $100,000 per truck destroyed. Former Under Secre-. Lary of Defense Townsend Hoopes hag pointed out that in the history of bomb- ing campaigns, only when the sources of production are attacked can the logisti- cal flow of supplies be effectively im- paired. In this case that would-'involve strikes against China and the Soviet Union. A study of the hamlet evaluation reports reveals that the number of vil- lages under government control in South Vietnam varied independently of the level of the air campaign over the 2ierth. On the ground the, bombing raises en- emy morale and ! alienates civilians. Pathet Lao defectors indicate that before the heavy bombing in Laos they managed only a 30-percent rate of voluntarism alclong their forces. However, after the massive attacks of late 1968 the figure jumped to almost 100 percent. "Better to die fighting than in a trench" was tie feeling of one Pathet Lao recruit. As I have indicated, the air war is not isolated in any one country in Ind- china. The Vietnam war has indeed be- come the Indochina war. But informa- tion concerning the extent of U.S. bomiW- ing in Laos has been limited and con- cealed by the executive branch, so t would like to discuss in more detail the situation in those skies. Since 1964 the United States has been engaged in an aerial campaign over as. The bombing was seriously escalated in late 1968 and early 1969 when restric- tion; against civilian targeting were si i- nificantly rel.xed. The air war has in- volved in Laos alone an estimated cost of to $7 billion, innumerable La- otian casualties, and over 400 pilots either dead, missing in action, or ca,- tured. E'ren tracers of these facts were o:.:ii- cially kept from the public until March 1970. The same pattern of duplicity and deception which the Pentagon papers have shown to characterize our entry into ', rently P. strict grayout is imposed on\U.S. operations there, with little -n - forii ation besides official reports avail- able the press. Reporters are not pr r- mitte to accompany attack and spotter' planes n their missions as they are in Vietnam. Most pilots are apparently under ins uclions not to talk with news- men. The it attache in Vientienne is similarly in ccessible. Recent requests by Congress ` n McCLOSKEY for photo- graphs of pr iously existing Lao ril- lages to confi their continued well- being have gone met by the Pentagon. Military officials ave failed as well to provide Congress 11 MCCLOSKEY with a listing of all bo )ed civilian targets in Lr.os. But there are some unofficial sources of information, These na rly unanimo.ls- ly te'l one story-that di massive bom- bardment of civilians un er Pathet Lao concroi. Congressmen MCCLOSKEY and WAT,nTE found, in a U.S. infd mation sar- vey initially concealed from hem by the Emoassy, that 75 percent of l+,he 190 re- spondants from 96 villages ha had their homes bombed. In addition 9 percent had seen a bombing attack an 61 per- cent had seen a-person killed. C gre:s- men McCLOSKEY and WALDIE als con- ducted their own interviews, and 11 16 refugees queried, from seven differen ?ril- lages, testified to the aerial destruc ion of every single dwelling in their hamli>ts. A report by U.N. expert Georges Ch, pelier in December 1970 stated that i the Plainedes Jarres- B?r 1969 the intensity of the bombings ,%as such that no organized life was possible as the villages.... Jet planes came daily and destroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. The only farmed at night. All of the interlocut :as without exception had their villages cc n- pletaly destroyed. In the last phase, bor p- ings were aimed at the systematic destr.;c- tion of the materials bases of the civilian socir,t y . At one time there were more than t 0,- 000 people living in the Plaine des Jarres. There is virtually no life there now. One village chief indicated that in 21 hamlet,. not one home was left standing. In his own village, 45 percent of the 2,600 inhabitants never left their trenches. A sample of 25 villages from the Plaine des Jarres revealed casualty rates of 5 to 10 percent from the bombing. It is esti- mated that 50 civilians are killed for every Pathet-Lao casualty. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. GRAVEL. I ;yield myself 3 addi- tional minutes. in 1968, Jacques Ilecornoy, the South- east Asian desk editor for Le Monde, traveled through Paithet Lao controlled areas. According to his int views, 65 vil- lages in the Sam Ne is dcilstrict alone had been destroyed by U S. lr power. Travel- ir.;; through the dev34ted areas, he de- picts it as "a worlcY'vithout noise for the :surrounding vill e 3 have disappeared. The inhabitant%themselves living in the mountains." / Such testonony is, of course, contrary to our Goyernment': official position that "never 46f ore has su,-h care been taken to spare givilians in bombing raids." Tie picture burns into one's imagina- tiori is that of hundreds of thousands of Laotians desperately huddling in caves and trenches as U.S. planes roar over- head. Again, it is he enormity of the suffering endured t y these poor people which blinds us to our own policy. I will rerun the picture, because we must break through the psychic numbness we have developed. There are hundreds of thousands of poor peasants, noncombatants, living un- derground in fear oof U.S. air power in .Asia. There are entire areas of former civilization reduced to near caveman standards by the most advanced Nation in the history of the earth. For what? No matter for what; it is indefensible. At Nuremberg, Teleford Taylor, chief U.S. Prosecutor, argued that where the military profits of any policy are dwarfed by the civilian casualties, such a policy is indefensible. The massive air war by the United States against the peoples of In- dochina is indefensible. Every B-52 raid, every A--119 K stinger drop, is criminal. The situation in Laos is not appreciably different from what is currently oc- curring in Cambodia. As the Senate Sub- committee on Refugees noted, the same pattern of destruction is being repeated relentlessly throughout "Indochina. It is up to Congress to terminate it. The Presi- dent has made it clear that he intends to continue the bombi::ag, stating in Febru- ary this year, "I wiT_ not place any limita- tions on the use of air power." The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired. ecretary of Def,m.se Laird has indi- cathi that we intend to maintain a naval and fir presence in :southeast Asia indefi- nitely\\llafter the last ground troops are wlthdr,%wn. The Pentagon, which seems to have statistics available for all cate- gories a d contingencies, lacks even an estimate f the likely civilian casualties this prese a will cause. Such considera- tons do not'seem to have a high priority in current American decisionmaking. The Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 S 15874 3. Space___________ 4. Farm ------------ 5. Public works---_- 6. Housing and urban develop- went ________-- 7. Education________ 8. Health----------- 9 . Social security-___ 10. Welfare__________ 11. Veterans_________ X 00300080084(9ty 'r 5, 1971 Approved For MJ.MN1VAL: f1 &W3B P Fiscal 1972 Cut spend- below Hold at Increase ing level level level (bil- (per- (per- (per- lions) cent) cent) cent) 76.0 57.0 36.0 7.0 4.1 81.6 16.4 2.0 3.3 57.4 34.6 8.0 9.6 39.0 47.8 13.2 2.3 14.2 54.7 31.1 3.7 16.7 38.1 45.2 5.2 13.2 46.4 40.4 3.1 5.0 40.1 54.9 4.3 5.0 43.0 52.0 11.4 48.4 35.2- 16.4 10.7 9.0 59.4 31.6 after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Repub- lic of Vietnam unless the President deter- mines any such air operation to be necessary to provide for the safety of United States Armed Forces during their withdrawal from Indochina. Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi- dent, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask unanimous consent that the time tie equally charged against both sides. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- out objection, it is so ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Who yields time? Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Alaska. Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, while we deliberate today in this Chamber Amer- ican planes will ease into the sky over Southeast Asia. They will drop tons of explosives, guided to the flesh of hu- man beings by the most elaborate and impersonal technology. Hovering over Laotian rice fields, the A-119 Stinger gunship can put a piece of shrapnel into every square foot of an area the size of a football field. On the ground are 3 million Laotians, the heaviest bombed people in the his- tory of warfare. They will huddle in their caves and field trenches, and some will die. Many will not see the sun for months, fear keeping them in their covered bunk- ers during daylight hours. In the name of America the planes come. Over the past 10 years 700,000 Laotians have been made refugees, tens of thou- sands have been killed or wounded, and hundreds of thousands forced to live much of the time in caves and trenches. The bombing raids also come in the name of the U.S. Senate, until we legis- late otherwise. The war is not winding down for the peoples of Indochina. Since the much heralded bombing halt over North Viet- nam, the planes have not come home. They have simply shifted their targets into Laos and Cambodia. The bombing has continued at 100 tons an how-, 2,400 tons a day. The rate of civilian casualties and refugee genera- tion, indicative of the overall level of violence, has if anything increased dur- ing the last 2 years. Recent hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees reveal that since the invasion of Cambodia nearly one quarter of that country's popula- tion-1,500,000 people-have become re- fugees. In the last few months in South Vietnam more refugees have been created than at any time since the 1968 Tet offensive. The bombing of North Vietnam has been resumed. As recently as September 21 an armada of 250 U.S. planes attacked targets in the North. and this raid was followed on successive days by two more so-called protective rea ,i )n strikes. At present the bombing of North Vietnam has reached an a.veraf rate of once every 4 days, and aoc( r( ing to North Vietnamese reports 106 ii;ages in addi- tion to missile sites hr c been struck. The Meatgrinder in Vie, ai in, which has taken 325,000 civilian lil and wounded more than a million sit 1965, is still whirling. As the So- 1.1 Vietnamese Minister of Informatiol a ommented in 1968, South Vietnam has i) -en devastated by an alien air force th t seems at war with the very land of 1,e nam. The amendment I 3 i-er is quite straightforward. Let us t )p the bomb- ing, not just partially c e- North Viet- nam but in all Iiidoch n i,-except for those strikes inside Sou h Vietnam de- monstrably related to th - ccurity of our withdrawing troops. Is it really the desire of the Senate to contii ut to send out those planes? An Orwellian transfor tion is taking place in our military poli -y in Indochina. Due to public pressure A,nerican boys are slowly coming honi but they are leaving an automated ws )ehind. There is every danger, as Now , Chomsky has warned, that we intend :) turn the land of Vietnam into an aul ,r_ rated murder machine. Computer ter aology and a small number of troop: tianning air- craft and artillery are -r eating a U.S. destructive presence thy I, may literally hover over Southeast A is for years to come. In the midst of ti is the public is confused, pacified by t 1e diminishing troop levels, yet vaguely 1 c abled by con- tinuing reports of devast , t on. Eluding recognition, ii Aden in the techno-euphemisms of i ,i itary speech, is the reality of our py At V. "Selective ordnance"-a rather dui :,nd technical sounding term until one 1 !r lizes it masks the use of napalm agains h uman beings. "Harrassment and i l "rdiction"-a rather light-hearted teri intil one un- derstands that it represe t, the random hurling of destruction in 3 iungle areas. These antiseptic words o )fuscate hor- ror-filled realities, and t )ereby circum- vent public judgment. "Surgical air strike"-one pictures a ts.rased cancer benevolently removed frcn the country- side. But the cancer is ti jeasantry. In World War II the cane ? as the Jews, and the operation was t 's< "final solu- tion." In the name of A tnerica, how many executions are tat is ; place from the air in Indochina. It is the enormity of o -r mistake that clouds it. if we were wry nl . how wrong we were. Nothing will b, ,r back those who have died, or the los a,-ms and legs, eyes and ears. But let t :commit our- selves at least to :;top t ty bombing of those who remain. How the people of this o ,retry, a good people, industrious peopl ,:red generous people, could have comet 'isit such de- struction on another na -ca is difficult to comprehend. Orwell in -i . masterpiece "1984" depicts such carr ,le as the re- sult of technology gone i ad, removed from common experienc( iving reality to surrealistic nightmare. Ve may have intervened in Indochina :(r commend- able reasons-even that is qi testionable- but at some time the mac ii ne got out of control and we could not t trn it off. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time fixed for the transaction of routine morning business has expired. MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE A message from the House of Repre- sentatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its read- ing clerks, announced that the House had passed a bill (H.R. 10880) to amend title 38 of the United States Code to provide improved medical care to veterans; to provide hospital and medical care to cer- tain dependents and survivors of vet- erans; to improve recruitment and reten- tion of career personnel in the Depart- ment of Medicine and Surgery, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate. MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972 The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which the clerk will state. The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropria- tions during the fiscal year 1972 for procure- ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces and to pre- scribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve com- ponent of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. AMENDMENT NO. 433 The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The pending question is on the amendment of the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL). There is a time limitation of 2 hours on the amendment. Without objection, the text of the pending amendment will be printed in the RECORD. The amendment follows: TITLE VI-CESSATION OF BOMBING IN INDOCHINA SEC. 601. (a) No funds authorized or appro- priated under this or any other law may be expended after the date of enactment of this Act to bomb, rocket, napalm, or otherwise attack by air, any target whatsoever within the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Viet- nam, and the Kingdom of Laos. (b) No funds authorized or appropriated under this or any other law may be expended Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00 9 000300080084-9 October 5, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SErv S15873 cattle feeding operations as we do it in the high plains areas. And most of all, they need a transporta- tion system. 't'hey need--and must have-a much improved farm to market road system to Transport tractor fuel and fertilizer to their farmsand grain and livestock and poultry products to their population centers. It might be well to invite not only Mat- skevitch, Minlstet of Agriculture, but invite the man who heads up their Highway De- partment. Matskevitch is an extremely competent in- dividual. He would be at} influential person in rile cabinet of any countU. I nci.ose a picture taken ili March of 1959 -t'ith identification of the indlq(iduals on the back because I thought you Night like a aicture of him. ',cry respectfully yours, i~S~ 16OSWELL CMRST. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., August 11, 1971 l.'ar.;AR Mn. GARST: The Secretary has aske me to reply to your letter of July 27, 1971, in which you propose that an invitation be issued by the Secretary of Agriculture to CViirtister Matskevich to visit the United hates. We appreciated receiving your suggestion and have discussed it with the Department of Agriculture. We understand that Matske- vich has already been invited to make a private trip to the United States this month. In the event that he comes, the possibility remains open, of course, that he might meet with Secretary Hardin while here. ;Sincerely. is. T. DAVIES, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European affairs. AUGUST 13, 1971. Mr. R. T. DAVIES, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. Department of State, Washing- tan, D.C. DEAR MR.. DAVIES: Thanks for your letter saying that you understood Minister of Agri- culture Matskevich has been Invited to make a private trip to the United States this month. I know aboutthat invitation-but I doubt seriously if he will come without an official invitation from Secretary Hardin, in spite of the fact that he has been invited to speak before a group of economists. And from the State Department's own in- terest, it seems to me an invitation to Mats- kevich to come would be highly desirable. Hardly anything could be more Innocent than inviting him back for another look a5' American agriculture after 15 years. in 1950, we were eating 64.4 pounds of beef per person. By 1960, it was up tcy 85.1 pounds per person. By 1970, it was/tip to 113.8 pounds per person. In 1950, Ave had ab=ut 150 million people-in 1970Above 200 million. It seems highly probable tha 'the U.S.S.R. fiat; failed to keep pace-and/ is anxious to learn how we have done so/well. '4o I urge you to reconsider your decision asut invite him. - Sincerely yours. ROSWELL GARST. 1TATOR PROXMIRE'S POLL OF 3E WISCONSIN RESIDENTS MJlr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, a poll I have taken of Wisconsin residents shows an overwhelming support for the President's wage-price freeze and with even more support expressed for con- tinuation of some, wage-price controls alter the freeze is ended. Among the other interesting results of the .poll, which was answered by some 18,000 Wisconsin residents, was the con- tinuing desire of the voters to reduce Federal spending in the area of defense. foreign aid, and space. The questions and tine results are de- tailed in my October newsletter to my constituents. I asked unanimous conser t that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the newslet- ter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, follows: WHAT YOU THINK ABOUT INFLATION, SCHOC L. BUSLV ., RED CFCINA, AND FEDERAL SPENDING Wisconsin voters continue a remarkabl,' consistent and emphatic. opposition to in- creased federal spending! You call for cuts in spending for defens foreign aid, and space. Most of you support admission of Mainland China to the United Nations. You overwhelmingly oppose busing to de- segregated schools. The Administration's new wage-price cos - ol program has your support ... so far. LAST YEAR If. do your preferences ccmpare with your attitude last year? In 1u ust o1970. in response to a simi}aw question ire, more of you favored bu$ge cuts but a majority continue to support a reduction i defense, foreign aid and'spa:e expenditures. n fact, there is more suppor; for reduced fo igr.L aid than there was la-* year--a whoppirlp 81.6 percent of you fav 1r The welfare pro am is also less popula - Almost 50 percent o you favor a cutback u On the other hand, a 'tajority of you fav,r an increase in spending- or health as well is a boost in social secutit, benefits. Last year there was no majority su or-: for spending Increases of any kind. OUR CHINA POLINt Where do you 'stand on Chhi a.? More than your out of ever tive of ycra support admitting Mainland Clna to t, e, (NI of ee- United Nations but not at the 't On:y 20 percent of ycu would ad it R?:d China if it meant barring Nationalis Chiba ideitt's proposed trip to Peking as wel more trade with Communist China. THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE And the freeze in your wages and price-? More than four out of every five of you support the 90-day freeze on wages and prices. You are willing, by and large, to pa.,s up a wage increase as long as prices and rer cs remain stable and you want some continu=d controls after the freeze expires. A great ma y of yoc (85.9 percent) feel the price freeze should be extended to cover interest charg=s. However, few of you are buying more goods becai: e of the freeze. SCHOOL BUSING Sec:regation and school busing? Although almost all of you are agair.:;t busing, to end segregation no matter where it exists, one out of every four who answered the questionnaire would approve of busing to end school segregation created by acts of a stag government. It it very clear. .however, that most of you stror:.gly oppose busing under any circum- stances. Here's how von and your fellow Wisconsin citizens answered my September questic a- naire : INFLATION Dc ,ou support the current 90-day freeze on wages, prices, rents? . 'ercer. C Yes --------------------------------- 84.7 No ----------------------------------- 15.3 Are you willing to forego an increase in your wages as long as prices and rents are held down also? Percent Yes --------------------------------- 86.2 No -------------------------------- 13.8 Do you expect to buy more clothing, furni- ture, appliances, or other products now that prices are frozen? Percer,.t yes ----------------- 22.4 ------------- No ----------------- - 77.6 Should the freeze Pb extended to cover in- terest charges? Percent Yes ---------- 4---------------------- 85.9 No ~----------------------- 14. 1 Should same kind owage-price contra Is be continued after Nov,miber 12, 1971? Percent Yes -------------------------------- 89.2 No ----------------------------------- 10 8 Do you. favor the President's plan to post- pone the Family Assistance Plan (welfare reform) ? Percent Yes --------------------- ------------- 51.7 No -----.- ------ _ 48 3 Do you favor postsanement of revenue sharing with state an I local governments? Percent yes _.--------------- --------------- 27.2 No ------------------------------------ 72 8 CBI VA. Do you support the President's decision to go to Peking before next May? Percent 'Yes -------------------------------- 71.5 No --------------------------------- 28.5 Would you favor opening up trade with Mainland China provided strategic goods were not traded? Percent Yes _.---------------- - 75.9 No ------------------------------------ 24.1 Would you favor admitting Mainland China to the United Nations: If Nationalist Chine, also kept its niein- bership? Percent Yes ----------------------------------- 83.8 No ----------------------- 16.2 If Mainland China admission is condi- tioned on expelling Nationalist China? Percent s 20 Do ou think busing should be used to desegr ate schools that were segregated by actions rf a state government? Yes ---- ------------------------ 24.6 Ilo ------\------------------------- 75.4 Do you tk busing, should be used to eliminate sag egation werever it erasts and whatever its c uses? Yes -------- 12 9 No -------------- ---- 8".1 SPENDING: NC 3EASE Oa CUT' The ]?resident's c,dget called for $249 billion for the curre t, fiscal year. How, as a U.S. Senator, would yo'a vote on the following proposed (or already a;,3prored) major spend- ing levels? Percent Yes --------------------------------- 5 i. 7 No --------------------------------- 48.3 Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080084-9