CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE RE: U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080080-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: August 3, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

S 12930
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E a 19 71
OPENINGS OF HEARINGS ON DE-
PARTMENT OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am very
much pleased that the distinguished
chairman of the Government Operations
Committee, the Senator from Arkansas
(Mr. MCCLELLAN) has called for opening
hearings on Thursday, August 5, on the
bill creating a new Department of Na-
tural Resources, S. 1431. As principal
Senate sponsor of this proposed legisla-
tion on behalf of the administration, I
am delighted that the Senator from
Washington (Mr. JACKSON) is taking
time, at Chairman MCCLELLAN'S request,
from his work as chairman of the Com-
mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs to
preside over these hearings in the full
Government Operations Committee, of
which he is also a member.
Senator JACKSON brings a wealth of ex-
perience in natural resource issues and
programs, a dedication to conservation
and environmental protection, and very
great ability to this subject. He will be
able to apply his first hand experience in
all of the substantive aspects of natural
resource programs and policies to create
an ideal new structural framework for
existing natural resource programs. The
result, I am confident, will be a very
sound bill.
The creation of such a new Depart-
ment could make major improvements
by coordinating planning of resource de-
velopment projects. An article published
in the Wall Street Journal of July 19,
entitled "Waterway Wrangle," demon-
strated again the waste and confusion
resulting from the conflicting aims of the
Agriculture Department's Soil Conserva-
tion Service, Interior Department agen-
cies, and conservation groups. The issue
is not whether stream charmelization is
good or bad in principle; the issue is
more clearly one of better defining our
objectives, planning without duplication
and waste for measured land reclamation
where necessary, and for maintaining
natural habitats where desirable and
where channelization is not clearly nec-
essary.
The public has every reason to be
frustrated with continued poor Govern-
ment performance and every right to de-
mand change.
I fully subscribe to the President's
comments in discussing his top-priority
programs with media executives in Roch-
ester, New York, on June 18:
I Edmply would suramarlze the attitude of
most people toward government in this way:
most people are fed up with it. They are fed
up with it at all levels. They are fed up with
it because they think it coots too much, they
think it doesn't work, and also they think
they don't have anything to say about it.
Government reorganization, combined
with revenue sharing, answers that funda-
mental concern of the American people. It
will reduce the cost of government by making
it more efficient. It will make it work better.
Thus I am pleased that Senator . Mc-
CIALLAN has called for hearings on the
proposed Department of Natural Re-
sources. The witnesses now planned will
be the Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss),
who has over a period of years led in pro-
posing new structures for natural re-
sources programs; Secretaries Morton
and Hardin; the Under Secretary of
Commerce, Mr. James Lynn; Atomic
Energy Commissioners Larson and
Laney; the Under Secretary of the Army,
Mr. Beal; the Chief of the Army Corps of
Engineers, General Clarke; and the Asso-
ciate director of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Mr. Weber.
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS?PRO-
(JE.K.)INGS IN CLOSED SESSION
Mr. FULBR1GHT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
today's RECORD the expurgated tran-
script of the proceedings of the closed
session of the Senate on June 7, 1971,
and that subsequently it be published at
the appropriate place in the permanent
RECORD of June 7, 1971.
There being no objection, the tran-
script was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, SS follows:
rU.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the
Senate will indulge the Chair for a
moment, the precedents and rules pro-
vide that any action taken now in the
Senate is confidential, and that means
that it is secret. It can be divulged only
by special affirmative action by the Mem-
bers of the Senate. or by a majority vote
of the Senate.
Under section 2 of Rule XXXVI, when
acting on confidential or executive busi-
ness, unless the same shall be considered
in open executive session, the Senate
Chamber shall be cleared of all persons
except the secretary, the chief clerk, the
principal legislative clerk, the executive
clerk, the minute and Journal clerk, the
Sergeant at Arms, the assistant door-
keeper, and such other officers as the
presiding officer shall think necessary.
Under recent practices, the word "as-
sistant doorkeeper" as used in the rule,
has been expanded to include the ma-
jority and minority secretaries.
Under previous practices, the Chair
under his authority to retain "other
officers as the presiding officer shall think
necessary" retains the Parliamentarian
and the Assistant Parliamentarian to aid
him
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I also
want to make it absolutely clear that the
loudspeakers are shut off completely, in
the cloakrooms and elsewhere. I would
hope that the Sergeant at Arms would
see that that is done.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Mr. President, I send to the desk two
unanimous-consent requests, the first
having to do with Senate staff employees.
I want to make it very plain that those
who are on the list, if the Senate agrees
that they should be cresent, must have
the clearance that the ones previously
allowed on the floor had.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will state the first agreement.
The Senator from Montana (Mr.
MANSFIELD) makes the following unani-
mous-consent request:
That during the close : ession the fol-
lowing Senate staff en 0,.)yees be per-
mitted the privileges .f the floor to
perform their official du -ies: The Official
Reporters; the Secrete' if the Senate,
Francis Valeo; the 'a rliamentarian,
Floyd Riddick; Journa flerk, Bernard
Somers; chief clerk, a A. ill St. Claire;
legislative clerk, Jame Johnson; the
secretary for the majo itr, J. S. Kim-
mitt; the assistant secre a y for the ma-
jority Teddy Roe; the ;,cretary for the
minority, Mark Trice; tie assistant sec-
retary for the minority. William Brown-
rigg; majority policy ommittee staff
members Charles D. Ft rrts and Daniel
E. Leach; the following orlicials for the
minority: William Hil lenbrand, Cecil
Holland, and Oliver Dor mterre; and the
following Senate of imals: Robert
Dunphy, the Sergeant a Arms; William
Wannall, the Deputy Se .geant at Arms;
and Nicholas Lacovars the Assistant
Sergeant at Arms.
The PRESIDING OFF IcER. Does the
Senator from Montana w.sh to include
the Assistant Parliamer a -Ian?
Mr. MANSFIELD. 0.10. the Parlia-
mentarian now.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request o the Senator
from Montana?
PRIVILEGE OP THI 005
Mr. CASE. Mr. Presicit nt, I ask unan-
imous consent that my assistant, who
specializes in matters relating to this
specific question of troo 3s in Laos and
the American emplort t t of merce-
naries in Laos, be added to the list. His
name is John Marks.
The PRESIDING OFF IC ER. Is there
objection to adding this / ,trie to the list?
Mr. SYMINGTON. hi r. President, I
ask unanimous consent l at two staff
members be allowed the a zvilege of the
floor during my prest atation. Their
names are James G. I owenstein and
Richard M. Moose.
The PRESIDING OFF LC ER. Is there
objection to these person4 saying on the
floor during the closed se Is..:on?
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Pr -s:dent, reserv-
ing the right to object, : wonder if the
chairman of the committ e the Senator
from Mississippi (MT. ST ,:s NILS), has his
people included?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
Senator from Mississipp ill be taken
care of.
The PRESIDING OFF
objection? The Chair hea
is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mi
have received no request I
man of the Committ(
Services.
However, in view of tie
may well encompass part ,
bility, I ask unanimous cc
distinguished Senator fr,
(Mr. SrsNins) may be a.
the following staff membe
If he so desires: T. Edwar,
R. James Woolsey.
The PRESIDING OFF)
objection?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr
serving the right to object
the able majority leader I
staff of the Armed Servi4
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CER. Is there
s none, and it
President, I
on the chair-
on Armed
fict that this
.1 responsi-
%sent that the
,m Mississippi
towed to have
s on the floor
1;raswell and
R. Is there
P-esident, re-
_ may I say to
!iat I told the
or Committee
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August 3, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
scheduled date, time, and place of said hear-
ing. In addition, at least 45 days before the
hearing date, the Board shall pubish in the
Newsletter a complete statement of proposed
programs in the next fiscal year. All inter-
ested parties should be granted an oppor-
tunity to testify. The Board can deny the
request to testify onLy on the basis of good
cause publishing the reasons therefor. A
record shall be made of all hearings, and
said record shall be available for public in-
spection. All reasonable and germane in-
quiries made at the hearing of the Board,
or of the principal investigators Where pos-
sible, must be fairly responded to on the
record. The Board shall wfdt at least 30 days
after the completion of the hearings to allow
for the comment of interested parties before
submitting its budget to the Preside/It
PATENTS
"Sir 409. Each contract, grant or other
arrangement for any research or development
activity supported by this title shall contain
ovisions effective to insure that all Infos'.
tion, uses, processes, patents, and ot
dev opments resulting from that sot ty
will ? made freely and fully available the
generai\Public. Nothing herein shall con-
strued t deprive the owner of an back-
ground pa nt of any right whic he may
have thereu er.
ram PENALTY
"SEC. 410. An person who violates any
regulation establis ed pursu t to this title
shall be subject to a vil pe HY of not more
than $10,000 for each vio tion or for each
day of a continuing vi tion. The penalti
shall be recoverable in civil suit brought
by the Attorney Gen n behalf of the
United States in the nit States District
Court for the distr t in whi the defend-
ant is located or /for The Di ict of Co-
lumbia "
?
/ 5.2408
d by the Senate and H
yes of the United State
Congress assembled; That
purchasers by private and public agencies;
" (1) prescribe such regulations as it deems
necessary governing the manner in which and the relation of any and all such facts
such functions shall be carried out; to the development of corserv,ation, industry,
"(2) appoint such officers and employees commerce, and the nationa defense. The
as may be necessary, and supervise and di-
06
rect theiractivities;
er
"(3) u ize from time to time, as appro-
priate, ex ts and consultants, including
panels of experts, who may be employed as
authorized by IMetion 3109 of title V of the
:United States Code;
"(4) accept and lize the services of vol-
untary and uncompe
reimburse them for tra
ing per diem, as authorize
sons in the government se
without compensation;
"(5) rent office space; and
"(6) make other necessary expertures.
"(b) If, in carrying out its functions nder
this section, the Board from time to me
should require the services of personnel
gaged in the generation, transmission an
distribution of electric energy, it should seek
such personnel from all segments of the elec-
tric power industry including investor owned,
State and local public agencies, cooperatives,
and Federal agencies.
ted personnel and
expenses, includ-
by law for per-
ice employed
"REPORT
"SEC. 406. The Board shall prepare and
submit to the President for transmittal to
the Congress not more than six months after
the passage of this Act and on the same day
annually after that, a comprehensive report
on the administration of this title for the
preceding calendar year. Wherever possible,
judgments contained in the report shall in-
clude a clear statement of the assumptions
and data used. Such report shall Include?
"(I) a thorough analysis and evaluation
of research and development activities funded
under this title:
"(2) a comprehensive evaluation of the
areas most in need of research and develop-
ment funding in the future;
"i3) an analysis of the possible and prob-
able impact of emerging technologies on the
present and future aspects of the following:
"IA) both the supply of and the demand
for electrical energy;
-(B) the economy; and
"(C) the environment; and
"(4) the extent of cooperation with other
Federal agencies and public and private in-
stitutions, indicating the difficulties and the
Board's plans for improvement, including
proposals for legislation if needed.
NEWSLETTER
"SEC. 407. (a) Not less than twice eh
month. the Board shall publish a newsl ter
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Newsle er'),
which shall be made available to al inter-
ested persons and include?
"(1) abstracts of all approved Vents, in-
cluding a statement on the genfiral nature
of the work;
"(2) announcements of h ings;
"(3) summaries of pro sing develop-
ments; and
"(4) the information
quired elsewhere
in this title.
"(b) The Board shaly give notice by pub-
lication in the Feder Register and in the
days before approval
0,000 or more and shall
unity for any interested
t on any such grant prior
to approval. grants may be approved
until thirty stays after completion of the
time allowed/for the comment of interested
persons. /
PROCEDURE
Newsletter at least
of any grant of $5
provide an oppo
party to comme
"Sze. 08. At least once each year the
Board all conduct a hearing on its pro-
posed/budget for the following fiscal year.
NotiO shall be given by publication in the contracts in respect to the sale of natural
Ferkiral Register and in the Newsletter at gas and its service to residential, rural, corn-
ier* 60 days prior to its occurrence, the znercial, and industrial consumers, andutlier
Be tt enae
Represent
America tat
tion 14 of the Natural Gas Act, as amended
(15 U.SIC. 717m) , is amended by adding
three ziew subsections as follows:
"(4 The Commission is further author-
izd and directed to conduct studies of the
oduction, gathering, storage, transporta-
ion, distribution, and sale of natural or ar-
tificial gas, however produced, throughoit
the United States and its posessions whether
or not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission, including the production,
gathering, storage, transportation, distri-
bution, and sale of natural or artificial gas by
any agency. authority, or instrumentality
of the United States, or of any State or mu-
nicipality or political subdivision of a State.
The Commission shall make an independent
evaluation of the proven natural gas reserves
of the United States identifying volumes in
production and volumes not being produced
and the reasons for such non-producti)n
and ,to update such evaluation annually. The
evaluation of proven natural gas reserves
shall be based on individual company data
obtained directly by the Commission and In-
dependently evaluated by government ex-
perts. It shall, so far as practicable, secure
and keep current information regarding the
ownership, operation, management, and cen-
tral of all facilities for such production,
gathering, storage, transportation, distribu-
tion, and sale; the total estimated natural
gas reserves of fields or reservoirs and the cur-
rent utilization of natural gas and the rela-
tionship between the two; the! cost of pro-
duction, gathering, storage. transportation,
distribution, and sale; the rates, charges, and
Se of
Commission shall report to
publish and Make avails
subsection (a) the res
under authority of th
"(j) The Commi
investigations, a
tion shall have
infiumation f
ngress and may
e as provided by
of studies made
subsection.
on in making studies,
reports under this sec-
uthority to obtain reserve
m natural gas companies
whether or n otherwise subject to the Com-
mission's j isdiction and shall publish the
informati annually in the form of .an esti-
the nation's natural gas reserves,
yen-and potential:, with breakdowns
ucing areas, identifying the volUmes
h area not being produced. The Com-
ion shall utilize, insofar as practicable,
t e. services, studies, reports, information,
nri continuing investigational programs of
/existing departments, bureaus, offices, agen-
cies, and other entities of the United States,
and of the respective States. Nothing in this
section Shall be construed as modifying, re-
assigning, or otherwise affecting the investi-
gating and reporting activities, duties, pow-
ers, and functions of any other department,
bureau, office, or agency in the Federal Gov-
ernment."
(k) Any natural gas company which fails
to reveal its gas reserves to the Commission
shall in addition to any other penalties which
may be assesesd, be automatically ineligible
to bid on any leases on any federal lands
until suc:h information is supplied to the
satisfaction of the Commission."
mate of
both p
by pr
In
-......???????11110.11?11EM
THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972?AMEND-
MENT
AMENDMENT NO. 368
(Ordered to be printed and to lie on
the table.)
Mr. JAVITS, for himself, Mr. BAYH, Mr.
HATFIELD, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. KENNEDY,
Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. MCGrOVERN, Mr. Moss,
Mr. PEARSON, Mr. PERCY, Mr. PROXMIRE,
Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. TAFT, Mr. TOWER, Mr.
UNNEY? Mr. SCHWEIICER, and Mr.
V ICKER, submitted an amendment in-
ten ed to be proposed to the bill (H.R.
9844 to authorize certain construction
at mi 'tary installations, and for other
purpose.
AMENDMENT NO. 379
(Ordere to be printed and to lie on
the table.)
Mr. CASE ubmitted an amendment
intended to be oposed by him to the bill
(H.R. 9844) , sup
NOTICE 0 HEARING
Mr. JACKSON. M1? President, I an-
nounce for the informa on of the Senate
and the public that on esdnesday, Au-
gust 18, 1971, the Subcom ittee on Min-
erals, Materials, and Fuels f the Senate
Committee on Interior and sular Af-
fairs, will hold a public hear in Bil-
lings, Mont., to obtain info tion on
problems involving access and eral
exploration activities in the Cus r and
Gallatin National Forests of Mo tana.
The hearing will be held at the Ea ern
Montana College, Billings, Mont., a 9
Any Member of the Senate or of the
general public who wishes to testify at -
this hearing should so advise the com-
mittee.
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August 3, 1 S 12931
this morning that in case the distin-
guished chairman of the committee
would like to have staff members on the
floor, I would have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There be-
ing no objection, it is so ordered.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Mr. MANSFIELD. ...r. President, I
send to the desk the other unanimous-
consent request and ask that it be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The re-
quest will be stated.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Montana (Mr.
MANSFIELD) makes the following unani-
mouse consent request:
That, at the conclusion of the closed
session, the complete transcript of the
proceedings be delivered by the chief re-
porter to the chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations; that the transcript
of the remarks of each Senator who par-
ticipated in the debate be made available
to that Senator for revision in the office
of the Committee on Foreign Relations;
that the chairman of the committee, with
the assistance of sworn and security-
cleared personnel, be authorized to ex-
purgate the transcript, by deleting all
classified material; that such expurgated
copy be delivered to the chief reporter
for publication at the appropriate place
in the permanent CONGRESSIONAL RECORD;
and that the chief reporter turn the short
hand notes of the official reporters over
to the Secretary of the Senate, to be kept
in secret and not to be disclosed without
leave of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, on the basis of
the declaration made by the presiding
officer, the Assistant Parliamentarian be
allowed to remain also.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
the Senator from Missouri will allow me,
I would like to suggest the absence of a
quorum briefly.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President I
would hope my colleagues would allow me
to finish my statement, at which time I
will be glad to yield for any observations
or questions.
Mr. CASE. Would the Senator use the
loudspeaker?
Mr. MANS.e.teALD. No, they are turned
off.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The reason for re-
questing this executive session of the
Senate was in order to discuss the situa-
tion in Laos and also the implications of
those operations for the United States.
One of the implications which is of
concern, as will be made plain in the
course of these remarks, relates to the
future role of the U.S. Senate.
First, a brief description of what the
United States is doing in Laos, and then
let me discuss whether there is legal au-
thority for what we are doing; also
whether we can afford it and, if we can
afford it, whether it is in our interest to
do so.
Many of us believe that in. a situation
of this character we in the Senate have a
right to know what we are actually doing
and the right to participate in decisions
as to whether or not the military opera-
tions in that country should continue.
In any case, in order to perform our
constitutional role, that is, carry out the
functions which the people who elected
us now expect us to carry out, as I see
it we have the obligation to inform our-
selves about this war and thereupon the
duty to form our own judgment.
After all, in Laos, every year, we are
spending hundreds of millions of dollars
of appropriated public moneys, and many
will be surprised to know how much.
The executive branch currently directs
this Laotian war, not through the De-
partment of Defense, where clearly
understood congressional controls apply;
rather through the State Department
and the Central Intelligence Agency, the
latter an Agency which, through the Na-
tional Security Council, reports directly
to the President.
I do not cast any aspersions on that
Agency, one which, in the main, has car-
ried out properly and efficiently the
orders which it has been given.
It is a fact, however, that the United
States is currently paying for foreign
troops, for mercenaries if you will, de-
spite legislation which, by letter as well
as intent, was designed to prohibit any
such practice.
So much for the reasons for this ses-
sion. I now turn briefly to what we are
actually doing.
By way of introduction, let me first
describe the process by which we ob-
tained the information being presented
to you today.
On January 27 of this year, the chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator FULBRIGIIT, wrote
the Secretary of Defense asking for sta-
tistical information relating to the mili-
tary situation in Cambodia and Laos
similar to that information regularly
supplied the committee with regard to
Vietnam.
More than 2 months later, in a reply
dated April 10, and signed :by Assistant
Secretary of Defense G. Warren Nutter,
this request was refused.
The operative portion of said refusal
read as follows:
I regret we are unable to comply with your
request in this instance. It would not be at
all appropriate to disclose outside the execu-
tive branch highly sensitive information on
military combat operations of the kind your
questions would elicit if answers were to be
provided.
Chairman FULBRIGHT then replied on
April 20, saying:
Would you please supply the committee
with a list of the items which you consider
In this category.
On May 5, Mr. Nutter
follows:
The information required
request is normally provide
personnel acting in. a milito
sistance role who accompany
try forces on combat operatic
Geneva Accord, the so-called
amendment, and certain ot
imposed by the Congress hai
law the presence of U.S. ru
personnel in Laos and Cam}
turn, effectively precludes re
to the Department of Defenst
of that nature.
Because of the extraordi
this correspondence, I a
consent that this exchang
printed as a part of the
session and appear in the
conclusion of my statemen
The PRESIDING OFFI
objection, so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Aft
refusal by the executive 1
the committee the inform
consultants of the comm
currently serving as staf
the Subcommittee on
Agreements and Commit
and who are on the Sena
time, went to Laos late
early last May.
They took with them ti
tions about which the Dt.?
ment said it did not ha,
formation.
Nevertheless, during
stay, they obtained fron
and military officials stat
and Thailand answers to
the questions on the list i.
return ?prepared for the
top secret report.
On May 21 this report
to a meeting of the sut
which the full committe(
vited, and, to say the lea
found the contents of sa:
disturbing.
With the approval of ; r e chairman
and members of the full committee, I
thereupon decided to reqe s. this closed
session so that the inf u iation con-
tained in the report w u. d be made
available to all Members A the Senate.
May I emphasize that -a id report fs
classified top secret.
The major points it co .tains are the
following:
First. It is clear to ma I ibservers in
Laos that, from the mil Ls ry point of
view, the Situation in ti at country is
growing steadily worse, w tl the initia-
tive now in the hands of -re enemy.
Since February, when Outh Viet-
namese ground forces, St pported by
American air and log/. ti 'al support
launched the Lam Son 71i attack on the
Ho Chi Minh Trail area of .o Ahern Laos,
more territory than was u Icer Lao Gov-
ernment control prior to t s t attack has
now been lost.
Today two-thirds of th : -;ountry, in-
cluding the Plain of Jars is well as most
of the Bolovens Plateau i; no longer
under Government contro,
The map at the back of t A room shows
in yellow the amount of g ind in Laos,
according to our most re !eat informa-
rf sponded as
r ?spond to the
hrough U.
.v advisory as-
'1' o Laos coun-
.; However, the
e2 oper-Church
c restrictions
,rohibited by
ary advisory
ot la which, in
laole reporting
o Information
ry nature of
it unanimous
ff letters be
e :Ord of this
record at the
71 R. Without
r this stated
rt nch to give
)n, two staff
tt ie, who are
nembers of
3. Security
rants Abroad
door at this
_At April and
e iist of ques-
feose Depart-
e reliable in-
eir 2-week
ITS, civilian
ted in Laos
al but one of
upon their
immittee a
vIts presented
:trrunittee, to
1: as also in-
.4 all present
report most
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tion, that is controlled by the enemy, and
the white shows what is not controlled by
the enemy. Relatively small parts in the
lower left-hand corner and the upper
left-hand corner show, in shaded yellow,
territory that is contested.
To the best of our knowledge, there are
no plans for trying to retake and hold
any of this territory, only hope; and even
that hope is confined to holding the ter-
ritory remaining under Government
control.
North Vietnamese and Pathet Lan
forces in Laos currently total between
115,000 and 139,000. (Three years ago
they totaled some 92,000.) This compares
with a total of 95,000 to 97,500 forces
considered friendly to the United States,
Second. Since February 1970, this
country has been using B-52's in north-
ern Laos on -a regular basis" (B-52 oper-
ations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail
area in southern Laos began years
earlier) ; but the Foreign Relations
Committee was never apprised of this
fact; and it was only learned by our com-
mittee members as a result of this recent
staff visit.
After discovery, the executive branch
defended not letting the committee know
by stating the question had not been
asked. (No doubt many other pertinent
questions have not been asked.)
But the committee did not have suf-
ficient information to know what to ask.
The committee, as well as the public,
was only informed about this regular
use of B-52 bombers in northern Laos
when the Under Secretary of State,
testifying on May 3, 1971, in wen ses-
sion before the committee, was asked
about these B-52 raids in northern Laos
close to China. The question was asked
as the result of the finding of the sub-
committee staff.
At that time the Under Secretary was
therepon asked how many B-52 sorties
were being flown over Laos. He said he
did not know, would have to obtain that
information from the Defense Depart-
ment.
The committee staff, however, had al-
ready been given these figures by the
American Embassy in Vientiane; and
their report tells us that in the first 4
months of this year, [deleted] B-52 sor-
ties were flown over northern Laos, com-
pared with [deleted] such sorties in all
of 1970.
Third. The United States continues to
train, arm and feed the Royal Lao Army
and Air Force. Also, through the CIA,
our Government trains, pays, advises
supports and, to a great extent, organizes
a large number of Lao irregular military
units.
These irregulars, whose present
strength is about 30,000 [deleted] include
combat elements almost as large as those
of the Royal Lao Army.
These combat elements, known as BG
(for Bataillons Guerriers) units, consti-
tute the most effective force now oppos-
ing the North Vietnamese and Pathet
Lao; and, as such, they are bearing the
brunt of the most critical fighting in
Laos. They are found not only in military
region II, which is commanded by Gen-
eral yang Pao, but in every other military
.10'13PPRAIR000300080041T4,ust -3, 19i1
region of Laos except the region im-
mediately around Vientiane.
The cost of maintaining this irregular
army is increasing every year, primarily
because of the rising costs of air trans-
port and ammunition. That figure, our
staff people were told, is now estimated
to be around [deleted] million annually.
Fourth. In addition, the United States
is currently operating a large civilian air
fleet in Laos. This fleet includes about 20
aircraft rented from the U.S. Air Force.
(During this fiscal year local air trans-
port costs alone amount to some $30
million.)
Fifth. [Deleted].
Sixth. For their part, the Chinese
presence has increased in northern Laos,
from between 6,000 and 8,000, as of 2
years ago, to between 14,000 and 20,000 at
the present time.
The road the Chinese are building in
northern Laos has been improved in re-
cent months; and its antiaircraft and as-
sociated radar have been heavily in-
creased. (In the opinion of knowledgeable
U.S. officials, from an antiaircraft stand-
point that area is now one of the most
heavily defended areas in the world:,
This area of northern Laos is consid-
ered out of bounds to U.S. combat planes,
but it has been bombed at least twice and
repeatedly overflown, by planes of ;he
Royal Lao Air Force. The latter planes
are unmarked T-28's provided by the
United States. In addition [deleted].
We were told that, whether related or
not, the rapid buildup of this antiaircraft
defense system followed these Lao air
attacks.
[Deleted.]
Seventh. [Deleted] there are [deleted]
Thai soldiers in Laos.
The Thai forces in Laos are part of an
irregular program. They are employed in
conjunction with other, in effect, CIA-
directed irregulars in Lam. They are re-
cruited in Thailand. All costs are paid
by the CIA, however, including both sal-
aries and allowances.
These Thai forces are flown into Laos
by Air America planes which in turn are
hired by the U.S. Government,
If any of these Thai are wounded, at
least some are thereupon evacuated by
Air America to a U.S. Air Force field hos-
pital at the Royal Thai Air Force Base at
Udorn, in northern Thailand.
The facts with respect to U.S. sup-
port for Thai forces presently fighting in
northern Laos were provided to the staff
by U.S. Government officials. On their
face they describe a situation which con-
travenes not only the intent, but also the
actual letter, of the Fulbright amend-
ments to last year's Defense authoriza-
tion and appropriation bills. These
amendments were specifically designed to
prohibit the hiring of foreign troops, such
as Thais, to defend the Governments of
either Laos or Cambodia.
In recent exchanges of correspondence,
letters from the State Department in
reply to questions from Senator Fulbright
and Senator Case acknowledge that the
United States is paying Thai forces to
fight in Laos. I ask unanimous consent
that these letters also be printed in the
record at the conclusion of my state-
ment.
The 'PRESIDING C)FFICER. Without
objection, so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. In a labored effort
to justify this secret operation, Assist-
ant Secretary of State Abshire made
the following extraordinary statement
in his letters to Senators FIILBRIGHT and
CASE:
We believe that it has been made clear
that this is not a question of U.S. support
for regular Thai forces in Laos. The irregu-
lar forces involved, while raised and trained
In Thailand, are all one-year volunteers who
go to Laos to serve under the command of
the Royal Lao Government; in this case the
Lao Military Region II Commander. These
guerrilla forces are therefore considered to
be local forces in Laos.
Commonsense forces one to ask, how-
ever, how can these Thai irregulars in
Laos be described as "local forces."
They are Thai, not Lao. They are re-
cruited in Thailand, not Laos. They are
[deleted].
[Deleted].
Eighth. The cost of our military assist-
ance program in Laos is rising rapidly.
In the fiscal year 1970 it was funded
originally at $74.2 million. According to
information given our staff by U.S. offi-
cials in Laos, however, it would seem to
have actually cost about double that
amount?$146.4 million.
The program figure for the fiscal year
1971 has already risen to $162 million;
and the amount presently being pro-
gramed for the fiscal year 1972 has risen
to $252 million, double the amount of
the original estimate of new funds
needed.
Most of these increases were described
to our staff as being the result of the
increased cost of ammunition. Ammu-
nition alone for Laos will cost $136.3 mil-
lion in fiscal year 1972.
In sum, during the next fiscal year the
military assistance program for our
Laotian operations will be three times
as large as the program was in 1967; and
25 times as large as it was when it first
began, in 1963.
At least as disturbing as the constantly
rising cost of this program, however, is
the fact that over the years the true
magnitude of the increase has been con-
cealed from the Congress; and one of
the primary purposes of this session is to
present that fact to your attention.
To our knowledge the Department of
Defense has never acknowledged?cer-
tainly never voluntarily?that this pro-
gram is costing far more than the
amounts specified in the authorization
requests.
As but one example, during this year's
authorization hearings the figures given
to the Armed Services Committee by the
Defense Department as the cost of fund-
ing the 1970-71 programs were those of
the amounts originally requested; but on
the basis of what our staff was told by
our own officials in Vientiane, 1970 pro-
gram costs were $72 million higher than
the amount Congress thought it had
authorized in new funds.
The program costs for 1971 will be $45
million higher than the amount of new
funds requested; and before the fiscal
year 1972 even begins, plans are being
made to spend more than twice the
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S 12933
amount currently being requested of th
Congress in new funds by the executiv
branch.
Ninth. The Laos AID program fo
this year?Fiscal 19'71?has amounted to
some $52 million. Some $16 to $18 million
of this figure goes to the Foreign Ex-
change Operations Fund, the fund
through which the Royal Lao Govern-
ment obtains 90 percent of its foreign
exchange. Other countries also contrib-
ute to the fund, but we provide about
three-fourths of the total :amount re-
quired to support the value of Lao cur-
rency abroad.
Tenth. The budget for the Govern-
ment of Laos for this year is the local
currency equivalent of $36.6 million;
whereas only a partial total of antici-
pated U.S. expenditures in Laos during
the fiscal year 1971 comes to $284.2 mil-
lion. In other words, this year, in Laos,
the United States will be spending, at
a minimum, almost eight times more
than the total Government budget in
that country.
This latter figure includes the $162.2
million being spent by the service funded
Military Assistant Program, although
even that figure may turn out to be low;
the $52 million AID program; and the
[deleted] million spent by CIA; but it
does not include any further increases
In military assistance, the cost of the
Thai irregulars, the administrative costs
of maintaining some 1,200 military and
civilian American Government employees
In Laos, or the heavy price the American
taxpayer also pays for United States air
operations in and over Laos.
Consider the fact that this partial total
of United States expenditures neverthe-
less amounts to $141 per capita for the
estimated 2 million Lao people under
Government control, as compared to an
estimated per capita gross national
product for those same people of $66.
And that is not all. The military assist-
ance presently scheduled for next year
will increase these partial United States
expenditures to at least $37.4 million.
That is $187 per capita, almost three
times the per capita gross national
product of this impoverished and war
ravaged country.
Let me again present to the Senate,
however, that the only figure so far ac-
tually released by the executive branch
for any category of assistance to Laos is
the $52 Million AID program, about one-
sixth of the true estimate of expendi-
tures in Laos in this fiscal year.
Eleventh. Finally, the executive branch
would appear determined to maintain
that perhaps unprecedented secrecy
which for so long has characterized
United States operations in this country.
It has been argued that, for many rea-
sons, this secrecy is necessary: examples,
to avoid offending the sensibilities of
Thai Government; to avoid violating the
agreement,s we have with that Govern-
ment under which we use Thai air bases
for operations against three other coun-
tries?North Vietnam, Cambodia and
Laos?[deleted] in Thailand; and [de-
leted] Thai to fight in Laos.
It is also argued that the Central In- s
telligence Agency, which runs by far the 0
most effective government military force
e in Laos, is not accustomed to operating i
e public; and that to do so would jeopar
dize its operations in other countries.
Underlying both of these argument,s
appears to be the view, never stated di
rectly, that while much of what the
United States is doing does violate the
Geneva Accords of 1962, the North Viet-
namese also violate the Accords; but
they do not admit their violations. Ac-
cordingly, those who hold this view
argue that if we were to admit publicly
what we were, and are, actually doing,
that would further complicate what-
ever possibility there may be of reac-
tivating the Geneva Accords at some
point in the future.
So much for what one member of the
committee, after hearing this staff re-
port, described as the "lurid tale" of our
activities in Laos.
It is obvious that unless the Congress
of the United States takes action now,
these activities will continue.
Our military strategy, as described out
there to our staff, would appear to be one
of regarding the war in Laos as an
adjunct to our military strategy in Viet-
nam. This, they were told, ties down
North Vietnamese divisions and permits
:the use of U.S. air power, in conjunction
itith South Vietnamese ground forces, so
as to exploit Lao territory to interdict the
Ho Chi Minh Trail.
This, we are also told, will buy more
time for Vietnamization.
What we have not been told, how-
ever, is how long these operations will
continue.
The stated aim of Vietnamization is to
spend these billions in order to put the
Thieu-Ky Government of South Vietnam
In a position to defend itself after U.S.
forces have been withdrawn.
But what about Laos?
Surely the Lao are in no position to
defend themselves; and the South Viet-
namese have shown they are not capable
of fighting in Laos even with extensive
U.S. air support.
Are we to believe our involvement in
Laos will end when our troops are with-
drawn from Vietnam?
Or are we planning to stay, and fight
and pay for others to fight indefinitely?
To our knowledge, the administration
has never disclosed any "future plans"
for Laos.
Could it be they have no such plans?
In any case, as the staff report con-
cludes, it has now become clear that the
United States is using the people of Laos
for its own purposes, at a startlingly
heavy increased cost to our taxpayers in
money, and to the Lao people in terms of
destroyed hopes, destroyed territory, and
destroyed lives.
Based on the above facts, we believe
the time has now come for another effort
by the Congress to limit the extent and
nature of our long secret involvement in
this war-torn country.
Experience would imply that one way,
and the most effective way, to accomplish
this would be to place a limitation on the
amount of money our Government can
pend in Laos. To that end, $200 million
hould surely be enough for our Laos 1
perations during this coming fiscal year.
If this administration believes it needs
n more, it should come to th, Congress and
- justify any need for addi .o.tal military
and financial effort.
The American people at .1 'heir repre-
- sentatives have the right o know more
about the amount of mot c3 now being
spent and more about the :5 es to which
that money is being put in tl As long, un-
declared and secret war.
As just one example, w iy should the
military assistance figure: 1or Laos be
classified, while those for :.'ambodia are
made a matter of public kr: ra ledge?
For 6 years I have dor my best to
find out what has been go al: on, and is
going on, in this little cow ,r. One can-
not overemphasize the fa ?,t that, even
with this staff report, we t -he Foreign
Relations, Armed Services nd Appro-
priations Coinmittees haw (lily partial
knowledge of what the Ur ,ted States is
doing, and spending, this ;ear in Laos.
We know about the anount being
spent for economic aid, be :ause we ap-
propriated it; but we shou d have more
of the truth about the ani :mit actually
being spent for military e.
And nobody knows the as iounts the
CIA is spending while unde rders from
the executive branch to continue to
supervise and direct tin, long and
ravaging war.
To summarize, whereas i 1E Ambrican
Public has been led to belle' e that in the
fiscal year 1971 in Laos we tr3 spending
$52 million, we now know th: t luring this
fiscal year at least $284.2 million will be
expended; and we have evt 73, reason to
believe the actual figure is itch higher.
The Senate has never hal he oppor-
tunity to bring to bear its co ietive judg-
ment on the cost of our LI otian activ-
ities, let alone the op ztunity to
consider, based on the facts tie wisdom
of continuing these activiti
Laos stands out as but ale more ex-
ample of the manner in wh..d. excessive
secrecy is depriving the Cot ess of in-
formation essential to the e: ercise of its
constitutional responsibilitie
In the case of the Thai at rcenaries,
we were told one thing whit it:)mething
else was being done, a clear ,buse of the
constitutional authority poss ed b the
Congress when it comes to a authority
over the raising of money, J 07 to men-
tion its war-making powers
With respect to Laos, n t only has
there been no declaration of war, to the
best of our knowledge thei ? has been
no statement of policy on part of
the Congress.
Let's face it. We have 1:1!e appro-
priating money for this war ) he blind.
The Senate's constitutional vie of ad-
vice and consent has been ig)
Our advice has not been su-ict d for, let
alone our consent given.
Every member of this hod viii want
to satisfy himself as to whe ht,r or not
dL
the facts presented here to y are true.
To the best of our knowled ;.e they are
true; and if they are, their nea.ning is
clear. The -Senate must act, io w, to re-
assert its constitutional righ when it
comes to the waging of war. I: it does
not do so, who will deny tha the legis-
ative arm has become the ser Us arm of
this Government.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 3, 1971
With the consent of the Senate, the
two staff members in question who visited
Laos this spring are now with us on the
floor. They have copies of their top secret
report which any Senator can look at at
this time: or, if preferred, the report can
be looked at in the committee room of
the Foreign Relations Committee. We
ask that no copy of this report be re-
moved from this chamber at this time;
also that every copy looked at be re-
turned to the staff members in question.
Mr. PRESIDENT, at some time after
this closed session I shall introduce an
amendment to S. 939, a bill to authorize
appropriations during the fiscal year
1972 for the procurement of aircraft,
missiles, naval vessels, and so forth. That
amendment follows:
[8.939, 92d Cong. First aess.1
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNIT'ED STATES
Referred to the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices and ordered to be printed.
AMENDMENT
Intended to be proposed by Mr. Symington
to the bill (S. 939) to authorize appropria-
tions during the fiscal year 1972 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, torpedoes, and
other weapons, and research, development,
test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces,
arid to prescribe the authorized personnel
strength for each active duty component and
of the Selected Reserve of each reserve com-
ponent of the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes, viz: At the end of the bill add a
new section as follows:
Sec. 502. (a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no funds authorized to be
appropriated by this or any other Act may
be obligated or expended in any amount in
excess of $200 million for the purpose
of carrying out directly or indirectly any eco-
nomic or military assistance, or any opera-
tion, project, or program of any kind, or for
providing any goods, supplies, materials, serv-
ices, personnel, or advisors in, to, for, or on
behalf of Laos during the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1972.
(b) No funds may be obligated or ex-
pended for any of the purposes described in
subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or
on behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning
after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have
been specifically authorized by law enacted
after the date of enactment of this Act. In no
case shall funds in any amount in excess of
the amount specifically authorized by law for
any fiscal year be obligated or expended for
any such purpose during such fiscal year.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and
(b) of this section shall not apply with re-
spect to the expenditure of funds to carry
out combat air operations over the so-called
Ho Chi Minh trails in southern Laos, and
over areas immediately adjacent to such
trails, by United States miliary forces.
(d) After the date of enactment of this
Act, whenever any request is made to the
Congress for the appropriation of funds for
use in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any fiscal
year, the President shall furnish a written
report to the Congress explaining the purpose
for which such funds are to be expended in
such fiscal year.
(e) The President shall submit to the Con-
gress within 30 days after the end of each
quarter of each fiscal year, beginning with
the fiscal year which begins July 1, 1971, a
written report showing the total amount of
funds expended in, for, or on behalf of Laos
during the preceding quarter by the United
States Government, and shall include in such
report a general breakdown of the total
amount expended, describing the different
purposes for which such funds were expended
and the total amount expended for each such
purpose.
Mr. President, I thank the Senate
its courtesy in listening to these remark.
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN REL TIONS,
January 27, 1971
Hon. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, DD.
DEAR MR. SECRXTARY : As you know, at She
request of the Committee on Foreign Real-
tiona the Department of Defense has, for some
time, been supplying it with monthly sa-
tistical data relating to the situation in
Vietnam. This information has proved to be
extremely valuable in following developments
there.
The Committee is finding It increasingly
difficult to keep abreast of the rapid develop-
ments in Cambodia, Laos, and North Viet-
nam, and I believe that a monthly report
containing data relating to those countries
would be helpful. The Committee Would,
therefore, appreciate the Department's co-
operation in supplying, on a monthly basis,
the information requested on the enclosed
list.
I. of course, have no objection to your
making this information available to other -
interested congressional committees, as was
done in the case of the Vietnam reports.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. l'clairamir,
Chairman.
I Enclosure]
MONTHLY DATA ON MILITARY OPETLATIONE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA,
Cambodia
1. Size of Cambodian Armed Forces:
(a). Trained and Combat Ready
(b) In training (specific location if ant-
side Cambodia) or other
(c) On duty outside Cambodia (ether
than training)
2. Number oI friendly foreign troops. in
Cambodia:
(a) South Vietnamese
(b) Other (specify)
3. Number of enemy troop> in Cambodia:
(a) North Vietnamese/Viet Cong
(b) Cambodian Communist
(c) Engaged in combat operations:
1. against Cambodia's forces
2. against South Vietnam forces
4. Combat air operations in Cambodia:
(a) Sorties flown by:
1. US. planes
2. Sorties flown by Cambodian planes
3. Sorties flown by South Vietnamese
planes
4. Sorties flown by Thais or ather
forces
(b) Ordnance expended (bomb tonnage
and other) by U.S. aircraft in
Cambodia;
1. B-52
2. other fixed wing aircraft
3. helicopter gunships, etc.
5. Casualties (military) :
(a) Enemy killed, wounded and cap-
tured
(b) Cambodian killed, wounded and
missing
(c) South Vietnamese killed, .wcrinded
and missing
(d) U.S. casualties or missing as a result
of air or other operations
6. Transport and Supply Operations:
(a) Number of flights flown by UsS, mili-
tary transport sarezaft to Cam-
bodian airports
(b) Number of U.S. helicopter trans-
port flights flown in Cambodia
(c) Number of air drop missions flown
by US. aircraft in Cambodia,
(d) Number of transport flights by 17.8.
non-milibary aircraft (Air Amer-
ica, etc.)
(e) Number of transport flights by
3outh Vietnamese or other aircraft
a
(g)
Number of supply missions by South
Vietnamese naval vessels
Please provide 'copies of any con-
tracts or agreements with foreign
government or private entities re-
lating to supply or transport op-
erations in Cambodia, including
data on amounts paid or reim-
bursed for such services and the
sources of the funding.
7. Payments made by the United States to
South Vietnam or other countries for oper-
ations in or services rendered in behalf of
Cambodia:
(a) Amounts or any such payments and
the purpose
(b) Provide copies of any agreements
entered into by the United States
concerning payments to foreigners
for services rendered in or in be-
half of Cambodia and the source
of of the funding
8. Number of U.S. personnel involved;
(a) Number of US. personnel attached
permanently or temporarily to the
U.S. Embassy in Cambodia-
civilian, military
(b) Number of visits in Cambodia by
U.S. personnel in a TAD or other
temporary status and total num-
ber of days of such duty by all
personnel during the month
Number of U.S. personnel in South
Vietnam, Thailand, or Laos whose
duties relate to operations in
Cambodia, including training and
logistics operations
9. U.S. Naval operations:
(a) Number and type of U.S. ships oper-
ating in or near Cambodian waters
during the month engaged in
operation's relating to Cambodia
(b) aiu.mber of visits to Cambodian
ports by U.S, naval vessels en-
gaged it. supply or transport
operations
10. Estimated number of U.S. prisoners
held in Cambodia:
Laos
1. Number of United States personnel in
Laos:
(a) Civilian (government employees)
(b) Military
(c) Personnel on temporary duty,
civilian and military (total num-
ber of man-days)
(d) Oontractoneireployees (Air America,
etc.)
2. Number of friendly military forces:
(a) Regular Laotian Armed Forces
(b) Irregular Forces
IC) Thai Forces in Laos
(d) Other Forces in. Laos (Cambodian,
South Vietnamese, etc.)
3. Enemy forces in Laos:
(a) Pathet Lao
(b) North Vietnamese
(c) Viet Cong
4. Air Operations in Laos:
(a) U.S. air sorties over Northern Laos
and munitions expended
1. B-52
2. other aircraft
(s) U.S. air sorties over Southern Laos
and munitions expended
1. B-52
2. Other aircraft
(c) Air sorties by Laotian forces and
munitions used
5. Casualties-killed or wounded:
(a) United States
(b) Laotian
(c) Other friendly
(d) Enemy
6. Incursions into Laos_ from South Viet-
nam or Cambodia:
(a) Purpose, date and number of U.S.
and foreign personel involved in
each incursion
7. Please provide copies of any contracts
(a)
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.,
or agreements entered into during the month
between the United States and other coun-
tries or private parties relating to military
operations in Laos.
8. Estimated number of U.S. prisoners held
in Laos:
North Vietnam
1. U.S. air operations over North Vietnam:
(a) Number of reconnaissance flights
flown
(b) Number of escort sorties flown
(c) Number of helicopters or other
manned aircraft sorties flown
(d) Number of drone flights
2. Enemy actions and U.S. losses:
(a) Number of times U.S. aircraft were
fired upon while over North Viet-
nam
(b) Number of times U.S. aircraft were
ftred- upon from North Vietnam
while over Laos
(c) Number of 'U.S. aircraft lost (by
type) over North Vietnam due to
enemy fire
(d) Number of U.S. aircraft lost over
North Vietnam (by type) not as a
result of enemy fire
(e) U.S. personnel losses
3. Retaliatory action taken:
(a) Number of times North Vietnam
targets were attacked
1. Number of aircraft involved in re-
taliatory actions
2. Quantities of Munitions used in
retaliatory action
4. Description of actions by South Viet-
namese or other forces in North Vietnam.
5. Estimated number of U.S. prisoners held
in North Vietnam.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., April 14, 1971.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR Ma. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Laird has
asked me to respond to your letter of 27
January in which you requested that the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations be
furnished, on a continuing basis, detailed
monthly report on military operations in
Southeast Asia.
I regret that we are unable to comply with
your request in this instance. Deputy Secre-
tary Packard's letter to Senator Symington of
11 June 1970, a copy of which Senator
Symington forwarded to you, pointed out
that it would not be at all appropriate to dis-
cuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch
highly sensitive information on military com-
bat operations of the kind which your ques-
tions would elicit if answers were to be
provided.
Sincerely,
G. 'WARREN NUTTER,
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1970.
Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: / understand
that when Generals Burchinal and Polk ap-
peared as witnesses before your Subcommit-
tee in late May, they were requested to make
available to the Subcommittee copies of writ-
ten instructions they had received both in
connection with the European trip of staff
members Pincus and Paul and with reference
to their testimony before your Subcommittee.
I am sure you will appreciate that those in-
structions, by definition, were documents in-
tended solely for internal use within the De-
partment of Defense and I would hope that
you would agree with rue that such docu-
ments should not be distributed outside the
Executive Branch.
From your personal experience as a former
Secretary of the Air Force, you are well ac-
quainted with the fact that, on the basis of
custom, tradition, usage and precedent, the
Legislative and Executive Branches have come
to accept and recognize that there are certain
matters which, for varying reasons, are not
normally discussed outside the Executive
Branch. The instructions in question con-
tained topics meeting that general descrip-
tion for the most part and included such
Items as military contingency plans. National
Security Council decuments. Inspector-Gen-
eral Reports of investigations, matters still in
the planning, proposal stage upon which no
decision has been reached, operational pro-
cedures and methods involving the risk of
life or safety of military personnel, and so
forth.
Early in the Subcommittee hearings, a mis-
understanding apparently developed in con-
nection with the handling or manner of
treatment of information on nuclear weap-
ons, a misunderstanding which, as I under-
stand it, has been resolved by the briefing
given to the Senator Committee on Foreign
Relations on 27 May 1970.
These categories of information are those
which have become widely accepted and gen-
erally recognized as topics which in the na-
tional interest, should be strictly limited in
either dissemination or discussion. Be as-
sured that any prohibitions against dis-
cussing such topics apply to all testimony
and were not, of course, restrictive solely
to witnesses appearing before your Sub-
committee.
Secretary Laird asked me to convey his
apology for the delay in responding to your
request, a delay which was occasioned by
the urgency of preparing for his trip to
Europe.
I trust that you will find this responsive
to your Subcommittee's interest in this
matter.
Sincerely,
Hon. G. WARREN Norrsa.
Assistant Secretary for International Security
Affairs, Department of Defense, Wash-
ington, D.C.
DEAR MR. NUTTER: I wish to acknowledge
your letter of April 10 in reply to the Com-
mittee's request tor a monthly report on cer-
tain developments in Cambodia and Lace.
You state that the information requested
would involve "highly sensitive information
on military combat operations" which would
not be "appropriate to discuss or disclose out-
side the Executive Branch." Would you please
provide the Committee with a list of the
Items requested which you consider to be in
this category. In order to avoid further delay
and without passing on the merits of the
Department's position on those items, I would
appreciate your providing the Committee
with monthly reports on the other items not
in this category.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. Ftrunucirr, Chairman.
DAVID PACKARD.
APRIL 20, 1971.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY O' DEFENSE,
INTERNATIONAL SECUREST AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., May 5, 1971.
HON. J .W W. FULBRIGHT.
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN ' This will acknowl-
edge the receipt of your letter of April 20,
1971, relative to our exchange of correspond-
ence in connection with the request of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to
be provided a monthly report on a continu-
ing basis of certain military combat opera-
S.12935
tions conducted by U.S. to, e and the in-
digenous forces of the gove lents of Laos
and Cambodia.
The information require, ) respond to
questions concerning the cx and combat
readiness of indigenous art e ( forces, their
air and ground combat opera it s, the enemy
forces they encounter and tt asualties they
inflict and sustain, etc., .0rmally pro-
vided through U.S. military sonnel acting
in a military advisory ass! s-ice role who
accompany the host countr f )rces on com-
bat operations. However, ZH Geneva Ac-
cords, the so-called Cooper- 11 urch Amend-
ment and certain other rest lc :ions imposed
by the Congress in enact xe the Defense
Authorization Bill have, combination,
prohibited by law the prese ,c, of U.S. mili-
tary advisory personnel in :Jf Os and Cam-
bodia which, in turn, effe, :1: ely precludes
reliable reporting to the Department of
Defense of information of ti at nature.
Additionally, there are a umber of other
questions that were posed s cu as those re-
lating to U.S. civilian perso: el in Laos and
Cambodia who are employe( ether by other
U.S. Government agencies 0- by private con-
tractors that do not fall 1. ricer the cogni-
zance of the Department of 'te: ease.
Finally, the possibility t la identical or
similar missions or military o Jerations may
be required in the same gen 11: geographical
area at some indefinite tutu te date creates a
sensitivity that precludes di .tmssing, outside
the Executive Branch, spec details with
respect to cross border that -s :ons by allied
forces, intelligence gatherim acerations, fre-
quency and area of covera. c of reconnais-
sance and attack sorties, :t vpcs of aircraft
employed and types and t aagages of ord-
nance expended, etc.
Again, I regret that we a e unable to re-
spond to your Committee's request in this
Instance.
Sincerely,
G. W .R LEN NUTTER.
lir. 28, 1971.
HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I
article from the Christian
of April 17 reporting that ti
is providing financial backin
operating in Laos. Would yc
the Committee with a cop
ments relating to U.S. sup
of Thai forces in Laos, as
details of any U.S. fuz
operations.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FULBRIG T Chairman.
m lose a news
science Monitor
e United States
ler Thai forces
t ilease provide
,1 any agree-
o-t or the use
Ned as the full
ig of such
From the Christian Sci? c: Monitor,
Apr. 17, 1971 (1
THAI FORCE IN LAOS?U.S. T FINANCE
FOREIGN TROD 'S
(By George W. Ash o-th)
Nixon-administration offli :a: s have ham-
mered out an agreement w tb the Govern-
ment of Thailand for sharp :, Increased use
of Thai forces in Laos.
The American Governmen las reportedly
agreed to provide the fit ar.cial backing
necessary for Thai troops to 'lel') bolster the
South Vietnamese-United Si it's position in
Laos.
Officially, neither the /ft Al Vietnamese
nor the Americans are involv d :n Laos. How-
ever, both sides are heavily ix' olved in fact
and have been for years. I n( North Viet-
namese have provided the b tc kbone needed
by the Pathet Lao for their :n argency. And
the Americans, largely thro i the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), h iv advised and
paid for much of the war eff r particularly
around the Plain of Jars.
Thai troops are known t jave been in
Laos for six or seven years. 13 it until late
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S 12936
Approved For 9j9,1 cAvIg PRP 7 3 gVQ,Z9f) 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 8 0 0 8 0 -3_
o.ILL-crs. August 3, 1971
last year, the number was relatively small.
This time last year, there were perhaps 1,000
Thais fighting on the South Vietnamese-
American side in Laos.
Now, the U.S. is providing most of the
financial backing for a force in Laos of be-
tween 4,000 and 6,000 Thais, according to
unofficial estimates.
OPEN-ENDED AGREEMENT?
According to sources, the agreement be-
tween the U.S. and Thailand on the use of
Thai troops in Laos is open-minded. As one
official put it, "The Thais are ready to send in
just about as many troops as we are willing
to pay for."
The Pentagon refuses to discuss Thai in-
volvement in Laos. Queried, a Pentagon
spokesman suggested that the Thais were
the only persons who could provide details.
One reporter in the field, Tammy Arbuckle,
reported in January in the Washington Star
that Thai forces were alleged to have operated
in northeastern Thailand with other troops
in an attempt to cut Route 7, Hanoi's major
supply route to the critical Plain of Jars.
The attempt failed.
Mr. Arbuckle also reported a 155-mm how-
itzer battery overrun near Muong Soul had
been removed to the greater safety of the
allied base area at Long Chien and provided
protection by Thai infrantrymen. Other Thai
troops have been operating in parts of Laos
near the Thai border.
Thai manpower has been increased sub-
stantially since Mr. Arbuckle reported from
the field, according to sources here. The
buildup apparently began as soon as the
Thais were assured of U.S. financial backing.
MAL ihR CLOSELY HELD
Although the Thai involvement is a very
closely held matter, particularly in the
Pentagon, some outside the defense estab-
lishment are aware of some details of the
new move. Sources report a growing concern
among some in the government that the
Thai involvement in Laos may soon become
too expensive to be absorbed within regular
defense expenditures.
Although the cleanest way to handle the
matter, at least in financial terms, would be
a request to Congress for a supplemental
appropriation, such a request almost surely
would be a hot political matter. For the mo-
ment, the costs are being absorbed with
increased difficulty.
There appear to be several reasons for the
increased Thai involvement:
Most importantly, perhaps, the Thais were
willing to help in Laos if most of the bill
were picked up. For several reasons the Thai
Government considers the insurgency in Laos
a matter of substantial concern. And con-
cerns have not been eased by the Chinese
construction of a road from Dien Bien Phu
across Laos toward Thailand. The insurgency
of Thailand is now a quite serious matter.
In some respects, the tide seems to have
tipped against the Royal Lao side in the con-
tinuing fighting. Until 1969, the fighting be-
tween the neutralist forces and the Pathet
Lao backed by Hanoi had been an ebb-and-
flow sort of warfare with territory changing
hands in a fairly regular pattern depending
upon the seasons. Then, in 1969, Gen. Vang
Pao and his Meo troons, with heavy American
air backing, pushed strongly against the
Communists on the plain, capturing large
numbers of supplies and causing heavy
enemy casualties. The Communist response
was to press back harder than before, and
the pressure has continued.
The Nixon administration undoubtedly
would like to see the neutralist regime in
Laos survive. This is seen as important both
for the non-Communist factions in Laos and
for the other beleaguered nations in Indo-
China.
Given the nature of the conflict in Laos,
congressional views, and the presidential
determination to pursue the Nixon doctrine,
the use of regular American troops in Laos
was unthinkable.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., May 19, 1971.
Hon. J W. FULBRIGHT, ?
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIR.MAN: The Secretary has
asked me to-reply to your letter of April 23,
1971, enclosing an article from the Christian
Science Monitor of April 17 concerning TS
financial support for Thai forces operating in
Laos. Senator Case wrote on April 23, 1971
about the same article, and we are providing
the same information to him. As Under Sec-
retary Irwin said on May 3, we understand
your Committee was briefed or. this subject
in executive session by Mr. Helms on
March 23.
We -believe that It has been made clear that
this is not a question of US support for regu-
lar Thai forces in Laos. The irregular forces
involved, while raised -and trained in Tha:i-
land, are all one-year volunteers who go to
Laos to serve under ?the command of the
Roy-al Lao Government; in this case the Lao
Military Region II Commander. These guer-
rilla forces are therefore considered to be
local fortes in Laos.
There are no written agreements between
our tdovernment and the Governments of
Thailand or LROS concerning this program. :
all arrangements were made orally.
The expenses for the US support of this
effort `nave been met from current approprIa-
tions Although the administration of this
activity does not fall under the Department
of State, It is -our understanding that these
expenditures are within present authorities.
May I suggest that upon his return from a
visit to East Asia, Assistant Secretary
Marshall Green give an oral briefing to your
Committee which would bring you up to
date and put -this program into proper
perspective?
Sincerely,
DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations
U.S. SENATE,
Waslungton, D.C., April 23, 1971
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing from
the April 17 Christian Science Monitor
George Ashworth's article which reports that
the Administration has reached an agree-
ment with the Government of Thailand for
a sharp increase in Thai troops to be used
in Laos. Mr. Ashworth notes that the United
States Government has reportedly agreed to
provide the financial backing to support the
Thai troops.
I would appreciate it if you could comment
on the accuracy of what Mr. Ashworth has
written and then, assuming his information
is correct, answer the following questions.
1. Does the Administration consider the
financial support of Thai troops in Laos to
be in accord with the Cooper-Church pro-n-
Mons in the 1970 Defense-Appropriations Act
which bans the payment of mercenaries ex-
cept to protect a safe and orderly American
withdrawal or disengagement from South-
east Asia or to aid in the release of United
States prisoners.
2. Does the Administration intend to sub-
mit the agreement with Thailand to the Sen-
ate as a treaty?
3. What are the specific terms of the
United States agreement with the Thai Gov-
ernment including the cost to the United
States Government and the agreement's
durEdion?
4. Does the Administration intend to re-
quest supplemental appropriations to pay
the costs of agreement or will existing funds
be reprogrammed?
5. Has the United States Government
made any assurances to the Thai Govern-
ment of United States support in event Thai
troops in Laos encounter difficulties?
Sincerely,
CLIFFORD P. CASE, U.S. Senate.
THAI FORCE IN LAos--U.S. To FINANCE
FOREIGN TROOPS
(By George Ashworth)
Nixon-administration officials have ham-
mered out an agreement with the Govern-
rnent of Thailand for sharply increased use
of Thai forces in Laos. The American Gov-
ernment has reportedly agreed to provide
the financial backing necessary for Thai
troops to help bolster the South Vietnamese-
United States position in Laos.
Officially, neither the North Vietnamese
nor the Americans are involved in Laos. How-
ever, both sides are heavily involved in fact
and have been for years. The North Viet-
namese have provided the backbone needed
by the Pathet Lao for their insurgency. And
the Americans, largely through the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), have advised and
paid for much of the -war effort, particularly
around the Plain of Jars.
Thai troops are known to have been in
Laos for six or seven years. But until late
last year, the number was relatively small.
This time last year, there were perhaps 1,000
Thais lighting on the South Vietnamese-
American side in Laos.
Now, the U.S. is providing most of the
financial* backing for a force in Laos of be-
tween 4,000 and 6,000 Thais, according to
unofficial estimates.
- OPEN-ENDED AGREEMENT?
According to sources, the agreement be-
tween the U.S. and Thailand on the use of
Thai troops in Laos is open-ended. As one
official put it, "The Thais are ready to send
in just about as many troops as we are willing
to pay for."
The Pentagon refuses to discuss Thai in-
volvement in Laos, Queried, a Pentagon
spokesman -suggested that the Thais were the
only persons who could provide details.
One reporter in the Acid, Tammy Arbuckle,
reported. in January in the Washington Star
that Thai forces were alleged to have
operated in northeastern Thailand with other
troops in an attempt to cut Route 7, Hanoi's
major supply route to the critical Plain of
Jars. The attempt failed.
Mr. Arbuckle also reported a 155-mm.
howitzer battery overrun near Muong Sout
had been removed to the greater safety of the
allied base area at Long Chien and provided
Protection by Thai infantrymen. Other Thai
troops have been operating in parts of Laos
near the Thai border.
Thai manpower has been increased sub-
stantially since Mr. Arbuckle reported from
the field, according to sources here. The
buildup apparently began as soon as the
Thais were assured of U.S. financial backing.
MATTER CLOSELY HELD
Although the Thai involvement is a very
closely held matter, particularly in the Penta-
gon, some outside the defense establishment
are aware of some details of the new move.
Sources report a growing concern among
some in the government that the Thai In-
volvement in Laos may soon become too
expensive to be absorbed within regular
defense expenditures.
Although the cleanest way to handle the
matter, at least in financial terms, would be
a request to Congress fo:r a supplemental
appropriation, such -a request almost surely
would be a hot political matter. For the
moment, the costs are being absorbed with
increased difficulty.
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Approved Qq3/1;fartm}39A2A98Nockliftfat96R000300080080-3 12937
August 3; 1971
There appear to be several reasons for the
Increased Thai involvement:
Most importantly, perhaps, the Thais were
willing to help in Laos if most of ...the bill
were picked up. For several reasons the Thai
Government considers the insurgency in
Laos a matter of substantial concern. And
concerns have not been eased by the Chinese
construction of a road from Dien Bien Phu
across Laos toward Thailand. The insurgency
of Thailand is now a quite serious matter.
In some respects, the tide seems to have
tipped against the Royal Lao side in the con-
tinuing fighting. Until 1969, the fighting be-
tween the neutralist forces and the Pathet
Lao backed by Hanoi had been an ebb-and-
flow sort of warfare with territory changing
hands in a fairly regular pattern depending
upon the sessions. Then, in 1969. Gen yang
Pao and his Meo troops, with heavy American
air backing, pushed strongly- against the
Communists on the plain, capturing heavy
enemy casualties. The Communist response
was to press back harder than before, and
the pressure has continued.
The Nixon administration undoubtedly
would like to see the neutralist regime in
Laos survive. This is seen as important both
for the non-Communist factions in Laos and
for the other beleaguered nations in Indo-
China.
Given the nature of the conflict in Laos,
coneressional views, and the presidential de-
termination to pursue the Nixon doctrine,
the use of regular American troops in Laos
was unthinkable.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., May 19, 1971.
Hon. CLIFFORD P. CASE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR CASE: Secretary Rogers has
asked me to reply to your letter of April 23,
1971 concerning a press report of US support
for Thai troops in Laos. The Secretary has
also received a letter from Senator Fulbright
asking for answers for his Com:mittee to basi-
cally the same questions. During his appear-
ance before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on May 3, Under Secretary Irwin
said that we understand your Committee was
briefed on this subject in executive session by
Mr. Helms on March 23.
We believe that it has been made clear that
this is not a question of US support for regu-
lar Thai forces in Laos. The irregular forces
Involved, while raised and trained in Thai-
land, are all one-year volunteers who go to
Laos to serve under the command of the
Royal Lao Government; in this case the Lao
Military Region II Commander. These guer-
rilla forces are therefore considered to be
local forces in Laos.
There are no written agreements between
our Government and the Governments of
Thailand or Laos concerning this program;
all arrangements were made orally.
The expenses for the US support of this
effort have been met from current appropria-
tions. Although the administration of this
activity does not fall under the Department
of State, it is Our understanding that these
expenditures are within present authorities.
Parenthetically it should be noted that
your first question is in error as to the scope
of the Cooper-Church Amendments to the
FY 1971 Defense Appropriations Act. These
amendments do not bear on the subject of
troop pay. Presumably you may have refer-
ence to the Fulbright Amendment to Section
838(a) of that Act (i.e. the first proviso
thereof), which is a limitation rather than
a ban and which is being fully complied with
by the Administration.
As I said in my letter to Senator FUL-
BRIGHT, the Department of State believes
that it might be useful for the Committee
to be briefed orally on this subject among
others In executive session by Aseistialut
Secretary for East Asia, MarshaLl Green,
following his return from his current visit
to East Asia. We think that an oral, birefing
could bring you up to date and put this pro-
gram into proper pespective.
Sincerely,
DAVID M ASSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield first, if I
may, to the Senator from Arkansas (Mr.
FULBRIGHT) , seconder of the request for
this closed session.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
want to commend the distinguished Sen-
ator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) for
the thorough job he has done in summar-
izing a long and exhaustive report.
What the Senator has said calls to our
attention our responsibility to know
about and to advise in a matter of great
importance.
One question I particularly wish to
ask the Senator regards the amend-
ments which were put into the Defense
authorization and appropriation acts for
fiscal year 1971. The Senator from Mis-
sissippi and I had a great deal of discus-
sion about those amendments last year.
The Armed Services Committee included
language in its report on the defense
authorization bill which was designed
to prevent use of any funds authorized,
"For Vietnamese and other free world
forces for the support of the govern-
ment of Cambodia."
I then offered an amendment extend-
ing that restriction to Laos. The final
clause that was agreed to in the bill was
as follows:
Nothing in clause A. first sentence of this
paragraph, shall be construed as authoriz-
ing the use of any such funds to support
Vietnamese or other free world forces in
actions designed to provide military sup-
port and assistance to the governments of
Cambodia or Laos.
After considerable struggle and after
agreement?by the Senator from Missis-
sippi and everyone, I think, concerned?
this provision was adopted. Now we have
this staff report.
It seems to me that the Defense De-
partment, or the Government of this
country, has simply paid no attention to
the restriction on the use of the money
which was asserted by Congress in the
defense appropriation and authorization
acts.
My question is: Does not the Senator
from Missouri believe, from what he
knows about it, that there is a conflict
with that restriction?
Mr. SYMINGTON. The able Senator
from Arkansas has read the law. I have
it here in front of me. Based on the law,
it seems clear said law has been violated.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the Senator going
to put into the record the letter from As-
sistant Secretary of State Abshire reply-
ing, for the Secretary of State, to my let-
ter raising this question? If not, I shall
put it in.
Mr. SYMINGTON. As previously
stated, I have put all that correspondence
in ;the record.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator.
I think that the excuse they give?
which I do not consider to 1 e valid at
all?is that the language do -3 not in-
clude, or rather excepts, guer i A forces
or the recruiting of what the; all local
forces in Laos.
It is not possible, it seems t( me, if the
language in the amendments i e imns any-
thing at all, that the Thais in fE os could
be considered local forces in I ,us. These
Thai [deleted]. So if one has a 13 reason-
able respect for the use of th 1 tnguage,
they are Thai troops in direct 'o ttraven-
tion of the restriction which ?e put into
law and did so, I may say, w a the co-
operation and approval of th c lairman
of the Armed Services Comm
I do not know what Congre: m. -an do if
the executive branch will nom stow any
respect for the laws as messed by
Congress.
I would be very much in m31 ested to
know whether the Senator thim ;k his own
amendment, Which he has jus described,
will be respected any more i_lan the
existing law was respected.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I reply, lave vis-
ited Laos many times and eve] ime, up-
on return, I thought to myse I finally
have the picture," but later o ind that
was not the case. This report 4, follows
that aspect. I was on the ot me ? side of
the government at the atm ;1 of the
Korean War. It worries me. 'kr use of
these heavy bombers, the digest jet
strategic bombers in the wor d so close
to the Chinese border. At tin r quest of
the man we support, Souvarn a Phouma,
the Chinese started building El mxtended
road system in the very norti- .?r 1 part of
Laos. [Deleted]. The Laot ?11 planes
have actually attacked it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. P a (dent, it
seems to me that this is a cla s c case of
the sort that we have been nfronted
with time and time again?t :e inability
to obtain ordinary, basic i if mrmation
with respect to what we are d
In this case, we had to sem t-.To of our
best and most experienced i e sabers of
the staff to Laos to get the i f mrmation.
ourselves. To put it another . the ex-
ecutive branch imposes an f miargo on
giving any information or km 'ledge to
the committee. This puts us a a great
handicap.
We now have the basis for a -1 asonably
well based judgment on the sA sdom of
what we are doing. It comes vn to the
real issue of whether there my pos-
sible objective in Laos worth h it we are
doing to achieve it? What col ;cm we do in
Laos which would be worth t expendi-
ture of at least some $375 million in
fiscal 1972.
I do not -know what it is f Kpected we
will achieve, especially in N ' e v of the
apparent change in attitude z the ad-
ministration toward China ar he whole
war in Vietnam. If Vietnam. -a mmion suc-
ceeds, what could we acoomp s , by con-
tinuing to step up the war in os?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. I .( sident, I
once had the privilege of bm r 0,- on the
board of directors of various 3( mpanies.
The president of the compar\ is question
would often ask theboard for ii ney. The
directors invariably wanted t ; now just
what the money was being u ;e i for.
What worries me in this it iation is
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how little those of us who put up the
money under our constitutional preroga-
tive know about what the money is ac-
tually being used for.
Mr, MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to the able
Senator from Iowa.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator for yielding. I would like to
get the figures more precisely for fiscal
1971. How much did the Senator say was
authorized and appropriated for 1971 in
Laos?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, un-
fortunately that information has now
been given to the clerk. I will get it. It
being top secret, I had only the one copy.
Mr. MILLER. The Senator referred to
some figures like $52 million and $300
Mr. SYMINGTON. $52 million was the
economic aid approved for Laos.
Mr. MILLER. For fiscal 1971?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Right.
Mr, MILLER. How about the military
aid?
Mr, SYMINGTON. With respect to the
military aid approved for Laos, the most
recent information the committee has re-
ceived from the Department of Defense
on the Defense Department funded mili-
tary 'assistance program in Laos was a
document dated January 26, 1971, en-
titled, "Estimated Amounts Included in
Military Function Appropriation for the
Fiscal Year 1972 Budget for Support of
the Free World Forces in Vietnam, Laos,
and Thailand, Related to Fiscal Year
1970, Fiscal Year 1971, and Fiscal Year
1972.'
That document gives a total figure, for
estimated new funds for the military
assistance program in Laos, of $74,200,-
000 in fiscal 1970; $117,300,000 in fiscal
1971; and $125,800,000 in fiscal 1972.
In Vientiane, the staff was told that the
fiscal 1970 program ceiling was $125
million; and even that ceiling apparently
has been exceeded by some $24,100,001);
so the total cost of the military assist-
ance program for fiscal 1970, insTead of
being $74,200,000, was $146,400,000.
They were also told that, as a result of
recent messages that had been received
from Washington, the fiscal 1971 pro-
gram ceiling had been increased to $162,-
200,000; and the fiscal 1972 ceiling to
$252,100,000.
Mr. MILLER. I have here, based upon
what the Senator just read, $52 million
for economic assistance and $117 million
for military 'assistance, for a total of $169
million for fiscal 1971 that was expressly
and specifically authorized and appropri-
ated. The Senator indicated that infor-
mation received in Vientiane had raised
the $117 million by some $45 million.
Did I not understand that there were
;ums estimated by the Senator to be much
more than, say, $200 million for the fiscal
1971 operation in Laos?
Mr. SYMINGTON. The fiscal 1972 op-
eration would be a great deal more. And
for 1971, a bare listing of the amount was
$284 million, counting both economic and
military assistance and the amount CIA
is spending.
Mr. MILLER. Well, $284 million. So,
I think the essence-- -
Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me present
this straight. The estimate of new funds
for 1971 military assistance, the staff was
told here was $117,300,000. The economic
assistance was $52 million.
Then when they arrived in Laos they
were 'told the CIA was spending [de-
ieted] million; and that the figure for
military assistance expenditures had been
raised to $162,200,000. This does not in-
dude other expenditures the U.S. Gov-
ernment was making in and over Laos.
Mr. MILLER. What the Senator is
saying is that in addition to the moneys
that we in the Senate specifically au-
thorized and appropriated for Laos,
for fiscal 1971 there is another $120
million spent by the CIA in Laos.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I do not know ex-
actly what was, or was not, spent by the
CIA, because although a member of the
CIA committee, those figures are not
given in detail. The staff in Vientiane
received this estimated breakdown of
expenses of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I do not
want to get bogged down.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator
would be good enough to put down, in
detail, what figures he has in mind, I
would be very glad to have the staff
analyze same and make it all part of the
record.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I do not
think that is necessary to get to my
point. What I had in mind now-and
the Senator may correct me if I am
wrong-is that we specifically appro-
priated about $169 million for military
and economic assistance for Laos for
1971, and about $120 million more came
from somewhere else for the operations
in Laos. I think there is only one other
place that could have come from, and
that is from the CIA.
Would that be a proper deduction?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
think the Senator's analysis could be
constructive. To be sure, we will place
the exact figure; given us by the Defense
Department in the record. I ask unani-
mous consent to do so.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, so ordered.
ESTI MATED AMOUNTS INCLUDED IN MILITARY FUNCTIONS APPROPRIATION FISCAL YEAR 1972 BUDGET FOR .;'.IPPORT OF FREE WORLD MI LITAR ( FORCES IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND
FHA I LAND AND RELATED COSTS IN FISCAL YEARS 190, 1971, 1972
(is millions of io tars)
Military personnel:
Army
Navy
Marine Carps
South
Vietnam
Fiscal year 1970
Korea Philip- Laos Thai.
pines and
23.4 89.9 1.2 _ 20.1
2.5
Total, military personnel
Operation and maintenance:
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
Totai, 0. & M
Procurement:
Army 858.2 67.2 9.3 37.4
Navy:
Aircraft and missiles
Other procurement
Shipbuilding
Marine Corps procurement
Air Force:
Aircraft procurement
Other procurement
Total procurement
Military construction:
Army_
13.8
25.9 103.7 1.2 20.1
467.9 58.3 . 8 16.0 21. 5
42.5 .4----------------1.0
.7 3.3 .4
85.4 .6 25. 8 8.4
596.5 62.6 .8 43.0 31.3
Summary:
Army
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
7.3 .3
2.6
33.4 4.1----------7
76.6 3.2 5.5
83.6 17.9 .2
1,061.7 71.3 30.4 ?14.1
1, 349. 5 215.4 2.0 27.3 79. 0
54.9 . 4 1. 3
34.1 21.2 1.1
245.6 .6 46.9 14. 1
Total 1,684.1 237.6 2.0 74.2 95. 5
Fiscal year 1971 Fiscal year 1972
Total
South
Vietnam
Korea
Laos
Thai-
land
Total
Sculls
Vietnam
Korea
Laos
114.6
74.1
90.8
8.1
22.1
195.1
53.1
91.2
8.1
2.5
.1
.2
.1
.4
.1
.2
13,8
.
12.8
12.8
12.6
150.9
74.2
103.8
8.1
22.2
208.3
'53.2
104.0
8.1
566. 5
562.2
50. 0
17.8
16.6
' 646.6
530. 8
49.6
19. 8
43.9
85.6
.1
2. 8
88.5
70.3
.1
4.4
.8
4.0
.5
5.3
.2
6.0
120. 2
97.4
1.0
36.6
11.2
146.2
110.5
1. 1
33.7
735.0
746.0
55.1
54.4
31.1
806.6
711.0
56.8
53.5
972. 1
732. 5
60.9
11.9
25.8
831.1
772.4
74.2
14.2
.2
.2
7.6
18.2
1.0
19.2
9.7
2.6
.5.8.2
.5
1.8
.5
2.8
.2
8.9
85.3
155.6
5.0
4.4
165.0
113.7
10.4
101.7
87.3
37.9
1.8
127.0
112.9
39.6
1,207.5
994.1
62.7
54.8
33.7
1, 145. 3
1, 008. 9
83.1
64.2
12.0
12.0
1, 673. 2
1, 380. 8
20 1. 7
37.0
64.5
1, 684. 8
1,3116.3
215.0
42.1
56.6
103.9
. 3
4. 1
108.3
30. 1
. 3
96.4
1.3
18.6
1.0
20. 9
.4
27. 5
3C7. 2
340.3
1.0
79. 5
17.4
438. 2
337. 1
1. 1
83. 7
2, OS3. 4
1, 826. 3
221.6
117.3
87.0
2. 252. 2
1, 7113. 9
243.9
125.8
9. (a) Funding of South Vietnamese and other Free World force under authority of the Defense Authorization and A.5oropria tion Acts, by category or purpc se.
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Thai- Total
land
11.9 174.3
.1 .4
12.6
12.0 187.3
13.5 613. 7
2.0 72.4
.6 6.8
12. 1 157.4
28.2 850.3
30.1 890.9
.2 .2
.9 10.6
9.1
3.4 127.5
2.4 154.9
37.0 1, 193. 2
55.5 1,678.0
3.2 83. 6
.6 28.5
17.9 439. 8
77.2 2, 230. 8
? ?
August 3, 197 Approved FooNOMPARainIVAft9E7QitR000300080080-3 s 12939
Mr. MILLER. As I say, for this pur-
pose I do not think I need to get to
whether it is $1 million, $2 million, or
$5 million less.
I think one of the points the Senator
made is that here we are with another
$120 million spent in Laos which we in
the Senate did not specifically authorize
and appropriate.
I have one further question. Does that
money, the $169 million or the $169 mil-
lion plus the other $120 million, include
the cost of bombing of the Ho Chi Minh
Trail?
Mr. SYMINGTON. No, it does not.
Mr. MILLER. Here is my point. I say
this most respectfully to my colleague
from Missouri. I think most of us under-
stand that when we make authorizations
and appropriations for the CIA, some of
that money is very likely to end up in
some of these operations, such as Laos.
In other words, I do not think we have
quite said there will be only so much
money for Laos and nothing more, be-
cause if we did we would have no motive
in appropriating money for the CIA.
This has troubled a number of us.
What is the money going to the CIA to
be used for? How much is it? How did
they spend it? That agency has been op-
erating for a long time under a cloak of
quasi-secrecy in the hands of a limited
number of people, and I think the Sen-
ator from Missouri is one of them as a
member of the subcommittee on CIA
oversight.
I have never served on that committee,
but I have great respect, as a former
member of the Committee on Armed
Services, for the integrity of those few
Senators who do have that oversight
responsibility.
I find it very difficult to believe that
the oversight committee could not ob-
tain some pretty accurate information on
how much of that CIA money was going
to Laos.
I am wondering whether the Senator
could tell us what efforts were made by
that oversight subcommittee to obtain
this information so it woiild not be nec-
essary for the staff to go to Vientiane.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The more informa-
tion one obtains before making a decision
the better the chances for a wise decision.
Even with the staff report mentioned, in
all my committees there is no real knowl-
edge of what is going on in Laos. We do
not know the cost of the bombing. We do
not know about the people we maintain
there. It is a secret war.
As mentioned before, the Central In-
telligence Agency reports directly to the
President. Therefore, in effect, it has
executive privilege. The head of the
Central Intelligence Agency is also the
head of the Intelligence Subcommittee
of the National Security Council.
I am not critical of this agency. As
mentioned in my prepared text, I have
admiration for them. But I do say there
is a war going on in Laos, and money is
being spent in heavy quantities about
which the Senate knows nothing. I am a
member of literally all the committees
involved. Each time we go to Laos and
believe we have uncovered the last leaf
of what has been and is going on, we find
later that is not true. The responsibility
cannot be placed entirely with the
Central Intelligence Agency, because to
the State Department has been delegated
some of the authority for the instruc-
tions being given the CIA.
What worries me. having gone through
the Korean situation at a time when we
thought we were in very good shape and
then were suddenly hit by the Chinese
in heavy force, is the fact there has been
a great deal of activity near the Chinese
border, in northern Laos, which has
nothing to do with the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, and that could give us more serious
trouble.
When we asked about B-52 bombing in
northern Laos we were told 3-52's were
bombing in northern Laos, far from the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. We were also told
that the reason we had not been told
before was because we had not asked.
The shocking information that we were
bombing with B-52's way up in north-
ern Laos was given in an open hearing
by the Under Secretary of State. He no
doubt gave it because he knew what the
subcommittee staff report was going to
say to the Congress.
Mr. MILLER. I want to make this
point. I have had an opportunity to visit
Vientiane myself to obtain some infor-
mation. I think the Senator from Mis-
souri has done more than any Member
of the Senate to try to obtain informa-
tion on our operations in Laos, and for
this he is to be commended. At the same
time, we should not leave the impression
that the Senate- somehow or other has
roggi--rui this matter. We_ are all
mature Individuals, and we know what
we are We have approm-ated a
lot of money for the CIA. if we have done
so, knowing the C/A is an executive
rr;atathinkwallaize_cione
sei-----E-OC.u?-0-e-s wide open, Maybe we
should change lat. That is something
else. But let us not say the Senate has
been hoodwinked or leave the impressign
we have been iffillead and have not
known what is going on. I think we may
have iackeu informal:MR on the specifics,
and the Senator is pulling out informa-
tion on the specifics, but the Senators
who voted on these appropriationr
tErrIrM, -e-ff=tre-ni-Irria? our es
wide
wide open, knowing what we were
going.ar7be we should change it. It is
something for future debate.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator
for his kind remarks about my efforts to
get the facts. I would be the last to say he
had been hoodwinked or that any other
Member of the Senate had been hood-
winked. But I have been hoodwinked,
and I want the Senate to know this after-
noon that that is the case.
I wanted to go to Laos in the fall of
1965, but was told the Ambassador did
not want Members of Congress to come to
that country, and did not like people to
go into Laos. So I met the Ambassador in.
Udorn, Thailand, just south of Vientiane.
At that time the Ambassador reafirmed
he did not think it right for people such
as me to go into Laos.
He mentioned that the present distin-
guished senior Senator from Massachu-
setts had been there, added at his visit
had created some consterni: i n and had
upset the Laotian Governr e. it.
So in 1966 I went to the f i :e Depart-
ment and said, "Regardless rt what that
Ambassador thinks about r v going into
Laos, I am going into Lam, s a member
of the Committee on Armed 3 rvices and
the Committee on Foreign R tions, with
his goodwill or without i but I am
going." State said, "Of cot -s ? you can
go. Who said you cannot?'' I said, "The
Ambassador, who so told m a td others."
I thereupon went to Hay, and later
received copies of telegri sent to
State by .the Ambassador r oesting my
planned visit.
Later I had a wire from to i mbasador,
saying he was glad I was con tr g and that
he hoped I could stay with Ala, with my
aide staying with his mil a ry aide. I
wired back I appreciated .s Invitation
but was going to stay wit friends in
Vientiane. He knew the on ? alace that
could be was a compound 1.1,anced in-
directly by the CIA, and I a As told he
wired State saying he thot itt it would
be a mistake if I stayed with t,ase people.
Later, in 1967, I went ?I - (gain and
that time stayed with him
It was a pleasant trip, an learned a
lot and was told a very gre t deal I did
not know.
But nobody told us that 1 a ted States
combat airplanes, with Am an pilots,
were bombing in northern 'if os, Amer-
ican pilots who carried the .dentifica-
tion so they would not be sI :t as spies if
they were forced down. Th, airplanes
were attacking, with napaln s nd bombs,
in northern Laos. This we y ttx t3 not told.
As a matter of interest, w te we came
back and had hearings in 1 e Foreign
Relations Committee, at on, r t)int ques-
tions came up. The answe vas, "You
did not ask." For the inforn a ion of my
good friend from Iowa, I did ic know we
were running 3-52 bombe aids over
northern Laos until the sta ame back
and so reported. So in this a e, also, it
was not logical to ask.
In my judgment (a) thea 3-52 raids
in northern Laos are dang us to the
security of the United Stat( - a field in
which I have had some ext co ience and
(b) no member of this bo :v knew we
were extending regular B-5 Aids that
far north in Laos.
In 1946, before there was a air Force,
when I was Assistant Secre a y of War
for Air, some Senators an emember
?that the Yugoslays at that ti a. were not
on as friendly terms with ul a they are
today. They shot down sever. Jf our un-
armed DC-3's. I called 27.1 General
Norstad, and asked him to t t some of
our fighters on that border t t a instruc-
tions to shoot down any A tnes that
attacked our planes.
Norstad said, "I am a figh 'I pilot and
that would be a mistake I asked,
"Why?" He replied, "Becau e if we, do,
the fight will not end up at 1 e border;
it will end up over Belgrade,' a id I with-
drew the suggestion.
That experience in itself c V 'S me ap-
prehension about the appa tly rela-
tively careless way we have ,e ,n handl-
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jug the B-52 bombing over northern
Laos.
I yield to the able Senator from New
York.
Mr. JAVITS. I would like to refer to
the Senator's points, which he has right-
ly emphasized. One point is the money.
The second point is the Fulbright amend-
ment. The third point is what the
4ilenator from Missouri, who has served
kts so well here, calls the long undeclared
and secret war.
If the Senator would be kind enough to
refer to the letter which Senator KEN-
NEDY has put on every Senator's desk,
he will see the explanation of the admin-
istration reflected in Mr. Abshire's letter
to Senator KENNEDY which reads as
follows:
However, as the President said in his
address to the Nation on October 7, 1970,
the war in Indochina "cannot be cured by
treating only one of its areas of outbreak."
If the North Vietnamese were to conquer all
of Laos they could divert thousands of their
forces now engaged in North Laos to the war
against South Vietnam, and greatly enhance
I heir position in those areas of Laos border-
ing South Vietnam from which they launch
-tttacks on United States and allied forces.
MY questions then, to the Senator
from Missouri are, one, does what he
has just described as our crowding the
Chinese border represent, in his opinion,
a risk in order to protect U.S. forces;
and, two, is there a separate war in
northern Laos which does not have a
-elation to the protection of our troops
ii South Vietnam, and, if so, does the
3enator know of any valid support for
the contention that it is to protect our
forces in South Vietnam?
Mr. SYMINGTON. If I may answer
the last question first, I believe that,
without question, the war in northern
Laos is a separate war. Secondly, I do
not believe this war ?is essential to our
position in Vietnam. But the major
ooint is we have not been informed.
We were not informed about the B-52
raids up north. The defense of the ad-
ministration was and is that we did not
ask. Perhaps some would change their
minds if they knew the facts; but the
core, the basic thrust, of the request for
this hearing today is: How can you have
any knowledgeable opinion if you do
not know what is going on or the reasons
for, and the thinking behind, the policies
and programs in question?
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, will the
it1enator yield?
Mr. JAVITS. If the Senator will allow
me to complete my thought, I think
what troubles all of us is, assuming we
can get an explanation in executive ses-
eion, whether it is still one of those ques-
tions so momentous that it ought to be
submitted to the public domain for a
vote of the Congress, or at least to have
the facts known so that the American
people-1-and we here as their repre-
sentatives?have an opportunity to
answer -Yes" or "No"?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I plan to make
every effort to release as much of this
information as possible.
Before yielding to the able chairman
of the Armed Services Committee, let me
'aimmarize my feeling about this war. I
have been raised to believe in the value
of human life. The great value of the life
of the least important GI i.s very impor-
tant. The President?and I respect him
for it?has stated that no military vic-
tory in Vietnam is possible; that what we
are trying to do is get out. With that
premise, it is sad indeed to realize that
each and every day from the time we
decided no military victory was or is
attainable, nevertheless we continue
with policies which result in the killing
of so many of our own young people, and
thousands upon thousands of others--
military and civilians. We are comforta-
ble around here. We say we are happy.
We are very prosperous?at least we
think we are. At the same time, out
there, day after day, people, human
beings, are being slaughtered. One can-
not fail, based on our traditions and our
beliefs, to ask why.
If it is right from the standpoint of
the future security and prosperity .and
happiness of the United States, then I
would be for it. But one day in 1966 I
was at a hospital in Nha-Trang when the
helicopters started dropping in with the
wounded. I turned to my escort officer,
a ground hero in the Korean war, and
said, "Ed, to be right at all, we must be
mighty sure this is right" He said, "I
could not agree with you more." There
is nothing more heartrending to listen
to than the cries of the wounded. Now we
admit there is no military victory possi-
ble so let us get out as soon as possible, so
as to reduce these casualties. In any case,
and at the least, let us obtain all the
truth before we put up more money. The
money is the only way it can continue,
right or wrong; and the most important
matter facing us today is the right of
the Senate to know just what is going
on before we fund this money.
I yield now to the able Senator from
Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
from Missouri. He has made a very
temperate statement here. As he stated,
he cannot vouch for all these figuret;. If
they are not correct, he- wants tri be
corrected. I have not seen the statement
before?
Mr. SYMINGTON. We finished it Ally
late last night.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, I understand.
I cannot discuss, much less explain,
those figures. and I have none available
to refute them, but let me say this to
Members of the Senate about the money
we appropriated in the military pro-
curement bill. That is the bill for military
hardware, which includes the ABM and
which we discussed for 7 weeks this year
and 61/2 weeks last year. In the bill we
provided $2.5 billion for military aid to
Southeast Asia. That was explained to
the fullest extent, and we had amend-
ments concerning it. There was one
amendment to put a cap on it. The Sena-
tor from Arkansas and I agreed on it. I
wanted a ceiling on it.
That money is what we call, in general
terms, military aid. It was transferred
over to the Armed Services Comnettee
from the Foreign Relations Committee,
with the consent of the Foreign Relations
Committee. about July 1, 1966. It showed
for the first time, I think, in fiscal
1967.
Just look at the map. How can you
separate the war, and the military aid for
all these countries in the area where the
fighting was already going on and still is?
Since then, we have gone into Cambodia
and we have openly gone into Laos. We
have done all these things and we are
bombing everywhere. I think that is the
real reason why the money was
transferred.
Now, I did what I could, and other
Senators did too, to explain that item to
the Senate. And we appropriated $2.5
billion. Whether you remember it or not,
I think it was said then that "this money
goes in with the regular DOD money that
is in this bill." It was not a separate ap-
propriation, so to speak. We had esti-
mates, but they were not separate
accounts.
The Department of Defense told us
frankly, "We are just not certain ex-
actly how much money was spent
through these funds in the various coun-
tries," although they made an effort to
keep up with it. With bombers flying
everywhere, and soldiers coming and
going, and [deleted] and everything
going on, I can see the difficulty. I was
not patient with it at first, but I came to
understand it better.
We have figures, but, as the Senator
from Missouri said about these ex-
penditures, they still call them estimates.
I am talking about the money now that is
appropriated through the Department of
Defense. The State Department may be
an advisor in this program. I am leaving
the CIA out of these remarks. They
frankly brought them to us as estimates
before our committee, we brought them
to the Senate floor as estimates, and
now, when they report back on the
money, they still call them estimates, for
the reasons I have given.
The figures here presented were
brought in good faith, I know absolutely,
by your representatives who went there.
They dug into a lot. But I would want to
look at these figures further. I think we
should.
However, as far as this $2.5 billion is
concerned, as far as being able to trace
it down country by country, I do not
think A is possible to do so. It was the
spirit of the appropriation, when the
authorization was made, that this money
was going into the general accounts of
the Department of Defense. They were
paying their own way over there, and for
every conceivable thing for American
soldiers, and we were going to be using
the same kitty, so to speak, for this kind
of military aid. We were going to leave
off the regular military aid that would
come through the Foreign Relations
Committee.
Just to sum up, I think the Senator
raised the point I raentioned, too, which
is that while we are doing this, is what
we- are doing in Laos an adjunct to the
war in Vietnam? I think it has been from
the beginning, and still is, and the Lord
only knows where we would be if we had
not done something up there in Laos.
What would have been the situation? The
North Vietnamese have had two or more
divisions in and out of there, back and
forth, all this time. I do not know
whether they are there today or not, but
they have been going back and forth all
the time, and they had to be offset. We
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tied them up, and we did a lot more than
that. But I just do not believe you can
separate an arm or leg or anything else
from the body of the war over there that
we are in and want to get out of.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
r y -
Mr. STENNIS. No
, let me say just a
IA, and I will be
through. All the money I have been talk-
ing about does not involve the CIA at all.
11:2Lits budget to our
subcommittee, always, they
have come up with expencetures right
in line with what trerrvere authorized
vipessly to do. By and large, that has
hapWfea,--g?i,n. I believe it will happen
even as to this complicated situation in
Laos. They have come clean with the
figures, an4J.L.,y_ie 'lege fold us and
think the Foreign Re a ions Committee
from time to time. about their activlties
in Laos, We can go into that later. But
their money, I think, is largely in the
clear and totally separate.
Now, who is involved in the CIA? Well,
the President of the United States, the
National Security Council, and we are a
party to it, in putting up the money. I
?think we all know that if we are going-W
have a CIA, and we have to have a CIA,
we cannot run it as rt Vffting,society or
something like that, in the ordinary way.
_Put their mone j.131.,he clear, and their
forthrightness, I think, is in the clear. I
noticed that the Senator from Missouri
was very straightforward, I thought. I
noticed his terms.
I have tried to tell the Senate on be-
half of the committee, what the situation
was. Of course, we will continue to try to
do that. I am very much interested in
this report, and intend to get into it as
time permits.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me?
Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, be-
fore yielding to the able Senator from
Massachusetts, I would make several ob-
servations in response to the remarks of
my distinguished chairman.
Perhaps we made a mistake in placing
this military assistance in the legislation
which goes to the Armed Services Com-
mittee. We did not do so with respect to
Cambodia. There is no secret aspect
about the military aid to Cambodia. I
would present to the Senate the fact
there are few people more interested in
getting the news than the news media
people of this country. A great many of
the questions asked, when we went to
Laos, were and are the result of stories
which came from televised reports and
newspapers in this country, spoken and
written by men and women willing to
risk their lives to first obtain and then
report the truth. When their stories were
published, many times they were in
trouble with the authorities out there.
Our staff went out and asked "Is this
true?" The people, being honorable
people and knowing in their hearts the
staff had the right to ask, replied, "Yes,
it is true." A great deal of this new in-
formation-was developed in this manner.
With respect to the map, and all coun-
tries involved in the map which the able
Senator referred to. I never thought
Vietnamization would work and said so
the day after it was announced as policy.
The reason for this belief was and is
simple: If we could not achieve a victory
under the rules, regulations, and restric-
tions laid down with 800,000 of the best
of our fighting men?to reach 800,000,
I am counting the fleet and all the Amer-
icans in Thailand, the Philippines, Old-
nawa, Guam, and Japan who were de-
voting all their time to Vietnam as well
as half a million in Vietnam?if we could
not achieve victory for Messrs. Thieu and
Ky with 800,000 of the best of all, how
are they going to achieve it by them-
selves? This is a somewhat oversimpli-
fied premise but was the basic reason
why I have always opposed the concept
of Vietnamization. That, until now, has
been my major criticism; and I agree
with the President that we should get
out as soon as we can.
But today we are talking about two
different wars or perhaps better put,
another and secret war. I have gone
out there and talked with just about
everyone in authority. I have gone up
to Luang Prabang and Sam Thong. I
have talked with Gen. yang Pao. I have
talked with our Jolly Green Giant peo-
ple. I have gone to Savannakhet and
Pak Se, and listened to the reasons, the
justifications.
There are two wars. I defy anyone to
assert there are not. One war has to do
do with protecting our troops, the air
and now the ground war against the Ho
Chi Minh Trails. But if anyone tries to
justify the bombing and napalming of
military and occasionally civilians up in
northern Laos as a way to protect Amer-
icans we say are leaving Vietnam, in my
judgment they are very wrong. I have
a right to my opinion as a Senator repre-
senting the people of Missouri. This is
what I have reported and will report
back to them.
In any case, the purpose of this ses-
sion is to again emphasize the importance
of getting out the facts, so we can get
enough truth to justify or not jusify
what is being done. I have never received
these facts as a member of either the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed
Services Committee, the CIA Subcom-
mittee, or the Appropriations Committee;
only have they come as a result of this
report, a report which once again shows
much was going on in northern Laos?
a different war?that we knew nothing
about.
I now yield to the able Senator from
Massachusetts.
Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Senator. I
think he has expressed very well the con-
cerns that I have in terms of the author-
ity of the administration to conduct the
other war?the one in northern Laos.
Not having been on either the Armed
Services Committee or the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, but being chairman of
the Refugee Subcommittee and interested
in the various programs that affect the
refugees in Laos, we had former Ambas-
sador Sullivan testify before the subcom-
mittee. In his oral testimony he made a
comment about the creation of refugees,
the numbers of which increased in al-
most direct proportion to the escalation
of the bombing in Laos.
I read now from Ambassador Sullivan's
formal testimony. He remarked:
Almost all of these ern:final residents have
long since left the area and today, for
all practical purposes, unpopul d except by
the North Vietnamese minter: Tees?
He is talking about the I xi Chi Minh
Trail.
Ambassador SULLIVAN (cont ing). Their
engineering and logistics auxil .ues, and the
porters whom they use in th peration of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Theref .*e the area of
Laos which is subjected to th, uost intense
military acivity is not an arr,_? vhich is of
direct concern to use in exami It g the ques-
tion of refugees.
The refugees in Laos are talc e whose lives
have been disrupted by the 0th vat' in Laos,
which has nothing to do with r a tary opera-
tions in South Vietnam or C. in'yodia. This
other war is a war which reprc et ts the am-
bitions of the North Vietnam ,a to extend
their control over their peace! .1 Lao neigh-
bors.
Then his testimony contint in elabo-
rating about the war.
At the end of his testim inv, I ques-
tioned Ambassador Sulli?in .1 --who, of
course, as genator SYMINGTO1 1 as pointed
out, was the Ambassador to ui os. I have
visited out there and so havE 0 embers of
my staff on the Refugee Si ommittee,
I questioned Ambassador S illt van.
What is the President's auth 1?1 y for wag-
ing the war there if it has r -t ling to do
with operations in Vietnam air ti Cambodia?
MY. SULLIVAN. I think this nu -tr has been
examined in other committees
Senator KENNEDY. I am corn
Mr. SULLIVAN. This question oi.s been ex-
amined in other committees.
Having this comment of ?t?ti ibassador
Sullivan, I continued the qt e: cioning. I
asked him to develop this ht tught. He
made the comment about t( -t lying be-
fore other committees, and t te he said:
The attacks in northern La . ve do not
consider to have to do with t 3 operations
In South Vietnam and Gambec
That is a direct quotatior from Am-
bassador Sullivan's testimon,
I took the opportunity on ril 23 to
write to the President to in t ire about
the authority for what ArribtE idor Sul-
livan, as a spokesman for ti e adminis-
tration, had commented on 1 s being the
other war. A copy of that re ai trise is on
the desk of each Senator.
As -David Abshire, who is i e Assist-
ant Secretary of State for Cc ressional
Relations, and who is the sp- to 'sman on
this matter, points out:
As the President said in hi. ; tot:tress to
the Nation on October 7. 1970 t to war in
Indochina "cannot be cured by iting only
one of its areas of outbreak."
But here we have quite a c ear con-
tradiction, in terms of the e: tb- ession of
policy, between Ambassade Sullivan,
who probably has been more .n rolved in
the entire Laotian situation t .a:i anyone
else within the aelministratn .1. and the
spokesman for the adminisr 3, ion, Mr.
Abshire.
When I asked Ambassador :ft ilivan at
the hearing for a fuller con to nit with
respect to the- authority for h - war in
northern Laos, he said he wi J I submit
it for the record. This has not ;,e
As a Senator who is in a rat it r unique
position of being on the comi ni tee con-
cerned with CIA appropriatio and the
Foreign Relations Committee, Lm won-
dering what the other commit re ss would
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i)e that would have had an opportunity
to consider this authority?if it was not
the Armed Services Committee, the
'ooreign Relations Committee, or the
,:ommittee which is involved in the
various CIA activities? What is the au-
thority for this war in northern Laos, an
authority the administration evidently
felleves ia has?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the able Senator from Massachu-
.tetts for presenting that testimony to the
-eenate. and I know of no other Senate
-:ommittee with jurisdiction in this field
...ban the ones mentioned.
Testifying before you, Assistant Secre-
tary of State Sullivan made my case
.tbout there being two wars better than
1 have made it or could make it. I fully
agree with his conclusions.
The purpose of this meeting was to
present to the Senate the fact we are
not getting enough information about
what the United States is doing in Laos.
Whether what we are doing is right or
wrong, we should be able to form our
aonelusion based on facts; otherwise we
are operating blindly when we put up
the money for these policies and pro-
rams in these foreign countries.
Second. and a more direct answer to
the Senator from Massachusetts, is that,
regarding the written law as passed by
the Senate, based on this report, that
law, in my opinion, has been and is being
violated. This aspect is something in
which most certainly every Senator and
every citizen should be interested.
The Senator from Alaska has asked me
informally whether the State and De-
fense Departments had a chance to re-
view this report. My answer is "No." But
the report will be filed as part of this
proceeding, so the executive branch can
analyze it and agree or disagree.
My earnest hope is that we obtain a
maximum amount of it declassified so
our people will be better informed about
Just what is actually going on in South-
east Asia.
Inasmuch as I mentioned the name of
the able Senator from Alaska, I now yield
to him and then will yield to the able
Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. STEVENS. It is my understanding
that the unanimous consent request was
that all the proceedings here plus the
staff report would remain classified in
the offices of Foreign Relations Commit-
tee. That is the reason why I asked the
'Senator whether the Department of State
and the Defense Department have access
to the staff report and these proceedings
without the consent of the Senate.
Mr. SYMINGTON. They will have
access.
In addition, as was the case in the last
closed session we had, we would ask
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They do not have
access without our permission.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If they desire to
examine it, we of course would want them
to do so.
In the last session, we had our record
declassified. I would hope, and at earliest
opportunity, we could have all these pro-
ceedings declassified.
Mr. STEVENS. I assume that the staff
report has been classified top secret by
the Senator's committee.
Mr. SYMINGTON. That is correct
Mr. STEVENS. Not by the execetive
branch.
Obviously, we are going to have debate
on your amendment in open session, but
I would be interested in having the State
Department and the Department of De-
fense have an opportunity to corn eient
and to have those comments in the For-
eign Relations Committee, so tha r we
could read the staff report and the com-
ments of the Department of State and
the Department of Defense.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am not certain
we can handle it exactly the way the
Senator from Alaska would wish. Bea the
more information we all. can obtain the
better. Let us hope, therefore, thiie all
reports and all information, the publica-
tion of which would not be against our
national security, will be released.
Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator allow
me to ask the chairman of the Fareign
Relations Committee this question: Ls it
possible in some way to get the Depart-
ment of State and the Department of
Defense to comment upon the staff re-
port and the facts contained therein? I
am perfectly willing to recognize it. for
what it is--a staff report that prasents
facts they have found. In effect, I should
like to have these people--
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am chairmcin of
the subcommittee to which the report,
was made; and with the approval cf the,
chairman of the full committee and the
committee would, of course, be glad to
have the executive branch examir e the
report. We would hope also they would
comment on it, agree where they igree,
disagree where they disagree, in the
tradition of our democratic system
Mr. STEVENS. I would like to have
their comments on the report.
Mr. SYMINGTON. They win be
available.
Mr. SCOTT. They have not yet seen it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. They have net yet
seen it, no.
Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senarion
Mr. SYMINGTON. I now yield to the
able Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. I have had the oppor-
tunity to serve on the Senator's sub.com-
mittee and to read the various reports,
and I would like to say that I have read
this report in full.
I think that the two men who went out
there, Mr. Lowenstein and Mr. Moose,
made a very fair report. That is evident
Ln the instances in which they give full
credit to the efforts of the CIA and the
embassy to be careful about getting too
lose to China, and so forth. It shows
Alen fairness.
wish to raise another point which
came to my mind when the Senator from
Mississippi was speaking. I do not think
this question has been raised before. I
think it is a very important question.
I recall 2 years ago, on August 1:!, 1969,
when the Senator from Arkansas (Mr.
tiAJLBRIGHT) got up and asked that funds
should be made available for military aid
to Southeast Asia but limited to $2 5 bil-
lion, and the Senator from Mississippi
a sented to that. It was correct that 1
year before that, and I have it in ti-le rec-
ord here, Secretary McNamara hal come
before the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions and asked that the authority to au-
thorize military aid for Laos and Thai-
land be transferred from the Committee
on Foreign Relations to the Armed Serv-
ices Committee.
This is what he said on August 12, 1969,
on page 9776 of the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD:
We are prepared ?:o provide Laos and Thai-
land the equipment and supplies they re-
quire to combat thf. armed Communist forces
which threaten their freedom. Therefore, the
transfer itself implies neither escalation of
conflict nor change in type or level of assist-
ance; it merely reflects the most effective
manner to handle the problem.
He did not tell what that manner or
level or nature of the operation was at
that point.
Now I hate to be referring to myself.
but I got the idea that perhaps we did
have forces operating in Laos and I of-
fered an amendment, which was the
predecessor of ail of these other amend-
ments limiting the authority of the Pres-
ident, to prohibit the use of any Amer-
ican military forces in Laos in support
of Laos and Laotian forces. It was chal-
lenged. -The Senator from Mississippi
thought it deserved further study. After
a while, I did agree to put it off until later.
But in that debate, the Senator from
Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) said he knew
we had forces operating in Laos. The
Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) said
that he thought we had forces operating
in Laos. The Senator from Arizona (Mr
GOLDWATER) said he had said so in the
campaign in 1964, that he knew we had
forces operating out there, but no one
paid any attention to him. So we knew
then?
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator used
my name. Could I ask, with respect, what
is the point he is driving at?
Mr. COOPER. I am getting to it. We
had hearings in the Committee on For-
eign Relations a year ago in which Mr.
Sullivan and others came before the corn _
mittee, and they detailed the kind of mili-
tary operations--the bombing, not by the
B-52's, but the bombing in the north to
support our forces.
The point I am getting at is that I first
think there must have been some trans-
fer of funds to "rip" the amount that has
been used in Laos; but the question is,
have these people got the right to oper-
ate out there with U.S. forces in support
of a Laotian Government without the
consent of Congress? They have been
doing that at least since 1964, and maybe
before that. We have never acted upon it.
Now of course the President says?and
there may be some measure of right in
it--that considering the necessity to pro-
tect our forces, we have to take this all
into consideration.
The point is, we have had an opera-
tion there to support the Government of
Souvanna Phoum.a for at least 6 or 7
years without any known authority of
Congress. I think that is a very delicate
question we will have to talk about some
time.
Another question that goes even fur-
ther is, has the CIA?a secret group?
the authority to get into a private war,
a secret -war, and gradually to lead us
perhaps into a larger war?
I raise these questions because I think
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they are serious: I do not know how we
can deal with them unless we discuss
them again in another secret session.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the record the
debate of August 12, 1969, which is
printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on
pages S. 9774 through 9783.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the record,
as follows:
[From the CONGRESSIONAL Bac?ao?Senate,
Aug. 12, 1969]
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR MILITARY PROCURE-
MENT, RESEARCH AND DE VBLOPMENT, AND
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE TEST
FACILITIES AT KWAJALEIN MISSILE RANGE,
AND RESERVE COMPONENT STRENGTH
The Senate resumed the consideration of
the bill (S. 2548) to authorize appropri-
ations during the fiscal year 1970 for pro-
curement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
and tracked combat vehicles and to author-
ize the construction of test facilities at
Kwajalein Missile Range, and to prescribe
the authorized personnel strength of the
Selected Reserve of each reserve component
of the Armed Forces and for other purposes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, amendment
No. 129 does two things.
First, it makes clear that no more than $3
billion of the funds appropriated for use of
the Armed Forces of the United States may
be used to support the forces of Vietnam and
other free world forces in Vietnam, or local
forces in Laos and Thailand.
Second, this amendment requires that the
decisions as to the expenditures of these
funds are to be the responsibility of the
President rather than the responsibility of
the Secretary of Defense.
My purpose in proposing this amendment
is to tighten up the provisions of this
authorization bill.
As it now stands, the Congress would be
atuhorizing the Secretary of Defense "on
such terms and conditions as he may deter-
mine" to spend, without any limitation what-
so ever, an amount that could be as high
as $80 billion to pay the expenses of armed
forces other than those of the United States.
This, I know, is preposterous. The Secre-
tary of Defense would do no such thing. But
that is precisely what the language of title
IV authorizes as I read it.
There must be some limit on the amount
we are expected to take from the use of our
Armed Forces and give to other free world
forces.
I guess I do not know what that limit is.
My amendment specifies that not more
than $3 billion may be spent on foreign
armed forces. That is more than we spend for
economic foreign aid and for many domestic
programs. It is but 10 percent of the some
$30 billion which the Vietnam war costs the
United States annually.
I know it will be said that there must be
a broad delegation of discretion in the ex-
penditure of these funds because we hope
that South Vietnam forces will take over
more and more of the burden. But I suggest
that the Senate is entitled at least to have
an estimate of how much next year is to be
used to pay for the forces of allies fighting
with us in Vietnam.
If the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee is not agreeable to the limiting
figure of $3 billion for this purpose, I would
be interested in receiving some other
estimate.
It does not make much sense to me to hold
elaborate hearings on the Defense Depart-
ment budget, to receive detailed estimates
on the costs of various weapons systems, and
then to adopt language in this bill which
says in effect that notwithstanding any
other law authorizing funds For the Armed
Forces of the United States, the Secretary
of' Defense can spend whatever he desires to
support other free world forces in Vietnam
and local forces in Laos.
The Congress must be cautious of such
wide open delegations of authority.
I hope the chairman of the Committee on
Armed Forces will accept this amendment.
Mr. STENNIS, Mr. President and members
of the committee, I call special attention to
the situation with respect to title 4. It may
be that a rolleall vote will not be required
on the matter.
I will first make a brief explanation of
title 4 of the bill. It covers what was once
called foreign military aid or foreign aid
for military. But this section is limited to
the South Vietnamese and other free world
forces in Vietnam, local forces in Laos and
Thailand, and for related costs during the
fiscal year 1970 on such terms and condi-
tions as the Secretary of Defense may
determine.
Mr. President, that is the identical lan-
guage that was used for last year in the
authorization bill as brought forward with-
out any change and also for the year 1968.
I am going to propose an amendment as a
substitute to the amendment of the Sen-
ator from Arkanas. The funds now in the
bill for this purpose amount to only $147
million. That is in hardware. The author-
ization is merely for the Appropriations
Committee, concerning such other amounts
as they may appropriate and for whatever
purposes they may appropriate. The Appro-
priations Committee now has authority to
appropriate items except military hardware
for OUT Army Or Navy, but they do not have
authority to appropriate even 0. & M.
funds? operation and maintenance funds--
for the Army of South Vietnam. So this
would be a general authorization.
When this matter came before us, my
best recollection is that in looking at it, the
Chief of Staff said that this is identical to
the matter of last year. and that was DOT -
rect. We did not get to the figures then,
however, and they gave me the figures later,
and showed how it was spent last year for
this purpose-42.5 billion. For this year, it
is estimated to be 52,25 billion for this
purpose.
On that point, I did not notice the open
end clause in here, which is the three or four
words on pages 12 and 15. "under this or any
other act." That gives it an open end, un-
limited authorization. I have not favored
that since we built the Air Force Academy. I
do not like us to make open end authoriza-
tions unless it is absolutely necessary. That
is my record on it.
But I failed to point that out to the com-
mittee; I am sure I did. That is why I want
to offer this substitute amendment now.
Instead of saying "not to exceed $3 billion,"
I think we should put it at $2.5 billion; and
if more money is needed, they can get the
authorization for it.
So I do not think we should try to step on
the President of the United States by requir-
ing him to issue a certificate.
My. amendment, which reads as follows,
is offered as a substitute:
"On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota-
tion marks and the word 'Funds' and insert
in lieu thereof the following: 'Not :to exceed
$2,500,000,000 of the funds'."
"On page 5, line 17, insert for the word
asonditions' the phrase 'under Presidential
regulations'."
That will put it forth in the register. The
President is responsible for what it does,
anyway. I think that will take care of the
situation.
So I offer that as a substitute, and I thank
the Senator from Arkansas very much for
calling attention to that matter. This lan-
guage, if it is going to refer to the other
authorization bills, should have a limit on
it, and it is limited. Let me repeat for clarity
S 12943
that it is limited to the fore is Vietnam,
other free world forces.en Vie am, and the
local forces in Laos and The. d.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Presies s , will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Inasmuch E does deal
particularly with the local for, s Laos and
Thailand, two countries in 1 1 II, at least
technically and legally, we a. lot at war,
does the Senator not think it \ E 1 al be better
that title responsibility be give , the Presi-
dent? We are now discussing b r-e our com..!
mittee a matter Involving Ti: it end, and it
seems to me that this is a matt -I' such con-
sequence that it should be s,,uarely the
President's responsibility to ris a decision
on a matter of this kind, as .1 stinguished
from the ongoing war 'n Vie m. That is
the part of it that struck me- ? Is t it should
be a presidential responsibilil n the law.
Mr. STENNIS. I think it shb cl be a presi-
dential responsibility. He is res s sible for it,
anyway. Certainly, we can true 1 an to make
the regulations about this ma :e', and then
the Secretary of Defense, acti nder those
regulations and our law and e frictions, I
believe?
Mr. FULBRIGHT Customarily I say to the
Senator, under the foreign aid .1 which my
committee has handled, the ft as are made
available to the President.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That has bee raditional,
since the beginning. Actually, I a is an item
which has been in the foreig ad bill, in
foreign assistance, in the past, r fact, some
Members presently are considc r taking it
back into that bill.
Therefore, I would suggest? a not know
that it is all that important? .t it would
still be more appropriate for n responsi-
bility to be given to the Preski a
Mr. SaauNdroN. Mr. Presid n , will the
Senator yield?
Mr. STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. SY M/NGTON. Mr. Preside there is a
$500 million difference here. As nderstand
the position of the distingui 1. a Senator
from Mississippi, he agrees with 1 e principle
of what is desired by the diatir 71 :shed Sen-
ator from Arkansas. We are . a fight in
Vietnam, -and we are and have t en taking
military action in Laos and Ti Li and.
I would hope that the able ch Lr man of the
Committee on Foreign Relations v mid accept
the proposals presented by the ,c airman of
the Committee, on Armed Serv e
Mr. PoLinucmr. I intended to ,o that when
I rose. I certainly accept the a is adment of
the Senator from Mississipp a. to the
amounts. His explanation of s is under-
standable.
I say to the Senator from Mis i rt that the
prosecution of the war, of course L a military
matter. But this involves far ac re than a
military matter, as we found ii morning;
and it is the very matter int vhich the
Senator from Missouri is lookini I think it is
primarily a political matter as low far we
go in a commitment to supp the local
forces in Laos and Thailand in a ticular, as
distinguished from Vietnam.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I know of t e Legislative
background incident to the ms te r we were
discussing this morning, and are st tined that
the Secretary of Defense aelieve lie matter
we discussed this morning, if lemented,
would necessitate the approval si Congress.
Again, it is my hope that the -1 airman of
the Committee on Foreign Rel 1 ms would
take the language suggested by I c chairman
of the Committee on Armed St a es.
Mr/Fmanuemr. I am willing 1 ,ccepet the
Senator from Mississippi's
amend-
ment in place of mine and won_ I, of course,
support it. I merely brought Is it to his
attention, in that I thought the e might be
a distinction between the signit a ee of the
local forces in Laos. But if the I a- ator from
Mississippi feels that strongly al q I: it I am
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perfectly willing to accept his amendment as
a substitute for mine.
Mr. STENNIS. It is my intention to have the
presidential responsibility at the very peak,
but I think he should be permitted to make
the regulations, and then the Secretary can
act on them.
Mr. FULBRIGHT Mr. President, a parlia-
mentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will
elate it.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. IS it proper for me to accept
tae substitute or withdraw my amendment?
Mr. President, I modify my amendment as
proposed by the Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. COOPER, Mr. President, will the Sena-
tor yield 7
Mr. STE/gars. I do not understand.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from
Arkansas has modified his amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I modify my amendment
in accordance with the suggested words of
she Senator from Mississippi. It is his pro-
posal, and that disposes of it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is
an modified.
Mr. STENNIS. I want to discuss it a little
slather, but I yield to the Senator from
Kentucky.
'The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SaoNo in the
:eiair). Will the Senator send the amend-
ment, as modified, to the desk.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield to the
rienator from Kentucky.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me first briefly?
Mr, STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did the Senator suggest
to strike "any other act" and only confine it
to this act?
Mr. &rearms. No, that was done in marking
up.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator does not wish
Lo strike out "any other act."
Mr. STENNIS. No, that is part of it. The
ceiling is on It now.
Mr. Fornermrr. Very well.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from
'Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I did not wish
te intervene until the Senator from Arkansas
and the Senator from Mississippi had agreed
upon the questions which the Senator from
Arkansas had raised. Now, I wish to raise
another question on this section. I hope I
may have the attention of the Senate for
lust a few minutes.
When I first read title IV on page 5 of the
bill, the thought came to me that it could
be considered a commitment as defined in
the national commitments resolution which
was adopted almost unanimously by the
Senate. I may attach too much importance
to language, but I want to give the reasons
tor my thinking in this direction.
In Vietnam we are furnishing supplies and
equipment to the South Vietnamese and to
ather free forces who are assisting the South
Vietnamese. We are- also using our troops in
support of the South Vietnamese-.
The same situation may prevail in Laos
and Thailand. as far as I know. We have
:tuthorized the supply of equipment and
materiel to Laos and Thailand. Until a few
years ago such supplies were authorized
:inder the military assistance section of the
coreign aid bill: in 1967 the authority was
transferred to the military authorization bill.
My question goes to the meaning of the
word "support." Is it intended in this sec-
tion that support of free forces in Laos and
Thailand is limited to equipment, materiel,
and supplies. or is it intended that word
asuoport" shall include the use of our own
Armed Forces in support of the local forces
:1 Thailand and Laos.
Mr. STENNIS. No.
Mr. COOPER. If use of our forces is intended,
article TV of the bill could be construed as a.
commitment of. our Armed Forces.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator
aresents a very good question but I do not
hesitate for one moment in answering. it
does not include troop personnel of that
kind.
As a matter of fact, I shall have platted
in the RECORD within just a few minutes an
itemization of these very items for fiscal sear
1968, fiscal year 1969, and fiscal year 1)70,
prospectively. We are dealing here with $2,-
226,400 for fiscal year 1970 which inch des
no military construction at this time, but
procurement for the Army, Navy, shipbuild-
ing conversion, aircraft procurement, missile
procurement, and other procurement, and
the operation and maintenance for the Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. So it is
strictly military matters, and military mat-
ters alone.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I accept of
course, as all of us do, the statement and
intention of the Senator from Mississippi,
about his understanding of the matter. But
It is important that we know the intention
of the language which speaks of itself. I
would ask if the Senator from Arkansas and
the Senator from Mississippi would be willing
to modify paragraph (2) which now reads
"(2: local forces in Laos and Thailand; so
as to insert before "local" the words: "to sro-
vide equipment, material supplies, and m
tena ace thereof to". The additional language
would remove any question of the inten-
tion---I do not know this is so intended; I
hope it is not intended to use any of taese
funds for our forces to support the local
forces of Laos -and Thailand.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator
yield?
Mr. COOPER. I base my suggested long :age
in part on a statement made by former Sec-
retary of Defense McNamara when he eked
that funds to assist Laos -and Thailand ocal
forces be taken out of the foreign aid bill
and placed in the defense bill. He supperted
his request in a, letter to Senator RUSSELL,
chairman of the Armed Forces Committee.
`We are prepared to provice Laos and
land the equipment and supplies the; re-
quire to-combat the armed Communist forces
-which threaten their freedom. Therefore, the
transfer itself implies neither escalation of
conflict nor change in type or level of assist-
an-u: it merely reflects the most effective
manner to handle the problem."
My amendment would limit the use of any
of the funds, as far as Laos and Thailand are
concerned, to equipment, material, and
supplies.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator might sepply
his language on that point With respeet to
equipment and supplies there, we already
have a list in the RECORD Of WYD, is
represented.
Perhaps the language would provide this
would not include any troops or U.S. lc rces.
Maybe that would cover it.
Mr. COOPER. "Other than U.S. forces."
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the Senator
yield?
Mr STENNIS. I yield.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I would lise to
make a comment. Perhaps the Senator from
Mossissippi and the Senator from Ken-
tucky might- indicate whether or not this
is within the scope of the Senator's proposed
language. My understanding is that main-
tenance can be involved as well as the actual
supplies and material.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. If we are going to have main-
tenance, this could indicate contract realm-
tenance, or it could indicate modifica tions
of liquipment. So I certainly think mitnte-
nan-ce should be in this language if we are
gaing to use specific language.
Ms. STENNIS. The word "maintenance" is
in the bill of particulars that I am goi ag to
have printed in the ,RECORD. It does in :lude
many things in addition tc military 1-mrd-
wile. It really has no place in this bill, strict-
ly speaking, except $:47 million. As a natter
of convenience we put it in 2 or 3 year:: ago.
I yield to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr, GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I am certain
I know what the Senator from Kentucky is
getting at. I find myself in favor of that but
I have a question as to whether or not his
exclusion would be so complete that we could
not, for example, install radars in Laos or
Thailand, or electronic detection equipment,
or electronic relay equipment that would re-
quire, at least for a time, personnel from the
United States. These people might not be in
uniform. They might be South Vietnamese.
Would the idea of the Senator from Ken-
tucky go that far?
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I shall try to
make myself clear. I do draw a distinction
between operations, on the one hand, in Viet-
nam and in Laos and Thailand, on the other.
Whatever may be one's views on Vietnam,
we are assisting Vietnam in at least two ways;
one by the supply of equipment and materiel;
and the other, and of greatest importance, by
the use of our Armed Forces in support of
Armed Forces of Vietnam and other free
forces. I have never voted against funds for
these purposes.
It has been said by former President John-
son that we have made -a commitment for
the use of our Armed Forces by the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution. It has been de-bated and
debated. In any case, we are in Vietnam,
and we are at war I do not know what is
occurring in Laos or Thailand but I know
it has not been declared either by the Ex-
ecutive or the Congress that we have a com-
mitment in Laos and Tolland against the
Pathet Lao, -or any insurgents in Tailand,
or Laos. The United States is at least not at
war in Laos or Thailand. My purpose is to
be sure that we d-o not provide funds for the
use of our Armed Forces in s?upport of the
local forces of Laos and Thailand and thus
run the risk of be-coming engaged in war
without joint authority of the Executive and
Congress.
On June 25, the Senate passed a resolu-
tion which had -been introduced by the Sen-
ator from Arkansas, which was later modified
and passed almost unanimously by the Sen-
ate. It states:
"Resolved, That (1) a national commit-
ment for the purpose of this resolution
means the use of the Armed Forces of the
United States on foreign territory, cr a prom-
ise to assist a foreign country, govern-
ment, or people by the use of the Armed
Forces or financial resources of the United
States, either immediately or upon the hap-
pening -of certain events, and (2) it is the
sense of the Senate that a national com-
mitment by the United States results only
from affirmative action taken by the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the United
States Government by means of a treaty,
statute, or concurrent resolution of both
Houses of Congress specifically providing
for such commitment."
Mr. President, this bill when enacted will
became a statute..It will represent the ac-
tion of both Houses of Congress. It leaves
no doubt-that we are ready to provide finan-
cial resources of the United States to local
farces in Laos and Thailand, but if we do
not make certain by proper language that
it does not provide funds for our Armed
Forces to engage in fighting in support of
the local forces of Laos and Tolland, it would
be interperted that this statute does provide
such funds for such use of our Armed Forces.
This may be said to strain language, but if
it is strained, we become involved in Viet-
nam by strained action by the strained
premises by the evolution of events which.
I am -sure, no one in the early years intended
or thought would bring us into that war.
I want to provide language in this section,
that will insure that use of the funds in-
volves -only the financial resources of the
United States. That means our money, our
equipment, -our materiel, our supplies and
operations related thereto. It would pro-
hibit the u-se of Arrned Forces in sup-post and
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combat support, of local forces fighting in
Laos and Thailand.
Mr. Svanworow. Mr. President, perhaps
we are missing a danger involved in all of
this; namely, if we lend or sell equipment
to the -present Vietnam Government, it is
very possible that in the not too distant
future, the North Vietnamese and the Viet-
cong could well be using that equipment
against some of the countries which today
are on our side; specifically, Lace and
Thailand.
That, I think, is a great danger, as evi-
denced by the fact that in the hearings con-
ducted in the Foreign Relations Committee
last year, relative to the sale of arms to other
countries, we found there were some 6,000
American tanks which, in effect, were for
sale if it could be arranged on the right
basis to countries in other parts of the world
where the tanks were not considered
obsolescent.
With complete respect for the remarks of
the distinguished Senator from Kentucky,
there is no real secret about the fact that we
have and are conducting military operations
in Laos; also that we are conducting mili-
tary operations from Thailand. I believe that
it is important to recognize tonight if Ameri-
cans are in danger in Thailand or if Ameri-
cans are in danger in Laos, because of actions
taken over recent years, it is as important for
use to work to defend them in those coun-
tries as to defend them in South Vietnam.
This morning, in a hearing conducted in
the Foreign Relations Committee with re-
spect to certain activities, the witness, not
of high rank, testified that before anything
occurred under the contingent agreement in
question, the matter should be taken up with
the Congress.
That, to me, made considerable impression,
because at least up to this administration,
many things took place in Laos and Thailand
which were not taken up with the Congress.
So I checked the legislative history of the
present Secretary of Defense when he was
a Member of the other body, and found that
he was forceful in stating such matters
should be taken up with the Congress.
I also found to my satisfaction that the
reason this witness stated It should be taken
up with the Congress was probably because
the Secretary of Defense believed it should be
taken up with the Congress. I believe, there-
fore, that we are in a new era when it comes
to the :method and the nature of risking
troops and utilizing equipment, in foreign
countries. I would give full and great credit
to the efforts which have been made by the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee so as to clarify this matter in these
hearings.
But, for these reasons and because of the
position takeh by the current management of
the Defense Department, I would hope that
we would see fit to pass title IV as it is now
in the bill.
Mr. President, I regret imolications?not
made here on the floor of the Senate?which
would imply that we have no military opera-
tions in Laos. We know we are having them
there; and we know we have built six major
bases in Thailand.
I believe that title 4 is all right. I thing
this discussion has been constructive from
the standpoint of the future.
Mr. SrEwans. As it le, by adoption of the
amendment of the Senator from Arkansas?
Mr. SYMINGTON. That is right; the amend-
ment of the able Senator from Arkansas, as
modified by the amendment of the distin-
guished chairman of the Armed Services
Committee. We will have both committees
working together, and this part of the bill
will be settled.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senator
from Texas had asked me for recognition. I
yield to him.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I would like to
associate my self with the remarks of the
distinguished Senator from Missouri. I think
the thrust of the amendment of the Senator
from Kentucky would be to deny involve-
ment of American personnel. It should be
roundly defeated. To begin With, what we are
talking about when we talk about Thailand
and Laos forces is paramilitary forces, regard-
ing counter-insurgency work. We are trying
to give them the sophisticated equipment
to do anything, for example, airlift and radar.
If we cannot train them to use the equip-
ment, it is pretty useless to give it to them.
I might say that our bases in Thailand are
defended by Thai troops. It is proposed that
they get no personnel support from the troops
In Thailand? Are we going to get no support
for the air bases that are supposed to be
defended?
The thrust of the amendment of the
Senator from Kentucky would be to necessi-
tate using American personnel for work that
they would not have to do if we were to allow
some support of Thai troops or paramilitary
troops.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would like to
hear from the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President. if the Senator
will excuse me just a minute, the Senator
from Arkansas and the Senator from Indi-
ana asked me to yield to them. I believe
the Senator from Arkansas asked me first.
I yield to him.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President. as I said a
moment ago on this particular amendment,
it seems to me that, with the amendment of
the Senator from Mississippi, it would be
satisfactory. I think the matter raised by
the Senator from Kentucky. however, is a
very significant one, and I do not want, in
any offhand way. to make what might be
called a national commitment with regard
to Thailand.
In my next amendment as printed, No. Ill,
which deals with the question of the Secre-
tary of Defense making available reports
prepared by outside organizations. I have in
mind such things as "think tanks," and so
on. That amendment is before the Senate.
I have also prepared another section which
I want to discuss as a modification to my
amendment, which provides that?
"The Secretary of Defense shall also pro-
vide to the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and the House of Represen-
tatives a cony of all bilateral contingency
plans, signed by a representative of the De-
partment of Defense and an official of a
government of a foreign country, involving
use of United States forces for the joint
defense of that country."
It deals, in effect, with the point the Sena-
tor from Kentucky has raised. ,
The point of the Senator from Kentucky is
a very important one. I do not wish, through
inadvertence, to see another Gulf of Tonkin
resolution go through here without knowing
it. I am inclined to believe that, with the ex-
planation and interpretation given by the
Senator from Mississippi and the Senator
from Missouri, it would be certainly an out-
rageous way to interpret it if it were done
that way.
I wonder if the Senator from Kentucky
could not offer this amendment at a later
date as his own amendment on this precise
subject. I do not know whether the next
amendment would cover it.
I think the Senator has a valid point, but
I do not think it is necessary, with what has
been said with regard to this amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, If I may say
this, I think the Senator from Kentucky has
made a contribution here. I have enjoyed
getting his thought. This is purely a money
bill. This is purely a special section here for
foreign military aid. It has 2 years of use as
a precedent. Except to put a ceiling on it, I
believe we ought to proceed in that way.
Mr. FITLBRIGHT. The Senator believes it
would be an outrageous distortion to in-
terpret it as authority for use of our military
12945
forces, apart from what they E "e presently
doing?
Mr. STENNIS. I do not see ho I could be
interpreted that way. It woul e a real
monstrosity.
I yield to the Senator from Lc i.ana.
Mr. ELLENDER. MT. President, I it not think
there is any question that the a sunt is for
Military hardware and uses of ti at kind, and
does not involve soldiers at all. a I rose to
ask the Senator this question: I 4. -armarked
$2.5 billion. During the hearin '3 that were
held 2 weeks ago. the figure wa 9 1.2 billion
instead of $2.5 billion.
Mr. STENNIS. That is correct.
Mr. ELLENDER. Would the Se: i n? modify
his amendment to include that vire?
Mr. SrEspns. No. I think the a hould be
some latitude. The $2.2 billion, ii .7,h I men-
tioned during the debate, wa xrived at
when the budget was written :p We have
already had a somewhat augme: e 1 program
to aid the Vietnamese to build ?> heir mili-
tary forces.
? I think that $2.5 billion figurt a realistic
one.
Mr. ELLENDER. The reason wh I raised the
question is that we used the I gi re of $2.5
billion during all the hearing -?-e had as
being the amount of foreign at ? o be used
for military hardware.
Mr. STENNIS. It will not hurt s :,11 to have
this excess. I suggest that in :2 ?e supple-
mental bills the extra amount ioney will
be used. It is better to have it d that way
than to have the department dr; w he money
from somewhere else and then a me before
the Congress with a big defici: : think we
ought to accept the figure of $2 illion.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, it :s late and I
do not want to detain the Sem e As I have
said, I may .be straining the pc a but I do
not think so.
This is an important matter. years we
have been talking about Vietn: al and cries
of anguish have gone up becau a ve did not
look ahead and consider the t that the
steps that were being taken co ii lead to?
our involvement in war. This 1 before us
will become a statute?could be at other step
involving the United States ; :1; -;11 as the
course of events led to our in '0 vement in
Vietnam.
I would agree that it would b a monstros-
ity if. the President of the Unite( S ates, upon
the language of this section eh a d consider
the language of this bill as aul :city to en-
ter the war in Laos or Thailanc I would be
a monstrosity, and I have full '1' fidence in
President Nixon, and that he o 'id not do
so, but that does not relieve I )f our re-
sponsibility.
It is admitted here by the ch -r nan of the
committee that these funds 9 :a 1 be used
only for what has been termet r ilitary as-
sistance.
Is that correct?
MT. FITLBRIGHT. That Is correct
Mr. ?Coorse. And, as I underst a. that they
shall not be used for our armed 3/ es in sup-
port of fighting, or assisting li-n ing of the
local forces of Laos and Thailar rther than
for supplies. Therefore, I will pr se another
amendment. "Military assistan? I believe,
is a phrase of art. Is it not?
Mr. STENNIS. Well, the Senate v ould know
more about that than I would.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. For years it W a n the for-
eign aid legislation. I assume i 3 still con-
sidered as such.
Mr. COOPER. In the testimony 9f the Secre-
tary of Defense before both the A med Serv-
ices 'Committee and the Fore. ,r Relations
Committee in 1967, he spoke o. t e transfer
of military assistance from th oreign aid
bill to the defense bill. He call 1 ,t military
assistance.
Mr. FULBR/GHT. That is right.
Mr. COOPER. That is what t had been
termed when it was considerec t :? the For-
eign Relations Committee.
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I propose: On line 15 before "local" insert
the words "military assistance" so as to read
"Military assistance to local forces in Laos
and Thailand." If these two items, Vietnam.
Laos, and Thailand, were separated and dis-
tinguished there would be no problem of a
misunderstanding.
However, the same words are employed for
the use of funds in Vietnam as for Laos and
Thailand, and there could be a mistake about
eheir meaning. I would urge that before "lo-
cal" there be inserted the words "Military as-
eistance."
Mr. PMERIGHT. I would think that would
be all right.
Mx STENNIS. We are talking about money.
We are talking about funds. The first sen-
tence reads "Not to exceed $2.5 billion of the
Zun.ds authorized for appropriation for the
use of the Armed Forces," and so forth. We
are talking about money, and that is all.
FIJI.BRIGHT. Yes.
Mr. STENNIS. And it would not fit in there
before the Senator's words "local forces,"
tt seems to me.
Mr. COOPER. I thought my suggestion would
help. I will offer the amendment I first pro-
posed. Is it in order for me to offer an
amendment?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator read it?
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The Chafe rules
-hat it is not in order for the Sena-tee from
'i-Centucky to offer an amendment ;1-. this
pint, except by unanimous consent.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, a parliart entary
Inquiry.
'the PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senae: r will
,tate it.
Mr. COOPER. After the pending amer lment
s voted upon, as it has been modified would
an amendment to the modified amerdment
,hen be in order?
`The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Feenator
'rd In Kentucky send his proposed r.:nend-
i- ent to the desk?
The Char would say, in answer to .:Ae in-
iiry of toe Senator from Kentucke that
ter the pending amendment, as m
Is voted upon it would be in order t:) at his
Amendment be considered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I th k the
amendment has been fully explained I ask
nnanimous consent that the table of funds
which reference has been made, t.-.e last
item being 32.2 billion, be printed in the
itECORD at this point.
There being no objecticn. the tees was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
rSTIMATED AMOUNTS INCLUDED IN MILITARY FUNCTION, BUDGET FOP SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD II LITARy
ASSISTANCE FORCES IN VIETNAM, LAOS, AND THAILAND AND RELA1 ED COSTS, FISCAL YEAR 1970 BUDGET
INCLUDING THE AID/DOD REALINEMENT
(In millions at nollarsi
Fiscal year Fecal year Pi cal year
1968 1969 1970
Military personnel:
Army 118.0 114.2 116.3
Navy .8 .6 .1
Marine Corps 15.0 14.8 14.2
Air Force .2 .2 .2
total, military personnel ______ _ . 134.0 129.8 130.8
....
Operation and maintenance: _
Army 605.8 708.0 632. 8
43.3 47.5 53.7
6.1 10.7 10.3
55.0 131.8 157.1
..
Total. operation and maintenance 710.2 898.0 853.9
Navy
Marine Corps
Air Force
Procurement:
Army_
Navy:
Other procurement
Ihipbuilding and conversion
PAMN- Navy aircraft and missiles
Marine Corps
Air Force:
Aircraft procurement
Missile procurement
Other procurement
_Mal. procurement
Military construction:
Army.
Navy
Air Force
Total military construction
Grand total
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. Preisident, I believe that
for the information of Senators, the clerk
should read the amendment of the Senator
from Arkansas, as modified.
The Pazsrourc OFFICER. The clerk will state
the amendment of the Senator from Ar-
kansas, as modified.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
'On page 5, line 11, strike out the quota-
tion marks and the word 'Funds' and insert
in lieu thereof the following: 'Not to exceed
e2,500,000,000 of the funds'.
"On page 5, line 17, strike out the words
'the Secretary of Defense' and insert in lieu
thereof the words 'the President'.
On page 5, line 17, insert after the word
'conditions' the phrase 'under the Presidential
regulations'."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on
agreeing to the amendment of the Senator
from Arkansas, as modified.
552.5 1, 243. 5 927.3
.!, 8 ill 2 4.2
4.5 6.5 3.4
.2
6f.5 508 88.3
31.1 88 1 103.9
. 1
67.4 85 4 114.4
734.9 1,484.5 1,241.7
1.7 10.7
1.9
9.0 1.5
12.6 15.5
1,591.7 2, 527. 8 226. 4
The amendment, as modified, was 'ereed
t
'The PREslorrm OFFICER. Does the Setiator
tem Kentucky now call up his amend -lent?
Mr. COOPER Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amenament
e el be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk real as
S thaws :
"On page 5, line 15, after (2) insea the
following:'to provide equipment, ma t erial ,
sapplies, and maintenance thereof to'.'
Mr. COOPER Mr. President, there ha: been
a very good discussion, but I do want to have
for the RECORD an interpretation of the sec-
bon. I would not be so interested if I hid not
been conscious of the steps by whic'. our
country became involved in the war in Viet-
nam. I shall spend a minute or two the
s:tbject.
It all started very simply. Under Pre dent
Eisenhower, military advisers were sent to
Vietnam. I do not know whether I should
speak of a statement former President Eisen-
hower made when he is now dead, but I
think it proper. He came here one day 2 years
ago and talked to a number of us. He said-
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have
order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will
be in order.
Mr. COOPER. He raid that the only com-
mitment he had made, was to provide mili-
tary assistance in the form of advisers, and
to provide economic aid as long as South
Vietnam made appropriate steps to help
itself.
I may say that, after searching the record,
that is all I could ever find that he had
promised.
For years, he had our military advisers in
Vietnam. We furnished equipment to Viet-
nam; we supported various regimes-it is
hard to remember how many-and then, as
the fighting increased in the outer areas, we
began to send troops to those areas, to assist
the South Vietnamese in acual fighting. They
were finally fired upon, and it became a
matter of national honor to defend them, as
the President had the right to do, additional
troops were sent to South Vietnam and step
by step we had become involved in the war
in Vietnam.
I am sure that President Eisenhower, Pres-
ident Kennedy, or :President Johnson never
intended that we would be involved in war
and certainly no major war. But we conveyed
to South Vietnam the impression that we
would stand with them and defend them.
I believe we conveyed that impression
throughout Southeast Asia.
Wars start from small beginnings. I have
thought, and many Senators have thought-
it was definitely the expression of the Senate
In the adoption of the National Commit-
ments Resolution--that a likely way to be-
come involved in a war is to put our armed
forces in another country where there is a
local War. And if we stay there long enough
and send enough teen there, they will be fired
on some day, and then, as I have said, it is
a matter of national honor and, because the
President has the constitutional duty to pro-
tect our troops, we will be involved in a war.
MT. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
MT. PULBRIGHT. What the Senator has said
does revive in my memory very clearly what
was said, and particularly what I said, after
having been briefed and informed by the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, in
regard to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
The Senator is very persuasive. It is a fact,
even though I thought it was a monstrosity,
that later the resolution was interpreted as
it was by the-President of the United States,
that it was so interpreted; and every time
the matter came up it was thrown in our
faces. I believe the Senator's amendment will
make the Senate's intent clearer and more
positive. I do not really see how this can
restrict the President's obligations, and I
hope the Senator from Mississippi will accept
the suggestion of the Senator from Kentucky.
What we are trying to do is protect ourselves
from such a monstrous interpretation. That
having happened within the memory of all
of us here, I believe it would be a very
healthy thing for it to be accepted.
Mr. President, I am not sure; can I accept
it? I would be willing to do so, with the agree-
ment of the Senator from Miesissippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr President, the Senate has
voted on the other amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parliamen-
tary inquiry.
The Premien:re Grimm The Senator will
state it.
Mr. COOPER. I have the floor, but I will
yield to the Senator for that purpose.
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S12947
I am not a warlike man, nor am I an un
peaceful man. But I find it difficult for any
one who was concerned with the vital corn
mittees of the Senate to stand on this floo
and say he did not know in the spring of 196
that we were becoming involved in the war
in Vietnam.
It is impossible for anyone not to hay
known it.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Senato
yield?
Mr. Amorr. I yield
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, was the Senator
referring to me?
Mr. ALLOTT. I was referring to anyone who
was a member of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee or the Appropriations Committee at
the time.
Mr. COOPER. Let me say in response that
during that debate I said that I knew what
we might get into. I voted for the resolution,
but I had no misapprehension about its pos-
sibilities. The debate will show that on that
day I said that it could lead us into war,
but we had confidence in the President that
he would use his authority with judgment.
However, I do not want the United States
to get into the same situation again by the
failure of the Congress to exercise its re-
sponsibility.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I appreciate the
situation of the Senator. And I ask him, and
he can answer it in any way he wants to, if
he does not believe the Secretary of Defense
of his own party and if he does not believe
his own President, because we have had
assurances from both of them that we will
not have any more commitments of troops
in the Far East.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the Sen-
ator let me respond?
Mr. ALLOTT. The Senator may respond.
Mr. COOPER. Mr President, I believe in the
responsibility of the President, and I believe
in President Nixon. He is my President
whether he is Republican or Democrat. It
happens that we are members of the same
party, of which I am proud.
I understand and respect his responsibility.
I believe that he will exercise it to the best
of his ability, and he has great ability.
I believe also in the responsibility of Con-
gress, both the House of Representatives and
the Senate. I believe that we have a respon-
sibility to determine also, whether the
United States should go into war and
whether we should become involved in situa-
tions which will send us into war?whether
our national interests, security and proper
commitments are actually involved.
We are talking about the future, and
whether we will take steps or refuse to take
steps that may prevent or inhibit the
possibility of war.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr, President, I understand
the concern of the Senator about not want-
ing to become involved in another Vietnam.
However, my statement was that there is no
reason for anyone who was a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee of the Appfo-
priations Committee, and particularly the
Defense Subcommittee, or the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, not to have known in the
spring and summer of 1964 that we were
going to become involved in a war.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President. I yield for a
question.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, it seems to
me that repeating the statement is inviting
comment upon a matter which was dis-
cussed at length. And the Senator looks in
this direction
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the amend-
ment of the Senator from Arkansas has al-
ready been agreed to. Can any one Senator
accept another amendment to that?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from
Mississippi asking that question as a par-
liamentary inquiry?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes, of course.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair rules
that it cannot be accepted. The amendment
of the Senator from Arkansas has been voted
upon. This is new matter.
Mr. COOPER. I hope not, but it is possible
we may be in war in Laos or Thailand; and
if we go Into war with the concurrent au-
thority of the President of the United States
and Congress, we will understand where we
are, and at least Congress and the President
will have made a determination that it is in
our national interest.
We may become involved in war without
such a determinatAork at some point, with
some 35,000 troops in Thailand, as I recall.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. There were 45,000 at the
last count, I think.
Mr. COOPER. If at some point we thus be-
came engaged in fighting, we may find our-
selves at war by the same process as that by
which we backed into war in Vietnam.
Again, I point out that the language of the
amendment ;applies both ;to Vietnam and to
Laos and Thailand. It is the identical
language.
I read the language to which I refer:
"Funds authorized for appropriation for
the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States under this or any other Act are
authorized to be made available for their
stated purposes to support: (1) Vietnamese
and other free world forces in Vietnam, (2)
local forces in Laos and Thailand;"
The same language Is used for bath coun-
tries. It is a .possible interpretation that these
funds could be used in .the same way in Laos
and Thailand as they are now being used in
Vietnam.
I have said that it would be preposterous
if the Secretary of Defense or the President
were to use the funds in Laos and Thailand
as they are being used in Vietnam as a result
of the language of title IV. However, it Is our
province rand our responsibility to make cer-
tain that the funds are not treated in the
same way. This is the purpose of my amend-
ment. It is simply to provide that as far as
Laos and Thailand are concerned, these
funds will only involve material, equipment,
supplies, and related costs. The term '-'rerated
costs" is in the language of the bill.
If this is what is intended by the sponsors
of the bill and the administration, I do not
see why they should not accept my language.
It would remove all doubt.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield the floor.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from
Missouri is recognized.
Mr.' SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I make two
points. In effect, we have been in war in Laos
for years, and it is time the American people
know more of the facts.
Second, the present Secretary of Defense
states that, if this matter comes up again
from the standpoint of any contingent
agreement, he believes it is a matter which
should be taken up with the Congress.
Mr. Arrow. Mr. President, I believe that
the previous remarks of the distinguished
Senator from Missouri, as well as his just
completed remarks, are well taken.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the
Senator.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I have been
very quiet during the course of this debate.
And, as I have listened to the debate, I find
my emotions swelling up within me to the
place where I think I would be hard pressed g
to express them in the period of 3 or 4 d
hours.
- advisers. They were not co a iered to be
- combat soldiers.
- Mr. ALLOTT. There were 6; ;, if the Sen-
r ator wants the exact figure.
4 Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Presic n , I do not
think anyone thought that to ,vere at war
or anticipated that we wol 'd be at war
e there in the future.
President Eisenhower had si given the
r opportunity to go to war it N ;etnam and
he rejected it? I think very ,t.ely?on the
advice of General Ridgewat General
Gavin.
I certainly did not think a ..tere getting
into war when President Rei a .ly sent ad-
visor personnel out there.
It is my impression that at hr it the same
time he sent troops to Ger ai fly because
Khruslichev had threatened bin, he be-
lieved, at the meeting at Vienn
I do not believe that he ided to get
into war any more than he i: e acted to get
into war in Germany -by sendii hose troops
there.
No action had been taken w re it came to
the Gulf of Tonkin hidden; ; self?
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President. w .th all due
deference to the Senator, I sal t.iat I would
yield for a question. I have be a rsterxing to
the distinguished Senator, witt e . interrupt-
ing him for weeks now. I yield ?3 for a ques-
tion, not, for a speech.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Preside t, I will put
it this way. Has the Senator r. u the report
of the Foreign Relations Corn al tee on the
Incidents of the Gulf of Tonki ?
Mr. Arran'''. Recently?
Mr. FTJLBRIGHT. At any time.
Mr. ALLOTT. Yes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Was the Ser t w not im-
pressed with the fact that th 'epresenta-
tions given to that committee b. the then
Secretary of State, Secretary Defense,
and the Chairman of the Jo :t Chiefs of
Staff proved to be in error?
Mr. ALLOTT. I am complet :y aware of
that. And I was present dun.; g all of the
Gulf of Tonkin debate, I am _wire of the
statements made by various S nators at
that time.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator . .ware that
the statements made by the :hairman of
the Foreign Relations Corrunita .vere based
on information given to him wl c: informa-
tion proved to be in error.
The question I ask the Sen -ha' is this:
That being so, how can he ma a the state-
ment that we all knew?and ..ssume he
means by that intended to a -cept?the
Southeast Asia resolution was. tI e equiva-
lent of a declaration of war?
Mr. ALLOTT. MT. President, I lave made
no such statement. I have tried .,t make my
remarks, and I am going to mak if we
stay here until midnight, despi +i ',he Sena-
tor's loquacity. I never made tl astement
or implied the statement that wi di the Gulf
of Tonkin resolution, for whic, admit I
voted, was passed, everybody ki o, we were
going to get into war. That was it ;, in 1964.
The Gulf of Tonkin resolution arm rot passed
in 1964.
Mr. PASTORE. Yes; it WES
Mr. FULBRIGHT. UrIfOrtUrlatel5
was in
August of 1964.
Mr. ALLOTT. I thought it was ,e ore that.
I apologize.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. I happen to o. Nit about
that. I was present.
Mr. Ara,orr. I apologize. I ha r:y dates
crossed.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The alleged int: A las took
place on the second and fon: b of Au-
gust, 1964. The resolution had be m prepared
long before that, I think. It was troduced
in the House, and it was acted almost
instantaneously.
Mr. ALLOTT. Let me say to t le Senator
that my mind played rhe a trick. LI ought it
was before this.
I was there. It is true that in the spring
of 1964, we -had approximately 15,000 or
6,000 soldiers in Vietnam. There had been a
radual escalation from the time that Presi-
ent Kennedy came in, when there were less
han 800 men who were considered to be
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But I will still go back to the statement I toward the posision of _creating a vacuum in But I cannot read his amendment in any
made that in 1964 no member of the Armed Southeast Asia. way except as being a totally unacceptable
Services Committee or the Appropriations I know that the domino theory was .as- and crippling burden upon the Secretary of
Committee?particularly the Defense Com- credited by all the intellectuals in -oils Defense and the President. I know the Sena-
mittee or the Foreign Relations Committee? country several years ago. But whether the tor's concern. I know he is sincere. I have
should not have known that we were being don dim theory was discredited by the Intel- never seen him do anything in his life which
committed to a war at that time. lectuals or not, the fact is that if we do aot was not sincere. He does not play games with
Now, Mr. President,I want to continue? preserve free governments in Southeast Aaia, people and he does not play games with legis-
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Maybe we should be a lot we ire leaving a vacuum which is going to be lotion. He is completely a sincere, honest, and
brighter than we are, but I did not know it, filled faster than we can turn around by '.he straightforward man.
am frank to say. Rea Chinese and by the North Vietnamese. But just as strongly. I would hope he
Mr. ALLOTT. Well, I am not surprised. As long ago as 1962. I brought to the at- would not press his amendment because I
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will the tendon of the State Department?without think it places a burden on our President
Senator yield? an action or any acknowledgement in any with respect to the protection of our forces
, the fact that Red Chinese troops were in those areas, which is something that no
one, if he understood it as I interpret it,
would wish to do.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will the Sena-
tor yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I wish to ask
the Senator if it is 'not true that the Presi-
dent inherited the problems in Vietnam. I
know the wish is shared by all of us that
there had been another way to solve that
problem. I know all of us wish that there
was some way to solve it now without with-
drawing from our commitments and without
doing something that would not be in the
best interests of our country.
However, is it not true that the President
said on several occasions there will be no
more 'Vietnams in his administration?
Mr. Amon.. That is my understanding of
what he has said.
Mr. MURPHY. Would it not be considered
responsible that this man who has been in
public life for many years and who has been
elected by the people of this country be
given the confidence without trying to write
into an authorization bill for military pro-
curement provisions that might be a detri-
ment to the protection of American people,
AllieLiCATI troops, and American property?
Mr. Aienorr. I fully believe so; yes.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, I have listened
patiently to the discussion, As I said at the
outset, and as the distinguished Senator
from Florida stated, this entire discussion
has been a filibuster. This entire discussion
has taken place at the wrong time and under
the wrong set of ciraumatances. It. should not
be a part of this particular bill. I made that
statement on the first day we considered. the
Mr. ALLOTT. 1 yield. wa
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, having roaming at will throegh a good portico of
had some unpleasant personal experiences northern Thailand. They still are, except - aat
about that time in 1964, involving this sub- now they are actually engaging in acts of
lea, I can speak with some experience on it. was. This is a large area. It is composed
have made the charge repeatedly, and it of many people. and with it a lot of the
itas never been denied?and this information natural resource wealth of the world.
,stme to me before my campaign actually We have done very well, in my opinion, in
aarted--that we did not drift into this war. Indonesia; perhaps not as startlingly weli as
We had a small number of advisers over there in Malaysia.
in 1960 and 1961, and suddenly 15,000 to But if we permit Laos to go completely
13,000 men were sent over, with explicit down the drain, Thailand to go down the
,aders to shoot back. drain. and Vietnam to go down the drat'., as
I tried to bring this to the attention of the some people would like to do?and oane
American public; I could not get anybody to people would like to have us encourage the
esten to me. I do not think it would have promotion of .a dual government there-, 7-
do
made a bit of difference. no. .laink it will be long before Southeast
But we were at war when the Gulf of Ton- As:a will have become a Communist strong-
kin incident took place. I remember begging hod. When this OCCUTS. I think our poet ion
for equal time on television so I could present in the world will be much more difficult our
not the Republican side but this American po Otani with ;the Philippines will be fauch
aide of the understanding of what was going more difficult; our position with Indy- esia
.1-1 in Vietnam, and I never got any place. will be much more difficult; and our position
When you are shooting back in a situation with Malaysia -sill be impossible.
tuch as that, you are in war; and although When we formed the tripartite situation in
we had advisers over there who were ex- Laos. I said at the time it would not 'ark.
?licitly told never to fire on anyone, this ad- It has not worked. Today we find the the
qisory situation ended some time in 1962, Plain of Jars in Laos is pretty much overrun
Mien the troops were told to fire back. bs the Viet Minh.
I suggest to the Senator from Kentucky If I may have the attention of the Setaitor
unless 1 am badly mistaken, even his from Kentucky particularly as I make this
language could not prevent a-President from remark, I do not want to see commitments
,siving the same orders or a Secretary of made for ground troops in this area any more
Defense from giving the same orders. Caen he does. He is no more sincere as. his
..SO I have a feeling that what we are talk- belief than I am. But I am sure he knows
ti.g about now gets to the fact of whether that we have air bases in Thailand. He :knows
or not we, as Senators, have faith, regardless teat we have a naval base in Thailand. That
-ii' whether we are Republicans or Democrats, is no secret. He knows of our activities is
m the man who has been elected President W Ar:.ch I shall not mention--in Laos, activities
and the men with whom he has surrounded w Itch do not Involve grounu srr
1,i.mself as Secretary of State and Secretary I have read his amendment. I say in al I sin- bill.
af Defense. - carity, looking down the road to witat I I assure the Senate that the work of this
I merely wanted to inject this because I think could happen if the Senate keens, on committee was carefully and thoughtfully
have not heard it brought up. I have never wile this sort of frenetic pattern it has estab- done. It was properly done. But now it is
been challenged on it, and I have made it Halted during the last few days and weeks, being shredded, twisted, and torn up. The
and made it and made it. thai, I am afraid we shall be sending a good more I hear this discussion, the more I am
Mr. ALLOT'''. I would say to the Senator that p ation of the world down the drain. I have certain discussion on our foreign policy, pres-
I see no reason to challenge it, looking back- had the clerk write out the Fullaright amend- en,t and future, should take place in this
ward for 5 years now. meet as modified. The amendment, so roodi- body, I would enjoy taking part in it.
Mr. Stennis addressed the Chair. fad reads, in pertinent portion: However, it would seem to me. and I hope
Mr. ALLOTT. I wish to continue. "Not to exaeed $2.5 billion of the I ands the Senator agrees, that this evening, at this
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator a naaarized for -appropriatio:a for the we of stage, in this protracted discussion this is an
%yin yield for this statement?it is 6 o'clock, t .1e. Armed Forces of the TJnIted States ander unfortunate attempt to place restrictions on
and if we are going to have a vote tonight, t OF or any other Act are authorized o be a new President who has been doing a mag-
7 think we should vote, with all deference made available for their stated .purpia es to nificent job, as far as I know, in bringing
to the Senator from Colorado. I just want to s mport: (1 i Vietnamese and other free world about solutions to problems that he inhera
aive my opinion. I noes in Viotnam, (2)?" ited. By taking a good hard look .at them he
Mr, ALLOTT. Mr. President, I want to defer And this is where the Senator's aanend- will 'be able to find solutions.
to the Senator, but I have kept very quiet rent comes in-- Mr. Mama. I thank the Senator for his con-
during the past weeks. My remarks will be "1,0 provide materiel, supplies equirnent, tribution. I am appreciative of the Senator's
very short. The fact that I would like to a net maintenance thereof to local forces ir, statements.
',peak for 3 or 4 hours does not mean I am tans and Thailand." Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator
aoing to do so or have any intention of doing have I quoted the Senator's amens ment yield?
sarsectly? Mr. ALLOTT. I yield.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President. I think this is
a dangerous amendment. I think it is poten-
tially mischievous and very unnecessary for
us to vote on itatonight when it has not been
printed and no One ha.s had -a chance to look
at it. There is no copy available except what
has been scratched in pencil on a piece of
paper. I think the matter requires extensive
debate.
I spent a great deal of time in Laos and
Thailand. I know what we are engaged in and
I know the extent to which we are involved.
00,
Mr, STENNIS. I withdraw my request. Mr. Coopart Correctly.
Mr. ALL OTT. If the Senator will permit me Mr. ALLOTT In my opinion, what the Sena-
to continue for a short time, I will be very tor from Kentucky's' amendment couk mean
grateful to nim. a that we could not put supplies a i Lao.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from or Thailand to maintain our forces, .: s sup-
Colorado has the floor. plies to protect our airpor as. our Air Porce,
Mr. Aatorr. Mr. President, looking at the our naval bases, or anything else that we
oresent aornendment, I wish to say this: The I rave there. rhe legislative history 1 quite
thing that rias concerned me about many of' lear, I think, as it pertains to every .S? nator,
the rash of amendments that we have had? hat none of us wishes to engage in more
acme of tnem have been meritorious?is that ;-round warfare in Southeast Asia or, f -r that
in my belief the Senate may be moving natter, anywhere else.
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A roved
If a rigid interpretation were applied to the the funds in this bill, because if e no not,
amendment of the Senator from Kentucky it if we approve that kind of activl it may
could seriously jeopardize the lives of Amer- lead?'I hope not?but it may is -i as into
lean men. I am not prepared to vote willy- war.
nilly on something that we know nothing The SEATO Treaty states that II t .e event
about. We do not know the reaction of the of armed aggression against at ?, of the
Department of Defense t o the amendment or parties thereto, including the prot I states,
Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand, t .e parties
thereto shall take action accordii o their
constitutional processes.
Mr. President, what are the cor t utional
processes?
It is not defined.
When Secretary of State Dull , testified
before the Foreign Relations Cor .rt ,ttee on
the SEATO Treaty?I have read t -e testi-
mony?he was asked what st tutional
processes meant. He replied that .sant the
Joint authority of the executive s nch and
the Congress.
The national commitments res 7don was
recently passed, expressing the as ni sense.
If we are fighting in Thailan? . nd Laos
now, we should know it.
The President of the Units States?
whether he be President Nixor 'resident
Johnson, or any President, in re -Jew, has
no right to take our country into ? re without
first coming to the Congress am a king for
its authority.
If a situation should arise whet in forces
were being attacked, of course, tl ?'resident
has the constitutional right to c? rid them
and to protect the security of r a country.
But I do not want war to ?scut b -cause of
carelessness or failure to look ,e ad. If we
get into war, I believe that the S ?ft Lte wants
the determination to be made 1 -s he Joint
authority of the President and t at Congress.
Mr. President, that is the met -u ig of my
amendment.
I shall withdraw the amendn . tonight
because many Senators have not '1.1 d the op-
portunity to read it and to con .0"r it. Un-
less the Armed Services Com:al and its
chairman modify the section n? amend-
ment?it has to be by amendm ?end by
interpretation so precise that A one can
think anything to the contrary. a int to say
that I will bring up this amen n- ant again
and we can determine if this lar da wants to
abide by the constitutional pro ?s es, wants
to abide by its national commit' ails+ resolu-
tion and wants to disapprove f tots for the
use of our forces which could s i us into
another war without the conseni o Congress.
Mr. President, I withdraw my ,ar endment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The et ator from
Kentucky withdraws his amend -nr nts.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the --e? ator very
much for his splendid remarks , for what
I think is a constructive atep, .s, in with-
drawing the amendment for th -? me being.
That is all I have to say.
Mr. 'COPPER. Mr. President, hank the
Senator, and I may add to my a- larks that
I shall ask for a rolloall.
E8fakfltlaPAPERttMIN-BD?fikitialg96R000300080080-3 2949
August 3, 1971 PP
speaks with conviction, courage, and force. I
appreciate very much what he has said, and
for his kind remarks about me.
Perhaps I may be sincere, Out someone else
might say that I may be sincere, but I may
not be always right or too bright about
things. Sincerity does not always make up
how they would interpret it. for those qualities.
If extended discussion is required on the My amendment has not been printed. I
matter tonight I am prepared to discuss it at had thought about it but as we were coming
length as long as anyone is prepared to sit to the close of the debate in these 2 days be-
and listen, fore we recess, I did not expect to bring it
Mr. Stennis and Mr. Fulbright addressed up until after the recess. But when the
the Chair. Senator from Arkansas offered his amend-
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I assured the ment, I knew that mine should be offered.
Senator from Mississippi I would not retain I will not press for a vote tonight. I know
the floor for more than a few minutes. I have that I can withdraw, and offer this amend-
no intention of -holding the floor further. ment later, but I ask a parliamentary ques-
I wish to say to the Senator from Missis- tion because I want to be certain: Mr. Presi-
sippi that the statement made by the Senator dent, in the event the Senator from Kentucky
from California is true. Senators can rest withdraws his amendment this evening,
assured that any matter coming out of the would it be possible for him to submit the
committee of the distinguished Senator from amendment at a later date?
Mississippi has had the most meticulous The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, that Would be
scrutiny, observation, discussion, and completely in order.
thought. Mr. COOPER. I thank the Chair. I will with-
While I do not desire to retain the floor draw the amendment but I will bring it up
against the wishes a the distinguished Sen-
ator from Mississippi, I felt some of these
things had to be said before this Matter was
voted upon because I am convinced this
amendment would wreak a lot of havoc..
There can be no question in anyone's mind
after this legislative history that the amend-
ment agreed to a few moments ago was never
intended to put ground troops in Laos and
Thailand.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield to the Senator from
Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I would hope we could get
on with the bill. I respectfully point out to
the Senate the fact that the language was of my fauily have been Republicans since
agreed to by the chairman of the Committee the Civil War?longer than some others have
on Armed Services and the chairman of the been, and some fought in the Civil War as
Committee on Foreign Relations. I thought Republicans. I support the office of President,
that the language agreed to was eminently I support the great responsibility it carries,
satisfactory and that we could have gone and I have great admiration for and con-
ahead at least 1 hour ago and gotten through fidence in President Nixon.
with this part of the bill. But, I also respect this body. We have
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield the floor. responsibilities, too. I do not want the Presi-
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I appreciate dent of the United States--and we are talk-
the contribution of the Senator from Ken- ing about President Nlxon?to be hindered
tucky. I feel this section is old law. It already in his efforts by the same mistakes which
has a meaning. It has been followed these 2 have been made before.
years. It would be far better to keep this It is rather curious that before 1966, when
section now, as used heretofore, with the this item had been carried in the foreign aid
ceiling we have prepared. If the Senator from bill for years, it was used for military assist-
Kentucky wants to pursue his thoughts fur- ance, meaning equipment, supplies, main-
ther, I know what a draftsman he is and tenance, food, and money. Then it was
that he does not need anyone particularly, changed, and placed in the Defense bill.
but if he would put anything he has in mind It is rather curious that after it had been
in a separate amendment; it would be helpful put in the Defense bill, we began to use hell-
o? ters in Laos and Thailand under orders
again. I hope that by the time I bring it up
again, the Senator from Mississippi will have
consulted with the Defense Department to
see if they would be willing to offer language
in title IV conforming to the Senator from
Mississippi's understanding that it was their
intention. The Senator has said is was in-
tended that funds were to be used for sup-
plies, equipment, and such. We have absolute
confidence in the Senator from Mississippi,
but the Department of Defense should spell
out clearly the purpose of title IV relative to
Laos and Thailand.
Mr. President, we have been -talking about
the President. President Nixon is my Presi-
dent. He is a Republican President. I do not
want to go back into history, but members.
to see w at others thought.
I am glad now to yield to the Senator from of the Department of Defense, and I under not
-
Kentucky. stand in military activities I cannot under- Mr. Famsarassr. Mr. Preside. ,,, I do
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I have taken stand why the language is not differentiated know what the wishes of the .s.aership or
? up a good deal of time tonight. I must say between funds to be used in Laos and Thai- of the Senator from Mississipt ? sre. I have
that I have not filibustered, land and funds to be used in Vietnam. It is a very minor amendment. whic ' - an go over
Mr. COOPER. I have taken some time be- exactly the same language. perhaps funds until September, but I wanted ? 5 inquire as
cause I considered this to be an important are to be used for some military activities to the wishes of the Senator fro it Aississippi.
matter, much more important than merely such RS for helicopters. Helicopters may take Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a 51 ,iamentary
reducing the amounts involved, with due local forces to back areas. Firing on the hell- incluirY?
regard to my friend from Arkansas and my copters begins, as it did in Vietnam, and war THE PRESIDING OFFICES. The i motor will
friend from Mississippi. We are dealing with comes, state it.
.1 lent been
an entirely different concept: The question In 1983 or 1964?before the Gulf of Ton-
Mr. STENNIS. Has the ante of whether funds can be spent for the use kin resolution?I remember the former Sena- adopted?
of our Armed Forces in fighting in support tor from Oklahoma, Mr_ Monroney, came THE PRESIDING Orricsa. Tis ; rnendment
. . e adment is
of local Laos and Thailand forces without a back from Vietnam and -told us that our has been withdrawn. No a
commitment by the President or the Congress helicopters were carrying men up the moun- pending.
or both, which might lead to war, tains, that there were U.S. riflemen on the
( ?
Mr. PULBRIGHT. MT. PreSitlf ',.-1 in other
I would therefore urge that the question helicopters who were tiring in defense of the sc In accord-
words, the one which I amen
is much more important than the matter of helicopters and the pilots, and that their fire ance with the Senator's amend' .5 it has been
dollars and cents, was being returned from the ground. That adopted, according to my unde .standing.
I want to thank my friend from Colorado may be what we are doing in Laos and Mr. STENNIS. That is nay un es standing.
. (Mr. Allott) for his statement. I know him. Thailand now. Mr. FULDRIGHT. Mr. Presidr art does the
I know that he has deep feelings about these The fact that some Senators have stated Senator wish me to offer amen I a Int No. 111
matters. lie does sit quietly at times, but I we are engaged in fighting in Laos and Thai- at this time or not? The Sena r Is familiar
know how deep his feelings run and he land makes it more important that we limit with it.
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August 3, 1971
Mr. STENNIS. I cannot agree to it.
Mr FuLERIGHT. I thought the Senator had
proposed an amendment to it.
Mr. STENNIS. No; that is the wrong one
The Senator is referring to another amend-
ment. I have only seen the amendment the
Senator has handled me within the last
hour or two.
Mr. PULA/RIGHT. This is No. 111,
Mr. STENN/S. I was handed the wrong one.
Mr. PuLBRIGHT. I ant sorry the Senator was
given the wrong amendment by mi t k
etter, and I think the spirit, of thio rescau
tion. He has rendered a great sery.ce.
I could go further and say that, a a resul
. of the efforts of the Senator from Kentucky
T have noticed that the Senate as a -vhole i
recent weeks has shown a greater seasitivit
to its responsibilities in this whole E.:ea than
a has ever done in the 25 years I have bee
,n the Senate. I think the Senao a from
Kentucky deserves the credit witch eh
Senator from Montana so appx priatel
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, if the Senator
will yield. I wish to associate myself with
the remarks just made by my cclieagues.
The Senator front Kentucky is a dear old
friend of mine I made the practicai sugges-
tion that to articulate this amendment
oroperly it will take not only the Depart-
nent of Defense, but it will take t le State
epartment, which have a role in trying to
coordinate the military and diplomat ti activ-
i tees of the United States.
I think the majority leader's words give
added authority to the need for arti:ulating
an amendment which wile be upon i he level
of the one we discussed so long and which
was decided so narrowly, but wheal will
t 7,11y seek to carry out a policy of th( United
States. That is what this amendment is
really all about.
I know that I, as a member of the com-
mittee, arid I am sure the chairman, will
cooperate with our colleague from Kentucky,
s-) that when he presents the proposal it
will truly represer.t the Senate dec. ,iration
as articulated, and which raises the q 1 lestion
s hich the Senater from Colorado (Mr. Allott)
raised, all of wh.ch is pertinent o our
security requirements.
Mr. COOPER I thank the Senator.
Mr. Javrrs. I think he has rent "red a
i storic service.
Mr. FHLBRIGHT. Mr. Preside at.?
Mr. SrEararis. Mr. Pres:.clent, who leis the
aoor?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senati: r from
Mississippi yielded to the Senator from
Arkansas. He had the floor initialle held
ay the Senator from Mississippi.
The Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. PULERIGHT. I was going to yield oi the
,aenator from Kentucky.
Mr. SamaiNts. I yield brie:13. to the lienator
;'ram Kentucky.
Mr. Come. Mr. President, I wish te asso-
ciate myself with the remarks made ry the
majority leader and would like to say to my
aneague that I would hope he would do us
the honor, when he resubmits the aelend-
raent, to consider using the argument .hat is
EOW in the RECORD and disseminatina it to
the Members of this body, and that he would
Co many of us the honor of asking f a* co-
saansors to his amendment when it may be
submitted in the future.
Mr. Smarms. Mr. President. I yield :o the
Senator from Arkansas. If he would aither
have the floor, I yield the floor.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well I will taio- the
floor. I want to direct an Inquiry the
Senator.
Mr. President, I wish to take the floor.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from
Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is my understandir e the
Senator from Mississippi has prepar? ,1 an
amendment to my amendment No. 111?a
proviso, I should say, at the end?onich
made the amendment acceptable to him. Is
that correct?
Mr. STENNIS I may say to the Senatce for
Arkansas that an additional question: has
risen here. about which I think we right
o have a colloquy with respect to poi eibly
e drafting the amendment of the See atm'.
un in sympathy with the amendment. I
elieve we could work something out 4.1ong
hat line.
- this question is a profound question that
we are dealing with here and one that
the Senator from Missouri has raised
? and deserves great credit for raising. I
? commend him for his efforts.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able
n Senator from Kentucky, one of the most
respected members of this body. As he
e will remember, I urged him to put air
amendment No. 111 was submitted and
arinted about a week ago.
Mr. Swarms. I am ready for the Senator
to present his amendment, if he is agreeable
to a proviso.
Mr. MANSFIELD. MT. President, will the
Senator yield briefly?
Mr. Fri:BRIGHT. I yield to the Senator from
Montana.
Mr, MANsFIELD. Mr. President, I do not feel
should let this occasion go by without ex-
pressing my respect, regard, and affection for
the distinguished senior Senator from Ken-
tucky (Mr. Coops). What he tried to say
and what he did was and is in the minds and
hearts of all of us, and has been for almost
half a decade, if not longer.
I want him to know that I honor him for
his persistence as well as for his sagacity and
I ant delighted that he is going to introduce
again the amendment which he has with-
drawn, because none of us can alibi himself
out of what he did on the Tonkin resolution.
It was plain, clear, and legible, and every one
of us understood it, but that does not mean
many of us have not regretted it.
The reason why I am impressed by what
the distinguished Senator has said is that
he has tried, as best he knows how, to exercise
his responsibility as a Senator of the United
Seates, in the 'hope that this body?the Sen-
ate of the United States?will live up to its
responsibility, collectively as well as individ-
ually, and that we will participate insofar as
we can within the realm of the Constitution,
in making certain that we act in line with
what President Nixon said just this past
month, when he laid down, in Guam, the
Nixon Doctrine for the Pacific.
Be said, in effect, "No more Vietnams." He
said, in effect, we are a pacific nation, with
peripheral Asian interests in the mainland.
He said in effect, we are not going to get
involved in internal difficulties. He said, in
effect, we are not going to go to war again
unless it is nuclear and our security is at
stake.
So I am -delighted that, even though the
hour is late, the Senator from Kentucky did
bring up this question. It is paramount.
Everything that is happening and has been
happening in Vietnam has an indirect and
a direct relationship to many of the other
troubles that confront this Republic today.
I agree with the Senator that we do not
want to get involved again in an area which
TS not vital to the security of this country,
and in an area which has cost this country
over $100 billion?and the end is not yet in
sight?and not just 36,000, but altogether
44,000 dead--with the end not yet in sight?
and with wounded of over 200,000?and the
end not yet in sight.
So I think the warning raised by the
listinguished Senator from Kentucky should
he and will be heeded,
want him to know that I honor him for
.vhat he has said, and I honor him for what
he has done in this body.
Mr. FT/IL/RIGHT. Mr. President, I would like
na associate myself with everything the ma- a
jority leader has said about the Senator t
irom Kentucky. The Senator from Kentucky r
alayed a leading role relating to the recent
resolution with regard to the responsibilities b
of the Senate and the Congress. In offering t
;.his proposal and in making the statement
ne made, he was carrying into effect the
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President. I t-,ink
power in his resolution, because air
power constitutes the majority of our
operations in and over Laos. At various
times, I have often felt, "Finally I now
know what we are doing in Laos." Each
time I found out, however, that I did
not know the entire story.
As lawyers observe?I say this with
respect and not in any criticism?par-
tial truth is an evasion of truth.
There are very important questions
concerning the military situation in
Laos. One is that little of their manpower
is left. Souvanna Phouma, at a dinner
here 'about a year and a half ago, said
to us:
When I first needed arms, I asked the
Communists to give me military aid. When
they refused, I came to you.
The implication was clear; if we did
not give him the military aid, he was
going to get that aid from the Com-
munists.
It is my belief, as well as that of ex-
perts, that the forces which oppose his
government in Vientiane can take Laos
any time they choose, unless the United
States decides to start another major
military intervention in that country.
There is a further development since
the hearings the Senator referred to
namely, the greater importance rela-
tively speaking?especially with respect
to their military role?of the CIA-di-
rected irregulars. They are close to being
about all that is left to protect Souvanna
Phouma and his government.
As we know, Pak Se is now in danger.
Luang Prabang was in danger for some
time.
Finally, and in some ways certainly
most important, is the possible confron-
tation with the Chinese. In the air we
are flying pretty close to China. No one
had the remotest idea the Chinese would
move in force against us in North Korea
when they did just that some 20 years
ago. We all know the results of that de-
velopment.
So, despite the fact I respectfully com-
mend the administration for accomplish-
ing better relationships recently with
the Chinese, these activities do not seem
to support that better understanding.
One can only view with apprehension
the number of military commitments of
the United States. I recently returned
from Germany. As an American, I would
not want to see soldiers of a foreign coun-
try walking up and down the streets of
St. Louis 25 years after the end of a war.
This psychology prevails around the
world today. [Deleted.]
So it seems some of these Laos opera-
tions should be examined, not only from
a strictly military point of view, but also
from the standpoint of diplomacy, inter-
national relations
I yield to the able minority leader.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I join the
distinguished Senator from Missouri in
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August 3, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE t2951
expressing the hope that as much as pos-
sible of the report of the two staff mem-
bers can be declassified.
I ask the Senator if it is not the fact
that in discussing the allegations regard-
ing the so-called massive U.S. bombings
in the north, the charge was the bombings
caused great losses among the civilian
Laos population and were principally re-
sponsible for the refugee problem in Laos..
Is it not a fact that the committee in-
vestigators do not come to the conclu-
sions I have stated? As a matter of fact,
they point out?while they treat it
briefly?it is my understanding, that
what they found was that while there
had been occasional injury to the civilian
population, there have been great efforts
to avoid it, and that the refugee problem
was due to many things, among which
the bombing was one. But generally these
two charges repeated in the press are not
actually borne out by the two staff
members,
Mr. SYMINGTON. The distinguished
minority leader has made a good point.
We do not know just ,how much damage
.has been done to the civilian population.
The people the staff members saw as-
sured them it was relatively little.
We have the B-52 raids. The staff was
told in Vientiane that there were
[deleted] raids in the first 4 months of
this year, as against [deleted] such raids
last year. Then we have fighter planes
us there. They use napalm as well as
bombs.
I would say that undoubtedly some of
the reports have been exaggerated.
In the report itself, the staff members
point out:
Given the apparent stringency of these
rules of engagement, ills difficult to see how
roads with civilian traffic, villages and groups
of civilians could have been bombed,
rocketed or napalmed. It seems clear, how-
ever, although the rules are stricter now
than they were souls years ago, that mistakes
do happen (especially when Forward Air
Controllers begin flying missions as soon as
they arrive in Lace); that some pilots have
deliberately violated the rules of engagement
expending ordnance against unauthorized
targets (the town of Khang Khay being a
notable example); and that the system itself
is so complicated that it cannot possibly be
foolproof. Indeed the effort to provide in
the rules of engagement for every contingency
. appears to create obvious loopholes. One is
the rule which allows ground fire to be re-
turned virtually anywhere in Laos when a
U.S. plane is participating in a search and
rescue operation or is flying in support of
infiltrating or exilltrating troops.
There are plenty of instances known to
American civilian employees who have been
in Laos for some years in which civilian
targets have been bombed. There is a certain
reluctance, especially on the part of the Air
Force, to admit that mistakes have happened
which tends to undermine the credibility of
official claims made about the infallibility of
the conduct of the air war in Laos. The
Embassy itself is quite insistent that the
rules are scrupulously observed. Yet it ap-
parently has no system for regular photo-
graphic rivew of the results of individual
strikes, although it can and does ask for
special photography if there is reason to be-
lieve a violation has occurred.
In the previous administration we
found our advisers were flying with South
Vietnamese pilots who could not speak
English and the advisers could not speak
Vietnamese: it is so often difficult to
know just what is going on. But I do feel
that any air activity around northern
Laos has in it the incipient danger of
? starting a major war.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, the Presi-
dent's report in March of 1970 points
out that the respective press conferences
of the 26th of September and 8th of De-
cember 1969 and 30th of January 1970,
had indicated a number of things, one
of which was:
That at the request of the Royal Laotiaia
Government, we have flown reconnaissance
missions in Northern Laos in support of the
Laotian government's effort to defend itself
against North Vietnamese aggression and
that we were engaged in some other activities.
Then he goes on to say:
Et would, of course, have posed no political
problem for me to have disclosed in greater
detail this military support activity which
had been initiated by two previous admin-
istrations and which have been continued
by this administration.
I have not considered It in the national
interest to do so because at our concern that
putting emphasis on American activities in
Laos might hinder the efforts of Prime Min-
ister Souvanna Phouma to bring about ad-
herence to the Geneva Agreements by the
Communist signatories.
That is part of what he said. Now,
in doing that, and in the speech, does
not the President recite the goals that
the Senator worries about today when
he says that we do not have a policy re-
garding Laos.
Then the whole speech of the Presi-
dent points back to the statements of
the other Presidents He says:
Our goal in Laos bus been and continues
to be to reduce American involvement and
not to increase it, to bring peace in accord-
ance with the 1962 itgreernent and not to
prolong the war.
He quotes earlier the statement of
President Kennedy in 1961:
Laos is far away from America, but the
world is small. The security of all Southeast
Asia will be endangered if Laos loses its
neutral independence.
When we put those two statements to-
gether, are they not the goals of three
successive administrations?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, dur-
ing the administration of President Ken-
nedy, I am sure his goal was also peace,
the same as other presidents.
With respect to tne statement made by
President Nixon, he talks about recon-
naissance. We are all looking at each
other. I am sure the Soviets take pictures
of the capital every day the weather is
good. And I am also sure we take pictures
of theirs.
What I was and am worried about,
however, was and is the nature and the
degree of combat involvement up in
northern Laos, much of it close to China.
It seems that now we all have the goal
of getting out as soon as possible. I do not
want to be sarcastic, but have never
understood how the best way to get out of
one country was to invade two other
countries?Cambodia and more recently
Laos. I would think the best way to
achieve the goals the minority leader pre-
sented would be to give fullest . ipport to
the Laotian Government.
Anyone who has been to L a would
say this present government -o aid fall
even faster than the Gmen ;r ants of
either South Vietnam or -a' mbodia
without this heavy support '1 ma the
United States.
Mr. SCOTT. But the Serif -.c r spoke
about the wide U.S. participati e and the
potential threat existing then
President Kennedy ordere( *.00 ma-
rines to that country in May 1 462. Did
President Kennedy ask the a isent of
Congress prior to going in the .! '.cith the
Marines?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I do not iow if he
made any specific request.
Mr. SCOTT. I supported it I-1
Mr. SYMINGTON. If we rr tce a mis-
take in 1962, or any other yea hat does
not justify another mistake t d Ly.
Mr. SCOTT. I was in favor 11 it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. At one hie I, too,
was in favor of many things :r the Far
East; but that was before I kr .v as much
about what we were and an C aing as I
know today.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. Presid( -1.1 will the
Senator yield to me?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I woul 1 te glad to
yield to the distinguished a al taut mi-
nority leader.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. Preside r this fol-
lows along on a, point inve v Id in the
colloquy with the distinguisl a minority
leader. Some reference was hide to the
fact that in his statement in VI Arch 1970,
President Nixon, in what I -ntnk was a
very candid and forthright 4. tement of
the situation and the facts r 4; rding our
involvement in Laos, not Li made it
clear that we have flown )i maissance
missions in northern Laos, 0 it he also
said:
We have continued to cond c air opera-
tions. Our first priority for et I operations
is to interdict the continued 'o v of troops
and supplies across Laotian te Ti tory on the
Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Then he says:
In addition to these air opt '3- tons on the
Ho Chi Minh Trail, we have c lntinued to
carry out reconnaissance Sigh m Northern
Laos and to fly combat suppo rissians for
Laotian forces when requested c 10 so by the
Royal Laotian Government.
At another point in this l atement of
March 1970, he Said:
Our support efforts have t' e one purpose
of helping prevent the men .n zed Laotian
government from being ot r Jaelmed by
larger Communist forces dot .2 ated by the
North Vietnamese.
It may be that the air Ca ri Oat support
missions?perhaps differe- .t; planes are
being used, perhaps they E, .7c in a differ-
ent place, but the fact that v were doing
more than conducting I 'e nmaissance
flights was no surprise t 1ongress in
March of 1970.
With the consent of the czstinguished
Senator from Missouri, 1w tO d ask unan-
imous consent that this er :k e statement
of President Nixbn of IV es th 1970, be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no object r.- the state-
ment was ordered to be rnted in the
RECORD, as follows:
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S 12952 Approved For Relemdficg/MINApliM/BBOO600300080080-3
SCOPE OF THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LAOS
A STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON 1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
In light of the increasingly massive- pres
ence of North Vietnamese troops and thei
recent offensives in Laos, I have written let
ters today to British Prime Minister Wilso
and Soviet Premier Kosygin asking their hal
in restoring the 1962 Geneva agreements fo
that country.2
As cochairman of that conference, th
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union hay
particular responsibilities for seeing that it
provisions are honored. My letters note th
persistent North Vietnamese violations of th
accords and their current offensives, suppor
the Laotian Prime Minister's own current
appeal to the coch,airmen for consultations
urge the cochairmen to work with other
egnatories of the Geneva accords, and pledge
ale United States cooperation.
Hanoi's most recent military buildup in
Laos has been particularly escalatory. They
have poured over 13,000 additional troops
into Laos during the past few months, rais-
ing their total in Laos to over 67,000. Thirty
North Vietnamese battalions from regular
units participated in the current
campaign in the Plain of Jars with tanks,
armored cars, and long-range artillery. The
ndigeneus Laotian Communists, the Pathet
Lao. are playing an insignificant role.
North Viet-Nam's military escalation In
; ,aos has intensified public discussion in this
'nun-try, The purpose of this statement Is to
eat forth the record of what we found in
January 1E/69 and the policy of this admin-
istration since that time.
. WHAT WE FOUND
,i. The 1962 Accords
When we came into office, this adrninistra-
eon found a highly precarious situation in
Laos. Its basic legal framework had been es-
tablished by the 1962 accords entered into by
tile Kennedy administration.
Laos has been a battleground for most of
the past 20 years. In 1949 it became a semi-
independent state within the French Union.
The Pathet Lao Communists rebelled against
tile government in the early 1950's and fight-
ing continued until the 1954 Geneva settle-
ments ended the Indochina war. Taos at that
time became an independent neutral state.
The indigenous Communists, the Pathet Lao,
nevertheless retained control of the two
northern provinces.
Since then, this small country has been the
victim of persistent subversion, and finally
invasion, by the North Vietnamese.
fly 1961, North Vietnamese involvement
became marked, the Communist forces made
great advances, and a serious situation con-
fronted the Kennedy administration. In his
news conference of March 1961, President
Kennedy said, "Laos is far away from Ameri-
ca, but the world is small. . . . The security
of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if
Laos loses its neutral independence.",
in May 1961, negotiations for a Laotian
settlement opened in Geneva. with Governor
[W. Averell] Harriman as the chief American
negotiator. During the course of those long
negotiations, fighting continued and the
Communists made further advances. Faced
with a potential threat to Thailand, Presi-
dent Kennedy ordered 5,000 marines to that
country in May 1962.
Finally, in July 1962, after 14 months of
negotiations. 14 nations signed the Geneva
accords providing for the neutralization of
iseued at Key Bisoayne, Fla., on Mar. 6
(White House press release):
Par texts of the Declaration on the Neu-
tralitysos and an accompanying proto- p
col, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259. a
2 For President Kennedy's news conference F,
en Mar. 23, 1961, see Public Papers of the g
Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 213.
- SENATE August 3, 1971
? tans. Other signatories besides the Unite
States included the Soviet Union, Corr
munist China, North Viet-Nam, the Unite
Kingdom, France, the Southeast Asia .iation
August 3, 1971
The Prime Minister is now once again try-
ing ?to obtain consultations among all the
parties to the Geneva accords, envisaged
under article 4 when there is a violation of
Lao sovereignty, independence, neutrality, or
territorial integrity.
In this situation, bur purposes remain
straightforward.
We are trying above all to save American
and Allied lives in South Viet-Nam, which
are threatened by the continual Infiltration
of North Vietnamese troops and supplies
along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Hanoi has in-
filtrated over 100,000 men through Laos since
this administration took office, and over
500,000 altogether. Our airstrikes have de-
stroyed weapons and supplies over the past
4 years which would have taken thousands of
American lives.
We are also supporting the independence
and neutrality of Laos as set forth in the
1962 Geneva agreements. Our assistance has
always been at the request of the legitimate
government of Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma, which the North Vietnamese helped
establish; it is directly related to North Viet-
namese violations of the agreements.
We continue to be hopeful of eventual
progress in the negotiations in Paris. But
serious doubts are raised as to Hanoi's inten-
tions if it is simultaneously violating the
Geneva agreements on Laos, which we
reached with them largely on the basis of
their own proposals. What we do in Laos has
thus as its aim to bring about conditions for
progress toward peace in the entire Indo-
chinese Peninsula.
I turn now to the precise nature of our aid
to Laos.
In response to press conference questions
on September 26, December El, and January 30,
I have indicated:,
That the United States has no ground com-
bat forces in Laos.
That there were 50,000 North Vietnamese
troops in Laos and ?that "more perhaps are
coming."
That at the request of the Royal Laotian
Government, which was set up by the Geneva
accords of 1962, we have provided logistical
and other assistance to that Government for
the purpose of helping it to prevent the Com-
munist conquest of Laos.
That we have used airpower for the pur-
pose of interdicting the flow of North Viet-
namese troops and supplies on that part of
the Ho Chi Minh Trail which runs through
Laos.
That at the request of the Royal Laotian
Government, we have flown reconnaissance
missions in northern Laos in support of the
Laotian Government's efforts to defend itself
against North Vietnamese aggression and
that we were engaged in "some other
activities."
It would, of course, have posed no political
problem for me to have disclosed in greater
detail those military support activities which
had been initiated by two previous adminis-
trations and which have been continued by
this administration.
Approved F:,rolkatIgsiefg/n/WE:61012_Pgi?png6R000300080080-3 12953
Because these reports are grossly inaccu-
rate, I have concluded that our national in-
terest will be served by putting the subject
into perspective througn a precise descrip-
tion of our current activities in Laos.
These are the facts:
There are no American
troops in Laos.
We have no plans for introducing ground
combat forces into Law.
The total number of Americana directly
employed by the U.S. Government in Laos is
616. In addition, there are 424 Americans em-
ployed on contract to the Government or to
Government contractors. Of these 1,040
Americans, the total number, military and
civilian, engaged in R military advisory or
military training capacity numbers 320.
Logistics personnel number 323.
No American stationed in Laos has ever
been killed in ground combat operations.
U S ersonnel in Laos during the past year
ground combat
whelmed by larger Communist
nated by the North Vietnames.
We will continue to give t
people the fullest possible inf
our involvement, consistent y
security.
I hope that a genuine quest
Indochina can now begin For I
require the efforts of the Gene
06ChairMen and the signatory
But most of all it will requir
reasonableness from Hanoi. 1
North Vietnamese, not we. wl
latecl the lighting. Today the
North Vietnamese troops in thi
try. There are no American
Hanoi is not threatened by
risks only when it moves it:
borders.
We desire nothing more in
see a return to the Geneva as
the withdrawal of North Vietr
I ces domi-
e American
S 12954 Approved For RVefNeSglgg/.08/01 ? CJA;RIOR731300296R000300080080-3
AL KEWItll ? SENATE August 3, 1971
Appropriations at the time of the death
of Senator Bridges of New Hampshire
That would take it back to the late fall
of 1962, I believe it was, or perhaps Jan-
uary 1963.
I must say to my friend that I have
seen him in committee meetings and I
have sat with him for many hours in
committee hearings of that particular
committee. I do not refer to the Com-
mittee on Armed Services or the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations because I
am not a member of either of those
committees. ?
ut this Senator has been aware of the
situa opeeng on in mathern Laos, I
ani. certain ]mostall the time since I
hi-FeTh-Feri. on the Defense Subcommittee.
1' 'thinkduring all this time also the
construction of the road has been under
way, and I can remember back as long
as 4 or 5 years ago in the hearings when
the fortifications in the defense of that
road were discussed at some length in
that committee.
The point of this is that really I am
not sure. Perhaps the Senator from Mis-
souri did not know these things. But I
think if he mats his mind back, he wilr
Tecalr discussions or particularly the
Prirria' Jars situation and Prince Sou-
vanna Ph5Urila, Tt trre-sengeor happened
to be present at the Defense Subcommit-
feeThTerrings at that time.
am not surehe was present. Of course
i he is busy and he does not attend all of
the hearings, but I know this Senator
never had any communication with the
1 Secretary of Defense or any of the sub-
secretaries at that time and the only
1 place I could have possibly found out this
information was in the Defense Sub-
committee on Appropriations. I think it
'1 is wise to keep this in mind.
Did the Senator say he had no aware-
ness of the road until 1967?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I neve said any-
thing like that?have known about this
road for a long time?but if the Senator
from Colorado knew about B-52's operat-
ing in northern Laos in any quantity, he
had information I did not have.
Mr. ALLOTT. No, the Senator did not
mention B-52's. I am talking about
general support.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The B-52 happens
to be the largest strategic jet airplane in
the world today.
Mr. ALLOTT. I know. I have seen
them, too.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The staff report.
states:
D. Chinese Forces. The number of Chi-
nese forces along the road they are building
In northern Laos has increased from be-
tween 6,000 and 8,000, the figure given the
Subcommittee two years ago, to somewhere
between 14,000 and 20,000.
The Chinese have also moved in a heavy
new increment of radar-directed anti-air-
craft weapons, increasing the number by 100 s
in the last six to seven months to the present t
total of 395, including for the first time guns
of 85mm and 100mm, the latter said to be t
snfective up to 68,000 feet. Since early 1970,
they have also [deleted]. Of the Chinese a
r..00ps along the road, those who hold to the
lower figure of 14,000 say that between 3,000 t
anti 8,500 are members of anti-aircraft crews e
and the rest construction workers while g
I,hose who give the higher estimate say that
anti-aircraft crews total 6,000 to 7,000.
As a result of recent wo:rk done on th
road it will be a matorable all-weather sur
faae dual-lane highway by August all th
way from the Chinese border to Muong Hues'al-?hough there has been no extension of th
road past Muong Huon since February 1970
In addition to upgrading earlier road con
struction, the Chinese have, since Novembe
1970, constructed eight small arms iiring
ranges of a kind normally associated with
garrisons of ground troops as well as large
headquarters buildings and 66 basketball
Courts. There are 154 camps along the road.
The western branch of the :road still erais 45
miles from Pak Beng on the Mekong River,
some 20 miles from Thailand. On the eastern
leg of the road, only a bridge or ferry across-
the River Ou needs to be built to connect
with the road which has been reconstructed
from Dienbienphu into Laos.
The point made is that I received no
information about this from any cem-
mittee; and there is a heavy additional
number of Chinese, who possibly are
military, placed into northern Laos.
There could be a confrontation.
Mr. ALLOT. This matter has been
discussed before in that subcommiteee;
not with respect to the B-52's but with
respect to the Chinese coming in and
building the road.
Mr. SYMINGTON. That road develop-
ment has been known for many years.
We are talking about a difference in de-
gree, not in kind.
Mr. ALLOTT. The document on aur
des lea states there were 6,000 troops there.
Mr. SYMINGTON. A simple way to
handle this would be to get the testi-
mony from the committee.
Mr. ALLOTT. I think the record is
there, and I do IST s-Wirli -this moment
12...aa.4s b fEirin7;tter as ifeit
all has come i.qme'grfew months.
SYMINGTON. Excefit for the ex-
tensive use of B-52's in northern Laos,
that was not my intention.
Mr. ALLOTT. It simply is not true.
Mr. ING . e e;Pr TITEFFe-si-
dene's statement from which the able
minority leader was reading also stated:
We will continue to give the American
people the fullest possible information Co
our Involvement consistent with national
security.
e the Senator will yield, I have already
made the point that last year, with the
cooperation of the Senator, a restriction
was put on the money to be used for
military assistance in Southeast Asia by
_ the Armed Forces. The Senator said that
r $2.5 billion was appropriated: $2.8 bil-
lion was originally authorized. This lan-
guage was added to the Department of
Defense authorization and appropriation
bills:
Nothing in clause (a) of the first sentence
hereunder shall be construed as authorizing
the use of any such funds to support Viet-
namese or other Free World forces in actions
designed to provide military support and
assistance to the governments of Cambodia
or Laos.
When we struggled over that language
here, we thought it would have some sig-
nificance; that it would be an effective
restriction against using money to pay,
for example, for the [deleted] Thai
troops now being paid to fight in Laos.
The question was raised in the course
'of that debate that perhaps such costs
were paid by the CIA, which raises an
extremely important point about the
CIA.
Whenever we restrict the use of money
to be spent by the Defense Department
in any specific way, such as we did here,
then we find that funds are used by the
CIA. There funds are carried in appro-
priation bills but not in any line item.
When we set that kind of restriction,
Senators would logically conclude that
the restriction would apply to the CIA.
Originally the CIA was supposed to be
an intelligence agency. Now, by a proc-
ess of osmosis, the CIA has become
another Defense Department, if we ac-
cept this situation, and, furthermore, a
Defense Department that we cannot
restrict.
We put in a restriction that money
cannot be used to pay for Thai troops to
tight in Laos, but it has been reduced to
an absolute absurdity if all the executive
brahch has to do is take the money out
of the CIA without our knowledge. It has
been said that we all know about what
1;he CIA is doing. I have been on the CIA
oversight committee, and I have never
seen any detailed figures whatever.
Often the briefings are about how many
missiles the Russians have. When we
ask about specific operations, they say
they are too secret, they can only re-
port to the National Security Council,
which means to the President.
There is a lot that I did not know
about specifically in Laos. I did not
know they were still paying for [deleted]
Thai troops and intended to continue
doing so. I thought that was prohibited
by law. I still think, by any reasonable
interpretation by a Member of Congress,
that it is.
Nobody knows that, the money has
come from the CIA, unless the chairman
of the Appropriations Committee knows.
He may be privy to knowledge nobody
else has, They do not give- out this in-
formation. I would say, by any interpre-
tation of the law, the executive branch
is in violation of the law.
Mr. HART. May I 'address a further
question? Let us assume that the reach
That is a fine expression of what I te-
lieve essential.
I yield to the able Senator from Michi-
gan 3.1.2r. HART)
Me. HART. Mr. President, perhaps I
am the only one here who has this ques-
tion, but before we close perhaps my
question could be clarified. That is the
reason why I intrude.
Putting aside the question of the
prudence of bombing so close to China,
and what happened in 19(35 or 1967,
twice I got the impression that it is sug-
gested that the executive branch has
violated our law. Before we adjourn, w11omeone please explain to .m.e if that is
he position?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
he Senator yield to me for a. comment
Mr. SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as the
tither of the amendment discussed ea
he distinguished chairman of the For-
ign Relations Committee, I would sug -
est that he answer the Senator from
Michigan.
Mr FULBRIGHT. Mr President,
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August 3,
of our statutory language extends to
CIA.
Does the discussion and debate abodt
whether this northern activity is a
separate war or whether it is a part of
what we generally describe as the war in
Vietnam have a bearing on the question
of whether the law has been violated,
even assuming that this language reaches
the CIA? Is it not true that we made
provision in that appropriation that the
restraint we were imposing on the use of
the moneys was not to be itgarded as
restraining its use if such use was re-
quired to protect our own people in Viet-
nam? Is the point about whether there
is one war or two wars in Laos part and
parcel of the argument over whether the
law has been violated?
Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say to the
Senator that it seems to me to be clear
the executive branch has no right, under
the law, to support [deleted] Thai troops
in Laos. The chairman has answered
that.
The Senator's second question is a
nicer question. The relevant language
in the Department of Defense Appro-
priation Act reads:
Nothing contained in this section shall be
construed to prohibit support of actions re-
quired to insure the safe and orderly with-
drawal or disingagement of U.S. forces from
Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of
Americans held as prisoners of war.
Under those circumstances, I would
say you would have to stretch pretty far
relating getting out of Vietnam to mak-
ing these attacks in northern Laos.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me?
Mr. SYMINGTON. May I just com-
plete this thought?
Mr. STENNIS. Oh, excuse me.
Mr. SYMINGTON. In the letter that
was written to Chairman Fulbright by
Secretary Abshire he tells us:
We believe that it has been made clear
that it is not a question of United States sup-
port for regular Thai forces In Laos. The
irregular forces involved, while raised and
trained in Thailand, are all one-year volun-
teers who go to Laos to serve under the com-
mand of the Royal Lao government; in this
case the Lao Military Region II Commander.
The guerilla forces are therefore considered
to be local forces in Laos.
I am sorry the able Senator from Colo-
rado (Mr. ALLoTT) left the floor, because
he mentioned what has come up in the
Appropriations Committee. There is no-
body more diligent in finding out just
what happens to the American taxpay-
ers' money than the chairman of that
committee who is now on the floor. Sure,
we discussed the fact the Chinese were
building roads in Laos. Sure, we discussed
planes going up North But we had no
idea of the magnitude of the operations,
from the standpoint, for example, of
their recently installed antiaircraft de-
fenses against our planes; or about the
additional number of people?possibly
military?they were putting around these
roads, and the building of roads that we
had no idea would be this type and
character of roads, the -building of ad-
ditional roads, and so forth.
So again I say, when you get into this
type and character of discussion, there
should be a recognition of the degree of
change, for example scores of B-52 raids
instead of one.
Mr. HART. I appreciate the help the
Senator has given. I repeat, I would hope
that all of us could resolve the very pre-
cise question: has there been a violation
of law?
The other question is largely a matter
of judgment ?that is. what is or is not
helpful in withdrawing from Vietnam.
Because we can operate only behind
closed doors on a matter like this, we
should either stay until all of us under-
stand the answer to the first question?
the question of whether there has been a
violation of the law?or resolve that no
one will say a blessed word, because all
of the screaming about law and order in
this country is talking about something
miniscule if in fact it is established that
one branch of the Government ignores
the law of the lawmakers.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator will
yield, I would put into the Record at this
time the details as to what has actually
been going on with respect to Thai troops
in Laos. Let us remember that if we are
supporting Thai troops in Laos, that
violates the law.
The staff report states:
At the time of our visit to Long Tieng on
April 28, there were [ deleted] Thai there,
at the nearby base of Sam Thong, and at
Hill 1663 near Sam Thong. (There was also
a -small Thai team of I deleted] men at Nam
Yu in Military Region I.) The Thai irregu-
lars are under [deleted] and the overall com-
mand of General Vang Pao, Commander of
Military Region II. Of these [deleted].
Most of the irregulars have been recruited,
we were told, as a "volunteer" force outside
the Thai Army although [deleted]. The Thai
irregular program developed during the past
year and was designed by the CIA specifically
along the lines of the irregular program in
Laos. The CIA supervises and pays for the
training of these irregulars in Thailand and
provides their salary, allowances (including
death benefits) and operational costs in Laos.
We were told that the details of the funding
were not known in Vientiane, as all of this
bookkeeping Is done in Washington. We were
also told, however, that some of the funds
probably come from the Defense Depart-
ment budget. The pay and allowances of the
Thai irregulars are said to be less than those
of regular Thai Army personnel [deleted].
The Thai irregulars are transported from
Thailand to Laos by Mr America and are
returned to Thailand when their tours are
up again by Air America. We were told that
the Embassy wanted to [deleted] the [de-
leted] with [deleted] -because the [deleted]
were more mobile and thus "could do things
the others could not do." As for the future
[Deleted.] The need for Thal "volunteers"
results from the fact that the military man-
power base in Laos is estimated to be 114,765
and the Lao Army. neutralist army, Irregulars
and Pathet Lao all must draw from this base
which is now exhausted. (General yang Pao's
forces, for example, have suffered 3,272 killed
and 5,426 wounded since 1967; as a result
40% of his forces are no longer Meo but Lao
Thung.) Thus additional military manpower
can only come from outside Laos, Estimates
of the number of additional [deleted]. We
also understand that there have been inter-
-mittent discussions regarding the possibility
of [deleted].
Incidentally, we asked what motivated Thai
to volunteer for the irregular forces in Laos
In light of the heavy losses some units have
suffered. We were told that the principal
motivation was [deleted].
Those are the facts as g ven in Laos
to our staff members. Im i quite clear
that at least the spirit, am -3 in our opin-
ion the letter, of the law -a re both con-
travened when we put th( inercenaries
from Thailand into Laos.
Several Senators addrc e tithe Chair.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am Jad to yield
to the able Senator fr r. Mississippi,
chairman of the Senate r ned Services
Committee.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank a Senator. On
the question raised by th i'.enator from
Michigan, the Senator r-m Missouri
has, of course, correctly _1 the law as
stated in the authorizatir ict, which is
Public Law 91-441, Octob r 1, 1970.
However, that same a ,lguage was
brought forward in the y .1propriation
bill, and some will recal. t mat the lan-
guage in the act of Oct ,b r 1970, was
restated in the approp y iron bill of
January 1971, with this -1 rther provi-
sion:
Provided further, that n- b ng contained
in this section shall be cons -1' -d to prohibit
support of actions required ''isure the safe
and orderly withdrawal or c 3( i7igagement of
U.S. forces from Southeast or to aid in
the release of Americans he: prisoners of
war.
In other words, it ties h cc in again to
the condition regarding :c ping in the
withdrawal or disengag -mnt of U.S.
forces from Southeast .
So we have gone back -r d completed
the cycle, now, with ret at nice to lan-
guage. I wanted to make at comment
because it is relevant.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I ay -elate that. I
had intended to bring the p and would
say two things:
We knew about the lam cage. It is in
the record. But it is nm I the position
taken by the State Demi- 'ant in their
letter to the chairman F. the Foreign
Relations Committee. It ir r?-ally stretch-
ing one's imagination a k tm way to jus-
tify, for example. B- raids over
northern Laos or napaln r-; villages in
northern Laos, as someth: g necessary to
insure the safe and orderl: r ithdrawal of
U.S. forces from Southe sm. Asia or the
release of Americans held a prisoners of
war in these various counr s which once
composed French Indochi
The irony is, and I am Id id to note it
is becoming more of an it 1; a with many
of those most closely con' ci ted with the
POW problem, that if w 1 :ere to set a
date to get out of this wa think prob-
ably we would automat] a ly solve the
problem of meaningful a id practical
negotiations incident to ,1 e release of
these American prisoners II: we did that,
we would -also save the ti ?ri .ayers of the
United States many adc L. mal billions
needed so badly in other .) aces, and at
the same time?to me b ar the most
important?save the unr ,.( :issary addi-
tional loss of American :1, other lives,
the lives of their militar: nd civilians.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr ? esident, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I y.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Th 3enator has
already read Ambassa io Sullivan's
statement, but it ought tt p n along with
this statement of the a a .tor. This is
Ambassador Sullivan's at t' -ment before
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august 3, 1971
the Refugee Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary:
The refugees in Laos are those whose lives
have been disrupted by the other war In Laos,
which has nothing to do with military opera-
tions in South Vietnam or Cambodia.
Surely, that makes clear what the ad-
ministration's view is with regard to the
war in northern Laos.
Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator
for yielding. I did not know he had quoted
that law.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to the Sen-
ator from New Jersey.
Mr. CASE. I want to express my thanks
to the Senator from Missouri for his
initiative in trying to get to the bottom
of this question of Laos. I also express
my thanks to the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee staff members who have been
enormously helpful in bringing the mat-
ter to our attention.
My only contribution on the point, if
I have any to make, is this:
What we should be most concerned
about is finding the best course of action
for our country to follow in Laos. We
should not overemphasize maintaining
the dignity of the Senate or placing the
question in dry, legalistic terms. Of
course, we must be concerned with pre-
serving the proper constitutional role of
the Senate. But our main purpose should
be to avoid unnecessary strife, suffering,
bloodshed, and catastrophe in Southeast
Asia.
That is why it is terribly important to
get the facts out, so that a judgment
on this matter can be made by Congress
and by the people. If the President's ac-
tions in Laos are necessary in order to
end the war in South Vietnam more
quickly, then his contention should be
tested. We shall never be able to judge
this unless the facts get out, and that is
what we are after. We are trying to find
out the truth.
do not think it is terribly important
whether or not there is a technical viola-
tion of the regulations or the limitations
placed in appropriation and authoriza-
tion bills, so long as we can get the facts
out. It certainly was not the purpose of
Congress in drafting these limitations to
hamstring the President in order to
glorify the Senate. That was not the
point. The point was that the Senate did
not think it was a good idea for the
United States to hire men to fight in
Laos, whether they be regular Thai
troops, whether they be irregular Thais,
or whether they be from Timbuktu. We
thought the idea of mercenaries was bad,
and that is why we put the prohibition
in the law.
I am not terribly interested in whether
the administration, by calling the Thai
troops irregulars, successfuly avoided
that prohibition in a legal way. I am
deeply concerned that the administra-
tion placed the Thai troops in Laos, and
in that way extended the war. Not that
the administration did not think it was
doing the right thing. Of course, it
thought so. I think the administration
was mistaken, and the American people
should have the facts to decide whether
or not a mistake was made.
The ultimate purpose of our inquiry
this afternoon, I suggest, should be what
Mr. Moose and Mr. Lowenstein concluded
in their report about the future of Laos.
Where are we going from here? How are
we going to get out of this thing? To an-
swer these questions we need the in-
formation. I hope it will be possible at
least for the concluding sections of the
report to be put verbatim in the public
record as early as possible, so- the country
can talk about Laos in these terms. The
people do not want to hear any more as
to whether the President exceeded his
authority or violated the rights of Con-
gress. Few in the country at large care
about the rights of Congress or whether
the President has exceeded his author-
ity? We want to stop the lighting. That
is wnat the people are interested in, and
that is why we need the facts.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the able
Senator from New Jersey for his typi-
cally constructive remarks; and agree
with the first part of what he said with-
out reservation?namely, that what we
should do is try to get the facts. That was
the basic thrust of the request for this
closed session. Let us have the truth.
But I cannot agree entirely with the
second part?that it would seem rela-
tively unimportant whether or not the
law nas been contravened. The Senate's
position is important, just as is the posi-
tion of the executive branch. The posi-
tion of Congress is important.
Based on our slowly increasing knowl-
edge of developments in this situation,
we thereupon interpreted in practical
fashion what the distinguished Senator
from New Jersey referred to and passed
a law. It is important, as the Senator
from Michigan requested, to find out
whether or not that law has been vio-
lated. Otherwise, we continue on tne
.basis of the Congress saying, You should
not do it," but the executive branch say-
ing, 'We are going to do it." There is no
way, as I see it, that we can prevent vio-
lations unless we uphold the dignity of
the Senate by finding out whether or not
the law was contravened. To me that
also?with deference to the Senator
from New Jersey?is an important aspect
of this situation. Otherwise, why are we
here', If we pass a law and -the law can
be honored in the breach, what real
reason is there to be a Senator of the
United States.
I have never questioned the sincerity
or patriotism of any Senator. Under the
Constitution, however, we have the rig:et
by majority to put up the money for what
is going on in the Far East and all over
the world; or not to put it up.
We have the right to find out whether
or not a law we passed has been con-
travened. Otherwise we are just figure-
heads here, with not position of authorii; y
despite the specifics of that authority
in the Constitution.
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my frieni
from New Jersey.
Mie CASE. I am sure the Senator
recognizes that I was just emphasizing
the question about which I felt we shoMd
be most concerned.
I did not mean that the constitutional
provisions as to the rights and powers
of tl e several branches of government
are not important. All I was trying to get
at was: why are they important? Not be-
cause of the dignity of the individual;
not because of the dignity of the Senate
as such; but because the Founding
Fathers thought, and I agree, that the
separation of powers is deeply important
to the continuation of democratic gov-
ernment and to the maintenance of
peace. That is all I was talking about.
What I was trying to do was to carry
this beyond the dry question of whether
the Senate's power and authority had
been abused and neglected; whether or
not we had been brushed aside. The con-
stitutional question is important, of
course--but not so much in itself, or not
because it affects individually the Sena-
tor from Missouri, the Senator from
Arkansas, or anyone else. By this time,
most of us have passed the point of
worrying about matters such as that. We
should be concerned that these abuses
have taken place because they lead, in
this instance, and in general, to the kind
of danger to the peace we are all con-
cerned about.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the Senator
from New Jersey for those comments.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Missouri yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I want to agree with the
senior Senator from Michigan, and also
with the Senator from Missouri, that
whether the President has violated the
law is important and is not to be passed
over lightly.
Because of that, I want to be sure that
the case on the other side is at least
adequately presented, at least as I see it,
because I do not believe there was any
violation.
The Senator from Mississippi has al-
ready pointed to the language. The pro-
viso says that
* * * nothing contained In this sec-
tion shall be construed as prohibiting sup-
port of actions required to insure safe and
orderly withdrawal or disengagement of
'United States forces from Southeast Asia.
Reasonable men can surely differ as
to whether this action?whatever it
was?was related to getting our men out
of Southeast Asia. A very good case can
be made that it is very important and
that it means a lot. But aside from that,
I think it should be clear that this lan-
guage, limiting the appropriations in the
Defense Department, prohibited the use
of Thai forces providing support in
Laos.
There is no question, I suppose, under
the language here, that if the Thai Gov-
ernment sent forces into Laos under a
Thai military command, -and they
fought, that there would be a violation.
But are we going to say that the Laos
military command cannot recruit volun-
teers--if they were volunteers, and I
take it there has been no real contention
with the fact that they were volunteers--
should limit the recruiting of troops in
its own country? Should it not also be
pointed out that those Thais who were
recruited and fought under the com-
mand of Laotians--not a Thai mili-
tary command?were, for the most part,
ethnic Laotians? While it is true they
were recruited from Thailand, they
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were ethnic Laotians. In other words, Mr. SYMINGTON. Based on our in-
blood cousins. They have more than a vestigations, we cannot be sure of the
pecuniary interest in what happens in source for all these funds. Certainly a
Laos. lot came from the CIA. Based on the
That fact has not been brought out. statements made to our staff, some ap-
It should be emphasized parently came from the Department of
Now, taking those two things together, Defense. In an effort to answer the pos-
and also the fact that this was a limita- sibility of a question today. "So what?",
tion on the Defense Department appro- I will, as I have said, introduce an
priation, it had nothing to do with the amendment which will limit the amount
CIA. The CIA has been in there for a of money that can be used in Laos, un-
number of years, as has already been less the administration presents its case
brought out. to Congress for more money and gives
There is a good case for the proposi- the reasons why more money is neces-
tion that there has been no violation. sary than what has been requested, with
Whether some further change in the law a ceiling in the coming fiscal year of $200
should be made is a matter for the million.
Senate to consider in the future, but Mr. CRANSTON. What was the total
I want the record to have the case on the sum appropriated in fiscal year 1971 for
other side, and I believe it is a persuasive the CIA?
case. Mr. SYMINGTON. That figure, I be-
Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, Mr. Pre,si- lieve, is not one that anyone in the
dent, the able Senator from Michigan Congress could give at this time. The
has made his case. I wish I could agree total figure, however, is a great deal more
with him, but cannot, based on the rec- than what we are discussing; that is,
ord which I have read about these Thai the total of what we are spending in
forces in Laos. Laos.
A volunteer is someone who wants to Mr. CRANSTON. My question relates
do something, generally in case of war, at to the sum that the Senator stated were
a sacrifice to himself..These Thais in Laos spent, presumably authorized for these
were recruited in Thailand. Their costs Purposes. I wondered if that would consti-
are paid for by the CIA--salaries, allow- t te a. substantial portion of the CIA
ances. They are flown into Laos in
American planes. If wounded, they are
evacuated by Americans to a U.S. Air
Force field hospital in northern Thai-
land?and so forth. The [ e e e
pointed out that by going into Laos and taxpayers pay for intelligence each year.
[deleted]. So I do not see how anyone The amount the CIA places into its Laos
operations is not so great, in my opinion,
budget or if it is an infinitesimal amount?
Mr. SYMINGTON. It is a substantial
amount although interestingly enough,
the total CIA budget is a relatively small
amount of the total bill the American
can call them volunteers in the true sense
of the word. that it endangers their operating Oft-
However, this, no doubt, is an honest ciently, as they generally do, in other
difference of opinion, and I appreciate parts of the world.
knowing the Senator's position. Mr. CRANSTON I am not probing to
know how these sums are allocated
Mr. FULBRIGHT. On that last ques- within the CIA budget. I am interested
tion, apparently the Thais are not re- in how many Senators know how much
cruited by the Lao Government but are money is available to the CIA.
recruited by the CIA and the Thai Croy- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in
ernment in Thailand. It was never sug- that connection we have the chairman of
gested to our staff members at any time the CIA Subcommittee on the floor. I
while they were there that these are would yield to him to determine if he
ethnic Lao who want to go back and de- would answer that question.
fend their homeland. That was never sug- Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I think
gested by anyone in the field. the Senator from Missouri is correct.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will Wp do not have enough facts here to say
the Senator from Missouri yield? whether there is any CIA money that
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield was used in this matter.
to the able Senator from California. Mr. SYMINGTON. We do know that
Mr. CRANSTON. In pursuing the ques- CIA money was and is used. We believe
tion that the Senator from Michigan we know that a large amount was used.
?brought up, which I think is a helpful The CIA runs the most effective military
contribution to seek to clarify what had operation being run in Laos today. And
happened in relation to the will of the they run it with money we here both au-
Senate and in the event the will of the thorized and appropriated. As to what
Senate was violated, it would be helpful percentage that money is of the total
to know what funds were used for that amount obtained, that is a question the
purpose. It was unclear to me what has chairman could answer better than I.
been used thus far. As pointed out by the Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, it has
Senator from Mississippi, the Senator not been established that direct military
from Missouri and others, funds have money was used here. I think rather than
been transferred from one place to an- put the total amount for Laos in here as
other, an estimate or a guess, it would be better
Does the Senator know for a fact that to get the accurate figures.
the funds were CIA funds, or does the Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, may
'Senator know for a fact that the funds the Senator from California ask the
were from funds appropriated for the Senator from Mississippi a question?
Defense Department under the Military Does ?the Senator know whether CIA
Procurement Act but used for other funds were part of the funds we ?have
?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. Pre; jut, I am
doubtful about it, frankly. I ,tri-doubtful
about it, as to this milita operation,
from what I have heard her ' ?.i.t I think
the facts can be establisl c And we
ought to get them, not at F;; moment,
but it ought to be establisl Nr in a firm
way so that we would knov
Mr. CRANSTON. I woul ? ike to re-
peat one question that hak t, t been an-
swered yet. What Senate' know how
much th tal appropriat o is for the
seeret.
. Is it to ecret What
Senators know? I am not a ;k ng the fig-
ures as yet. I am asking v 1-r. ,t Senators
know that figure. How ni ty Senators
know?
Mr. STENNIS. Well, Ik ov it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I knc The chair-
man of the Appropriatio Committee
and the chairman of the 'c-eign. Rela-
tions Committee also km as well as
several other Senators no, in the floor
who are members of the A subcom-
mittee.
I put in the record of t ID closed ses-
sion the CIA money estim It 1 to be used
in the overall operation o t tis clandes-
tine Laotian war?I-delete( 3 'nfilion.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. 3 rt sident, that
question, it seems to me, very impor-
tant. Most, if not all, of t e money is
carried within the militar udget with-
out anyone being able to (I( ntify it. We
put in a restriction that ra n oney should
be used in this military ; ,,:.stance pro-
gram for a particular pur c ;e. If we are
going to accept the princir e aiat because
CIA is not specifically t terttioned, be-
cause it is not mentioned i ywhere, the
executive branch can do vii lever it likes
to ?evade the restriction. i e restriction
is or becomes a complete illity.
What is the sense of th mate acting
If that is going to be tl result? It is
rather difficult to work ( ti this kind of
restriction. We spent a I( I if time on it
and came up with a null 3, and a farce.
It is farcical, it is idiotic t bring in an
amendment saying that .e do not want
something done if the lendment is
ignored. The Senator fr ,n New Jersey
said that we are against 'i ring mercen-
aries in Laos. The Congi 's agreed. The
President signed the bill h to law. Then
it turns out that the CIA It s done things
that violate the amendn t I.
It seems to me that au o ?havior of not
just the Senate and not t st the Senate
committees concerned o t the whole
legislative body makes .c sense. When
two or three Senators s v they know, I
am surprised they are positive.
Mr. SYMINGTON. IA a tile question
whether we know the ov t a amount?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nc 1 le question is
how much money the 1 used.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I it etecil million
was that figure? I do n 't wish to criti-
cize the Central Inte114 i e Agency for
their operations in Laos T le CIA did not
want to conduct this vv It is an intel-
ligence agency, not an a e icy to conduct
war, rather to collect in igence.
They have been givt -.. the authority
and the instructions inc jut to the con-
duct of this war in Lao- ? rid as a result,
purposes? discussed this afternoon
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the Senate knows little or nothing about
its conduct as compared to what we know
about the conduct of the war in Cam-
bodia and Vietnam, as well as operations
of our military forces in other parts of
the world, where matters are directed
from the Pentagon.
At times I have had my suspicions
as to why this Laotian war was given
to this intelligence agency instead of to
the regular channels of military control
under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The CIA is not
doing anything they have not been di-
rected to do by the National Security
Council. None of this is intended as
criticism of the CIA. It is a criticism of
the conduct of the overall war which is
a responsibility of the Congress and the
executive.
The question is whether the Congress
can have any influence upon the con-
duct of the war. Can it do what the Sena-
tor from New Jersey said, say that we
want to prohibit the employment of mer-
cenaries in Laos?
cannot think of any language more
specific than that which the Congress
passed and the President signed into law
last year. What we are faced with is the
question of whether the executive branch
can evade that prohibition by using CIA
money in part or in all.
The staff heard that part of this
money for Thai troops came from regu-
lar Defense Department funds and part
from CIA.
I have known, and several Senators
have known, about this secret army. Mr.
Helms testified about it.
Deleted].
He gave the impression of being
more candid than most of the people we
have had before the committee in this
whole operation.
I did not know enough to ask him
everything I should have about Thai
forces in Laos. I think these forces
clearly violate the spirit and the letter
of the law unless we can say the CIA
is not responsible to the control of Con-
gress. That provision was intended to
cover the whole operation. Otherwise, it
is a nullity and an empty gesture to put
a prohibition into the law if it is not
intended to cover the whole operation.
Mr. CR.ANSTON. Mr. President, will
the -Senator yield for a question on one
other aspect?
Mr. SYMINGTON. lam glad to yield.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, the
presentation and the discussion has been
very illuminating.
Mr. SYIVIINGTON. I thank the
Senator.
Mr. CRANSTON. [Deleted].
Mr. SYMINGTON. [Deleted].
Mr. CRANSTON. [Deleted].
Mr. SYMINGTON. [Deleted]. Subc
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Agree
Senator yield to me briefly? G.
syg6ART120300080080-3
August 8, 1971
with the situation, and I know that to be
a fact.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a couple of. quick non-
controversial questions?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Any time I can ac-
cede to the wishes of my colleague from
Colorado, that is a privilege.
Mr. ALLOTT. Who are the staff peo-
ple? When the bell for the quorum call
rang I thought it was a routine quorum
call and I was 6 or 7 minutes late.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The gentlema
my left is James Lowenstein and
gentleman with the Senator from Arkan-
sas (Mr. Pullbright) is Richard Moose.
These are the two staff members who
visited Southeast Asia last April and
May; and then made this report.
Any time the Senator would like to dis-
cuss or review any part of this report
with them, I am sure they would be
honored to do so at the Senator's
convenience. ?
Mr. ALLOTT. Were they sent there
under a letter of direction by the Senator
from Missouri or the chairman of the
committee?
Mr. SYMINGTON'. I wrote lettere to
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and- the Director of the Central
Intelligenc,e Agency. We gave their
names and they received all necessary
clearance. They went with the knowledge
of the proper departments of the execu-
tive branch.
Mr. ALLOW. I am not concerned with
that so much as to the direction. Was the
scope of the investigation laid out in this
letter by the Senator from Missouri?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.
Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator.
Mr. SYMINGTON. We did the best we
could in advance to tell the heads of the
various agencies in question just what it
wantedwas we to find out.. Does th
answer the Senator's question?
Mr. ALLOTT Yes. Was that in the le
ter? Was that asked before 1 came?
SYMINGTON. I do not believe th
particular point ea-me up, and am Oa
it is now in -the Record. I will put in th
Record all the letters in question writte
prim' to their trip.
Mr. AI.J.,OTT. I think it would make
complete record.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I think it a goo
idea.
Mr. ALLOTT. I thank the Senator.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I ask unanimott
consent to include these letters in th.
record at this point.
(There being no objection, the letter
were included.)
APRIL 15, 1971.
Hon. WILLIAM P. RooEss,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
EAR MR. Smear:1'411v: At the request of the
ommittee on United States Seourity-
inents and Commitments Abroad, James
Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, Con -
zits, Senate Foreign Relations Commit.
wJl be traveling to Laos and possibly
bottle, Vietnam and Taiwan between the
od of April 18 to May 9. The purpose a'
trip will -be to provide-the Subcommit-
wIth information concerning Unitec
es military assistance programs, genera,
lcal, economic and military subjects anti
ed States relations with the countries
ert
or to their departure, Mr. Lowenstein
Mr Moose will want to rece;.ve executive
branch -briefings. They have already provided
your Department with details of the Sub-
committee's interests, and I would appreciate
the Department of State's assistance in ar-
ranging appropriate briefings by officials of
the State and Defense Departments.
Sincerely,
STUART SYMLNGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
United States Security Agreements and
Cornmitments Abroad.
Hon. MEtvin R. LAIRD,
n tO Secretary of Defense,
the Washington, D.C.
DEA:a MR. SECRETARY: At the request of the
Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad, James
G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose, Con-
sultants, Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, will be traveling to Laos and possibly
Cambodia, Vietnam_ and Taiwan between the
period of April 18 to May 9. The purpose of
their trip will be to provide the Subcommit-
tee with information concerning United
States military assistance programs,_ general
political, economic and military subjects and
United States relations with the countries
concerned.
Prior to their departure, Mr. Lowenstein
and Mr. Moose will a ant to receive executive
branch briefings on the above subjects. I
have asked the Department of State to ar-
range these briefings and would appreciate
the cooperation and participation of the De-
partment of Defense in these sessions.
Department of Defense support, including
authorization to use milltaro air transporta-
tion as required while they are overseas will
be deeply appreciated. Pursuant to the pro-
visio:ns of Section 1314 of Public Law 207,
83rd Congress, the payment of such actual
and necessary expenses as they may incur is
authorized.
Sincerely,
STUART SYMaNGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
United States Security Agreements and
Commitments Abroad.
APRIL 15, 1971.
at APRIL 15, 1971.
Mr. RICHARD HELMS,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
t Washington, D.C.
DEAR Ms. HELMS: The Subcommittee on
at United States Security Agreements and Corn-
d ruitments Abroad has asked James C. Lowen-
e stein and Richard M Moose, Consultants,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to visit
Laos and possibly Cambodia, Vietnam and
a Taiwan and report back to the Subcommittee
on the situation in those countries and on
various aspects of United States activities
d there. I would appreciate your asking your
Agency representatives in the countries noted
above to help Mr. Lowenstein and Mr. Moose
3 in their assignment. I would also appreciate
e it if you could arrange for them to be briefed
in Washington before their departure on
April 18,
Sincerely,
Mr, SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield tee,
suite
to my friend from Mississippi. Gam
Mr. ,STENNIS. I understand the Sena- Peri
tor from Kentucky used my name, or had their
a question on these CIA funds, while I
:teat
was out of the Chamber, I want to make pont
clear that in this Laotian operation-- unit
all of it?--the CIA has acted at the di- cone
rection of the National Security Council Pri
or the President. I have been familiar and
STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
U.S. Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYIVIINGTON. I yield.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. I do not know if
the Senator wishes to be seated or not.
I would like to put in a, resume of facts
that I thought were not clear in the
beginning. If this resume is not correct,
I hope that I will be corrected by the
Senator.
I understand that in fiscal year 1971,
although Congress thought that it had
authorized $117 million in new funds, the
military assistance program actually be-
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August 3, /Approved For Retwisk2NIgNalic WINIt73Bnis9klip0300080080-3
ing administered in Laos with military
assistance funds from the Department of
Defense will cost $162 million. If that is
not correct, I hope that someone will cor-
rect me.
We thought at the time of the appro-
priation that the cost would be $117
million but the program has actually
cost $162 million.
The estimate of the CIA contribution
to the overall effort?our staff was
told?was [deleted] million and the AID
program was $52 million, making a
total of $284 million in fiscal year 1971.
That is what is being spent aside from
whatever the authorization for new funds
provided or what we thought was being
spent.
The request for new funds for military
assistance in fiscal year 1972 is $125 mil-
lion for the Department of Defense. Yet
they are planning a program which will
cost $252 million. Assuming the [deleted]
million is still the same for the CIA, and
the $52 million is still the amount of
economic assistance, there will be an in-
crease from $284 million to $374 million
in the next fiscal year. In other words,
the present price for staying in Laos will
be $374 million just from those three
sources.
I want to call attention to the fact
that this ?does not include the cost of
Thai troops, whatever that might be. It
does not include the cost of maintaining
1,200 U.S. personnel who are there with
the State Department, AID, and similar
agencies. And it does not include the cost
of air operations over northern or south-
ern Laos. These are extra costs which I
would guess, at a very minimum, would
round that figure to $400 million, not
including the cost of air operations,
which we will be spending in Laos in
1972 if present programs are put into
effect.
If that information is not accurate, I
hope that somebody on the staff or the
Senator from Missouri will say so.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Those figures are
accurate. One that is interesting is that
our total annual expenditures in Laos
may amount to a total of $1131 per capita,
almost three times the per capita Gross
National Product of that little country.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. To get some sense
of perspective, when one considers what
a relatively small country this is, a coun-
try which is about 20 percent literate,
what we seek to achieve for an invest-
ment of that amount of money is beyond
my comprehension. Its relation to our
troop withdrawals from South Vietnam
is beyond me.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I .have been to Laos
several times; and whether it is right or
wrong for us to be there surely is a matter
for discussion, as we are discussing this
operation today. But nobody could argue
that, in effect, the United States, has now
destroyed large parts of this country, as
it has parts of Cambodia and large parts
of both North and South Vietnam.
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for one additional question?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield to my friend
from Alaska.
Mr. GRAVEL. First, let me thank the
Senator from Missouri for the contribu-
tion he is making to the Senate with his
presentation today.
I would like to know how we can bring
this matter to the attention of the coun-
try. What can we do other than have a
dialogue and receive information, which
the Senator from Missouri has assidu-
ously secured?
This information is kn o w n to
thousands of Laotians and Thais. It is
obviously known to the Chinese. Ob-
viously it is known to the Soviet Union.
If I heard the Senator correctly, he said
the information is classified Top Secret.
How do I, as a colleague of the Senator
from Missouri. get the information de-
classified, since the Laotians and the
Soviets know about it, so that the Ameri-
can people will know about it?
Mr. SYMINGTON. A good question.
This is one of the problems which often
comes up with respect to our military
activities in various other parts of the
world, as we pursue what might be called
our "Pax-Americana." concept of the
world which has developed since World
War II. Other countries know about our
activities. Their people know about these
things, but for some sad reason the only
people who really do not know about
them are the people of the United States.
This record will be sanitized and as
much as possible of it released to the
people; in fact, there will be a Major
effort on our part to make available as
much as possible: but inasmuch as much
of said information was given to us as
classified information, we cannot print
it without first receiving agreement from
the executive branch as to what can be
released to the public. That was the
premise incident to our staff members
being told much of this information on
their recent visit to Southeast Asia.
We will do our best to see that as much
as possible of what is in this record is
declassified. Then the Senator can use
it for himself and with his constituents,
so they can form their conclusions based
on as much of the facts as possible.
We are making this record today with
a reporter. This record will be examined
and as much as the executive branch
permits will be made public. In case of '
disagreement, we hope to be able to con-
vince the executive to release?having
been somewhat successful in the past in
obtaining declassification of certain in-
formation the executive originally classi-
fied because we did not believe its
Publication would in any way affect
national security?as much of this in-
formation as possible.
Mr. GRAVEL. That would include the
report tendered by the Senator's staff?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes and I ask
unanimous consent to have the staff re-
port printed in the record at the con-
clusion of debate in this closed session.
PRESIDING OFFICER. Without ob-
jection, so ordered.
Mr. GRAVEL. So that I can expect, as
an American taxpayer and a citizen, to
have it made public as soon as possible?
Mr. SYMINGTON. As much as pos-
sible, as soon as possible, will be made a
matter of public record.
Mr. GRAVEL. The fact- that we are
financing people in that part of the world
will become public, will it not?
S 12959
Mr. SYMINGTON. I le so. Much of
that data has already o en published.
Mr. GRAVEL. I tak hat to be an
agreement that it will lot n ade public.
Mr. SYMINGTON. It already been
published in the press A at we are fi-
nancing some 4,800 TM, roops in Laos.
That is no secret. Some I she details are
still secret. Every Sena- has to decide
for himself whether he 'I I obey the re-
strictions laid down a- those who
originally classify the m s rial.
Mr. GRAVEL. How i .n.; will it take
to sanitize the record?
Mr. SYMINGTON. rriut is another
good question. It will n t take too long
on our part.
Mr. GRAVEL. / do c , understand,
and I apologize for ta, u g this body's
time with this, but if tl e Senator from
Missouri established the o ) secret classi-
fication and he can dee] s ify it rapidly,
who else makes the d ti rmination on
declassification?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mi a esident, if the
Senator will yield. it w 1 be up to the
chairman of the comn it ee, the State
Department, and the c it trman of the
subcommittee.
Mr. GRAVEL. If, at t r le later point,
a Senator has disagreer .t over classi-
fication of this inform t on, what re-
course would he or an .ther Senator
have?
Mr. SYMINGTON. 'I.( t le best of my
knowledge, no one has f er released in-
formation declared tot ecret by the
executive branch.
Mr. GRAVEL. May I . ;I, if the Sena-
tor thinks there is anytt nt in here that
goes to the national .e 'ense of our
country?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yt , I do.
Mr. GRAVEL. That ,t:sfies me.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. President, I
just want to clarify th; the figure of
$374 million excludes T ,a troops, U.S.
personnel costs and the ,s.,s of air oper-
ations in Laos, north am s rah. A mem-
ber of ?the staff has as d the publicly
announced cost figure fo c.-dnance for a
sortie in 1969 was $3,1 1 That is the
estimated ordnance cost a each sortie.
These are obviously estin II as. They can-
not figure to a dollar wh t it costs to fly
a plane and drop a bomb C to not believe
these estimates apply t B-52 strikes.
They are much more ext 1 sive.
So, working those fig r ,s out, there
were approximately 10,( -C sorties each
month in 1971. In 1970 ti u e were 14,000
sorties per month on al verage. By a
process of multiplicatioi i3,190 multi-
plied by 14,000 a month t,,r 12 months
amounts to a total of i3 ) million. In
1971 air operations hay ,een running
at the rate of 10,000 sorti t month, and
that works out to $382 n l ton.
If that is a rough estin tie of what the
air war costs, and we s IC that to the
nearly $400 million in la ,er costs, we
get some sense of perspec a of what we
are investing in the war ,.aos. It is no
small item.
When we add that to t..er items, we
can see why we have a d 'fi.!it estimated
at $25 billion, a problem r our balance
of payments, and so forti r is no secret
that the country is rapi 1: moving to-
ward bankruptcy. We c r understand
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S 12960
why when we see what we are spending
in Laos alone.
Mr. SYlVIINGTON. Mr. President, the
Senator is clearly correct when he points
out what all these adventures are doing
to the health of our economy. If we do
not stop this growth, this self-appointed
task since World War II of trying to
defend all the free world and finance?
'oabysit?the free world, we are certain to
bankrupt this Government.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, first
I want to commend the Senator from
Missouri. He has rendered a real service
in making known to the membership of
this body facts pertaining to a country in
which, in a sense, two wars are being
waged, and for doing so in a nonpartisan
and nonpolitical manner, thereby en-
hancing the education of all of us so that
we may be cognizant of what is occurring
in that remote land which is occupied by
a very simple people, a very happy peo-
ple?or they were a very happy people
before geography placed them in a most
difficult position.
Mr. President, I move that the Senate
return to open legislative session and that
the gallery doors be opened.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, if the
Senator will withhold his motion, I want
to join the majority leader in commend-
ing the Senator from Missouri. I know
how hard he has worked on this matter.
In working with the staff, he has spent
a great deal of time on it. I agree that it
is a great contribution to the work of the
Senate. I only hope the Senate will take
it seriously and seek to use it for the wel-
fare of our country as a whole.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, may
I thank the able majority leader and my
chairman, the chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, for their unde-
served but very kind remarks. It has been
and is a privilege to work with and for
both of them on these matters which
have so much to do with the future se-
curity, prosperity and happiness of this
Nation.
The report referred to previously is as
follows:
LAOS: APRIL 1971
(A staff report prepared for the use of the
Subcommittee on U.S. Securtiy Agree-
ments and Commitments Abroad of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate)
comairrras ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas, Chairman; John
Sparkman, Alabama; Mike Mansfield, Mon-
tana; Frank Church, Idaho; Stuart Syming-
ton, Missouri; Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island;
Gale W. McGee, Wyoming; Edmund S. Mus-
kie. Maine; William B. Spong, Jr., Virginia;
George D. Aiken, Vermont; Karl E. Mundt,
South Dakota; Clifford P. Case, New Jersey;
John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky; Jacob K.
Javits, New York; Hugh Scott, Pennsylvania;
James B. Pearson, Kansas; Carl Marcy, Chief
of Staff; and Arthur M. Kuhl, Chief Clerk.
SUBCOMMITTEE ON U.S. SECURITY AGREEMENTS
AND COMMITMENTS ABROAD
Stuart Symington, Missouri, Chairman;
J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas; John Sparkman,
Alabama; Mike Mansfield, Montana; George
D. Aiken, Vermont; Clifford P. Case, New Jer-
sey; John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky; Jacob
K Javits, New York; Pat Holt, Staff Assist-
ant; James G. Lowenstein, Staff Assistant;
and Richard M. Moose, Staff Assistant.
PREFACE
At a meeting in executive session on May
21, the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agree-
ments and Commitments Abroad received a
report. classified "top secret," from James G.
Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose of the sub-
committee staff on a trip which they haci
made to Laos-on behalf of the subcommittee.
The information contained in their report
added considerably to the subcommitteeh
understanding of the nature and extent et'
the activities of the United States in Laos.
I felt that the importance of this information
was each that it should be brought to the
attention of the Senate and accordingly a
closed session was held for this purpose on
June 7 at my request and with the concue -
rence of the chairman of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee.
The staff of the subcommittee has now re-
viewed the report with representatives of the
Departments of State and Defense and the
Central Intelligence Age:ncy. After consider.
able discussion of the basis and, need for con-
tinued security classification of much of the
Information in the report?a process which
lasted 5 weeks?the representatives of the
executive branch agreed to publication of the
report as now issued. Nevertheless, consider-
able information has been deleted at their
insistence.
While I do not agree that the publication
of some of the material which has been de-
leted from the report which follows would
adversely affect our national security, the in
which does appear will give the
American public a far better picture of U.S.
involvement in Laos than can be found
any previous public government report.
STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on United
States Security Agreements and Com-
mitments Abroad, Committee on Fcr-
cign Relations.
I. Introduction
During our visit to Laos from. April 22 to
May 4, 1971, we met with Ambassador Godley
and the senior and junior civilian officials
and military officers in the U.S. Mission. In
addition, one or both of us met with Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma; the Foreign and
Defense Delegates and the Transport Min:s-
ter; the Commander of' Military Region V
and the Governor of Xiang Khouang Pro,, -
ince; the Pathet Lao representative in Vie e-
tiancr reporters, teachers, and others in p:-'-
vats site; and a number of other Ambassa-
dors. We spent a weekend in Savannakhet
with the Ambassador and Chief of the AID
Mission who were there to open an airfield
during which time we visited the Air Opera-
tions Center, the [deleted], the irregular force
base camp and the irregular training carep
knoo: n as "Whiskey Three"; a day at the Long
Tieng? base, the headquarters of General
yang Pao, with whom we lunched, and at
Site 32, a village composed mostly of re-
settled Mao refugees which is; north of the
Plain of Jars and is the only enclave in that
area not under Pathet Lao control; and a
day In Thailand at Udorn, visiting the 7/13th
Air Force and the [802 joint Liaison Detach-
ment deleted], and at Nakhon. Phanom Air
Base visiting [deleted] which Is the activ:ey
that runs the so-called electronic battle-
field in southern Laos.
II. Summary and general observations
A. Most observers in Laos say that from
the military point of view the situation there
is growing steadily worse anti the initiat ve
seems clearly to be in the hands of the
enemy. There are apparently no plans far
retaking and holding any of the two-thirds
of the country no longer under government
control but only a hope, not too firmly teed
in some quarters, that the one-third of Lao
terrhory now under government control can
corihn ue.to be held. Since Lam Son 719, me:e
Lao territory has come under enemy control,
and there are about three regiments more of
North Vietnamese forces in southern Laos
than there were before the Lam Son opera-
tion. U.S. air operations continue in both
northern Laos and in the south against the
Ho Chi Minh Trail. In both cases the number
of sorties this year is down in comparison
with last year, theereduction being propor-
tionally greater in the north. The principal
reasons for this reduction are, first of all, the
fact that fewer aircraft are now available
because some squadrons are being rede-
ployed from Southeast Asia, and, second, the
additional demands imposed on remaining
aircraft by the situation in Cambodia. Since
February 1970 we have been using B-52s in
northern Laos on a regular basis, a fact the
Committee had not been told and that was
not made public until the open Committee
hearing at which the Under Secretary of
State testified on May 3. We are, however,
now flying about [deleted] times as many
B-52 sorties in southern Laos as in the
northern part of the country. The Royal Lao
Air Force has doubled its sortie rate in the
past year, but the attrition rate of their
limited number of T-28 aircraft is high. We
a:re filling the gap. The "truck kill" rate of
North Vietnamese trucks is also high, having
reportedly reached the astronomical total of
over 100 a day in April of this year, but even
some U.S. military authorities in Southeast
Asia discount these figures, most by about 30
percent. And despite everything that is being
done in the air by the United States, and on
the ground by the South Vietnamese, Lao
and Cambodians, supplies continue to move
through Laos into Cambodia and South Viet-
nam, The Air Force claims that only about
one-third the quantity of supplies is getting
through this year compared to last year, but
others point out that the fact remains-that
the North Vietnamese are moving sufficient
supplies through Laos to sustain their mili-
tary operations.
B. The war in Laos is run in most respects
by the Embassy in Vientiane. In fact, this
nndertaking seems to consume a considerable
portion of the time of the senior officers in
the Mission. The "Operations Meeting" at the
Embassy?which lasts from 9 a.m. to approxi-
mately 10:30 daily, including Saturday, and
at which the Ambassador presides?is devoted
in large part to detailed briefings by the
Army and Air Attaches and the CIA Station
Chief which cover practically every military
engagement of the preceding 24 hours. Air
operations are followed very closely, even
down to the types of ordnance employed, as
are the details of the deployment and support
of Royal Lao Army and irregular forces.
C. The United States continues to train,
arm, and feed the LSO Army and Air Force
and to, train, advise, pay? support, and, to
a great extent, organize the irregular mili-
tary forces under the direction of the CIA.
The combat element of these irregular forces
is about as large as the combat element of
the Royal Lao Army. These irregular forces
include not only the forces under General
Vang Paces command in Military Region II,
but forces in every other military region of
Laos except the area immediately around
Vientiane. The' costof these irregular-forces
has been increasing every- year, in part be-
cause as more territory has fallen under Pa-
thet Lao control it has become necessary to
rely increasingly on air transport and in
part because of the rising cost of ammuni-
tion. These irregular forces have become the
cutting edge of the military, leaving the
Royal Lao Army as a force primarily devoted
to static defense.
D. [Delete.] In the past few months the
Chinese have increased their air defense
capabilities along the road they are building
in northern Laos. The road now reaches to
Cu River, marking the division of responsi-
bility between the Chinese and the North
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Vietnamese on the east, and is only some 45
miles from Pak Beng on the Mekong in the
west. The number of Chinese forces along
the road has increased from 6,000 two years
ago to between 14,000 and 20,000. The con-
centration of anti-aircraft and associated
radar installations along the road which has
been greatly increased in recent months,
makes this area one of the most heavily de-
fended in the world. The area around the
road, and north of it, is off-limits to U.S.
aircraft, and supposedly to Lao aircraft as
well, although it was bombed in January
1970 by two Lao Air Force planes. Whether
related or not, the buildup of anti-aircraft
facilities followed this attack.
E. The number of Thai in Laos, at the time
of our visit, was about [deleted]. Since then,
[deleted]. We were told that these "irregular"
volunteers, as they are characterized by
Thai and American officials, are recruited
for service in Laos from outside the regular
Thai Army. They are said to receive lower
pay and allowances than regular Thai Army
personnel [deleted]. The costs involved are
channeled through CIA, although U.S. offi-
cials told us that they thought some of the
funds come from the Defense Department
budget. As far as the future is concerned,
[deleted).
F. The Royal Lao Government continues to
be almost totally dependent on the United
States, perhaps more dependent on us than
any other government in the word, and this
dependence appears to be increasing as the
war continues and the military situation
worsens. The cost of U.S. military assistance
to Laos has risen rapidly in the past few
months with the fiscal year 1972 program
doubling since January, mostly as the result
of the rise in the cost of ammunition and
ordnance being supplied to both the Royal
Lao Army and Air Force and the irregular
forces and the higher rate at which this am-
munition and ordnance is being used. The
United States provides not only for all of
Laos' defense needs but for day-to-day needs
as well. And on the political front, we gath-
ered from our conversations with various Lao
that it has been made plain to all opponents
of the present Prime Minister?primarily the
southern politicians and generals?that we
wish to see him continue in office and that
any change in government might Jeopardize
continued U.S. support.
G. The Lao Government's budget for the
current year is 18.3 billion kip or, converted
to dollars at the official rate of 500 kip to the
dollar, $36.6 million. By contrast the partial
total of estimated U.S. expenditures in Laos
in fiscal year 1971 is $284.2 million, com-
posed of an estimated $162.2 million in mili-
tary assistance, $52 million in the AID pro-
gram and $[deleted] millions spent by CIA
exclusive of the Thai irregular costs. This
partial total of estimated U.S. expenditures
amounts to $141 per capita for the approxi-
mately 2 million Lao under government con-
trol compared with a per capita GNP esti-
mated art $66. Not included in the above U.S.
expenditure total are items such as the cost
of U.S. air operations in northern or south-
ern Laos or the cost of Thai irregulars in
Laos. The planned increase in fiscal year 1972
military assistance coupled with AID and
CIA expenditures at this year's level would
bring the total of these three programs up
to $374 million. So far as we can determine,
the only overall figure ever released by the
executive branch for any category of current
aid to Laos is the $52 million estimate for
the AID program in fiscal year 1971, although
during the Symington subcommittee hear-
ings in 1969 the fiscal year 1971 military as-
sistance program was estimated at $90 mil-
lion. In point of fact, we were told that the
actual final total for that year was $146.4
million, as noted in the section below on the
military assistance program.
H. U.S. activities in Laos show the inter-
locking relationship between all U.S. agencies
in Laos and all U.S. activities and commands
in Southeast Asia. Thus. (deleted]. The sortie
rate of U.S. tactical aircraft is kept at Udorn,
but this information does not include the
rates for B-52s or Navy aircraft. These figures
are kept by 7th Air Force in Saigon. Within
Laos, the CIA trains and advises irregular
forces, but until last week AID had pro-
vided these forces with rice in Military Re-
gions I and II, while the military assistance
program, operated ostensibly under AID in
Laos, provides food and equipment to the
regular Lao Army. The U.S. Air Force flies the
planes that bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail,
but much of their targeting information
comes from CIA. and the final approval for
their missions, at least in some cases, comes
from the Embassy.
I. Finally, there is an evident determina-
tion among U.S. officials in Laos to continue
to prosecute the war with only gradually re-
duced secrecy. It is argued, with regard to
air operations, that many of these places are
based in Thailand and are there pursuant to
agreements with the Thai Government which
stipulate that [deleted]. As far as operations
of the irregular forces are concerned, scene
say that CIA is not need to prosecuting a war
in public and does not see what purpose
would be served by doing so. Underlying
many of these arguments for maintaining
secrecy is the feeling that much of what the
United States is doing does violate the Ge-
neva Agreements of 1962, and ancillary "un-
derstandings" thereto and that while our
violations are Justified by antecedent North
Vietnamese violations, putting our violations
on the public record, while North Vietnam
continues to deny that it, is violating the
agreements, would make it far more difficult,
If not impossible, to reactivate the provisions
of the 1962 agreements.
III. The military situation
A. General Description
Since last July, the enemy has extended
his control to the the western edge of the
Plain of Jars, past Muong Soui and Sam
Thong, while pushing further west in south-
ern Laos, taking Muong Phalane shortly after
Lam Son 719 ended. To the west of the area
in Which South Vietnamese forces were ac-
tive during Lam Son 719, a whole new net-
work of trails has been constructed, al-
though the enemy continues to use the routes
In the area in which the Lam Son operation
took place. Enemy forces have put increas-
ing pressure on the important towns of Seno
and Pakse, both of which are now only a few
kilometers from the area under enemy con-
trol. Virtually the entire Bolovens Plateau
areas is now held by the North Vietnamese,
the few remaining Lao outposts on its west-
ern edge having been captured in the last
few days. In sum, over 60 percent of Laos is
no longer under Lao Government control.
The generally accepted figure for the en-
tire population for Laos has been 2.8 mil-
lion, although some dispute this figure and
claim that it is closer to 2 million. On the
basis of the 2.8 million figure, the Embassy
claims 2.1 million under government control,
although a nublication issued by the AID
Mission sets the figure at 1.7 million.
In the weeks immediately preceding our
visit to Vientiane, Luang Prabang hart been
under virtual siege. The airfield had been
rocketed and the enemy surrounded it on all
sides. During the time that we were there,
the enemy pulled bock, indicating an inten-
tion not to take the royal capital. During the
same period, however, they rocketed the prin-
cipal base at Long Tieng daily with rocket
attacks averaging 30 a week.
Trying to estimate enemy intentions is a
constant concern of American officials in
Vientiane as it is in Saigon, Phnom Penh,
and Bangkok. The prevailing assumptions at
the time of our visit were that the North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao would continue
the war in the north despite American and
Lao bombing; that they could continue to
move supplies through Lao
and South Vietnam althou
rate, again regardless of the
fact could do in Laos prel
they wished during both we,
provided they were willip
casualties in some cases: th
would not try to take Luang
It is the site of the Royal Pei
the King and such an attack
have a deleterious effect OT
In Laos; that the Royal I
forces will [deleted] In
bath American and Lao offic
they would consider the lot
to be a disastrous psychol
hence had determined that
fended. Understandably, Ge
was particularly adamant 3
Long Tieng represents virtue
hold of the Mao people in n
Recent new developmen
military situation, all repor
since our visit, have been
for the first time, of North
face-to-air missiles in south.
velopment of a road system
Jars which will enable the le'
to operate throughout the r
the occasional sighting of N
MIGs over Lao territory, ;
hazard for the Lao T-28s art
flying Forward Air Control r
observation planes.
B. Friendly For
Cambodia
11 sit a reduced
.o nbing, and in
sell whatever
dry seasons
; take heavy
e hey probably
,.bang because
:e and home of
? eild therefore
oblic opinion
tc Government
ii connection,
.1.1, told us that
I Long Tieng
el al blow and
, hould be de-
e. a1 yang Pao
his point for
the last foot-
he Laos.
- affecting the
;fe in the press
deployment,
1. tnamese sur-
er Laos, the de-
n the Plain of
h Vietnamese
y season, and
n Vietnamese
gotential new
?
:se U.S. pilots
S ions in small
Friendly forces in Laos 'O isist of [de-
leted] in the Royal Lao Ai., ;y I deleted] in
the neutralist army. I delete 1] in the Royal
Lao Air Force, and some 30.1 10 Lao and [de-
leted] Thai irregulars (whe ; ;ire described
in section VI below). Frier ii. forces thus
total between 95,150 and 97, .i( compared to
enemy forces of about 111-. 010 to 139,000.
Of the [deleted] in the 1 .ek al Lao Army,
somwhere between [deleted nd [deleted]
are infantry, depending e whether the
Army Attach?stimates of t io -1,, present for
duty is taken or the Lao Are v figure Is used
as a basis for calculation.
It has apparently become a ,easingly dif-
ficult in the past year or anti maintain an
adequate level of manpower ; he Royal Lao
Army. There are very few al tstments and
no national conscription aye .ela. From time
to time manpower requiren -r s are set by
Royal decree for each mill; a- region, and
quotas are then levied on r ,ovinces and
villages. What follows is a: /0 by some to
resemble a press gang opel it on in which
only those without polite Al connections
end up in the Army. We w iv told that 30
percent of all new recruits ci
?The length of service in si e Royal Lao
Army is 2 years and the ;toe pay for a
private is equivalent to $5 a. month plus
allowances for dependents. ec 'tiers appar-
ently seldom receive all ot t ;e money or
food to which they are entitl .1 and the rolls
of some units are said to e. padded with
personnel who never existe ,r who have
been killed, are missing, or have deserted.
We were told about one unit -r the neutral-
ist army, for example, whic as supposed
to have 300 men but when -1 .stered could
produce only 25. Another A le lean told us
that such an accomplishmei could be the
envy of many other battale .-ommanders.
C. North Vietnamese and Pa eie t Lao Forces
The estimate of enemy it e s in Laos as
of April 20 was between 114, Of and 139,000.
The 139,000 estimate is corm ae el of 100,000
North Vietnamese and 39,0 '0 Pathet Lao.
The estimate in March of ee3 was 91,690
composed of 40,045 North NO; s tmese troops
and 51;645 Pathet Lao.
It thus seems clear that l ie North Viet-
namese have been able to In re :Ise the level
of their forces in Laos des site the heavy
casualties they have taken. n fact, at the
time of our visit there were t ir 'e more regi-
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S 12962
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? N
A L'E August 3, 1971
ments of North Vietnamese forces?about
15.000 men?in southern Laos than there
before Lam Son 719 began, although some of
the enemy forces who fought in Laos during
that operation had returned to North Viet-
nam.
;Deleted.]
Of the North Vietnamese in Laos, some
[deleted] are in infantry battalions; [de-
leted] in transportation, engineering, and
communications units; [deleted] in anti-
aircraft and artillery units; [deleted] in
Pathet Lao infantry battalions or as advisors
to such battalions; and [deleted] in armored
units. [Deleted.] In all, about 80 percent of
the North Vietnamese are in southern Laos
in Military Regions III and IV,
Is for the Pathet Lao troops, [deleted]
are infantry battalions with some [deleted]
of these in Military Region I; [deleted] each
in Military Regions II and IV; [deleted] in
Military Region III (where North Vietnamese
strength is particularly high); and [deleted]
in Military Region V. About 60 percent of all
Pathet Lao forces?combat and support
are in northern Laos.
The ratio of enemy killed to friendly killed
in action is far lower than the ratio released
for Vietnam. In the period from 1968
through the first 4 months of 1971, the ir-
regular forces lost 8,020 killed in action (of
which 6,873 were lost in Military Regions I
and II), while killing an estimated 22,726 of
the enemy. During this same period the
Royal Lao Army lost 3,664 killed in action,
while killing 8,522 of the enemy. The enemy
kill ratio is thus far higher for the irregular
forces. At the same time, however, the brunt
of irregular losses has fallen heavily upon
tribal groups such as the Meo, which is one
of the reasons why Thai irregulars have been
brought into Military Region II.
rhe North Vietnamese units are definitely
carrying the brunt of the fighting and tak-
ing most of the casualties, and most Pathet
Lao mitts have North Vietnamese cadre. It
seems to some observers that the North Viet-
namese are deliberately sparing the Pathet
Lao for the future when they will vie for
political control in Lacs with non-Commu-
nist Lao forces whose numbers will have
been greatly reduced by war losses inflicted
by the far more numerous North Vietnamese.
During our stay in Vientiane, a number of
Pathet Lao, possibly as many as 200, were
reported to have "rallied" to the Govern-
ment side. Authorities in Vientiane were en-
deavoring to exploit these defections which
they believe, on grounds which were not al-
together clear to some observers, to be indic-
ative of a "trend."
D. Chinese Forces
The number of Chinese forces along the
road they are building in northern Laos has
Increased from between 6,000 and 8,000, the
figure given the subcommittee 2 years ago, to
somewhere between 14,000 and 20,000.
The Chinese have also moved in a heavy
new increment of radar-directed anti-aircraft
weapons, increasing the number by 100 in the
last 6 to 7 months to the present total of 395,
Including for the first time guns of 85mm
and 100mm, the latter said to be effective up
to 68,000 feet. Since early 1970, they have also
[deleted]. Of the Chinese troops along the
road, those who hold to the lower figure of
14,000 say that between 3,000 and 3,500 are
members of anti-aircraft crews and the rest
construction workers, while those who give
the higher estimate say that anti-aircraft
crews total 6,000 to 7,000.
,e3 a result, of recent work done on the road,
it will be a motorable all-weather surface
dual-lane highway by August all the way
from the Chinese border to Muong Huon, al-
though there has been no extension of the
road past Muong Huon since February 1970.
In addition to upgrading earlier road con-
struction, the Chinese have, since November
1e70, constructed eight small arms firing
ranges of a kind normally associated with
garrisons of ground troops as well as large
headquarters buildings and 66 basketball
courts, There are 154 oamps along the road.
The western branch of the road still ends ,I5
mile.. from Pak Beng on the Mekong Ether,
some e0 miles from Thailand. On the eastern
leg c f the road, only a bridge or ferry acr )es
the liver On needs to be built to connect.
with the road which has been reconstructed
from Dlenbienphu into Laos.
We were told, on originally inquiring, that
there had been no provocation which woied
accoant for the sudden buildup in anti-air-
craft defenses along the road. After further
inquiry, however, we learned that the Lao
Air Force had bombed the road at least twice.
In the most recent and important such n-
cldeLt, two Lao T-28s from Luang Prabe rig
flew over the road in January 1970 and
claimed to have been fired upon by the COI-
nese In their debriefing the pilots stated
they had then destroyed 10 trucks. This claim
coulii not be confirmed from later photog-
raphs, although the photograph did show
craters on. the road. [Deleted.]
IV. Air operations
Use, air operations in Laos have declined .n
the surse of the past year and are now bet DAr
the level of the first 9 months of 1969. At that
time. the United States was flying abeet
[deleted] sorties a day in northern Laos and
[deleted] a day in southern Laos, a total of
400 sorties a day. One year ago, the average
daily rate was about 350 sorties.-[deletedF in
northern Laos and [deleted] in southern
Laos En April of this year, the rate averasind
about 340 sorties a day?[deleted] sorties a
day :n northern Laos and [deleted] a day :n
southern Laos, although during the last week
in April, while we were in Laos, the sortie
rate averaged 282 a day?Ideleted] in the
north and [deleted] in the south.
Or February 18, 1970, the United Stasts
begat B-52 missions against northern Lees.
The White Huose confirmed in March 1e70
that one B-52 mission had taken place in
northern Laos, but there had been no subee-
quent disclosure that B-52's were bombing
northern Laos on a regular basis. In fact, the
Cominittee had not been informed, even on
a classified basis, that B-52 raids had been
extended to northern Laos, although seve
time , executive branch witnesses were pr?-'-
pareci so to testify in executive session if
askett. Our telegram from Vientiane reporting
on 11-52 operations in northern Laos 'ins
relaeed to the Committee by the Department
on April 29, 1971. When Under Secretary Le-
win was asked about B-52s at the public hear-
ing in May 3, he acknowledged the fact -if
B-52 operations in northern Laos but said
that he could not supply sortie figures as
these were not available in the State D.,-
pertinent. It is interesing to note, in this cc n-
nection, that documents dealing with B.52
operstions in northern Laos are classified
"Top Secret" while Ba52 operations in the
south are considered "Secret."
The figures we were given by the Embaa.y
in Vientiane indicated that the B-52 sone
rate n northern Laos is higher in 1971 than
It we; in 1970. We were told in Vientiane tnat
In tae first 4 months of 1971 there were [ee-
leted B-52 sorties in northern Laos and V.- . it
In an of 1970 there had been [deleted] Bee2
sorties in northern Laos.* 11-52 sorties in
northern Laos constitute a small percentage
* sabsequently, in response t:o a questisn
in aa open Committee hearing on May 3,
the -.hider Secretary of State said that lie
did ? lot know how many B-52 sorties had
beer flown in northern Laos in 1970 and -1
but amid provide the figures. Under cot er
of a top secret totter elated June 10, 1971,
frort. Assistant Secretary of State Alsira,
the igures given were [deleted] sorties ei
1970 and [deleted] as of May 1971?indices -
ing ri lower sortie rate in 1971 than in 1970.
of total 11-52 strikes In Laos, both north and
south. For all of Laos 13-52 strikes are now
average [deleted] to [deleted] a day.
The reported figures for the number of
North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao trucks
damaged or destroyed are growing at a
geometric rate. We were told that, during the
first 29 days of Aprie 69 trucks had been
destroyed and over 4,133 damaged in north-
ern Laos and over 4,850 destroyed and 1,155
damaged in southern Laos. For previous
years, the figures gisen us for trucks de-
stroyed or damaged were 3,291 in 1967; 7,332
in 1968; 9,012 in 1969; and 12,368 in 1970.
These figures are not taken seriously by
most U.S. officials, even Air Force officers,
who generally apply something on the order
of a 30 percent discount factor. One reason
why there is some skepticism about the truck
kills claimed by the Air Force is that the
total figure for the last year greatly exceeds
the number of trucks. believed by the Em-
bassy to be in all of North Vietnam.
Truck kill and damage figures are arrived
at through a set of criteria developed by the
Air Force. It is assumed,, for example, that if
a truck Is hitby a 40nun shell it is destroyed
and that if the shell hits within 10 feet of
the truck it is damaged. One Air Force officer
told us that if the truck kill figures proved,
on further analysis, to be unrealistic, the
criteria would then be changed. Another
commented that he assumed that the North
Vietnamese were intelligent enough to set
off decoy explosions when trucks were being
attacked so that they would be counted as
destroyed or damaged even if not hit.
"Through put" figures, which refer to the
estimated number of tons transported into
South Vietnam or Cambodia by either trucks
or water-borne means, are kept at 7/13th
Air Force. They vary widely with the season
and cannot take account of such unknown
factors as stockpiling. In January and Feb-
ruary 1970, we were told, between 1,500 and
2,500 tons were estimated to be "in put" and
between 1,150 and 1,250 tons as "through
put" a week. In January and February 1971,
"In put" averaged between 2,000 and 3,300
tons a week while "through put" averaged
between 135 and 200 tons a week. The figures
for the week of April 14-20 showed an "in
put" of 1,932 tons and a "through put" of
824 tons, a record figure for 1971. We were
told that the Lam Son, operation had not
slowed the trend and that the seasonal trend
this year follows the same general pattern
as last year, although at a considerably lower
level. Last year 33 percent of the "in put" was
getting 'through. This year only 10 percent is
getting through. And in the course of the
first 4 months of this year, 4,000 to 5,000 tons
have gotten through, which is exactly half
the amount that it is estimated got through
in the first 4 months of last year. These fig-
ures are regarded with considerable skepti-
cism by some U.S. officials who point out
that as a matter of fitct, the North Vietna-
mese continue to be able to get the supplies
through to Cambodia and South Vietnam
that they require for the military operations
they are conducting.
The Royal' LaoAir Force has more than
doubled the number of sorties flown in the
past year. One year ago they were flying
!deleted] sorties a month. Now the rate is
I deleted.] Of this total, about [deleted] are
T-28 bombing sorties and [deleted] are AC-
47 gunship sorties. The Royal Lao Air Force
has [deleted] AC-47 and about [deleted]
T-28s. Somewhere between [deleted] and
deleted] of the T-2?s were in commission
every day during our visit and available for
bombing missions. [Deleted] T-286 were re-
served for training and were kept at Udorn,
its were those being repaired. The Lao Air
Force has been promised [deleted] additional
T-28s through the military assistance pro-
gram by the end of this December. Ten of
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these are, however, borrowed from the Thai
Air Force program and will have to be re-
turned or replaced.
We noticed that none of the Lao Air Force
T-28s we saw in Vientiane, Savannakhet,
Long Tieng, and Udorn were marked except
for serial numbers on the tail, a fact that
seemed to come as a surprise to some Amer-
ican officials when it was mentioned. Lt seems
clear that this procedure would allow them
to be interchanged with other T-28s.
?
The sortie rate of the 7/13th Air Force
seems to provide a rough index to ?the in-
tensity of the air war in Laos. In January
1970, monthly sorties in Laos reached a high
point of 14,000, of which about [deleted]
were in northern Laos and [deleted] in
southern Laos. The sortie rate 'then began
to decline, the rate of sorties in northern
Laos more rapidly than the rate in southern
Laos, and total sorties in April of this year
were 8,299. The projection for the next fiscal
year is that the total will further decrease
to an authorized maximum of [deleted] a
month.
U.S. sorties in Laos are controlled by a
complicated set of "Rules of Engagement
and Operational Authorities.' These rules
seem to make it impossible for villages or
other nonmilitary targets to be bombed. In
brief, target information is developed either
by Royal Lao Army units. CIA irregular
units, electronic means, aerial visual recon-
naissance, or photo intelligence. 7/13th or
7th Air Force then selects targets and these
requests are passed to the mission in Vien-
tiane. Planned strikes are first reviewed by
the Air Attache, or?for targets in southern
Laos outside the Trail area?by the Air Oper-
ations Center at Savannakhet, and then
passed to a junior Foreign Service officer in
the Embassy (known locally as the "Bomb-
ing Officer") for "validation" or approval. He
checks proposals against the rules of en-
gagement and the latest aerial maps which
show nonmilitary "structures" in order to
make certain, for example, that the proposed
strikes are targeted more than 500 meters
from "active villages" (defined as one build-
ing, hut, or structure not validated by the
Embassy for a strike) and, at least 500 meters
from friendly intelligence teams. If there is
any doubt in the Bombing Officer's mind, he
passes the request on to the Deputy Chief
of Mission or Ambassador for final decision.
In 1970, 86 percent of all requests for tactical
air strikes, 76 percent of the requests for
B-52 strikes in northern Laos, and 70 per-
cent of the requests for strikes in special
operating areas, which are explained below,
were approved. When U.S. tactical aircraft
'arrive over targets, they are controlled by
U.S. Forward Air Controllers accompanied by
Lao spotters.
B-52 strikes are directed against two cate-
gories of special operating areas: SOLOAS,
which are specially validated areas, and PAR
VELAS which are partially validated areas.
These special operating areas are, in effect,
free fire zones. They are areas in which it
has been determined by the Embassy that
there is no civilian population or civilian
structure of any sort. SOLOAS are considered
to be validated without further clearance ex-
cept when napahn is used. PARVELAS re-
quire 72-hour advance notice to the Embassy.
At the time of our visit there were 11
SOLOAS and four PARVELAS.
There is one other kind of prevalidated
strike area known as a SOA (special oper-
ating area) in which tactical air strikes can
be made against any military target without
specific validation. In these areas the Em-
bassy has predetermined that there are no
"active villages." Napalm may be used within
the SOA for several kinds of targets, and
any type of ordnance approved for use in Laos
may be jettisoned within the SOA. At present
one group of SOAs covers most of the Plain
of Jars plus Route 7 leading front North
Vietnam to the Plain.
The rules of engagement for U.S. air oper-
ations vary from one area of Laos to an-
other. In eastern Laos pilots have maximum
flexibility whereas in the far north, ad-
jacent to China, there are no U.S. combat
air operations. In fact, no U.S. aircraft are
permitted to enter this area without Em-
bassy Vientiane, CINCPAC, and JOS ap-
proval. [Deleted.]
American pilots who fly Forward Air Con-
trol missions do so out of five Air Operations
Centers. These are located in Vientiane,
Pakse, Savannakhet. Luang Prabang, and
Long Tieng. In theory each American For-
ward Air Controller has a Lao pilot in the
back seat who is there because he knows the
ground situation and can communicate with
ground Forward Air Guides. There are 53
Royal Lao Army Forward Air Guides and
129 from the irregular units spread through-
out all military regions.
Given the apparent stringency of these
rules of engagement, it is difficult to see
how roads with civilian traffic, villages and
groups of civilians could have been bombed,
rocketed, or napalmed. It seems clear, how-
ever, although the rules are stricter now than
they were some years ago, that mistakes do
happen (especially when Forward Air Con-
trollers begin flying missions as soon as they
arrive at Laos): that some pilots have de-
liberately violated the rules of engagement,
expending ordnance against unauthorized
targets (the town of Khang Khay being a
notable example); and that the system itself
is so complicated that It cannot possibly be
foolproof. Indeed, the effort to provide in the
rules of engagement for every contingency
appears to create obvious loopholes. One is
the rule which allows ground fire to be re-
turned virtually anywhere in Laos when a
U.S. plane is participating in a search and
rescue operation or is flying in support of
infiltrating or exfiltrating troops.
There are plenty of instances known to
American civilian employees who have been
in Laos for some years in which civilian tar-
gets have been bombed. There is a certain
reluctance, especially on the part of the Air
Force, to admit that mistakes have happened
which tends to undermine the credibility of
official claims made about the infallibility of
the conduct of the air war in Laos. The
Embassy itself is quite insistent that the
rules are scrupulously observed. Yet it ap-
parently has no system for regular photo-
graphic review of the results of individual
strikes, although it can and does ask for
special photography if there is reason to be-
lieve a violation has occurred. We made sev-
eral attempts to obtain photographs of spe-
cific towns which we had been told had been
bombed. The Embassy was unable to produce
such photographs and neither was 7/13th
Air Force. The Lao Ministry of Information
was reported to have photographs of bomb
damage on the Plain of Jars. In response to
its efforts to obtain copies of these for us,
the Embassy was given only photographs of
sightseeing dignitaries and fuzzy distant
views of Xieng Khouangville.
The Royal Lao Air Force is not bound by
the same rules of engagement and is theo-
retically free to do what it wishes, although
we were told that U.S. officials have sought
to do their best to influence the Lao to ad-
here to the same general principles. Never-
theless, Lao T-28 bombers have attacked
towns, Saravane being a well-known case in
point, the Chinese road and other targets
that are clearly off-limits to U.S. aircraft.
As noted above, Lao T-28s are not marked so
some of these attacks may well be blamed on
the United States U.S. Forward Air Con-
trollers have been able to assume control
over virtually all of the Lao Air Force sorties
in Military Regions III, IV and V, but not.in
Military Regions I and II. Furthermore, Lao
Air Force pilots are given special combat al-
lowances which are differer
region, and at least in son
they are paid a bonus for t
there is an incentive nc
strictly to rules of engage
gunships are not controlle
Controllers but control th
although most of these
situations were friendly tre
with enemy forces.
Aircraft loss figures are
in Vietniane, but we were
January 1970 and April lir;
25 U.S. aircraft and 13 crei
northern Laos and 56 airt
members lost in southern
do not include U.S. Forwa
(live FACs and one Air (
commander were lost in
FACs in the first 4 mom
B-52s (although none has
bat in Indochina) or Nay
?
In addition to military a
there is a large U.S. civil!'
In Laos run by Air Ainerice
and Lao Air Transport. Ti
operate under contracts w
funds are provided by AID
partment, CIA, and the S
The funding arrangements
Washington.
We were told that the civ
sists of 20 helicopters, 12 (
helios, 10 Porters, 7 C-46s,
C-123s and C-7As are "ba.1
is, they are rented from tl
the Lao T.-28e, they are una
In fiscal year 1970, the r
tract costs involved were $
(of which $0.5 million was
craft), $ [deleted] million f
million for the AID Ret
which administers the in
program. Air transport cent
$26.2 million. We were tol
is up about 10 percent in
Half of AID's fixed wine
million was for refugee re
CIA contract goes to fern
and forth each day to 1
Thong, and refugee sites, as
ation is so precarious that
remain there overnight. T
ample, 55 Americans sit Lor
Thong who are shuttled bra
Vientiane every day.
V. The military assista
The most recent inforr
mittee has received from r
Defense on the Defense De
military 'assistance progra
document dated January
titled "Estimated Amounts
tary Functions Appropria
1972 Budget fdr Support
Porde:a in Vietnam, Laos, a
Related Costs in Fiscal Year
1971, and Fiscal Year 1972.
gives as total estimated fie
the military assistance r
amounts of $74.2 million 1/
$117.3 million in fiscal yea'
million in fiscal year 1972.
were told that the fiscal y
ceiling was not $74.2 milli,
lion (although even that ce
ceeded by $21.4 million, s
military assistance progran
year 1970 was not 3712 ir
million). We were also tolc
of "recent messages from '
fiscal year 1971 ceiling had
$162.2 million, and the fiscre
to $252.1 million.
The explanation which v
the increase in total progn
1972, which Is double the
of the new funds needed, v
crease in fighting and the r
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S 12963
each military
iilitary regions
.e sortie so that
.0 adhere too
a tit. Lao AC-47
y Forward Air
own missions,
cc ions occur in
p are in contact
,cult to obtain
that between
iere have been
embers lost in
a t and 53 crew
s. These totals
1 kir Controllers
rations Center
1 70 and three
s of 1971) , the
e n lost in cam-
arrier aircraft.
?
-c aft operations,
fleet operating
( antinental Air,
s three carriers
? AID, although
t ie Defense De-
? Department.
S 12964
Approved FormaggpaupiliffetaPiwAyroo3000sooso-3
August 3, 1971
munition and ordnance. According to figures
given us in Vientiane, these ammunition and
ordnance costs were $79.4 million in fiscal
year 1970, declined to 651.7 million in fiscal
year 1971, but rose to $136.3 million in fiscal
year 1972. Of that $136.3 million, the Royal
Lao Air Force is to receive $ [deleted] million
(compared to about half that amount in
fiscal year 1971). and the irregulars will re-
quire an addition [deleted] million worth of
ammuntion. Incidentally, the other most
noticeable change in the program between
1970 and 1972 is the rise in operating costs
of the Lao Air Force from $74.3 million in
fiscal year 1970 to [deleted] million In fiscal
year 1972, reflecting costs of the [deleted]
T-28s to be provided the Lao by the end of
this calendar year.
Military assistance costs are thus rising
steeply, as they have throughout the pro-
gram. According to the figures we obtained
in Vientiane, the cost of the military assist-
ance program when it began in fiscal year
1963 was $11.9 million. That cost rose to $24.4
million in fiscal year 1964, $40.8 million in
fiscal year 1965, $50.7 million in fiscal year
1966, $80.8 million in fiscal year 1967, $79.4
million in fiscal year 1968, $90.4 million in
decal year 1969, and?aa explained above?
$146.4 million in fiscal year 1970, $162.2 mil-
lion in fiscal year 1971, and $252.1 million in
fiscal year 1972. The cost of military assist-
ance thus doubled every year between fiscal
year 1963 and fiscal year 1965, doubled again
between fiscal year 1965 and fiscal year 1967,
and in fiscal year 1972 it will be more than
three times as large as it was in fiscal year
1967 (and 25 times as large as it was when
it began 9 years ago) .
The military assistance program is designed
to support a Defense Department "force goal"
recently increased from [deleted] to [de-
leted]. As noted above, Royal Lao Army and
Air Farce strength is now [deleted].
The Royal Lao Air Force has some [de-
leted] T-28s, [deleted] C-47s, [deleted] II-34
helicopters, and [deleted] small 0-1 and U-
17 aircraft. It is "authorized" [deleted] T-
28s. The rate of loss of T-28.5 has been about
[deleted] a year. although in this fiscal year
almost that many have already been lost. As
noted above, [deleted] new T-28s are sched-
uled to be provided between now and De-
cember, although 10 of these will go to the
Thai Air Force and replace the 10 now on
loan from that program.
? ? ?
Die logistical functions of the military as-
sistance program are administered in Laos by
the AID Requirements Office rather than by
a MAAG as would normally be the case. This
device is used in order to maintain the ap-
pearance of U.S. compliance with the prohi-
bition against foreign military advisory per-
sonnel contained in the 1962 Geneva Agree-
ments. The Requirements Office has 34 U.S.
direct hire employees, all of whom are former
military personnel but are now AID em-
ployees; 24 third country nationals; 93 local
employees; and 65 Filipinos under contract
to Eastern Construction Co. In addition, there
are three Defense Department employees, 18
U.S. dependents three local employees, and
24 Filipinos under contract to the Eastern
Construction Co. who run an English lan-
guage school for Lao military personnel. We
did not have the chance to hear how Lao who
have been taught English by a Filipino use
the language, but those who have say the end
product is often quite unique.
The Requirements Office has regional offices
in each military region where liaison work is
done with the Army and the Air Force. We
were told that there is not much emphasis
in the Requirements Office operation on end-
use checking because, it was stated to us, a
Presidential waiver has been granted. (In
Cambodia, on the other hand, we had been
told that there has been no such waiver, and
end-use requirements thus continue to be
used as a Justification by the Defense De-
pertinent in arguing for an increase in the
size De the Military Equipment Delivery
Teams and more direct control over the me-
itary assistance program by CINCPAC.)
In addition to the Requirements Office
personnel, Army Attache personnel also work
with the Lao Army and Air Force in the
military regions. Of the 127 authorized Army
Attacea personnel, 24 are assistant Arnie
Attaches stationed in the five military in-
gions working with Royal Lao Array units.
In addition to gathering information art
doing some end-use checking, they perform
what seems -to amount to an advisory func-
tion. One officer from the Army Attache
office is permanently detailed to USIS where
his Joe is to "publicize the Lao Government
to the Lao people." Incidentally, these Army
personnel wear uniforms in the field and are
referred to by rank. The Air Force personnel
in the Air Operations Centers do not weer
uniforms, are called "Mister" and say they
are with the AID Mission if asked.
VI. CIA activities
A. Lao Irregular Forces
The most effective military force in Lass
is non the Royal Lao Army, but the form
known previously as the Arrnae Clandestine,
then as the SOU (for Special Guerrilla Unite
and now as the BGs (for the French term
BataiLlons Guerriers). The BG units are
part of the irregular forces which are trained,
equipped, supported, advised, and, to a
great extent, organized by the CIA. The
BG units have become the cutting edge ef
the Lao military forces, as one U.S. official
put it. The Royal Lao Army forces are con-
centrated near centers of population, lines
of ceinmunication, depots, and airfields and
in fact 3,000 members of the Army, or over
5 percent of the force, is -tied up in straiget
guard duty.
Royal Lao Army units are all controlled
by individual military region commanders
who are frequently likened to warlords. We
were told that Vientiane authorities are this
not at liberty to move them fro:n one region
to another as the overall military situation
may require. Apparently each such move
requires negotiation with regional author-
ities. The BO units, because of the Amen.
can connection, are relatively free from such
constraints. We were told, for example, that
at the outset of the recent crisis in Luang
Prabeng, the Prime Minister asked for ir-
regular units to defend the capital. The re-
quest was refused, and the Prime Minister
was compelled to negotiate with the regional
commanders in order to increase the forces
around Luang Prabang. The Prime Minister's
success in this negotiation was cited as ;in
indication of a growing sense of national re-
sponsibility on the part of regional military
and political figures or, at least, as a mar -
festa-.ion of their devot:ion to the king.
In addition to the greater flexibility with
which they may be used, the irregular forces
are considered -by American officials to be
better disciplined and more capable of con-
ducting independent unit operations. It !s
the Bei units that do most of the day-t' -
day pltrolling, ambushing, and attackt ag
throughout the country. As for other irreg.,. -
lar units, [deleted', self-defense units orge -
nize the defense of villages and conunarelo
teams go out to destroy trucks ind supplies
and ambush troops.
All of those in the BG units are volunteers
(referred to by the Americans in charge of
the programs as 'assets"' with the excepti-..e.
of some 1,500 cadre personnel and officers
from the Royal Lao Army. The CIA supervises
the operation closely and claims that, [de-
leted , the irregular units receive the ratioes
and oay due them. Also unlike the Royal
Lao Army, they are guaranteed evacuati
by Air America helicopters and subsequent
medical care, which for at least some of the un
is in a U.S. field hospital at the Royal ma
Air Farce-base at Udorn, Thailand. CIA "Case
Officers" supervise the training and advise
on operations of these irregular units, but we
were told that they do no accompany them
on operations. -
BG units and other supported para-
military and intelligence units exist not only
in Military Region II, where they first began
as a force of Meo tribesmen under General
Vang Pao, but in every military region, ex-
cept Military Region V around Vientiane.
There are [deleted] in Military Region
[deleted] in Military Region II, [deleted]
in -Military Region Ea, and [deleted] In
Military region IV. About 38 -percent of ir-
regulars are thus in Military Region
U. In fiscal year 1967, the irregular
forces totaled 37,800. Their strength rose to
39,800 in fiscal year 1969, but then dropped
to present totals by March of this year. The
authorized force level for U.S. support is
[deleted]. The size of the irregular forces
has been reduced since fiscal year 1969 be-
cause of attrition, principally desertion,
heavy casualties, and the financial restraints
incurred by budgetary limitations. We were
told that the costs of these forces have gone
up as increased combat activity resulted
in the expenditure of more ordnance and be-
cause of the necessity to rely more and more
on air transport as more Lao ter-
ritory has fallen under enemy control. The
CIA budget for the Lao irregulars was [de-
leted] million in fiscal year 1969. This year,
we were told in Vientiane, it is expected to be
about $[deleted] million. This figure does not
include the costs connected with the Thai
irregulars.
B. Thai Forces
At the time of our visit to Long Tieng on
April 28, there were [deleted] Thai there, at
the nearby base of Sam Thong, and at Hill
1563 near Sam Thong. (There was also a
s:nall Thai team of [deleted] men at Nam
Yu in Military Region I.) The Thai irregulars
are under [deleted] and the overall command
of General yang Pao, Commander of Mili-
tary Region II. Of these [deleted].
Most of the irregulars have been recruited,
we were told, as a "volu:nteer force" outside
the Thai Army, although [deleted]. The Thai
irregular program developed during the past
year and was designed-by the CIA specifically
along the lines of the irregular program in
Laos. The CIA supervises -and pays for the
traineng of these irregulars in Thailand and
provides their salary, -allowances (including
death benefits), and operational costs in
Laos. We were told that the details of the
funding were not known in Vientiane, as all
of this bookkeeping is done in Washington.
We were -also told, however, that some of the
funds probably come from the Defense De-
partment budget. The pay and allowances of
the Thai. irregulars are said to be less than
those of regular Thai Army personnel [de-
leted]. The Thai irregulars_ are transported
from Thailand to Leas by Air America and
are returned to Thailand when their tours
are up again by Air America. We were told
that the Embassy wanted to [deleted] the
[deleted] with [deleted] because the [de-
leted] were more mobile and thus "could do
things the others could not do." As for the
future, [deleted]. The need for Thai "volun-
teers" results from the fact that the military
manpower base in Laos is estimated to be
114,765 and the Lao Army, neutralist army,
irregulars and Pathet Leo all must draw from
this base which is now exhausted. (General
yang Pao's forces, for example, have suffered
3,272 killed and 5,426 wounded since 1967; as
a result 40 percent of his forces are no longer
Meo but Lao Thung). Thus additional mili-
tary manpower can only come outside Laos.
Estimates of the number of additional [de-
leted]. We also understand that there have
been intermittent discussions regarding the
possibility of [deleted].
Incidentally, we asked what motivated
Thai to volunteer for the irregular forces in
Laos in light of the heavy losses they have
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suffered. We were told that the principal
motivation was [deleted].
C. [Deleted]
D. Secrecy
The irregular force camps continue to be
kept behind a barrier of strict official secrecy.
This applies particularly to the principal
camp at Long Tieng. Reporters are not per-
mitted on either Air America, Continental,
Laos Air Force, or civilian planes which land,
or which even might land, at Long Tieng air-
port, the only means of reaching the camp.
Every nonofficial American or Lao who wishes
to fly to Long Tieng must have written per-
mission from General yang Pao, and passen-
gers are checked both getting on and getting
off planes. In fact, a few chosen reporters
have been allowed to visit Long Tieng but
they have been sworn to secrecy.
The principal arguments we heard for the
need to continue to maintain secrecy were
these: first, that General yang Pao does not
want to allow the press to visit because his
military security would be compromised; sec-
ond, that if reporters were permitted to visit
Long Tieng, they would concentrate on the
role of the United States, overlooking yang
Pao's contribution: third, that CIA is a clan-
destine organization not used to operating in
the open and that its operations in other
parts of the world might be compromised if
the techniques and individuals involved in
Laos were to become known; fourth, that
were U.S. activitieb publicized, the United
States would be accused of violating the Ge-
neva Agreements of 1962 and it would thus
be more difficult to re-establish the Geneva
Agreements as a framework for a future set-
tlement in Laos; and fifth, that the details
of the Thai presence would become known
Which would [deleted].
VII. The AID program
The total Lao budget for this year is 18.3
billion kip or $36.6 million. The estimated
total of U.S. economic assistance to Laos in
fiscal year 1971 is $52.036 million, a total that
has been about the same since fiscal year
1969 when it dropped from the higher totals
of fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1968.
The soope of the AID program covers vir-
tually every aspect of Lao civil administra-
tion. As a publication of the AID Mission in
Laos states, there are 24 broad projects in-
volving various fields, 145 activities going on
to implement these programs, and some 550
different individual. jobs.
The broad categories of the AID program
are economic stabilization (the Foreign Ex-
change Operations Fund which offsets the
effect of the Lao Government's budget defi-
cit), programs related to security (such as
assistance to refugees, medical assistance,
and air transport), the maintenance of gov-
ernmental services (such as hospital opera-
tion, dam repair, school building, teacher
training, public administration, police train-
ing, aind highway maintenance), social in-
frastructure (such as education and nurse
training), and economic development (such
projects as rice production, fisheries, agri-
cultural research, irrigation, power, indus-
try, and roads).
*
Points of interest from the AID publica-
tion "Pacts on Foreign Aid to Laos":
(a) The government obtains 90 percent of
its foreign exchange from the Foreign Ex-
change Operation Fund. Contributions to the
fund totaled $22.4 million in 1969, the last
year for which figures were published, of
which the United States contributed between
$16.1 million and $118 million, depending on
which set of AID figures is accepted. At a
minimum, in any case, the United States
contributed 72.5 percent of the foreign ex-
change provided. The other contributors
were Japan with $2 million., France with $1.'/
million (although it is said that the French
have a special farrangement with the Fund
which permits them to remove foreign ex-
change so that their contribution is often
less than it appears to be), the United King-
dom with $1.7 million, and Australia with
$0.7 million. When the Fund was originally
established in 1964. with a total contribution
of $7.8 million, the United States provided
51.3 percent of the total. That percentage has
gradually increased and has been over 70
percent since 1967.
(b) The Lao have recently had to expend
an estimated $4.5 million in foreign exchange
each year to import rice, the production of
whidh began to decline in 1960.
(c) Exports were valued at $2. million and
imports at $42.2 million in 1969. The United
States was the principal source of imports
in the first half of 1970, providing about 34
percent of total imports, followed by Indo-
nesia and Thailand. each with about 19
percent, Japan with 11 percent, and France
with 9 percent. Since independence, the
trade deficit of Laos has always been financed
by foreign economic assistance. In 1969, 67
percent of the country's imports were fi-
nanced by the Commodity Import Program
of the United States and by the Foreign Ex-
change Operations Fund.
(d) Lao budgetary expenditures for se-
curity last year equaled total government
receipts.
(e) Over two-thirds of budget revenues
are derived from customs duties and more
than half of this sum comes from duties
on gold. Direct taxes provide less than 10
percent of the total revenue.
(f) The literacy rate in Laos is 20 percent
compared to 41 percent in Cambodia, 60 per-
cent in South Vietnam. and 68 percent in
Thailand.
(g) The United States has constructed or
improved 3,272 kilometers of road, which is
slightly less than half of the total road net-
work of 6,392 kilometers of asphalt, gravel,
or laterite and earth roads in Laos.
(h) In any given year 25,000 to 30,000 peo-
ple become refugees in LAOS. The Royal Lao
Government estimates that since 1964 over
600,000 people have been displaced by the
war. The number of refugees "supported by
the government," to use the phrase found
in the AID publication, rose from about
108,000 in January 1963 to 275,000 in January
1970 and declined somewhat by May 1 to
257.800. (While refugees depend on the gov-
ernment for support, the government in
turn depends on the United States for sup-
port. In fiscal year 1971, the United States
provided $17.3 million for refugee relief. U.S.
aircraft drop approximately 50 tons of rice
each day at a total of 120 drop sites for refu-
gee use, and at an air delivery cost of 658
a ton which is about equal to the original
price of the rice, and the Public Law 480
food donation has risen from 3,700 metric
tons in fiscal year 1968 to 9,800 in fiscal year
1971.)
(i) AID has constructed 76 percent of the
total number of elementary classrooms in
Laos, 100 percent of the teacher training
schools, and 22 percent of the secondary
schools. In all, 88 percent of the students
enrolled in schools in Taos attend schools
which have received U.S. assistance.
(j) Economic assistance from other coun-
tries has been at an annual amount con-
siderably less than that contributed by the
United States. The Nam Ngum Dam is de-
scribed in the AID publication as a regional
project implemented under the auspices of
the Mekong Committee and financed by
grants from a consortium of nine donor na-
tions. The donations total $28.6 million, but
of this amount the United States has con-
tributed $15.6 million. The Asian Develop-
ment Bank has granted Laos $250,000 for a
feasibility study of agricultural activities and
a $973,000 loan for an irrigation project. The
total assistance from U.N. agencies amounted
to $968,000 in calendar year 1970. France,
which contributes the second largest amount
S 12965
of foreign assistance to La is now giving
betWeen $6 and $7 million ,..nar, most of it
for. technical and educati, n: institutions.
British assistance has droT pet from a pre-
vious high point of $6 mill .n to about $2.5
million annually, of which . million is the
British contribution to the '..)--eign Exchange
Operations Fund. Japan p ided, in 1970,
$1.7 million to the Foreign 'tange Opera-
tions Fund, $500,000 wort' -1 agricultural
equipment and $30,000 wor .)f humanitar-
ian assistance for refugees. ',u,tralian assist-
ance had reached an annual . e.-el of $1.2 mil-
lion by 1970 including a $ 000 contribu-
tion to the stabilization fur .. West Germany
has loaned the Royal Lao C. vrrnment 6 mil-
lion DM for the Vientiane p (wer distribu-
tion system. Canada, Thalia 0 New Zealand,
and India have provided 1.....r amounts of
assistance.
?
In addition to its own a '0,.1.ties in Laos.
AID provides support for 0 t?, CIA and the
military assistance prograr the AID food
distribution program, for e s Iple. feeds ir-
regular military units as a ql as their fam-
ilies who often are nearby efugee camps.
Until recently, this progra . _lad also been
totally .funded by AID, but .17, ta now funded
almost entirely by the Deft :it Department.
As noted earlier, both th or operations
branch and the Requireme ? t. Office of AID
are heavily involved in rn Ii ary programs.
While visiting Savannakhet a learned that
the airport which was beth I edicated that
weekend as an AID public _)r,.s project had,
in fact, been funded Iron Department of
Defense appropriations.
V///. Miscellaneou oints
A. In the subcommittee : rings in 1969,
the number of U.S. perso as of Sep-
tember 30 totaled 891. Of V: .4 ..otal, 558 were
so-called direct hire and 3, 3 were contract
personnel. In his speech 01 March 6, 1970,
the President gave a total ,f 1,040 consist-
ing of 616 direct hire and .1'4 contract. The
figures we were given total 0 ,t,',,een 1,143 and
1,231. Every set of figures received, and
they were given to us save ..s; times in the
course of our stay, showed 3.13 direct hire,
but the number of contract .(...-sonnel varied
from 480 to 568. We notice that the num-
ber of Air America personne x. as now some-
where between 276 and 415 The figures we
were given covered the full : ge. The figure
we were given for direct hir ,.ID employees
ranged from 330 to 395. It sc m,ed clear to us
that there is considerable n fusion in ac-
counting for the number . Americans in
Laos, and that the various r tugories of peo-
ple are shifted to keep the .11 tubers as low
as possible. In all fairness 1 t.tould be said
that the highest version of v rt 'us categories
include CIA personnel who -1 rst be hidden
in various components of t. it mission staff,
which may well account for ,e of the con-
fusion, and that the vario is contract ar-
rangements also make it 0 1 ult to cate-
gorize some personnel.
B. The mission does not se:r: to have made
much of an effort to keep r r -cord of what
factors have been resnonsib it for "generat-
ing" refugees. As a result, Ili v are unable
to provide proof to counter :1 egations that
most refugees are generated I 7 J.S. bombing.
Some of the officers who w( rk in the refu-
gee affairs section of AID, I try of whom
have been in the country lo years, esti-
mate that between 2 to 5 pe !ie :it are due to
the 'bombing. They say that hi it rest of the
refugees have come out beca .s. of their dis-
like of the North Vietnames nd their fear
of general military activity, 1: a most dreaded
aspect of which is the born ii g. They also
say that in the northeast a ot I. 30 percent
of the population has chose ? ? o remain in
Pathet Lao territory while :0 percent has
spot surveys that have been '0 ',ducted tend
left. On the other hand, t a few on-the-
to put more weight on eithe: t ,e experience
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of bombing, or the fear of bombing, as a
reason for moving. Certainly that was the
principal reason given by a group of refu-
gees with whom we talked outside of Seno,
only a few miles, incidentally, west of Dong
Rene captured by the enemy 10 days after we
left Laos.
Those who work most closely with the
refugee problem are particularly concerned
about the fate of the refugees from the tribal
areas, such as the Meo. There appears to be
little prospect of these people returning to
their native areas, and although they have
paid a heavy price in lives to defend their
homelands against the North Vietnamese?
thereby defending the capital and the Vien-
tiane plain as well?the minority people con-
tinue to be looked down upon by the ethnic
Lao who control the Government. Some
Americans believe that the situation of the
minority peoples pose a potentially serious
problem as more of them come to recognize
what little security the government in Vien-
tiane_ affords to them.
C. The Embassy in Vientiane told us that
the latest figures that they have for U.S.
personnel missing in Laos as of January 19,
1971, showed 232 U.S. personnel, including
one Air America pilot, missing since April 1,
1965. There is no firm evidence, according to
CIA, that any of these men are being held
prisoner in Laos by either the North Viet-
namese or the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao
representative told us that Prince Soupha-
nouvong had stated recently that the Pathet
Lao were holding prisoners, including some
Americans, and that these prisoners were
being held in a safe place. We asked him if
a list of the prisoners could be obtained,
pointing out that the North Vietnamese had
provided such a list. He said that the North
Vietnamese had not provided a list until after
the bombing had stopped and that the Pathet
Lao, similarly, would not do so as long as
the bombing continued.
D. The Royal Lao Government is holding
92 North Vietnamese prisoners of war. The
number of North Vietnamese prisoners taken
has thus been low in proportion to the num-
ber killed and wounded. There were 17 pris-
oners taken in 1968, 15 in 1969, 26 in 1970,
and 15 in 1971. Similarly, there have been
few North Vietnamese "ralliers"; that is,
those who have come over to the other side.
These ranters totaled 17 in 1968, 15 in 1969,
18 in 1970, and two in 1971. By comparison,
there were 725 Pathet Lao prisoners taken in
1968, 1,213 in 1969, 412 in 1970, and 144 in
1971. Similarly, there have been far more
Pathet Lao ralliers-270 in 1968, 401 in 1969,
174 in 1970, and 239 in 1971. The explanation
given for the low number of North Vietnam-
ese prisoners is that the North Vietnamese
prefer to commit suicide rather than permit
themselves to be captured. We also heard
reports, however, that the Lao sometimes
shoot North Vietnamese wounded prisoners,
especially when Lan -forces are in retreat.
Last year there were discussions between
the Lao and South Vietnamese governments
about turning over North Vietnamese prison-
ers in Laos to South Vietnam. The decision
was made not to do so. The United States
took no position in these discussions except
to say that it would-assist both goverments
in whatever decision was reached.
E. The table of instructions sent by the
State and Defense Departments about our
trip asked our Embassies in any country vis-
ited to be frank and forthcoming and to
avoid confrontation at all costs but stipu-
lated four subjects which were not to be
discussed with us. There were: (1) the de-
ployment of nuclear weapons; (2) military
contingency plans or military rules of en-
gagement past, present or proposed, includ-
ing the operational details of joint integrated
air defense, (3) the operational details of
sensitive operations, the disclosure of which
would clearly jeopardize the safety of
U.S. forces, and (4) military assistance
4
program plans and programs beyorei
fiscal year 1972 (In connection with which
the Embassy was instructed to say, if the
subject arose, that no decision had been
taken beyond 1972). The instructions ale-,
said that no documentation should be pro-
vided and that if documentation were ri-
quested. guidance should be sought from
Washington. In summary, the cable noted
that our approach "will likely be that _if
participants in an adversary process."
F. Deleted.]
IX. Future prospects
No one we met in Laos, American or Lao,
seems, to have a prescription fcr the future
other than to continue to do what is being
done now. Some observers pointed out to -is
that, in the long run, the odds are heavily
against defending Laos, given the advantages
the North Vietnamese enjoy. These are a
1,300-raile front along which they can at-
tack; short, well-developed and increasingly
heavily defended supply lines; a sanctuary
largely safe from direct attack; a population
10 times that of Laos; and a larger, more ex-
perieaced and better motivated army. In their
more optimistic moments Lao and Americans,
as well as meet western observers, expressed
a guarded belief that the Lao will be atee
to cling to what remains of their territcry
until the war ends in Vietnam, believing that
the war in Vietnam will end In an agreed
settlement in which the great powers will
participate and that this settlement will
lead to a similar resolution of the situate in
in Lace.
There is a sporadic dialogue between toe
Pathet Lao and Lao Governments, and a
Pathet Lao representative has arrived in
Vientiane within the past week to present
new proposals. But these new proposals are
apparently harder than previous proposals
and include a demand for a bombing cessa-
tion throughout Laos?not just in parts of
Laos, as previous dernands?before talks
can begin.
Thus, the prospect of negotiations seems
slim indeed. In the first place, the Pathet
Lao and North Vietnamese are in tree
strongest military position they have ever
enjoyed, -and it is difficalt to imagine what,
from their point of view, they might gain by
a compromise which did not bring an end to
U.S. bombing of the Trail. In the second
place. as long as we continue to provide the
Lao with the means for continuing the war,
even though at a high cost to us in money
and as exorbitant cost to then, in lives, and
as long as the leaders of Laos eee no crucial
need to negotiate, the initiative for a poli-
tical settlement will not come from the Lao.
The latest series of attacks all along the hue
In Laos may, however, force Lao leaders to
-alter their attitude toward negotiation, par-
ticularly if additional American or Thai help
Is not forthcoming. Finally, as far as I. S.
policy is concerned, it is quite apparent that
many American officials regard the continued
prosecution of the war in Laos as an essen-
tial adiunot of our current military strategy
in Vietnam because, in their view, -it ties
down two or more North Vietnamese dl?;a-
sions and permits us to exploit Lao terri-
tory to interdict the Trail, thereby buy:ng
time for Vietriamization. In this sense, we
are -indeed using the Lao for our own rylr-
pOses at an increasingly heavy cost- to them
In lives and territory. At the same time, U.S.
officals also believe that if U.S. air activities
in Laos were stopped, the military situatien
woute be even more serious in Mlltary Re-
gions U, UI, arid IV and that all of Military
Region II, including the vital base at Long
Tieng, could be lost.
The Thai irregulars constitute a new cc In-
plicating factor, one not yet fully acknowl-
edged by some accustomed to dealing with
Laos within the context of an Indochina war.
Some observers pointed out to us, however,
that it would seem to follow from the pres-
ence of these Thai in a key strategic loca-
tion in Laos that the That will inevitably be
parties to any negotiation with the North
Vietnamese, the issue for them being the
line demarcating areas of influence in Laos.
And in connection with areas of influence,
it was pointed out to us that the practical
effect of the 'Chinese road is that the Chinese
border has already been shifted southward
to encompass a substantial portion of north-
ern Laos.
Both the Royal Lao Government and the
United States Government seem to consider
themselves tied inextricably to the concept
of the 1962 Geneva Agreements. Prince Min-
ister Souvanna Phouma indicated in his con-
versation with us that he regards these agree-
ments as a commitment on the part of the
great powers in general, and the United
States in particular, to provide military as-
sistance and financial support. He also seems
to view the agreements as a pattern for the
future. It is difficult for some observers to
see how agreements violated so blatantly, by
both parties, can be regarded as a realistic
basis for a future settlement when they have
not accomplished this end so far. Yet the
statement is persistently heard in Vien-
tiane?from both Lao and United States offi-
ciaLs?that the Geneva Agreements of 1962
can be implemented after the war in Viet-
nam is settled or in conjunction with a set-
tlement. And no one seems willing to admit
the possibility that there may be no final
settlement but merely -a continuation of the
war in Vietnam, though perhaps_ at a some-
what-reduced level.
If there is no settlement in Vietnam and
the war also continues; in Laos. Laos will re-
main a hostage available to the North Viet-
namese should they wish to draw American
airpower away from Cambodia and South
Vietnam, embarrass the United States,
threaten Thailand or bring the Chinese into
closer involvement. Perhaps the only real
protection the Lao have is whatever limits
the North Vietnamese wish to place on them-
selves. Some U.S. officials believe that these
limits include not taking over the whole
country but continuing to use Lao territory
as a supply route while assisting the Pathet
Lao as a political?as well as military?force
with the final objective of a partitioned Laos
in which the eastern portion will be governed
by the Pathet Lao and the western portion by
a regime not unsympathetic to North Viet-
nam. Meanwhile, the area under government
control shrinks steadily, the cost to the
United States rises, the Pathet Lao consoli-
date their hold on territories no longer un-
der government control and the Lao Govern-
ment's professed policy of neutralism con-
tinues to hang by the single human thread
of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. He, in
turn, seems to be increasingly isolated from
other powerful political figures in his coun-
try who wish to involve the United States, or
ehe Thai, even further in the defense of
what remains of their country, knowing that
they cannot possibly defend it themselves.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the motion of the
Senator from Montana.
(The motion was agreed to, and, at
:34 p.m., the doors of the Chamber
were- opened.)
,??111.1111.11111??=????????-.-
AMERICAN INDIANS MUST NOT
STOP RUNNING
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, Amer-
ican Indians are the poorest of the poor.
Our national policy toward the American
Indian has been a disgrace. The pattern
has been the same with few exceptions.
We took their land and confined them
to reservations which often could not
sustain them. With attention focusing on
the problems of the Indians as never be-
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gonna close them and lay the blame on us."
Another USW local president, Morros
Brummitt, who heads an MOOD-man local at
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'s Aliquippa, Pa.,
mill, says company negotiators warned of
such closings. "They said that they had mar-
ginal operations and that an unacceptable
contract would cause them to phase out
some plants or departments," he says. An-
other J&L local chief quotes company bar-
gainers as saying, "fff you force us to put
too much money in, it may force us to close
down."
Industry officials don't dispute predictions
of mill closings. "I 'know we have some open-
hearth capacity that will never come back on
again," says one management man, Steel fi-
nancial analysts agree. "More and more of
the old mills are going to be phased out,"
says one Wall 'Street source
Some industry men see a repeat of the cut-
backs of the early 1960s, when steel remand
slumped after the industry had taken a 116-
day strike in 1959. In 1960, for instance, 17.5.
Steel announced "temporary" closedowns of
steel-making facilities at Donors and Clair-
ton, Pa. Those old Monongahela Valley facil-
ities were "temporarily" idle for about two
years?and then were permanently shuttered.
Albert T. Delsandro, who lost his mill job
in Donora and now is the mayor there,
remembers how it was. "It is a staggering
blow to the economy of the town" to have
about 1,700 jobs wiped out, he says. "I wish
the other steel communities a lot of luck,
because it is a tough blow."
In Youngstown, where U.S. Steel last month
"temporarily" closed its 2,700-man Ohio
Works due to lagging orders, USW local of-
ficials were so worried the plant would never
reopen that they mobilized some political
muscle against U.S. Steel. Responding to
their appeals, their Congressman, Charles
Carney, confirms that he persuaded Rep.
Wilbur Mills, head of the House Ways and
Means Committee, to extract a pledge from
U.S. Steel chairman Edwin H. Gott that the
closing would in fact be temporary. Says Al
Wellington, a vice president of the USW local
at the Ohio Works: ''Now that we have the
word of such honorable people (as Messrs.
Mills and Gott) we feel we have a chance to
start up again."
Besides closely scrutinizing their own
operations for possible pruning, at least some
steelmakers may begin eyeing each other as
merger partners, financial analysts believe.
They say that such consolidations may be
the only way to save the industry's weakest
companies.
"If the National-Granite City deal goes
through, I think you are going to find other
mergers occurring hi the industry," says Ted
Gerken, vice president at Laird Inc., a New
York-based brokerage house. "It would be
very good for the industry, because steel
companies all over the world are doing it"
and presenting a more formidable competi-
tive threat, he asserts.
A top official of the Steelworkers Union
agrees. "I think there may be too many
steel companies," he says. "I think you'll see
some mergers."
A prospect more threatening to the union,
however, is the increased possibility that
American steelmakers will try establishing
mills abroad. One big steel company looking
into the possibility of a foreign mill concedes
that anticipation of a major labor cost in-
crease here was one reason for exploring the
idea.
Armco Steel Corp. is far along on an in-
vestigation of building a mill in Australia
that Would ship semifinished steel to the
U.S. for final processing. "Armco is convinced
that good management dictates a move over-
seas for the production of semi-finished
steel," says an executive. This proposition
has "passed the 'whether' stage?it's only
a question of when such a move will be
made," he adds. Though Armco isn't dis-
closing its timetable, observers believe the
costly labor settlement will increase its in-
terest, and that of other producers, in over-
seas producion. Such a move, of course, would
take jobs from the U.S. and threaten losses
in the ranks of the USW.
USW officials concede they face a declining
membership in the basic steel industry.
"There will be fewer steelworkers," says one
top official. Mill employment has been dwind-
ling for many years. The steel industry's
average number of hourly workers dropped
to 403,000 last year from 458,000 in 1985. The
USW has been able to offset this drop in its
major membership group by enrolling more
members in non-steel industries and absorb-
ing some smaller unions; currently, it has
more than 1.2 million members.
THE DECLASSIFIED SUBCOMMII i
STAFF REPORT ON LAOS
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that a state-
ment released yesterday in connection
with the publication of a report on Laos
by the staff of the Subcommittee on U.S.
Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
THE DECLASSIFIED SIIEICOMMITTEE STAFF
REPORT ON LAOS
I am releasing today the sanitized text of a
report, entitled "Laos: April 1971," prepared
by the Staff of the Subcommittee on United
States Security Agreements and Commit-
ments Abroad. The report, originally classi-
fied Top Secret, was presented at an exec-
utive session of the Subcommittee on May 21.
Believing that the substance of said report
should be brought to the attention of the
entire Senate, I subsequently requested,
with the concurrence of the Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, a closed
session of the Senate to discuss the situation
in Laos. This session was held on June 7.
Acting in accordance with the orders of
the Senate, the Staff of the Subcommittee
then met with representatives of the Depart-
ment of State, the Department of Defense
and the Central Intelligence Agency in order
to discuss what portions of the proceedings
of this Senate session and the staff report
should be deleted for reasons of national
security prior to publication.
These discussions began on June 21 and
were concluded July 29.
The deletions in the report and in the
record of the closed session of the Senate,
which I understand will appear in the REC-
ORD of Tuesday, August 3, are those which
the Executive Branch insists are necessary for
reasons of national security.
It is an encouraging sign that the Execu-
tive Branch has finally agreed that much of
what the United States Government has been
doing in Laos may now be made public. The
veil of secrecy which has long kept this
"secret war" in Laos officially hidden from
the American people has been partially lifted.
We doubt, however, that this veil would
have been even partially lifted if the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations had not ascer-
tained for itself the facts concerning Amer-
ican operations in Laos.
In this connection, I note that since the
visit of the Subcommittee Staff to Laos in
April, at which time they began submitting
reports by cable from Vientiane, certain facts
have been made public by the Executive
Branch which facts were heretofore kept
secret from the American people. These in-
clude the fact that since early 1970 the
United States has been conducting B-52
raids in northern Laos on a regular basis;
official confirmation that there are Thai
forces in Laos; the fact the United States is
paying for these Thai troops: also admission
that, although the only prey
announced official expenditth
Fiscal Year 1971 was approxin
lion in economic assistance,
United States operations in
Fiscal Year was about $350 nal
of bombing costs.
Unfortunately there continu t..) be various
facts which the Executive I 'ranch insists
must remain classified. In p rttcular, that
Branch continues to be unwilli ig to acknowl-
edge certain truths concerniz g the nature,
composition and command ar angements of
the Thai forces in Laos, the nets of which
forces are paid for with fund a ppropriated
by the Congress and provided iy the Ameri-
can people without their knot
Furthermore, these facts wl lea the Exec-
utive Branch continues to reft se to declassi-
fy bear on the question of A tether past
and present arrangements for United States
support for That forces in La s onstitute a
violation of amendments to tae Fiscal Year
1971 defense authorization a id appropria-
tions acts.
The stated reason for I lit Executive
Branch refusal to declassify :base facts is
so as to avoid making public that the Gov-
ernments of Thailand and La a to not wish
to make public. But since th - axpayers of
this country are paying the bil a, why should
the recipient foreign goverrur inta have the
right to dictate what our cit zens can and
cannot be told about the way which pub-
lic funds are being spent?
If the Administration wish. =' continue
arguing that the Thai forces n ox in Laos are
"local forces in Laos," it wo, id seem they
should produce proof of such aa assertion:
and at the same time explai; heir insist-
ence upon suppressing facts wl IC., make that
assertion highly questionable.
Let us hope that, despite tr
which the Executive Branch h;
staff report on Laos will help
public decide whether It is eitl
sirable for the United State
to do what we have been doi
ever-increasing cost to this t
lass, and to the Lao people
territory.
In any case, such a fundan mtal decision
should not be made by a ea 'mil group of
Government officials who oterate behind
closed doors on the basis a -nformation
available only, to them- -Mich Is who there-
upon are free to control wh tt the public
shall know of their decisions.
If this democracy is to con: 'n le to func-
tion with the consent of th uoverned, it
would appear obvious that t )th the Con-
gress and the public should ta-e as muoh
of the truth as possible abou, &Leh policies
and programs of this Governn n t, especially
as the programs in question require hun-
dreds of millions of dollars an: ually in pub-
lic money and even more imp sl ant involve
this country both directly ant 1 ',directly in
armed conflict.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Preside it. it is cus-
tomary to blame whatever :"r mident we
have for whatever is the itate of the
economy. I think it would mat: be amiss
for us in Congress to acce t a part of
that responsibility.
Take the steel settleme: ?t. Everyone
Is talking about the fact when we
increase wages we have to increase the
price of steel. We would no have to in-
crease wages and we would not have to
increase the price of steel H Congress
had not been voting more money than
the President asked for, if we had not
been anxious to apply a "gr en poultice"
to every ailment, believing ti at by throw-
ing money up at it we can so: v e iny prob- ?
lem.
S 12907
:nay publicly
n Laos for
=i,tAy $50 mil-
tie cost of all
os in that
tic is, exclusive
rieletions on
naisted, the
',be American
et wise or de-
o continue
ig in Laos at
at ion in dol-
if lives and
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CONGRESSIONALMUNI A 1 t August 3, 197
Thus, Congress has participated in the
inflationary rise.
Thereupon, union labor asks for an
increase in living wages under their right
of collective bargaining. Management ac-
cedes and then management increases
the cost of its product. Then everyone
gets up on the Senate and House floors
and says, first, that it is the fault of the
President and, second, that it is the fault
of management.
I submit that is not so much the fault
of anyone, but that the effect is due to
the operation of labor unions and man-
agement and also to the fact that both
are impelled to do what they do, because
the Government has been increasing the
cost of living.
Therefore. I believe that Congress
should take a greater share of the blame.
Congress should be willing to admit that
it should not blame management alone
at the expense of labor and exculpate
labor; or blame labor and exculpate
management. It is a three-legged stool,
and we are responsible for the fashion-
ing of the weakest of the three legs.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
would the able minority leader yield?
Mr. SCOTT. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the
minority leader knows of the great re-
spect in which I hold him. If his remarks
are the result of the short statement I
made today. may I say that I do not
blame labor primarily. The problem of
their leaders is to get enough in the way
of a working wage to insure a decent
living for their people.
Nor do I blame management primarily.
Management is interested in making as
much profit as possible. Together they
both realize or should realize, that these
price increases and wage increases make
us even less competitive in foreign mar-
kets.
The problem would now appear pri-
marily one for the Government. As to
whether it primarily is the problem of
Congress or the executive branch, I per-
sonally feel it is a problem for the oper-
ating leadership of the Government,
which is the executive branch.
May I say in this connection that since
1966 I have recommended more fiscal
recognition of the problem.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. SYMINGTON. And since 1967
more control over prices and wages.
TM:6u 1.6 TO SENATOR STENNIS
ON HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY
Mr. GAMBRELL. Mr. President, I take
note that on this date in 1901, the dis-
tinguished junior Senator from Missis-
sippi (Mr. STENNIS) was born. I know
that we all want to extend to the Sen-
ator from Mississippi a happy birthday
on his birthday today.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, if the
Senator would yield. I believe I have the
privilege of having known the Senator
from Mississippi longer than any other
Member of the Senate. I was in school
with him. I was next door to him. He is
a very dear friend. I do not charge him
with holding all of my views. We differ
on many issues.
OICHAAMMKNORA,,,,N,AMOIM,
I 4oin with the junior Senator frpm
Georgia in wishing him happy birthday.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I,
too. would like to join the distinguished
junior Senator from Georgia and -..ne
distinguished minority leader in :he
remarks they have had to make today
about the distinguished Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) .
We differ on many occasions about
many issues. However, I have always
found him to be a man of honor, integ-
rity, and distinction.
May I say that his great attempt to
maintain the Senate amendment in the
draft bill was most responsible.
I commend the Senator from Missis-
sippi. He worked hard and carried out
the best traditions of the Senate. He
tried to carry out the will of the Senate.
I do not always agree with his direc-
tion, but he is entitled to credit for what
he attempted to do, and he did so with
stubbornness and understanding.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there
further morning business?
QUORUM CALL
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. W:th-
out objection, it is so ordered.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECU-
TIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid
before the Senate the following letters,
which were referred as indicated:
REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
PROCUREMENT
A letter from the Acting Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense submitting, pursuant to law,
the report of Department of Defense Procure-
ment from Small and Other Business Firms
for July 1970?May 1971 (with accompanying
report); to the Committee on :Banking, H -fus-
ing. and Urban Affairs.
INTERIM REPORT FROM THE U.S. METRIC STUDY
A letter from the Secretary of Comlnerce
submitting the seventh in the series of in-
terim reports stemming from the U.S. Metric
Study, prepared by the National Bureau of
Standards (with accompanying report) ; to
the Committee on Commerce.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION RELATING TO BASIC PAY
OF THE MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICE'R OF THE
COAST GUARD
n letter from the Secretary of Transporta-
tion submitting proposed legislation to make
the basic pay of the master chief petty officer
of the Coast Guard comparable to the basic
pay of the senior enlisted advisers of the
other Armed Forces, and for other purposes
(with accompanying papers) ; to the Commit-
tee on Commerce.
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
A letter from the Secretary of the Interior
transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on
the activities of the geological survey during
the period January 1 through June 30, 1971;
to the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.
ANNUAL WELFARE PROGRAM REPORT OF :EIEW
A letter from the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Heal iii, Education, and Welfare
transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the
efforts of State public welfare agencies to
provide social services to families with de-
pendent children (with accompanying re-
port ) ; to the Committee on Finance.
REPORT ON CERTAIN DEFECTOR ALIENS
A letter from the Commissioner, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, reporting,
pursuant to law, on certain bona fide defector
aliens (with accompanying papers) ; to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
REPORT ON SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF
A CERTAIN ALIEN
A letter from the Commissioner, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, reporting,
pursuant to law, on the suspension of de-
portation of Vicente Aguilar-Munoz (with
accompanying papers); to the Committee on
the Judiciary.
REPORT ON ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS OF
CERTAIN ALIENS
A letter from the Commissioner, Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, reporting,
pursuant to law, on the adjustment of status
of certain aliens (with accompanying pa-
pers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.
REPORT ON CERTAIN ALIENS
A letter from the Commissioner. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, reporting,
pursuant to law, on orders entered in cases
In which the authority contained in section
212(d) (3) of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act was exercised in behalf of such
aliens (with accompanying papers); to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
.....????=1?01MMINIM
PkawrIONS
Petitions were laid before the Senate
and referred as indicated:
By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:
A joint resolution of the Legislature of the
State of California; to the Committee on
Appropriations:
"SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 21
"Resolution relative to unemployment
Insurance
"Whereas, In the San Francisco area alone,
300 postal employees have been laid off and
the total is expected to reach 1,000 by
May 1, 1971, when the layoff will be com-
pleted; and
"Whereas, Federal employees in other cate-
gories are also being laid off, and this sev-
erance program is being carried out in all
California cities, and in all other states of
the Union; and
"Whereas. Those federal employees already
laid off have applied for their unemployment
Insurance, but they were refused because the
budget item has not been considered yet so
there is no money available; and
"Whereas, R requires the permission of the
President to have this budget item considered
out of order; and
"Whereas, The former federal employees
have waited the necessary two weeks before
applying for unemployment insurance, their
funds are very low, and many of them can-
not pay their rent and will have to apply for
public assistance either to pay rent or to buy
food; and
"Whereas, Federal employees in prior years
have repeatedly been compelled to suffer de-
lays in the payment of federal unemployment
benefits due to the failure of the federal
government to prolvd? the necessary funds;
now, therefore, be it
"Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of
the State of California, jointly, That the Leg-
islature of the State of California respect-
fully memorializes tile President and the
Congress of the United States to allocate
moneys to the federal unemployment insur-
ance fund in order that former federal em-
ployees. recently laid off, can draw their un-
employment insurance compensation; and be
It further
"Resolved, That the Legislature of the
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