CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE RE: THE BOMBING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 19, 2002
Sequence Number:
64
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 13, 1971
Content Type:
OPEN
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CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1.pdf | 1.19 MB |
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H 6672
Approved FCO Release I00 /~ /0 $DP7 96R0003000800ft1, 13, 19i1
happy that Mr. Hoover is aware of their
activities.
Much of the FBI's work is unheralded.
Much of its work is of a type not amen-
able to publicity. In, any :investigation,
there is much routine, matter-of-fact
work that is neither glamorous nor un-
duly exciting. Yet it is important.
It is important why? Because this is
the way the FBI is' protecting you and
me.
As Americans we should be apprecia-
tive and I am happy to salute Mr. Hoover,
a courageous American, as he enters his
48th year as Director of the FBI.
Ask citizens in all areas of America.
Ask citizens in my district in Florida. Al-
most to a man they will say, "I'm glad
there is an FBI."
This indeed is testimony of the debt
which the Nation owes to the men and
women of the FBI.
[Mr. McCLOSKEY addressed the
House. His remarks will appear hereafter
in the Extensions of Remarks.]
THE BOMBING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
F The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
a previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) is
recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield so that I may conclude
my statement?
Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5
minutes to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia (Mr. GUBSER).
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman for yielding.
I think it is about time that we read
into the RECORD something which is dif-
ferent than the allegation that this is a
U.S. war against the Pathet Lao.
One of the authorities quoted by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Mc-
CLOSKEY) Is Ronald J. Rickenbach, for-
mer refugee and relief officer for the
Agency for International Development,
I shall read parts of his testimony, but
I am not going to take them out of con-
text-I can assure you of that.
This appears at page 23 of the report
entitled "Refugee and Civilian War Cas-
ualty Problems in Laos and Cambodia."
In speaking of the Meo tribesmen, he
says:
From conception, the Moo "cause" has
simply been an effort on their part to protect
their homeland from outside incursion. Their
intended purpose: merely self-preservation.
The Communist North Vietnamese moved
Into Laos, and in force.
The armed presence of the North Viet-
namese Army was enough to put the Moo
on the defensive, in line with tradition.
However; their options were limited; ac-
commodate themselves, fight or flee. They
could not very well fight without arms, and
assistance; they could flee, but to nowhere
as suitable to their way of life than where
they already were; or they could accommo-
date themselves in some peaceful, subser-
vient way to the Vietnamese presence,.:. .
It is at this crucial juncture that the
American Government's involvement can be
traced.
That was in the late 1950's.
Then the gentleman concludes his
testimony, and this is Mr: Rickenbach:
But I feel, at the same time, that it is of Member who is not frankly committed
paramount importance that we do not com- to the view that our colleague and my
pound our mistakes- . friend, the gentleman from California
And he meant in Southeast Asia- (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) has advanced. But I
by not, in some form, showing a continuing ask this question based upon my own per-
commitment to those people who over the sonal knowledge of some of the facts you
years have shown the greatest loyalty to our have alluded to, having accompanied Mr,
presence, whether history eventually justi- MCCLOSKEY to Indochina and having
fies that presence or not. been present on several occasions as de-
No single group, I am sure, has been as scribed by other parties who were pres-
true an ally to America during this conflict eat. I do not suggest to you that you have
believe as the hill
thlat it is the tribesmen responsibility Laos. I and obli- firmly misrepresented what was told to either
that
of this committee to insure that, in Mr. MCCLOSKEY or me because you were
one way or another, they are given a more not there and you were of necessity re-
just repayment than pure abandonment, in quired to rely on third persons. But I
this, their hour of truth. can say to you that in several instances
Let us not forget that this war is going those third persons have misled you.
on in Laos for one reason-the North The first instance is as to Reverend
Vietnamese are invading it. The North Roffe and it pains me as I know it pains
Vietnamese are invading it and the Meo you to hear suggested that a man of the
tribesmen are resisting that invasion, cloth would mislead you, but that is pre.
Mr. WALDIE. Can the gentleman tell cisely what he has done, if you have re-
me from his vantage point of superior ported his conversation with you on page
knowledge and information, and I say H6656, wheiie you recite in your state-
that seriously as a member of the Com- ment, and I am not quoting this but it is
mittee on Armed Services, if the Meos are in the second column about one-third
being employed by the Central Intelli- the length down, where it says that Rev-
gence Agency? erend Roffe has told Mr. Hecht that he
Mr. GUBSER. First of all, let us talk detected no discrepancy between the an-
about this question of superior knowledge swers given by rather Menger and those
I do not have a thing in the world that is which lie heard from the refugees them-
not available to the gentleman from Cali-
fornia-not a thing. Ask Congressman
HEBERT and he will show you anything
that I am privileged to see. So I am not
in a superior position of having any su-
perior knowledge.
The Meo tribesmen are supported by
the U.S. Army and the U.S. advisers and
they have been for many, many years.
Mr. WALDIE. Are they not employed
by the Central Inteligence Agency?
Mr. GUBSER. As to whom they are di-
rected by or financed by, I am not pre-
pared to say, but at this time they have
the support of the United States and
they have fought valiantly.
Mr. WALDIE. Let me ask this question.
Do you know whether they are in the
employ of Central Intelligence Agency or
whether you are at liberty to say so-you
do not know that?
Mr. GUBSER. No, I do not know that.
Mr. WALDIE. Were I to ask that ques-
tion of Mr. HEBERT, would that knowledge
be within his purview? Do you know?
Mr. GUBSER. I cannot answer for the
gentleman from Louisiana.
Mr. WALDIE. Certainly, this may be a
peripheral issue, but I understand mem-
bers of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices are very privy to the appropriations
for the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. GUBSER. Not on the Committee
Is that your understandini';?
Mr. GUBSER. That is what Mr. Hecht
told me; yes.
Mr. WALDIE. The fact of the matter
is that I think these statements by Rev-
erend Menger ought to be clearly brought
out for your information.
I guess you have apparently relied
heavily on their version of the refugee
situation in Laos.
I only add this information to your
well of intelligence, of their background,
and of their credibility as I personally
experienced it.
In the first place, the 16 refugees in-
volved in about a 4-hour period of inter-
viewing, eight of whom were interviewed
by me and eight of whom were inter-
viewed by Mr. MCCLOSKEY are an inter-
esting parallel to the refugee conclusions
that you stated-a church croup did in-
terview 350 people.
Mr. GUBSER. No, 150.
Mr. WALDIE. It was 150 in 1 day and
we were only able to interview 16 between
the two of us in 4 hours.
Now I want to go into their interviews
later to see whether they have showed
you their interviews: You have seen the
statement. Did they have statements of
those interviews?
on Armed Services-we do not have a Mr. WALDIE. They only gave you an
thing in the world to do with appropria- assessment of the interviews.
tions for the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. GUBSER. Exactly, a; quoted; yes.
Mr. WALDIE. Do you have anything to Mr. WALDIE. Let me tell you a little
do with the authorization for the Central bit about Reverend Roffe. They flew
Intelligence Agency? down into the village, that sleepy refugee
Mr. GUBSER. I would presume yes. village. You are absolutely right. You
However, I do not know about the au- have been on enough trips overseas, as I
thorizations for the Central Intelligence have, to know that if you do not select
Agency. There are facets of the bill that where you want to go, you will go where
could be that-I do not know. they want to go. They wanted us to go
Mr. WALDIE. Let me ask you a ques- to a large party. They wanted us to fly
tion or two before I yield to my good up north to the capital where we could
friend, the gentleman from California go to a party and have some dancing
(Mr. DELLUMS). I ask this question as a done by Laotian dancers.
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That was not the purpose for which refugees whom I had first interviewed to
we were there. it was not the purpose we check Father Monger's translation. This
should have been there. We said. "Thank was a massive village of refugees, and
you, but we will select the places we they had faded into that population with
want to go." It was rude, perhaps, but it the exception of one. I found that one
was our own consensus-and I shared refugee.
Mr. MCCLOSKEY'S view that the infor- I asked the identical questions I had
mation that would be derived from our asked In the presence and with the as-
selected itinerary would in all probability sistance of Father Menger. The responses
establish more accurate or Informative as to the presence of enemy soldiers in
information than we would have gleaned the village were entirely contrary to
rom sources that they delivered to us. what Father Menger had testifld.
We flew to this refugee site in two hell- The next three groups of refugees that
copters. Both interpreters, Rev. Ed Rolle I interviewed, not one said that there
and Father Menger, provided us by Am- were enemy soldiers in the village. So
btissador Godley, were warranted to us Reverned Roffe to you was telling the
as independent, excellent interpreters truth when he said there was no distinc-
that had been used by the embassy on tion between the translations of the ref-
siinilar occasions in the past. Father ugees given to me and those given to
Meager was in my helicopter and next to Father Menger.
lne. Reverend Rolle was in Mr. McCLOS- What he was saying is that there was
xaY's helicopter. My first exposure to no difference between the translation of
Father Menger, I confess to you, was refugees given to him than given Father
not a very palatable or a very warm ex- Menger when he accompanied "PETE"
posure. MCCLOSKEY with a backup interpreter,
On the way down the Father was dis- because in the second round of interpre-
cussing the problems in Indochina, His tations with Father Menger interpreting
statement to me was precisely these for "PETE" with a backup interpreter, in
words: fact, there were no enemy soldiers in the
The trouble with the American youth of village.
today is they are yellow. They are not willing So let me suggest to you from personal
to shed their blood for other peoples. experience, as a fairly neutral observer,
My reaction to that was, as your reac- not total, and becoming less so as the
tion would have been, one of being aghast days progress on this issue, Father
such an accusation, My comment Menger in my view is not a credible trans-
at
the t such her was this: lator. He either does not understand
a
Father,, you may be familiar with the Laotian or is not willing to translate it
Laotian situation, having been here 20 years, -as it was given.
but you have been away from America for He either does not understand Laotian
a long time and are not familiar with the or was not willing to translate it as it
American situation now. You do not have to was given. Reverend Roth translated it as
go that far, however. Go to Vietnam, from accurately as it was delivered, according
where Mr. McCloskey and I have just come. to the intrepreter along with us.
Go to the hospital we visited and take a
look at the Americans who have shed their The question that I asked of the Em-
blood for causes in which I dp not believe bassy people all along involved the ques-
and probably they do not believe. tion the gentleman has constantly posed
That was the basis on which I was about this survey on which the gentle-
introduced to Father Menger, man from California (Mr. MCCLOSKEY)
During the interview of the eight ref- has relied, that it was a very limited
ugees, four of them in the first round I survey of a very limited group of people
was interviewing with Father Menger's in a very limited period of time in a very
assistance and one other reporter, who limited space. They claim that to base the
unfortunately did not speak Laotian and conjectures and the extraction of the
neither did I. With Mr. MCCLOSKEY was hypothesis on that, which the gentleman
Reverend Roffe and several others who from California (Mr. McCosxEY) has--
spoke Laotian to check his translation. that is a matter that concerned me. I
We met after 2 hours and he commented - asked the Embassy officials about it when
to me, he said, "It is remarkable." this report finally came to light-and it
I said, "What is remarkable?" seems'a question that should concern us
He said: all, but I am not going to dwell on the
The fact that there was riot in one in- details as to how it came to light or
stance of one interview that I conducted an whether it was probably concealed or not,
enemy soldier either within the village or That is not of interest to me.
closer than 2 to l0 miles from the village The fact is that once it came to my
at the time of the bombing "tack on the attention it was immediately disclaimed
village that produced the wounded refugees
or the evacuated refugee, as not being a valid refugee report, as the
gentleman suggested was claimed by the
I said, "That is Lemarkable." Embassy people. They said that it was
Among my four interviews there was
not one who did not say in his village that
in fact there were either both Laotian or
North Vietnamese soldiers.
We decided that coincidence was re-
markable, so remarkable that it should
be tested.
He then took Father Menger on the
next round of interviews. I took Reverend
Roffe along with two men who also spoke
Laotian, I tried to And all four of the
sador runs that country as if it were a
fiefdom, and the Central Intelligence
Agency runs it as if it is a fiefdom also.
But the fact of the matter is all the
resources are under their control to take
the polls and to say whether thi.t poll
is inaccurate.
It may very well be a fact that it is,
but it is the only poll they have.
I have one more response-and I am
sorry I have not yet yielded to the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS)
as he requested, but I have one more
comment.
I was pleased to hear the response to
the gentleman from Michigan r Mr.
RIEGLE) that the gentleman would . oin in
requests for photographs. As I reed this
testimony quite closely, it is not the gen-
tleman's belief, I gather, that the photo-
graphs that have been sought to confirm
or deny the existence in the first instance
of villages in the area in question are not
in existence-those photographs are not.
It is the gentleman's argument, as I
understand this, that although they may
be in existence, they are so difficult to
interpret, that there Is a danger in re-
leasing those photographs, because they
may be misinterpreted.
In response to that, I think this t is a
valid argument, the conclusion at least,
that any photograph might very well be
susceptible of a variety of interpretations
as to what happened to the villaies if,
in fact, the villages have been destsoved.
But it does seem to me as a lawyer that
the determination is within the hands of
the jury as to whether the evidence is
credible or not, If it is in the possession
of the lawyer, he should present 11; to
the jury, unless he desires that jury
not to see it. As a defense lawyer, one
might not want the jury to see the evi-
dence. But we are not defense lawyers or
prosecutors here. We want the people to
know the facts.
What is wrong with procuring the pho-
tographs as they exist and letting judg-
ments 'be made as to what happened to
the area in question? The gentleman's
judgment may differ from mine, or we
may agree. But in respect to that, may
I ask the gentleman simply this question.
He has referred to two photograph:; that
he displayed to the House of Represen-
tatives, and he discussed a survey of 26
square kilometers as to the density of
structures. I presume in the survey of the
26 square kilometers, a descriptb"n or
conclusion as to the density of structures
would have required some visible evi-
dence of the existence of structures in
that 26 square kilometers?
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, if the
gentleman will yield, I presume-and I
am quite sure it is correct-that wa:: cal-
culated from bomb damage assessment
reports.
done in an inadequate manner, there Mr. WALDIE. Would that include pho-
were an insufficient number of samples,??tographs?
and conclusions therefore should be dis- Mr. GUBSER. I would think so, yes.
trusted. I suggested that could very well Mr. WALDIE. Do you know whether
be so, but I asked why they did not at- in that 26 square kilometers ther^ are
tempt to take additional polls to confirm photographs of structures?
or deny the results of that poll.
They have it within their power. They
own that country, and they really own
that, I will say to the gentleman from
California- (Mr. GussEa), The. Ambas-
Mr. GUBSER. I do not.
Mr. WALDIE. Of the two photographs
the gentleman presented to the House of
Representatives; it was artillery damage?
I presume it was the gentleman's con-
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elusion of the damage, that it was caused
by artillery .
Mr. GUBSER. Artillery and mortars.
Mr. WALDIE. Who provided the
gentleman with those photographs?
Mr. GUBSER. They were from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. WALDIE. Were they taken by
American reconnaissance planes?
Mr. GUBSER. I cannot answer the
question, but I presume they were.
Mr. WALDIE. The American forces
were not, in fact, bombing those?
Mr. GUBSER. No, nor were the Lao-
tians. The purpose of those two photo-
graphs was only to show the extent of
damage that can be caused from ground
action.
Incidentally, those two photographs
were not even up in the PDJ area but
were in the panhandle.
Mr. WALDIE. My curiosity Is as to how
you obtained them. No American forces
were involved in that action. No Ameri-
can air power was involved in that ac-
tion. Yet, there is, within the possession
of the Secretary of War, two photo-
graphs of villages, which relate to a to-
tally Laotian action, I presume.
Mr. GUBSER. Of course, we fly re-
connaissance many times a day over
that area because that is where the Ho
Chi Minh Trail is.
Mr. WALDIE. I presume so. And I pre-
sume equally there would. be photo-
graphs covering the area in question, as
to whether structures exist in that area.
Mr. GUBSER. I would say to the gen-
tleman, it is my belief there would be
ample photography along the LOC, lines
of communication.
Mr. WALDIE. Yes.
Mr. GUBSER. But I seriously doubt
that there is reliable, up-to-date photog-
raphy of the areas away from the LOC's.
I think Captain Michel told Representa-
tive MCCLOSKEY he had Just flown a
mission the day before along LOC
route 7. '
Mr. WALDIE. You mentioned in your
testimony yesterday that the bomb
craters would not necessarily be evidence
or that the crater would not necessarily
be evidence of a bomb. I suspect that is
correct. There might be a question as to
a bomb crater, an artillery crater or a
mortar crater.
M. GUBSER. Or, if I might add, a
question as to whether the bomb crater
was caused by a Laotian pilot.
Mr. WALDIE. There is no question of
that.
Mr. GUBSER. Or whether when a
village happened to be evacuated, it was
at the time a military target.
Mr. WALDIE. There is also the ques-
tion that no photograph can honestly
answer at' its inception. The area as to
which I was confused was Mr.
McCLOSHEY'S question to you which
was . not able to be developed be-
cause time expired. I am not sure, mili-
tarily, but I gather from the question
Mr. MCCLOSKEY was asking, and Informa-
tion provided to me, that a cluster bomb
does not leave a crater. I am talking
about CBU, not phosphorous.
Mr. GUBSER. The gentleman is cor-
rect. Incendiary, on occasion, and antt-
personnel.
Mr. WALDIE. Antipersonnel bombs
do not.
Mr. GUBSER. Some do, but these 1
understand do not.
. Mr. WALDIE. Then to add further to
the gentleman's understanding of our
dilemma in interpreting what is happen-
ing in Laos, almost every one of the
refugees I interviewed who possessed
wounds on their bodies or who had lost
members of their families from the
bombing lost them from cluster bomb
wounds, from antipersonnel bombs. The
one exception was the white phosphate
wound that had scarred a Meo, now a
9-year-old boy, from his toe up through
his back, that killed his sister and
burned him.
Mr. GUBSER. Is the gentleman refer-
ring to a boy whose name I previously
misspelled? I called him Ba Son Di, but
I understand his correct name is Thao
Som Dii.
Mr. WALDIE. I do not know. I have
that in my notes.
Mr. GUBSER. A 10-year-old boy who
had a burn on his right leg, whom you
saw?
Mr. WALDIE. Yes.
Mr. GUBSER. I am sure we are talk-
ing about the same person. I believe it
is rather interesting, If the gentleman
will permit me no more than 2 minutes
of his time, to go into this,
Mr. WALDIE. Surely.
Mr. GUBSER. I asked about that
young person, On the morning of July 6
a USAID officer Interviewed the father
of this boy. .
Mr. WALDIE. That Is the man I inter-
viewed, the father, not the boy. I did not
interview the boy.
Mr. GUBSER. From the description
I have heard of the boy's injury, I think
it probably was a phosphorous bomb, be-
cause I understand it was rather local-
ized. But the father of Thao Som Dii
told the USAF officer this morning on
July 6 that his son was burned by na-
palm dropped by jets while the family
was walking along the road near the rice
fields at some -distance from their
village.
As I understand it from the docu-
ments-I have never seen the boy-the
burns could not have been napalm, be-
cause it would have enveloped him and
would have been much more widespread
and not localized. The point that I make
here is an example of how unreliable in-
formation is when you get it from no-
madic and primitive peoples like even the
father who says that it was napalm when
we know it was not.
Mr. WALDIE. Let me suggest to you
it is unreliable if you are not careful in
the interviews. The father said that it
was napalm. We suspected that he was
incorrect because of the nature of the
wound. We went into It in much greater
detail and ultimately found out that he
was talking about a white phosphorus
bomb.
Mr. GUBSER. Here is another part of
the same information that I requested..
Mr. WALDIE. Although I suspect that
if you are burned by napalm or by white
phosphorus---
Mr. GUBSER. Neither are very nice.
Mr. WALDIE. That is right.
Mr. GUBSER. This wire says "It is
also possible that the child in question
was in fact playing with undetonated
phosphorus parachute flare's or smoke
markers, which sometimes occurs."
We know that phosphorus Is only used
for marking and screening. There are
two other weapons, which are cluster
bombs and which are never used except
against supply dumps and military tar-
gets and are not used again :t personnel.
Mr. WALDIE, Wait a minute. I do not
yield further. I want to comment on that.
They should never have bern used, and
our policy would never per+ni t them to
be used. If in fact they were used it was
a violation of our policy, wa: it not?
Mr. GUBSER. May I read in response
another portion of this teIfrgram which
I have and which came from Mr. Sterns,
the Deputy Chief of Mission. It says:
Phosphorus ordnance is never-repeat-
never used as antipersonnel weapon in Laos.
It has been used on one occasion we know
of in 1989 in an attempt to burn Pathet Lao
North Vietnamese army rice etorage area.
Mr. WALDIE. The point of the matter
Is I know what the policy i:: and I know
the policy is extremely humane. The
regulations of engagement are as mag-
niflcient documents of humanitarianism
as you could possibly find Ill warfare. It
Is not the policy I am concerned with but
the practice. I suppose every interview I
received and which was contained in that
refugee report could be discounted as
maybe somebody who was motivated in
the refugee stations, by other reasons,
but there is sufficient basis in my mind-
and I left Indochina, as I mentioned to
you yesterday and as Mr. MCCLOSKEY
knows, genuinely concerned that the con-
clusions he had drawn from what I con-
sidered to be limited evidence were not
warranted.
However, the failure to provide the
Congress with evidence that is within
their prerogative-not only the failure
to provide that evidence but the actual
policy to keep this House of Representa-
tives from knowing about Laos-causes
me to be highly Incredible as to their ac-
tual representations. I do not even un-
derstand my good friend from California
(Mr. GussER). I do not understand the
majority of my own colleagues in their
refusal the other day to ask questions
about what we are doing in Laos.
The administration will not provide us
with these answers. I do not cast all of
the blame on this administration, be-
cause the prior administration and the
two prior administrations, both leaders
of whom were in my own party, were
equally adamant in their refusal to let
the American people and their represent-
atives know what is happening there in
Laos. It is for that reason that I am be-
coming increasingly of the belief that
Mr. MCCLOSKEY's charges have been far
more credible than the effort today to
destroy him suggests is the case.
The evidence you have used to at-
tempt to refute Mr. MCCLOSrCEY'S charges
has been reports on the evidence being
Insufficient. I grant you that the evidence
was Insufficient. I granted that from the
start, and it did not have to be diminished
further to be insufficient. But you have
not answered why the admiraibtration did
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not produce the concrete evidence of Lao and the North Vietnamese alter- allegation of war crimes and wa;? atroci-
photographs and additional refugee sur- nately occupy this region and that dur- ties in Indochina.
veys showing how erroneous the con- ing every wet season the Meo tribesmen I commend the gentleman for specifi-
elusions of this survey were. There must come back. In other words, it changes tally raising the issue of bombing in
be evidence other than that which has hands every year. These people have been Laos, but I would like to deal with the
been presented, other than a mere at- used as slaves and their rice has been broader question of war atrocities be-
tack on the limited evidence Mr. Mc- taxed and at the time this is what they cause I personnally believe that to at-
Cr.osKEY has presented, that would re- were protesting against. tack your credibility in exercising your
fute the charges. Mr. WALDIE. There is no question, right to know as a public official is tragic,
Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, will the however, that almost every refugee with ludicrous, expedient, and sometimes even
gentleman yield further? which I had contact expressed his theatrical.
Mr. WALDIE. I would be happy to. thorough distaste of the practices you It would seem to me that if we are con-
Mr. GUBSER. Before I respond to the have described. cerned about the critical issues t hat one
concluding part of. your statement, let Mr. GUBSER. Is it not a fair state- of our colleagues raises here on the floor
me say to the gentleman that I admire ment to say that almost every refugee of the House of Representatives, such as
the manner in which he has approached had at some time known that the Pathet in this matter, then I, for one, seriously
this problem and I admired the state- Lao or the North Vietnamese were oc- question the value of personal debate
inents he made upon returning. In fact, cupying these villages? with seven or eight Congressmei on the
the gentleman really makes my case Mr. WALDIE. Oh, surely, but that does floor, and perhaps 30 people in ,he gal-
which provoked this entire interchange. not mean If they were there last month leries. If we are serious about the allega-
I have always said that Mr. MCCLOS- the villages should be destroyed this tions then why have not the Members
KEY has not proven his point and that he month, of the Congress joined in calling for a
had an obligation to prove the serious Mr. GUBSER. Certainly, but I want full-scale open Inquiry into the war
charge he made before injuring the to clear up the point and the implication crimes and other atrocity allegations in
image of his country. That is what this that Reverend Raffe and Father Menger Indochina? If we would, then we could
argument is all about. But, nevertheless, were deliberately concealing the fact solve the matter. But standing here on
it has evolved into something else. . . that the Pathet Lao had been there. The the floor with nine people discussing the
Mr. WALDIE. Let me interrupt the facts are that they were there. technicalities of bombing In my estinia-
gentleman at that point because I surely Mr. WALDIE. It is certainly my own tion is rather absurd, it is playing games
do not want my silence to indicate or to personal opinion that Reverend Menger as courtroom lawyers, grandstanding for
suggest that Mr. MCCLOSKEY has injured was deliberately misinterpreting. He said the record, and does not seem to me to
this country by his statements. I do not at the time of the bombing there were solve the critical problem of whether or
believe that at all, and make no mistake no North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao in not we actually committed war crimes in
about it. It is my opinion that Members the village. Reverend Raffe said subse- Southeast Asia,
of Congress can debate passionately and quently that in fact they were there. Before I go to the general issue of
with conviction policies of this country So I appreciate the generosity and war crimes in Indochina I would just like
and when he expresses that disagree- courtesy of the gentleman in yielding to to make one set of comments as the
ment with passion and conviction, all of me, chairman of 4 days of ad hoc hear-
which I happen to believe fit your col- At this time, Mr. Speaker, I plan to ings on war crimes in Southeast Asia.
league and mine admirably and com- yield to the gentleman from California One of the Marine captains who flew
pletely, then I feel he is entitled to do so. (Mr. DELLUMS) for 10 minutes, but be- many missions in Indochina mentioned
Mr. GUBSER. But, again, getting fore I do so may I inquire how much that one of the most precise bombing
down to the conclusion which the gentle- time I have remaining? missions Is ostensibly the computer
man made, I would like to go back to The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gen- bombing runs, generally flown at night.
one other point. I, certainly, was not a tleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) He indicated that, given variations in
party to the interviews. I cannot com- has consumed 33 minutes, wind velocity, variations in spend and
ment upon the honesty of Father Menger Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, will the human time lapse response, that it Is
or Reverend Roffe because I was not the genleman yield? possible that bombs could have been
there. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the dropped as far as 6 miles away from
Mr. WALDIE. But I was. gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) strategic military targets.
Mr. GUBSER. I accepted the gentle- yield to the gentleman from California The point is that if you understand
man's statement as being an accurate (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) ? computer bombing runs, someone is on
reflection of what he sincerely believes Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would the phone who tells the pilot to push the
to be true. But it seems to me that the ask the gentleman from California (Mr. button. If they push it late, either one
main issue which was wrapped around MCCLOSKEY) whether he would permit of them, if there are variations in the
the credibility of Father Menger and me to yield first to the gentleman from speed or in.the wind velocity, than bomb
Reverend Roffe is whether or not there California (Mr. DELLUMS) who has a does not have to drop as depicted on a
were Pathet Lao in the villages. Now, the very important mission to perform on piece of paper In a computer, It. could
survey-the famous USIS survey upon behalf of the Democrats in that he has to drop 6 miles down the road.
which Mr. MCCLOSKEY places so much go out and practice his pitching talents. Second, the testimony further reveals
emphasis and relies upon so heavily says Mr. McCLOSKEY. Certainly. that the unwritten policy Is never to re-
that 95 percent of those who lived there Mr. WALDIE. I yield 10 minutes to the turn to base with any bombs still at-
and were refugees did not go back when gentleman from California (Mr. DEL- tached to the plane, And on questions
the war ended if it were occupied by the LUMS). from the Chair-
Communists. More than 60 percent gave Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. GUBSER. Mr, Speaker, will the
a variety of reasons for their becoming the gentleman from California (Mr. gentleman yield?
refugees which included. the protest WALDIE) for yielding to me. Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman has
against the 15-percent rice tax Imposed Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman spoken for 3 hours. Please give me 10
by the North Vietnamese and the Pathet from California (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) on his minutes.
Lao and the fact that they were forced actions, his courage and his convictions Mr. GUBSER. I have seen a lot of them
to become military porters and were with respect to what I consider are some come back to base with their bombs.
treated as slaves and cattle, very critical issues, and problems. Mr. DELLUMS. On questions from the
The other thing-I think it Is clearly I for one do not question your inte- Chair and other members of the ad hoc
established, regardless of what the testi- grity nor your motives. I think your ac- committee as to "what do you do with
mony may have been when Father Men- tivity typifies the highest and the best In the bombs?" The response was, "We drop
ger and Reverend Roffe were translating a public official who diligently attempts them."
for you Is that the Pathet Lao had oc- to Inform the American people and chal- The Constitution grants Congress vir-
cupied. those villages. Perhaps, at the lenges his colleagues in the House of tually unlimited control with respect to
moment they were not there, but we all Representatives to discuss some very the military and military policy. War pol-
know that every dry season the Pathet serious problems, and that is the serious icies and war crimes ,responsibility fall
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well within congressional purview over
the military. Thus far, though, that au-
thority has meant very little.
There are many reasons.
First, as with just about all congres-
sional functions, Congress has evolved
into a client, not a? regulator. The mili-
tary dangles both carrots and sticks be-
fore Congress-usually locating of or
closing down of installations, defense
contracts, and so forth. After a while the
message gets across. Even when the Ex-
ecutive has dared to slice funds from
questionable defense projects, Congress
not only reinstates money, but projects as
well. Throughout the early 1960s, Con-
gress continually budgeted the B-70
bomber even though the administration
had decided to let the project die, and in
1970, Chairman Rivers successfully led a
drive to fund a carrier that the Navy had
not requested.
This philosophy carries through to war
atrocities. The military committees mir-
ror the sentiments of the Defense Estab-
lishment. But, only so far. For example,
the House Armed Services Committee
report on My Lai:
From its inception, the ... investigation has
been hampered by a generally uncooperative
attitude of the Department of the Army.
Usually, though, the military commit-
tees agree with the Military Establish-
ment's perspective that it is individuals,
not policies, that commit war, atrocities.
The Establishment and committees fight
every effort to investigate ultimate re-
sponsibility for war crimes.
Second is the ethics of Congress itself.
Survival-reelection-not the public in-
terest, is the motivating force in Con-
gress. Posturing aims to avoid stands,
avoid involvement. Closed-door negotiat-
ing, "the art of compromise," these are
rewarded.
War crimes were--and are-an ex-
tremely sensitive topic. Remember that
Ronald Ridenhour sent a number of Rep-
resentatives letters detailing My Lai be-
fore any action was taken. Standard op=
orating procedure dictates that so-called
crank mail will be brushed aside, thrown
out, or referred to the Congressman who
represents the writer's home town.
It took almost 8 months from Riden-
hour's letter reaching Congress until be-
fore mention was made of My Lai on
the House floor. And that notice came
about only because the Cleveland Plain
Dealer broke the story. The House Armed
Services Committee had received Riden-
hour's letter in early April 1969; on
November 24, the then chairman of the
House Armed Services Committee, Chair-
man Rivers, made a brief speech:
We do not know what there is to this or
what the Army has in their files in Washing-
ton. If, the investigating committee, and we
will be setting as a kind of quasi-grand jury-
If we see that this warrants further inquiry
and should be brought out into a larger
investigation; the subcommittee will do this.
But, for the moment, exercising our juris-
diction over the Army and as a subcommittee
created for this purpose, we are making the
first move. I think the House ought to know
it, because I am sure you are getting a lot
of inquiries on just exactly what we are gging
to do in the House of Representatives on
this matter which seems to be catching the
headlines gut this time.
In blunter terms, had it not been for
press reports of My Lai, Congress would
have probably shunted aside the whole
incident.
Once out in the open though, con-
gressional rhetoric gushed forth. Within
2 weeks of the first public arousal over
My Lai, approximately 40 Representa-
tives and Senators made floor statements
on the slaughter.
In general, Congress reacts rather than
leads. When I joined with a group of
other concerned Congressmen to propose
and conduct open ad hoc hearings on
command responsibility for war atroci-
ties, there was expected criticism and op-
position from the right and a general
silence and avoidance from many Mem-
bers termed "liberal."
A. third reason comes from the pro-
cedural nature of Congress. Of our essen-
tially conservative governmental struc-
ture, I view Congress as the most tradi-
tional and slow-acting branch. Even-
tually, Congress does act on most press-
ing national problems. But so much time
has passed between the initial causes of
a problem, the development of an issue
as an issue, the recognition by Congress
that some problem exists, real action by
Congress, and, finally, administration of
whatever new policies or remedies are
established to meet the problem, that by
the time this lengthy process is com-
pleted, the original problem is consider-
ably changed or enlarged but the remedy
is only tuned to its earliest stages.
I am reasonably sure that Congress
will eventually openly deal with the ques-
tion of ultimate command responsibility
for war atrocities. Yet, I am almost just
as sure that whenever Congress would
undertake such an analysis, it would be
too late to have an impact on the shape
of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Instead,
the whole effort would wind up as a mere
academic exercise-but with great fan-
fare from the Congress.
Finally, I see much of Congress' reti-
cence resulting from the basic philos-
ophies of the men who hold the key posi-
tions in the House and Senate. Most of
them Deceived their basic and deepest
political educaiton in the 1930's and
1940's. Simply put, their general phi-
losophy is that they "know" what
is right for America-and because, for
them, American is the richest, strongest,
most influential nation, therefore, also,
what is "right" for the world.
For them, it is implausible that Amer-
lean soldiers could have been involved in
large-scale war atrocities. They accept
My Lai as an isolated aberration, but
they also believe that the war in South-
east Asia is the same type of war they
knew and fought in, and that war crimes
therefore are invariably punished.
War atrocities in Southeast Asia are
not aberrations. They are an integral
part of the basic type of conflict in which
America became so foolishly entangled.
Strict military judicial enforcement may
reduce a marginal percentage of atroci-
ties, but I do not forsee any significant
reduction in war crimes as long as U.B.
forces continue an active role in South-
east Asia.
From testimony presented at the ad
13, 1971
hoc hearings, and from my other stud-
ies, I single out five important factors
which are causing the continuation of
atrocities.
First. A key part of the psychology of
our involvement is one of treating all
Vietnamese people-whether South Viet-
namese, Vietcong, or North Vietnam-
ese-as subhuman beings. Everyone
who is Vietnamese is pert.jived as a
"gook," "slant-eye," or "slope." as less
than human. Therefore, no real effort is
made to distinguish betwe'^n civilians
and combatants, between friends and en-
emies. In blunter terms, the racism per-
vasive in this country is obr'iously per-
vasive in Indochina.
Second. Therefore, I find it a blatant
falsehood on the part of those persons
who tell the American public that we
are "helping" the Vietnamese
Third. On the operations level, con-
ventional warfare in a people': guerrilla
struggle results in multiple and continu-
ing atrocities. People, old women and
children are shot down in.a village: For
what military purpose. Boml ~s are indis-
criminately dropped on innocent human
beings: For what military purpose? The
conventional warfare concept means
that GI's perceive all human being as
their enemy; otherwise, the concept is
flawed..
Fourth. If we are to assume any re-
sponsibility for war atrocities, then it
must be laid at the highest military and
civilian policymaking levels. I think that
any time this country does not see fit
to deal with fundamental. problems that
it will create at that moment a scape-
goat. Black people, brown, red, yellow,
students, poor people all have been con-
venient scapegoats. Lieutenant Calley is
a scapegoat for the military command.
Fifth. Fixing responsibility is not
enough. I think it falls critically short
of the most necessary close examination
of institutional factors thot give rise
to American involvement and adventur-
ism. We have to deal with racism, mili-
tarism, and sexism in this country which
is extended into the conduce, of our for-
eign affairs. Too many people wring their
hands in guilt, but do not -see the need
to go.beyond dealing with symptoms and
effects. -
My hope is that no other young person
will have to go through the same kind
of evil, the same kind of insanity, the
same kind of wanton death as we have
suffered in Indochina. The proper role
of Congress is to deal with lhasic causes,
and the inability of Congress to confront
the issue of ultimate responsibility for
war atrocities must be seen as a serious
flaw in our ideals of a democratic state.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Sneaker, I
thank the gentleman for yielding.
I have been perplexed as the debate
proceeded to try to come to grips with the
real issue involved-as to whether these
villages had been bombed or not. I think
the gentleman from California (Mr.
GunsEn) who contests my view would
concede the bulk of his concern is that I
have made too extensive conclusions
from the evidence before m". I, in turn,
have not been able to get the gentleman
to address the evidence itself, the evi-
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dence of hundreds of people who have A: This is very Communist area, Mr. McCLOSKEY, I cite that citation
said their villages have been destroyed, Q: The villages themselves are Communist because it puts both Father Meager and
I noted in the argument yesterday the villages? Mr. Hecht, whom the gentleman quoted
gentleman quoted William Hecht, special Q2: Why did they leave then to get sway yesterday, in context when he
assistant to a U.S. delegation of church- from Communists? You said they to to get It y indi-
away from Communists, because they are cate in their judgment, regardless of the
men, who had been In Vientiane inter- Communist villages. I don't get it. bombing or how many people are killed,
viewing refugees at the same time we A: You never lived under Communists? that the bombing is justified.
were. I quote his statement: Well, I have. Mr. GUBSER. That is not the point at
Our assessment was that refugees con- Q: I couldn't live if my house disap- issue.
sidered the bombing a blessing. peared-was blown up. Mr. McCLOSKEY. Much of the argu-
A: Like Laktuan. I lived up there. 57, 58,
That was remarkably parallel to what 59. Bon Bon, Kai Kai, r know this area, meat the gentleman made is to the ef-
Father Menger, who had been there 15 Q: That's irrelevant. It's irrelevant whether feet that the North Vietnamese are in-
years and who had interviewed a number you lived there. The question is whether vading the country, that the people do
of these refugees with us and translated those villages. were bombed without Com- not like living under the North Viet-
some for me, had stated, and I would like munist troops being there. namese, and even if we are bombing it
to state his precise statement off a tape A: I say you cannot understand. I will be might be justified.
very honest-I might hurt your feelings.. You Mr. GUBSER. No. The
we had with the concluding interviews will.not get a true picture-unless they know gentleman is
of the refugees there. This was the final who you are-you will not get a true picture reading conclusions into my statement
refugee interview, and I would like to of this country in three days. which I never uttered. I wish the gentle-
read it into the record, if I may at this Q: Wait just a minute. These things which man would cease and desist this constant
point. These are my 'comments and you- just interpreted-when we asked these practice of reading interpretations into
-Mu any of e o
made by one of the members of my staff: '""` i --a...~..,,, were
A: Some aP them yes. . Many of them m no.
Congressman McCloskey, "Finally, we got Q: All right. Let's take them. I asked them
from them the fact that a study had been their name and I asked the village from
made of refugee attitudes and when I saw them. Were they truthful on that?
that study of refugee attitudes and it sum- A: Yes.
marizes the information we are verifying to- Q: What about their age?
day, I said I would like to take this list of A: No.
names and places and go up to these refugee Q: That's not truthful. It could be any-
villages. We were set to leave at 1:00 in the thing.
afternoon to come up to 272, to go up to A:
Luang Prabang which would have given us Q : I've got to get some specific things.
a chance to see the northern refugee ,camps. When they said they were bombed many,
At 1300 it turned out that the papers were many times. Were they being truthful?
not ready and we didn't get them actually A: I don't know.
until 3:00 in the afternoon. Because of that, Q: When they said they saw T-28's and
we are limited to getting one camp rather jets, were they truthful?
than site 272 and Luang Probang. There is A: Yes. Oh, sure.
nothing I would have liked to do better. Q: When they said they saw big bombs
One question I'd like to ask you-why and bombers, were they truthful?
would the Embassy deliberately prevent us A: Yes.
from getting this information when I first Q: When they say all their villages were
came here? If I had followed their schedule destroyed, were they truthful?
that they laid out for me, I wouldn't have A: I don't know.
learned a single thing I learned today. Why Q: You don't know whether all their
would they do that? Why would a visiting houses were destroyed?
Congressman-why wouldn't they be the first A: I would ...
to tell me what these facts are?" Q2: You haven't been out there since the
A: (Father Monger) "You work. for the bombing, have you? You'd be out ... be-
gpvernlent, I don't, I don't know how they tween August 1969 and 1970?
Q: "Why do they do this? You know? You A: I know the church was destroyed.
know the Ambassador. You know Ambassa- Q: When they told him the number of
dor Godley. Why In the Lord's name wouldn't people killed and the number of water buf-
he want me to know this information?" falo killed, do you believe those answers?
A: I don'tknow. A: The exact number-no.
Q: Could I ask you a question? As T re- Q: What about this woman saying her
call, Father, your testimony to the Kennedy husband was killed?
Committee, you said that the bombing was A: Probably true.
not responsible for the refugee movement Q: How about the people
their wounds?
but that Communist terrorism W
Ho
d
.
w
o
you feel about it now that you've talked to
these people?
A: Same as before.
A: Possibly true.
Q: Possibly true. Possible they got their
wounds some other way?
Q: Which means you don't believe what This Is the answer I want you to note:
these people have said? A: No. What I will sa
A: Let me tell you. I have lived with these say, and you should
people. They will tell you one thing. You go put it out-even though it is true-even
back to the same people. You slit down with though our, American bombing has, care some
them, you have lunch with them, you live is 100'seo killed people-I I don't y- wish If It
with them for a couple of days, you will find you print this-quote I can me-thank the real story. You're not getting the real you would d print this-quote mthanGod
story, for that bombing. Otherwise, this country
Q2: You don't think they were really would not be free today,
bombed? This concludes Father Menger's tesa
A: Look. Wait. You want the real story. The timony.
immediate cause of their leaving was prob- Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, will the
ably the bombing.' But that is the immediate gentleman yield?
cause. But the ultimate cause-the real rea-
son is because they do not want to lose their Mr. WALDIE. I yield to the gentleman
freedom , .. from California, Mr. GUBSER.
Q2: Why didn't anybody tell us that? Mr. GUBSER. Is the gentleman in-
Q: Nobody has said that. These people-- troducing that quotation from Father
every single one ofs these villages has been Menger as proof of his allegation that we
destroyed. There hasn't been a village have engaged in indiscriminate bombing
we've ... In Laos?
with a piece of evidence I did not present
yesterday. This is a report by a United
Nations expert, which seems to me to
sum up everything we tried to produce
yesterday to indicate that villages of
seven provinces had been destroyed by
bombing.
This Is by U.N. expert George., Chape-
lier, who conducted during 1970 inter-
views in depth with some 50 refugees
from the Plain of Jars. The results of
his findings were published in the fall
of 1970 In a study entitled: "Plain of
Jars: Social Changes Under Five Years
of Pathet Lao Administration." Excerpts
from this report follow:
All these efforts tended to enhance na-
tional consciousness, but perhaps what con-
tributed more than anything else to forge an
in-group feeling were the heavy and recur-
rent bombings. A brief account of what we
consider as the major event in the five years
under the Pathet Lao will make it easier to
understand the reaction of the people and
the further Pathet Lao politics of portage
responsibilities and restriction of consumer
goods.
Prior to 1967, bombings were light and
far from populated centers. By 1968 the in-
tensity of the bombings was such that no
organized life was possible in th,^ villages.
The villagers moved to the outskirts and
then deeper and deeper into the forest as
the bombing climax reached its peak in
1969 when jet planes came daily and de-
stroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was
left standing. The villagers lived in trenches
and holes or in caves. They only farmed at
night. All of the interlocutors, without any
exception, had his village compi=!tely de-
stroyed. In the last phase, bombings were
aimed at the systematic destruction of the
material basis of the civilian soci~-ty. Har-
vests burned down and rice became scarce,
portage became more and more frequent.
(pp. 18-19).
These people seem to be fed up wU.h bomb-
ing and unable to foresee the en,i of this
tragic epoch. It must be noted that these
observations are valuable at a behavior level
and do not engage the author about !,he inner
feelings of the refugees. A genuine assimila-
tion between communism and bombing is
frequent in Vientiane, even amongst West-
ern-educated people. A meaningful example
is given by the answer of a Deputy whom we
were asking, "Do you think that ?,ao per-
sonality fits well in the communist system
or, more simply, that Lao peasants are pathy
in PL territories?' He replied with a large
smile: 'But don't you know that they are
bombed day after day, live In holes like
animale and work in their paddy field at
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night? Is Ghat a good life?' Obviously, he is one of the greatest strengths in a free
assimilated communism and bombing and society with a free press. We need more
his reaction Is typical of the Lao social of it.
climate in 'Vientiane, (p. 36). For this reason, earlier this year I
That is a quote from pages 18 and 19 Joined a number of my colleagues in
of the Plain of Jars paper by Mr. Georges cosponsoring the "Newsman's Privilege
Chapelier of the United Nations. Act" which would protect reporters in
Mr. Speaker, I think that sums up the their investigative reporting efforts. This
nature of the testimony given by hun- is one way we utilize a free press to ex-
dreds of refugees. Nowhere in this debate pose mistake, mismanagement, and cor-
has the gentleman from California, from ruption inside and outside our Govern-
Santa Clara County, challenged the fact ment. Thus, reporters should not become
that these refugees from seven different the investigative arm of the Government.
provinces accurately described the de- At the same time, neither the print
vastating bombing by U.S. Air Force jets nor the electronic media should become
of their villages climaxing in 1969, the the propaganda arm of the Government.
same year when this country dropped A free nation loses a valuable resource
over half a million tons of bombs in the if the media become mere endorsers of
country of Laos, doubling the bombing Government policy or conveyors of state-
in the previous year of 1968. This cir- ments by Government officials.
cumstance I cannot say establishes with This is the issue in the delicate case
clarity or establishes beyond any reason- before us today. We are living in a time
able doubt that we pursued a deliberate of lively public debate over major and
policy of destroying the villages, but it minor issues of public importance. There
does show from the testimony of the have been repeated calls for "truth in
witnesses who were there and saw it that government" and for expanded "freedom
the bombing was deliberate and was in- of information" so that the public can
tended to destroy the structure of that make participatory democracy a reality
society and confirms the testimony of the on the basis of complete information.
United Nations experts who said that the One of the major issues which has come
bombing was systematically attempting fully to the fore recently in the debate
to destroy that society. I seems to me it over the Indochina war has been the
establishes a prima facie case that the public right to know the events, policies,
program and the activities of the United and rationale behind our involvement in
States over Laos in :1968 and 1969 were that war.
attended by the destruction of hundreds The ironic fact in this whole contro-
if not thousands of villages in northern versy Is that many of us have hoped that
Laos. we could encourage documentaries and
Mr. Speaker, I state there is no evi- other forms of investigative reporting in
dence in the record that.shows anything' the broadcast medium as well as the
to the contrary. press. The electronic media are particu-
larly suited to informing the public along
GUARANTEE OF A FREE PRESS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from California (Mr. BELL) is re-
cognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. BELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in op-
position to another misguided and dan-
gerous attempt to trample on the first
amendment guarantee of a free press.
It is unfortunate, though perhaps to
be expected, that attempts by Govern-
ment officials to infringe upon freedom
of the press occur more often at times
when the press is most vigorously fulfill-
ing its role of informing the public vi-
gorously and critically of the activities
of the Government and its officials.
It is highly significant that the prin-
cipal rationale argued by both the com-
mittee majority and the CBS network is
the concern for the "people's right to
know." This is as it should be, for a major
function of a free press in a free society
must, of course, be to enable the people
to discover the truth about their Nation
and their government and its policces.
Although the case before us today does
not directly involve the need to protect
confidential sources, the issue is much
the same. The need for protection of a
reporter's personal notes-his private
scribblings, words and phrases not used
in a final draft, and the names of his
sources-is essential if we are to uphold
the value of vigorous investigative re-
porting. This kind of reporting in,both
the print media and the broadcast media
these lines because of the visual impact
of their medium. For 30 or 60 minutes
the television can knock down the walls
and the distances in our society and
bring the ghetto, the war, the refugee
camp, hungry people, and similar iso-
lated people and events in our society
into every living room.
Following the recommendation of the
committee today would discourage such
informative presentations and encourage
the broadcasting media to present noth-
ing but dull "pablum" to the public. For
the dubious purpose of protecting the
sensitivities of some Government officials,
some would have the Government assume
the role of arbiter of truth in the pres-
entation of news, documentaries, and
investigative reports concerning Govern-
ment policies and the conditions of our
people at war and at home.
As both the committee majority and
the CBS network have correctly stated,
the "people's right to know" is of para-
mount importance in the issue of a free
press. But the committee would have us
take misguided and unconstitutional
means to attempt to protect and expand
the freedom of information for the
public.
As I understand it, the committee's
majority opinion relies on the rationale
that first amendment protection for the
electronic media is something less than
the protection afforded the print medium.
The point has been made that Congress
regulates the broadcast media, unlike the
print media, through the Federal Com-
munications Commission and its licens-
ing procedure.
I would hasten to point out, however,
that the means for regulating the cur-
rent controversy have been adequately
provided by existing legislrhtion. The
"fairness doctrine" in the Federal Com-
munications Act provides for the pres-
entation of all sides of a public con-
trovel'sy rather than limiting debate and
limiting the "people's right to know" all
sides of the controversy. Accordingly, the
Federal Communications Commission
has ruled on this very case that CBS
complied with the provisions of the
"fairness doctrine." A month after pre-
senting its news documnentary, the pro-
gram was rebroadcast on March 23 with
a 22-minute postscript containing criti-
cal comments by Vice President AGNEW,
Secretary of Defense Laird, and Chair-
man HtBERT of the House Armed Services
Committee, and a response by the presi-
dent of CBS News.
Then on April 18 CBS broadcast an
hour-long panel discussion presenting
opposing views on the Defense Depart-
ment's public information program,
which was the subject of tho documen-
tary. In this way, the public was not
shielded from controversy and was en-
abled to hear many sides of a contro-
versial public issue and make judgments
based upon a variety of opinions.
The disturbing thing about the com-
mittee's recommendation is that the sub-
pena would require the network to di-
vulge not only the material, presented
on the program but also unused films and
tapes which. constitute electronic Jour-
nalism's "newsman's notebooks." To
subpena these materials would be com-
parable to demanding the interviews,
notes, and correspondence which con-
stitute the rough drafts of an author's
book.
To permit Congress to so invade the
newsman's privilege in this fashion is to
invite the chilling effects on a free press,
to encourage Government surveillance of
the news, and to inhibit the press from
advancing the cause of the "people's
right to know."
I would agree enthusiastically with
those who contend that a limited access
medium such as the broadcast medium
has a very high responsibility to the pub-
lic. There is always the danger that the
highly concentrated media will misuse
their responsibility and powers as they
may have on some occasions. If this is
done, the result would be an unfor-
tunate impairment of the "people's
right to know," and good government
would suffer.
But the way to increase the flow of
information to the public is iiott to follow
the committee's recommendation which
is before us today. The committee would
have Congress harass broadcast Journal-
ism, submit broadcast journalists to in-
terrogation, and induce se]-censorship
in broadcast Journalism. Thfo committee
would have the Congress institute in-
quiries into the news judgments of
broadcasters and encourage i?he estab-
lishment of a Government standard of
"truth" in evaluating editorial decisions.
This would cripple the right of the elec-
tronic press to report freely on the con-
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