CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-HOUSE RE: THE BOMBING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1
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7
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December 12, 2016
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June 19, 2002
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64
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July 13, 1971
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H 6672 Approved FCO Release I00 /~ /0 $DP7 96R0003000800ft1, 13, 19i1 happy that Mr. Hoover is aware of their activities. Much of the FBI's work is unheralded. Much of its work is of a type not amen- able to publicity. In, any :investigation, there is much routine, matter-of-fact work that is neither glamorous nor un- duly exciting. Yet it is important. It is important why? Because this is the way the FBI is' protecting you and me. As Americans we should be apprecia- tive and I am happy to salute Mr. Hoover, a courageous American, as he enters his 48th year as Director of the FBI. Ask citizens in all areas of America. Ask citizens in my district in Florida. Al- most to a man they will say, "I'm glad there is an FBI." This indeed is testimony of the debt which the Nation owes to the men and women of the FBI. [Mr. McCLOSKEY addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.] THE BOMBING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA F The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gen- tleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) is recognized for 60 minutes. Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield so that I may conclude my statement? Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Cali- fornia (Mr. GUBSER). Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I think it is about time that we read into the RECORD something which is dif- ferent than the allegation that this is a U.S. war against the Pathet Lao. One of the authorities quoted by the gentleman from California (Mr. Mc- CLOSKEY) Is Ronald J. Rickenbach, for- mer refugee and relief officer for the Agency for International Development, I shall read parts of his testimony, but I am not going to take them out of con- text-I can assure you of that. This appears at page 23 of the report entitled "Refugee and Civilian War Cas- ualty Problems in Laos and Cambodia." In speaking of the Meo tribesmen, he says: From conception, the Moo "cause" has simply been an effort on their part to protect their homeland from outside incursion. Their intended purpose: merely self-preservation. The Communist North Vietnamese moved Into Laos, and in force. The armed presence of the North Viet- namese Army was enough to put the Moo on the defensive, in line with tradition. However; their options were limited; ac- commodate themselves, fight or flee. They could not very well fight without arms, and assistance; they could flee, but to nowhere as suitable to their way of life than where they already were; or they could accommo- date themselves in some peaceful, subser- vient way to the Vietnamese presence,.:. . It is at this crucial juncture that the American Government's involvement can be traced. That was in the late 1950's. Then the gentleman concludes his testimony, and this is Mr: Rickenbach: But I feel, at the same time, that it is of Member who is not frankly committed paramount importance that we do not com- to the view that our colleague and my pound our mistakes- . friend, the gentleman from California And he meant in Southeast Asia- (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) has advanced. But I by not, in some form, showing a continuing ask this question based upon my own per- commitment to those people who over the sonal knowledge of some of the facts you years have shown the greatest loyalty to our have alluded to, having accompanied Mr, presence, whether history eventually justi- MCCLOSKEY to Indochina and having fies that presence or not. been present on several occasions as de- No single group, I am sure, has been as scribed by other parties who were pres- true an ally to America during this conflict eat. I do not suggest to you that you have believe as the hill thlat it is the tribesmen responsibility Laos. I and obli- firmly misrepresented what was told to either that of this committee to insure that, in Mr. MCCLOSKEY or me because you were one way or another, they are given a more not there and you were of necessity re- just repayment than pure abandonment, in quired to rely on third persons. But I this, their hour of truth. can say to you that in several instances Let us not forget that this war is going those third persons have misled you. on in Laos for one reason-the North The first instance is as to Reverend Vietnamese are invading it. The North Roffe and it pains me as I know it pains Vietnamese are invading it and the Meo you to hear suggested that a man of the tribesmen are resisting that invasion, cloth would mislead you, but that is pre. Mr. WALDIE. Can the gentleman tell cisely what he has done, if you have re- me from his vantage point of superior ported his conversation with you on page knowledge and information, and I say H6656, wheiie you recite in your state- that seriously as a member of the Com- ment, and I am not quoting this but it is mittee on Armed Services, if the Meos are in the second column about one-third being employed by the Central Intelli- the length down, where it says that Rev- gence Agency? erend Roffe has told Mr. Hecht that he Mr. GUBSER. First of all, let us talk detected no discrepancy between the an- about this question of superior knowledge swers given by rather Menger and those I do not have a thing in the world that is which lie heard from the refugees them- not available to the gentleman from Cali- fornia-not a thing. Ask Congressman HEBERT and he will show you anything that I am privileged to see. So I am not in a superior position of having any su- perior knowledge. The Meo tribesmen are supported by the U.S. Army and the U.S. advisers and they have been for many, many years. Mr. WALDIE. Are they not employed by the Central Inteligence Agency? Mr. GUBSER. As to whom they are di- rected by or financed by, I am not pre- pared to say, but at this time they have the support of the United States and they have fought valiantly. Mr. WALDIE. Let me ask this question. Do you know whether they are in the employ of Central Intelligence Agency or whether you are at liberty to say so-you do not know that? Mr. GUBSER. No, I do not know that. Mr. WALDIE. Were I to ask that ques- tion of Mr. HEBERT, would that knowledge be within his purview? Do you know? Mr. GUBSER. I cannot answer for the gentleman from Louisiana. Mr. WALDIE. Certainly, this may be a peripheral issue, but I understand mem- bers of the Committee on Armed Serv- ices are very privy to the appropriations for the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. GUBSER. Not on the Committee Is that your understandini';? Mr. GUBSER. That is what Mr. Hecht told me; yes. Mr. WALDIE. The fact of the matter is that I think these statements by Rev- erend Menger ought to be clearly brought out for your information. I guess you have apparently relied heavily on their version of the refugee situation in Laos. I only add this information to your well of intelligence, of their background, and of their credibility as I personally experienced it. In the first place, the 16 refugees in- volved in about a 4-hour period of inter- viewing, eight of whom were interviewed by me and eight of whom were inter- viewed by Mr. MCCLOSKEY are an inter- esting parallel to the refugee conclusions that you stated-a church croup did in- terview 350 people. Mr. GUBSER. No, 150. Mr. WALDIE. It was 150 in 1 day and we were only able to interview 16 between the two of us in 4 hours. Now I want to go into their interviews later to see whether they have showed you their interviews: You have seen the statement. Did they have statements of those interviews? on Armed Services-we do not have a Mr. WALDIE. They only gave you an thing in the world to do with appropria- assessment of the interviews. tions for the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. GUBSER. Exactly, a; quoted; yes. Mr. WALDIE. Do you have anything to Mr. WALDIE. Let me tell you a little do with the authorization for the Central bit about Reverend Roffe. They flew Intelligence Agency? down into the village, that sleepy refugee Mr. GUBSER. I would presume yes. village. You are absolutely right. You However, I do not know about the au- have been on enough trips overseas, as I thorizations for the Central Intelligence have, to know that if you do not select Agency. There are facets of the bill that where you want to go, you will go where could be that-I do not know. they want to go. They wanted us to go Mr. WALDIE. Let me ask you a ques- to a large party. They wanted us to fly tion or two before I yield to my good up north to the capital where we could friend, the gentleman from California go to a party and have some dancing (Mr. DELLUMS). I ask this question as a done by Laotian dancers. Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296ROQ0300080064-1 July 13, 1971 Approv")Fg&MW RR2 fk jglA- HR00296R000300080064-111 6673 That was not the purpose for which refugees whom I had first interviewed to we were there. it was not the purpose we check Father Monger's translation. This should have been there. We said. "Thank was a massive village of refugees, and you, but we will select the places we they had faded into that population with want to go." It was rude, perhaps, but it the exception of one. I found that one was our own consensus-and I shared refugee. Mr. MCCLOSKEY'S view that the infor- I asked the identical questions I had mation that would be derived from our asked In the presence and with the as- selected itinerary would in all probability sistance of Father Menger. The responses establish more accurate or Informative as to the presence of enemy soldiers in information than we would have gleaned the village were entirely contrary to rom sources that they delivered to us. what Father Menger had testifld. We flew to this refugee site in two hell- The next three groups of refugees that copters. Both interpreters, Rev. Ed Rolle I interviewed, not one said that there and Father Menger, provided us by Am- were enemy soldiers in the village. So btissador Godley, were warranted to us Reverned Roffe to you was telling the as independent, excellent interpreters truth when he said there was no distinc- that had been used by the embassy on tion between the translations of the ref- siinilar occasions in the past. Father ugees given to me and those given to Meager was in my helicopter and next to Father Menger. lne. Reverend Rolle was in Mr. McCLOS- What he was saying is that there was xaY's helicopter. My first exposure to no difference between the translation of Father Menger, I confess to you, was refugees given to him than given Father not a very palatable or a very warm ex- Menger when he accompanied "PETE" posure. MCCLOSKEY with a backup interpreter, On the way down the Father was dis- because in the second round of interpre- cussing the problems in Indochina, His tations with Father Menger interpreting statement to me was precisely these for "PETE" with a backup interpreter, in words: fact, there were no enemy soldiers in the The trouble with the American youth of village. today is they are yellow. They are not willing So let me suggest to you from personal to shed their blood for other peoples. experience, as a fairly neutral observer, My reaction to that was, as your reac- not total, and becoming less so as the tion would have been, one of being aghast days progress on this issue, Father such an accusation, My comment Menger in my view is not a credible trans- at the t such her was this: lator. He either does not understand a Father,, you may be familiar with the Laotian or is not willing to translate it Laotian situation, having been here 20 years, -as it was given. but you have been away from America for He either does not understand Laotian a long time and are not familiar with the or was not willing to translate it as it American situation now. You do not have to was given. Reverend Roth translated it as go that far, however. Go to Vietnam, from accurately as it was delivered, according where Mr. McCloskey and I have just come. to the intrepreter along with us. Go to the hospital we visited and take a look at the Americans who have shed their The question that I asked of the Em- blood for causes in which I dp not believe bassy people all along involved the ques- and probably they do not believe. tion the gentleman has constantly posed That was the basis on which I was about this survey on which the gentle- introduced to Father Menger, man from California (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) During the interview of the eight ref- has relied, that it was a very limited ugees, four of them in the first round I survey of a very limited group of people was interviewing with Father Menger's in a very limited period of time in a very assistance and one other reporter, who limited space. They claim that to base the unfortunately did not speak Laotian and conjectures and the extraction of the neither did I. With Mr. MCCLOSKEY was hypothesis on that, which the gentleman Reverend Roffe and several others who from California (Mr. McCosxEY) has-- spoke Laotian to check his translation. that is a matter that concerned me. I We met after 2 hours and he commented - asked the Embassy officials about it when to me, he said, "It is remarkable." this report finally came to light-and it I said, "What is remarkable?" seems'a question that should concern us He said: all, but I am not going to dwell on the The fact that there was riot in one in- details as to how it came to light or stance of one interview that I conducted an whether it was probably concealed or not, enemy soldier either within the village or That is not of interest to me. closer than 2 to l0 miles from the village The fact is that once it came to my at the time of the bombing "tack on the attention it was immediately disclaimed village that produced the wounded refugees or the evacuated refugee, as not being a valid refugee report, as the gentleman suggested was claimed by the I said, "That is Lemarkable." Embassy people. They said that it was Among my four interviews there was not one who did not say in his village that in fact there were either both Laotian or North Vietnamese soldiers. We decided that coincidence was re- markable, so remarkable that it should be tested. He then took Father Menger on the next round of interviews. I took Reverend Roffe along with two men who also spoke Laotian, I tried to And all four of the sador runs that country as if it were a fiefdom, and the Central Intelligence Agency runs it as if it is a fiefdom also. But the fact of the matter is all the resources are under their control to take the polls and to say whether thi.t poll is inaccurate. It may very well be a fact that it is, but it is the only poll they have. I have one more response-and I am sorry I have not yet yielded to the gen- tleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) as he requested, but I have one more comment. I was pleased to hear the response to the gentleman from Michigan r Mr. RIEGLE) that the gentleman would . oin in requests for photographs. As I reed this testimony quite closely, it is not the gen- tleman's belief, I gather, that the photo- graphs that have been sought to confirm or deny the existence in the first instance of villages in the area in question are not in existence-those photographs are not. It is the gentleman's argument, as I understand this, that although they may be in existence, they are so difficult to interpret, that there Is a danger in re- leasing those photographs, because they may be misinterpreted. In response to that, I think this t is a valid argument, the conclusion at least, that any photograph might very well be susceptible of a variety of interpretations as to what happened to the villaies if, in fact, the villages have been destsoved. But it does seem to me as a lawyer that the determination is within the hands of the jury as to whether the evidence is credible or not, If it is in the possession of the lawyer, he should present 11; to the jury, unless he desires that jury not to see it. As a defense lawyer, one might not want the jury to see the evi- dence. But we are not defense lawyers or prosecutors here. We want the people to know the facts. What is wrong with procuring the pho- tographs as they exist and letting judg- ments 'be made as to what happened to the area in question? The gentleman's judgment may differ from mine, or we may agree. But in respect to that, may I ask the gentleman simply this question. He has referred to two photograph:; that he displayed to the House of Represen- tatives, and he discussed a survey of 26 square kilometers as to the density of structures. I presume in the survey of the 26 square kilometers, a descriptb"n or conclusion as to the density of structures would have required some visible evi- dence of the existence of structures in that 26 square kilometers? Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I presume-and I am quite sure it is correct-that wa:: cal- culated from bomb damage assessment reports. done in an inadequate manner, there Mr. WALDIE. Would that include pho- were an insufficient number of samples,??tographs? and conclusions therefore should be dis- Mr. GUBSER. I would think so, yes. trusted. I suggested that could very well Mr. WALDIE. Do you know whether be so, but I asked why they did not at- in that 26 square kilometers ther^ are tempt to take additional polls to confirm photographs of structures? or deny the results of that poll. They have it within their power. They own that country, and they really own that, I will say to the gentleman from California- (Mr. GussEa), The. Ambas- Mr. GUBSER. I do not. Mr. WALDIE. Of the two photographs the gentleman presented to the House of Representatives; it was artillery damage? I presume it was the gentleman's con- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1 I3 6674 Approved FaCM@R&gg,0t$@EP-7g ;6R0003000800f&Zy 13, 1971 elusion of the damage, that it was caused by artillery . Mr. GUBSER. Artillery and mortars. Mr. WALDIE. Who provided the gentleman with those photographs? Mr. GUBSER. They were from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Mr. WALDIE. Were they taken by American reconnaissance planes? Mr. GUBSER. I cannot answer the question, but I presume they were. Mr. WALDIE. The American forces were not, in fact, bombing those? Mr. GUBSER. No, nor were the Lao- tians. The purpose of those two photo- graphs was only to show the extent of damage that can be caused from ground action. Incidentally, those two photographs were not even up in the PDJ area but were in the panhandle. Mr. WALDIE. My curiosity Is as to how you obtained them. No American forces were involved in that action. No Ameri- can air power was involved in that ac- tion. Yet, there is, within the possession of the Secretary of War, two photo- graphs of villages, which relate to a to- tally Laotian action, I presume. Mr. GUBSER. Of course, we fly re- connaissance many times a day over that area because that is where the Ho Chi Minh Trail is. Mr. WALDIE. I presume so. And I pre- sume equally there would. be photo- graphs covering the area in question, as to whether structures exist in that area. Mr. GUBSER. I would say to the gen- tleman, it is my belief there would be ample photography along the LOC, lines of communication. Mr. WALDIE. Yes. Mr. GUBSER. But I seriously doubt that there is reliable, up-to-date photog- raphy of the areas away from the LOC's. I think Captain Michel told Representa- tive MCCLOSKEY he had Just flown a mission the day before along LOC route 7. ' Mr. WALDIE. You mentioned in your testimony yesterday that the bomb craters would not necessarily be evidence or that the crater would not necessarily be evidence of a bomb. I suspect that is correct. There might be a question as to a bomb crater, an artillery crater or a mortar crater. M. GUBSER. Or, if I might add, a question as to whether the bomb crater was caused by a Laotian pilot. Mr. WALDIE. There is no question of that. Mr. GUBSER. Or whether when a village happened to be evacuated, it was at the time a military target. Mr. WALDIE. There is also the ques- tion that no photograph can honestly answer at' its inception. The area as to which I was confused was Mr. McCLOSHEY'S question to you which was . not able to be developed be- cause time expired. I am not sure, mili- tarily, but I gather from the question Mr. MCCLOSKEY was asking, and Informa- tion provided to me, that a cluster bomb does not leave a crater. I am talking about CBU, not phosphorous. Mr. GUBSER. The gentleman is cor- rect. Incendiary, on occasion, and antt- personnel. Mr. WALDIE. Antipersonnel bombs do not. Mr. GUBSER. Some do, but these 1 understand do not. . Mr. WALDIE. Then to add further to the gentleman's understanding of our dilemma in interpreting what is happen- ing in Laos, almost every one of the refugees I interviewed who possessed wounds on their bodies or who had lost members of their families from the bombing lost them from cluster bomb wounds, from antipersonnel bombs. The one exception was the white phosphate wound that had scarred a Meo, now a 9-year-old boy, from his toe up through his back, that killed his sister and burned him. Mr. GUBSER. Is the gentleman refer- ring to a boy whose name I previously misspelled? I called him Ba Son Di, but I understand his correct name is Thao Som Dii. Mr. WALDIE. I do not know. I have that in my notes. Mr. GUBSER. A 10-year-old boy who had a burn on his right leg, whom you saw? Mr. WALDIE. Yes. Mr. GUBSER. I am sure we are talk- ing about the same person. I believe it is rather interesting, If the gentleman will permit me no more than 2 minutes of his time, to go into this, Mr. WALDIE. Surely. Mr. GUBSER. I asked about that young person, On the morning of July 6 a USAID officer Interviewed the father of this boy. . Mr. WALDIE. That Is the man I inter- viewed, the father, not the boy. I did not interview the boy. Mr. GUBSER. From the description I have heard of the boy's injury, I think it probably was a phosphorous bomb, be- cause I understand it was rather local- ized. But the father of Thao Som Dii told the USAF officer this morning on July 6 that his son was burned by na- palm dropped by jets while the family was walking along the road near the rice fields at some -distance from their village. As I understand it from the docu- ments-I have never seen the boy-the burns could not have been napalm, be- cause it would have enveloped him and would have been much more widespread and not localized. The point that I make here is an example of how unreliable in- formation is when you get it from no- madic and primitive peoples like even the father who says that it was napalm when we know it was not. Mr. WALDIE. Let me suggest to you it is unreliable if you are not careful in the interviews. The father said that it was napalm. We suspected that he was incorrect because of the nature of the wound. We went into It in much greater detail and ultimately found out that he was talking about a white phosphorus bomb. Mr. GUBSER. Here is another part of the same information that I requested.. Mr. WALDIE. Although I suspect that if you are burned by napalm or by white phosphorus--- Mr. GUBSER. Neither are very nice. Mr. WALDIE. That is right. Mr. GUBSER. This wire says "It is also possible that the child in question was in fact playing with undetonated phosphorus parachute flare's or smoke markers, which sometimes occurs." We know that phosphorus Is only used for marking and screening. There are two other weapons, which are cluster bombs and which are never used except against supply dumps and military tar- gets and are not used again :t personnel. Mr. WALDIE, Wait a minute. I do not yield further. I want to comment on that. They should never have bern used, and our policy would never per+ni t them to be used. If in fact they were used it was a violation of our policy, wa: it not? Mr. GUBSER. May I read in response another portion of this teIfrgram which I have and which came from Mr. Sterns, the Deputy Chief of Mission. It says: Phosphorus ordnance is never-repeat- never used as antipersonnel weapon in Laos. It has been used on one occasion we know of in 1989 in an attempt to burn Pathet Lao North Vietnamese army rice etorage area. Mr. WALDIE. The point of the matter Is I know what the policy i:: and I know the policy is extremely humane. The regulations of engagement are as mag- niflcient documents of humanitarianism as you could possibly find Ill warfare. It Is not the policy I am concerned with but the practice. I suppose every interview I received and which was contained in that refugee report could be discounted as maybe somebody who was motivated in the refugee stations, by other reasons, but there is sufficient basis in my mind- and I left Indochina, as I mentioned to you yesterday and as Mr. MCCLOSKEY knows, genuinely concerned that the con- clusions he had drawn from what I con- sidered to be limited evidence were not warranted. However, the failure to provide the Congress with evidence that is within their prerogative-not only the failure to provide that evidence but the actual policy to keep this House of Representa- tives from knowing about Laos-causes me to be highly Incredible as to their ac- tual representations. I do not even un- derstand my good friend from California (Mr. GussER). I do not understand the majority of my own colleagues in their refusal the other day to ask questions about what we are doing in Laos. The administration will not provide us with these answers. I do not cast all of the blame on this administration, be- cause the prior administration and the two prior administrations, both leaders of whom were in my own party, were equally adamant in their refusal to let the American people and their represent- atives know what is happening there in Laos. It is for that reason that I am be- coming increasingly of the belief that Mr. MCCLOSKEY's charges have been far more credible than the effort today to destroy him suggests is the case. The evidence you have used to at- tempt to refute Mr. MCCLOSrCEY'S charges has been reports on the evidence being Insufficient. I grant you that the evidence was Insufficient. I granted that from the start, and it did not have to be diminished further to be insufficient. But you have not answered why the admiraibtration did Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1 July 13, 1971 Approved I g~"A?L/0 V~~ 1~-RW3JR%0296R000300080064-1 116675 not produce the concrete evidence of Lao and the North Vietnamese alter- allegation of war crimes and wa;? atroci- photographs and additional refugee sur- nately occupy this region and that dur- ties in Indochina. veys showing how erroneous the con- ing every wet season the Meo tribesmen I commend the gentleman for specifi- elusions of this survey were. There must come back. In other words, it changes tally raising the issue of bombing in be evidence other than that which has hands every year. These people have been Laos, but I would like to deal with the been presented, other than a mere at- used as slaves and their rice has been broader question of war atrocities be- tack on the limited evidence Mr. Mc- taxed and at the time this is what they cause I personnally believe that to at- Cr.osKEY has presented, that would re- were protesting against. tack your credibility in exercising your fute the charges. Mr. WALDIE. There is no question, right to know as a public official is tragic, Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, will the however, that almost every refugee with ludicrous, expedient, and sometimes even gentleman yield further? which I had contact expressed his theatrical. Mr. WALDIE. I would be happy to. thorough distaste of the practices you It would seem to me that if we are con- Mr. GUBSER. Before I respond to the have described. cerned about the critical issues t hat one concluding part of. your statement, let Mr. GUBSER. Is it not a fair state- of our colleagues raises here on the floor me say to the gentleman that I admire ment to say that almost every refugee of the House of Representatives, such as the manner in which he has approached had at some time known that the Pathet in this matter, then I, for one, seriously this problem and I admired the state- Lao or the North Vietnamese were oc- question the value of personal debate inents he made upon returning. In fact, cupying these villages? with seven or eight Congressmei on the the gentleman really makes my case Mr. WALDIE. Oh, surely, but that does floor, and perhaps 30 people in ,he gal- which provoked this entire interchange. not mean If they were there last month leries. If we are serious about the allega- I have always said that Mr. MCCLOS- the villages should be destroyed this tions then why have not the Members KEY has not proven his point and that he month, of the Congress joined in calling for a had an obligation to prove the serious Mr. GUBSER. Certainly, but I want full-scale open Inquiry into the war charge he made before injuring the to clear up the point and the implication crimes and other atrocity allegations in image of his country. That is what this that Reverend Raffe and Father Menger Indochina? If we would, then we could argument is all about. But, nevertheless, were deliberately concealing the fact solve the matter. But standing here on it has evolved into something else. . . that the Pathet Lao had been there. The the floor with nine people discussing the Mr. WALDIE. Let me interrupt the facts are that they were there. technicalities of bombing In my estinia- gentleman at that point because I surely Mr. WALDIE. It is certainly my own tion is rather absurd, it is playing games do not want my silence to indicate or to personal opinion that Reverend Menger as courtroom lawyers, grandstanding for suggest that Mr. MCCLOSKEY has injured was deliberately misinterpreting. He said the record, and does not seem to me to this country by his statements. I do not at the time of the bombing there were solve the critical problem of whether or believe that at all, and make no mistake no North Vietnamese or Pathet Lao in not we actually committed war crimes in about it. It is my opinion that Members the village. Reverend Raffe said subse- Southeast Asia, of Congress can debate passionately and quently that in fact they were there. Before I go to the general issue of with conviction policies of this country So I appreciate the generosity and war crimes in Indochina I would just like and when he expresses that disagree- courtesy of the gentleman in yielding to to make one set of comments as the ment with passion and conviction, all of me, chairman of 4 days of ad hoc hear- which I happen to believe fit your col- At this time, Mr. Speaker, I plan to ings on war crimes in Southeast Asia. league and mine admirably and com- yield to the gentleman from California One of the Marine captains who flew pletely, then I feel he is entitled to do so. (Mr. DELLUMS) for 10 minutes, but be- many missions in Indochina mentioned Mr. GUBSER. But, again, getting fore I do so may I inquire how much that one of the most precise bombing down to the conclusion which the gentle- time I have remaining? missions Is ostensibly the computer man made, I would like to go back to The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gen- bombing runs, generally flown at night. one other point. I, certainly, was not a tleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) He indicated that, given variations in party to the interviews. I cannot com- has consumed 33 minutes, wind velocity, variations in spend and ment upon the honesty of Father Menger Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, will the human time lapse response, that it Is or Reverend Roffe because I was not the genleman yield? possible that bombs could have been there. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Does the dropped as far as 6 miles away from Mr. WALDIE. But I was. gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) strategic military targets. Mr. GUBSER. I accepted the gentle- yield to the gentleman from California The point is that if you understand man's statement as being an accurate (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) ? computer bombing runs, someone is on reflection of what he sincerely believes Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would the phone who tells the pilot to push the to be true. But it seems to me that the ask the gentleman from California (Mr. button. If they push it late, either one main issue which was wrapped around MCCLOSKEY) whether he would permit of them, if there are variations in the the credibility of Father Menger and me to yield first to the gentleman from speed or in.the wind velocity, than bomb Reverend Roffe is whether or not there California (Mr. DELLUMS) who has a does not have to drop as depicted on a were Pathet Lao in the villages. Now, the very important mission to perform on piece of paper In a computer, It. could survey-the famous USIS survey upon behalf of the Democrats in that he has to drop 6 miles down the road. which Mr. MCCLOSKEY places so much go out and practice his pitching talents. Second, the testimony further reveals emphasis and relies upon so heavily says Mr. McCLOSKEY. Certainly. that the unwritten policy Is never to re- that 95 percent of those who lived there Mr. WALDIE. I yield 10 minutes to the turn to base with any bombs still at- and were refugees did not go back when gentleman from California (Mr. DEL- tached to the plane, And on questions the war ended if it were occupied by the LUMS). from the Chair- Communists. More than 60 percent gave Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. GUBSER. Mr, Speaker, will the a variety of reasons for their becoming the gentleman from California (Mr. gentleman yield? refugees which included. the protest WALDIE) for yielding to me. Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman has against the 15-percent rice tax Imposed Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman spoken for 3 hours. Please give me 10 by the North Vietnamese and the Pathet from California (Mr. MCCLOSKEY) on his minutes. Lao and the fact that they were forced actions, his courage and his convictions Mr. GUBSER. I have seen a lot of them to become military porters and were with respect to what I consider are some come back to base with their bombs. treated as slaves and cattle, very critical issues, and problems. Mr. DELLUMS. On questions from the The other thing-I think it Is clearly I for one do not question your inte- Chair and other members of the ad hoc established, regardless of what the testi- grity nor your motives. I think your ac- committee as to "what do you do with mony may have been when Father Men- tivity typifies the highest and the best In the bombs?" The response was, "We drop ger and Reverend Roffe were translating a public official who diligently attempts them." for you Is that the Pathet Lao had oc- to Inform the American people and chal- The Constitution grants Congress vir- cupied. those villages. Perhaps, at the lenges his colleagues in the House of tually unlimited control with respect to moment they were not there, but we all Representatives to discuss some very the military and military policy. War pol- know that every dry season the Pathet serious problems, and that is the serious icies and war crimes ,responsibility fall Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1 Approved Fp EgS4eRM/(1 $DPl?@ 6R0003000800t1b, well within congressional purview over the military. Thus far, though, that au- thority has meant very little. There are many reasons. First, as with just about all congres- sional functions, Congress has evolved into a client, not a? regulator. The mili- tary dangles both carrots and sticks be- fore Congress-usually locating of or closing down of installations, defense contracts, and so forth. After a while the message gets across. Even when the Ex- ecutive has dared to slice funds from questionable defense projects, Congress not only reinstates money, but projects as well. Throughout the early 1960s, Con- gress continually budgeted the B-70 bomber even though the administration had decided to let the project die, and in 1970, Chairman Rivers successfully led a drive to fund a carrier that the Navy had not requested. This philosophy carries through to war atrocities. The military committees mir- ror the sentiments of the Defense Estab- lishment. But, only so far. For example, the House Armed Services Committee report on My Lai: From its inception, the ... investigation has been hampered by a generally uncooperative attitude of the Department of the Army. Usually, though, the military commit- tees agree with the Military Establish- ment's perspective that it is individuals, not policies, that commit war, atrocities. The Establishment and committees fight every effort to investigate ultimate re- sponsibility for war crimes. Second is the ethics of Congress itself. Survival-reelection-not the public in- terest, is the motivating force in Con- gress. Posturing aims to avoid stands, avoid involvement. Closed-door negotiat- ing, "the art of compromise," these are rewarded. War crimes were--and are-an ex- tremely sensitive topic. Remember that Ronald Ridenhour sent a number of Rep- resentatives letters detailing My Lai be- fore any action was taken. Standard op= orating procedure dictates that so-called crank mail will be brushed aside, thrown out, or referred to the Congressman who represents the writer's home town. It took almost 8 months from Riden- hour's letter reaching Congress until be- fore mention was made of My Lai on the House floor. And that notice came about only because the Cleveland Plain Dealer broke the story. The House Armed Services Committee had received Riden- hour's letter in early April 1969; on November 24, the then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Chair- man Rivers, made a brief speech: We do not know what there is to this or what the Army has in their files in Washing- ton. If, the investigating committee, and we will be setting as a kind of quasi-grand jury- If we see that this warrants further inquiry and should be brought out into a larger investigation; the subcommittee will do this. But, for the moment, exercising our juris- diction over the Army and as a subcommittee created for this purpose, we are making the first move. I think the House ought to know it, because I am sure you are getting a lot of inquiries on just exactly what we are gging to do in the House of Representatives on this matter which seems to be catching the headlines gut this time. In blunter terms, had it not been for press reports of My Lai, Congress would have probably shunted aside the whole incident. Once out in the open though, con- gressional rhetoric gushed forth. Within 2 weeks of the first public arousal over My Lai, approximately 40 Representa- tives and Senators made floor statements on the slaughter. In general, Congress reacts rather than leads. When I joined with a group of other concerned Congressmen to propose and conduct open ad hoc hearings on command responsibility for war atroci- ties, there was expected criticism and op- position from the right and a general silence and avoidance from many Mem- bers termed "liberal." A. third reason comes from the pro- cedural nature of Congress. Of our essen- tially conservative governmental struc- ture, I view Congress as the most tradi- tional and slow-acting branch. Even- tually, Congress does act on most press- ing national problems. But so much time has passed between the initial causes of a problem, the development of an issue as an issue, the recognition by Congress that some problem exists, real action by Congress, and, finally, administration of whatever new policies or remedies are established to meet the problem, that by the time this lengthy process is com- pleted, the original problem is consider- ably changed or enlarged but the remedy is only tuned to its earliest stages. I am reasonably sure that Congress will eventually openly deal with the ques- tion of ultimate command responsibility for war atrocities. Yet, I am almost just as sure that whenever Congress would undertake such an analysis, it would be too late to have an impact on the shape of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. Instead, the whole effort would wind up as a mere academic exercise-but with great fan- fare from the Congress. Finally, I see much of Congress' reti- cence resulting from the basic philos- ophies of the men who hold the key posi- tions in the House and Senate. Most of them Deceived their basic and deepest political educaiton in the 1930's and 1940's. Simply put, their general phi- losophy is that they "know" what is right for America-and because, for them, American is the richest, strongest, most influential nation, therefore, also, what is "right" for the world. For them, it is implausible that Amer- lean soldiers could have been involved in large-scale war atrocities. They accept My Lai as an isolated aberration, but they also believe that the war in South- east Asia is the same type of war they knew and fought in, and that war crimes therefore are invariably punished. War atrocities in Southeast Asia are not aberrations. They are an integral part of the basic type of conflict in which America became so foolishly entangled. Strict military judicial enforcement may reduce a marginal percentage of atroci- ties, but I do not forsee any significant reduction in war crimes as long as U.B. forces continue an active role in South- east Asia. From testimony presented at the ad 13, 1971 hoc hearings, and from my other stud- ies, I single out five important factors which are causing the continuation of atrocities. First. A key part of the psychology of our involvement is one of treating all Vietnamese people-whether South Viet- namese, Vietcong, or North Vietnam- ese-as subhuman beings. Everyone who is Vietnamese is pert.jived as a "gook," "slant-eye," or "slope." as less than human. Therefore, no real effort is made to distinguish betwe'^n civilians and combatants, between friends and en- emies. In blunter terms, the racism per- vasive in this country is obr'iously per- vasive in Indochina. Second. Therefore, I find it a blatant falsehood on the part of those persons who tell the American public that we are "helping" the Vietnamese Third. On the operations level, con- ventional warfare in a people': guerrilla struggle results in multiple and continu- ing atrocities. People, old women and children are shot down in.a village: For what military purpose. Boml ~s are indis- criminately dropped on innocent human beings: For what military purpose? The conventional warfare concept means that GI's perceive all human being as their enemy; otherwise, the concept is flawed.. Fourth. If we are to assume any re- sponsibility for war atrocities, then it must be laid at the highest military and civilian policymaking levels. I think that any time this country does not see fit to deal with fundamental. problems that it will create at that moment a scape- goat. Black people, brown, red, yellow, students, poor people all have been con- venient scapegoats. Lieutenant Calley is a scapegoat for the military command. Fifth. Fixing responsibility is not enough. I think it falls critically short of the most necessary close examination of institutional factors thot give rise to American involvement and adventur- ism. We have to deal with racism, mili- tarism, and sexism in this country which is extended into the conduce, of our for- eign affairs. Too many people wring their hands in guilt, but do not -see the need to go.beyond dealing with symptoms and effects. - My hope is that no other young person will have to go through the same kind of evil, the same kind of insanity, the same kind of wanton death as we have suffered in Indochina. The proper role of Congress is to deal with lhasic causes, and the inability of Congress to confront the issue of ultimate responsibility for war atrocities must be seen as a serious flaw in our ideals of a democratic state. Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Sneaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I have been perplexed as the debate proceeded to try to come to grips with the real issue involved-as to whether these villages had been bombed or not. I think the gentleman from California (Mr. GunsEn) who contests my view would concede the bulk of his concern is that I have made too extensive conclusions from the evidence before m". I, in turn, have not been able to get the gentleman to address the evidence itself, the evi- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1 July 13, 1971 Approved F r~ ]R9 (8/ eSI DPj(j&9 96R000300080064-1 116677 dence of hundreds of people who have A: This is very Communist area, Mr. McCLOSKEY, I cite that citation said their villages have been destroyed, Q: The villages themselves are Communist because it puts both Father Meager and I noted in the argument yesterday the villages? Mr. Hecht, whom the gentleman quoted gentleman quoted William Hecht, special Q2: Why did they leave then to get sway yesterday, in context when he assistant to a U.S. delegation of church- from Communists? You said they to to get It y indi- away from Communists, because they are cate in their judgment, regardless of the men, who had been In Vientiane inter- Communist villages. I don't get it. bombing or how many people are killed, viewing refugees at the same time we A: You never lived under Communists? that the bombing is justified. were. I quote his statement: Well, I have. Mr. GUBSER. That is not the point at Our assessment was that refugees con- Q: I couldn't live if my house disap- issue. sidered the bombing a blessing. peared-was blown up. Mr. McCLOSKEY. Much of the argu- A: Like Laktuan. I lived up there. 57, 58, That was remarkably parallel to what 59. Bon Bon, Kai Kai, r know this area, meat the gentleman made is to the ef- Father Menger, who had been there 15 Q: That's irrelevant. It's irrelevant whether feet that the North Vietnamese are in- years and who had interviewed a number you lived there. The question is whether vading the country, that the people do of these refugees with us and translated those villages. were bombed without Com- not like living under the North Viet- some for me, had stated, and I would like munist troops being there. namese, and even if we are bombing it to state his precise statement off a tape A: I say you cannot understand. I will be might be justified. very honest-I might hurt your feelings.. You Mr. GUBSER. No. The we had with the concluding interviews will.not get a true picture-unless they know gentleman is of the refugees there. This was the final who you are-you will not get a true picture reading conclusions into my statement refugee interview, and I would like to of this country in three days. which I never uttered. I wish the gentle- read it into the record, if I may at this Q: Wait just a minute. These things which man would cease and desist this constant point. These are my 'comments and you- just interpreted-when we asked these practice of reading interpretations into -Mu any of e o made by one of the members of my staff: '""` i --a...~..,,, were A: Some aP them yes. . Many of them m no. Congressman McCloskey, "Finally, we got Q: All right. Let's take them. I asked them from them the fact that a study had been their name and I asked the village from made of refugee attitudes and when I saw them. Were they truthful on that? that study of refugee attitudes and it sum- A: Yes. marizes the information we are verifying to- Q: What about their age? day, I said I would like to take this list of A: No. names and places and go up to these refugee Q: That's not truthful. It could be any- villages. We were set to leave at 1:00 in the thing. afternoon to come up to 272, to go up to A: Luang Prabang which would have given us Q : I've got to get some specific things. a chance to see the northern refugee ,camps. When they said they were bombed many, At 1300 it turned out that the papers were many times. Were they being truthful? not ready and we didn't get them actually A: I don't know. until 3:00 in the afternoon. Because of that, Q: When they said they saw T-28's and we are limited to getting one camp rather jets, were they truthful? than site 272 and Luang Probang. There is A: Yes. Oh, sure. nothing I would have liked to do better. Q: When they said they saw big bombs One question I'd like to ask you-why and bombers, were they truthful? would the Embassy deliberately prevent us A: Yes. from getting this information when I first Q: When they say all their villages were came here? If I had followed their schedule destroyed, were they truthful? that they laid out for me, I wouldn't have A: I don't know. learned a single thing I learned today. Why Q: You don't know whether all their would they do that? Why would a visiting houses were destroyed? Congressman-why wouldn't they be the first A: I would ... to tell me what these facts are?" Q2: You haven't been out there since the A: (Father Monger) "You work. for the bombing, have you? You'd be out ... be- gpvernlent, I don't, I don't know how they tween August 1969 and 1970? Q: "Why do they do this? You know? You A: I know the church was destroyed. know the Ambassador. You know Ambassa- Q: When they told him the number of dor Godley. Why In the Lord's name wouldn't people killed and the number of water buf- he want me to know this information?" falo killed, do you believe those answers? A: I don'tknow. A: The exact number-no. Q: Could I ask you a question? As T re- Q: What about this woman saying her call, Father, your testimony to the Kennedy husband was killed? Committee, you said that the bombing was A: Probably true. not responsible for the refugee movement Q: How about the people their wounds? but that Communist terrorism W Ho d . w o you feel about it now that you've talked to these people? A: Same as before. A: Possibly true. Q: Possibly true. Possible they got their wounds some other way? Q: Which means you don't believe what This Is the answer I want you to note: these people have said? A: No. What I will sa A: Let me tell you. I have lived with these say, and you should people. They will tell you one thing. You go put it out-even though it is true-even back to the same people. You slit down with though our, American bombing has, care some them, you have lunch with them, you live is 100'seo killed people-I I don't y- wish If It with them for a couple of days, you will find you print this-quote I can me-thank the real story. You're not getting the real you would d print this-quote mthanGod story, for that bombing. Otherwise, this country Q2: You don't think they were really would not be free today, bombed? This concludes Father Menger's tesa A: Look. Wait. You want the real story. The timony. immediate cause of their leaving was prob- Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, will the ably the bombing.' But that is the immediate gentleman yield? cause. But the ultimate cause-the real rea- son is because they do not want to lose their Mr. WALDIE. I yield to the gentleman freedom , .. from California, Mr. GUBSER. Q2: Why didn't anybody tell us that? Mr. GUBSER. Is the gentleman in- Q: Nobody has said that. These people-- troducing that quotation from Father every single one ofs these villages has been Menger as proof of his allegation that we destroyed. There hasn't been a village have engaged in indiscriminate bombing we've ... In Laos? with a piece of evidence I did not present yesterday. This is a report by a United Nations expert, which seems to me to sum up everything we tried to produce yesterday to indicate that villages of seven provinces had been destroyed by bombing. This Is by U.N. expert George., Chape- lier, who conducted during 1970 inter- views in depth with some 50 refugees from the Plain of Jars. The results of his findings were published in the fall of 1970 In a study entitled: "Plain of Jars: Social Changes Under Five Years of Pathet Lao Administration." Excerpts from this report follow: All these efforts tended to enhance na- tional consciousness, but perhaps what con- tributed more than anything else to forge an in-group feeling were the heavy and recur- rent bombings. A brief account of what we consider as the major event in the five years under the Pathet Lao will make it easier to understand the reaction of the people and the further Pathet Lao politics of portage responsibilities and restriction of consumer goods. Prior to 1967, bombings were light and far from populated centers. By 1968 the in- tensity of the bombings was such that no organized life was possible in th,^ villages. The villagers moved to the outskirts and then deeper and deeper into the forest as the bombing climax reached its peak in 1969 when jet planes came daily and de- stroyed all stationary structures. Nothing was left standing. The villagers lived in trenches and holes or in caves. They only farmed at night. All of the interlocutors, without any exception, had his village compi=!tely de- stroyed. In the last phase, bombings were aimed at the systematic destruction of the material basis of the civilian soci~-ty. Har- vests burned down and rice became scarce, portage became more and more frequent. (pp. 18-19). These people seem to be fed up wU.h bomb- ing and unable to foresee the en,i of this tragic epoch. It must be noted that these observations are valuable at a behavior level and do not engage the author about !,he inner feelings of the refugees. A genuine assimila- tion between communism and bombing is frequent in Vientiane, even amongst West- ern-educated people. A meaningful example is given by the answer of a Deputy whom we were asking, "Do you think that ?,ao per- sonality fits well in the communist system or, more simply, that Lao peasants are pathy in PL territories?' He replied with a large smile: 'But don't you know that they are bombed day after day, live In holes like animale and work in their paddy field at Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1 1-16678 Approved FF,5%?M ffiRil f/W'I a&DP R J96R0003000800 -) 13, 1971 night? Is Ghat a good life?' Obviously, he is one of the greatest strengths in a free assimilated communism and bombing and society with a free press. We need more his reaction Is typical of the Lao social of it. climate in 'Vientiane, (p. 36). For this reason, earlier this year I That is a quote from pages 18 and 19 Joined a number of my colleagues in of the Plain of Jars paper by Mr. Georges cosponsoring the "Newsman's Privilege Chapelier of the United Nations. Act" which would protect reporters in Mr. Speaker, I think that sums up the their investigative reporting efforts. This nature of the testimony given by hun- is one way we utilize a free press to ex- dreds of refugees. Nowhere in this debate pose mistake, mismanagement, and cor- has the gentleman from California, from ruption inside and outside our Govern- Santa Clara County, challenged the fact ment. Thus, reporters should not become that these refugees from seven different the investigative arm of the Government. provinces accurately described the de- At the same time, neither the print vastating bombing by U.S. Air Force jets nor the electronic media should become of their villages climaxing in 1969, the the propaganda arm of the Government. same year when this country dropped A free nation loses a valuable resource over half a million tons of bombs in the if the media become mere endorsers of country of Laos, doubling the bombing Government policy or conveyors of state- in the previous year of 1968. This cir- ments by Government officials. cumstance I cannot say establishes with This is the issue in the delicate case clarity or establishes beyond any reason- before us today. We are living in a time able doubt that we pursued a deliberate of lively public debate over major and policy of destroying the villages, but it minor issues of public importance. There does show from the testimony of the have been repeated calls for "truth in witnesses who were there and saw it that government" and for expanded "freedom the bombing was deliberate and was in- of information" so that the public can tended to destroy the structure of that make participatory democracy a reality society and confirms the testimony of the on the basis of complete information. United Nations experts who said that the One of the major issues which has come bombing was systematically attempting fully to the fore recently in the debate to destroy that society. I seems to me it over the Indochina war has been the establishes a prima facie case that the public right to know the events, policies, program and the activities of the United and rationale behind our involvement in States over Laos in :1968 and 1969 were that war. attended by the destruction of hundreds The ironic fact in this whole contro- if not thousands of villages in northern versy Is that many of us have hoped that Laos. we could encourage documentaries and Mr. Speaker, I state there is no evi- other forms of investigative reporting in dence in the record that.shows anything' the broadcast medium as well as the to the contrary. press. The electronic media are particu- larly suited to informing the public along GUARANTEE OF A FREE PRESS The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle- man from California (Mr. BELL) is re- cognized for 30 minutes. Mr. BELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in op- position to another misguided and dan- gerous attempt to trample on the first amendment guarantee of a free press. It is unfortunate, though perhaps to be expected, that attempts by Govern- ment officials to infringe upon freedom of the press occur more often at times when the press is most vigorously fulfill- ing its role of informing the public vi- gorously and critically of the activities of the Government and its officials. It is highly significant that the prin- cipal rationale argued by both the com- mittee majority and the CBS network is the concern for the "people's right to know." This is as it should be, for a major function of a free press in a free society must, of course, be to enable the people to discover the truth about their Nation and their government and its policces. Although the case before us today does not directly involve the need to protect confidential sources, the issue is much the same. The need for protection of a reporter's personal notes-his private scribblings, words and phrases not used in a final draft, and the names of his sources-is essential if we are to uphold the value of vigorous investigative re- porting. This kind of reporting in,both the print media and the broadcast media these lines because of the visual impact of their medium. For 30 or 60 minutes the television can knock down the walls and the distances in our society and bring the ghetto, the war, the refugee camp, hungry people, and similar iso- lated people and events in our society into every living room. Following the recommendation of the committee today would discourage such informative presentations and encourage the broadcasting media to present noth- ing but dull "pablum" to the public. For the dubious purpose of protecting the sensitivities of some Government officials, some would have the Government assume the role of arbiter of truth in the pres- entation of news, documentaries, and investigative reports concerning Govern- ment policies and the conditions of our people at war and at home. As both the committee majority and the CBS network have correctly stated, the "people's right to know" is of para- mount importance in the issue of a free press. But the committee would have us take misguided and unconstitutional means to attempt to protect and expand the freedom of information for the public. As I understand it, the committee's majority opinion relies on the rationale that first amendment protection for the electronic media is something less than the protection afforded the print medium. The point has been made that Congress regulates the broadcast media, unlike the print media, through the Federal Com- munications Commission and its licens- ing procedure. I would hasten to point out, however, that the means for regulating the cur- rent controversy have been adequately provided by existing legislrhtion. The "fairness doctrine" in the Federal Com- munications Act provides for the pres- entation of all sides of a public con- trovel'sy rather than limiting debate and limiting the "people's right to know" all sides of the controversy. Accordingly, the Federal Communications Commission has ruled on this very case that CBS complied with the provisions of the "fairness doctrine." A month after pre- senting its news documnentary, the pro- gram was rebroadcast on March 23 with a 22-minute postscript containing criti- cal comments by Vice President AGNEW, Secretary of Defense Laird, and Chair- man HtBERT of the House Armed Services Committee, and a response by the presi- dent of CBS News. Then on April 18 CBS broadcast an hour-long panel discussion presenting opposing views on the Defense Depart- ment's public information program, which was the subject of tho documen- tary. In this way, the public was not shielded from controversy and was en- abled to hear many sides of a contro- versial public issue and make judgments based upon a variety of opinions. The disturbing thing about the com- mittee's recommendation is that the sub- pena would require the network to di- vulge not only the material, presented on the program but also unused films and tapes which. constitute electronic Jour- nalism's "newsman's notebooks." To subpena these materials would be com- parable to demanding the interviews, notes, and correspondence which con- stitute the rough drafts of an author's book. To permit Congress to so invade the newsman's privilege in this fashion is to invite the chilling effects on a free press, to encourage Government surveillance of the news, and to inhibit the press from advancing the cause of the "people's right to know." I would agree enthusiastically with those who contend that a limited access medium such as the broadcast medium has a very high responsibility to the pub- lic. There is always the danger that the highly concentrated media will misuse their responsibility and powers as they may have on some occasions. If this is done, the result would be an unfor- tunate impairment of the "people's right to know," and good government would suffer. But the way to increase the flow of information to the public is iiott to follow the committee's recommendation which is before us today. The committee would have Congress harass broadcast Journal- ism, submit broadcast journalists to in- terrogation, and induce se]-censorship in broadcast Journalism. Thfo committee would have the Congress institute in- quiries into the news judgments of broadcasters and encourage i?he estab- lishment of a Government standard of "truth" in evaluating editorial decisions. This would cripple the right of the elec- tronic press to report freely on the con- Approved For Release 2002/08/01 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080064-1