CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE RE: MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: October 4, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

I~162 Approved For `ell 'a 'fib ib6b11~'A'rR-PDP'T3 b 0003000800 Wbe, 4, i J 1
Mr. ALLOTT. Now, .Mr. President, I coFF), the Senator from New Hampshire
am ready, if the distinguished Senator (Mr. MCINTYRE), the Senator from In-
from Mississippi, the chairman of the diana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from
committee, is ready, and I am perfectly Minnesota (Mr. HUMPHREY),. and the
willing to ask for a quorum call to be Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MON-
taken out of both sides. I want to be TOYA) would each vote "yea."
sure that we have a recorded vote on Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sen-
this matter, and when we have enough ator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) is absent
Senators in the Chamber, we' can ask on official business.
for yeas and nays. The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas BELLMON), the Senator from. New Hamp-
and nays have previously been ordered. shire (Mr. COTTON), the Senator from
Mr. ALLOTT. If they have been or- Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Senator from
dered, Mr. President, I think we should Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN), the Senator
have a short quorum call. I suggest the' from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Sen-
absenceof a quorum. ator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and the
The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) are
will call the roll. necessarily absent.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call The Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
the roll. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask The Senator from Tennessee (Mr.
unanimous consent that the order for BROCK), and the Senator from Con-
the quorum call be rescinded, necticut (Mr. WEICKER) are detained on
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without official business.
objection, it is so ordered. If present and voting, the . Senator
Mr. ALLOTT. If it. is agreeable to the from Tennessee (Mr. BROCK), the Sen-
chairman of the committee, the man- ator from Kansas (Mr. DOLE), the Sen-
ager of the bill, I am willing to yield ator, from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the
back the remainder of my time, if he is Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), and
willing to yield back his, and we can the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER)
then proceed, the yeas and nays having would each vote "yea."
been ordered, to vote on amendment The result was announced-yeas 65,
No, 430. nays 4, as follows:
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if there INo. 247 Leg.]
is no one who wishes time, I am ready YEAS-66
to yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. ALLOTT. I yield back the re-
mainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.(Mr. BENT-
SEN). All remaining time having been
yielded back, the question is on agree-
ing to the amendment No. 430 of the
Senator from Colorado, as modified. On
this question, the yeas and nays have
been ordered, and the clerk will call
the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the
Senator from North Dakota (Mr. BUR-
DICK), the Senator from West Virginia
(Mr. BYRD), the Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH), the Senator from Missouri
(Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Mis-
sissippi (Mr. EASTLAND), the Senator
Aiken
Fannin
Nelson
Allen
Fong
Packwood
Allott
Gambrell
Pastore
Anderson
Goldwater
Pearson
Baker .
Gurney
Pell
Bayh
Hansen
Proxmire
Beall .
Harris
Randolph
Bentsen .
Hatfield
Roth
Bible
Hruska
Saxbe
Boggs
Hughes
Schweiker.
-Brooke
Inouye
Scott
Buckley
Jackson
Spong
Byrd, Va.
Jordan, N.C.
Stafford
Case
Jordan, Idaho
Stennis
Chiles
Mansfield
Stevens
Cook
Mathias
Symington
Cooper
McClellan
Taft
Cranston
McGovern
Thurmond
Curtis
Metcalf
Tunne
Dominick
Miller
Williams
Ellender
Moss
Young
Ervln
Muskie
from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Sen-
ator from South Carolina (Mr. HoL-
LINGS), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr.
HUMPHREY) , the Senator from Louisiana
(Mr. LONG), the Senator from Washing-
ton (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Senator from
Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE), the Senator
from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), the
Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Mc-
INTYRE), the Senator from Alabama
Bellmon
Gravel
Mondale
Bennett
Griffin
Montoya
Brock
Hart
Mundt
Burdick
Hartke
Percy
Byrd, W. Va.
Hollings
Ribico8
Cannon
Humphrey
Sparkman
Church
Javits
Talmadge
Cotton
Long
Tower
Dole
Magnuson
Weicker
Eagleton
McGee
Eastland
McIntyre
the earlier, Senate-passed version of the
pay Increase, I was gratified that Senate
approval of this measure was achieved
today.
It is important to keep in mind that
raising military pay scales is a matter of
high national priority for two very crucial
reasons. First, by increasing the pay of
our men and women in uniform we fulfill
an obligation to recognize and reward the
contributions they are making to the
maintenance of our national defense. In
many cases their pay is Woefully inade-
quate and totally unjustified in terms of.
the responsibilities they bear and the
obligations they owe to themselves and
their families. And second, by putting
military pay in closer competition with
civilian wages we take a significant step
toward ending the draft and creating an
all-volunteer military force. For, only
by making a military career attractive
and secure monetarily, can we hope to
draw to it the type of individuals needed
to fulfill the requirements of modern na-
tional defense. '
I commend the Senator from Colorado
for his leadership in seeking to upgrade
the pay scales of the Armed Forces and
for his longstanding concern and devo-
tion to the men and women who wear
the uniform of the United States so
proudly and with such great distinction
to themselves and their Nation.
ORDER FOR STAR PRINT OF S. 2620
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent that a star print be ordered
for S. 2620, the East-West Trade Ex-
change Act of 1971, introduced by the
Senator from Washington (Mr. MAGNU-
SON) on Thursday, September 30, 1971.
.Due to an inadvertence, an incorrect text
was attached when the bill was intro-
duced for referral.
The PRESIDING OFFICER .(Mr.
BENTSEN). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
MILITARY PROCUREMENT AU-
THORIZATIONS, 1972
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to au-
thorize appropriations during the fiscal
year 1972 for procurement of aircraft,
missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat
vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons,
and research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to
prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
Reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
AMENDMENT NO. 434
Nevada (Mr. CANNON) are necessarily ab- was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
sent. Mr. DOLE subsequently said: Mr. STEVENSON). Pursuant to the previous
I also announce that the Senator from President, this morning I was unavoid- order, the Senate will now proceed to the
from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and from Kansas and narrowly missed the
the Senator from Georgia (Mr. TAL- rollcall on the amendment sponsored by
MADGE) are absent on official business; the distinguished senior Senator from
I further announce that, if present Colorado (Mr. ALLOTT). Had I been
and voting, the Senator from North present it would have been my privilege to
Dakota (Mr. BURDICK), the Senator from join with the overwhelming majority of
Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from my colleagues In approving the- Senator
Washington (Mr. MAGNUSON), the Sen- from Colorado's proposal to provide sub-
ator from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), the stantial pay increases to members of the
Senator from Connecticut (Mr. Rim- armed services. Having voted in favor of
the Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMING-
TON), which the clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as
follows:
The Senator from Missouri (Mr. SxMiNG-
TON) proposes amendment No, 434 as fol-
lows :
At the end of the bill add a new section as
follows:
"SEC. 506. (a) Notwithstanding auy other
provision of law, no funds authorized to be
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appropriated by this or any other Act may
be obligated or expended in any amount in
excess of $200,000~DOO for the purpose of
carrying out directly or indirectly any eco-
nomic or military assistance, or any opera-
tion, project, or program of any kind, or Yor
providing any goods, supplies, materials,
equipment, services, personnel, or advisers in,
to, for, or on behalf of Laos during the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1972.
"(b) In computing the $200,000,000 lim-
itation on obligation and expenditure- au-
thority under subsection (a) of this section
in.fiscal year 1972, there shall be included
in the computation the value of any goods,
supplies, materials, or equipment provided
to, for, or on behalf of Laos in such fiscal
year by gift, donation, loan, lease, or other-
-wise. For the purpose of this subsection,
"value" means the lair market value of any
goods, supplies, materials, or equipment pro-
vided to, for, or on behalf of Laos, but in no
case less than 33 /3 per, centum of the amount
the United States paid at the time such
goods, supplies, materials, or equipment were
acquired by the United States.
"(c) No funds may be obligated or ex-
pended for any of the purposes described in
subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or
on behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning
after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have
been specifically authorized by law enacted
after the date of enactment of this Act. In
no case shall funds in any amount in excess
of the amount specifically authorized by law
for any fiscal year be obligated or expended
for any such purpose during such fiscal year.
"(d) The provisions of subsections (a) and
(c) of this section shall not, apply with re-
spect to the obligation or expenditure of
funds to carry out combat air operations
over the so-called ?Ho Chi Minh trails in
southern Laos, and over areas immediately
adjacent to such trails, by United States mili-
tary forces.
"(e) After. the date of enactment of this
Act, whenever any request is made to the
Congress for the appropriation of funds for
use in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any fiscal
year, the President shall furnish a written
report to the Congress explaining the pur-
pose for which such funds are to be used in
such fiscal year.
"(f) The President shall submit to the
Congress within thirty days after the end of
each quarter of each fiscal year, beginning
with the fiscal, year which begins July 1,
1971, a written report showing the total
amount of funds expended in, for, or on be-
half of Laos during the preceding quarter by
the United States Government, and shall in-
clude in such report a.general breakdown of
the total amount expended, describing the
different purposes for which such funds
were expended and the total amount ex-
pended for such purpose."
The PRESIDING OFFICER.-The time
on the amendment is limited to 5 hours.
Who yields time?
PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator Yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that James Lowen-
stein, Richard Moose, and Katherine
Nelson, staff assistants of the distin-
guished Senator from Missouri (Mr.
SYMINGTON) be granted the privilege of
the floor during the debate on the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, i,t is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll,
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I move
that the vote by which the amendment
was agreed to be reconsidered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move
to lay that motion on the table.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move
to lay the motion on the table.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Another
amendment is pending at the moment,
and it will take unanimous consent to
reconsider.
Mr. ALLO ']:'. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may move to
reconsider the vote by which the amend-
ment was agreed to.
. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Colorado? The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
Is there a motion to table?
Mr. PASTORE. I so move.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to. in Laos.
Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, I suggest Until now, there has been iio ceiling
.the absence of a quorum. whatever on the amounts this Nation
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk could spend in this war; indeed, there
will call the roll. has been little information available
The assistant legislative clerk pro- about what our representatives agave been
ceeded to call the roll. doing. As a result, the costs of this un-
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I ask declared Laotian war to the American
unanimous consent that the order for taxpayer have risen steadily as our in-
the quorum call be rescinded. volvement in Laos-both our direct in-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without volvement and our indirect involvement
objection, it is so ordered. through the use of Thai troops-has
-CONTROL OF THE COST OF THE SECRET WAR IN steadily deepened.
LAOS I believe that many in this chamber
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, to-- will be surprised, even now, to learn the
day I would propose for the Senate's
consideration a revised version of an
amendment to the military procurement
authorization bill which I proposed origi-
nally during consideration of the bill by
the Armed Services Committee.
This amendment, with one exception,
would establish a ceiling of $200 million
on U.S. expenditures in Laos during the
fiscal year 1972 for economic aid, mili-
tary assistance, and all other U.S. activi
ties. That exception would be costs con-
nected with combat air operations by
U.S. forces aver the Ho Chi Minh trail
area in Southern Laos.
We now know that for at least 10 years
the U.S. Government has been conduct-
ing a war in Laos. I might add, inasmuch
as the Secretary of Defense testified be-
fore the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate that he was not conduct-
ing military operations in Laos, it is clear
that the functioning of this war has been
directed by the Central Intelligence
Agency. We have been using funds pro-
vided by American taxpayers and appro-
priated by the Congress without the au-
thorization of the Congress; and largely
without the knowledge-therefore obvi-
ously without the consent-of either the
Congress or the American people.
During these 10 years the cost and the
scope of that war have expanded steadily
behind a screen of official secrecy.
In recent months some of the pacts
regarding the participation of this Na-
The figures on the cost of the military
assistance program that were obtained
by the staff of the Subcommittee on U.S.
Security Agreements and Commitments
Abroad from our officials in Laos do pro-
vide one index.
In 1963, the year in which the military
assistance program began, the staff was
told that the cost-the amount actually
spent-was $11.9 million.
During the following year, 1964, the
cost rose to $21.4 million.
In 1965, that cost reached $40.8 mil-
lion; in 1966, $59.7 million, and in 1967,
$80.8 million.
By the fiscal year 1971 the cost had
risen to $162.2 million.
Finally, for fiscal year 1972, while
the executive branch has asked for $138.5
million in new obligational authority, the
Armed Services Committee has been told
that ? the program cost-that is the
amount which actually will be spent-
will be $221.2 million.
In other words, the cost of military as-
sistance to Laos doubled between the fis-
cal year 1963 and fiscal year 1965, dou-
bled again between 1965 and "i967; and
in the current year, if some limitation is
not imposed, it will be almost three times
as large as it was in the fiscal year 1967;
and nearly 20 times as large as it was
when it all began in secrecy 9 years ago.
tion in this war in Laos have been re-
vealed. Those facts prove conclusively
that there has been a continuing and
growing American involvement.
The only conclusion that can be drawn
would appear to be that if there is to be
any limit on the increasing cost and
scope of our involvement in Laos, it will
have to be obtained through the Congress
by means of its constitutional right'to
appropriate, with understanding, the
funds necessary to conduct war.
It is now clear that for years the Con-
gress has been appropriating anoney in
the blind'to finance this Laotian war. We
have not had knowledge of how much
money was actually being spent; nor
have we had knowledge of how any
money spent was expended,
The purpose of the amendment which
I offer today is to place the Congress in
a position to exercise its constitutional
responsibilities with regard to U.S. ac-
tivities in Laos; an objective which can
only be achieved provided the Congress
places some overall ceiling on the amount
of money that can be spent in Laos and
also takes steps to know, both before and
after the fact, the nature of our activities
degree of the rise in the costs and our
activities, year by year.
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Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the' Armed Services Committee in terms of Commitments Abroad that military as-
Senator yield so that I. may ask a a new authorization of $125.8 million. At sistance costs in Laos for f seal year 1970
question? roughly the same time, two members of were estimated by Defense officials at
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield the staff of the Subcommittee on U.S. about $90. million. It subsequently de-
to the Senator from Rhode Island. Security Agreements and Commitments veloped that they were $146.4 million;
Mr. PASTORE. I would like to ask the Abroad of the Foreign Relations Com- and there were no official figures gen-
distinguished Senator from Missouri mittee were in Vientiane; and there erally available to the Congress or the
whether this limitation would in any way learned that the estimate of the 1972 public for total U.S. expenditures in any
impede or contribute to the danger of our military assistance program actually be- previous fiscal year prior to the Secre-
troops that are being withdrawn from ing planned for Laos was nothing like tary of State's admission, which he made
Vietnam. The argument would be made the $125.8 million, but actually was last June 15, that costs for the last fiscal
and I wonder what the Senator's reaction $252.1 million, just twice the amount de- year in that little country, and exclusive
would be to that question. scribed to the Armed Services Commit- of any air operations, were "in the neigh-
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say to my tee,, borhood of $350 million."
able friend from Rhode Island that we Prior to this year, the only figures Not only was the cost of our Lao oper-
have been careful to exclude the bomb- available to Senators, even on a classi- ations concealed before this spring, but
ing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in order fled basis, for the cost of the U.S. Lao- the scope and character of the war-and
that'we would not be justifiably criticized tian operations were the amounts of the the details of our participation in it-
for doing anything to affect the with- classified requests for new obligational were not acknowledged until recently.
drawal of our troops from Vietnam. The military assistance authority and the In a statement on March 6, 1970,
position taken by the administration in public figure for the AID program. The President Nixon provided the American
this matter is that any limitation of any total of these two figures revealed a cost people with what he descriared as a "pre-
kind on what we are doing over there is much greater than anything the public , case description of our current activities
wrong. could have known, but this amount was in Laos." According to the President, the
I worry about this a great deal. The still only a portion of what was actually pertinent facts were:
Prime Minister of Laos, who is currently being spent in Laos. First. The United States was providing
in town, asked the People's Republic of In the fiscal year 1971, for example, regular and irregular Lao forces with
China to build roads in northern Laos as noted above, $117 million in new ob- equipment, training, and logistics
for him, and they are now doing so. ligational authority was requested for support.
Therefore, in areas adjacent to where military aid and $52 million for eco- Second. The United States was con-
our bombers and fighters are operating nomic aid, for a total of $169 million. Fol- ducting air operations to interdict the
in northern Laos, we are running the lowing the secret session of the Senate, Ho Chi Minh Trail, reconnaissance
danger of hitting some of those thou- in which I discussed the report of our flights in northern Laos; and, on request
sands of Red Chinese in northern Laos. subcommittee staff, the Secretary of from the Lao Government, combat sup-
Our operations in northeren Laos have State acknowledged in a press confer- port missions for Lao forces.
little to do with the operations going on- ence on June 15 that the total of U.S. While this description of our activities
in southern Laos, hundreds of miles. expenditures in Laos, excluding U.S. Air in Laos went beyond previous acknowl-
away and, therefore, are separate from Force operations in both northern Laos edgments of such activities_ it glossed
our operations in South Vietnam. and the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, was not over the following details which subse-
Few, if any, Members of this body in the realm of $169 million, but was 'ac- quently came to light through the work
could have been aware of the steadily tually more than double that, "in the of our Commitments Subcommittee:
mounting cost of our military program in neighborhood of $350 million." That was First. Most of the war iii Laos is co-
Laos, because before this year the actual twice the amount previously given on a ordinated through and by the American
costs of the total program had never classified basis to the few Members of Embassy in Vientiane.
been assembled and presented to the the Senate. Second. The United States trains,
Congress; or even to the Armed Services Although, as mentioned, the Secretary arms, and feeds the Lao Army and Air
Committee. did not give figures for the cost of air Force.
The actual costs were, of course, read- operations in either northern Laos or Third. The United States, through the
ily available to the executive branch had the Ho Chi Minh Trial area, in testi- Central Intelligence Agency, trains, ad-
they chosen to share them with the Con- mony before the Armed Services Com- vises, pays, supports, and coordinates an
gress. Instead they presented only esti- mittee on this year's defense authoriza- irregular army, elements of which are
mates of obligations against single year tion bill, it was revealed -that U.S. deployed in four of the five military re-
authorizations. expenditures in Laos will actually total gions in Laos.
Each year for the past few years the $490.2 million in this fiscal year. That Fourth. The United States, through the
Senate Aimed Services Committee has figure includes $143.4 million for U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and in coop-
been asked to recommend to the Sen- air support excluding the Ho Chi Minh eration with the Thai Government,
ate the authorization of specific amounts Trail area. trains, pays, supports, and "oordinates a
for military assistance to Laos; and the It is clear, therefore, that the Senate growing force of Thai soldie ?s in Laos.
committee has regularly complied, ap- has been kept in the shadows as far as Fifth. In addition to interdiction oper-
parently in the belief that the amounts actually knowing how much we are ations, over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the
of new obligational authority requested spending in Laos is concerned. It is clear U.S. Air Force flies hundreds of combat
constituted at least a rough index of also that the public has been kept com- air missions throughout Laos in close
the size of the program involved. pletely in the dark. support of Lao regular and irregular
We now know just how wrong that . Prior to this year the only figure the ground combat forces. Therr missions are
assumption was, in presenting its justi- public knew was the annual cost of the also coordinated by the American Em-
fication for authorizations to support economic assistance program, which has bassy In Vientiane. Included in this
free world forces in Vietnam, Laos, and been running at about $52 million a year American 'air effort are strikes by B-52
Thailand in the fiscal year 1970, the De- since the fiscal year 1969. bombers in northern Laos, far from the
fense Department told the Armed Serv- Think of that, Mr. President. We live Ho Chi Minh Trail area.
Ives Committee that it needed $74.2 mil- in a democracy where the people have There is considerable doubt in my own
lion for military assistance to Laos; but the right to know. Actually, we have with mind whether foProp, s tos spend
the recently declassified figure for the spent over $1.5 billion in Laos, if we count,, half a a billion llin dllars straightforward carry on to spend
actual cost of the Laos military assist- the bombings of the Ho Chi Minh Trails; a would have dollars
agreed ery o do d such so; but
ance program was $146.4 million. yet the only figure the American people insofar as we can . no ean but
For the fiscal year 1971, $117.3 mil- knew about was $52 million. sional detfore this year, was
lion was sought; but the actual costs Th sional
v n -anytco, before sne picture that year were $162.2 million. ose few members of the press and ever given any comprehensive picture of
On May 6 of this Year Defense Depart- closely mwho have followed this subject our operat in Laos. The ~Wo ight have learned from reading -tees of the Senate most directly involved,
meat witnesses discussed the Lao mill- the published hearings of the Subcom- the Armed Services and Foreign Rela-
tary assistance program before the mnittee on U.S. Security Agreements and tions Committees, have been given only
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a partial and, therefore, misleading, pic-
ture of what has been going on in that
country.
The history of Thai forces in Laos pro-
vides an excellent example. It is a history
replete with missing pages-written in
large part in invisible ink.
During the last session of the Congress,
a law was passed prohibiting U.S. sup-
port for Vietnamese or other free world
forces-this is the law-"in actions de-
signed to provide military support and
assistance to the Government of Cam-
bodia or Laos," The intent of the spon-
sors of this legislation is beyond ques-
tion. One of their specific purposes was
to preclude U.S. financing of Thai forces
to fight in Laos.
Despite the passage of this law, it has
now become public information that
there are thousands of Thai fighting in
Laos. The executive branch now acknowl-
edges the presence of these forces, al-
though claiming they are all "volunteers"
serving under Lao military command.
The Department of State has also
recently acknowledged, in a letter which
I will ask be printed in the Record at
the conclusion of these remarks, that
most of these Trai have served in
the Thai Army; that the units in ques-
tion are formed in Thailand and include
volunteer officers and NCO's who have
severed their connections with the Thai
armed forces; that there are Thai of-
ficers, including a general, stationed in
Thailand who perform liaison functions
with the Lao government; and that the
Thai units in Laos include an "artillery
capability composed of individuals with
previous artillery experience."
At no point in the State Department
letter is the claim made that the Thai in
question are ethnic Lao. Nor is it ex-
plained why some of these Thai have
said, in various interviews with journal-
ists-where we get most of our new in-
formation-that they are regular Thai
army troops who were asked to accept
special assignment in Laos for extra pay.
The administration has now -acknowl-
edged publicly that the cost of this extra
pay, as is true of the other expenses in-
volved in this program of Thai forces
being sent to Laos, are borne by the
United States.
Up to now, however, the administration
has refused to make public any additional
details as to the specific numbers of Thais
now involved, or the number it is planned
to have Involved in the future. Nor has
it said any more about the arrangements
for recruiting, organizing, directing and
financing these forces.
Nevertheless, the executive branch is
now asking the Congress, in this bill to
authorize additional funds so as to con-
tinue, even expand, this program of Thai
forces in Laos; in fact, based .on what
we can learn, three times as many addi-
tional Thais are to be financed for fight-
ing in Laos, which will require three
times as much U.S. money in the fiscal
year 1972 as was used for this purpose
in the fiscal year 1971.
In an article'in the September 23 issue
of the Washington Evening Star, written
from Vientiane by Tammy Arbuckle, he
reports that-
American official sources confirmed that
12,000 Thais will be available to meet the ex-
peoted dry season offensive by the North
Vietnamese early next month.
Mr. Arbuckle notes that-
This will more than double the current
force of between 5,000 and 6,000 Thai army
troops deployed in Laos.
Mr. President, I am a member of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
and I heard the debate in that comrnit-
tee. We passed this legislation through
that committee, which was ultimately
made law, passed by-both Houses and
signed by the President, and I know that
what we were doing there was an effort
to prevent such activities as Thai troops
fighting in Laos.
In addition to the highly .dubious
legality of our paying for these Thai sol-
diers in the face of the legislation passed
'last year, 'there are the policy risks en-
tailed by drawing the Thais, to whom we
have -a defense commitment under
SEATO, into more direct conflict with
the North Vietnamese.
There would also seem to be something
grossly out of line about the costs to the
American taxpayer of these Thai merce-
naries. While I am not at liberty to make
public the exact figures involved, I can
tell the Senate, on the basis of testimony
by the U.S. Ambassador in Laos before
the Foreign. Relations Committee, that
the proposed expenditures for supplying
Thai soldiers to fight in Laos in fiscal
year 1972 are 25 percent higher than the
proposed military assistance program for
the Royal Lao Army itself-30 percent
higher than the cost of the Lao irregu-
lars-and this despite the fact that the
number of Thai soldiers involved is far
less than a quarter and less than half the
strength of the total strength of the Lao
Army the Lao irregulars.
This brief review of the major facts
which underlie current U.S. operations
in Laos should be sufficient to demon-
strate why the time has come for the
Congress to place at least some restraints
upon the conduct of this undeclared and
uncontrolled war.
The amendment which I offer, there-
fore, would place a limit of $200 million
on all U.S. expenditures in Laos, ex-
clusive, I emphasize, of the air opera-
tions over the Ho Chi Minh Trails area.
This amount is sufficient to cover all
amounts which the executive branch re-
quested and justified at the outset of the
Armed Services Committee's considera-
tion of this bill this year.
Since the time when the committee
initially considered the Southeast Asia
portion of the military procurement au-
thorization bill, for this fiscal year, the
administration has agreed that the cost
of U.S. operations in Laos in the coming
year-again exclusive of air operations
over the Ho Chi Minh Trails area-is
nearly $500 million-$490.2 million to be
exact-of which $221.2 million will be ex-
pended for the military assistance pro-
gram. Note that in May the estimated
amount of new money need for the fiscal
year 1972 military assistance program in
Laos, as presented to the Armed Services
and Foreign Relations Committees, was
$125.8 million.
I believe it entirely fair to assume that
this new figure for the cost of our Lao op-
erations would not have come to light
if members of the staff of the commit-
ments subcommittee had not made an
extended actual visit to the area in ques-
tion. Following a report of their findings
to a secret session of the Senate on June
6, with subsequent inquiries by Armed
Services and Foreign Relations for addi-
tional details of expenditures In Laos,
executive branch witnesses ag+,in ap-
peared before the Armed Services Com-
mittee on July 22 ; and at that meeting,
the true dimensions of the Laos program
began to emerge for the first time-
The justification then presented for
an expenditure of $490.2 million was es-
sentially the same as that offered in May.
No different explanation was offered to
justify an increase in the military as-
sistance program to $221.2 million than
that presented in May when the program
was being described in terms of $125.8
million.
Year after year the Defense a]epart-
ment has had enough excess money and
material available to support a program
much larger than that authorized- -some-
times twice as large, Similarly, there was
no explanation, whatever, offered as to
how the anticipated costs of the Thai
mercenaries-a category of expenditure
not even mentioned in the earlier ses-
sion-had been computed.
It was acknowledged that the per man
cost of the Thai was somewhat higher
than that of the Lao irregulars, but there
was no emphasis of the fact the real
ratio is 33 percent more money for less
than half as many Thai troops as Lao ir-
regular troops, both of which groups we
finance and train. This fact did not be-
come clear until administration witnesses
testified before the Foreign Relations
Committee pater on the same day.
There are many other gaps in this
effort to Justify a half a billion dollars
for Laos, exclusive of the trails. To the
best of my knowledge, at no point have
the costs of the CIA operations n Laos
been explained as a separate item to any
congressional committee. Neither has the
nature of U.S. air operations in northern
Laos ever been fully described to any
committee.
As noted earlier, the President has re-
ferred to combat support missions which
have been flown at the request of the
Royal Lao Government. The fact is that
the U.S. Air Force is engaged In an
around-the-clock campaign of intensive
combat operations of all sorts through-
out Laos, ranging from the stationing of
forward air controllers and aircraft to
B-52 strikes in the northern poition of
Laos, hundreds of miles from the Ho Chi
Minh Trails, and far closer to the bound-
ary of the People's Republic of China.
In short, none of the above activities
has as yet been described to Congress in
sufficient detail-nor has the derivation
of the costs of these activities yet been
explained in a manner which would sup-
port any such appropriation. In effect,
all th6,t Congress has been told is that
the United States is conducting many
more programs in Laos than were known
before; therefore, twice as much money
is required. -
This new information which has come
to light, coupled with the now universal-
ly admitted serious economic problems
we face here at home, makes me even
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less willing than before to continue ex-
penditures in Laos at this steadily high-
er level. I believe that any American pol-
icy in Laos which costs more than $200
million to support is too expensive, or
too dangerous, or both.
This belief is reinforced by the ac-
knowledgement of 'administration wit-
nesses before Armed Services that, not-
withstanding all we are currently doing
in Laos-there could not be a more im-
portant point-the North Vietnamese
and the Pathet Lao presently have the
capability, if they so chose, at any time
to complete their takeover of Laos,
In the face of this admitted fact, the
waste and futility of this effort becomes
all, too apparent.
Surely, Congress has the right to re-
ceive from the executive branch justi-
fication for specific additional authori-
zation requests, plus an explanation of
the reasons why such additional author-
ity is needed. Section (e) of my amend-
ment would establish a requirement for
a written explanation of the purposes for
which any future funds for Laos are re
quested.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD the text of the amendment.
There being no objection, the amend-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
Snc. 505. (a) Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no funds authorized to be
appropriated by this or any other Act may be
obligated Or expended in any amount in
excess of $200,000,000 'for the purpose of
carrying out, directly or indirectly any eco-
nomic- or military assistance, or any opera-
tion, project, or program of any kind, or
for providing any goods, supplies, materials,
equipment, services, personnel, or advisers
in, to, for, or on behalf of Laos during the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1972.
(b) In computing the $200,000,000 limita-
tion on obligation and expenditure authority
under subsection (a) of this section in fiscal
year 1972, there shall be included in the com-
putation the value of any goods, supplies,
materials, or equipment provided to, for, or
on behalf of Laos in such fiscal year by gift,
donation, loan, lease, or otherwise. For the
purpose of this subsection, "value" means
.the fair market value of any goods, supplies,
materials, or equipment provided to, for, or
on behalf of Laos, but in no case less than
33'/ per centum of the amount the United
States paid at the time such goods, supplies,
materials, or equipment were acquired by the
United States.
(c) No funds may be obligated or expended
for any or the purposes described in subsec-
tion (a) of this section in, to, for, or on
behalf of Laos in any fiscal year beginning
after June 30~ 1972, unless such funds have
been specifically authorized by law enacted
after the date of enactment or this Act. In
no case shall funds in any amount in excess
of the amount specifically authorized by
law for any, fiscal year be obligated or ex-
pended for any such purpose during such
fiscal year.
(d) The provisions of subsection (a) and
(c) of this section shall not apply with re-
spect to the obligation or expenditure of
funds to carry out combat air operations
over the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails in
southern Laos, and over areas immediately
adjacent to such trails, by United States
military forces.
(e) After the date of enactment of this
Act, whenever any request is made to the
Congress for the appropriation of funds for
use in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any fiscal
year, the President shall furnish a written
report to the Congress explaining the pur-
pose for which such funds are to be used in
such fiscal year.
(f) The President shall submit to the
Congress within thirty days after the end
of each quarter of each fiscal year, begin-,
ping with the fiscal year which begins July 1,
1971, a written report showing the total
amount of funds expended in, for, or on
behalf of Laos, during the preceding quarter
by the United States Government, and shall
include in such report a general breakdown
of the total amount expended, describing the
different purposes for which such funds were
expended and the total amount expended
for such purpose.
Mr. SYMINGTON. In addition to es-
tablishing a requirement for written
explanations in connection with any fu-
ture fund requests for Laos, section (c)
of the amendment would prohibit the
obligation or expenditure of funds for
any purpose after the date of enactment
of the amendment unless such- funds
have been specifically authorized by law.
As noted earlier, in the past the
amounts of money specifically identified
in requests to Congress as being for use
in Laos have constituted only a portion
of the total cost of U.S. opera-
tions in that country. The purpose of
section (c) of the amendment is to insure
that Congress knows when it is author-
izing or appropriating money for this
country; and, conversely, to prevent the
diversion to Laos of funds appropriated
for other purposes.
Mr. President, what is wrong with
that? What is wrong with our being told
as to what they did with the money re-
quested, particularly if they did not do
with it what was asked for when it was
authorized and appropriated? In my
opinion, that could well be the basic
thrust of my remarks.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield, so that I may ask three
or four questions to clarify the amend-
ment somewhat?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am happy to yield.
Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator's amend-
ment affect the expenditures now being
carried out by the CIA in Laos?
Mr. SYMINGTON, That would be cov-
ered by the amendment.
Mr. AIKEN. Does the Senator think
that would affect the operations of the
CIA?
Mr. SYMINGTON. In Laos?
Mr. AIKEN. Yes.
Mr. SYMINGTON Inasmuch as the
Secretary of Defense testified that he was
conducting no military operations in
Laos, the only conclusion I can draw
from that, based on my experience, is
that the Central Intelligence Agency is
conducting these operations under the
direction of the State Department, and
funds for such operations are included
in this ceiling
Mr. AIKEN. I understand that a great
many more Laotians now live in Thai-
land than remain in their home country
and that considerable recruiting is done
in Thailand for the purpose of strength-
ening the comparatively weak forces
they have at home. Would this amend-
ment also apply to the recruiting now
done in Thailand if such recruits were
paid by the United States?
Mr. SYMINGTON. The word "ethnic"
is the only way, I say to my able friend,
that the administration caic justify what
it is doing on any basis. Otherwise, it is
clearly breaking the law.
I would say if there were people who
had lived in Thailand for a period of
years and the Irnited Slates claimed
that, because' their grandfather or their
great-grandfather originally came from
Laos, we could, therefore, finder the law,
pay, train, and finance them to fight in
Laos, that interpretation of the law is
certainly in violation of tae interest of
the Congress.
Mr. AIKEN. I understand that about
three or four times more Laotians are
now living in Thailand than the number
living in Laos, and the Laotian Army
depends on them for the Laotian forces
to maintain their numbers--I do not
know for sure though.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe that the
figures the Senator presents are correct.
Mr. AIKEN. How would this amend-
ment affect the air cover which is now
provided for the Laotians in the Plain
of Jarres, which I believe is considered a
crucial area in that country?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, be-
fore answering that, I would like to men-
tion that at no time has the executive
branch ever contended to me or to the
subcommittee that the so-called volun-
teers are ethnic Lao; and, based on
other testimony we have received, I think
that might be difficult for them.
Mr. AIKEN. They are Laotian in the
same sense that a third cr fourth gen-
eration European living in America now
is loyal to the old country, their great-
grandfather's country. Is that correct?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I believe so.
In the statements by the Secretary of
Defense and the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs, before thr Armed Serv-
ices Committee, there wa. considerable
discussion of the Thai forces in Laos,
about how they are all volunteers-that
was the big word-and how they have
severed their connection with the Thai
Armed Forces. But there was no mention
whatever of the fact that they are ethnic
Lao. I think if the Senator looks at the
record, he will see that because what
they have done is pretty clear, they have
constantly raised new justification for it.
Mr. AIKEN. Frankly, I do not know,
and that is why I raised the question. I
also asked about the air cover for the
Plaine of Jarres, which is considered a
crucial area in defense of the whole
country.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I think that any
support that Vang Pao can get he will
welcome. Therefore, any support we
give-including in the Plaine of Jarres-
would be better for him. I do not think
it would have much to do with the ques-
tion of whether the country will exist as
a country under the present government,
because, as mentioned, we have had testi-
mony that any time the North Vietnam-
ese and the Pathet Lao under Souvanna
Phong, want to take the country over,
they can do so.
Mr. AIKEN. The reason I asked is that
there seems to be some apprehension
that they would take the country over
quickly if Laos lost the protection of our
Air Force over the Plaine of Jarres.
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Mr. SYMINGTON. I think we have a
great deal of apprehension about what
would happen in South Vietnam, what
would happen in Cambodia, and what
would happuen in Laos. There is no doubt
that pretty soon we would have the same
story told to us about Burma and Thai-
land.
May I say to my good friend that this
amendment does not cut out air support
in northern Laos, but merely puts a limit
on what we can spend. So what the
amendment does is to force a little dis-
crimination with respect to how the
money will be used; and to provide the
Congress with knowledge to that end. I
know the Senator from Vermont would
agree with me that we should have
knowledge of what we appropriate.
Mr. AIKEN. The Senator is saying that
if we should spend $20 million or $30
million to complete a hydroelectric plant,
that same money could not be spent for
any other purpose.
Mr. SYMINGTON. A hydroelectric
plant in Laos?
Mr. AIKEN. Yes. I think there is one
there.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Money spent for
that plant would fall under the limita-
tion. One of the reasons I am keen for
the amendment is that we need a little
money back in my State.
Mr. AIKEN. The next question is, if the
Government of Laos should fall to the
enemy, with the North Vietnamese lead-
ing the enemy forces, what does the
Senator think would be the result on
our position in South Vietnam? Would it
make our withdrawal more likely, less
likely, or what?
Mr. SYMINGTON. When we get into
the question of what government we
support, which is the question that comes
up in so many countries where we in-
vest American taxpayers' money, we run
into a problem of decision as to what
would be the reasons. I personally heard
the Prime Minister of Laos in Washing-
ton some months ago, stating frankly
that when he first thought he had
trouble, he applied to the North Viet-
namese for arms. He said that that was
rejected, so he left it there; but the pre-
sumption was that if the United States
did not continue to support him in the
way he felt was right, he would apply
to them again for arms, As the able
Senator knows, it is difficult in a coun-
try like this, which is a tribal country
with a king we do not hear much about,
to really know what is going on. We
know, as an example, that the present
prime minister has asked the People's
Republic of China to build roads in his
country and that there are thousands
and thousands of Chinese now quite
close to the capital of Laos. Because of
all these factors, therefore, I honestly
cannot answer a question like that.
Mr. AIKEN. One last question and this
is the last one. The Peoples Republic of
China is supporting the North Viet-
namese at this time, and we are told
that Russia is also giving them support-
I do not know bow much from each coun-
try-but except for the support from
Russia "and China, it is likely that the
North Vietnamese could actually threaten
to take, over Laos itself, assuming that
we withdraw all our military strength
from South Vietnam. Does the Senator
from Missouri believe that Russia and
China would withdraw much of their
support from those forces which are
harassing Laos at the present time?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, Mr. President,
based on the briefings which cannot be
discussed on the floor of the Senate to-
day, and at which the able Senator from
Vermont and I have been present, I would
say that problems between the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China
are such that whatever one of the two
countries 'did with respect to Laos, the
chances are the second country would
take a directly reverse position.
Mr. AIKEN. It would appear to me,
however, that if we withdraw, the pres-
sure on Laos from the Pathet Lao, sup-
ported by Russia, and China, or both,
would be somewhat reduced, would it
not?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Would the Senator
please repeat that.
Mr. AIKEN. It appears to me that if
we should withdraw'from South Vietnam,
the pressure-the support, rather, that
Russia and China are giving the North
Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao, would be
somewhat-if not wholly reduced-at
least substantially reduced. Am I think-
ing in the right direction?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I do not think there
is any question about that. I would think,
if we left South Vietnam, the chances
are a good many to one, that President
Thieu would go with us. Thus I think that
the North Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, the
National Liberation Front and the South
Vietnamese would, in a period of weeks,
if not days, take over South Vietnam and
get rid of the present government.
Mr. AIKEN. Does it appear to the Sen-
ator from Missouri that our unfortunate
venture in Indochina, South Vietnam
particularly, is largely responsible for
the very great difficulties that Laos and
Cambodia find themselves in now?
Mr, SYMINGTON, I think that is a
logical conclusion.
Mr. AIKEN. That is my last question.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the able senior Senator from Ver-
mont, and may I present to him and to
the Senate that there is no one in this
body for whom I have greater respect.
As is seen clearly in the testimony on the
pending legislation before the Armed
Services Committee, the administration
contends that it cannot be bound within
a fixed budget for Laos; and the prefer-
ence of the executive branch to have no
budgetary restrictions or limitations is
understandable. That position is tanta-
mount, however, to saying that the au-
thority to appropriate, given to the Con-
gress by the Constitution, nevertheless
should not be taken seriously.
Section (f) of the present amendment
would require quarterly reports to the
Congress showing the total amount of
funds expended in, for, or on behalf of
Laos.
In the past, the Department of De-
fense has furnished quarterly reports of
obligations against those funds au-
thorized under the Defense procurement
bill for the support of free world forces
in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand; and al-
though frankly we had not realized it be-
fore this year, the latter reports repre-
sented a far from complete pictur" of the
cost of military assistance to Laes. This
experience furnishes evidence that a
more complete and detailed accounting
by the executive branch is esseatial if
the Congress is to have any as:;urance
that it knows what is going on; and that
is the purpose of section (f).
As noted earlier, the present amend-
ment excludes any obligations rnd ex-
penditures incident to U.S. air opera-
tions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail area
because it is maintained by the adminis-
tration that these operations are essential
to the safety of American troops in South
Vietnam and also to the successful imple-
mentation of the Vietnamization pro-
gram.
Successive administrations have been
able to pursue these policies and pro-
grams in Laos because there have been
virtually no public or congressional
restraints upon that policy. The absence
of any restraints has been due, in large
part, to the fact that for some 10 years
neither the public -nor the Congress has
known anything about what was going
on.
In other words they are operating
without the approval and without the
knowledge of Congress; and this despite
the clause which specifically states our
rights when it comes to participation in
foreign policy decisions. What is the pur-
pose of our being here if when we send
out able members of the various commit-
tee staffs of the Congress, we rind out
there are different sets of facts from
those given by the Executive when we
were asked to first authorize and then
appropriate the money.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield
to the able chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
Senator asked concerning our relevance
and why we are here, I suggest, that we
do play a role, because our beiaig here
makes most of the people of the coun-
try think we have a role. It give:. a kind
of facade behind which the executive
branch can do as it pleases without tak-
ing responsibility for it.
The Senator from Missouri and I Nave
a responsibility. We try to make the ex-
ecutive take some responsibility. How-
ever, the executive does not even write
any more letters. The Secretary of De-
fense and the Secretary of State rarely
answer a letter inside of 3 or 4 months,
and that is usually to say why they can-
not supply the information to the Senate.
As the Senator well knows, at the be-
ginning of September when we Pressed
hard enough to get answers relevant to
the matter of foreign aid, the adminis-
tration refused the information and
pleaded executive privilege. That is the
first time they did it so formally. They
do not have to do it by delay. They just
do not come.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
Arkansas is primarily responsible for
their taking executive privilege because
for the first time we said, "If you don't
take executive privilege, you won't get
the money." So, that was a banner day
for Congress.
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Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
congratulate the Senator for his many
accomplishments. He has done so much
to get information to the committee. And
he has done so much to bring into the
public domain what information has
been found.
On the pending amendment, I will
wait until the Senator completes his
statement which is nearly completed be-
fore I ask further questions.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
appreciate the remarks of the able Sen-
ator from Arkansas. I will not be much
longer.
Mr. President, we now know far more
than before about what is going on in
Laos, therefore are in a better position
to reach judgments about the future
course of U.S. policy. We have also dis-
covered just how much we did not know,
and accordingly have a clearer idea about
what information we need to have in the
future if we are to exercise our constitu-
tional responsibilities. The amendment
which I offer is a vehicle for assuring a
continuing flow of information to the
Congress with reepect to our Laos oper-
ations.
No war should be planned and con-
ducted Without the knowledge and au-
thorization of Congress, especially when
one considers the risks such wars may
entail in terms of the involvement of
other nations.
The purpose of this amendment is not
to put an immediate end to the war in
Laos. Desirable as that objective would
be, it is not a realistic possibility at the
present time. But the amendment does
represent an opportunity and a challenge
to the Senate to both accept and exercise
its full responsibilities in the constitu-
tional process.
Surely the Congress should not appro-
priate money without knowledge of . the
purposes for Which it is being used; and
now that we do know what has been hap-
pening in the past, I believe we should
bear our full share of responsibility for
what Will follow in the future.
I ask unanimous consent that the fol-
lowing material be printed in the REC-
ORD at this point: My letter of August 10'
to Secretary Rogers; the article in the
August 9 Washington Post by D. E. Ronk
entitled, "CIA Backed Thais in Laos Say
They Are Regular Army;" Mr. Abshire's
reply of September 24; also the article in
the September 23 Issue of the Evening
Star by Tammy Arbuckle entitled, "Thai
Combat Troops for Laos Expected To
Double by March."
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CIA-BACKED TIIAIS IN LAOS SAY THEY ARE
REGULAR ARMY
(By D. E. Ronk)
VIENTIANE, LAbs.-Thai soldiers serving
with the CIA-supported irregular forces in
Laos say they are regular army troops of
Thailand, asked to accept special assignment
in all That battalions.
Their assertion contradicts a Senate For-
eign Relations Committee staff report made'
public last week. The report, prepared by
Heavily censored in most of its references
to Thais serving in Laos, the report said the
Thai fighting men "are recruited for serv-
ice in Laos from outside the regular Thai
army."
Speaking to a reporter; several Thai soldiers
said they were asked to accept an assign-
ment in Laos after the advantages of such
service were explained. They have the op-
tion of refusing, they said.
According to the Lowenstein-Moose repolit,
,.the CIA supervises and pays for the train-
ing of these irregulars in Thailand and pro-
vides their salary, allowances (including
death benefits), and operational costs in
Laos,"
Their units are formed in Thailand with
Thai commissioned and non-commissioned
officers and are given special training for
Laos.
They arrive in Laos aboard CIA-supported
Air America planes from Udorn airbase in
Northern Thailand. All orders, from the bat-
talion level down, are issued by Thais, the
soldiers said. Only at the very top, with
Gen. Vang Pao, the Meo commander of Laos
Military Region Two, and the CIA's Armee
Clandestine, is there interference with the
Thai chain of command, they said.
Vang Pao does not command the Thais,
they said, but consults with Thai officers and
the CIA "case officers" who actually make the
decisions.
The Thai soldiers agree with press reports
that there is at least one Thai general in
Laos, using the code name Nai Caw. This is
the equivalent of John Doe. The Thai troops
say he is a lieutenant general.
Code names are frequently used by and
for Thai troops in Laos. Reliable sources in
Thailand say that until recently all wounded
Thais treated in the U.S. hospital at Udorn
Airbase were listed as John Doe One, Two,
Three, etc. to hide their national origins.
At present the troops say, there are 10
or 12 Thai battalions in Laos, or about 4,800
men. Two Thai battalions are at Pakse, in
southern Laos, and "about ten" in northern
Laos, with headquarters at Long Cheng, the
soldiers said.
Reliable sources in Bangkok say, moreover,
that another Thai artillery battery has either
just entered Laos or shortly will, accom-
panied by an American major. The U.S. offi-
cer is to advise them on the operation of
unfamiliar equipment, believed to be aim-
ing devices.
Official U.S. sources deny knowledge of
such a unit, that an American officer has
been given such an assignment, and that a
new American officer has arrived or is ex-
pected, even on temporary duty.
The Bangkok sources say the officer will
be traveling on a civilian passport and in
civilian clothing.
A Thai soldier now stationed in Pakse out-
lined the sequence of events in his assign-
ment to Laos. Returning to Thailand from
duty in South Vietnam, he said, he was sent
for advance training in Thailand following
a 30-day leave. He was told the training was
for assignment to Cambodia, he said,
Following the training, he was told his
assignment was changed to Laos, but that
he could refuse to go and remain in Thai-
land.
After the pros and eons were explained
he decided to accept and became a volunteer.
Following formation of a special battal-
ion," he was sent to Udorn, then to Long
Cheng. At Long Cheng, the unit was engaged
in defense of that headquarters. The Thais
fought in one "heavy" battle in a sector called
vicinity of Ba Houei Sai, oh the Bolovens
Plateau.
As a result of the Hanoi offensive, they
withdrew to Pakse. The soldiers said they
are not deeply involved in thr current coun-
ter offensive to recapture the Bolovens,
though some of them are used as forward
air guides, relaying bombing targets from
ground to air.
Recent visitors to Pakse say the Thai
soldiers are very much in evidence in hotels
and bars. They do not wear Thai army mark-
ings on their uniforms and the soldiers say
they carry no identification, on orders from
their officers,
Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Washington Post
of August 9 contains an article from Vien-
tiane, Laos by Mr. E. E. Ronk which includes
several statements dealing with Thai troops
in Laos, Mr. Ronk notes in his story that
statements made by Thai soldiers in Laos
contradict the recent report of the staff of the
Subcommittee on United States Security
Agreements 'and Commitments Abroad con-
cerning Laos,. Because the Information In the
staff report concerning Thai troops was based
on information provided by United States of-
ficials I would appreciate receiving your com-'
ments on the substance and the details of the
following portions of Mr. Ronk's story:
1. "Thai soldiers serving with the CIA sup-
ported irregular forces in Laos say they are
regular army troops of Thailand, asked to
accept special assignment in all Thai bat-
talions."
2. "Their units are formed in Thailand with
Thai commissioned and non-commissioned
officers .
3. "All orders from battalion level down,
are issued by Thais , , ."
4. "Vang Pao does not command the Thais
but consults with Thai officers and the
CIA case officers ... 11
5. "The Thai soldiers agree with press re-
ports that there is at least one Thai general
in Laos, using the name Nai Caw."
6. "Reliable sources in Thailand say that
until recently all wounded Thais treated in
the U.S, hospital Sit Udorn Airbase were
listed as John Doe One, Two, Three, etc, to
hide their national origins."
7, "Reliable sources in Bangkok say, more-
over, that another Thai artill'ry battery has
either just entered Laos or shortly will, ac-
companied by an American major."
8. "A Thai soldier now stationed in Pakse
outlined the sequence of events in his as-
signment to Laos. Returnini; to Thailand
from duty in South Vietnam, ne said, he was
sent for advance training in Thailand fol-
lowing a 30 day leave. He was told the train-
ing was for assignment to Cambodia," he
Said.
f
"Following the training, he was told his
assignment was changed to Laos, but that he
could refuse to go and remain in Thailand."
8. some of (the Thai soldiers) are
used as forward airguides, relaying bombing
targets from ground to air."
10. ". . the (Thai) soldiers say they carry
no identification, on orders from their of-
ficers."
I am confident that you share my desire
that the official record dealing with the facts
of the nature, composition and command
arrangements of Thai forces in Laos should
be as accurate as possible. With this end in
mind, I look forward to receiving your com-
ments on Mr. Ronk's story,
Sincerely,
o
or
e
-
Committee staff members James G. Lowen- namese forces last May the That battalion
stein and Richard M. Moose referred to Thai was flown to Ubon Air Base in Thailand then
troops in Laos as "irregulars." to Fakes, where -'they, were airlifted to the
"Skyline" by U.S. personnel.
Shortly before the fall of the Bolovens
Plateau in southern Laos t
N
th Vi
t
STUART SYbMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Se-
curity, Agreements and Commitments
Abroad.
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of between 5,000 and 8,000 Thai army troops
deployed in Laws.
American official sources confirmed that
12,000 Thais-will be available to meet the ex-
pected dry season offensive by the North
Vietnamese early next year, but they said
that "all of these Thais will not be in Laos
at the same time. Units will be rotated to
Thailand for rest and rehabilitation."
The additional troops will come from
Thailand's Black Leopard Division which is
withdrawing from South Vietnam. Head-
quarters will be at Kanchanaburl, northwest
of Bangkok and many hundreds of miles
from Thailand's border. _
The Bangkok Post, an English language
daily, has quoted government sources as say-
ing the'new troops will be used as a guerrilla
force within Thailand to counter the Com-
munist insurgency problem in Thailand.
Lao military sources said there would be
an announcement telling of the formation of
the Thai guerrilla force to fight In Thailand,
but that the troops actually are destined to
fight in Laos.
Thus American officials handling' funds
would be able to disburse money to the
Thais, although they would be paying for
troops in Laos.
The reason for this is that administration
officials are trying to get around the congres-
sional ban on the use of Defense Department
funds to spay for mercenaries in Laos. As part
of this, U.S. government officials here and in
Washington describe the Thais as "volun-
teers" and ethnic Lao from northeast Thai-
land.
In reality, however, the Thais serving in
Laos are regular members of the royal Thai
army who volunteered to serve in Laos for
extra pay.
Eight Thai soldiers who were interviewed
confirmed the arrangement. Threes of the
soldiers came from Bangkok or its sister city,
Thonburi, one was from Nonthaburi and the
others were from north or northeast Thai-
land.
The Thais have their own command system
and have almost nothing to do with the royal
Lao army. The only Lao military decision
which affects them is by a Lao regional com-
mander who may ask American officials to
deploy the Thais in a certain place as part
of.an over-all Lao army operation.
U.S. administrators have claimed the Thais
are part of the royal Lao army, but none of
the eight Thais spoken to considered them-
selves as such. American officials attempting
to circumvent the congressional restriction
deserve some sympathy, for their problem is
a difficult one.
.The Thais are essential to the survival of
the royal Lao forces against the North Viet-
SEPTEMBER 24, 1971.
Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Secretary has
asked me to reply further to your letter of
August 10, 1971, citing a newspaper article
concerning Thai volunteers in Laos, and to
your followup letter of September 22.
On the basis of information available to
us here the following comments are made on
the article :
The Thai forces in Laos are composed ex-
clusively of volunteers, most of whom have
served in the Thai Army, but have been dis-
charged. The voluntary character of this pro-
grain is illustrated by the fact that Thai per-
sonnel are free to leave their units in Laos
and return to Thailand before their contract
period ends without penalty or punishment
by Thai authorities. Many have in fact done
so, as noted in the article.
In view of its importance to the security
of Thailand, the Thai volunteer program in
Laos has the approval and support of the
That government. Cooperation between the
Lao and Thai governments has facilitated
the formation of Thai volunteer units in
Thailand, thus obviating many of the prob-
lems that would develop If the Thai units
had to he organized from scratch after the
individual Thai volunteers arrived in Laos.
These units are fully staffed--to include vol-
unteer officers and volunteer NCO's who
have severed their connections with the Thai
Armed Forces.
General Vang Pao controls the use of That
volunteers in Military Region II. Like any
effective military commander, Vang Pao con-
sults with a number of individuals. Among
these are That military officers stationed.
nearby in Thailand who perform liaison
functions with the Lao government. One of
these is a'Thai general officer. Vang Pao also
consults with the CIA officers advising his
forces, but It is he who makes the military
decisions involving the Thai volunteer units.
There are no Thai generals stationed iii
Laos.
That volunteers were treated on an emer-
gency basis at the U.S. hospital at Udorn
but this service has been discontinued.
The Thai volunteer units in Laos Include
a modest and rather thinly spread artillery
capability composed of individuals with pre-
vious artillery experience. There are no
American military personnel with any of the
Thai volunteer units.
It Is true that all of the Thai in the Lao
irregular program are under no legal mili-
tary or other enforceable obligation to serve
in Laos or to remain in the program for any
specified length of time. namese. The Lao army is sadly depleted, with
It is also true that some of the Thai vol- its casualties running at 10 men killed in
unteers like their Lao counterparts are used action a day.
as forward airguldes, relaying bombing tar- This year the Thais have been involved in
gets from ground to air. I am not familiar most major action in Laos. They fought at
with the identification procedures used by Houei Sal on the Bolovens Plateau when it
the Thai volunteers in Laos but it would not fell. They took part in the Plain of Jars oper-
be surprising, In view of the Thai and Lao ation, helping the Lao recapture the area.
desire to keep the Thai volunteer program Thai artillerymen are manning firebase Lion
as low profile as possible, if the volunteers on the plain now.
did, not carry ID cards. The Thais also took the responsibility for
I hope the above Information will be. help- clearing out a new enemy position at Pak
ful to you and the Subcommittee. . Song last week, freeing sufficient Lao troops
Sincerely, for a helicopter lift to take Pak Song from
DAVID M. ABSHIRF, the east.
Assistant Secretary for Congressional, The high Lao casualties at Pak Song (1,262,
Relations. Including 212 killed and 295 missing out of a
force of fewer than 3,000) make it likely
(From the Evening Star, Sept. 23, 19711 that Thais will be needed in the southern
THAI COMBAT TROOPS FOR LAOS EXPECTED TO Laos Bolovens Plateau. -
DOUBLE BY MARCH
(By Tammy Arbuckle)
VIENTIANE.-Twelve thousand Thai troops
will be available for combat in Laos by March
1, high-Tanking Lao military sources say.
This will more than doube the current force
QUORUM CALL
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum and 'ask
unanimous consent that the time for the
quorum call not be charged again:;t my
time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk called thsg roll
and the following Senators answered to
their names:
[No. 248 Leg.]
Allen Hansen Mathias
Bentsen Harris ' Metcalf
Boggs Hruska Miller
Chiles Hughes Moss
Curtis Jackson Packwood
Ervin Jordan, N.C. Roth
Fannin Magnuson Stennis
Fulbright Mansfield Symington
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum
is not present.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Sergeant at Arms be di-
rected to request the presence of absent
Senators.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques-
tion is on agreeing to the motion of the
Senator from Montana.
The motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Ser-
geant at Arms will execute the order of
the Senate.
After some delay, the following: Sen-
ators entered the Chamber and an;wered
to their names:
Aiken Dominick Pearson
Allott Ellender Pell
Anderson Fong Proxmir"
Baker Gambrell Randolph
Bayh Goldwater ' Saxbe
Beall Gurney Schwefker
Bible Hart Scott
Brock Hatfield Smith
Brooke Humphrey Spong
Buckley Inouye Stafford
Burdick Jordan, Idaho Stevens
Byrd, Va. Kennedy Stevenson
Case McClellan Taft
Cook McGovern Thurmond
Cooper Mondale Tunney
Cotton Muskie Weicker
Cranston Nelson Williams
Dole Pastore Young
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BEALL). A quorum is present.
Who yields time?
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, the dis-
tinguished Senator from Missoul i (Mr.
SYMINGTON) agreed to yield me 10 min-
utes on his time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Iowa may proceed.
MI". HUGHES. Mr. President, I am
pleased to join the distinguished senior
Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON)
in this effort to put a $200 million ceil-
ing on American expenditures in Laos.
We should all be grateful for the per-
sistence which he, has shown in prying
the facts about our involvement there
from our secrecy-ridden Government
and then in bringing these facts before
the Senate and the American people.
In an important sense, the principle
of establishing some ceiling is even more
urgent than the precise figure. If the Con-
gress is to exercise its duty of authorizing
and appropriating funds, we must know
how much is being spent and for what
purposes. The burden of developing and
justifying programs falls on the execu-
tive branch, but the Congress can and
should decide how much may be spent
and under what restrictions.
Gradually, in recent years, the Con-
gress has done what successive admin-
istrations failed to do: Put limits on the
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conflict in Southeast Asia. First, we for-
bade extension of U.S..ground combat
operations into Laos and Thailand. Then
we set clear limits to the war in Cam-
bodia. For several years, we have im-
posed a ceiling on the amount of money
which could be spent for support of South
Vietnamese and other forces in South
Vietnam.
Amendment 434 is the next step in
this process-and it is a necessary step
if we are to prevent the shifting into
neighboring countries of the tragic
violence which has scarred Vietnam. If
we really believe in "winding down the
war," as virtually every Member of this
body favors, then we must cap. the
volcano in Laos.
The administration argues that a ceil-
ing would somehow "cut the ground" out
from under our friends in Laos, I do not
follow that logic. Is there any evidence,
for example, that our $2.5 billion limita-
tion on overall military aid to Indochina
has made the South Vietnamese less
willing or able to fight? If conditions
change, and there is persuasive new evi-
dence of need, surely the Congress can
add to the $200 million figure established
by this amendment.
One of the most attractive features of
the Symington amendment is that it sets
a total, all-inclusive limit to U.S. ex-
penditures in Laos. The only exception
is for the cost of bombing along the Ho
Chi Minh trails, which the State Depart-
ment admits is related to the conflict in
South Vietnam and ? is separate and
distinct from the other war in Laos. This
amendment reaches across the many
separate and even secret bills and line.
items which have hitherto prevented the
Congress from assessing the totality of
our involvement in Laos.
Until a few months ago, the Congress
did not even have a full and accurate
picture of U.S. expenditures in Laos. If
one looks at the budget submission for
total economic and military assistance
for Laos planned for fiscal year 1972,
the figure is a. seemingly modest $178
million. As recently as June 7, when this
body met in secret session, the admitted
cost of our economic and military assist-
ance was put at $284 million. Barely a
week later, Secretary of State Rogers
announced that the total for U.S. ex-
penditures in Laos, exclusive of bombing,
was $350 million. Thus, in fact, the Amer-
ican people have been paying over twice
as much to support the war in Laos as
they had initially been led to believe.
Even these costs are rising. In July,
Secretary of Defense Laird said that
planned expenditures for fiscal year 1972
would reach the staggering level of $490
million. In other words, we will be spend-
ing 40 percent more this year than last.
And the total cost will be more than
twice the gross national product of that
poor country.
I am pleased that the administration is
now more open about the costs of our
involvement in Laos. I am still waiting,
however, for a persuasive justification of
the need for such increased expenditures.
In military aid alone, the U.S, Govern-
ment plans to spend nearly three times
As much in 1972 as it did in 1969..
When we consider what we are really
buying with these expenditures, I believe
that few people will see the need for such
increases. In fact, one might well con-
clude that we are pouring money into a
futile and destructive effort.
In a nation where perhaps one-third of
the people have been refugees at some
time in recent years, the overwhelming
desire is for peace. Our own Ambassador
told the Armed Services Committee last
July that "the Lao have been bled white
by this war."
The truth of this statement can be
seen in the casualty figures. Our people
are upset, and justifiably so, when Amer-
ican deaths are 29 per week, as they were
last week. Yet in Laos, with only one-
one-hundredth our population, the death
toll on the Royal Government side aver-
ages out to about 70 per week, according
to calculations based upon the Moos-
Lowenstein report. In other words, the
Lao casualty rate is the equivalent of
1,000 Americans dying every day.
We must put a halt to this killing.
Even though we may think we have the
best of motives, I do not believe that the
United States should be financing suicide.
Much of our aid has gone for the tough,
patriotic Meo tribesmen. But a decade of
vicious war, prolonged by strong U.S.
support, has seen that tribe lose a huge
percentage of its population-perhaps
one-fourth. Reports from Laos now say
that 12- and 13-year-old boys have been
pressed into service. At least one report
last month said that rice supplies were
being withheld from Meo who refused to
send their sons to fight.
To keep the war effort going, the
United States is financing Thai soldiers
who fight alongside the Lao. Although
the administration claims that these
troops are not regular Thai military per-
sonnel, Ambassador Godley admitted
that assistance has been sought from the
Thai Government "in facilitating the
volunteering" of its people. By paying
for these foreign troops, we are perpet-
uating the historic struggle between
Thailand and Vietnam for dominant in-
fluence in Laos.
Besides financing protracted conflict,
our funds also support the logistics of
the Lao military, yet persistent reports
from journalists and knowledgeable offi-
cials contend that much of the opium and
its derivatives, which ultimately is the
heroin consumed by U.S. forces in Viet-
nam, travels through Laos on the planes
and trucks which America pays for. This
is a question that has neither been ade-
quately pursued nor answered by our
Government.
There must be some limit to this con-
flict. If the President is unwilling to draw
the line, then I believe it is time that
the Congress must. x
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, will.
the distinguished Senator from Virginia
yield me 5 minutes?
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Arizona.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Arizona is recognized for 5
minutes. ,
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
having visited Laos and South Vietnam
quite a few times and having witnessed
the operations over there. I am more
than a little bit aware of what is going
on. -
I am quite disturbed by this amend-
ment and the effect it could have. We
have to keep in mind, Mr. President, that
we have been unmercifully bombing part
of Laos for the past 10 years. It is a very
important part of the South Vietnam
operation. Without that bombing and
without tactical air attacks on the so-
called Ho Chi Minh Trail, the enemy
never could have been contained by the
South Vietnamese or by us.
I have felt all along that we certainly
owe something to that country for the
destruction we have wrought in the east-
ern part of it. The help we have been
giving Laos in a military way, I think,
is a method of repaying it for the debt
we owe by reason of using their country
to fight a war involving other countries.
I would have to see this combination
upset.
I think if the amendment were agreed
to, we could almost judge '.he time that
Laos would fall as a country to either
Red China or North Vietnam. And, I
have to add, this would be just the be-
ginning of the failures over there, be-
cause Thailand would be next. The Red
Chinese have now completed a road to
the Burmese border. And certainly they
have not built that road just for an ex-
-ercise in highway construction. -
I think their ultimate aim--as I have
felt for a long time-is the domination
of Southeast Asia and then the domina-
tion of all of Asia.
If we allow this to happen, I think we
can very safely foresee the beginning of
another world war, because Red China
with domination over Asia will then be
a serious threat to Russia on Russia's
southern border. We, by that time, would
have vacated the world lerdership spot,
which we seem to. be in a: great hurry
to do. The world leadership would start
us on another war. And the conflict
would start between Red China and their
then acquired land and the Soviet Union
who would resist this effort.
Mr. President, I would hate to see the
amendment agreed to. I know that it is
a very attractive one. I ,now that it
means the saving of money. However,
the saving of money and the saving of
a country and the saving of our country
from participation in a third world war,
I think, is an entirely different subject.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I
strongly support Senator SYMINGTON's
amendment to the military procurement
authorization bill establishing a $200
million ceiling in fiscal year 1972 on U.S.
expenditures in Laos for economic aid,
military assistance, and all other U.S.
activities. This ceiling would not apply
to costs connected with U.3. combat air
operations over the Ho Chi Minh Trail
area in southern Laos.
More than any Member of the Senate,
Senator SYMINGTON has tried to alert the
Congress and the American public to the
"secret war" in Laos and America's in-
creasing involvement in that war. We are
still a long way from knowing the full
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truth about America's participation in become another Vietnam-and that the of American soldiers as Southeast Asians
that war; but what we have learned is a United States will not be dragged into ' themselves acquire the capability to de-
result of Senator SYMINGTON's persistent another Southeast Asian quagmire. fend themselves effectively against ex-
efforts to get at the truth. I believe that As Senator SYMINGTON has pointed out, ternal aggression. It is therefore clear
his work in trying to curtail this unde- this amendment will not put an immedi- that under the Nixon doctrine the costs
Glared and uncontrolled war will be re- ate end to the war in Laos. But it will of U.S. assistance to foreign governanents
garded as one of the major contributions prevent the executive branch from uni- may have to increase as American forces
in the distinguished career of our col- laterally expanding U.S. involvement in are withdrawn; it would be unreasonable
league from Missouri. that war-without the knowledge and to attempt to reduce both the American
For years, Congress has appropriated approval of the Congress. participation and American m:,terial
funds to finance this Laotian war with- In addition to limiting U.S. expendi- support for Asia's defense. For example,
out knowing how much money was be- tures in Laos, the amendment would re- an important part of our efforts to fin-
ing spent on how this money was being quire the executive branch to submit a crease the capability of the Lao to per-.
used. written explanation describing the pur- mit them gradually to replace U.S. ef-
Because of Senator SYMINGTON's in- poses of any future funding requests for forts in the area is building up the Lao
vestigation, we now know that our mili- Laos. And the amendment would prohibit air force. This would entail an increase
tary assistance program to Laos has sky- the obligation or expenditure of funds in ordnance expenditures significantly
rocketed from $11.9 million in 1963 to for any purpose in Laos unless such funds as an item in the MASF progra3n for
the $221.2 million requested for fiscal have been specifically authorized by law. Laos. An element of the Nixon doctrine
year 1972. For too long now, the Congress-and is U.S. support for regional cooperation
And this $220.million is only part of particularly the Senate-has abdicated in defense. One example of assistance to
the story, According to Senator SYMING- its constitutional powers. We have au- regional cooperation is U.S. support for
TON, the administration had admitted thorized and appropriated funds in the Thai volunteers serving In irregular
that the cost of all U.S. operations in dark-without even the most minimal forces in Laos under the command of the
Laos in fiscal 1972-exclusive of opera- knowledge of how these funds were being Royal Lao Government.
tions over the Ho Chi Minh trails area- tised. The original Symington amendment
?is approximately $490 million. America's involvement in Laos-per- would directly reduce our ability to act
These figures were only made available haps more than any other event-has without delay and as required to respond
this year. Thus, a program we knew vir- . clearly demonstrated the atrophy of ' to surges In North Vietnamese attacks
tually nothing about has been vastly ex- congressional power, in Laos. The ceiling proposed Is quite
panded over the past several years. This amendment offers us the opportu- inadequate to continue essential ongoing
In part, this increase is a result of the nity to accept and exercise our constitu- operations in Laos which facilitate our
United States subsidizing the use of tional responsibilities. general objectives in Southeast `Asia, in-
thousands of Thai mercenaries in Laos- In meeting our responsibilities, we may cluding Vietnamization and withdrawal
a fact which I revealed on January 19, prevent another tragedy in Indochina. of U.S. forces. The administration has
1971. In using U.S. Government. funds to Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I rise to accepted overall limitation on MASF
pay for these Thai troops, the executive urge that this body reject the original funds for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.
branch ignores Congress prohibition of amendment offered by the distinguished Imposition of a subceiling for Laos alone
U.S. support for Vietnamese or other free Senator from Missouri. This amendment, would limit dangerously U.S. ability to
world forces "in actions designed to pro- if passed, would have the effect of under- respond to North Vietnamese actions
vide military support and assistance to mining the chances for a careful with- there. As President Nixon noted in his
the Government of Cambodia or Laos." drawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam. It October 7 peace proposal, the current
While we have learned somewhat more would also contribute to the political de- struggle in Indochina is basically indi-
about our involvement in Laos, neither terioration of the Laotian Government visible. As reductions are made in other
the cost of CIA operations in that coun- at a time when its stability and endur- areas, particularly South Vietnam, it
try nor the nature of U.S. air operations ance could lead to enhanced prospects may become necessary to maintain ex-
in Northern Laos have been fully de- for political negotiation in Indochina as penditures in Laos, In any event, any
scribed to any congressional committee a whole. The Senator from Kansas be- amendment whose limitations include
We do know that the U.S. Air Force lieves that the pending amendment expenses for U.S. air support for Lao
is engaged in an around-the-clock bomb- would thereby constitute a double dis- regular and irregular forces would be
ing in Laos-hundreds of miles from the service to the interests of the United difficult to implement. Although it I.,; pos-
Ho Chi Minh trails. While the full impact States as we seek to both stabilize and sible to devise a rough estimate for the
of this bombing is not yet clear, there are disengage ourselves from Souheast Asia. costs of an average sortie and to multiply
ample news stories documenting the de- The original amendment to the De- this estimate against the total number
struction and devastation of Laotian vil- fense Procurement Act would set a ceil- of sorties which are considered to have
lages and the suffering of the Laotian. ing of $200 million on all U.S. assistance been in support of Lao forces rather than
people. to Laos, both economic and military, interdiction efforts against the trail, it
Without any real understanding or with the exception of U.S. air interdic- would be in practice difficult to devise
approval by the Congress or the Amer- tion efforts against the Ho Chi Minh bookkeeping which could satisfy the Con
lean public, U.S. military forces are Trail. The restriction would cover (a) gress that the intent of this amendment
deeply involved in still another . Asian AID, (b) MASF * for the Royal Lao was being observed. In any case, a ceiI-
war. After our Vietnam experience, we Army, (c) the Lao irregular program, lug 'of $200 million which would include
are entitled to ask "Where does it all (d) support for Thai volunteers in the U.S. -air operations-except against the
stop?" irregular forces in Laos, (e) U.S. air ac- Ho Chi Minh Trail-would be highly un-
The limited assistance to South Viet- tivities in support of Lao regular and realistic. As Secretary Rogers has noted,
nam led to American "advisers" and the irregular forces, and '(f) U.S. support for the value of support in Laos for fiscal
We know where those so-called limited
commitments took us.
Is there any reason to believe that our
limited commitment to Laos will not take
us down the same path-will not lead us
to an ever-increasing involvement in
ground actions-for example, by GVN year 1971 is $350 million, exclusive i_)f all
forces-in the trail area. The adminis- U.S. air operations. If the level of North
tration believes that such an amendment Vietnamese activities is not reduced
would not contribute to the attainment through some agreement or at least a
of U.S. foreign policy objectives in South- .,local cease-fire, the arbitrary cut in Lao
east Asia. effectiveness through such a drastic cut
NIXON DOCTRINE in U.S. assistance could almost Inevitably
that war? The Nixon doctrine provides for the result in a political as well as military
Since our commitment to Laos con-
tinues to escalate,. it is imperative that
Senator SYMINGTON's amendment be
adopted. For if this amendment becomes
law, the Congress will make it clear to
the executive branch that Laos will not
in Asian defense by greater indigenous
efforts with U.S. support. It has been
deemed advisable to reduce the numbers
EFFORT TO REACH A SETTLEMENT IN LAOS
We are encouraging the Royal Laotian
Government's current efforts to explore
actively with the l_rao Communist-, the
possibility of arriving at some form of a
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settlement which would permit the re- Laos and create movement toward an Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
duction of the level of hostilities in North Indochina solution. we in the Senate would still he in the po-
Laos. There are indications that the Gov- Delicate political negotiations leading sition of approving the expenditure in
ernment of North Vietnam now recog- to shifts and maneuvers will take place Laos of far more money than we thought
nizes that there are mutual advantages during the crucial year of 1972. It would we had appropriated for military activ-
in a local cease-fire. If progress can be seem highly inadvisable for this body to sties of which we were barely aware.
made on this front, it should be possible take unilatral military steps which would One reason the war in Las remained
gradually to reduce U.S. support for ac- disrupt the negotiating position of the unnoticed for so long, and unexamined
tivities in Laos-outside the trail area- Royal Lao government or undermine that after it had been noticed, was that it
to a level which could be within a $200 government's very stability. Drastic cuts has been and still is overs?iadowed by
million ceiling. However, if such a con- in U.S. support or the eliminaiton of U.S. the war in Vietnam. The situation in
gressional limitation were passed while support for Thai assistance with volun- Laos, like that in Cambodia, is, of course,
the negotiations are underway, it would teers could undermine totally the Royal intimately related to the war in Vietnam.
be clearly seen by the enemy as having Lao government's defensive position dur- In these other two countries of Indo-
drastically reduced the ability of the ing the coming dry season. If Lao Prime china we see reflected the false hopes
Royal Laotian Government to defend it- Minister Souvanna Phouma were faced and mistaken judgments thr.t led us into
self, and hence the Communists would with military disaster, he could well de- the quagmire of Indochina in the first
considerably harden their negotiating cide to resign. Souvanna is the symbol of place and that continue to keep us there.
position to the detriment of the Royal Lao neutralism and would be indispen- I find it cause for serious concern, for
Laotian Government. The Royal Laotian sable to any attempt to return to the example, that since the policy known as
Government would be unable to exact framework of the Geneva agreements. He Vietnamization began, Came:odia has be-
concessions from the Government of will also be a crucial figure in efforts to come engulfed in war and is now vir-
North Vietnam in return for reductions move toward a solution of the conflict on tually entirely dependent upon the
in U.S. military support-such as a the Indochinese Peninsula. His disap- United States both militarily and eco-
bombing halt and "withdrawal of Thai pearance from the scene could only re- nomically. The costs to the American
volunteers. An unfavorable settlement duce drastically the chances for a settle- taxpayer of our involvement in Cambodia
would have serious consequences. for the meat of the conflict in Laos which in turn -are increasing rapidly, and the outlook
ability of other friendly governments in could complicate the solution of the rest for the immediate future is that these
the area to resist North Vietnamese ex- of the conflict in Indochina. costs will continue to increase.
pansionism, and could affect Vietnamiza- The Senator from Kansas urges that In Laos, too, our costs have never been
tion and thus the withdrawal of U.S. this body reject the pending amendment greater. Yet the situation of the Royal
forces. which can only serve to undermine our Lao Government has never been weaker.
LAOS-CRUCIAL NEGOTIATING PERIOD goals of withdrawing from Southeast I gather that the most that can be hoped
Since March 1970 Lao Prime Minister Asia and of creating a viable political for militarily is that the RD.. al Lao Gov-
Souvanna Phouma has been actively en- situation as we do so. The amendment ernment can maintain its hold on the
gaging in internal talks with the Lao would be a critical blow against the Nixon one-third of its territory that remains
Communists. The talks have proven to be doctrine and against the interests of the under Government control, and even this
a useful way of defining the basic posi- United States. objective will require a continued heavy
tions of each side and of furthering con- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I American investment and r n increasing
tacts which, at an appropriate point, yield to the Senator from Arkansas what- Thai involvement for which the United
might assist in arriving at a settlement in ever time he desires. States must pay.
at least North Laos. In addition, such a The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The Senate has been tardy, if not
settlement could spread to other areas of ator from Arkansas is recognized. derelict, as far as the war in Laos is
Laos, and the form of political accommo- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the concerned. Until recently we could plead
dations might be precedence for settle- principle of the amendment of the Sen- ignorance, although ignorance of a war
ments elsewhere in Indochina. It is im- ator from Missouri, I support. is no more valid an excuse for avoiding
portant that the Lao prime minister and The distinguished Senator from Mis- the consequences than is ignorance of the
other non-Communists be in a position souri has done more work, I think, in try- laW. Now, however, due principally to
to hold out for a settlement which does Ing to enlighten, and in enlightening, the the efforts of the senior Senator from
not compromise basic Lao national inter- Senate, the committee, and the public Missouri and his subcommittee, we no
ests-nor those of Thailand, South Viet- about the war in Laos which this and the longer have that excuse. YeI the war con-
nam or Cambodia. For the example of predecessor administration has gone to tinues without any real authorization by
Berlin shows that continued firmness such length to keep secret from the Con- the Congress except in theannual. appro-
may indeed encourage the Communists gress and the public. He deserves great priations we have voted, appropriations
to abandon extreme positions which they credit. which mask the scope and details of our
have insisted on, sometimes for years, I agree with the principle in this involvement and which do ,uat represent
and enter into serious negotiations. amendment that attempts to limit our an accurate measure of the expenditures
The coming year will be a crucial one involvement in Laos. When I finish my involved. We are now considering the
for Indochina. Even without formal prog- prepared remarks, I wish to elaborate latest of these appropriations but we are
ress in the Paris talks, it is obvious that upon that idea. doing so, for the first time, with sufficient
other changes in Indochina will have an Mr. President, the amendment offered information to enable us to debate and
impact upon the development of a solu- by the Senator from Missouri puts a lim- decide whether we wish to exercise some
tion there. The President's trip to Peking, itation-where there has been no limita- control over what has been essentially
the continuing progress of successful tion -on our steadily increasing involve- an uncontrolled war.
Vietnamization and withdrawal of U.S. ment in Laos and which requires-where It seems that the only vay in which
forces, the increased competence and ca- there has been no requirement-that the we will be able to exercise some control
pability of the Cambodian Government, Congress be kept informed of the pur- over, and impose some limitations on,
and the increasing Thai efforts to deal poses for which public moneys are be- our activities in Laos is through the ap-
with their concern about threats to their ing spent in Laos. The amendment has propriations process. We tried last year
own security, all will have an important been proposed by the Senator who, per- by legislation to prevent our underwrit-
effect upon Laos. In view of the Commu- haps more than any other, has demon- ing third country participation in the
nists continued assurances of support for strated a consistent concern with regard war in Laos because it was our judgment
the Geneva agreements of 1962 and its to the war in Laos and a persistent deter- that this was not a wise course of action
internal arrangements, the principal ele- mination to find out what was going on for the United States. That legislation
ments for a possible Lao solution accept- in that country and to insure that the was not respected. It was circumvented
able to both the Communists and to the American people, whose tax moneys pay by the executive branch through the de-
non-Communists are available. The for the war, are made privy to as much vice of calling the Thai forces that were
North Vietnamese desire to reach an of this information as possible. Without sent into Laos, and who were paid by the
overall settlement in the area. Such a his efforts, in the last few years through. U.S. "local forces" in Laos. It is now
settlement could begin with progress in the Subcommittee on U.S. Security contended that they are "local -forces"
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Approvtq r t.pA"QQ2 R]OlA=F31D0296R000300080020- 13773
because they had severed their connec-
tions with regular Thai military and had
"volunteered" for service in Laos. We
learn from the press, however, that this
is not what the volunteers themselves
think they have done. They still appear
to believe that they remain in the regular
Thai army.
The cost of this program of under-
writing Thai forces to fight in Laos will
increase in this fiscal year. The program
began because there was no longer suffi-
cient Lao manpower to defend what re-
mained of the territory under Royal Lao
Government control, as Ambassador
Godley made clear in his testimony be-
fore the Armed Services Committee. If
the fighting in Laos continues, and there
is no prospect that it will not, Lao man-
power will be further depleted and even
more Thai may be needed at even higher
costs to American taxpayers. That is pre-
cisely the situation the Senate attempted,
through legislation last year, to prevent.
We have not used the appropriation
process before to attempt to control our
involvement in Laos. Before the staff of
the Subcommittee on U.S. Security'
Agreements and Commitments Abroad
submitted their report on Laos to the
subcommittee, we did not even know the_
rough order of magnitude of U.S. spend-
ing in Laos, for that figure had never
before been announced. Now we do know,
and the costs in this fiscal year will be
almost half a billion dollars, not includ-
ing the cost of bombing the Ho Chi Minh
Trail.
Surely these costs are too high. Even
administration witnesses before the.
Armed Services Committee admitted that
if the North Vietnamese wished to devote
sufficient resources, they could take Laos
any time they wished to. Thus, in the long
run it would make little difference
whether we were to appropriate $100 mil-
lion or $200 million or a billion fo', as
the subcommittee staff :report on Laos.
branch has never been constrained in any
way in prosecuting the war in Laos. The
public did not know how extensive the
American involvement in the war was,
and the Congress had no idea of the costs
involved.
In addition to reversing the trend of
American expenditures, and forcing a
shift in emphasis from the military to the
political sphere, the amendment pro-
posed by the senior Senator from Mis-
souri would impose certain requirements
on the executive branch to keep the
Congress informed. I believe those re-
quirements are of utmost importance.
Without them, there is every indication
that the executive branch will continue
to keep the Senate in the dark. As those
who attended the secret session of the
Senate on June 7 will remember, the
senior Senator from Missouri pointed
out, at the beginning of that session, that
on January 27 of this year I wrote the
Secretary of Defense asking for statis-
tical information relating to the military
situation in Laos and Cambodia similar
to that information regularly supplied
to the committee with regard to Vietnam.
Mr. G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for International Secu-
rity Affairs, replied on April 14 and said
that he was unable to comply with my
request because-
It would not be at all appropriate to dis-.
cuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch.
highly sensitive information on military com-
bat operations of the kind which your ques-
tions would elicit if answers were to be pro-
vided.
I then wrote Mr. Nutter on April 20 and
asked whether he could provide the com-
mittee with a list of the items requested
which he considered to be in the cate-
gory of "highly sensitive information on
military combat operations" which it
would not be "appropriate to discuss or
disclose outside the executive branch."
He replied on May 5, and said in his
letter:
The information required to respond to
have is whatever limits the North Vietnamese questions concerning the size and combat
wish to place on themselves. readiness of indigenous armed forces, their
Large amounts of American economic air and ground combat operations, the
enemy forces they encounter and
and military assistance, and an intimate the
casualties they inflict and sustain, etc., is
American involvement in military opera- normally provided through U.S. military per-
tions in that country, have not brought sonnel acting in a military advisory assist-
peace to Laos. There are now twice as ance role who accompany the host country
many North Vietnamese forces in Laos forces on combat operations. However, the
as there were three and a half years ago. Geneva Accords, the so-called Cooper-Church
The bloodshed and destruction continue, Amendment and certain other restrictions
exacting a terrible price from the Lao imposed by the Congress in enacting the De-
fense Authorization Bill have, in combing-
people. tion, prohibited by law the presence of U.S.
I believe that the emphasis must shift military advisory in Laos and Cambodia
in Laos from military confrontation to which, in turn, effectively precludes reliable
political accommodation and that this reporting to' the Department of Defense of
shift will not take place as long as we information of that nature.
continue to underwrite the war without I then. wrote to Mr. Nutter again on
limitation. It is, of course, not only in August 9, renewing my request on Laos
Laos that there must be a shift in em- on -a monthly basis. I said in my letter
phasis but within this government as well that since the exchange of correspond-
and that shift, it appears, can only be ence had begun, two members of the sub-
achieved if we in the Congress force it. committee staff had visited Laos and had
There is no evidence that the United
States has ever seriously considered a
negotiated settlement in Laos. The Pen-
tagon papers indicate that in the past the
United States deliberately undercut ef-
forts to attain such a settlement. The
negotiating alternative has never been
taken seriously because the executive
Perhaps the only real protection the Laos
obtained answers to virtually all of the
questions regarding the situation in Laos
which I had asked. I also noted that their
report had now been declassified and
published, after review by the Depart-
ments of State and Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency, and that it
thus did not seem to me any longer
credible to claim that he could not pro-
vide answers to these questions on the
ground that it would not be "appropri-
ate" to discuss or disclose this iniorma,-
tion outside the executive branch or that
the information was not available be-
cause we did not have U.S. military per-
sonnel Laos "acting in a military advisory
assistance role who accompany the host
country forces on combat operations."
As I said, my most recent letter to Mr.
Nutter on this subject was dated August
9. Today is October 4. I have not yet re-
ceived 'a reply to my letter. Apparently,
the Department of Defense cannot decide
how to respond to, or perhaps it should
be said how to avoid meeting, a simple
request to be provided with an updating
of information which the committee staff
has already been able to obtain on its
own. If that is the kind of cooperation
that we can expect to receive, it seems
to me that we must compel the executive
branch by law, as would the amend-
ment before us, to provide the kind of in-
formation which they are obviously un-
willing to provide otherwise.
I ask unanimous consent that my ex-
change of correspondence with the De-
partment of Defense on this subject be
printed in the RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, but
to leave the question of information and
to return to the question of controlling
-the war, if this amendment is adopted
the options of the executive branch in
Laos will be limited to those which the
Congress has decided we can afford. This
amendment represents the first applica-
tion of precise fiscal controls to the war
in Laos. It is, of course, opposed by the
Defense Department which argues that a
budgetary ceiling is unthinkable as well
as unworkable and, for that reason, has
not been imposed before.
It is a new departure for the Congress
to attempt to impose fiscal controls on
our activities in Laos. But this is a prac-
tice which the Congress follows, and the
executive branch is compelled to observe,
in all of our domestic programs. We reg-
ularly decide how much we can aitord to
spend on the war against poverty and in
the war against crime. If we can place
limits on how much we can spend and for
what purposes on problems such as these,
which are of such enormous consequence
to us at home, what earthly argument
can there be for not placing similar lim-
itations on the war in Laos.
Mr. President, the amendment of the
Senator from Missouri provides for a
substantial 'reduction in the amount
which the administration proposes to
spend and no doubt will spend. It, is true
that I and some of my colleagues have
almost been reduced to 'the situation
where it makes no difference what is
put into the law, the administration will
not abide by it. We had a restriction on
the employment of Thai troops in Laos,
but the Executive did so any way. This
being a political question, I do not see
how it could be brought into the courts.
If we passed a clear expression, even over
a presidential veto, that there should be
no bombarding ,in the north, I am sure
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the Executive would continue to bomb the commander in chief of the Pacific in The basic law on foreign aid today re-
Hawaii. quires the Executive to submit all rele-
and call them protective reaction strikes. The American military aid program last vant documents on foreign aid. It says so
I do not know how to deal with a Gov- year consisted of $180-million, which in- in the law in very broad language, It
ernment in which there is no respect be- cluded both the expenses of training and could not be any broader. So when we ask
tween the legislative and the executive equipping Cambodian troops in South Viet-
branches, when there is no respect with nam and delivering other equipment to Cam- foor he document to s, the Pr ,,ddent refuses
es
regard to waging war and the law. With bOThis year's request by the Administration they are internal working documents and
regard t to the Cooper-Church amend- is for $200-million, 60 per cent of which goes claims Executive privilege. 1 do not agree
ment, the executive ignored the restric- toward ammunition. that such privilege is applicable to mat-
tions on limiting the number of Ameri- "The guidance from Washington is to help tern of this kind. I think it is an absolute
cans i11 Cambodia. them maintain a light infantry force, mod- distortion of the whole concept. I do not
I hold in my hand an article with a estly supported by artillery and air," one leg
- is Piuioln Penh dateline; which was pub- ai a said. "In conquering words, not to make them t inr there is any of legal l bar reoririt. eIt is a
lished in The New York Times on Sep- a army."
tember 20, 1971. I ask unanimous con- The Cambodians have been given six heli- of the law.
sent that the entire article may be copterseand also six get air propeller-driven p American Now the Senator from Missouri puts
ers. They in this requirement, and I am for that,
printed in the RECORD. jets based in Vietnam and Thailand. The , because, as a Senator, I have
There being no objection, the article money for those air strikes is not accountable of of proce course, as if this were still a law-
as was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, to the military assistance program here.
as follows: According to official sources, the team abiding country and that people abide by
MILITARY GAINS GROUND IN U.S. EMBASSY IN members make field trips in unmarked Amer- the law, even though I strongly suspect
CAMBODIA scan helicopters that come from Vietnam but that some will not do so if at is inconven-
only to inspect the military equipment and jent to them, just as they have not abided
(By Craig R. Whitney) how it is used. Before each trip Ambassador of the oCooper-
PNOMrIIENH, CAMBODIA, Sept. 17-United Swank is informed, the sources say. by Churc the h law in the amendments, case and of the ed-
States Embassy officials who wanted to keep The four officers on Colonel Amos's staff Chut m tang use t Thai troops, or re-
the supporting American military presence also make field trips to gather information, men of
here down to a bare handful have lost some the sources said. Colonel Amos does not wear quirements for furnishin.; information
ground that they considered important. a uniform in Pnompenh but in his second to the Senate on foreign aid.
These Americans, led by Jonathan F. floor office last week several majors in combat The real reason why this executive
Ladd, the embassy political-military coun- green uniforms came in to make reports. has such contempt for the Congress and
selor and former commander of United States "Those guys have to grit their teeth when it controls the
Army Special Forces in Vietnam, have been they can't advise," one civilian observer said., the Congress. 1aW IS W that ith it the Is believes [ it c t split
outmaneuvered, and now, according to dip- "Now they've got a flag officer here, next ith the th Demic rat st split
lomatic sources, have less influence in the they'll want a major general, then a lieuten-about 50-50 embassy than the 50-man Military Equip- ant general, and it'll end up being MACC," ing close together, the administration consid
portan ment Delivery Team headed by Brig. Gen. or Military Assistance Command Cambodia. thinks anything it
so wh e'S imp it rnt
Theodore C. Mataxis. So far, however, the Cambodians have not will pass, anyway;
Mataxis, who used to spend a' asked for that, and Ambassador Swank an spect a - body which has no role? I can
couple of days a week in Pnompenh and the advocate of the low profile for the American understand that. I, nevertheless, believe
rest in Saigon, has now moved to Pnompenh presence here is likely to hold the day-at n, Wi +e11 this war is
with his staff and has more than doubled the least for now. th thatat, , t in is the he long country will runreturn to its senses
size of the Pnompenh contingent of the Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the "`and we will then have an opportunity to
team. When it moved to Cambodia in Jan- point is that the military team in Cam- resurrect the basic principles of law on
nary he had 16 men. In May it was expanded bodia has just recently been doubled. I which this country was founded.
to 23.
There are also 63 other men attached to will read part of the article: But realize .t as hat long the as the war is administration going does on, I
not
ahc team but based in South Vietnam, where United States Embassy officials who wanted
I snibodian. soldiers get their basic to keep the supporting American military have to pay attention to those in Con-
4;. 'c from the South Vietnamese and are presence here down to a bare handful have grass Or the Senate who disagree with
issiied equipment-field radios. M-16 rifles, lost some ground that they considered im^ its sse because the administration has
and uniforms-by the Americans. The total portant.
pro-
May. and Saigon has 'the These embassy political -military counselor and ference votes, and it dif-
of 113 men Pnompenli
been about the pro-
been n the same e since
quipment, the Cambodian former commander of United States Army vidence of the war in Laos Or Cambodia.
-Helped by the equipment, May.
Army has been winning back some. territory Special Forces in Vietnam, have been out- Just as was true of the preceding admin-
lost to the enemy. manueuvered, and now, according to diplo- istration, as long as the administration
American military advisers were prohibited matic sources, have less influence in the em- has the votes it will do as it pleases.
in Cambodia by Congress last year. Accord- bassy than the 50-man Military Equipment I want to
Ing to a United States official in Pnompenh, Delivery Team headed by Brig. Gen. Theodore from this article:
the members of military equipment delivery' C. Mataxis.
teams are not advisers, and pare not engaged General Mataxis, who used to sped a couple In addition to the team's members there
in training Cambodian troops. "They perform of days a week in Pnompenh and the rest in are 25 servicemen in the office of the Amer-
a certain logistic advisory function, seeing Saigon, has now moved to Pnompenh with ican military attache, Col. Harry 0. Amos.
that the right equipment gets to the right his staff and has more than doubled the size So far that is all, but one disgruntled ad-of a
smaller unit and is used properly," the official said. Whe the nompenh to Cambodiatin of the January he here -said the other day, '-the t exth thing
FACT SHEET ISSUED had 16 men. In May it was expanded to 23, they'll want M.P.'s, then a P1. then a movie-
A Department of Defense fact sheet issued There are also 63 other men attached to house, and next thing you know there will
in Saigon today and in Washington yester-
day emphasized that the team the team but based in South Vietnam. be a thousand men here."
et
military ry The fact is that I realize as a Senator That is exactly what happened in V,iet-
with the he Congressionally approved p is "Operating
bodia" and said that it was deliberately or- we have to keep up the appearance of nam. The President committed himself
ganized with a lower number of personnel. dealing with these laws trying to restrict in the last election to get our troops out
than would eventually be needed." them, even though the executive depart-. of Vietnam. What he appears to be do-
,
are ad the team's members there is gradua are 25 servicemen icin the office of the Ameri- merit refuses to take them seriously and mIng uehO too slowly,llmy, blit, ovin ~SO a gas allay-
can military attache, Col. Harry Q. Amos. abide by them.
So far that is all, but one disgruntled ad- I have mixed feelings about the amend- though he held that up until that election
vocate of a smaller American establishment ment I shall support the $200 million yesterday. That was a very enlighten-
here said the other day, "the next thing limitation. I shall not, however, support ing election. One cartoon said, "One
they'll want is M.P.'s, then a PX, then a the amendment which gives the adminis- man, one vote. What could be mote
moviehouse, and next thing you know there trat'ion the equivalent of the $490 million, democratic?"
will be a thousand men here." or the $350 million, exclusive of bombing. That is what it was-it was a very
Author itat Ametithsce the This would be no restriction on the democratic election-,one man, one vote.
that t is is not like kely, but the e preressurs re is is o on thhe
embassy for still more staff but I predict the other portions Mr. Thieu did not get Is many votes as
members. The
team, while operating under f the supervision of the amendment requiring reports, and Hitler did. Hitler got 99 percent of the
of Ambassador Emory C. Swank, comes under so forth, they will pay no attention to. votes. The president of South Vietnam
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got 89 percent, I believe, so he is 10 per-
cent off Hitler's record. But I say with a
tone of sarcasm it was a great election,
and I suppose it is being celebrated both
in Saigon and downtown as a great vic-
tory which has now given South Vietnam
the opportunity for self-determination,
which is the way the administration, I
believe, has described it.
The President has never made a com-
mitment, as far as I know, to get out of
Cambodia or Laos. That is the reason
they are doubling-and they are dou-
bling-the size of our military contingent
in Cambodia, I want to predict now that
Cambodia will turn out to be more sensi-
tive, in many respects, than Vietnam.
Mr. Sihanouk, both hereditary and
elected ruler of Cambodia, resides in
Peking today. There are many indica-
tions that the Chinese regard Cambodia
more or less as a ward. One reason is
Prince Sihanouk. There are other rea-
sons. Cambodia has been under the in-
fluence of the Chinese in the past. The
Cambodians have always regarded them-
selves as a people of superior culture
to the people of Vietnam. They have
great pride in the former kingdom of the
Khmers which resulted in Angkor Wat,
and so forth. They have a history some-
what different from that of Vietnam and
I think a history of close association with
the Chinese. The Chinese have regarded
them as a tributary state but, neverthe-
less, have regarded them as a state for
which they have a responsibility.
I think it is very dangerous for us to
escalate the war in Cambodia, in some
cases more dangerous, on ideological and
psychological grounds, than in Laos. It is
a great tragedy that we are escalating the
extension of the war and the cost of
the war in Laos as well as Cambodia. I
understand they will be spending some
$200 million or more in Cambodia this
year. We never know how much, because
the actual amounts are never carried in
a way that one can recognize them in the
budget itself. There is so much that is
secret. So much of it is spent through the
CIA or some other activity of this kind
and it is mixed up with the. cost in Viet-
nam. Some of the Army men who are
serving much of the time in Cambodia
are based in Vietnam and no doubt they
show up in the costs of Vietnam itself.
I shall support the amendment limit-
ing aid to Laos to $200 million. I am
not sure, since the Senator has sent an-
other amendment to the desk, if it in-
creases it to the current amount. If so,
I cannot vote for it. There is no point in
lny voting for an amount which means a
great escalation. I do not want to vote
for any amendment, because there are
those who later will look at this RECORD
and say "Look, you voted for authority
for war in Laos." I do not want my vote
to be interpreted as authority for war
in Laos. Of course, in a technical sense,
it could be that I voted for it. But this
amendment should be viewed as an at-
tempt to restrict, restrain, and prevent
an escalation of the war in Laos.
That is exactly how the Tonkin Gulf
resolution was presented to us. It was
presented as a way to prevent a layer
war in Southeast Asia. President Johnson
and his advisers said-
If you will give us this quickly, it will show
the solidarity of the Congress behind the
President. This is the only way to discour-
age. the North Vietnamese from escalating
the war. This is the way to prevent a widen-
Ing of the war. If you do not give us this
authority, then the war will inevitably esca-
late because they will not have any fear
or concern about what we will do in South-
east Asia. We have got to impress the Viet-
namese with our determination- and our,
strength, and this is the way to stop the
war in Vietnam. This is the way to prevent
the North Vietnamese for enlarging their
activities.
That was the whole thrust of that
.program.
Of course, I have always been crit-
icized, and still am-every day, prac-
tically, someone in this body or some-
where else who says:
Did you not vote for the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution?
Well, they will say in this case:
Did you not vote for the authority for the
Laotian war?
This measure is not intended as au-
thority for the war. They are already
spending this money. They are going to
spend much more if they can. I have no
confidence. that they will pay any atten-
tion to restrictions in any way. Never-
theless, for the sake of appearance, I
have to support an amendment to re-
strict not only the amount of money but
the way they report it and their activities
in addition to spending the money.
I know this is going to be considered
a cynical speech-"You do not have any
confidence in our system," and so forth.
Well, it is not that I have no confidence
in the system. In wartime our democratic
procedures break down. They have
always done so throughout history. We
delegate power. This has been done. That
is the way it goes.
I have no doubt that we could get this
war over if we do not keep backing wid-
ening the war into Laos and Cambodia.
If we can stop the war in Vietnam, I
believe this country will return to a
democratic, law-abiding community. But
we cannot make much progress doing
that until we get the war in Vietnam
over, and the wars in Cambodia and
Laos stopped also.
This amendment is an effort to stop
the war, to restrict the war in Laos,
not to authorize it. What has been going
on there has not been authorized,, not
even acknowledged. The support of 'the
Meo army has been primarily through
the CIA, which they do not acknowledge.
We all know it, but they do not admit
it. It is like Radio Free Europe; the CIA
paid for it, but they pretended the pub-
lic paid for it.
Here the CIA has paid for the war
and we hdve never acknowledged sup-
port for it publicly. The Senator from
Missouri produced evidence in a hear-
ing that is very persuasive to that effect,
and no man in his right mind can say
it is not public knowledge now. But I do
not think there has ever been a law
passed authorizing so much money for
a war in Laos. If I am wrong, I am will-
ing to stand corrected. I do not think
there has been authorization to carry
on a war in Laos.
Those wishing to make capital of it
could say this amendment is an author-
ization for the war in Laos, just as those
who wish to take advantage of the tech-
nicality said the Gulf of Tonkin reso-
lution was an authorization for the war
in Vietnam, whereas its purpose was the
prevention of a wider involvement in
Southeast Asia.
But in order to get a $200 million lim-
itation, I said I would vote for the Sep-
ator's amendment; but I cannot vote
for any larger sum than that.
[ EXHIBIT 1 ]
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
January 27, 3 971.
Iron. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, at the
,request of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions the Department of Defense hes. for
some time, been supplying it with monthly
statistical data relating to the situation in
Vietnam. This information has proves: to be
extremely valuable In following de?ielop-
ments there.
The Committee is finding it increasingly
difficult to keep abreast of the rapid develop-
ments in Cambodia, Laos, and North Viet-
nam, and I believe that a monthly report
containing data relating to those countries
would be helpful. The Committee would,
therefore, appreciate the Department's co-
operation in supplying, on a monthly basis,
the information requested on the enclosed
list.
I, of course, have no objection to your
making this information available to other
interested congressional committees, 's was
done in the case of the Vietnam reports.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.
[Enclosure]
MONTHLY DATA ON MILITARY OPERATIONS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Cambodia
1. Size of Cambodian Armed Forces:
(a) Trained and Combat Ready;
(b) In training (specific location i' out
side Cambodia) or other;
(c) On duty outside Cambodia other
than training).
2. Number of friendly foreign troops in
Cambodia:
(a) South Vietnamese;
(b) Other (specify).
3. Number of enemy troops in Cambodia;
(a) North Vietnamese/Viet Cong;
(b) Cambodian Communist;
(c) Engaged in combat operations:
1. against Cambodian forces;
2. against South Vietnam forces.
4. Combat air operations in Cambodit .
(a) Sorties flown by:
1. U.S. planes;
2. Sorties flown by Cambodian planes.
3, Sorties flown by South Vietnamese
planes;
4. Sorties flown by Thais or other forces;
(b) Ordnance expended (bomb tonnage
and other) by U.S. aircraft in Cambodia
1. B-52.
2. other fixed wing aircraft;
3. helicopter gunships, etc.
6. Casualties (military) :
(a) Enemy killed, wounded and capi.ured;
(b) Cambodian killed, wounded and miss-
ing;
(c) South Vietnamese killed, wound( d and
missing;
(d) U.S. casualties or missing as a result
of air or other operations.
6. Transport and Supply Operations:
(a) Number of flights flown by U.S. mili
tary transport aircraft to Cambodian air-
ports;
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tries or private parties relating to military
operations in Laos.
8. Estimated number of U.S, prisoners held
in Laos:
North Vietnam
1. U.S. air operations over North Vietnam:
(a) Number of reconnaissance flights
(b) Number of U.S. helicopter transport
flights flown in Cambadia;
(c) Number of air drop missions flown by
U.S. aircraft in Cambodia;
Number aircraft transport
(Air r Americd, etc.)U.S.
non-military (e) Number of transport flights by South
Vietnamese or other aircraft;
(f) Number of supply missions by South'
Vietnamese naval vessels;
(g) Please provide copies of any contracts
or agreements with foreign government or
private entities relating to supply or trans-
port operations in Cambodia, including data
on amounts paid or reimbursed for such
services and the -sources of the funding.
7. Payments made by the United States to
South Vietnam or other countries for oper-
ations in or services rendered in behalf of
Cambodia: i
(a) Amounts or any such payments and
the purpose;
(b) Provide copies of any agreements en-
tered into by the United States concerning
payments to foreigners for services rendered
in or in behalf of Cambodia and the source
of the funding.
8. Number of U.S. personnel involved:
(a) Number of U.S. personnel attached
permanently or temporarily to the U.S. Em-
bassy in Cambodia-civilian, military;
(b) Number of visits in Cambodia by U.S.
personnel in a TAD or other temporary status
and total numer of days of such duty by all
personnel during the month;
(c) Number of U.S. personnel in South
Vietnam, Thailand, or Laos whose duties re-
late to operations in Cambodia, including
training and logistics operations.
9. U.S. Naval operations:
(a) Number and type of U.S. ships oper-
ating in or near Cambodian waters during
the month engaged in. operations relating to
Cambodia;
(b) Number of visits to Cambodian ports
by U.S. naval vessels engaged in supply or
transport operations.
10. Estimated number of U.S. 'prisoners
held in Cambodia:
Laos
flown;
(b) Number of escort sorties flown;
(c) Number of helicopters or
manned aircraft sorties flown.
(d) Number of drone flights.
2 Enemy actions and U.S. losses:
other
(a) Number of times U.S. aircraft, were
fired upon while over North Vietnam.
(b) Number of times U.S. aircraft were
fired upon from North Vietnam while over
Laos;
(c) Number of U.S. aircraft lost (by type)
over North Vietnam due to enemy fire;
(d) Number of U.S. aircraft lost over North .
Vietnam (by type) not as a result of enemy
fire;
(e) U.S. personnel losses.
3. Retaliatory action taken:
(a) Number of times North Vietnam tar-
gets were attacked;
i. Number of aircraft involved in retalia-
tory actions;
2. Quantities of munitions used in retali-
atory action.
4. Description of actions by Southvietnam-
ese or other forces in North Vietnam.
b. Estimated number of U.S. prisoners held
in North Vietnam.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., April 14, 1971.
Hon. J, W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Laird has
asked me to respond to your letter of 27
January in which you requested that the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations be
furnished, on a continuing basis, a detailed
monthly report on military operations in
Southeast Asia.
I regret that we are unable to comply with
your request in this instance. Deputy Secre-
tary Packard's letter to Senator Symington
of 11 June 1970, a copy of which Senator
Symington forwarded to you, pointed out
that it would not be at all appropriate to dis-
cuss or disclose outside the Executive Branch
highly sensitive information on military com-
bat operations of the kind which your ques-
tions would elicit if answers were to be
1. Number of United States personnel in
Laos:
(a) Civilian (government employees) ;
(b) Military;
(c) Personnel on temporary duty, civilian
and military (total number of man-days);
(d) Contractor employees (Air America;
etc.).
2. Number of friendly military forces:
(a) Regular Laotian Armed Forces;
(b) Irregular Forces;
(c) Thai Forces in Laos;
(d) Other Forces in Laos
South Vietnamese, etc.).
3. Enemy forces in Laos:
(a) Pathet Lao;
(b) North Vietnamese;
(c) Viet Cong.
4. Air Operations in Laos:
(a) U.S. air sorties over Northern Laos and
munitions expended;
1. B-52;
2. Other aircraft.
(b) U.S. air sorties over Southerl} Laos and
munitions expended;
1. B-52;
2. Other aircraft.
(c) Air sorties by Laotian forces and muni-
tions used.
5. Casualties-killed or wounded:
(a) United States;
(b) Laotian;
(c) Other friendly;
(d) Enemy.
provided.
Sincerely,
Legislative and Executive Branches have
come to accept and recognize that there are
certain matters which, for varying reasons,
are not normally discussed outside the Ex-
ecutive Branch. The instructions in question
contained topics meeting teat general de-
scription for the most part and included such
items as military contingency plans. National
Security Council documents, Inspector-Gen-
eral Reports of investigation:;, matters still In
the planning, proposal stage upon which no
decision has been reached, operational pro-
cedures and methods involving the risk of
life or safety of military personnel and so
forth.
Early in the Subcommittee hearings, a mis-
understanding apparently developed in con-
nection with the handling or manner of
treatment of information on nuclear weap-
ons, a misunderstanding which, as I under-
stand it, has been resolved by the briefing
given to the Senator Committee on Foreign
Relations on 27 May 1970.
These categories of information are those
which have become widely accepted and gen-
erally recognized as topics which in the na-
tional interest, should be strictly limited in
either dissemination or discussion. Be as-
sured that any prohibitions against dis-
cussing such topics apply to all. testimony
and were not, of course, restrictive solely
to witnesses appearing before your Sub-
committee.
Secretary Laird. asked me to convey his
apology for the delay in responding to your
request, a delay w'hcih was occasioned by
the urgency of preparing for his trip' to
Europe.
I trust that you will And this responsive
to your Subcommittee's interest in this
matter.
Sincerely,
APRIL 20, 1971.
Hon. G. WARREN NUTTER,
Assistant Secretary for International Secu-
rity Affairs, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. NUTTER: I wish to acknowledge
your letter of April 10 in reply to the Com-
mittee's request for a monthly report on
certain developments in Cambodia and Laos.'
You state that the information requested
would involve "highly sen ;itive information
on military combat operations" which would
not be "appropriate to discuss or disclose out-
side the Executive Branch." Would you please
provide the Committee with a list of the
items requested which you consider to be in
this category. In order to nvoid further delay
and without passing on =he merits of the
Department's position on those items,
I would appreciate your providing the Com-
mittee with monthly reports on the other
items not in this category.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS,
Washington, r).C., May 5, 1971.
Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This will acknowl-
edge the receipt of your letter of April 20,
1971, relative to our exchange of correspond-
ence in connection with the request of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to
be provided a monthly report on a continu-
ing basis of certain mill' ary combat opera-
tions conducted by U.S. forces and the In-
digenous forces of the governments of Laos
and Cambodia.
The information required to respond to
questions concerning tho size and combat
readiness of indigenous rtnned forces, their
air and ground combat operations, the enemy
forces they encounter anc the casualties they
inflict and sustain, etc., is normally pro-
vided through U.S. military personnel acting
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., June 11, 1970.
Hon. STUART SYMINGTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on U.S. Security
Agreements and Commitments Abroad,
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR SYMINGTON: I understand
that when Generals Burchinal and Polk ap-
peared as witnesses before your Subcommit-
tee in late May, they were requested to make
available to the Subcommittee copies of writ-
ten instructions they had received both in
connection with the European trip of staff
members Pincus and Paul and with reference
to their testimony before your Subcommittee.
I am sure you will appreciate that those in-
structions, by definition, were documents in-
tended solely for internal use within the De-
partment of Defense and I would hope that
you would agree with me that such docu-
ments should not be distributed outside the
Executive Branch.
From your personal experience as a former
Secretary of the Air Force, you are well ac-
quainted with the fact that, on the basis of
custom, tradition, usage and precedent, the
6. Incursions into Laos from South Viet-
nam or Cambodia:
(a) Purpose, date and number of U.S. and
foreign personnel involved in each incursion;
7. Please provide copies of any contracts
or agreements entered into during the month
between the United States and other coun-
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in a military advisory assistance role who
accompany the host country forces on com-
bat operations. However, the Geneva Ac-
cords, the so-called Cooper-Church Amend-
ment and certain other restrictions imposed
by the Congress in enacting the Defense
Authorization Bill have, in combination,
prohibited by law the presence of U.S. mili-
tary advisory personne'l.in Laos and Cam-
bodia which, in turn, effectively precludes
reliable reporting to the Department of De-
fense of information of that nature.
Adidtionally, there are ia number of other
questions that were posed such as those re-
lating to U.S. civilian personnel in Laos and
Cambodia who are employed either by other
U.S. Government agencies or by private con-
tractors that do not fall under the cogni-
zance of the Department of Defense.
Finally, the possibility that identical or
similar missions are military operations may
be required in the same general geographical
area at some indefinite future date creates a
sensitivity that precludes discussing, outside
the Executive Branch, specific details with
respect to cross border incursions by allied
forces, intelligence gathering operations, fre-
quency and area of coverage of reconnais-
sanco and attack sort'es, types of aircraft
employed and types and tonnages of ord-
nance expended, etc.
Again, I regret that we are unable to re-
spond to your Committee's request in this
instance.
Bincerely,
Mr. C. WARREN NUTTER,
Assistant Secretary for International Scour-,
ity Affairs, Department of Defense, Wash-
ington, D.C.
DEAR MR. NUTTER: On January 27, 1971, I
wrote Secretary Laird, noting that the De-
partment of Defense had been supplying the
Committee for some time with monthly
statistical data relating to the situation in
Vietnam and asking for a monthly report
relating to developments in Cambodia, Laos
and North Vietnam. You replied, for Secre-
tary Laird, on April 14 and said that you
were unable to comply with my request be-
cause "it would not be at all appropriate to
discuss or disclose outside the Executive
Branch highly sensitive information on mili-
tary combat operations of the kind which
your questions would elicit if answers were
to be provided,"
I then wrote you on April 20 and asked
whether you could provide the Committee
with a list of the items requested 'which you
considered to be in the category of "highly
sensitive information on military. combat
operations" which would not be "appropriate
to discuss or disclose outside 'the Executive
Branch."
You replied on May 5, saying in your letter:
"The information required to respond to
questions concerning the size and combat
readiness of indigenous armed forces, their
air and ground combat operations, the enemy
forces they encounter and the casualties they
inflict and sustain, etc., is normally provided
through U.S. military personnel acting in a
military advisory assistance role who accom-
pany the host country forces on combat oper-
ations. However, the Geneva Accords, the so-
called Cooper-Church Amendment and cer-
tain other restrictions imposed by the Con-
gress in enacting the Defense Authorization
Bill have, in combination, prohibited by law
the presence of U.S. military advisory in Laos
and Cambodia which, in turn, effectively pre-
cludes reliable reporting to the Department
of Defense of information of that nature."
I now renew my request for the -informa-
tion on Laos on a monthly basis requested in
my original letter of January 27, 1971. Since
our exchange of correspondence, two mem-
bers of the Committee staff have visited Laos
and they have obtained the answers to vir-
tually all of the questions regarding the situ-
ation in Laos in the enclosure to my letter
of January 27. Furthermore, as you know,
their report has now been declassified and
published, after review by the Departments
of State and Defense and the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. Thus, it does not seem to me
any longer credible to claim that you cannot.
provide answers to these questions on the
ground that "it would not be at all appro-
priate to discuss or disclose outside the Ex-
ecutive Branch highly sensitive information
on military combat operations of the kind
which your questions would elicit if answers
were to be provided." Nor, it seems to me,
can you sustain the argument that "The in-
formation required to respond to questions
concerning the size and combat readiness of
indigenous armed forces, their air and ground
combat operations, the enemy forces they en-
counter and the casualties they Inflict and
sustain, etc., is normally provided through
U.S. military personnel acting in a military
advisory assistance role who accompany the
host country forces on combat operations."
Semantic arguments aside, the fact of the
matter is that the information I have re-
quested is available because it has been pro-
vided to members of the Committee staff. I
would now like to receive this information on
a monthly basis.
I am enclosing a copy of the questions I
sent the. Department of Defense regarding
Laos as an enclosure to my letter of Jan-
uary 27.
Sincerely yours,
J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman,
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I congratulate the
able Senator for the way he has presented
his case. It is true that money has not
been authorized, but it is also true that
it has been appropriated.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. And spent. I agree
with that.
Mr, SYMINGTON. It sort of makes
one wonder what the system is. I respect-
fully commend the able Senator, for he
is the one who has consistently, with
great courage, pointed out the tragic mess
that we have gotten ourselves into in
Southeast Asia.
With respect to this amendment, to be
frank, my thinking goes along the line,
at this point, that it is better to have half
a loaf than none at all.
I agree with the Senator that whether
my amendment said $200 million, or $350
million, or $490 million, sometime some-
one might get up and say, "You voted
money for a war in Laos, and therefore,
in effect, you were for the war in Laos."
On the other hand, the perfecting
amendment, and on which I shall ask
for a vote, if I may run through it a bit
with the able chairman, would be as fol-
lows.
We say:
Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, no funds authorized to be appropriated
by this or any other Act
The word "obligated" Is taken out for
technical reasons,
may be expended in any amount in excess
of $350,000,000 for the purpose of carrying
out directly or indirectly any economic or
military assistance., or any operation, pro-
ject, or program of any kind, or for provid-
ing any goods, supplies, materials, equip-
ment, services, personnel, or advisers in, to,
for, or on behalf of Laos during the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1972.
One reason for the perfecting amend-
ment is that under the continuing res-
olution and at this point in the fiscal
year, a substantial part of this money
has already been spent. Another thought
is that, after discussing it with some of
my colleagues, it is my opinion there
would be no possibility of getting the con-
trols which we do by this amendment if
we did not raise that figure.
On page 2, we continue with the con-
cept of eliminating the word "obliga-
tion," On page 3, lines 2 and 3, we strike
out:
Over the so-called Ho Chi Minh trails in
southern Laos, and over areas imi iediately
adjacent to such trails,
And insert:
In or over Laos
Which would signify that we would
place no restriction on bombing the Ho
Chi Minh Trails or in Northern Laos.
Then subsection. (e), which is very im-
portant to me as a member of the com-
mittees involved:
After the date of enactment of this Act,
whenever any request is made to .he Con-
gress for the appropriation of funds for use
in, for, or on behalf of Laos for any fiscal
year, the President shall furnish P. written
report to the Congress explaining the purpose
for which such funds are to be used in such
fiscal year.
Then the next paragraph, and it is not
long:
The President shall submit to the Congress
within thirty days after the end of each
quarter of each fiscal year, beginn'ng with
the fiscal year which begins July 1. 1971, a
written report showing the total amount of
funds expended in, for, or on behalf of Laos
during the preceding quarter by the United.
States Government, and shall _ include in
such report a general breakdown of the
total amount expended, describing the dif-
ferent purposes for which such funds were
expended and the total amount expended
for such purpose.
My point is that if we tried to tie the
executive branch to $200 million-and I
fully sympathize with the able chair-
man's position-the $200 million figure
could be a little unrealistic because of
the amount of money that has already
been spent. If we make the change about
combat air operators over Laos, wn would,
in effect, be giving the administration
more along the lines of what they asked
for, but we would also be establishing,
for the first time, controls on this un-
fortunate operation. Would not the able
Senator agree with me on that?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would if I had any
confidence that controls would be re-
spected. Putting it all together, to give
them all the money in return for the
controls, which are certainly proper con-
trols, would enable, them to say they
have a certain lawful authority if they
spend more. It is a matter of degree, it
is true. They will use about $490 ;pillion,
as the Senator knows, to effectuate pres-
ent plans. They could go through the
ceiling; it could be twice that, and the
Senator has no way of stopping it.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senal or im-
plies that by taking the air out, exclusive
of the trails, it would be $490 million
instead of $200 million; but for the first
time we would have direct controls.
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Mr. FULBRIGHT. If you expect them
to be observed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If you do not be-
lieve that, you might as well not have
any amendment at all.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Sena-
tor's purposes are good, and you never
know what will happen. I said I would
support the $200 million. The only reason
I support the $200 million is because of
the controls that the Senator has in
there. But I do not want us to become
more involved there. We are already
in
Mr. SYMINGTON. The only reason
that I would change the $200 million is
that I have now found out there would
be little or no chance of getting it
through the Senate. If we could agree
on the compromise figure, it would not
only get through the Senate, but as a
conferee I would hope we could uphold
it in conference as a sound and construc-
tive move.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would expect the
greatest value of offering it is at least
getting the expenditures on the record-
in trying once more to draw to the at-
tention of the country, the press, and the
people-what is going on. I do not think
most people have been aware of what has
been going on. I do not think they ap-
prove it. Even Members of Congress cer-
tainly have not been aware of it until
very recently, if at all.
So I think it serves a very good pur-
pose to discuss this subject, whether or
not this amendment is enacted, because
I myself cannot imagine that the House
of Representatives, with the attitude they
have taken toward the war, would accept
this amendment and when they are as
determined as they have been on a very
simple statement of policy such as the
Mansfield amendment to the draft bill,
and resist that, then you can imagine
what they will do to something substan-
tive dealing with money.
That is the explanation for my lack of'
enthusiasm for an amendment which is
certainly justified on all grounds to be
enacted as far as the restrictions go-on
all grounds other than giving them a lot
of money to carry on an unwanted war.
The argument that this authorization is
necessary for the protection of the with-
drawal of our troops is absurd, however.
It is about as absurd as the South Viet-
namese elections yesterday.
One of the justifications for this activ-
ity was that it would help us get the
troops out of Vietnam safely. If anybody
believes that, he is liable to believe any-
thing.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I suggest to the
Senator from Arkansas that without the
controls that are in here, even though
the amendment is agreed to the way he
wants it, if that were defeated-and I
am afraid it would be--we would have no
control over expenditures.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to
discourage the Senator. I will support his
first amendment, simply because it is a
substantial reduction in the amount; and
I think the one thing--the, only thing-
that the administration is likely to abide
by is the lack of money.
I have never figured out how they are
able to spend money that has neither
been authorized nor. appropriated. They
have ways of drawing on unexpended
funds. I imagine there is at least $50 bil-
lion of unexpended funds in the pipeline,
as they call it, as reserve for the Pen-
tagon.
So I would not be sure that even with a
prohibition against the appropriation of
any money, they could not find some in a
very short time.
I wonder if the Senator would allow me
to ask a question or two about Thai
troops.
It was my amendment originally that
I believe prohibited the hiring of Thais
to fight in Laos. Can the Senator tell me
why, with one-fourth as many Thai
troops as there are in the Royal Lao
Army, they cost 25 percent more? That
would indicate that they pay two or three
times as much to a Thai fighting in Laos
as to a Lao fighting in Laos. Is that a
fact?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Not only that;
there is more to it than that. For exam-
ple there are less than one-half as many
Thais as there are Lao irregulars, but,
the Thais cost 33-percent more. There-
fore, there is a very great difference be-
tween what the Thais, who are subsi-
dized to fight in Thailand, receive as
against what we pay for the Laotian ir-
regulars.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator will
recall that I had another amendment
which prohibited the practice of paying
.foreign troops brought into Vietnam the
special allowances which at that time
gave them more than was given to an
American soldier. Does the Senator re-
call that?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes, I do.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In this case, be-
cause we had no war-acknowledged
war-at that time in Laos, I assume they
take the position that that restriction
does not apply to Laos. Is that correct?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would think it
did, yes. But it was my understanding
that we were not going to support any
Thais in either Laos or Cambodia, or any
mercenaries in either Laos or Cambodia,
and it was my understanding that that
is what our amendment was designed
to do, as I said on the floor earlier to-
day.
On the other hand, the press is now
reporting that it is planned to finance
and train 12,000 Thai to fight in Laos,
and I imagine the executive branch
will continue to handle this matter just
about the way they see fit. That is why
I am particularly anxious for the dis-
tinguished chairman-who has done as
much in this field as I have-to agree on
modifying the money. I agree with him
that we may be accused, somewhat, even
if we vote for the money involved. But
at least for the first time we would be
setting some controls, so that the whole
operation of the Senate will not be a
farce, as it has been in the past; because
no Member of the Senate, including my-
self, a member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, a member of the Armed Serv-
ices Committee, and a member of the
subcommittee on the CIA until recently
has had the faintest knowledge of what
was going on in Laos.
If it had not been for the able group
of investigators who went to Laos, it is
very possible-in fact, I think, probable-
that we would not yet know what we do
now.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has
said that although there is an existing
provision of law prohibiting the hiring
of mercenaries, they are hiring them.
Why does the Senator think they will
respect his restrictions any more than
they respected that restriction?
Mr. SYMINGTON. It is a good ques-
tion, and I would answer it in this way:
First, they claim-I do not justify the
claim; I simply state their claim-that
they are all volunteers, that they volun-
teered to go there. Inasmuch as we found
out that many of them were regulars in
the Thai military, including at least one
general officer in Laos, and that they
were given bonuses to go to Laos and
their families were giver: privileges if
they did go or were wounded, it is hard
to follow that argument.
On the other hand, they also use the
justification that 'they are ethnic Lao.
The testimony is that twice as many Lao
are actually living in Thailand as are
living in Laos, and three times as many
are living in Thailand as are controlled
by the present government in Laos that
we support.
These are the reasons they give to
justify the Tai forces in Laos, despite the
amendment that the able Senator from
Arkansas succeeded in having adopted,
for which I voted and which, to my mind,
said they should not do what they are
apparently doing.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. So, the Senator
thinks that for some reason they might
respect his restrictions. although they
have not respected that one?
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator is
making a very tight argument. I would
say that they have just as much chance
of respecting the $350 million amend-
ment as they would the $200 million
amendment.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would grant the
Senator that.
Why do they feel that they have to
hire Thais who are so expensive? Why
can they not hire somebody else at half
the price? That seems an exorbitant
sum, if it is 3 or 4 times as much as they
pay the Laotians.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I have always
found that people in government are not
as good traders as people in private busi-
ness. Perhaps they could have made a
better deal with the Thais.
This deal, to my mind, is not nearly as
advantageous to the Thais as the deal
was for the Filipinos who went into Viet-
nam under the previous administration,
because they went in with heavy bonuses,
plus the assurance that under no cir-
cumstances would they ever have to go
into combat. At least, this is a better deal
than the one that was made with the
Philippines.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is
damning with faint praise. Nobody I
know of justifies the Philippine deal as
other than a very crude shakedown.
Mr. SYMINGTON. It was a deal that
was made secretly. The reason I am giv-
ing consideration to a perfecting amend-
ment-in fact, I will offer one-is that
at least we would get this matter out in
Y
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the open, and we do get into the ques- bastion in Thailand where we have
tion of expenditures, which brings in superb fighter bases----six to be exact-
the very powerful Appropriations Coln- and, in addition, one of the finest
mittees in both Houses. I think that if we strategic bomber bases in the world,
support it, there will be a good chance of south of Bangkok; and might it not be
getting it through conference with the that the great interest we have built up
House. in Laos and Cambodia, at the same time
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator we emphasize we are going out of South
not think that supporting one army Vietnam as quickly as possible, is that
would be more efficient than supporting we have the SEATO agreement with
three? We have the Thai, the Royal Lao- Thailand, and might that not be one of
tion Army, and the Lab regulars. To the reasons why we are operating the
have three different armies in Laos, all way we are?
of them supported by the United States, Mr. FULBRIGHT. It well might be, al-
seems to me to be very improvident. Can though the SEATO agreement would not
we not operate the way mergers are ef- require that we do anything with Thai-
fected in the business field and merge land, but we can do what we like with
them into one army and have only one Thailand as long as Thailand is agree-
officer corps and thereby save a great able. It would not exclude that at all.
deal of money? Would that not be much Cambodia is completely dependent upon
wiser? us. We pay for everything. It is a pawn
Mr. SYMINGTON, It would be much in our hands, whereas Thailand retains
wiser, but it would be much more diffi- a government of its own and, except for
cult. I recall that 10 years ago, when I our vast expenditures there, they could
was going through Thailand to get to assert their. independence again. Cam-
Saigon, the Thais and the Cambodians bodia and Laos are, I think, in a much
were practically at war. These being weaker position.
I believe there would be If we are concerned about the Laotian
tribal countries
,
great difficulty in having officers that people, we could make a serious effort to
could serve with all three armies. bring about an agreement between Sou-
The Senator's point is well taken, how- vanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao-
ever, and I would hope that we could get they are led by half-brothers, as the
better organized out there with' these Senator knows, they are close ethnically,
mercenaries. as the Senator has said. But we have not
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think we ought to made much of an effort to do that. I
come home. I think that is the only think it would be far wiser to do that
answer. than to continue to escalate the war and
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would agree with spend half a billion dollars this year in
that, but I thought the Senator was talk- this poor little country. It is going to be
ing about troops from other countries. an ever more burden on this country,
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was, I said that is as the Senator has said. Much more so
what I would like to do.
Mr. President, I should like to close
by citing a short article published in the
Washington Post for September 1, 1971,
headlined, "China Says U.S. Eyes Laos
Move."
It reads:
China accused the United States today of
plans to send more Thai troops into Laos to
expand the war there.
An editorial in the Official Peking People's
Daily said the United States showed its in-
tention on Aug. 9 when it accused North Viet-
nam of a "massive" invasion of Laos.
"It is futile for the U.S. government to try
and cover up its own aggression with the
guise of an alleged 'Invasion' of Laos by the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam," said the
editorial. It charged that the United States
is planning to send "still more Thai accom-
plice troops to. Laos to expand the war of ag-
gression there."
Mr. President, that shows that the Chi-
nese have their eye on Laos and
Cambodia.
I repeat, Cambodia is much more sensi-
tive in the eyes of China than Laos. We
are taking grave risks in escalating the
war in Cambodia and Laos as we pull our
troops out--very gradually--out of
Vietnam.
Mr. SYMINGTON. May I ask a ques-
tion of the able chairman?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, indeed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Does it not run
through the Senator's mind that perhaps
the basic plan, especially as we talk so
much about getting out of Indochina, is
to "hole up," we might say, on the South-
east Asian mainland by establishing a
than in times gone by, given our present
financial situation. It seems incredible
that we are called upon to continue this
kind of expenditure in a little, moun-
tainous country 10,000 miles away from
us. It makes absolutely no sense from any
point of view to spend $490 million on
such a futile undertaking.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I certainly agree
with the Senator from Arkansas. One of
my constituents wrote me recently, ask-
ing why I spend so much time on Laos,
and I said the more time I spend on Laos
and all these other overseas expendi-
tures, and try to get them reduced, the
more money will be available to do the
things which are needed so desperately
back in Missouri.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. What we are doing
is keeping the Laotian people involved in
a war that is decimating them, making
refugees out of them, and ruining their
country for nothing that can possibly
benefit them:
Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. President, I send a perfecting
amendment to the desk and ask that it be
considered as an amendment to my pres-
ent pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be-stated.
The legislative clerk read the amend-
ment as follows:
On page 1, line 3, strike out "obligated or".
On page 1, line 4, strike out "$200,000,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$350,000,000".
On page 2, line 4, strike out "200,000,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$360,000,000".
On page 2, lines 4 and 6, strike out "ob-
ligation and".
On page 2, line 10, strike out "obligated
or".
On page 2, line 23, strike out "obligated
or".
On page 3, line 1, strike out "obligation
or".
On page 3, lines 2, 3, and 4, strike out "over
the so-called He Chi Minh trails in southern
Laos, and over areas immediately adjacent
of such trails," and insert in lieu thereof the
following: "in or over Laos".
On page 3, line 20, strike out the period
and insert in lieu thereof a comma and the
following: "except that in the case of the
first two quarters of the fiscal year beginning
July 1, 1971, a single report may he sub-
mitted for both such quarters and such re-
port may be computed on the basis of the
most accurate estimates the Secretary of De-
fense can make taking into consideration all
information available to him."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I:> there
objection to the present consideration of
the amendment to the amendment?
There being no objection, the itimend-
ment to the amendment was considered
and agreed to.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On the
Senator's time?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Yes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Tie clerk
will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without,
objection, it is so ordered.,
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as I
said earlier the purpose of my original
amendment was not to put an immediate
end to the war in Laos. As desirable as
that might be, it does not seem to be an
immediate military or political possi-
bility.
It is, however, possible for the Senate
by its action today to place itself in the
position to know what is going on ,n Laos,
to know how much is being spelit there
and thereby in future years to play a
more active role in the formulation of
policy which may lead the United States
out of the war in Laos and put an end
to the fighting which has destroyed so
much of that country and has decimated
such a large portion of its population.
Having in mind as my primary objec-
tive the assertion of congressional au-
thority over the conduct of the war in
Laos, I have discussed my amendment
with the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee and have
found him receptive to the idea of the
spending controls and reporting require-
ments set forth in my amendment.
Accordingly in the belief that the prin-
ciples embodied in these control: will in
the long run be more important the.n the
amount of money involved-although I
continue to believe that half a billion
dollars of U.S. expenditures in Laos is
far too much-I have sent to the desk
a perfecting amendment which would
increase the ceiling for U.S. expenditures
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in Laos to $350 million in fiscal year 1972.
At the same time it will exclude from the
operation of the ceiling the cost of all
U.S. air activities in and over Laos.
I am pleased that the distinguished
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee has indicated his willingness to
support the revised amendment which
provides as follows:
For the first time, a ceiling on U.S.
expenditures in behalf of the Lao Gov-
ernment-section (a).
Requires that, in the future, any money
requested for Laos must be identified and
explained-section (c).
Precludes use in Laos of money au-
thorized for other purposes-sections (c)
and (e).
Requires the executive branch to sub-
mit quarterly reports on expenditures in
Laos including description of purposes-
section (f).
Mr. DOMINICK, Mr. President, would
the Senator yield?
Mr. SYMINGTON. I am please to yield
to the Senator from Colorado.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, I
would like to ask the Senator from Mis-
souri to comment on a statement he just
made in which he said his amendment,
as modified, would preclude use in .Laos
of money authorized for other purposes.
It does not read that way in the original
amendment. I wondered what modifica-
tions the Senator had made in the
amendment.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, the
Senator is correct. The amendment as
modified would eliminate from the ceil-
ing restriction all air activity in and over
Laos. Therefore on the premise that the
amount of money being spent this year ?
outside of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the
air is $140 million, it would increase it
actually from $200 million in the original
amendment to $490 million.
Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, would
the Senator point out what changes he
has made on page 3 of the amendment to
accomplish that?
Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, I
would be very glad to do so. Has the Sen-
ator from Colorado got a copy of the
amendment?
At the top of page 3, we would elimi-
nate the words "obligation or" which is a
technical limitation that the entire staff
recommends. Then, it would read:
With respect to the expenditure of funds to
carry out combat air operations in and over
Laos by U.S. military force.
Mr. DOMINICK, I thank the Senator.
That clarifies that point. The only prob-
lem I still have is that I find it difficult
to reconcile this with the fact that a
great number of us were critical when
the previous administration was direct-
ing tactical operations when we were
already in hostilities. I find it difficult to
determine why 535 Members of the Con-
gress should try to do it.
It is my understanding that the
amendment, as modified, contains the
amount of money for Laos that has been
requested.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator is cor-
rect. I emphasize that, because we are
compromising on a reduction of the
money in order to get the controls that
the dignity of the Senate requires.
I am confident that the able Senator
from Colorado, with whom I have the
honor to serve on the Armed Services
Committee, -does not like to authorize
money when he does not know, as I have
not known in the past, how that money
is to be used.
Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator
for his comments. I have some difficulty
in interpreting the last statement because
I know that the distinguished Senator
from Missouri-as well as I-has been
briefed on this matter on a great number
of occasions, including times by the pre-
vious Ambassador when we were in Vien-
tiane on a number of occasions. However,
despite that fact, it seems to me the prob-
lem?is whether we should try to exercise
congressional control over the present ac-
tivities or over some future activities.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say to the .
distinguished Senator that sections (e)
and (f) justify the amendment. All of
the sections of the amendment, I think,
with the modifications, would give us
better control.
Mr. DOMINICK. I thank the Senator
from Missouri.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, while
I continue to believe that it would have
been highly desirable to more severely
limit the amount of money to be spent
in this fiscal year, I believe that the
amendment in its revised form con-
stitutes a significant assertion of our
rights and our responsibilities here in the
Senate.
I am very pleased, but not surprised, to
be joined in urgent adoption -of the
amendment as perfected by the able
chairman of the Armed Services Commit-
tee. His role in overseeing the activities
of the Department of Defense is one
which should have earned him the ad-
miration, if not the sympathy, of all the
Members of this body.
His support is appreciated and in turn
I will appreciate the support of all Mem-
bers of this revised amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose
time?
Mr. STENNIS. On my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. STE, NNIS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without,
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, this en-
tire subject matter pertaining to mili-
tary aid and economic aid in Laos is a
very involved and rather complicated
matter, and the money has grown to
rather large amounts. Before this
amendment is voted on I hope there is
some way yet to get this information
before the membership of the Senate. I
had been thinking I might ask for a
closed session, primarily to get the mem-
bership into the Chamber, so we could
talk about the high points, but I do not
think it is necessary to have a closed
session this afternoon.
The amendment has been offered by
the Senator from Missou, i, who, I am
glad to say, has done a great deal on this
subject. I am pleased that he has, It is
hard, difficult work, and he stayed with
it. He has made more than one trip, to
Laos and to other places in the area
and he is entitled to credit on this sub-
ject matter.
Mr. President, we have had requests
this year for items that go to make up
these military programs, and also for
economic aid in Laos. In a few minutes I
will go into the figures. The original
amendment of the Senator from Mis-
souri limited these programs to $200 mil-
lion, excluding the cost oi. bombing on
the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Tice proposal in
his modified amendment riot only leaves
out the cost of that,part of the bombing,
but also the costs for bomt-ing and other
air activities, in and over ail of Laos. The
air activities is not all bombing. Some of
it is strafing and some of it is close air
support. The cost of all that is excluded
now.
For economic aid, we have the Agency
for International Development-the AID
program. That is listed here at $50.5
million.
All of those program,,.; outside the
bombing and the other air activities add
up to $350 million. So th~ Senator has
modified that provision which we lim-
ited to the total expenditures. This per-
tains to expenditures for fiscal year 1972.
I could not have support rd the amend-
ment at $200 million under any circum-
stances. One reason was that almost that
much already has been spent or will be
spent under continuing resolutions.
By the time the appropriation bill
leaves the President's desk almost one-
half of the programed amount will have
been spent under the continuing resolu-
tion. In conversation with the Senator
from Missouri I brought up the question
of these requested amounts, the question
with reference to the ccmmittee's re-
sponsibility, and also the question of hav-
ing these matters identified. I told the
Senator if he saw fit to modify his
amendment, putting it at $350 million for
the fiscal year 1972, that I could support
it and that I would.
I do wholeheartedly support the mod-
ified amendment. I do think we have a
control problem here. I think the Presi-
dent has a problem. I think this is the
best way for us to get o=1, and I hope
there will be a good strong vote here. I
hope the Senate will pass this amend-
ment which relates to ex)>enditures and
values of equipment that nay be sent in
or supplies that we have already used. It
provides a total amount of $350 million.
At the same time it gives legislative rec-
ognition to the fact that these funds are
needed and it gives us a start toward a.
consideration of this matter for next
year.
We do have the unusual matters that
come up. The Senator froia Missouri and
I, should there be an unusual develop-
ment or added need before this bill leaves
Congress, agree that it -2ould be con-
sidered. That added figure could be con-
sidered in conference although I do not
expect -anything like that. to happen. It
is covered, anyway.
I think this has been a misunderstood
matter. Incidentally, we have the money
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totals that related to this amendment in Laos is part of the Indochina war. No one ports on funds expended. The question
the present form. Some of the informa- would be approving the $350 million- is would obligations and transfer, of the
tion is classified. I cannot read it all. We the Senator from Missouri would not be nature described in section (b) of the
had these figures this year in our files. offering it-he would not be approving it, amendment also have to be reflected in
We have made headway within the last I would not be, none of us would be, if the quarterly reports.
3 years in getting more and more accu- this were not connected with the war in The answer is yes, we believe they
rate information with respect to the ex- South Vietnam. I think it is a very im- would. In this sense, section (f) must be
penditures. It is a very difficult matter portant part of it. read in conjunction with section (b).
to keep up with these war expenditures. I do not think that this provision will I might add with regard to another
We have requested it and the utmost ef- cripple anyone-the President, the ad- question which has been raised, that a1-
fort is being made to get these matters ministration, or the military. I think though the revised amendment which
before Congress. there is a better pattern of responsibil- excludes combat air operations from the
The total is about 20 percent above the ity being exercised by us, a better pat- provision of Section (c) which requires
amount for these items for fiscal year tern of accountability for the executive specific authorization, reques+s for
1971, the fiscal year that closed June 30. branch and the military. We have this funds for air operations in Laos must
The modified amendment carries a fig- example, and a road may be before us still be so identified pursuant to section
ure that is 20 percent above the figure that will serve as a basis by which these (e) and expenditures for air com.be.t op-
for last year. It excludes bombing and matters will be handled. erations must still be reported under
air activity over the Ho Chi Minh Trail There has been no contention about section (f).
and over any part of Laos from any litre- some of these, measures being ill-con- Mr. President, I should like to bring
itation. The original amendment except- ceived. Some persons do not approve of up one other point again to submit to
ed only that part relating to the Ho Chi them, but no one says they are not the Senate: Inasmuch as the Secretary
Minh Trail. relevant. No one asserts that they are of Defense testified before the Foreign
The modified amendment places a lim- not valid. Some persons think they are Relations Committee, in open session,
itation on expenditures of $350 million . too much, or some persons, as a matter that the Defense Department was con-
for fiscal year 1972 on all the various pro- of principle, perhaps will not want to ducting no military operations in Laos,
grams being carried on in Laos. vote for anything in that field. that means that this operation is being
That word expenditure is there, and it I commend the Senator from Missouri conducted through the ambassador, by
is interpreted to include also the values of for being willing to meet.the situation. the Central Intelligence Agency, or, if it
equipment and supplies that have already He is willing to vote for money that will would be preferred, directly by the Presi-
been used. We have a provision in the meet this problem, and he is willing to dent, because the Central Intelligence
regulations that this material cannot be espouse modifications in his own name. Agency reports to the National Security
valued at a very small amount, but have I commend him for it. Council, which is an advisory body to
to be valued at least one-third of initial The Senator said time had made his the President. Under those circum-
cost. proposed ceiling somewhat out of date, stances, it seems to me that wars more
Limitations are placed on expenditures but even with a moderate increase I properly should be handled by the De-
for these programs as compared with the would have been compelled to ask Sen- fense Department than by an agency
original amendment, which placed the ators to oppose it. As I see it 11ow, I am such as the Central Intelligence Agency.
limitations on both the obligations and satisfied that this is the best approach, Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and
expenditures. and I think it is the best solution. I know nays on the amendment.
Since almost half of the fiscal year it is no crippling device on the President. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas
1972 will have elapsed by the time this I cannot see where it possibly would be. and nays have already been-
bill becomes law and appropriations are I believe it will be helpful to us in years Mr. SYMINGTON. I am advised that
actually made, language has been added to come, and I think we will look back the yeas and nays were ordered last week.
which would require interim estimates on this with considerable satisfaction. The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
being made, We have found a way to work it out correct.
All this means that if this amendment, along this line. Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr, President. I am
in its modified form, is adopted, it will Mr. President, how much time do prepared to yield back the remainder of
provide, in substance, for the same have remaining? my time.
money, in terms of program, that has The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- Mr. STENNIS. I want to use 2 minutes.
been requested by the administration. ator has 123 minutes remaining. Mr. President, I would like to make
Another point is as follows: This Mr. STENNIS. I do not think we will some other remarks about this money,
amendment does not add any power to use that time, but I would like to reserve but it involves classified material. I do
our legislative control of these matters. that time for any Senator who may want not think it is necessary to ma::e those
We have had the power and legislative to speak. remarks at this time. Therefore, I will
control. It does outline a method of op- Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
oration that goes deeper into these mat- suggest the absence of a quorum. forego doing so.
But for reasons I have already given,
sat-
ters and it sets a pattern for the commit- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk Mr. President, I think that this is a sat-
will call the roll.
tee Frankly, ~Mr. President, as chairman of The legislative clerk proceeded to call isfactory disposition of the amt ndment
the roll. as it is now modified with the budget
the committee, I welcome a chance here Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, amounts and I hope that it will get a
to have such a pattern, a program, a ask unanimous consent that the order good solid vote of the membership. I be-
method that can more clearly and more e for the quorum call be rescinded. lieve that it will. be a frames *ork for
definitely go into these matters. fuller understanding and consideration
These funds, at the beginning, were The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without in the future, not only of the Armed
emergency funds to meet specific situa- objection, it is so ordered. Services Committee on this, bill, but in
tions, but this has now been going on a Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I the Appropriations Committee on other
good while. I do not know whether this is am ready to yield back the remainder of bills as well.
classified, or what has come out, but my time, but before doing so, I would So, unless someone else wishes time
this has gone on for many years, without like to make a couple of observations, to speak, I yield back the remainder of
anyone being at fault. Nothing wrong Mr. President, I have been asked, with my time.
has been done. No law has been violated, regard to section (b) of the amendment, The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time
But I think this amendment is a satis- whether it is the intent of the sponsor to has now been yielded back.
factory way, since all these matters have include within the ceiling the fair . The question is on agreeing to the
been brought out, of settling it. It will be market value of any equipment or sup- amendment, as amended, of the Senator
fair to the administration and to the plies sold for use in Laos. That is correct. from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) .
legislative branch of the Government,- Section (b) refers to transfer by gift, On this question the yeas and nays
and will not put any impediments that donation, loan, lease, or otherwise. have been ordered, and the clerk will
I can see in the path of those represent- Otherwise would certainly include sales, call the roll.
ing us in the war in Vietnam. I have also been asked a question re- The assistant legislative clerk called.
There is no doubt that the fighting In garding section (f) which requires re- the roll. -
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 a..adO4
Approved
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I move to lay that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
my understanding that there may be a
few voice votes this afternoon, but there
will be no more rollcall votes this after-
Mr. MANSFIELD. I announce that the
Senator from West Virginia (Mr. BYRD),
the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON),
the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH),
the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. EAST-
LAND), the Senator from Alaska (Mr.
GRAVEL), the Senator from Oklahoma
(Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Indiana
(Mr., I-IARTKE) , the Senator from Wash-
ington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from
Louisiana (Mr. LONG), the Senator from
New Hampshire (Mr. MC'INTYRE), the
Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIRI-
COFF), and the Senator from Alabama
(Mr. SPARKMAN), are necessarily absent.
I further announce that the Senator
from Wyoming (Mr. MCGEE), and the
Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MON-
TOYA), are absent on official business.
I further announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Wash-
ington (Mr. JACKSON), the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF), and the
Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS),,
would each vote "yea".
Mr. SCOTT. I announce that the Sena-
tor from Oklahoma. (Mr. BELLMON), the
Senator from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), the
Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN),
the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS),
the Senator from Maryland (Mr.
MATHIAS), the Senator from Illinois (Mr.
PERCY) and the Senator from Texas (Mr.
TOWER) are necessarily absent.
. The Senator from South Dakota (Mr.
MUNDT) is absent because of illness.
If present and voting, the Senator
from Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), the Senator
from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS), the Sena-
tor from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) and the
Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) would
each vote "yea".
The result was announced-yeas
nays 11, as follows:
[No. 249 Leg.]
YEAS-67
Aiken
Gambrell
Pastore
Allen
Goldwater
Pearson
Allott
Gurney
Pell
Anderson
Hansen
Proxmire
Baker
Hart
Randolph
Bayh
Hollings
Roth
Beall
Hruska
Saxbe
Bennett
Hughes
Schweiker
Bentsen
Humphrey
Scott
Bible
Inouye
Spong
Boggs
Jordan, N.C.
Stafford
Burdick
Jordan, Idaho
Stennis
Byrd, Va.
Kennedy
Stevens
Case
Magnuson
Stevenson
Chiles
McClellan
Symington
Cotton
McGovern
Talmadge
Cranston
Metcalf
Thurmond
Curtis
Miller
Tunney
Dole
Mondale
Weicker
Eagleton
Moss
Williams
Ellender
Muskie
Young
Ervin
Nelson
Fong
Packwood
NAYS-11
Brock
Cooper
. Mansfield
Brooke
Dominick
Smith
Buckley
Fulbright
Taft
Cook
Hatfield
NOT VOTING--22
Bellmon
Harris
Montoya
Byrd, W. Va.
Hartke
Mundt
Cannon
Jackson
Percy
Church
Javits
Ribicoff
Eastland
Long
Sparkman
Fannin
Mathias
Tower
Gravel
McGee
Grfilin
McIntyre
67,
. So Mr. SYMINGTON'S amendment, as
amended, was agreed to.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move
PROGRAM
The schedule for tomorrow is as fol-
lows :
The Senate will convene at 9 a.m. Fol-
lowing the recognition of the joint lead-
ership and the expiration of any 15-min-
ute orders for speeches which may be
entered in the meantime, the Senate will
then consider amendment No. 433 by
Mr. Gravel, with a limitation of 2 hours
thereon; and a rolleall vote is expected.
Upon disposing of the Gravel amend-
ment, the Senate will consider the Buck-
ley amendments Nos. 447, 448, and 449,
with regard to each of which there is a
limitation of 1 hour; and there may be
rolldall votes thereon.
Following the disposition of Senator
Buckley's amendments, and he may or
may not decide to call up all of the three
amendments, the Senate will proceed to
consider any amendments to the military
procurement bill which may be called
up.
No amendment has been clocked into
the schedule for Tuesday afternoon but
it is hoped that Senators who have
amendments will call them up.
I note from the schedule that there
is no time for the conduct of morning
business. I ask the Chair if an order has
been entered to that effect.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There has
been.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Presid-
ing Officer.
It is my understanding that the dis-
tinguished Senator from Illinois (Mr.
PERCY) is the only Senator who has
asked and been granted a special order
for not to exceed 15 minutes tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is correct.
ORDER FOR STAR PRINT OF
AMENDMENT NO. 419
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr.. President, at
the request of the Senator from New
Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment of the Sen-
ator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA),
amendment No. 419, be reprinted as a
star print with some minor changes that
reflect the fact that the October 3 presi-
dential elections in South Vietnam have
been completed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ENROLLED BILL PRESENTED
The Secretary of the Senate reported
that on today, October 4, 1971, he pre-
sented to the President of the United
States the enrolled bill (S. 2613) to ex-
tend for 1 month the Federal Water
Pollution Act, as amended.
MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHOR-
IZATIONS, 1972
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill (H.R 8687) to au-
thorize appropriations during the fiscal
year 1972 for procurement of aircraft,
missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat
vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons,
and research, development, test, and
evaluation for the Armed , orces, and to
prescribe the authorized personnel
strength of the Selected Reserve of each
Reserve component of the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
send to the desk an amendment and ask
that it be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The amendment was read as follows:
On page 8, line 8, strike oui the period and
insert in lieu thereof a colon and the follow-
leg:
"Provided, That $14,500,000 of funds
available to the Air Force for aircraft pro-
ourement shall be available for the procure-
ment of 30 armed' STOL aircraft."
ARMED STOL AIRCRAFT
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, this
amendment would provide authority for
procurement of 30 armed STOL aircraft
for operational testing by the Air Force.
The amendment does not add any money
for this purchase because prior year
money is available for thi;; purpose.
This program was submitted by the
President on July 30, 1971 as an amend-
ment to the fiscal year 1972 budget. The
committee considered the program but
declined to include it in the bill to permit
further evaluation of the program, The
Air Force has now determined that there
are 1971 funds that can be repro gramed
to finance the program.
Mr. President, this is a new program,
and my amendment is submitted to pro-
tect the integrity of the authorization
proce's's. This amendment has the support
of the chairman of the armed Services
Committee and I am informed that the
reprograming subcommittee has heard
testimony and I believe the subcommittee
will recommend approval of use of the
1971 funds.
Let me briefly describe the armed short
take-off and landing aircraft concept.
What the Air Force want:; to do is to buy
cheap, off-the-shelf aircraft and test
these aircraft to see if they can be used
in a limited interdiction role in South
Vietnam.
It would be my hope that eventually
this would be a breakthrough for a
cheaper approach for a tactical airplane
for our forces.
I want to emphasize that the 30 air-
craft I am speaking of are for operational
tests. Whether the program goes any fur-
ther will depend on the tests. The aircraft
are not for Cambodia, Laos, or Thai-
land-they are for testing in South Viet-
nam.
Mr. President, one of my concerns is
that time is of the essence. The Air Force
wants to test this concept during the next
dry season. In order to meet their sched-
ule, the go-ahead must be given now. It's
not often we see a relatively inexpensive
approach such as Air Force is proposing.
I urge acceptance of this amendment.
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