THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300060002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 27, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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92d Congress
1st Session
THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM
REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION
MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois, Chairman
ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut
PURSUANT TO
H. Res. 109
AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVES-
TIGATIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., May 27, 1971.
This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
by a special study mission conducted between April 3 and 23, 1971.
The findings in this report are those of the special study mission and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full
Committee on Foreign Affairs.
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman.
(III)
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMI7 rE1 ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., May 27, 1971.
Hon. TIIOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, TVVashington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN : There is transmitted herewith a report of a
special study mission conducted between April 3 and April 23, 1971, by
the undersigned, both members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
We were accompanied by Dr. John J. Brady, Jr., staff consultant,
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Mr. Fred Flott, Department of State,
acted as escort officer.
The purpose of the study mission was to gather information per-
taining to the illegal international traffic in heroin.
During the course of the trip, which took us around the world, we
met with United States diplomatic and military officials, parliamen-
tarians, foreign law enforcement officials responsible for narcotics
control and other foreign governmental leaders responsible for nar-
cotics matters in Switzerland, France, Italy, Turkey, Iran, Thailand,
South Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Japan. Prior to our departure we
met with officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and
Treasury, concerning various aspects of this problem.
We would like to express our thanks and appreciation for the assist-
ance, cooperation and hospitality extended to the members of the study
mission by Departments of State and Defense personnel in the coun-
tries visited.
In particular, we would like to thank the agents of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Department of Justice, with
whom we met in the several countries. It was largely through their
efforts that we were able to learn as much as we did concerning the
illegal production of, and traffic in, heroin around the world.
It is hoped that the information contained in this report will be help-
ful to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Congress
in their deliberations on the legislation pending on this subject.
MORGAN F. MrTRrnY, Chairman,
ROBERT H. STEELE,
Special Study Mission on
the World Heroin Problem.
(v)
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CONTENTS
Foreword Page
--- ---------- -- - -- -- ------- -------------------- at
Letter of transmittal----------------?---------------------- v
Introduction ------- - -- -- - - -- -- ------- ---------- 1
The heroin problem in the United States______________________________ 3
Heroin addiction in the United States_____________________________ 3
Consumption of heroin in the United States________________________ 4
Heroin addiction and crime in the United States_________________ 4
The source of illicit heroin___ 4
Illustration showing major illicit opium sources and flow through-
out the world ----------------------------------------- Facing p. 6
Profits from the production, procssing and sale of illegal opium----- 5
The situation in France and Italy____________________________________ 7
France ---- ---- ---- - - -- - ---- --- - ----- - --- 7
Heroin production in France__________________________________ 7
The Marseilles heroin operation_____________________________ - 7
French mechanism for control____________________ __________ 8
Difficulties in controlling illegal heroin production in France____ 9
Italy -------------------------------------- 10
Italian efforts to control the illegal traffic in narcotics ---------- 10
Italian cooperation with the United States_____________________ 11
The role of Turkey--------------------------------------------------- 12
Background ___________________ 12
Attempts to control opium production______________________________ 12
Economic factors involved in Turkish poppy growing---------------- 14
What Turkey has not done_______________________________________ 14
United States-Turkish cooperation________________________________ 16
The problem in Southeast Asia____________________________________ 18
Heroin addiction in the military services in South Vietnam______ 18
U.S. deaths from heroin abuse________________________________ 18
Ready availability of heroin in South Vietnam_________________ 19
Heroin production in Southeast Asia__________________________ 19
Major flow of illegal traffic___________________________________ 20
Smuggling into South Vietnam________________________________ 21
The problem of corruption____________________________________ 22
What the governments of Southeast Asia are doing :
South Vietnam------------------------------------------- 23
Thailand ------------------------------------------------ 24
Burma -------------------------------------------------- 25
Laos ---------------------------------------------------- 25
What the United States is doing to attack the heroin problem in
Southeast Asia--------------------------------------------- 26
Iran and Japan-------------------------------------------------- 30
International cooperation to control illegal heroin traffic _____________ 32
International Criminal Police Organization____________________ 34
Other international organizations_____________________________ 35
Conclusions ------------------------------------------ ----- 36
Recommendations ----------------------------------------------- 37
Journal (schedule of meetings, interviews, and discussions) --------- 40
Appendix: Note of presentation (transmittal sheet to Lao National
Assembly) concerning the draft law on the prohibition of the grow-
ing of the poppy, of the manufacture, consumption, sale, purchase,
and possession of opium--------------------------------------- 45
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THE WORLD HEROIN PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
Drug abuse around the world is increasing. Of particular concern is
the alarming rise in the use of opium-based drugs, particularly heroin,
in the United States, and the rapid increase in heroin addiction within
the United States military forces in South Vietnam, where the best
estimates are that as many as 10 to 15 percent of our servicemen are
addicted to heroin in one form or another.
To combat this growing menace around the world and at home the
United States must use every resource available. It must work through
international organizations; it must exert pressure on its friends and
allies to convince them of the need to take strong action either to con-
trol or eliminate the growing of opium poppies or to increase their
efforts to stop the illegal traffic in narcotics. Our Nation must provide
the leadership to make international cooperation to control the illegal
traffic in narcotics and other dangerous drugs more effective.
The battle to stem the alarming increase in heroin addiction will not
be easy, nor will victory come quickly. But the war against heroin must
be sharply accelerated-now. Given the increasing use of heroin among
our youth, immediate action is crucial. Unfortunately, time is not on
our side, and as this report is being written more young Americans are
becoming addicted to heroin.
Equally distressing is the fact that the United States alone cannot
bring an end to the waste and devastation that drug abuse, particularly
the use of opium and its derivatives, is causing among the youth of
the Nation. We must have the cooperation of the entire world.
For example, only a small percentage of the illegal heroin that
reaches the United States is confiscated by the authorities. There are
simply too many ways of hiding heroin, from small containers secreted
in various body orifices to hollow ski poles and food containers. There
are literally thousands of places to hide illegal heroin on board ships
entering U.S. ports. International air travel has complicated the
problem even further for it enables the courier or trafficker to
move quickly from continent to continent, arranging pickups and
payoffs personally, in addition to providing places to secrete illegal
shipments.
Once the poppy pod is cut and the opium gum extracted and sold on
the illegal market, the battle to prevent the end product, heroin, from
reaching the addict is lost. The problem must be attacked at the
source-in the poppy fields of the Near and Far East, principally in
Turkey, Thailand, Burma, and Laos.
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We must be willing to devote more resources, human and material,
to fight the illegal international traffic in heroin, including the exercise
of economic and political pressures where necessary. If that means the
imposition of economic sanctions or the exercise of political initiatives,
we must be willing to follow that course of action. We are fighting to
save generations of young Americans from the scourge of heroin. As in
any war, we must bring all of the weapons available to the point of
decision.
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THE HEROIN PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES
The problem of heroin addiction in the United States
The National Institute of Mental Health estimates that there are
250,000 heroin addicts in the United States. One-half of these are
located in the New York City area.
In 1970, 1,154 persons died as a result of drug addiction in the Na-
tion's largest city. One half of these deaths occurred among young
people 23 years of age, or less.
In a 1970 survey in the District of Columbia, heroin addiction was
estimated at 10,400 persons. In 1971, this estimate had risen to 16,880,
an increase of more than 60 percent.
There are approximately 9,000 heroin addicts in Chicago, according
to the Narcotics Squad of that city.
Heroin addiction among U.S. military forces has reached alarming
proportions. Reliable authorities estimate that as many as 10 to 15 per-
cent of the troops in Vietnam are using heroin in one form or another.
Some smoke it, some sniff or "snort," and approximately 5 to 10 per-
cent inject.
Five years ago the heroin problem was restricted to the ghetto areas
of our major cities. Now it is spreading to the suburbs and is found
among the children of the wealthy and well-to-do as well as among the
poor.
The heroin problem is also affecting U.S. industry. The Wall Street
Journal, quoting from a study conducted by the New York Chamber
of Commerce, reported last summer that "drug abuse in business-a
problem which was rare, indeed, two years ago has overnight become-
in qualitative terms-almost as serious as that of alcoholism."
"The increase in drug abuse on company premises stems partly from
the spread of illegal drugs through high schools and college campuses
and U.S. troops in Vietnam," the report concluded.
And the number of addicts is increasing rapidly. In a statement
to the United Nations Commission on Narcotics at Geneva in Sep-
tember 1970, John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) said that "the list of addicts is grow-
ing by several thousand each year and, in 1969, the number of new
addicts doubled from the preceding year. Every time one addict is
cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of
heroin available. Among the other debilitating consequences of the
addiction problem is that in New York City alone, persons are dying
of drug related causes at the rate of three per day."
Even these statistics, alarming as they are, may not tell the whole
story. Unfortunately, the extent of the addiction problem is difficult
to measure. There is no central agency in the United States which col-
lects all of the intelligence on the number of drug users and the figures
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provided by BNDD are minimal estimates since they are based only
on reporting from law enforcement agencies.
The statistics that are available, therefore, are only educated guesses
and the number of addicts may be greatly in excess of the estimated
250,000.
Consumption of heroin in the United States
Based on the estimates that there are at least 250,000 heroin addicts
in the United States, it would take between 4 and 5 tons of heroin to
support the addict population.
Estimates of the cost of the heroin that the average addict requires
daily varies, however, from $30 to $100 per day.
Heroin addiction and crime in the United States
The habit of the narcotics addict is not only a danger to himself,
but to society as a whole. Narcotics have been cited as a primary cause
of the enormous increase in crimes committed over the past few years.
Whatever the price, the cost in property stolen by the addict to
support the habit is tremendous.
The estimated amount of money spent by heroin addicts in the
United States is $7.5 million per day. This figure is based on the fact
that there are 250,000 addicts, with an average habit (minimum) of
$30 daily. For this year, the estimated figure would be approximately
$2,737,500, &0 To support the habit, reliable authorities estimate that the addict
would have to steal goods worth at least 4 or 5 times the cost of his
habit per year.
If 75 percent of those addicted resorted to crime, using the above
figures, then, the cost. in crime committed to sustain the habit would
be in excess of $8 billion per year at a minimum.
The source of illicit heroin
Most world poppy cultivation takes place within a zone extending
from the Plains of Anatolia in Turkey to Yunnan Province :in China.
The international illegal traffic in opium has two major production
areas. The first area of importance for the United States is in the
Near East where opium produced in Turkey for legitimate medical
requirements is diverted to illegal channels. The opium is smuggled
to Syria and Lebanon where it is processed into morphine base. (A
certain amount of morphine base and heroin is also produced in Tur-
key.) The morphine base is then smuggled to the Marseilles area of
France where it is refined into heroin in clandestine laboratories. The
bulk of the heroin entering the United States is grown in Turkey and
processed in Marseilles.
The second important area is in the Far East, particularly in Laos,
Burma, and Thailand, and to a lesser degree, Yunnan Province in
China.
At least 1,000 tons of raw opium are produced in the Shan states
of Burma, the border area of Yunnan Province in China, northern
Thailand, and northwestern Laos. This production is illicit and is
grown in areas where there is little or no governmental control by
either Burma, Laos, or Thailand.
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The central collecting point for the majority of this opium is at
a point where the borders of Thailand, Laos, and Burma meet. A
large proportion of the opium is designated for Southeast Asian opium
addicts. The remainder is either exported outside of Southeast Asia
or is refined into morphine base, the basic ingredient of heroin, or
heroin itself in laboratories located in the Burmese-Laotian-Thailand
border area, in Vientiane, Laos, in Bangkok, Thailand, and at other
points along the Mekong. The heroin labs manufacture both No. 3
purple smoking heroin, which is used by Asian addicts, and No. 4
white heroin, which is produced primarily for the U.S. market and
for U.S. troops in South Vietnam.
The main flow of No. 4 heroin to U.S. troops in South Vietnam
is through Laos and Thailand. In addition, large quantities of opium
and morphine base are smuggled into Hong Kong, where it is both
consumed locally and refined into No. 4 heroin for the U.S. market.'
U.S. narcotics experts regard Hong Kong of increasing importance
as a source of the heroin being smuggled to the United States from the
Far East. Current estimates are that at least 10 percent of the heroin
entering the United States comes from the Far East and that the per-
centage is growing. There is also evidence that some of the No. 4 heroin
appearing in Saigon also has its source. in Hong Kong.
A Chinese traveler from Hong Kong was arrested at Ton Son Nhut
in April carrying 3.5 kilos of heroin. This could be the beginning of
a trend. When the heroin dealers in Hong Kong realize that a lucra-
tive market exists among the Americans in South Vietnam, they will
undoubtedly attempt to get into the market.
There has recently been an increase in the amount of No. 4
heroin smuggled directly from Thailand to the United- States.
Narcotics experts attribute the increase primarily to the expanding
activity of a number of ex-servicemen and U.S. nationals who have
served in Southeast Asia and have. set up smuggling operations in
Thailand.
A certain amount of heroin is also produced from opium poppies
grown in Mexico. It is estimated that Mexico accounts for about 15 per
cent of the heroin which is smuggled into the United States. There is
no evidence available to suggest, that the Chinese Communists are ac-
tively engaged in the illegal international traffic in opium or its
derivatives.
The major sources and flow of illicit opium is shown in figure 1.
Profits from the production, processing, and sale of illegal opium
One of the fundamental facts mitigating against solution of the
heroin problem hi both the United States and abroad is the tremen-
dous profit involved. From the prices paid to the poppy grower to the
1 Opium and morphine base are smuggled into Hong Kong primarily in Thai fishing
boats. It is processed into heroin in four or five clandestine laboratories. The authorities
in Hong Kong have a difficult time intercepting shipments from Thailand. The Thai fishing
boats dump the opium into Chinese Communist waters where it is picked up by one of the
11,000 junks that ply the waters around Hong Kong. The job of policing and seizing is
almost impossible. As in the case of Turkey, once the poppy is cut and the opium intro-
duced into illegal channels, the battle to prevent the end product from falling into the
hands of the addict is lost.
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retail price for pure heroin sold in New York, there is a $219,975
dollar mark-up as shown in the following table :
DEVELOPMENT OF RETAIL PRICE OF HEROIN IN THE UNITED STATES, 1969
U.S. dollars per
kilogram
U.S. dollars per
kilogram of raw
opium equivalent
Price to farmer for opium (in Turkey)_____________________________________
W
$25
------------------
holesale price for heroin r (Marseilles)___________________________________
5,000
$500
Border price for heroin (New York) ---------------------------------------
10,000
1
000
Wholesale price for heroin (New York) -------------------- ..----------------
22,000
,
2
200
Retail price for heroin (New York) -----------------------------------------
220,000
,
22,000
1 When raw opium Is converted to morphine and heroin the volume is reduced by a ratio of 10 to 1.
Because of the tremendous profits that are realized as a result of
the illegal traffic in narcotics, there is always the possibility that
governmental authorities and police at all levels "can be bought."
Above all, some way must be found to take the profit out of heroin
smuggling.
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THE SITUATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY
Heroin production in France
Heroin is produced in illegal laboratories primarily in the Mar-
~- eilles area although some may also be produced in Paris and Le
Havre. The principal area is Marseilles because of the port facilities
and the large criminal element located there. Marseilles is also closer
to the source of supply, Turkey, than either Paris or Le Harve,
although there is evidence that increasing amounts of morphine base
are being smuggled into West Germany by Turkish nationals em-
ployed in that country. If this trend continues, other areas of Europe
could be used to produce heroin. This will be particularly true if cur-
rent efforts to close down the illicit laboratories in Marseilles prove
successful.
It has been estimated that 80 percent of the heroin entering the
United States originates in Turkish poppy fields and is processed
in France. French authorities question this estimate. From the dis-
cussion which the study group has had with authorities in France,
Turkey and the United States, this estimate is undoubtedly high. It
is fair to say, however, that the bulk of the heroin entering the United
States does originate in Turkish poppy fields and is processed in
France. According to the experts, French heroin is among the best
grade made due to the expertise of the French chemists who process
the morphine into heroin. By the time it reaches the addict in the
United States, it has been reduced to 4 to 6 percent purity.
The Marseilles heroin operation
Most of the illegal heroin producing laboratories are located on the
southern coast of France, between Nice and Marseilles, and possibly in
~+~' Corsica.
These laboratories are not large and a number are believed to be
obile. They do not operate continuously as it does not take long to
cess a shipment of morphine base into heroin. According to the best
Ites, there are probably only 5 to 10 laboratories operating at
,ne time.
fhe poppy is grown in Turkey and the opium smuggled to Mar-
seilles by sea, air, and overland. Once it arrives in Marseilles it is
picked up by the purchaser and turned over to a chemist for
processing.
The chemist usually operates his own laboratory, frequently on a
free-lance basis. There is no one central organization commanding the
entire operation although cooperation among groups is not unusual. If
a shipment to one group is seized by the police, another group will help
by loaning it some morphine base to tide the losing group over until
it can arrange for another shipment from Turkey.
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It is estimated that there are five, and possibly ten, groups operating
at any one time with up to 100 individuals employed. Each group
appears to have its own courier and trafficking and purchasing opera-
tions. Over the past 10 years every narcotics case in Marseilles has
involved one or more of four Corsican families : the Venturi brothers
(Jean and Dominic), Marcel Francisci, Antoine Guerini and Joseph
Orsini. (Orsini himself served a prison term in the United States and
was deported in 1958.) There are offshoots of these four families and
ad hoc groups may appear from time to time, but these four families
are the heart of illegal heroin production in Marseilles. The problem
is that in France, as well as in the United States, the police must have'
evidence, upon which to base a case. The police cannot put the finger
on the families or people involved. French authorities are hampered
by the secret Swiss bank accounts as much as are U.S. authorities.
French mechanism for control
Though France does not suffer to the same extent from heroin
abuse as the United States, there is a problem developing in that coun-
try. This has been a major factor in prompting French authorities to
increase their efforts to combat the availability of heroin in France.
An indispensable element in this endeavor has been a growing willing-
ness to cooperate with the United States in its efforts to fight heroin
abuse.
A French-American agreement setting up close cooperation between
the agencies specializing in the fight against the illegal traffic in drugs
in France and the United States was signed on February 26, 1971, by
Raymond Marcellin, French Minister of the Interior, and U.S. Attor-
ney General John M. Mitchell. Under the terms of the agreement both
governments have agreed to exchange narcotics agents in order to fa-
cilitate cooperation. Very considerable credit belongs to Mr. Marcellin
for assigning high priority to the anti-heroin effort.
The fight against, drug abuse in France is centralized in the Office
of the Chief of National Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Bureau.
There are three groups which deal with narcotics matters : the Cen-
tral Office, the Marseilles Service, and the Narcotics Service in Paris.
In 1969 there were 40 agents assigned to narcotics duties; today
there are 120 with the probability that this number will be increased
shortly.
In addition, between 6,000 and 7,000 police and gendarmerie and
others have been given training in narcotics control practices.
It was pointed out that under the centralized French system, num-
bers were not as important as emphasis.
If any information becomes available to any French authority, it
will be transmitted to the Central Office, although at the present time
French authorities are working largely from information provided
by the United States.
The French authorities believe that the effort against drug traffick-
ers must be secret. In their opinion the nature of the problem is such
that the less known about police methods and tactics, the better the
chances are for successful results. As a result, police throughout the
country sometimes work on narcotics cases without being completely
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aware of all the facts surrounding the case. This approach also serves
to prevent police corruption.
French police do very little undercover work. Under French law
even police officials are not permitted to get involved in narcotics
traffic. If they do, they are liable to criminal prosecution. In addition,
if it could be shown that the evidence was provoked by police activity
the case would be thrown out of court. As a consequence, the French
police depend upon U.S. personnel for their information.
Difficulties in controlling illegal heroin production in France
The French police have been able to locate and close only 13
laboratories over the past 20 years. Two were closed in 1969; one in
1964. One of those closed in 1969 was located in a villa approximately
25 kilometers outside of Marseilles. Finding this one was a result of
fine police work by both the French police and United States BNDD
agents working closely with the police. A man suspected of being im-
plicated in the narcotics racket was released from arrest. He went
directly to the villa and was followed by the authorities. When the
police raided the villa, the laboratory was in full operation.
The study mission inspected another building in the suburbs of
Marseilles which had housed the illicit laboratory that was closed in
1964. It was an innocent looking building, and if the authorities had
not been told by an informer that a laboratory was located in that par-
ticular building it would not have been discovered.
As it result of visiting these two locations, it became evident to us
that looking for an illegal heroin-producing laboratory is like looking
for a needle in a haystack. They can be set up anywhere in a short
period of time and they can be moved just as quickly.
At present, the only practical method by which they can be located
is through the use of informers. This takes time and money. Money
must also be available to pay the informer as well as for making a
purchase of the heroin from illegal sources in order to develop leads.
Both French and American authorities voiced confidence that their
efforts were progressing satisfactorily and that the Marseilles Service
and the Central Office were developing a force capable of effective
action in discovering and closing the illegal laboratories. There is a
steadily increasing spirit of aggressiveness on the part of the French
authorities in their efforts to stop the illegal production of heroin in
France.
The French authorities were also hopeful that scientific and tech-
nological developments would greatly assist them in their investiga-
tions. For example, now in the process of development is a sensory
device which, when perfected, will "smell" illegal laboratories in
operation. These devices will be mounted in helicopters which will
be used by the police to patrol the area. Unfortunately, the device
must be in an area when a laboratory is in operation if it is to be
useful to the police.
Helicopter-borne patrols are of considerable assistance to the police
and should be used. If nothing else, they can increase the sense of
police pressure that the narcotics manufacturer is beginning to feel
in France. The authorities were emphatic in their belief that, because
of French narcotics laws and police pressure, the laboratory oper-
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ators are beginning to "panic." Police pressure should, therefore, be
increased.
Consideration. should be given to making helicopters and trained
pilots available to the French until they develop their own capa-
bilities. If arrangements can be made with French governmental
officials it might be possible to place U.S. helicopter units assigned
to U.S. Forces in Europe on temporary duty in the Marseilles area.
While this would be only an interim solution to the problem, it would
be useful and it would enable the authorities to utilize one more
weapon in the struggle to stamp out illicit heroin production during
the period when the French are developing their own airborne patrol
capability.
ITALY
Italy is a transshipment point. It is estimated that 30 to 40 percent
of the raw material used to produce heroin either passes through
Italy or is hidden in vessels destined for France which stop at
Italian ports.
There is also the probability that some of the heroin produced in
France and elsewhere returns to Italy where it is then smuggled to the
United States. There are no firm estimates on the amount involved,
but it is considered to be substantial by knowledgeable experts. The
number of known heroin traffickers seen in Italy, plus the deep :involve-
ment of a number of known Mafiosa in the United States form the basis
for this judgment.
There is also the possibility that heroin is being produced in
Sicily and Sardinia.
Italian efforts to control the illegal traffic in narcotics
Efforts by the Italian Government to control the illegal traffic in
narcotics have not been successful. For example, it is estimated that
the Italian authorities seize only about one-tenth of 1 percent of the
narcotics which reach that country.
There appear to be a number of reasons for this.
First, the Italian police agencies are fragmented and cooperation
depends upon personalities rather than institutional procedures. There
are three distinct national police agencies: The Finance Police, the
Public Security Forces, and the Carabinieri. Each is jealous of its
prerogatives.
In addition, a Central Narcotics Office (CNO) has been set up in
the Ministry of the Interior. Charged with the responsibility for coor-
dinating efforts to control narcotics traffic, the CNO does not always
get the cooperation of the police agencies or high-ranking government
officials.
Second, the Mafia is deeply involved in the narcotics traffic, and
high-ranking Italian Government officials aid that organization
throughout Europe. A commission has been appointed to determine
the extent of Mafia infiltration of the Italian Government. It will take
some time, however, before the results of this study are known.
Third, the Italians do not recognize the seriousness of this problem.
According to police authorities throughout; Italy, there is no Italian
heroin problem. Consequently, there is no feeling of urgency to take
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immediate and effective action to coordinate their efforts to combat
this problem.
Fourth, the Italians will not take action to improve international
cooperation to stop the illegal traffic of heroin. They do not coordinate
their activities with the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol) in spite of the fact that that organization maintains com-
plete files on all known international criminals. Nor will they pass
information to Interpol. They have also refused to put any pressure
on Turkey to do anything about this problem. Another indication of
Italian attitudes is their refusal to participate in the Special Drug
Abuse Control Fund established by the United Nations until at least
three-fourths of the members have contributed.
Italian cooperation with the United States
There are BNDD agents in Italy working with the Italian author-
ities in an effort to interdict morphine passing through Italy and to
stop heroin from returning. These efforts are hampered by the need
to coordinate activities within the several Italian police agencies.
Nevertheless, BNDD is helping and encouraging the Italians to im-
prove their capability to halt the drug traffic while waiting for the
Italian Government to centralize its operations in this area. Right
now, there is little or no cooperation between the Central Narcotics
Office and the several police agencies, including the local police. As a
matter of fact, the only successful seizures and arrests made in Italy
since 1962 have been made with BNDD assistance.
Ambassador Graham Martin has met with Italian Government
officials on at least three occasions requesting more cooperation from
the Italian Government, to no avail.
These efforts must be intensified. The United States must keep
the pressure on the Government of Italy to take effective action and
should be prepared, if necessary, to supply aircraft, helicopters,
vehicles, communication and other equipment to help increase
Italian capabilities to deal effectively with the illegal traffic in
narcotics.
If there were no opium production in Turkey, however, the illegal
laboratories in Marseilles could not exist. Nor could the illegal traf-
ficker profit in Italy. Solution to the problem has to be found in Tur-
key. If efforts to close the illegal laboratories in Marseilles, or to stop
the Italian trafficker are successful, the operation will move some place
else. Without morphine base it is impossible to produce heroin. The
Middle East-European aspect of the illegal international traffic in
narcotics can only be stopped at the source-in the poppy fields of
Turkey.
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THE ROLE OF TURKEY
Background
Poppy cultivation is a tradition in the Anatolian region of Turkey
dating back to about 1900 B.C. During the 19th century, as world
trade greatly expanded, the demand for opium increased and between
1850 and 1900 cultivation spread and expanded throughout the entire
country as a cash crop and an important export. In addition to opium
gum, other important by-products include seeds for flavoring and oil,
both of which have become a standard part of the Turkish farmer's
diet.
Although by 1900 the addiction and abuse of opium and its deriva-
tives had become a serious world health problem and the need for con-
trols was recognized, the political, cultural, social and economic differ-
ences between nations made achievement possible only through a
progression of treaties, culminating finally in their codification in a
Single Convention in 1961. The Single Narcotics Convention which
came into force in 1964 was ratified by Turkey in December 1966 and
by the United States in 1967. Under this agreement Turkey is recog-
nized as an opium exporter to the legal market.
Attempt8 to control opium production
Since 1967 Turkey has reduced the number of provinces legally per-
mitted to cultivate poppies from 21 to 7 for the 1971 harvest. It has
announced a_ further reduction to four provinces for 1972. During this
same period the legal production of opium gum has been reduced from
368 tons to an estimated 100 tons in 1970. It is estimated by reliable au-
thorities, however, that illegal production could be at least as much
and possibly twice that amount--more than enough to satisfy the
4 to 5 tons of heroin required by the addict population in the United
States.
Turkey has also tightened procedures for surveillance of poppy
.fields, purchase from farmers, and curbing of illegal traffic, and in-
stituted efforts to encourage crop substitutions.
Under current practice, worldwide opium trade requirements are
determined by the United Nations Control Board. Based upon this,
the Turkish Government estimates how much opium Turkey should
produce in the following year. The Ministry of Agriculture then de-
termines how much acreage should be planted and in which provinces.
The Cabinet then passes an approving decree. The Ministry does not
tell the farmer how much land he can plant,. Instead, the farmer de-
clares to the village headman how much he intends to farm and the
expected yield. These estimates are then passed to the Ministry of
Agriculture. The farmer is expected to abide by his declaration, but
under present law he is not required to obtain a license.
Control teams will be organized in each of the four provinces to
monitor the growing of poppies. These teams will inspect the fields
continually from the time of planting through the harvest. The con-
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trol team will also be responsible for inspecting those areas where
poppy cultivation is not permitted. To insure that the provincial con-
trol teams are managing the program properly other inspection teams
will be periodically sent from Ankara. To facilitate the inspection
process the United States will probably loan an airplane to the Turk-
ish Marketing Organization (TMO) to help in the surveillance. The
control teams will also educate the farmer on the reasons for and the
need to eradicate poppy growing in Turkey.
The Government of Turkey has also increased its efforts to purchase
the total opium crop being produced this year. Special instructions
have been given to the TMO which is the agency responsible for all
purchases and sales of opium. In addition, the. governors of the prov-
inces currently harvesting opium have been instructed to assure the
closest cooperation between TMO, Ministry of Agriculture, and law
enforcement agencies in their provinces.
The basic problem in any collection system is to get an accurate
measure of how much is actually planted and how much opium gum
is produced. If the above system is effective, the illegal production of
opium should be reduced. These procedures are not, however, a sub-
stitute for a licensing law. Under this procedure the only penalty is
to deny the farmer the authorization to grow poppies. These steps,
however, do represent an effort to bring poppy cultivation under
control.
Hopefully, once poppy cultivation is brought under control, the
next step should be a decision to stop growing poppies entirely. To
do this, the farmer must be taught to grow other crops. This should
not be an insurmountable problem. Poppy cultivation represents only
a minor portion of the crop land. The poppy grower seldom devotes
more than one hectare to poppies. The poppy takes so much out of
the soil that there is a need to rotate crops. If modern farming meth-
ods could be introduced and crops that are easier on the soil developed,
the incentive to grow poppies might be removed.
To encourage crop substitution, the Ministry of. Agriculture has
appointed at least one extension agent to each county in the poppy
cultivation area. Depending upon soil and climatic conditions, farm-
ers are being encouraged and assisted to switch to other cash crops,
including fruits and vegetables, safflower, sunflower, alfalfa, vetch
and wheat. A new high yielding winter wheat seed has been intro-
duced on the Anatolia Plateau which includes some of the poppy
growing provinces.
The matter of crop substitution is a long-term problem. The Gov-
ernment of Turkey has yet to develop any particular crop that would
pay the farmer the same amount of income as that derived from the
legal and illegal production of opium. While there are crops that
would pay the farmer the same amount of money that he now derives
from the legal cultivation of poppies, there is no other crop which
would equal the total income from both legal and illegal production.
In an effort to induce the Turkish farmer to grow other crops, con-
sideration should be given to discontinuing poppies as a cash crop.
It is one of two crops grown in Turkey for which payment by the
Government is immediate. The other is sugar beets.
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If the Government were to increase the payments for sugar beets
and encourage the substitution of wheat or some other crop for the
poppy as a cash crop, the results might be encouraging. If necessary,
the I'?nited States should help in this effort by vigorously pressing the
Turkish Government to consider this alternative and by furnishing
financial and technical assistance to implement such a program.
Consideration should also be given to the feasibility of increasing
the price that the Government pays the farmer for opium gum. This
action, combined with a strict licensing laws and other measures which
would make possession of, and trafficking in, illegal opium or its
derivatives a crime punishable by death, as in Iran, could produce
positive results.
Economic factors involved in Turkish poppy growing
If Turkey stopped growing poppies completely there would be
slight impact upon the Turkish economy. According to official Turkish
Government statistics, Turkey's total export earnings in 1969 were
4.8 billion Turkish lira (TL) or approximately $534 million, at the rate
of 9 lira to the dollar. Legal exports of opium products-opium gum
and poppy straw-in that year were valued at only TL 23.6 million or
$2,622,196.
Illegal sales of opium do not show up in these figures. If illegal
opium sales netted the Turkish farmer even three times that amount
or $7,866,588 this is an insignificant item in it total export earning of
approximately $534 million.
There are now approximately 80.000 farmers engaged in growing
poppies for opium production. In the late 1960's the average annual
earnings per farm was between $700 and S800. Ten percent of this
was derived from the sale, legal and illegal, of opium gum. This
represents approximately one-half of the total annual cash income
of the Turkish farmer. The Government pays between $10 and $15
per kilogram for legal opium. On the other hand, the farmer can sell
opium on the illegal market for at least $25 per kilogram. Thus, the
incentive is to sell to the illegal purchaser.
There is another problem. At present the farmer takes the opium
gum to the Government collector in his area who is supposed to weigh
the gum and pay the farmer on the spot.
In practice, the farmer is very often cheated. The TMO repre-
sentative responsible for the purchase of the opium gum from the
farmer frequently waits 6 weeks before he. weighs the opium gum.
During this time moisture in the gum has evaporated and the weight
reduced. As a consequence, the farmer gets less money and he feels
cheated. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that the farmer is
more interested in selling on the black market.
What Turkey has not done
In 1966 Turkey ratified the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.1
Article 23 of the Convention requires that all parties enact licensing
laws to control the growing of poppies. To date, Turkey has not
passed a licensing law.
The principal reasons given are that domestic political realities
(approximately 80,000 farmers grow poppies) do not permit passage,
and that passage as a result of U.S. pressure would give the impression
that the Government of Turkey is a "puppet of the United States."
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The Committee on Foreign Affairs has been studying this problem
since July 1970. At that time passage of the licensing laws was thought
imminent, before the Turkish Parliament adjourned during the first
week in August. No action was taken.
At the Geneva meeting of the United Nations Commission on Nar-
cotics in September 1970 the Turkish representatives pledged pas-
sage of a licensing law shortly after Parliament convened early in
November.
It is now May 1971 and no positive action has yet been taken by the
Turkish Parliament. In response to questions by members of the study
mission, a high-ranking Turkish official expressed strong belief that
a licensing law would be passed this year.
The Demirel Cabinet fell in March 1971 and a new Cabinet has
been installed under the leadership of Prime Minister Nihat Erim.
This government is a non-Party government and is more broadly
based than was the Demirel government. If it had the will to do so it
could pass quickly a law licensing the growing of poppies.
And while there are indications that the Prime Minister intends to
take action to control the growing of poppies, the study mission is of
the opinion that there is no sense of immediacy on the part of the
Turkish Government.
An extract from the Erim government's program fully illustrates
this. "Our Government is of the opinion that opium smuggling, which
has become a destructive disaster of the youth of the world, is hurting
above all our humane feelings; therefore, due importance shall be
attached to this problem. Opium producers shall be provided with a
better field of occupation in fanning."
Certain Turkish legislators questioned the inclusion in the pro-
gram of remarks on opium. The full response of Prime Minister Erim
is not available; however, observers present report that he took a
strong position in favor of opium production controls and then ex-
plained that opium production would not be discontinued com-
pletely until the farmers engaged in poppy farming and opium
production were provided with means of attaining a higher level of
subsistence.
While it is reassuring to learn that the Government of Turkey is
aware of the problem, it is well to remember that actions speak louder
than words.
If the United States is to solve the problem of heroin addiction at
home, it must have the active and effective cooperation of the Turkish
Government, for only the. Turks have the power and the authority to
control the growing of poppies. And while the United States can't
tell the Turks what to do in this matter, it must employ every avail-
able leverage to persuade the Turkish Government to take whatever
steps are necessary to control and eventually discontinue the growing
of poppies.
As a measure of Turkish sincerity in acting on this problem, it is
essential that legislation controlling the growing of poppies be enacted
as a meaningful first step. While passage of a licensing law will not
solve the problem, it is required if the Government of Turkey is to
inhibit the flow of opium to the illegal market. Passage of this legisla-
tion would also demonstrate Turkey's desire to fulfill her treaty com-
mitments under the provisions of the Single Convention-commit-
ments that were made in December 1966.
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United States-Turkish cooperation
In September 1966 the United States began discussions with the
Government of Turkey to find ways to better control the production
of opium in Turkey. At that time poppy cultivation was permitted
in 21 provinces. Although production was prohibited throughout the
rest of Turkey, enforcement agencies were poorly equipped and
relatively untrained for this type of control, resulting in an estimated
200 tons available for the illegal market.
By 1967, as a result of U.S. efforts and decreasing world opium
requirements, the Government of Turkey concluded that opium pro-
duction would not be an economic crop in the future and that steps
should be taken to reduce production. At the same time, the Govern-
ment decided that it needed to upgrade its enforcement capabilities
as well as to provide assistance to farmers to switch to other crops.
To assist in this effort, in 1968 the United States made $3 million
available from AID funds. Approximately $1.5 million of the loan
is being used to finance vehicles and equipment for enforcement
agencies and the remainder to finance research to develop alternative
crops and vehicles and equipment required by the Ministry of Agri-
culture to assist the farmer in switching to other crops.
All of the commodities programed under this loan have not been
received in Turkey. Bureaucracy and redta.pe have held up the clear-
ing of the commodities through Turkish customs, with the result
that much of the equipment sits around on the dock for substantial
periods of time. Steps are now being taken to insure that equipment
and commodities shipped for the use of the National Police and
gendarmerie will not be subjected to customs clearance.
In connection with this loan, the Government of Turkey has re-
organized the Turkish National Police and the gendarmerie in order
to develop a 750-man narcotic law enforcement group. The head-
quarters of this group is located in Ankara and when fully developed,
it is expected that there will be 51 regional offices. At the present time
it is estimated that half of the 750-man group has been trained and
deployed in the field.
Cooperation between the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dannerous
Drugs and Turkish enforcement agencies has been excellent. BNDD
agents are now in Turkey working with their counterparts on narcotics
control. U.S. agents have reported little evidence of illicit production
in provinces where poppy cultivation has been prohibited, and such
crops, when found, have been immediately destroyed.
There have been suggestions that the United States make money
available to Turkey to buy up the entire poppy crop. They have been
rejected on the grounds that it would result in every farmer increasing
the land that he devotes to poppy cultivation.
The suggestion has also been rejected by the Turkish Government
on the grounds that the domestic political situation in. Turkey made it
impossible. If this obstacle could be overcome, it is estimated that it
would cost about $5 million to buy up the entire crop.
Another proposal worthy of consideration has been made that the
U.S, attempt to purchase the entire illegal crop through the use of
undercover agents. This would have the effect of drying up the source
of morphine for the laboratories in Marseilles and if entirely success-
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ful would dry up the heroin supply to the U.S. market, at least tem-
porarily. Consideration might be given to this expedient as a stop gap
measure while other programs, such as crop substitution, are being
developed.
It was also suggested to the study mission by a leading Turkish
parliamentarian that a parliamentary group be established between
the Congress of the United States and the Turkish Parliament for the
purpose of discussing mutual problems in the field of narcotics control.
In the opinion of the study mission such a group would be beneficial
and would provide a useful. forum for a meaningful exchange of views
on the subject. It should not, however, become merely a discussion
panel.
It has been argued that if the supply of opium from Turkey is shut
off completely, those engaged in the illegal production of heroin
would transfer their operations someplace else, possibly to Afghan-
istan, India, Iran, Thailand, etc.
There are valid arguments against this line of. reasoning. In the
first place, the heroin obtained from poppies grown in Afghanistan is
low quality and cannot be produced in the quantities needed by the in-
ternational heroin dealer. Secondly, most of the opium grown in
Afghanistan is consumed either in Afghanistan or in Iran.
Iran has strict licensing laws and efficient collection procedures, and
most of what she produces is also consumed domestically.
India also has strict licensing laws and efficient collection procedures.
There is little evidence of a leakage of opium gum to the illicit market
from India.
Thailand, Burma, and Laos do present a problem. But it is a prob-
lem that will have to be faced under any circumstances, regardless of
whether Turkey produces opium gum or not. If the source of illegal
opium can be compressed, more resources can be applied to a smaller
area. This would enable the United States and the international com-
munity to concentrate its effort in Southeast Asia.
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THE PROBLEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Heroin addiction in the military services in South. Vietnam
Heroin addiction in the military forces of the United States is in-
creasing rapidly, particularly in South Vietnam where the best esti-
mates available are that 10 to 15 percent of all U.S. troops currently
in South Vietnam are addicted to heroin in one form or another. It
is estimated that in some units heroin addiction might be as high
as 25 percent. Some smoke it; some sniff or "snort." From 5 to 10
percent of these inject. In the eloquent words of one concerned young
American currently serving in Vietnam : "It is ironic indeed that in'
the last two years of the war our biggest casualty figures will come
from heroin addiction, not from combat."
Contributing to this epidemic use of heroin is its ready availability,
the frustrations and boredom growing out of the war, and the fact that
the drug culture in the Armed Forces reflects American society as a
whole. It is realistic to assume that many young Americans have
used heroin prior to induction into the military services.
However, most of the addicts in South Vietnam become addicted
in that country-usually within the first 30 days after entry.
Because of the quality of the heroin available in South Vietnam, it
is possible to become addicted through smoking or sniffing. The "high"
does not develop as quickly as when injected, but smoking or sniffing
does develop a physical need for heroin. Unfortunately, most of those
who smoke or sniff are under the dangerous illusion that heroin taken
in this manner is not addictive. Nothing could be further from the
truth.
There is also a widespread belief among many American servicemen
in Vietnam that this heroin is actually cocaine, a non-addictive drug.
This, again, is not true.
Of the heroin users among the U.S. military in South Vietnam, it
is estimated that 40 to 45 percent sniff, 50 percent smoke, and between 5
and 10 percent inject. Because of the purity of the heroin all are addic-
tive, although according to medical authorities those who inject become
physically dependent sooner than do those who sniff or smoke.
Those who have become addicted to the high quality heroin available
in South Vietnam will have no choice but to inject the much more
diluted heroin that is available in the United States. The military
services should, therefore, make every effort to detect and rehabilitate
addicts before returning them to civilian society.
U.S. deaths from heroin abuse
The rate of deaths resulting from drug abuse in South Vietnam is
increasing. Between August and December 1970, there were 90 deaths
which were suspected to have been drug related. Autopsy confirmed
that 59 of these had died from an overdose of heroin.
In January 1971 there were 17 deaths which were suspected to have
been drug related. In February there were 19 such deaths. Figures for
March and April are not yet available, but if this trend continues over
200 young Americans will die of heroin addiction in 1971.
(18)
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Ready availability of heroin in South Vietnam
Heroin is readily available to Arnei can servicemen in South Viet-
nam, particularly in Saigon. And it is cheap.
One quarter gram sells for as little as $2.50 and as much as $10,
while an eighth of a gram will sell for as little as $1.50 and as much as
$5. Most is purchased, but it large amount is obtained by military per-
sonnel who barter cigarettes and other post exchange items for the
drugs.
Contributing to the availability of heroin in Saigon is the large
number of U.S. military deserters who are engaged in every form of
criminal activity, including the selling of heroin.
According to figures provided by United States Army Vietnam
(USARV) there are 875 such deserters, although the figure varies.
Between 400 and 500 of these live in an area of Saigon which is
called Soul Alley. This area is "off limits" to U.S. personnel and one
enters at his own risk. Military police and others who have entered
the area have been assaulted, robbed, stripped of their clothing and
weapons and otherwise mistreated.
United States military efforts to conduct raids into Soul Alley have
failed.
The intelligence gathering capability of the inhabitants of Soul
Alley is excellent, and they are usually "tipped off" when a raid is
being planned.
Nevertheless, U.S. authorities in South Vietnam should surround
and raid Soul Alley and apprehend all U.S. deserters. While this would
not solve the heroin problem in Vietnam, certainly it would help.
Heroin production in Southeast Asia
Virtually all of the heroin being used by United States military
personnel in South Vietnam, and an increasing amount of the heroin
entering the United States, is produced from poppies grown in the
remote mountain areas of Burma, Laos, Thailand, and parts of
Yunnan Province in Communist China.
Unfortunately, no government exercises effective administrative or
political control over these areas.
Poppies are. grown in areas occupied by hill tribesmen who have
been growing poppies for centuries. Some of the areas of Laos and
Thailand are infested with Communist guerrillas, if not actually con-
trolled by them, while rebel bands and remnants of the Koumintang
inhabit the poppy-producing areas in Burma and Thailand.
Burma, Laos, and Thailand produce an estimated 1,000 tons of
raw opium, or more than one-half of the world illicit output. Most of
this is consumed in the Far East and Southeast Asia. Practically all
observers are agreed that the largest group of users and addicts con-
sists of overseas Chinese. Burma, Laos, and Thailand may together
account for three-quarters of a million users and addicts, with Burma
having the largest share. Hong Kong may account for another 150,000.
Two different types of heroin are produced from the poppies grown
in this area-white and purple. There is little or no indigenous re-
quirement for white heroin in Southeast Asia-purple heroin is
smoked there.
The production of white heroin in quantity is a comparatively re-
cent development. There are no reliable statistics available to indicate
what proportion of opium production is processed into heroin, but it
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must be concluded that production is increasing in direct proportion
to the growing demand among Americans in South Vietnam.
The major flow of illegal traffic
The major flow of the traffic from the producing areas of Burma,
Laos, and Thailand is directed through the Mekong River Valley in
the latter two countries. Major cities in these two countries, such as
Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Bangkok, serve as final markets, her-
oin processing centers, and transslilpment points, principally to South
Vietnam and Ilong Kong.
The first major collections of the raw opium in Burma are made by
Koumintang irregulars and guerrilla armies of the Shan tribal
insurgents who themselves convoy the product southward for delivery
to wholesale operators in the cities. The latter arrange for conversion
to heroin and for the domestic and export distribution of both opium
and heroin. Often these wholesalers are prominent local businessmen.
In Laos, Government armed forces are major wholesalers of opium
and heroin and have been directly involved in large-scale smuggling
activities.
The major conduit, however, is Thailand.
From the American viewpoint., Thailand is as important to the
control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey,
While all of the opium produced in Southeast Asia is not grown in
Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that country. Some of this
is processed into heroin which is smuggled to the United States by
couriers on commercial or military aircraft. Some is mailed to the
United States by U.S. military personnel using both commercial and
military postal. services. Most, however, is smuggled into South
Vietnam through both Laos and Thailand.
Recently American citizens, mostly ex-military, have moved to
Thailand and have entered the business of smuggling heroin to the
United States.
According to U.S. narcotics agents, the Bangkok operation is led
by an ex-U.S. serviceman, William Henry Jackson. Jackson operates
a place called the Five Star Bar in Bangkok, which is patronized
chiefly by black U.S. servicemen. According to the narcotics agents,
Jackson is assisted by other ex-military men, some of whom have moved
from Europe to Bangkok. According to the agents, the Jackson group
recruits patrons of the Five Star Bar as heroin couriers to the United
States and utilizes other active duty military personnel to ship heroin
to the United States through the Army and Air Force Postal System.
Jackson is now wanted in the T?nited States in connection with a
heroin seizure case, and American authorities are working with the
Thai Government to have him deported.
BNDD agents in Bangkok are of the opinion that Jackson is prob-
ably paying a Thai legislator for protection.
Bangkok is also the source of heroin for another major system en-
gaged in smuggling heroin into the United States-the Okinawa sy-s-
i The Bureau of Customs announced on May 6, that it made 248 seizures of narcotics
through Army and Air Force post offices from the beginning of March through April 24.
1971. It also announced that it had seized 17 pounds of heroin in a piece of military mail
from Bangkok, Thailand, on April 5. The package, seized at Fort Monmouth. N.J., con-
tained heroin valued at an estimated $1.75 million on the street.
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tern. This system is composed of U.S. military and ex-military per-
sonnel allied with a few Okinawans. Efforts to contain this system are
hampered by the inability of authorities on Okinawa to initiate ade-
quate customs procedures at the evilian airports. Most U.S. authorities
are convinced that this will change once Okinawa reverts to Japan and
Japanese law enforcement officials assume customs responsibility for
Okinawa.
These Americans who are engaged in this most despicable crime of
modern times carry U.S. passports with all of the privileges attend-
ant. They are enemies of the American people who do not deserve the
rights accorded to law-abiding citizens, and serious consideration
should be given to withdrawing the passports of these international
criminals.
Above all, the United States Government should inform the Thai
Government that a refusal to deport known U.S. heroin traffickers
could prejudice Thai-American relations.
Smuggling into South Vietnam
Heroin is smuggled into South Vietnam in a variety of ways. Some
is carried in commercial aircraft, some is air landed or air dropped.
Some is probably carried overland by North Vietnamese or Vietcong
using trail areas used for transporting supplies, and some is carried
in South Vietnamese vehicles and aircraft..
It is believed that the Laotian and South Vietnamese Air Forces are
deeply involved in this activity. Heroin has also been smuggled in Air
America aircraft although there is no evidence that any official of a
U.S. agency has ever been involved in the smuggling of heroin into
South Vietnam.
It is also possible to rent private aircraft in Southeast Asia and
the use of private aircraft for smuggling purposes is increasing.
It is assumed by the U.S. military that this activity reaches high
levels of command, to include the politicians, both in Laos and in
South Vietnam. We were told that there is information available that
high-ranking Vietnamese officials, including military, are mixed up in
dru operations.
Heroin is smuggled into South Vietnam from Bangkok by Thai
soldiers either returning from leave or those beginning a tour of
duty in South Vietnam. Many of these soldiers travel in U.S. mili-
tary aircraft. Unfortunately, there are no adequate customs pro-
cedures in effect and the Thai soldier enters South Vietnam unchecked.
Some is also carried in Thai aircraft, both military and commercial,
and some is thought to be mailed by Thai military personnel through
the postal system which the United States operates for the Thai
military serving in Vietnam. As one American official told us, "This
is an ideal situation for shipping heroin to Vietnam." Finally, some
heroin is thought to be carried in by American military personnel re-
turning from R. and R. Recent evidence indicates that Hong Kong
may be a limited source of the heroin reaching U.S. troops in South
Vietnam.
Once the heroin reaches South Vietnam from these various sources,
it becomes readily available in the streets of Saigon. The street peddler
who sells heroin is the low man on the totem pole. The structure of
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the illegal heroin market can be illustrated as a pyramid consisting
of four tiers :
Financiers and Backers
Producers, Smugglers and Importers
Drug Distributors
Street Peddler
If the financiers and backers who finance the narcotics business can
be uncovered and prosecuted, severe damage could be inflicted on the
entire operation, especially if strong measures are taken to deal with
the bottom three tiers of the pyramid simultaneously.
The problem of corruption
Official corruption plays an important part in the worldwide traffic
in heroin. The extent of corruption in Southeast Asia is difficult to
assess. Reliable sources report that. at least two high-ranking Laotian
officials, military and governmental, including the chief of the Laotian
general staff, are deeply involved in the heroin business.
In Thailand, a former diplomat and member of one of the most re-
spected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the
opium, morphine base, and heroin operations in that country and
throughout Southeast Asia.
Recently, a member of the South Vietnamese legislature, and friend
of high-ranking governmental officials, was arrested smuggling heroin
into Vietnam. The II.S. Military Command has supplied Ambassador
Bunker with the names of high-ranking Vietnamese officials it suspects
of involvement in the heroin trade, and believes that the corruption
has reached the point where only forceful intervention by President
Thieu can succeed in checking the traffic.
There have also been reports that Vice President Hy is implicated
in the current heroin traffic. The study mission was unable to find any
evidence to support this allegation.
In general the wholesale organizations trading in opium and opiates
seek to involve government officials in their activities by corruption.
Essentially, the wholesalers want both legal protection for themselves
and insurance for the dependability of their business operations. In
order to provide deliveries of contraband in large volumes and with
regularity, the wholesalers seek to corrupt officialdom at fairly high
levels if possible. At the same time, officialdom itself may be vulner-
able to corruption because of the relatively large compensation it can
get for collaborating with the major traders. For this reason, some
officials are undoubtedly involved in illegal narcotics traffic.
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The involvement in the traffic of individual officials and military
officers in some other countries has also been reliably reported, as has
the use of diplomatic pouches for smuggling opium and heroin. In
no country, however, is there likely to be a flourishing illicit trade in
opium or heroin without the complicity of at least a few key civil
servants or police officers.
Ihhat the governments of Southeast Asia are doing
Most of the heroin in Southeast Asia is produced for Americans.
Until recently this led many governments to look upon heroin usage
as strictly an American problem and little was done to help stop the
illegal traffic. Addiction, however, is being discovered among the in-
digenous population, and the various governments are responding to
U.S. initiatives in order to begin to get some control over this
problem.
This is particularly true in the South Vietnamese military forces.
We were told that during the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, that
some South Vietnamese troops who had been transferred from other
areas of Vietnam on short notice had to be treated for withdrawal
symptoms. Some U.S. personnel supporting the operation were also
treated for withdrawal pains. The theory is that these troops were
moved so rapidly and on such short notice that it was not possible to
obtain sufficient heroin to satisfy their needs. As a result, one high-
ranking South Vietnamese official told the study mission that whereas
the had formerly looked upon the drug problem as an American prob-
lem, he now realized that it was becoming a Vietnamese problem.
Proper enforcement of South Vietnamese law would put a stop to
a large part of the illegal traffic in heroin in that country. Particular
emphasis must be placed on ending corruption in the customs service,
which has been responsible for large quantities of heroin entering
South Vietnam.
The possession of and the sale of heroin in South Vietnam is illegal.
Yet sales on the streets of Saigon are so blatant that several attempts
were made to sell heroin to members of the study mission as they
walked the streets of Saigon, accompanied by a uniformed member of
the United States Army.
As a result of American pressure the national police are becoming
more aware of the need to do something about this problem. The na-
tional police commander has promised to take action.
In this context, combined narcotics suppression committees have been
established in each military region. The membership consists of two
U.S. officers and two inspectors from the national police. The com-
mittee collects and evaluates information on narcotics smuggling and
informs the national police agencies of the need to take action to
arrest and prosecute offenders.
It is too early to measure the effectiveness of these committees. In
spite of the fact that heroin addiction has been a growing problem for
over a year, the committees were not established until February 1971.
The study mission was assured by U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker that both President Thicu and Vice President Ky were con-
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cerned with the problem and are interested in stopping the illegal
traffic in heroin.
Promises and interest are not enough, however. Strong action must
be taken to stop the heroin traffic in South Vietnam. We are not opti-
mistic that the Government is either willing or able to take such
action.
One of the major reasons for pessimism is the internal political situa-
tion in South Vietnam, where differences between President Thieu and
Vice President Ky inhibits effective action being taken.
Vice President Ky was especially critical of the efforts being taken
by the Government of South Vietnam to solve the problem of heroin,
and stated that if he were given the responsibility of cleaning up
"the drug mess" in South Vietnam, he would produce concrete results
within 2 or 3 months.
The implication of this statement is that the Government is not
doing all that it can, or should. Some way must be found to convince
the South Vietnamese of the urgency of this problem and the absolute
necessity to solve it.
In the final analysis, neither South Vietnam nor the United States
can solve this problem alone. Both need the cooperation of the produc-
ing countries : Burma, Laos, and Thailand. Of the three, Thailand is
the most important, and the most able to take action.
THAILAND
According to United States officials in Bangkok, the Thai Govern-
ment is taking some action to stem illicit: heroin production.
Since producing opium is illegal in Thailand, there are projects
aimed at, encouraging the hill tribesmen to grow other crops. These
programs consist of education and training in new farming tech-
niques and improved enforcement of Thai law.
The study mission visited a tribal research center which is situated
on the grounds of Chiang Mai University in Northern Thailand.
The research center is the research branch of the Hill Tribe Division,
Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of the Interior. One of the
problems which led to the creation of the research center was the
illegal cultivation of poppies in Northern Thailand. The Government
was desirous of eliminating the growing of poppies, yet the economy
of some of the hill societies is based upon the income derived from
opium sales. Prohibition, without the promotion of alternative cash
crops would have caused considerable hardships. In addition, the in-
ability of the Government to exert effective administrative control
over these areas would have doomed the project to failure.
In 1967 and again in 1970. the Thai Government requested the
United Nations to help by conducting a study on the economic and
social needs of the opium producing areas in Thailand.
There have also been efforts to resettle the hill tribes to other areas,
but this program has not been overly successful.
The Thai Government has initiated efforts to destroy the poppy
crops, but without great success. The areas are too remote and en-
forcement almost impossible because of the Communist inspired in-
surgency in the area.
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In 1962, the Thai invited U.S. BNDD agents into Thailand to
assist them in their efforts. Relations between BNDD agents and the
Thai police are improving. The Thai now permit BNDD agents to
operate undercover and to appear in court in narcotics cases.
BNDD efforts, at least until 1969, were hampered because funds
needed to do an effective job were not available. This situation has also
changed and sufficient funds are now being made available.
Much more cooperation on the part of the Thai government is re-
quired, however. The Thai must devote more resources to improve-
ment of their capability to intercept illegal shipments of opium, mor-
phine, and heroin.
The Thai Government must also institute adequate and effective
customs inspection, especially in the case of Thai troops and aircraft
going to and from South Vietnam.
The study mission was also of the opinion that the United States
Mission in Thailand should be more forceful in convincing the Thai
Government that the United States not. only needs, but expects, rapidly
increasing action to stop the illegal traffic in opium and its derivatives.
Strong and effective measures by the Thai Government, however,
would not completely solve the problem. Poppies are also grown in
Burma and Laos.
Poppies are grown in Burma under uncontrolled conditions. Due to
economic, social, and political factors, the Government is not able to
apply control measures required to implement their policies or in-
tentions of prohibiting, or to supervise and control the growing of
poppies and the production of opium. While much of the opium
produced in Burma is consumed locally, a considerable amount ap-
pears in the illicit traffic. It is bartered for goods or sold for cash.
Opium is very often the principal cash crop.
Burma has few economic, political, or cultural contacts with the
outside world as a result of the Government's acute sensitivity to
foreign influence. Because of this, U.S. relations with Burma are not
close, although they are "correct and friendly."
Any reduction in the amount of opium produced in Burma will
take time. The Government must be strengthened and some way found
to convince the opium producers to grow other crops.
There is little that the United States can do unilaterally to bring
this about. It can, and must, however, urge the United Nations to
help.
The Laotians are deeply involved in the growing of poppies and in
the production of heroin. Opium is the principal source of income of
the ethnic minorities in Laos.
The possession of opium in Laos is not illegal at the present time.
There is a law being considered which would make such possession
illegal. Even if the law passes, enforcement will be next to impos-
sible because of the inability of the Laotian Government to exercise
effective political control over most of Laos. A copy of the proposed
legislation, including the note of presentation, is included in the.
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appendix. This proposal, which was first drafted in 1963, will be pre-
sented to the National Assembly, hopefully in May 1971.
There are other steps that the Laotians can take to assert some
control over the illegal. traffic in opium and its derivatives. From the
evidence available, there is no doubt that the Laotian military is
deeply involved in the international traffic in heroin. Heroin is proc-
essed in laboratories located in Laos, and what is not snuggled
through Thailand is smuggled through Laos, primarily by air in
Laotian Air Force planes. While there is little likelihood that the
Laotian Government will gain control over its territory in the near
future, it can, and must, take action to reform its air force and elim-
inate the corruption which permits the drug traffic to flourish.
It should also be pointed out that tribesmen who grow poppies in
the non-Communist part of Laos are some of the most effective re-
sistance fighters against the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao.
They depend for their livelihood upon opium production. The United
States should consider the feasibility of buying up the opium crop
each year, while encouraging and assisting the tribesmen to grow
other crops. Such a program would probably cost at the most. $10
million annually. In 5 years, however, it would not equal the amount
of military assistance that the United States gives to Laos annually to
enable it to remain non-Communist. If it is in the national security in-
terests of the United States to save 3 million Laotians from communism,
it certainly is in the national security interest of the United States to
spend whatever is necessary to save generations of young Americans
from heroin addiction.
In summary, the heroin problem in Southeast Asia is a regional
problem. It transcends national boundaries and the operations in one
country are dependent upon the operations in the other. Efforts to
combat it must, therefore, be regional in scope. And the United States
must push the fight against heroin as vigorously as it has conducted the
fight against Communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
For years the United States has been encouraging; regional economic
development in Southeast Asia. It is discouraging that the most success-
ful regional commercial development has been the illicit production
and sale of heroin.
What the United States is doing to attack the heroin problem in
South Vietnam
Steps are being taken by the United States Government in South
Vietnam at both the diplomatic level and the military level to combat
the growing heroin problem.
The study mission learned that the United States has made a strong
appeal to the Government of South Vietnam to take action in this
area. In a strongly worded memorandum, the U.S. Ambassador pointed
out that "continuation of illegal traffic in drugs, particularly heroin,
will have a serious impact on American support of the national effort."
Because there has been criticism of U.S. diplomats for not pressing
the narcotics issue forcefully enough with host governments, it is only
fair to say that the study mission wholeheartedly supports the efforts
of the Embassy in South Vietnam. Following is an extract from the
paper:
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Accordingly it is suggested that the following goals be established:
1. Recognition by all Vietnamese officials and citizens of the magnitude of the
drug problem and the serious impact that a continuation of illicit traffic in drugs,
particularly heroin, will have on the American support of the national effort.
2. Development of a national will to eradicate trafficking in drugs.
To achieve these goals it is specifically recommended that the President of
Vietnam :
1. Issue a circular in the immediate future, through both civilian and military
components of the government, indicating your concern over the accelerating
drug problem and the apparent involvement of large numbers of Vietnamese in
drug trafficking. This circular should specifically mention the trafficking of heroin
and the danger this highly addictive narcotic currently poses to the physical well-
being of Americans as well as the future danger it poses to Vietnamese citizens.
This circular should be followed by a decree which specifically legislates against
trafficking in heroin and which imposes severe penalties for doing so.
2. Appoint a Presidential Task Force of highly qualified, dedicated and honest
investigators to ferret out, investigate and prosecute the financiers and backers
who comprise the powers behind drug trafficking. These men are responsible for
manipulating, fostering, protecting and promoting the illicit traffic in drugs. They
include influential political figures, government officials and moneyed ethnic
Chinese members of the criminal syndicate now flourishing in the Cholon sector
of Saigon.
3. Initiate action to establish a comprehensive drug training program for all
law enforcement elements within the Republic of Vietnam, to include prose-
cutors. Such training would be directed primarily at heroin, its characteristics
and the danger it poses to the physical well being of users.
4. Initiate immediate action to arrest all importers, distributors and street
peddlers involved in the distribution and sale of drugs, especially heroin. Further,
that stringent penalties be levied against these people to preclude their return
to these activities.
5. Initiate action to form a specialized narcotics section within the Customs
Fraud Repression Service. Such a section would devote its energy to combat
the smuggling of drugs, especially heroin.
6. Take immediate action to have existing customs regulations enforced.
Specific actions that must be taken are :
(a) Unauthorized personnel must not be allowed to handle any items of
cargo or baggage until such items have been properly cleared by customs
offici' ls.
(b) Existing customs regulations pertaining to the actual processing and
searching of individuals and all classes of cargo/personnel must be adhered
to rigidly.
7. Initiate action to enforce existing health and welfare laws as they pertain
to the sale of pharmaceutical products (dangerous drugs) throughout Vietnam.
No such products should be sold to American servicemen without the required
prescription.
U.S. military authorities in South Vietnam are also aware that the
problem of heroin addiction has reached epidemic proportions and
must be solved. To do this, a four-point pro? rain has been developed,
consisting of education, amnesty, rehabilitation, and suppression.
Education programs have been expanded at all levels of command
where the consequences of drug abuse are stressed. There are also
programs aimed at educating noncommissioned and commissioned offi-
cers in the detection and control of drug abuse in their units.
An education program to be effective must stress the dangers inher-
ent in the illegal use of drugs and the dangers it poses to the health and
future of the user. It must be current, accurate, and hardhitting.
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There has been criticism that material provided for use in Vietnam
does not fit these requirements. According to one recognized author-
ity, more use should be made of films which "tell it like it is." These
films should be kept up to date and they should focus on the problem
in South Vietnam.
Amnesty programs have been instituted. Basically, amnesty is a
promise of freedom from punishment in exchange for accepting medi-
cal treatment and rehabilitation. Under this program when an addict
requests rehabilitation treatment and medical assistance, he is admitted
to a rehabilitation center where he undergoes treatment for his addic-
tion. To prevent the amnesty program from being used as a vehicle to
escape from combat and to discourage resumption of the habit, an in-
dividual is permitted to request amnesty only one time.
While there has been no success in curing those who inject, there
have been some successes in curing those who sniff or smoke. There
are very few statistics available concerning rehabilitation programs.
They must, therefore, be used with caution.
For example, during the first quarter of 1971, 3,458 heroin users
participated in the, rehabilitation program. Of this number, there
were at least 703 known unsuccessful participants. There are no
figures available which estimate the rate of cure of those participat-
ing. From statistics that are available, the rate of cure is not en-
couraging. For instance, of 532 addicts treated at Pioneer House, an
amnesty and rehabilitation center located in Lon- Binh, between Octo-
ber 1970 and March 1971, there were reported 149 successful cures, 94
failures, and 249 in the unsure category.
An important part of the rehabilitation program is the counseling
received during the treatment period. Even here, the program is vul-
nerable. For instance, the week before the study mission visited Long
Binh, two counsellors at Pioneer House were arrested, one for using
LSD; the other for using heroin.
Another problem emanates from the requirement that the amnesty
and rehabilitation program is entirely voluntary. The individual is
free to leave the center at any time. In the past, people have walked
out of the rehabilitation center before they were cured. They will prob-
ably do the same in the future.
But perhaps the most serious shortcoming of the drug rehabilitation
program is that there is not a coordinated Vietnam-wide effort to
establish rehabilitation centers. Responsibility is delegated to major
commanders. Some commands support the effort fully. Some distrust
the concept and take little or no interest in the program.
Several steps have also been taken to suppress the use of drugs, par-
ticularly heroin, in South Vietnam. Drug-abuse, councils have been
formed in every unit down to battalion/squadron level to provide
analysis, evaluation, and monitoring of all aspects of narcotics and
drug suppression. A combined antinarcotics enforcement committee,
composed of Vietnamese and American forces, has also been estab-
lished in each military region to eliminate the illicit traffic in narcotics
within the civilian community of the Republic of Vietnam.
In addition, a Joint United States/Republic of Vietnam Narcotics
Investigative Detachment will concentrate its efforts on the illegal
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drug supply and trafficking problem to interdict and eradicate drug
sources before the heroin reaches military personnel. This detachment
is made up of representatives from the several U.S. military investi-
gative organizations, the Vietnamese Military Police, and the Viet-
namese National Police.
Simultaneously, a Joint U.S. Customs Group has been established
to assume responsibility for all military customs operations in Viet-
nam to include postal, household goods, unaccompanied baggage, and
the processing of accompanied baggage and personnel arriving or
departing South Vietnam. This unit is responsible for all customs
enforcement, including narcotics.
Hopefully, these steps will help reduce the availability and use of
heroin by U.S. personnel in South Vietnam.
There is one other aspect of the problem which is of concern to
military authorities in South Vietnam-they have no adequate and
reliable procedures for detecting the, heroin addict. As part of the
drug-suppression program, new and more complete surveying tech-
niques are to be employed and statistical data will be collected and
compiled on a commandwide basis.
Measures must be taken to improve the reliability of addict detec-
tion procedures. If possible, the development of a simplified urinalysis
test should become a matter of first priority for medical authorities. If
this is not feasible, adequate laboratory facilities should be furnished
down to battalion and squadron level. Every soldier should be required
to undergo periodic urinalysis, especially before his return to the
United States and absolutely before his separation from the military
service. If the serviceman who has become addicted using 94- to 97-
percent pure heroin in South Vietnam enters the drug scene in the
United States where the heroin available is 4 to 6 percent pure, the
ominous implications are obvious for himself, his family, and for
American society. In the absence of the heroin available in South
Vietnam, the only alternative for one who has become addicted through
sniffing and snorting will be to inject.
Implementation of the above program must receive the highest
priority at every level of command, and it must be pushed with a
greater sense of urgency than has been the case. In spite of the fact
that drug abuse has been a growing problem in South Vietnam for
over 1 year, the directive setting out the program to combat it was not
issued until December 1970.
While U.S. military and diplomatic personnel in Southeast Asia are
concerned about the problem, the study mission is of the opinion that
a greater sense of urgency is needed.
For example, when we arrived in Bangkok, we were told that there
was a regional conference being held to discuss the problem of drug
addiction among U.S. military personnel in Southeast Asia. All U.S.
agencies responsible for the drug problem were represented at the
meeting. This included military. Bureau of Customs, the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and U.S. diplomatic personnel.
While it was encouraging to note that this conference was finally
held, such action should have been taken much sooner to mobilize the
resources available to take strong coordinated action to stop the illegal
traffic in heroin.
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IRAN AND JAPAN
The study mission also traveled to Iran and Japan in an effort to
determine what impact if any, those countries had upon the heroin
problem in the United ?tates. We are happy to report that there is no
evidence to suggest that either contributes in any way to the illegal
production and smuggling of heroin into the United States.
What was of particular interest to us was the approach that the two
countries have taken, and are taking, to control heroin addiction.
In both, these procedures are aimed at suppression of the illegal
traffic, rehabilitation of the addicts when found. and strict justice for
those convicted for illegal possession of, or trafficking in, heroin.
IRAN
Iran has one of the largest heroin using populations in the world-
approximately 50,000. Unlike the United States, 90 percent of the
heroin used in Iran is produced illegally in that country. The remaining
10 percent required by the Iranian heroin addict population originates
in the poppy fields of Turkey.
In 1955, because opium addiction was undermining the health of the
nation, Iran banned the growing of poppies.
By 1969, discouraged by the lack of movement on the part of Turkey
and Afghanistan, and alarmed by the gold drain which covered the
cost of illicitly imported opium, Iran authorized limited poppy culti-
vation under strictly controlled conditions.
Iran has strict opium collection procedures and the poppy crop is
closely monitored from planting until the harvest of the opium gum.
And whereas the Government of Turkey pays the farmer $10 to $15
for opium gum, the Government of Iran pays $90. This, of course, ex-
plains in part why there is little or no leakage of opium gum from the
licit to the illicit market in Iran.
There are other reasons. If the farmer in Iran violates the law, he
forfeits his license to grow poppies. And if an individual in Iran is
convicted of possession or trafficking in heroin, he is executed. (Since
1969, 86 people have been shot for offenses involving heroin.)
In the past, Turkish smugglers moved raw opium into Iran. As a
result of strict enforcement of Iranian narcotics legislation and efforts
by both Turkish and Iranian Governments to combat smuggling, the
amount of opium introduced from Turkey has been reduced dramati-
cally. Now, however, instead of smuggling raw opium, the Turks are
smuggling morphine base and heroin. This is a new development.
It is easier to deal in morphine gum or heroin which has one-tenth
the bulk of opium gum. In addition, opium gum has a distinctive odor
and in hot weather is extremely difficult to conceal while morphine
base or heroin is almost odorless.
This poses a potential problem of severe dimensions for the entire.
international effort to control the illegal traffic in narcotics.
(30)
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The evidence suggests that the drug traffickers in the Marseilles area
of France are becoming concerned at the increasing pressure being
applied by the French authorities in cooperation with U.S. Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug agents. It is thought that they may
be looking for other areas in which to operate their illicit lab-
oratories. If heroin is produced in Turkey, at the source of the
opium gum, it will remove the necessity to smuggle opium gum or mor-
phine base to France. The long, circuitous route from Turkey to Mar-
seilles provides an opportunity for law enforcement agencies to
intercept the shipment at any step along the way and particularly in
Marseilles where it is halted long enough to be turned into heroin.
If, on the other hand, heroin production takes place in Turkey on a
scale large enough to provide the illegal heroin formerly produced in
Marseilles, interception will become much more difficult.
It is obvious that Turkey must introduce effective opium production
controls and work toward a complete abolition of opium production.
The heroin problem in Iran and the United States is fueled by the
opium that originates in Turkey, and it, is that country that can do the
most toward helping to solve the heroin addiction problem.
JAPAN
The Japanese have been able to control heroin addiction. Since 1964
they have succeeded in reducing their heroin addict population from
approximately 50,000 to only several thousand.
The success of Japanese efforts to control addiction is due to effec-
tive Japanese police work and to strict, penalties dealing with the nar-
cotics pusher.
The maximum penalty is 10 years in prison for smuggling or selling
heroin.
If a man is arrested for heroin pushing, there is no bail permitted.
He must be charged within 48 hours, however. The police can hold the
suspect for 10 days during which preindictment investigations are
conducted. At the end of 10 days, he is turned over to the prosecutor
who has an additional 10 days to bring the accused to trial. If neces-
sary, the prosecutor can request an additional 10 days before com-
mencing trial. Therefore, an indiv, idual arrested for possession of
heroin can be held for 30 days without bail.
It is the opinion of the study mission that law enforcement officials
and legislators in the United States should study the methods used
by Japan to deal with this problem.
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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO CONTROL
ILLEGAL HEROIN TRAFFIC
It is obvious that if the illegal traffic in heroin is to be brought
under control international cooperation is needed. The most imme-
diate problem is to control the cultivation of poppies and the produc-
tion of opium.
The production of legal opium is regulated by the International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) through the provisions of the Sin-
gle Convention of 1961 which became internationally effective Decern
ber 13, 1964.
The Board is entrusted with enforcing the provisions of the Single
Convention. The Board asks both parties and non-parties to the Con-
vention for estimates of drug requirements and existing stocks and
statistics of production, consumption and seizures each year, and by
article 12(3), if estimates are not forthcoming, the Board can fix
them. Among the weapons which the Board has are requests for in-
formation and explanations, public declarations that a country has
violated its obligations, and under article 14(2), a recommendation
to parties that they impose embargoes on imports and exports against
an offending country.
Member states are also required to license the growing of poppies
and to control trade by granting export licenses only when the im-
porter produces an import certificate from the importing country. A
third country is not to allow drugs to pass through its territory with-
out a copy of the export authorization.
The provisions of the Single Convention, however, apply only to
the control of legal production of opium. They provide essentially vol-
untary restraints on parties with respect to cultivation of the opium
poppy, production of opium, manufacture of opium-derived drugs and
import and export of these substances. The United States has pro-
posed amendments which, if adopted, would provide the INCB with
authority to control production and illegal traffic in narcotic drugs.
It is hoped that a conference to consider the proposed amendments
would meet early in 1972.
While the study mission fully supports U.S. efforts to strengthen
the ability of the international community to restrict narcotics activity
to legitimate medical and scientific purposes, it is of the opinion that
such a conference should be convened as soon as possible and not wait
until early in 1972. Time is essential and the United States should
impress this fact on the international community at every opportunity.
The problem, however, is not the control of legal production, but
to find ways to stop leakage of opium to the illegal market. Some
countries such as India, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia have
been relatively successful in accomplishing this. Others such as Turkey
have not.
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Complicating the problem are those areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Burma, Laos, and Thailand were opium poppies are grown illegally
and under uncontrolled conditions.
Because of the amount and quality of heroin produced from the
poppies grown in Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Turkey, international
efforts to control the illegal traffic in heroin must be concentrated on
those four countries.
Experience has demonstrated that the only way to control this prob-
lem is to control it at the source-in the poppy fields.
The United States can, and should, exercise what bilateral diplo-
matic and economic pressures it can to encourage its friends and allies
to take action to stop opium production. It is also necessary to obtain
the cooperation of the United Nations.
Acting upon the initiative of the United States the United Nations
did agree to establish a Special Fund for Drug Abuse Controls, to
be made up of voluntary contributions and used to develop short-
term and long-term plans and programs to bring the problem of drug
addiction under control.
The United States pledged $2 million and on April 1, 1971, the Per-
manent U.S. Representative to the United Nations made the first $1
million payment. Unfortunately, the United States is the only coun-
try to have pledged any money, although one other, West Germany,
has announced unofficially that it will pay approximately $350,000
into the fund.
This is disappointing. With addiction increasing around the world,
particularly in the United States, there is an immediate need for effec-
tive action and cooperation.
According to the Secretary General, the purpose of the drug abuse
fund will be to develop short-term and long-term plans and programs
and to provide assistance in the execution of those plans and programs.
During the initial stages of the Fund, pending the completion and
submission of a proposed long-term policy and plan of action which
would deal with all aspects of the problems related to drug abuse con-
trol, the voluntary contributions to the Fund will be used for specific
projects to be included in a short-term program without prejudice to
on-going projects. The short-term program will consist of projects
to expand the research and information facilities of United Nations
drug control bodies; to plan and implement programs of technical
assistance in pilot projects for crop substitution purposes, the es-
tablishment and improvement of national drug control administra-
tions and enforcement machinery, and training of personnel, and in
setting up or expanding research and training centers which could
serve national or regional needs; to enlarge the capabilities and ex-
tend the operations of United Nations drug control bodies and their
secretariats; to promote facilities for the treatment, rehabilitation and
social reintegration of drug addicts; and to develop educational mate-
rial and programs suitable for use on high-risk populations.
While this is a commendable program and should be encouraged
it does not go to the heart of the problem-how to stop the illegal
traffic in heroin now or how to get Turkey to honor her international
treaty obligations by passing a law licensing the growing of poppies;
or what is to be done to control the growing of poppies and the pro-
duction and smuggling of heroin in the Far East.
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These are the basic problems and, if necessary, the United States
should be willing to make funds available to the United Nations,
or to the individual countries, so that they might begin to deal with
them.
The United States also must convince the world community of the
urgency of this problem.
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)
Essentially, the purpose of Interpol is to enable police forces
in the different countries to coordinate their work effectively in the
double aim of law enforcement and crime prevention.
Interpol is not an enforcement body, nor is it an investigating body.
It collects, collates, stores and disseminates information on known
international criminals.
It has a staff of 107, of which 12 devote full time to narcotics
matters.
Interpol is hampered in its efforts to assist in the control of nar-
cotics by-
(1) Bad communications between police units in the member
countries ;
(2) Corruption in the police units or on a higher national
level; and
(3) Poor administrative and police control over large parts
of the country such as in Thailand, Laos and Burma.
Another problem is that Interpol does not receive a. great, amount
of intelligence from member countries concerning the smuggling
of narcotics. If a foreign national is arrested for a narcotics offense,
the national police are required to provide Interpol with all of the
information surrounding the case. This is not always done. Until
January 1971 one of the greatest offenders was the United States.
The United States is also currently behind in its dues to Interpol.
The dues were increased in 1969 from $28,500 per year to $48,780.
The United States needed legislative authority to pay the difference-
authority which has not yet been granted.
There have been a number of suggestions made that Interpol could
increase its effectiveness by improving its communications facilities
and by computerizing its operations. The Study mission. discussed this
with Interpol officials at some length. Although it was the considered
opinion of those experts that such improvements would make :Interpol
operations more efficient, they pointed out that there were no funds
available for this : Interpol operates on an annual budget of less than
$1 million and any additional equipment would require an increase in
the annual dues.
It has been suggested that the United States should make money
available to Interpol to introduce these modernization programs. This
could be done but it should be done with caution and in such a way as
to preclude the assumption that the United States is trying to "take
over" Interpol.
The United States should consider ways to improve the communi-
cations capabilities of Interpol and the member countries, either on a
bilateral basis or through the Interpol apparatus.
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Other international organizations
In addition to action in the United Nations and increased coopera-
tion with Interpol, the United States should also consider hutting pres
sure on our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Both are
mutual security treaties and both pledge action against a common foe.
Heroin addiction is an enemy of mankind and all the world's resources
should be mobilized against it.
The United States furnishes approximately $100 million military
assistance to Turkey annually to enable that country to fulfill her
commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
NATO was organized to protect the security of the North Atlantic
area, including the United States. During the 22 years that NATO has
been in existence, the United States has contributed well over $20 bil-
lion to insure its survival. Money is no object when it comes to the de-
fense of the free world. The U.S. defense budget in 1971 will be
approximately $79 billion, plus another $2 billion for military
assistance.
But how well will we have defended America, if we lose a genera-
tion of young Americans to heroin addiction in the process?
Europe depends upon the United States for its security. It should be
willing to do what is necessary to help solve this problem, including
putting pressure on Turkey to take effective action to first control and
then to stop the growing of poppies.
The same situation applies in Southeast Asia. Thailand is a SEATO
partner and Laos and South Vietnam fall under the U.S. security
blanket. They must all be persuaded to join in the battle against heroin
now.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. As of May, 1971, there are an estimated 250,000 heroin addicts
in the United States and an additional 30,000-40,000 addicts among
U.S. troops in Southeast Asia.
2. The problem is how to stop heroin from reaching American
addicts in the United States and in Southeast Asia. Once the
poppy is cut and introduced into illegal channels, the battle to
prevent the end product, heroin, from reaching the addict is
virtually lost.
3. Heroin addiction is essentially an American problem and most
countries view it as such. As a result, there is a great deal of talk
about cooperation with the United States but there is very little
action.
4. There is no sense of urgency on the part of mostgovernments
that action must be taken immediately to stop the illegal produc-
tion of, and traffic in, heroin. U.S. diplomatic personnel must
assign top priority to gaining the full cooperation of host gov-
ernments in attempting to solve the heroin problem.
5. Turkey must stop growing opium poppies if this problem is to
be brought under control. Most of the heroin entering the United
States originates in the poppy fields of Turkey.
6. Prospects for stopping poppy cultivation and the production
of heroin in Southeast Asia in the near future are dim. Ef-
forts must be directed toward stopping the illegal flow of heroin
into South Vietnam. If these efforts fail, the only solution is to
withdraw American servicemen from Southeast Asia. Above
all the U.S. diplomatic community in the several countries must
be aware that their job is to represent United States interests
rather than to appease the host government.
7. The United States can and should exert pressures on the
Governments in Southeast Asia in order to gain their coopera-
tion in the fight against heroin. The survival of Laos and South
Vietnam depend upon continued military and economic assistance
fromthe United States and the ability of Thailand to defend itself
would be seriously weakened if the United States were to discon-
tinue military assistance to that country. While the effectiveness
of threats to cut off military and economic assistance are debata-
ble, there can be no disagreement that because of this assistance
the United States has a right to expect full cooperation from
these countries in efforts to stop illegal traffic in heroin.
8. Corruption plays an important role in the illegal heroin traf-
fic, particularly in Southeast Asia. Governmental and military of-
ficials at all levels are implicated. If graft and corruption are to
be eliminated, some way must be found to take the profit out of
the production and sale of heroin.
(86)
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That the President take personal command of the struggle to
eliminate the illegal international traffic in narcotics, particularly
heroin, and commit the full resources of the country to that battle.
2. That every U.S. department and agency engaged in the con-
duct of foreign policy be instructed to participate in a broad-
based diplomatic offensive to gain the full cooperation of foreign
gvernments in eliminating the illegal traffic in opium and its
derivatives. These instructions should require each U.S. country
team to draw up a comprehensive and specific plan for gaining
greater cooperation from the host government. Such plans should
entail the escalating use of all available political and economic
leverages and each foreign government should be put on notice
that failure to cooperate would prejudice bilateral relations. To
buttress the efforts made abroad, the Department of State should
undertake a concerted campaign to impress on foreign ambassa-
dors in Washington and at the United Nations the seriousness of
the U.S. Government's concern.
3. That the U.S. Government immediately and forcefully
exercise the special leverages it has with the South Vietnamese
and Royal Laotian Governments by virtue of our enormous mili-
tary, economic, and political support of those governments to
gain their cooperation in cracking down on the illegal heroin trade
in their countries and the official corruption that contributes to it.
4. That the U.S. Government underwrite an accelerated research
program to find a nonaddictive substitute for opium, which con-
tinues to have important medicinal applications.
5. That the United States negotiate with other countries to
better control and, where feasible, stop the cultivation of opium
poppies. To help accomplish this, the United States must be pre-
pared to undertake a multimillion-dollar bilateral program to
assist those countries to develop substitute economic activities for
their opium farmers.
6. That the permanent U.S. Representative to the United Na-
tions continue his initiatives to gain greater U.N. participation in
the fight against illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs, emphasiz-
ing efforts to:
(a) gain the strong support of the Secretary General in this
struggle ;
(b) push vigorously to insure adoption of amendments to
the Single Convention which have been proposed by the United
States;
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(c) gain participation by all nations in the U.N. Special
Fund for Drug Abuse Control; and
(d) initiate proposals designed to upgrade the capabilities
of the United Nations Division on Narcotic Drugs and the
International Narcotics Control Board in terms of personnel
and funding. Special emphasis should be placed on the devel-
opment of programs by the U.N. Division on Narcotic Drugs
to provide alternate economic activities for opium farmers.
7. That U.S. military authorities in Southeast Asia undertake
all appropriate policing measures to reduce the flow of heroin to
U.S. troops in South Vietnam, including increasing the surveil-
lance of mail entering South Vietnam through APO channels.
Customs procedures must also be expanded to include inspection
of Thai soldiers entering South Vietnam aboard U.S. military
aircraft.
8. That the Department of Defense improve its capability to
identify military heroin addicts by instituting an extensive pro-
gram of urinalysis; that it provide acute care and detoxification
for all military addicts; and that it provide basic rehabilitation
services for those addicts. That in cases where military rehabilita-
tion efforts prove unsuccessful, the unrehabilitated addict's com-
manding officer should be permitted and required, prior to the
addict's discharge from the military, to civilly commit the addict
to the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration for a period
of 3 years for treatment and rehabilitation. That the Veterans'
Administration in turn contract with civilian multimodality treat-
ment centers at the community level withthe purposes of utilizing
the centers' expertise within the VA hospitals and ultimately turn-
ing the patient over to such centers for reintegration into society.
9. That the United States substantially speed up the withdrawal
of military draftees from South Vietnam. The draftees have
proven far more susceptible to heroin addiction than nondraftees
and are estimated to have an addiction rate of over 15 percent.
10. That the Congress consider legislation which would provide
for preventive detention, in the form of a nonbailable offense, for
those arrested for the illegal possession of, or trafficking in, heroin,
who are not addicted themselves. This legislation should also
consist of a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 20 years upon
conviction with no possibility of parole.
11. That the Congress consider legislation which would ban the
manufacture, distribution, sale, or possession with intent to use,
drug materials for illegal purposes.
12. That the United States consider canceling the passport of
any American known to be engaged in the illegal traffic in heroin.
13. That U.S. customs authorities increase the surveillance of
mail entering the United States through APO channels.
14. That the United States utilize its worldwide intelligence col-
lection apparatus, including the use of satellite photography, to
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39
gather information on all aspects of the illegal production of and
traffic in heroin.
15. That substantial new funds be made available to the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for discretionary expenditure.
16. That the United States consider making additional funds
available to Interpol to improve its operations.
17. That the United States seek greater cooperation from the
Government of Switzerland to identify individuals who utilize
secret Swiss bank accounts to finance the traffic in heroin.
18. That Congress extend an invitation to the Parliament of
Turkey to join in the creation of an interparliamentary group to
consider ways and means of attacking the illegal production and
sale of opium and its derivatives.
19. That the Committee on Foreign Affairs conduct an in-depth
series of hearings to consider the several legislative proposals that
have been made to deal with the illegal international traffic in
narcotics.
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JOURNAL
SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS
TVashington, D.C.March 30 and 31:
Mr. Frank A. Bartimo, Assistant General Counsel Manpower, Re-
serve Affairs, Health and Environment, Department of Defense.
Mr. Kenneth Giannoules, Interpol Bureau, Department of the
Treasury.
Mr. Fred T. Dick, Chief, Saigon Office, Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Andrew C. Tartaglino, Assistant Director for Enforcement,
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
Genera, Switzerland-April 4-5:
United Nations:
Dr. Dale C. Cameron, Chief, Drug Dependence Unit, World Health
Organization."
Mr. S. P. Sotiroff, Officer in Charge, U.N. Division of Narcotic
Drugs.
Mr. Leon Steinig, U.S. Member, International Narcotics Control
Board.
Mr. S. Stepczynski, Deputy Secretary, International Narcotics Con-
trol Board.
Dr. Braenden, Director of U.N. Narcotics Laboratory.
Dr. J. M. Chilov, Chemist from TT.S.S.R., I.T.N. Narcotics Labora-
tory.
Dr. Carl Blood, World Health Organization.
U.S. Mission to the European O#Fce of the United Nations:
Hon. Idar Rimestad (AEP),U.S. Representative.
Mr. Edward J. Gaumond, Counselor for Administration.
Mr. Edward G. Misey, Legal Officer, Control Officer.
Paris, France-April 6:
Mr. Jean Nepote, General Secretary, International Criminal Police
Organization (Interpol) and staff.
Hon. Arthur K. Watson, U.S. Ambassador to France.
Hon. David K. E. Bruce, (AEP), U.S.- Representative, Paris Peace
Talks.
Mr. John Cusack, Chief, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Europe, and staff.
Mr. Marcell Carrere, Chief, French National Narcotics Squad, and
staff.
Mr. Louis F. Janowski, Control Officer, Consular Officer, U.S.
Embassy.
M lfarseilles. France-April 7-9:
Mr. Philip H. Chadbourn, Jr., Consul General.
Mr. Albert Habib, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Marseilles.
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Mr. Anthony J. Morelli, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Stephen M. Swanson, Special Agent, Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Druggs.
Mr. Robert Maattei, Chief, Narcotics Division, Marseilles.
Mr. Francois Goujon; Asst.. Chief, Commission Principal.
Mr. Antoine Comiti, Chief of Narcotics, Marseilles Regional
Services.
M. Henri Arnaud, Member, French Chamber of Deputies.
M. Hubert Louis, Commission Division, Ministry of the Interior.
Mr. Herbert. Moza, Dir. of American Studies, University of Aix,
Aix, France, and selected students.
M. Jean Laporte, Regional Super. Prefect, Marseilles.
Romn,e, Italy-Apu '7 9-10:
Mr. Michael A. Antonelli, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs Italy.
Mr. Wells Stabler, Deputy Chief of Mission,' U.S. Embassy.
Col. David Brown, Defense Attache Office, Control Officer, U.S.
Embassy.
Bishop Paul C. Marcinkus, Vatican Diplomatic Corps.2
Mr. Mario Cozzi, U.S. Customs Liaison Representative, Rome.
Ankara, Turkey-April 10-12:
IIon. William J. Handley, TT.S. Ambassador to Turkey.
Mr. Henry P. Schardt, Political Officers, U.S. Embassy.
Mr. Joseph S. Toner, Dir., U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, Turkey.
Dr. Harry R. Varney, Agricultural Attache (visit to poppyfield in
Afyon).
Mr. Morris Draper, Political Officer, Control Officer.
Mr. Leonard H. Otto, Agricultural Adviser, U.S. AID Mission.
Mr. James W. Spain, Principal Officer, Istanbul.
Mr. John Warner, Special Assistant to the Director, U.S. Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
Mr. Bernard J. Rot.l:lein, Mutual Security Affairs Officer, Control
Officer.
Maj. General Dudley Faver, TTSAF, Commander, Turkish-U.S. Lo-
gistics Command (TUSLOG).
Mr. Robert A. Lincoln, Public Affairs Officer, USIA.
Hon. Kasim Gulek, Presidential Quota Senator.
Hon. Mahmut Vural, Justice Party Senator from Ankara.
Hon. Mustafa Ustundag, Republican Peoples Party Deputy from
Konya.
Hon. Mukadder Oztekin, Republican Peoples Party Deputy from
Adana.
Hon. Ali Ihsan Balim, Justice Party Deputy from Isparta.
Hon. Osman Meric, Under Secretary, Ministry of Interior.
Hon. Oral Karaosmanoglu, Justice Party Senator from Manisa.
Congressman Steele, only.
2 Congressman Murphy only.
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Mr. Altemur Kilic, Press and Publications Director General, Prime
Ministry.
Mr. Ekren Gunay, Assistant General Director, Ministry of
Agriculture.
Mr. Orhan Eralp, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.
Tehran, Iran April 1213:
Hon. Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Ambassador to Iran.
?Mr. Douglas L. Heck, Dep. Chief of Mission.
Mr. Donald R. Toussaint, Political Officer.
Col. Warren Bovee, Chief of Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie.
Mr. Arnold L. Raphel, Political Officer (Narcotics Reporting
Officer), Control Officer.
CWO Danny Boyd, Genmish Narcotics Adviser.
Mr. James P. Cavanaugh, Regular Administrator Specialist, Se-
curity Officer, U.S. Embassy.
Major James J. McGowan, Jr., U.S. Army Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's Office.
General Roohollah Amini, Chief, Narcotics Division, Iranian Gen-
darmerie.
Dr. Amini-Rad, Director General, Narcotics Control Administra-
tion.
Col. Naser Gholi Shirani, Chief, Narcotics Division, National Police.
Dr. Jahanshah Saleh, Iranian Senate.
Mr. Mohammad Saidi, Iranian Senate.
Mr. Hill, Community School, Tehran.
Mrs. Ertehfat, International School, Tehran.
Dr. Morrone, Tehran, American School.
Thailand-April 141--17:
Hon. Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador.
Mr. George S. Newman, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Rey M. Hill, Director, United States Operations Mission,
Agency for International Development.
Ir. William Wanzeck, Chief of Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs.
Mr. Keith S. Shostrom, Chief, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Hong Kong.
Maj. Gen. Louis T. Seith, USAF, Commander, Military Assistance
Command.
Mr. Joseph Jenkins, Agent in Charge, United States Customs
Bureau, Southeast Asia.
Mr. Laurence G. Pickering, Political Officer.
Mr. Michael A. Burns, Political Officer, Control Officer.
Brig Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, Commanding General, Sup-
port Command, Thailand.
Mr. Louis J. Lapham, Political Counselor.
Wever Gim, Consul General, Chiang Mai.
Mr. James Pettit, Bur. of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Chiang
Mai.
Hon. Rajawongse Thongthang Thonghem, Director General, Cus-
toms Department.
H. S. H. Prince Bhisatej Rajani, His Majesty's Hilltribe Project.
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Mr. Chit Posayanonda, former Director General, now Counselor,
to the Bureau of Narcotics.
Police Maj. Gen. Surapol Chulabrahm, Police Department (Border
Patrol Police).
Police Maj. Gen. (M. R.) Nilya Bhanumas, Secretary General, Thai-
land Central Bureau of Narcotics.
Mr. M. R. Chiravadee Kasemsri, Chief, U.N. Division, Department
Technical and Economic Cooperation (participated in U.N. Narcotics
Survey.
Mr. ayom Ratanawichit, Chief, Social Studies & Planning Divi-
sion, Dept. of Public Welfare.
Mr. Nikom Khamnuanmasok, Social Development Branch, Chief,
Social Projects Div., National Economic Development Board.
Visit to Hilltribe Research Center, Chiang Mai University.
Visit to Border Patrol Police Hilltribe Handicraft Center.
Flyover Mae Kong Soon poppy-growing area.
Also participated in a Staff Conference on Control of Drug Abuse
and Traffic with representatives from IJ.S. Mission in Southeast Asia.
Saigon-April 17-19:
Hon. Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador, South Vietnam.
Mr. Samuel D. Berger, Deputy Ambassador.
Mr. John E. McGowan, Special Assistant.
Mr. Terrence G. Grant, Political/Military Affairs Officer, Control
Officer.
Mr. Stephen Winship, Political/Military Affairs Officer.
Lt. Gen. William J. McCaffrey, Dep. Commanding General, U.S.
Army, Vietnam.
Lt. Gen. Michael Davison, Commanding General, II Field Forces,
Vietnam (II FFV).
Col. George Webb, Deputy Chief of Staff II FFV.
Col. James H. Hyndman, Provost Marshal General II FFV.
Lt. Col. Frank H. Chamberlin, Surgeon General, II FFV.
Specialist John Backoven, Coordinator, Pioneer House.
Sgt. Tim Jaqua, Coordinator, Pioneer House.
Lt. Col. Alfred R. Jefferson, Deputy Provost Marshal, MACV.
Lt. Col. James M. Parrack, Commanding Officer, Joint Narcotics
Investigation Detachment, 8th MP Group (CI), 18th MP Brigade.
Maj. James J. Reilley, Control Officer, Drug Abuse Suppression
Division, Provost Marshal Office MACV.
Maj. Robert Schwartz, Joint customs Section, Security and Inves-
tigations Division, Provost Marshal Office, MACV.
Hong Kong-April 19-t0:
Mr. David L. Osborn, prinicipal officer, U.S. consulate.
Mr. David Dean, International Relations Officer General.
Mr. J. Donald Blevins, Consular Officer, Control Officer.
Mr. Keith S. Shostrom, Chief, Bur. of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Hong Kong.
Cdr. R. L. Vomies, Liaison Officer, 7th Fleet, Hong Kong.
Cdr. R. L. Stanford, Officer in Charge, Commander, U.S. Naval
Forces Phil. Det. Hong Kong.
Mr. Wayne Crawford, Resident Agent, Naval Investigative Serv-
ices.
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Mr. Vincent E. Durant, U.S. Customs, Foreign Liaison Officer,
Hong Kong (TDY).
Tokyo-April 21-22:
Hon. Armin H. Meyer, U.S. Ambassador, Japan.
Mr. Lester E. Edmond, Economic/Commercial Officer.
Mr. Ronald A. Gaiduk, Consular Officer, Control Officer.
Mr. Rustam Aruslan, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
Tokyo.
Mr. William J. Cunningham, Political Officer.
Mr. Thomas C. Stave, Economic/Commercial Officer.
Mr. Segoro Usukura, Police Superintendent and Chief of Second
Vice Section,, Tokyo -Metropolitan Police Dept.
Mr. Hiromasa Sato, Chief of Narcotics, Second Section, Ministry of
Health, and Welfare; Briefing by Office of Special Investigations,
US 1 Air Force, Naval Investigation Service Office, and Criminal In-
vestigation Detachment, US Army, Japan.
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APPENDIX
NOTE OF PRESENTATION (TRANSMITTAL SHEET TO LAO NATIONAL
ASSEM-
BLY) CONCERNING TILE DRAFT LAW ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
GROWING OF THE POPPY, OF TILE DLtNUF ACTURE, CONSUMPTION, SALE,
PURCHASE, AND POSSESSION OF OPIUM
Importance of the opium problem is manifest equally from the domestic and
the international point of view. On the domestic side, the economic aspect of the
problem is tied to its political aspect by the fact that the culture of the opium
poppy constitutes the principle source of revenue of our ethnic minorities.
However, it would be useless in the present state of affairs to think that we
would be able to avoid international control of drugs. The idea of considering
opium as an important source of revenue is best rejected.
Traffic in drugs in Laos was formerly an administrative offense governed by
the Decree of Haussaire (High Commissioner] No. 247/3101 of 3 September 1948
which is no longer in effect.
The Royal Government, by letter No. 2595/PC/AG of December 10, 1958
addressed to the Ministry of Finance gave its agreement to the principle of the
complete revision of their legislation concerning drugs to replace the Decree of
3 September 1948 of the High Commissioner of France in Indochina, regarding
the establishment of the opium regulation.
Such is the draft text prepared by our experts and followed by an explanation
of the rationale attached to this note.
In view of the events which continuously preoccupy us it would be appropriate
to develop a clear policy concerning the campaign against illicit traffic in drugs. It
is recalled that in 1963 the Royal Government decided to withdraw the member-
ship of Laos in the Single Convention of 1961 regarding drugs.
DRAFT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION CONCERNING THE PROHIBITION OF THE CULTI-
VATION OF THE POPPY, OF THE MANUFACTURE AND CONSUMPTION, SALE AND
PURCHASE OF OPIUM
Article 1.-For a period of five years following the publication of this law
the mountain dwelling population who traditionally devote themselves to the
cultivation of the opium poppy may only continue to consume the opium which
they produce.
Authorization to grow and consume may be granted by provincial governors
only to men over thirty years of age.
The area of land to be cultivated will be determined in relation to the needs
of the person requesting it by a provincial consultative commission chaired by
the provincial governor and including a representative of the Ministry of National
Education. This area will be reduced each year so that at the expiration of the
five year period indicated above no authorization to cultivate the poppy and to
consume the opium which may be drawn from it will be granted.
Article 2.-With the exception of the specific cases covered by the preceding
Article, the culture of the opium poppy, the manufacture, possession, consumption
and the vending of opium are forbidden throughout the territory of the Kingdom.
The sale and purchase of opium are forbidden to all persons including those
exceptionally authorized to cultivate the opium poppy and who may consume
only the product of their cultivation.
Article, 3.-With the exception of medicinal products containing opium or such
products intended for the manufacture of medicines which remain subject to
regulations regarding the sale, conditions and use of poisonous substances, im-
portation, even with the intention of reexportation, transit, storage and trans-
shipment of opium are prohibited.
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Article 1.-Any person who shall cultivate the poppy or Shall consume opium
without the authorization specified in Article 1 or who shall not respect the limits
of such authorization as he shall have revolved, shall be punished by it tine from
5,000 to 200,000 kip and by iaaprIsomneut of three months to three years, or by
one of these two penalties only.
In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine shall be applied.
,l)ti-clc 5.-Any person will he punished by it fine from 5,000 to 10,000 kip and
by imprisonment: front six months to five years or one of these two penalties only,
who ,hall have
1. Manufactured opium outside of the special cases covered in Article 1
2. 'transported or possessed or given opium either freely or for payment, or
who will have bought or received free;
3. Forged, false authorization to cultivate or to consume or who will have
falsified authorization granted by provincial governors by the substitution of
names, of photographs, or by false notification or false declarations of civil
status;
4. Participate In the preparation and the introduction into circulation of false
authorization or falsified authorization;
5. Sale of an authorization or who will have given such authorization free;
6. Bought au authorization or will have received it free ;
7. Who will have obtained or tried to obtain urore than one authorization;
8. Who will have iaaported opium, stocked it, had it transshipped, or had it
transited in Laos territory.
Further in the cases covered by sections 5, 6 and 7, the authorization will he
withdrawn.
In case of repetition of the offense, the maximum fine will he applied.
Article 6.-Any keeper of an opium smoking den will be punished by a fine
from 10,0(8) to 1 million kip and be imprisoned from six months to five years or
by one of these two penalties only.
In case of repetition of the offense the maximum fine will be applied.
Article 7.-Infractions covered by this law will be prosecuted by the Depart-
ment of the Public Prosecutor.
In every case opium seized will be confiscated and destroyed. Means of trans-
portation will be seized an(] sold on behalf of the state if it is established that
their owners are the perpetrators of the infraction, prosecutors or accomplices
of such perpetrators.
Materiels, furniture and special objects such as beds, sofas, lamps, pipes,
etc. . . . found in the possession of keepers of opium dens will be seized, con-
fiscated and destroyed.
Opium found abandoned in Lao territory will be seized and destroyed on de-
mand of the Public Prosecutor.
Article 8.-All previous dispositions contrary to the present law are annulled.
Certified that the present text is adopted by the National Assembly at its meet-
ing of --------------
TILE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
O
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